Sand: Monitoring and management for a sustainable future 2 March 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 February 2021 Online

In partnership with the Global Sand Observatory Initiative, this event outlines the sand challenge, what actions are currently underway to address it, and what else needs to be done.

Please complete your registration on Zoom:

After water, sand is the raw material that the world consumes in the greatest quantity. It is no exaggeration to say that fine sand and coarser materials – the medium-to-coarse-grained pebbles, gravel and rock fragments used in construction – are the building blocks of the modern world.

When bound with cement, sand becomes concrete; when mixed with bitumen, it becomes asphalt; and when heated, it becomes glass. Without sand, we would have no highways, high-rises or high-speed trains. Yet sand – which is used here as shorthand for sand, gravel and crushed rock together – is a resource that is both abundant and finite.

In global terms, it is abundant, especially when compared with many other raw materials, albeit often not available close to where it is needed. It is finite in that the rate at which we are using it far exceeds the natural rate at which it is being replenished by the weathering of rocks by wind and water.

Industrialization, population growth and urbanization have fuelled explosive growth in the demand for sand. Precise data on sand extraction are hard to come by and the lack of data compounds the challenge of managing the resource sustainably.

However, the UN estimates that overall extraction could be in the region of 40 billion tonnes per year, driven primarily by construction sector demand. That equates to 18 kilograms of sand each day for every person on the planet and signals how strategically important these resources are for future sustainable development. Post-COVID-19 recovery investment in infrastructure, digital technologies, tourism and other economic activities are dependent on sand resources.

Current efforts to improve the management of sand resources at local, national and global levels are uneven. This is partly due to unique geological features and geography, but also differences in local manifestations of the ‘sand challenge’, national and regional demand for sand resources, as well as capacities to enforce or implement best practice assessment procedures, extractive practices, environmental management and restoration requirements.

We must put stronger conditions in place for a rapid, just and scaled transition to sustainable sand management. But where to focus our efforts for the greatest positive impact?

Youth voices on climate action 22 April 2021 — 12:30PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 March 2021 Online

To celebrate Earth Day, youth activists, local change-makers, innovators and entrepreneurs discuss opportunities and challenges for youth-led climate activism.

Young people will bear the brunt of the intensifying impacts of climate change over time. Facing this challenge, youth around the world have emerged at the forefront of climate activism at an unprecedented scale.

School strikes, marches, and declarations complement youth engagement in diplomacy, technology, science, and law. Providing a platform for young people involved in climate action at the local, national and global levels is essential to promote collaboration, generate new policy ideas, and demand accountability from political and business leaders.

Panellists engage in critical conversation about COP26; global leadership in climate mitigation, adaptation, and finance; and how to develop the full potential of youth-led global initiatives going forward.

COVID-19 and food security in southern Africa 16 July 2021 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online

This event aims to take a deeper look at the interlinking issues of food security, nutrition, climate change and food systems in southern Africa.

Developing climate smart agri-food systems in sub-Saharan Africa is a precondition for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Over the years household food security has been affected by different shocks including climate change and the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

The impact on rural households in southern Africa, in particular, has been significant due to the structure of food systems in the region.

This event aims to take a deeper look at the interlinking issues of food security, nutrition, climate change and food systems in southern Africa and consider how practitioners and policymakers can build more equitable, resilient and better food systems. 

A deep dive into loss and damage solutions 8 February 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 January 2022 Online

This second event of our loss and damage series cuts through polarized debate by bringing together international experts to discuss innovative legal and financial approaches.

This event will focus on a deep dive into constructive solutions and progress made to address loss and damage.

Following the first event of this two-part series, ‘Loss and Damage – where are we now and what happens next’, this event focuses on a deep dive into constructive solutions and progress made to address loss and damage.

Loss and damage refers to harms and destruction caused by climate change impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation or adaptation. While it has gained increasing recognition in international climate change negotiations, turning the concept of loss and damage into tangible action for climate-vulnerable countries has been contentious.

Loss and damage is interwoven with issues of fairness and equity. The issue is highly disputed due to its connection with the historical responsibility of developed countries in causing climate change, as well as associated calls for compensation from developing countries.

At COP26, Scotland became the first government to pledge funds for loss and damage for countries in the Global South. However, most climate-vulnerable countries left disappointed by the failure of the Glasgow Climate Pact to secure the establishment of a dedicated loss and damage financing facility.

Developing countries have made it clear that they will continue to push for a new financing facility in the Glasgow Dialogue, a set of international discussions on loss and damage kicking off in June. The Environment and Society Discussion Series is hosting two events on loss and damage ahead of that date.

This second event convenes a deep dive into the progress and potential on loss and damage solutions, while also examining the hurdles that are still to overcome to make loss and damage support a reality.

Feminist solutions to the climate crisis 8 March 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 March 2022 Online

This International Women’s Day panel explores intersectional feminist approaches to solving the climate crisis.

Gender inequality and climate change are closely intertwined. Due to their different and unequal social roles and status, women, girls and people of marginalised genders are disproportionately affected by climate change impacts, also differentiated by factors such as age, race, ability and location.

They are also leading innovative solutions to climate change at all levels, especially in frontline communities. Yet as the Glasgow Women’s Leadership statement highlighted at COP26, there is still a lack of momentum for prioritising their knowledge, tools and leadership in climate policy and action.  

This panel considers what feminist approaches can bring to climate change communication and movement building, spotlighting a range of local and regional gender-responsive climate initiatives. It also discusses concrete examples of feminist and gender-responsive policies to address climate change, such as the Feminist Green New Deal.

The panel highlights the critically important work being carried out by diverse feminist activists and researchers, and how the audience can centre gender and social equality in their work on climate change.  

Duterte’s Victory Is Cry for Help From Those Left Behind in Philippines Expert comment sysadmin 12 May 2016

But large support for mainstream parties and a mature democratic system should keep the country from slipping back towards authoritarianism.

The victory of political outsider Rodrigo Duterte in the 2016 Philippines’ elections is proof that a significant minority of the country’s population feels left behind by its recent economic success and estranged from its political elite. However the results of the elections as a whole suggest that most voters opted for a continuation of the current government’s policies.

Duterte looks almost certain to be inaugurated as the next president of the Philippines on 30 June. The country’s presidential voting system – a single round, first-past-the-post election – delivered victory to a populist outsider with 39 per cent support. Two candidates advocating a continuation of the current government’s policies − the Liberal Party’s Mar Roxas and independent Grace Poe − polled a combined 45 per cent. The long-standing factionalism within Philippines elite politics split the ‘anti-Duterte’ vote.

Changing the conversation

The contrast between Duterte and Roxas could hardly be greater. Mar Roxas is the grandson of the first president of an independent Philippines, a graduate of Wharton Business School and a former investment banker in the US. Rodrigo Duterte is a political outsider with an electoral base geographically almost as far from Manila as is possible to get in the Philippines: the city of Davao on the island of Mindanao.

The story of Duterte’s victory is the story of how ‘Duterte managed to change the national conversation from poverty towards crime and corruption,’ says Marites Vitug, editor-at-large of one of the Philippines’ most popular online news sites, Rappler. In January, Duterte was running fourth in opinion polls but a strategy that positioned him as the only opponent to the Manila elite gave him victory. This is the first time a provincial official has made it to the top job.

The headline figures tell us that the Philippines’ economy has done very well under President Benigno Aquino. Between 2010 and 2014, growth averaged 6.3 per cent per year. That fell to a still-impressive 5.8 per cent last year but is expected to pick up this year and next, according to the Asian Development Bank. Growth in agriculture, however, is significantly slower and rural areas feel left behind. While economic growth is benefiting the majority, inequality is worsening and resentment rising in poor villages. The contrast between the metropolitan sophistication of the Makati district in Manila and life in faraway provinces such as Duterte’s Mindanao is widening.

Ironically the Philippines’ economic success is a part of the explanation for the defeat of the ‘mainstream’ presidential candidates. Crime and corruption may have become more important issues simply because more voters have become better off and therefore more likely to be concerned about crime and corruption than before. It’s also undeniable that Duterte has a record for getting things done. Human rights groups rightly criticize his (at best) tolerance of the extra-judicial killing of alleged criminals but his repeated re-election as mayor demonstrates that many citizens are prepared to accept that in exchange for improved personal security. A surprising number of Manila residents have actually moved to Davao because of its better quality of life.

Traditional power bases

However, the results as a whole suggest a narrow majority in favour of current policies. In the vice-presidential race, the Liberal Party candidate Leni Robredo is narrowly ahead of Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, the son of the eponymous former president. Like Duterte she is regarded as a successful mayor of a well-run city, Albay. Duterte’s running mate Alan Cayetano received just 14 per cent of the vote.

In the senate election, Liberals won five of the 12 seats being contested, with a party- backed independent winning a sixth. The opposition, even with boxing champion and national idol Manny Pacquiao running for the United Nationalist Alliance, won four.

Taken as a whole, the results show the enduring nature of traditional Philippines power bases. The country’s many islands and distinct linguistic and cultural regions are virtual fiefs in which families and big bosses can wield almost total power through control of local authorities, businesses, the courts and security forces.

Threat to democracy?

It’s easy to forget that the election of Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 was originally welcomed as a challenge to the traditional elites of Philippine politics. The same accolades are currently greeting Duterte. Could they presage a return to the Philippines’ bad old days?

This seems less likely. Philippine democracy has matured considerably since Marcos declared martial law in 1972. There is a substantial, and vocal, middle class with experience of mobilizing against ‘bad’ presidents. There will also be pressures from international investors and the Philippines’ treaty ally, the United States, for better governance.

The Philippines will chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations next year. That will put Duterte in the international spotlight as host of several international meetings – including the East Asia Summit attended by, among others, the presidents of China, Russia and the US. Since his victory Duterte has promised to act with decorum in office and declared that his election campaign antics were just a ploy to attract attention. Some leaders in Southeast Asia will use his victory to buttress their arguments against allowing their people to freely vote. It’s up to Duterte to decide whether he wants to be an advertisement for – or an argument against – democracy.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Populism Comes to South Korea Expert comment sysadmin 20 December 2016

Public disgust with the embattled president reflects not only the unedifying details of her impeachment but a wider distrust of the political system.

For South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye, the jury is quite literally still out. Impeached by the country’s National Assembly on 9 December over claims of corruption, cronyism and influence peddling, she defiantly rejected – in a detailed statement – all of the charges levelled at her by an independent prosecutor. Any resolution of the issue must now await the ruling of the country’s Constitutional Court on the legitimacy of the impeachment vote – a decision that most likely will come early in the new year.

For the special prosecutor’s office, which is due to start its formal investigation on 21 December, the challenge is to find unambiguous evidence of the president’s direct responsibility for any of the corruption that may have taken place. The president, for her part, can claim, with some credibility that so far she has been tried only in the court of public opinion; that in South Korea’s rumour-prone, scandal-hungry media environment in which prosecutors have been known in the past to leak information to skew public debate, she has been denied natural justice and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

Long shadows

But for the more than three-quarters of the Korean public calling for Park’s resignation, the president is symptomatic of Korean society’s wider flaws, including a pattern of corruption, privilege and hypocrisy endemic to the country’s political, economic and social elites. At a time of anemic economic growth (the country’s growth rate is predicted to slow to 2.1% next year), widening wealth and income disparities and reduced employment opportunities for a highly educated workforce, there is a growing mood of populist disaffection with the entire social and political system – for its lack of fairness and transparency and its perceived regulatory inefficiencies. This has been highlighted dramatically by disasters such as the Sewol ferry sinking that claimed the lives of some 300 school-children in August 2014 – at which time the president was castigated for being absent from her office at the time of a grave national crisis.

Complicating the current stand-off is the long-shadow of identity politics and unresolved disagreements about the country’s postwar historical narrative. As the daughter of the man responsible for the Korean economic ‘miracle’ who protected the country from the external communist threat in the North and radical subversion from within, Park’s political lineage is, for the older generation of voters in their sixties and above, a powerful reason to back the beleaguered president.

Already there are signs that this constituency is beginning to rally behind Park, with 30,000 demonstrating on 17 December against the impeachment decision, and with the governing Saenuri party showing signs of a consolidation of power around pro-Park legislators. The president, who has a reputation for stubbornness, may be calculating that this core support may allow her to defy the much larger calls for her resignation. She may also be hoping that the constitutional court, in which the majority of justices are politically conservative, will rule in her favour, allowing her to see out the remainder of her time in office, set to end in February 2018.

A pro-Park ruling by the court seems unlikely given the weight of the circumstantial evidence. Leading opposition politicians, including Moon Jae-in, former head of the Democratic Party and the current front runner in any post-impeachment presidential contest, has warned of a popular ‘revolution’ if the impeachment vote is not upheld. Moreover, the appetite for street protests against the president remains undimmed, and even conservative politicians appear to be positioning themselves for a post-Park era. Ban Ki-moon, the outgoing UN secretary general and long considered a likely Saenuri party candidate for the presidency, has been publicly distancing himself from Park. With 20.5% support, behind Moon on 23.7%, he has compelling reasons to align himself with the popular mood.

Lessons

At an individual level, the experience of President Park combines both political failure and personal tragedy. She has demonstrably failed to live up to her early commitments to represent all Koreans and to bridge the deep divisions between left and right in Korean society. She has also remained deeply isolated from the professional politicians and democratic polity she purports to lead. This is perhaps not so surprising given her authoritarian heritage and the experience of seeing both her parents assassinated in space of five years in the 1970s. The trauma of this experience reportedly made her distrustful of government officials and overly inclined to rely on the guidance of personal friends of dubious reliability, the font of her current troubles. There is also a profound irony that a politician who came to power vowing to place ‘trust-politik’ at the heart of her policy towards North Korea has seen her political position undermined, perhaps fatally, by a near complete collapse in public confidence in her administration.

More widely, the Park saga reveals an important and potentially seismic shift in public attitudes in South Korea, perhaps spurred by a growing populist trend evident elsewhere, whether in the US, Europe or parts of Southeast Asia. Koreans appear to have lost patience with their political system. This new climate of dissent – emboldened by the signs that protest can potentially lead to radical political change – is likely to prove a challenge to any future Korean leader hoping to secure the trust and legitimacy needed to govern.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

What to Know About Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Election Expert comment sysadmin 27 March 2017

Tim Summers looks at what we know about Carrie Lam, the territory’s new leader, and where Hong Kong politics goes from here.

Carrie Lam, formerly number two in the Hong Kong government, was selected as the Special Administrative Region’s new chief executive on 26 March. What does the process and her selection say about Hong Kong’s political future?

1. Elections for Hong Kong’s top job are still within Beijing’s control. Due to the failure of political reform proposals in 2015, Lam was elected on the basis of 777 votes from the 1,194 members of the Chief Executive Election Committee. This ‘small-circle’ process was essentially the same as that used since 1997 (the only change being the expansion of the committee from its initial size of 800). The design of the process favours Beijing, and indeed Lam was the favoured candidate of the central government and many of its supporters in Hong Kong.
2. But the influence of the central government has limits. The second-ranked candidate, former finance minister John Tsang (365 votes), had not been encouraged to stand by Beijing, and a fourth candidate, Regina Ip (who did not obtain enough nominations to join the vote), reportedly also rejected suggestions from Beijing that she should not put herself forward. The Committee itself contained 325 individuals affiliated to or sympathetic to opposition parties and around 100 establishment figures who did not support Lam – most of whom voted for Tsang. Although Lam gained more votes than her predecessor, CY Leung, in 2012 (he obtained 689 votes after a controversial campaign when scandals undermined his main opponent), Beijing appears to have expended substantial political capital in securing her victory.
3. Despite the closed process, public opinion matters. The campaign saw all the candidates actively seek not only the votes of committee members, but also wider popular support. This highlights the need for broader legitimacy, and the fact that public participation and media debate are central factors in Hong Kong’s open political culture. A number of opinion polls showed Lam to have notably lower levels of popular support than Tsang. This will constrain her ability to govern effectively and she will not be cut much slack by the Hong Kong population. There were protests at the election venue calling for ‘genuine universal suffrage’.
4. The new chief executive is an economic interventionist. The two main candidates – Lam and Tsang – have different policy approaches. Tsang’s was a more liberal ‘laissez faire’ one. Lam is likely to continue the somewhat more interventionist approach of CY Leung, who intervened more than previous governments to try to stabilize property prices and make more land available for housing, as well as reinstating policies targeting poverty and agreeing measures to limit the social impact of rising numbers of visitors and money from mainland China.
5. Political reform seems very far off. The third candidate, former judge Woo Kwok-hing, had the clearest position on the thorny issue of political reform. Many of the government’s critics see less prospect for progress here under Lam, who fronted the government’s consultation processes during the 2013–15 debates over political reform. Lam gave some conflicting signals during the campaign, and it remains to be seen whether she tries to restart the process. But given rising populism, the growing fragmentation and polarization of Hong Kong politics, and entrenched positions from both Beijing and the opposition, it will be even more difficult to obtain consensus on a way forward than when the last failed attempt at reform took place – a key indicator will be whether all political parties are willing to discuss compromises.
6. July’s anniversary will be contentious. Following formal appointment by the central government, Lam’s term will begin on 1 July. This will also mark the 20th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, which will coincide with a planned visit by President Xi Jinping. This will no doubt spark protests; for many, the 20th anniversary of the handover will therefore be less a time for celebration than an opportunity for many to highlight concerns about the future of the former British colony.

The Hard Truth Is Rohingya Refugees Are Not Going Home Expert comment sysadmin 6 October 2017

The only likely outcome of the crisis is the near-permanent presence of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya along the Bangladesh border.

The harrowing scenes of human suffering on the Myanmar–Bangladesh border have provoked outpourings of sympathy and some firm statements by international politicians. At least half a million people have been brutally expelled from their homes and are now living in miserable conditions in muddy refugee camps and storm-drenched shanty towns. As the international community debates how to respond, it needs to take a clear-eyed view of the situation and recognise a brutal truth: the refugees are almost certainly not going home.

Consequently, policymakers must not hide behind the fiction that Bangladesh is only temporarily hosting the refugees in preparation for their rapid return home. Over-optimistic assumptions now will lead to worse misery in the long term. Instead, the world needs to plan on the basis that Bangladesh will be hosting a very large and permanent refugee population.

The expulsion of the Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State in northwestern Myanmar is the culmination of decades of discriminatory policies enacted by the country’s military rulers since 1962. In 1978, the Burmese military’s ‘Operation Dragon King’ pushed 200,000 Muslims into Bangladesh. International pressure forced the military to allow most of them to return. Then, in 1991–92, the military again expelled a quarter of a million people. Bangladesh forced some of them back over the border and eventually the military agreed to allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to manage the repatriation of most of the remainder.

State-sponsored abuses of the Rohingya and ethnic violence perpetrated against them by chauvinists among the ethnic Rakhine population have continued. The abuse became dramatically worse in 2012 when tens of thousands of Rohingya were forced to flee their homes, although most remained inside the country. This year, armed attacks by self-proclaimed defenders of the Rohingya, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, gave the military an excuse to mount what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’.

It is tempting to believe that, as before, the Myanmar government will allow the expelled Rohingya to return after international pressure. However, recent geopolitical developments in southeast Asia and the election of a democratic government in Myanmar in 2015 make this much less likely.

Southeast Asia is now an arena of geopolitical competition between China and its rivals: mainly the United States, India and Japan. All are battling for influence. Both China and India have made public statements of support for Myanmar’s government in the current crisis. In that context, diplomatic pressure or economic sanctions imposed by Europe or the United States will only have one effect – to push Myanmar towards China.

Moreover, those in the EU and US who want to see democracy survive in Myanmar will be unwilling to push the elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi too far. There is an extraordinary degree of hostility towards the Rohingya among the majority Bamar population. This has broken out into street violence on occasions but even where the situation is calm, anti-Muslim prejudice is easily awoken. The current government is very unlikely to challenge such sentiments at a time when it is trying to preserve its position against the military’s continuing domination of political and economic life.

Myanmar is one of the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations but ASEAN is unlikely to impose any meaningful pressure. Only Malaysia has been publicly critical of Myanmar’s government. Indonesia has attempted to mediate – its foreign minister Retno Marsudi has held face-to-face meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi – but without apparent effect. Both countries have sent aid and volunteers to the Rohingya refugee camps but there is absolutely no talk of sanctions or other overt pressure.

The question then is: what will happen to the refugees? One option could be resettlement, but neither Bangladesh nor any of the other states in the region are willing to take them in. Malaysia already hosts 60,000 registered Rohingya refugees and probably another 150,000 unregistered ones. Unknown thousands of Rohingya have fled to Thailand and Indonesia by boat but have often fallen victim to unscrupulous human traffickers in cahoots with local officials. Thailand has already said it will refuse to allow new ‘boat people’ to land.

The only likely outcome therefore is the near-permanent presence of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya along the Bangladesh border. Delaying preparations for a permanent refugee population in the hope that they will be allowed to re-cross the border back into Myanmar will only make the situation worse. Seventy years ago, another ‘temporary’ movement of people into refugee camps created decades of instability around the Middle East. The world must remember the Palestinians as it plans for the future of the Rohingya.

Putting the Hong Kong Crisis into Historical and Comparative Perspective 14 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

This roundtable will focus on current events unfolding in Hong Kong, where the territory has been convulsed with protests for several months.

The speakers will examine how class, race and poverty play into the conflict. Taking a comparative approach, they will examine the generational divide, looking at the ideological gulf between the older, more conservative and pro-Beijing population versus the younger, more pro-democracy protesters. The discussion will also draw upon the erosion of trust between police and the wider public.

While acknowledging the unique features of this wave of unrest, the speakers will draw parallels, placing the current crisis in Hong Kong beside events that have occurred in other periods and other places.

Parallels to be explored include those with Shanghai struggles of the 1910s through 1980s and upheavals and crackdowns in the former Soviet bloc during the Cold War.

Is Myanmar Running Out of Time? 17 February 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Just a few years ago the West was celebrating what appeared to be the conclusion of a quarter-century long contest between Myanmar’s democrats and a military dictatorship. Today, the country stands charged with genocide at the International Court of Justice, with Aung San Suu Kyi leading the defence. Is Myanmar a democratic transition gone awry? Or something else entirely?

The speaker will argue that Myanmar is not the simple morality tale often portrayed. It has instead become the stage for some of the world’s most pressing challenges such as climate change, explosive inequality and rising populism, the impact of social media; and the rise of China as the next global superpower.

In this context, are 20th century democratic institutions and free-market reforms the correct remedy for a country plagued by the legacies of colonialism, decades of civil war, tyranny and a predatory economic system? The speaker will offer a prognosis for Myanmar’s future, assessing the question of whether it will become Asia’s next failed state.

This event will be held off the record.

Future of work

Innovation, technology and societal shifts are all changing the world of work, and it is necessary to rethink the rules that govern labour markets and skills.

Advances in automation, digitization, ICT and manufacturing represent enormous opportunities for employers and employees, but also require policymakers and businesses to navigate critical challenges.

Issues under scrutiny include disruption to existing jobs and industries, skills development, how to maintain economic competitiveness and - in the long-term - adapting to systemic and societal changes already in progress.

Core factors in developing the most effective regulatory regimes for managing this shift include the growth of global workplaces and workforces that transcend national borders, and the drivers and policy implications of the emerging ‘on-demand’ and ‘gig’ economies.

Zhaohui Fu, Tao Tang and Jiang Yang
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2745-2767.
Abstract, references and article information

Karen Rios Soto explains how mathematics illuminates the link between air pollution from motor vehicle emissions and asthma. Air pollution causes the premature deaths of an estimated seven million people each year, and it makes life worse for all of us. People with asthma can experience chest tightness, coughing or wheezing, and difficulty breathing when triggered by air pollution. One major source is gas- and diesel-powered cars and trucks, which emit "ultrafine" particles less than 0.1 micrometers across. That's about the width of the virus that causes COVID-19, so tiny that these particles are not currently regulated by the US Environmental Protection Agency. Yet ultrafine particles can easily enter your lungs and be absorbed into your bloodstream, causing health issues such as an asthma attack or even neurodegenerative diseases. Mathematics can help us understand the extent of the problem and how to solve it.

Víctor González-Aguilera, Alvaro Liendo, Pedro Montero and Roberto Villaflor Loyola
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5483-5511.
Abstract, references and article information

Bero Roos
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 137-151.
Abstract, references and article information

Lutz Mattner
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 45-122.
Abstract, references and article information

Chris A.J. Klaassen
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 9-19.
Abstract, references and article information

Shengyu Tang
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5381-5394.
Abstract, references and article information

Anh Tuan Nguyen, Tómas Caraballo and Nguyen Huy Tuan
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5175-5189.
Abstract, references and article information

P. Lochak
St. Petersburg Math. J. 35 (), 477-535.
Abstract, references and article information

E. Voronetsky
St. Petersburg Math. J. 35 (), 433-443.
Abstract, references and article information

Alin Bostan, Xavier Caruso and Julien Roques
Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 61 (), 609-658.
Abstract, references and article information

Family, friends, and community members gathered on Saturday at the Falmouth First Assembly Church to celebrate the life of 15-year-old Jahmarie Reid, a William Knibb High student who tragically lost his life at sea on August 27 in what is believed...

Health Minister Dr Christopher Tufton is warning about the possible dangers to the health of students caused by vaping. "We have seen cases where students have been rushed to the A...

Carnosine (β-alanyl-l-histidine) and anserine (β-alanyl-3-methyl-l-histidine) are abundant peptides in the nervous system and skeletal muscle of many vertebrates. Many in vitro and in vivo studies demonstrated that exogenously added carnosine can improve muscle contraction, has antioxidant activity, and can quench various reactive aldehydes. Some of these functions likely contribute to the proposed anti-aging activity of carnosine. However, the physiological role of carnosine and related histidine-containing dipeptides (HCDs) is not clear. In this study, we generated a mouse line deficient in carnosine synthase (Carns1). HCDs were undetectable in the primary olfactory system and skeletal muscle of Carns1-deficient mice. Skeletal muscle contraction in these mice, however, was unaltered, and there was no evidence for reduced pH-buffering capacity in the skeletal muscle. Olfactory tests did not reveal any deterioration in 8-month-old mice lacking carnosine. In contrast, aging (18–24-month-old) Carns1-deficient mice exhibited olfactory sensitivity impairments that correlated with an age-dependent reduction in the number of olfactory receptor neurons. Whereas we found no evidence for elevated levels of lipoxidation and glycation end products in the primary olfactory system, protein carbonylation was increased in the olfactory bulb of aged Carns1-deficient mice. Taken together, these results suggest that carnosine in the olfactory system is not essential for information processing in the olfactory signaling pathway but does have a role in the long-term protection of olfactory receptor neurons, possibly through its antioxidant activity.

High-throughput sequencing of hematologic malignancies and other cancers has revealed recurrent mis-sense mutations of genes encoding pre-mRNA splicing factors. The essential splicing factor U2AF2 recognizes a polypyrimidine-tract splice-site signal and initiates spliceosome assembly. Here, we investigate representative, acquired U2AF2 mutations, namely N196K or G301D amino acid substitutions associated with leukemia or solid tumors, respectively. We determined crystal structures of the wild-type (WT) compared with N196K- or G301D-substituted U2AF2 proteins, each bound to a prototypical AdML polypyrimidine tract, at 1.5, 1.4, or 1.7 Å resolutions. The N196K residue appears to stabilize the open conformation of U2AF2 with an inter-RNA recognition motif hydrogen bond, in agreement with an increased apparent RNA-binding affinity of the N196K-substituted protein. The G301D residue remains in a similar position as the WT residue, where unfavorable proximity to the RNA phosphodiester could explain the decreased RNA-binding affinity of the G301D-substituted protein. We found that expression of the G301D-substituted U2AF2 protein reduces splicing of a minigene transcript carrying prototypical splice sites. We further show that expression of either N196K- or G301D-substituted U2AF2 can subtly alter splicing of representative endogenous transcripts, despite the presence of endogenous, WT U2AF2 such as would be present in cancer cells. Altogether, our results demonstrate that acquired U2AF2 mutations such as N196K and G301D are capable of dysregulating gene expression for neoplastic transformation.

Mammalian Asn-linked glycans are extensively processed as they transit the secretory pathway to generate diverse glycans on cell surface and secreted glycoproteins. Additional modification of the glycan core by α-1,6-fucose addition to the innermost GlcNAc residue (core fucosylation) is catalyzed by an α-1,6-fucosyltransferase (FUT8). The importance of core fucosylation can be seen in the complex pathological phenotypes of FUT8 null mice, which display defects in cellular signaling, development, and subsequent neonatal lethality. Elevated core fucosylation has also been identified in several human cancers. However, the structural basis for FUT8 substrate specificity remains unknown.Here, using various crystal structures of FUT8 in complex with a donor substrate analog, and with four distinct glycan acceptors, we identify the molecular basis for FUT8 specificity and activity. The ordering of three active site loops corresponds to an increased occupancy for bound GDP, suggesting an induced-fit folding of the donor-binding subsite. Structures of the various acceptor complexes were compared with kinetic data on FUT8 active site mutants and with specificity data from a library of glycan acceptors to reveal how binding site complementarity and steric hindrance can tune substrate affinity. The FUT8 structure was also compared with other known fucosyltransferases to identify conserved and divergent structural features for donor and acceptor recognition and catalysis. These data provide insights into the evolution of modular templates for donor and acceptor recognition among GT-B fold glycosyltransferases in the synthesis of diverse glycan structures in biological systems.

Investigations of bacterial resistance strategies can aid in the development of new antimicrobial drugs as a countermeasure to the increasing worldwide prevalence of bacterial antibiotic resistance. One such strategy involves the TipA class of transcription factors, which constitute minimal autoregulated multidrug resistance (MDR) systems against diverse antibiotics. However, we have insufficient information regarding how antibiotic binding induces transcriptional activation to design molecules that could interfere with this process. To learn more, we determined the crystal structure of SkgA from Caulobacter crescentus as a representative TipA protein. We identified an unexpected spatial orientation and location of the antibiotic-binding TipAS effector domain in the apo state. We observed that the α6–α7 region of the TipAS domain, which is canonically responsible for forming the lid of antibiotic-binding cleft to tightly enclose the bound antibiotic, is involved in the dimeric interface and stabilized via interaction with the DNA-binding domain in the apo state. Further structural and biochemical analyses demonstrated that the unliganded TipAS domain sterically hinders promoter DNA binding but undergoes a remarkable conformational shift upon antibiotic binding to release this autoinhibition via a switch of its α6–α7 region. Hence, the promoters for MDR genes including tipA and RNA polymerases become available for transcription, enabling efficient antibiotic resistance. These insights into the molecular mechanism of activation of TipA proteins advance our understanding of TipA proteins, as well as bacterial MDR systems, and may provide important clues to block bacterial resistance.

Chorismate mutase (CM), an essential enzyme at the branch-point of the shikimate pathway, is required for the biosynthesis of phenylalanine and tyrosine in bacteria, archaea, plants, and fungi. MtCM, the CM from Mycobacterium tuberculosis, has less than 1% of the catalytic efficiency of a typical natural CM and requires complex formation with 3-deoxy-d-arabino-heptulosonate 7-phosphate synthase for high activity. To explore the full potential of MtCM for catalyzing its native reaction, we applied diverse iterative cycles of mutagenesis and selection, thereby raising kcat/Km 270-fold to 5 × 105 m−1s−1, which is even higher than for the complex. Moreover, the evolutionarily optimized autonomous MtCM, which had 11 of its 90 amino acids exchanged, was stabilized compared with its progenitor, as indicated by a 9 °C increase in melting temperature. The 1.5 Å crystal structure of the top-evolved MtCM variant reveals the molecular underpinnings of this activity boost. Some acquired residues (e.g. Pro52 and Asp55) are conserved in naturally efficient CMs, but most of them lie beyond the active site. Our evolutionary trajectories reached a plateau at the level of the best natural enzymes, suggesting that we have exhausted the potential of MtCM. Taken together, these findings show that the scaffold of MtCM, which naturally evolved for mediocrity to enable inter-enzyme allosteric regulation of the shikimate pathway, is inherently capable of high activity.

Identification of antibody-binding epitopes is crucial to understand immunological mechanisms. It is of particular interest for allergenic proteins with high cross-reactivity as observed in the lipid transfer protein (LTP) syndrome, which is characterized by severe allergic reactions. Art v 3, a pollen LTP from mugwort, is frequently involved in this cross-reactivity, but no antibody-binding epitopes have been determined so far. To reveal human IgE-binding regions of Art v 3, we produced three murine high-affinity mAbs, which showed 70–90% coverage of the allergenic epitopes from mugwort pollen–allergic patients. As reliable methods to determine structural epitopes with tightly interacting intact antibodies under native conditions are lacking, we developed a straightforward NMR approach termed hydrogen/deuterium exchange memory (HDXMEM). It relies on the slow exchange between the invisible antigen-mAb complex and the free 15N-labeled antigen whose 1H-15N correlations are detected. Due to a memory effect, changes of NH protection during antibody binding are measured. Differences in H/D exchange rates and analyses of mAb reactivity to homologous LTPs revealed three structural epitopes: two partially cross-reactive regions around α-helices 2 and 4 as well as a novel Art v 3–specific epitope at the C terminus. Protein variants with exchanged epitope residues confirmed the antibody-binding sites and revealed strongly reduced IgE reactivity. Using the novel HDXMEM for NMR epitope mapping allowed identification of the first structural epitopes of an allergenic pollen LTP. This knowledge enables improved cross-reactivity prediction for patients suffering from LTP allergy and facilitates design of therapeutics.

Abnormal changes of neuronal Tau protein, such as phosphorylation and aggregation, are considered hallmarks of cognitive deficits in Alzheimer's disease. Abnormal phosphorylation is thought to precede aggregation and therefore to promote aggregation, but the nature and extent of phosphorylation remain ill-defined. Tau contains ∼85 potential phosphorylation sites, which can be phosphorylated by various kinases because the unfolded structure of Tau makes them accessible. However, methodological limitations (e.g. in MS of phosphopeptides, or antibodies against phosphoepitopes) led to conflicting results regarding the extent of Tau phosphorylation in cells. Here we present results from a new approach based on native MS of intact Tau expressed in eukaryotic cells (Sf9). The extent of phosphorylation is heterogeneous, up to ∼20 phosphates per molecule distributed over 51 sites. The medium phosphorylated fraction Pm showed overall occupancies of ∼8 Pi (± 5) with a bell-shaped distribution; the highly phosphorylated fraction Ph had 14 Pi (± 6). The distribution of sites was highly asymmetric (with 71% of all P-sites in the C-terminal half of Tau). All sites were on Ser or Thr residues, but none were on Tyr. Other known posttranslational modifications were near or below our detection limit (e.g. acetylation, ubiquitination). These findings suggest that normal cellular Tau shows a remarkably high extent of phosphorylation, whereas other modifications are nearly absent. This implies that abnormal phosphorylations at certain sites may not affect the extent of phosphorylation significantly and do not represent hyperphosphorylation. By implication, the pathological aggregation of Tau is not likely a consequence of high phosphorylation.

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16 September 2020

Pectins are a major dietary nutrient source for the human gut microbiota. The prominent gut microbe Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron was recently shown to encode the founding member (BT1017) of a new family of pectin methylesterases essential for the metabolism of the complex pectin rhamnogalacturonan-II (RG-II). However, biochemical and structural knowledge of this family is lacking. Here, we showed that BT1017 is critical for the metabolism of an RG-II–derived oligosaccharide ΔBT1017oligoB generated by a BT1017 deletion mutant (ΔBT1017) during growth on carbohydrate extract from apple juice. Structural analyses of ΔBT1017oligoB using a combination of enzymatic, mass spectrometric, and NMR approaches revealed that it is a bimethylated nonaoligosaccharide (GlcA-β1,4-(2-O-Me-Xyl-α1,3)-Fuc-α1,4-(GalA-β1,3)-Rha-α1,3-Api-β1,2-(Araf-α1,3)-(GalA-α1,4)-GalA) containing components of the RG-II backbone and its side chains. We showed that the catalytic module of BT1017 adopts an α/β-hydrolase fold, consisting of a central twisted 10-stranded β-sheet sandwiched by several α-helices. This constitutes a new fold for pectin methylesterases, which are predominantly right-handed β-helical proteins. Bioinformatic analyses revealed that the family is dominated by sequences from prominent genera of the human gut microbiota, including Bacteroides and Prevotella. Our re-sults not only highlight the critical role played by this family of enzymes in pectin metabolism but also provide new insights into the molecular basis of the adaptation of B. thetaiotaomicron to the human gut.