Editors' Note: Hammering out the political deal that has now brought Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations to a successful conclusion was a landmark achievement, but as Mireya Solis argues, there are still battles to be fought. This post originally appeared in Nikkei Asian Review.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal that the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim countries struck in Atlanta today was five years in the making. More than once we heard that the end game had come, only to see deadlines pass us by as the negotiations continued to move at a frustratingly slow pace. The grueling work required to cinch this mega trade deal should not come as a surprise, however, given the sheer complexity of the negotiation agenda and the wide differences in the makeup of the participating countries.

Hammering out the essential political deal that has brought TPP negotiations to a successful conclusion is a landmark achievement. But we should not lose sight of the fact that more battles will need to be won before the TPP morphs from an agreement in principle to an agreement in reality. Success at the Atlanta ministerial, however, delivers immediate and portentous benefits. 

U.S. leadership: A balance between strength and flexibility 

Central to American grand strategy has been updating the international economic architecture to match the realities of 21st-century economy and consolidating the critical role of the United States as a Pacific power as envisioned by the Asian rebalance policy. The TPP has long emerged as a litmus test of the American will and resolve to rise to these challenges in a world of fluid geopolitics. With success at the TPP negotiating table, the convening power of the United States—as demonstrated by its ability to steward the most ambitious blueprint for trade integration—has received an enormous boost. 

But equally important is that in the final TPP deal, the United States has displayed another key trait of international leadership: flexibility. Critics of American trade strategy have frequently complained that the U.S. rigidly pushes for its own free-trade agreement (FTA) template without incorporating the preferences of its counterparts: that de facto, the United States does not “negotiate” in trade negotiations. But the set of final compromises that enabled the TPP deal to be struck at Atlanta shows a different picture, one that in fact makes U.S. leadership more attractive and the TPP project more compelling. 

The TPP project is still a promise, not a reality.

In endorsing the principle that TPP countries can opt out of investor-state dispute settlement in their public regulation of tobacco products, and in adopting a hybrid approach that will give up to eight years of data protection for biologic drugs, the United States has shown the strength to compromise without surrendering high standards. In turn, these negotiated compromises cast a favorable light on the TPP as a collective endeavor with a commonality of purpose among founding members: to ensure that protection of foreign direct investment does not hinder public health regulations; and to both promote innovation and access to medicines.

Reviving trade policy 

The trade regime has not had a success of this magnitude for the past two decades. Rather, the list of failures and missed opportunities is long, and the prospects of the Doha Round are dim at best. 

In powerful ways, the TPP revives a stagnant trade regime. It shows that mega trade agreements can offer a platform to devise updated rules on trade and investment that cover sizable share of the world economy. And it creates an incentive structure for concurrent trade agreements to aim higher if they want to remain competitive. 

A genuine re-launch of Abenomics 

After a bruising political battle to secure passage of the security legislation, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that the economy would be his utmost priority. In so doing, he disclosed three fresh arrows: a strong economy, raising the fertility rate, and boosting social security to care for the elderly. 

Abenomics 2.0, however, has fallen flat, as it lacks specifics on how to achieve the target of 600 trillion yen GDP, and because subsidies for young families and the expansion of nursing homes, while desirable and politically popular, do not make for a strategy of economic revitalization. Instead, the TPP deal boosts Abenomics 1.0 where its true transformative power lies: structural reform.

An informed debate on TPP 

After legal scrubbing, the TPP text will be released. This will offer the much-needed opportunity to debate the merits and demerits of the agreement with facts, and not speculation. Full disclosure of the agreement, close public scrutiny, and a spirited discussion on where the agreement has lived up to expectations and where it has fallen short will be essential in shoring up public support.

The TPP project is still a promise, not a reality. Another set of milestones will be required (twelve, to be exact). Each participating country has its own domestic procedures for ratification, and some definitely face an uphill battle: Malaysia is gripped by a major political crisis as Prime Minister Najib Razak fights charges of corruption; and it is anyone’s guess what the electoral results in a couple of weeks will mean for Canada’s place in the TPP. 

For the United States too, the quest for TPP ratification could not come at a more complicated time with a full-blown presidential election race. In wrapping up the TPP negotiations, the United States has demonstrated its leadership in convening a significant and diverse group of countries and in stewarding with success the negotiation of an ambitious blueprint for economic governance. But this will mean little if TPP is voted down in Congress or stays frozen in ratification limbo. Without the power to deliver a TPP in force, past accomplishments will rightfully be brushed aside. 

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Japan’s presence in the Arctic is not new, but it has been limited mostly to scientific research. Japan has stepped up its engagement after it gained observer status to the Arctic Council and appointed its first Arctic ambassador in 2013. However, Japan has yet to flesh out a full-blown Arctic strategy that identifies the range of its national interests in the polar region and actionable strategies to achieve them. The Arctic offers Japan an opportunity to expand cooperation with the United States in an uncharted area, poses hard questions on how to interact with Russia in the post-Ukraine era, and creates the interesting proposition of whether China and Japan can cooperate in articulating the views of non-Arctic states.

On October 19, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted a panel of distinguished experts for a discussion on what components should be included in Japan’s Arctic strategy, ranging from resource development, environmental preservation, and scientific research, to securing access to expanding shipping lanes and managing a complex diplomatic chessboard. 

Join the conversation on Twitter using #JapanArctic

Video

• Charting Japan's Arctic strategy

Event Materials

• taisaku ikeshima presentation

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Despite being a developed and prosperous country, Japan faces a host of basic challenges today and going forward—some of its own creation and others beyond the country’s control. For example, Japan lacks essential natural resources, while also facing overcrowding in cities and depopulation in rural areas. As a result, food and energy self-sufficiency is low. Also, while the dual phenomena of a low birthrate and an ageing population have long been deemed problematic, these issues are rapidly growing more serious. The problems Japan faces today are potentially the same problems the rest of the world will face in the near future. Japan, therefore, may serve as a bellwether for the global community as many nations anticipate similar challenges in the future.  

On October 26, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings and the U.S.-Japan Research Institute co-hosted Hiroshi Komiyama, chairman of the Mitsubishi Research Institute and president emeritus of the University of Tokyo, for a discussion of his recent book, “Beyond the Limits to Growth: New Ideas for Sustainability from Japan.” In this book, Komiyama examines the issues facing Japan—and the world—presenting a number of potential viable solutions and offering insights into Japan’s experiences and the lessons it can provide for a more sustainable future.

Audio

• Overcoming the limits to growth: Sustainability lessons from Japan

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20151026_japan_sustainability_transcript
• hiroshi komiyama presentation

As part of his economic revitalization plan, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been touting “womenomics,” a plan to increase the number of women in the labor force. One way for women to enter the workforce but bypass the conventional corporate structure is through entrepreneurship.

Four questions for three female entrepreneurs

At a recent Center for East Asia Policy Studies event on womenomics and female entrepreneurship in Japan, we brought together three successful female entrepreneurs to discuss their experiences both in the United States and Japan. Prior to their panel discussion, we asked each of the speakers four questions about their careers.

1. What was the trigger that made you decide to start your own business?
2. What was the biggest hurdle in starting and/or running your business?
3. How or when was being a woman an asset to you as an entrepreneur and/or running your business?
4. How has the climate for female entrepreneurs changed compared to when you started your business?

Despite the differing environments for entrepreneurs and working women in the two countries, the speakers raised many of the same issues and offered similar advice. Access to funding or financing was an issue in both countries, as was the necessity to overcome fears about running a business or being in male-dominated fields. All of the speakers noted the positive changes in the business environment for female entrepreneurs since they had started their own businesses, as well as the impact this has had in creating more opportunities for women.

Donna Fujimoto Cole

Donna Fujimoto Cole is the president and CEO of Cole Chemical and Distributing Inc. in Houston, Texas. She started her company in 1980 at the urging of her clients. Today Cole Chemical is ranked 131 among chemical distributors globally by ICIS (Independent Chemical Information Service) and its customers include Bayer Material Scientific, BP America, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Lockheed Martin, Procter & Gamble, Shell, Spectra Energy, and Toyota. Cole is also an active member of her community and serves on the boards of a variety of national and regional organizations.

Fujiyo Ishiguro

A founding member for the Netyear Group, Fujiyo Ishiguro is now the president and CEO of the Netyear Group Corporation based in Tokyo, Japan. The firm, which was established in 1999, devises comprehensive digital marketing solutions for corporate clients. The Netyear Group was listed on the Mothers section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 2008. Recently, Ishiguro has served on a number of Japanese government committees including the Cabinet Office’s “The Future to Choose” Committee and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s “Internet of Things” Committee. 

Sachiko Kuno

Sachiko Kuno is the co-founder, president, and CEO of the S&R Foundation in Washington, D.C., a non-profit organization that supports talented individuals in the fields of science, art, and social entrepreneurship. A biochemist by training, Kuno and her research partner and husband Ryuji Ueno have established a number pharmaceutical companies and philanthropic foundations including R-Tech Ueno in Japan and Sucampo Pharmaceuticals in Bethesda, Maryland. Together, Kuno and Ueno hold over 900 patents. Kuno is active in the greater Washington community and serves on the boards of numerous regional organizations.

Full video of the event featuring these speakers can be found here.

Video

• The importance of mentors for female entrepreneurs
• Female entrepreneurs: Different options and different styles
• Female leadership creates opportunities

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Earlier this month, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement was signed by its 12 member states in New Zealand, bringing the trade deal one step closer to fruition. The member states must now work on resolving their respective domestic issues tied to TPP. For Japan, one of the major issue areas involving TPP is agriculture.

On February 24, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies hosted Kazuhito Yamashita for a presentation in which he discussed the impact of Japan’s market access commitment on agriculture, the TPP countermeasures that the Japanese government announced for agriculture, and the types of agricultural policy reform that are being considered in Japan.

Transcript

• Transcript of Kazuhito Yamashita Presentation (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Yamashita Brookings presentation for website 022416
• Transcript Kazuhito Yamashita Presentation

Editor’s Note: This blog post is one in a series of posts in which guest bloggers respond to the Brookings paper, “The potential and limitations of impact bonds: Lessons from the first five years of experience worldwide.”

Social impact bonds (SIBs) are one of a number of new “Payment by Results” financing mechanisms available for social services. In a SIB, private investors provide upfront capital for a social service, and government pays investors based on the outcomes of the service. If the intervention does not achieve outcomes, the government does not pay investors at all. The provision of upfront capital differentiates SIBs from other Payment by Results contracts.

Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) are a variation of SIBs, where the outcome funder is a third party, such as a foundation or development assistance agency, rather than the government. To date, 47 SIBs and one DIB have been implemented in the sectors of social welfare (21), employment (17), criminal recidivism (4), education (4), and health (2).

In a recent Brookings study, drawing from interviews with stakeholders in each of the 38 SIBs contracted as of March 1, 2015, we evaluate 10 common claims of the impact bond literature to date, so far made up of published thought-pieces and interview-based reports.

Figure 1. Common claims about Social Impact Bonds

Source:  The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds: Lessons Learned from the First Five Years of Experience Worldwide, Brookings Institution, 2015.

Of the 10 common claims about impact bonds, we found five areas where the SIB mechanism had a demonstrable positive effect on service provision:

1. Focus on outcomes. We found a significant shift in the focus of both government and service providers when it came to contracting and providing social services. Outcomes became the primary consideration in these contracts in which the repayment of the investment depended on achievement of those outcomes. Given that outcomes are the pivotal and defining piece of a SIB contract, it is unsurprising that many of those interviewed in the course of our research emphasized their importance, though we did find that this represented a more significant transformation in culture than expected.
2. Build a culture of monitoring and evaluation. The outcome-based contract necessitates the collection of data on outcomes, which helps build a culture of monitoring and evaluation in provider organizations and government. We found that the SIB is beginning to help solve longstanding problems in systemic data collection in multiple instances. In turn, government evaluation of outcomes and obligation to pay only for successful outcomes provides transparency and value for taxpayers. However, it is too soon to tell whether the monitoring and evaluation systems will remain in place after the SIB contracts conclude.
3. Drive performance management. The involvement of the investors and intermediaries in management of the service performance is a key component of SIBs. These private sector organizations often have stronger background in performance management and bring a valuable perspective to the social service sector. However, on average we find limited evidence that the service providers in SIBs to date have been able to significantly adjust their programs mid-contract in the case of poor outcomes, despite SIB proponents claiming this is one of the mechanism’s greatest merits.
4. Foster collaboration. In addition to collaboration between the for-profit, nonprofit, and government sectors, we also find evidence of gridlock-breaking collaboration across government agencies, levels of government, and political parties due to SIB contracts. This was noted to be one of the most important aspects of SIBs but also one of the most challenging.
5. Invest in prevention. External, upfront capital for services allows government to invest in preventive programs that greatly reduce spending in the future, such as early childhood development programs that reduce remedial education, crime, and unemployment. We found that all but one of the 38 SIBs were issued for preventive programs. Going forward, SIBs will not necessarily need to be tied to cash savings for government, but could simply be used as a method to finance programs that achieve desired social outcomes. 

Where do SIBs currently fall short?

For the five remaining claims about SIBs, we found less evidence of impact.

1.  Achieve scale. Of the 38 impact bonds contracted as of March 1, 2015, 25 served less than 1,000 beneficiaries. The largest impact bond, the SIB to reduce criminal recidivism at Rikers Island Prison in New York City, aimed to reach up to 10,000 individuals, but was terminated a year early this July because it did not meet target outcomes. The smallest SIB supports 22 homeless children and their mothers in the city of Saskatoon in Canada. These numbers are nowhere near the scale of the toughest problems facing the globe, where, for example, 59 million children are out of school. However, since March of 2015, two larger SIBs have been contracted, which may be an indication of increasing confidence in the mechanism. The Ways to Wellness SIB in the U.K. aims to improve long-term health conditions of over 11,000 beneficiaries and the first DIB launched plans to improve enrollment and learning outcomes of nearly 20,000 schoolchildren in Rajasthan, India. Further, the impact bond fund model used in the U.K. for 21 SIBs—where teams of service providers, intermediaries, and investors bid for SIB contracts based on a rate card of maximum payments per outcome government is willing to make—could be used to reach greater scale by contracting multiple SIBs at once. The largest of the impact bond funds, the Innovation Fund, reaches over 16,000 beneficiaries across 10 SIBs.
2. Foster innovation in delivery, and 
3. Reduce risk for government. SIBs vary in the degree of innovation and risk to investors—SIBs based on more innovative programs pose a greater risk to investors and may have higher investment protection or greater potential returns to balance the risk. In our study we found that very few of the programs financed by SIBs were truly innovative in that they had never been tested before, but that many were innovative in that they applied interventions in new settings or in new combinations. The literature claims that SIBs reduce the risk to government of funding an innovative service (government pays nothing if outcomes aren’t achieved), but as of March of this year it did not seem that the programs were particularly risky. The SIB in Rikers Island Prison was one of the most innovative and risky, and the early termination of the deal was an important demonstration of the reduction in risk for government. The New York City Department of Correction did not pay anything in this case; instead the investor and foundation backing the investment paid for the program.
4. Crowd-in private funding. Our research also shows mixed evidence on the power of impact bonds to crowd-in private funding, the fourth claim with unclear results. The literature up until now has claimed that impact bonds crowd-in private funding for social services by increasing the amount of money from traditional funding sources and bringing in new money from nontraditional sources. There is some evidence that traditional service funders, such as foundations, are increasing their contributions because of the opportunity to earn back what would otherwise have been a donation. Many of the current investors in impact bonds, Goldman Sachs for example, are indeed new actors in the space and their increased awareness of social service provision may be a benefit in and of itself. However, if a program is successful, government ultimately pays for the program. In this case, investors are solving a liquidity problem for government by providing upfront capital and not actually providing new money. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that paying only for proven outcomes has motivated the public sector to spend more on social services and that the external upfront capital has allowed government to shift spending from curative to preventive programs. Further, most programs thus far have been designed such that savings to the public sector are greater than payments to investors, resulting in a net increase in available public sector funds.
5. Sustain impact. Finally, five years since the first impact bond, we have yet to see whether impact bonds will lead to sustained impact on the lives of beneficiaries beyond the impact bond contract duration. The existing literature states that impact bonds could lead to sustained impact by demonstrating to government that a sector or intervention type is worth funding or by improving the quality of programs by instilling a culture of outcome achievement, monitoring, and evaluation. However, the success of impact bonds depends on whether new efforts to streamline the contract development stage come to fruition and whether incentives for all parties are closely scrutinized.

The optimal financing mechanism for a social service will differ across issue area and local context, and we look forward to conducting more research in the field on the suitable characteristics for each tool.

Introduction

Reaching education goals in the coming years will require sharp increases in funding and better delivery. Despite a global focus on improving access to education, nearly 60 million children in developing countries remain out of primary school and increased investments have not translated to better education quality or improved learning outcomes (UNESCO 2015a). Even with an increase in domestic public expenditure, UNESCO estimates that the financing gap for delivering good quality universal education from pre-school through junior secondary levels by 2030 in low-income countries will be $10.6 billion, on average, between 2015 and 2030—over four times the level currently provided by official donors ($2.3 billion) (UNESCO 2015b).

Closing acute financing and delivery gaps that prevent access to quality education will be a major challenge, requiring all hands on deck. Domestic governments and foreign donors will need to step up their game substantially, but fiscal and capacity constraints are likely to prevent them remedying resource deficits on their own in the short term. Non-state actors—mainly religious and charitable organizations, private (“foundation”) schools, and a small number of for-profit schools—are already partially filling the gaps, although the precise extent of their services and their impact is unknown.

Determining the appropriate role of non-state actors in education is a contentious topic among specialists. Disagreements have revolved around serious normative issues, including such basic questions as whether non-state provision is consistent with the principle of education as a human right, and serious empirical questions relating to quality and equity implications. This discussion has been blurred by definitional issues (i.e., what is non-state and private education?); lack of clarity over distinctions between ownership, delivery, and financing; a lack of accurate data on current and potential provision rates; and an insufficient base of evidence from which to draw clear conclusions on the effectiveness of non-state engagement in education. These problems have made it difficult to generate comparisons across empirical studies, leading to significant variation in the interpretation of evidence. For some observers, evidence has fueled concern that non-state education is violating human rights principles (e.g., the report by the United Nations Rapporteur on Education),1 while for others it has provided encouragement that non-state engagement can help address financing and delivery challenges (e.g., Tooley 2009).

Our goal is to provide a neutral background to this debate and identify areas of common ground. Beginning with some big picture facts, this paper develops a detailed language around non-state actors in education. We then outline current issues and poles of debate around engagement of non-state actors in education and provide an assessment of the depth of available data and evidence. To close, we establish a typology and propose a framework for discussions around the role of non-state actors in basic education and how these actors can best contribute to the achievement of Education for All and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Our paper refers largely to basic education, including pre-primary, primary, and lower-secondary, as this is the main focus of much recent discussion around the role of non-state actors in education and an area of strong growth in developing countries.

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Editor’s Note: This blog post is one in a series of posts in which guest bloggers respond to the Brookings paper, “The potential and limitations of impact bonds: Lessons from the first five years of experience worldwide."

In 2014, clause 5 (1) of the County Early Childhood Education Bill 2014 declared free and compulsory early childhood education a right for all children in Kenya. Early childhood education (ECE) in Kenya has historically been located outside of the realm of government and placed under the purview of the community, religious institutions, and the private sector. The disparate and unstructured nature of ECE in the country has led to a proliferation of unregistered informal schools particularly in underprivileged communities. Most of these schools still charge relatively high fees and ancillary costs yet largely offer poor quality of education. Children from these preschools have poor cognitive development and inadequate school readiness upon entry into primary school.

The Kenyan constitution places the responsibility and mandate of providing free, compulsory, and quality ECE on the county governments. It is an onerous challenge for these sub-national governments in taking on a large-scale critical function that has until now principally existed outside of government.

In Nairobi City County, out of over 250,000 ECE eligible children, only about 12,000 attend public preschools. Except for one or two notable public preschools, most have a poor reputation with parents. Due to limited access and demand for quality, the majority of Nairobi’s preschool eligible children are enrolled in private and informal schools. A recent study of the Mukuru slum of Nairobi shows that over 80 percent of 4- and 5-year-olds in this large slum area are enrolled in preschool, with 94 percent of them attending informal private schools.

In early 2015, the Governor of Nairobi City County, Dr. Evans Kidero, commissioned a taskforce to look into factors affecting access, equity, and quality of education in the county. The taskforce identified significant constraints including human capital and capacity gaps, material and infrastructure deficiencies, management and systemic inefficiencies that have led to a steady deterioration of education in the city to a point where the county consistently underperforms relative to other less resourced counties. 

Nairobi City County now faces the challenge of designing and implementing a scalable model that will ensure access to quality early childhood education for all eligible children in the city by 2030. The sub-national government’s resources and implementation capacity are woefully inadequate to attain universal access in the near term, nor by the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) deadline of 2030. However, there are potential opportunities to leverage emerging mechanisms for development financing to provide requisite resource additionality, private sector rigor, and performance management that will enable Nairobi to significantly advance the objective of ensuring ECE is available to all children in the county.

Social impact bonds (SIBs) are one form of innovative financing mechanism that have been used in developed countries to tap external resources to facilitate early childhood initiatives. This mechanism seeks to harness private finance to enable and support the implementation of social services. Government repays the investor contingent on the attainment of targeted outcomes. Where a donor agency is the outcomes funder instead of government, the mechanism is referred to as a development impact bond (DIB).

The recent Brookings study highlights some of the potential and limitations of impact bonds by researching in-depth the 38 impact bonds that had been contracted globally as of March, 2015. On the upside, the study shows that impact bonds have been successful in achieving a shift of government and service providers to outcomes. In addition, impact bonds have been able to foster collaboration among stakeholders including across levels of government, government agencies, and between the public and private sector. Another strength of impact bonds is their ability to build systems of monitoring and evaluation and establish processes of adaptive learning, both critical to achieving desirable ECD outcomes. On the downside, the report highlights some particular challenges and limitations of the impact bonds to date. These include the cost and complexity of putting the deals together, the need for appropriate legal and political environments and impact bonds’ inability thus far to demonstrate a large dent in the ever present challenge of achieving scale.

In the Kenyan context, especially at the sub-national level, there are two key challenges in implementing impact bonds.

To begin with, in the Kenyan context, the use of a SIB would invoke public-private partnership legislation, which prescribes highly stringent measures and extensive pre-qualification processes that are administered by the National Treasury and not at the county level. The complexity arises from the fact that SIBs constitute an inherent contingent liability to government as they expose it to fiscal risk resulting from a potential future public payment obligation to the private party in the project.

Another key challenge in a SIB is the fact that Government must pay for outcomes achieved and for often significant transaction costs, yet the SIB does not explicitly encompass financial additionality. Since government pays for outcomes in the end, the transaction costs and obligation to pay for outcomes could reduce interest from key decision-makers in government.

The above challenges notwithstanding, a combined approach of results-based financing and impact investing has high potential to mobilize both requisite resources and efficient capacity to deliver quality ECE in Nairobi City County. To establish an enabling foundation for the future inclusion of impact investing whilst beginning to address the immediate ECE challenge, Nairobi City County has designed and is in the process of rolling out a modified DIB. In this model, a pool of donor funds for education will be leveraged through the new Nairobi City County Education Trust (NCCET).

The model seeks to apply the basic principles of results-based financing, but in a structure adjusted to address aforementioned constraints. Whereas in the classical SIB and DIB mechanisms investors provide upfront capital and government and donors respectively repay the investment with a return for attained outcomes, the modified structure will incorporate only grant funding with no possibility for return of principal. Private service providers will be engaged to operate ECE centers, financed by the donor-funded NCCET. The operators will receive pre-set funding from the NCCET, but the county government will progressively absorb their costs as they achieve targeted outcomes, including salaries for top-performing teachers. As a result, high-performing providers will be able to make a small profit. The system is designed to incentivize teachers and progressively provide greater income for effective school operators, while enabling an ordered handover of funding responsibilities to government, thus providing for program sustainability.

Nairobi City County plans to build 97 new ECE centers, all of which are to be located in the slum areas. NCCET will complement this undertaking by structuring and implementing the new funding model to operationalize the schools. The structure aims to coordinate the actors involved in the program—donors, service providers, evaluators—whilst sensitizing and preparing government to engage the private sector in the provision of social services and the payment of outcomes thereof.

The confluence of the agreement on 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, or Global Goals) in 2015, and the increased attention being paid to the role of non-traditional actors in contributing to shared prosperity, provide a unique opportunity to focus attention on attempts to identify promising new solutions to the barriers that impede the full development of the world’s youngest citizens. Current estimates indicate that 200 million children globally under the age of 5 are at risk of not reaching their development potential. With these goals, the global community has a tremendous opportunity to change the course of history. There is evidence that certain early childhood development (ECD) interventions—spanning the nutrition, health, water and sanitation, education, social protection, and governance sectors from conception to age 5—have high potential to help to achieve the SDGs related to child development. Furthermore, early childhood interventions have been found to improve adult health and education levels, reduce crime, and raise employment rates, which will be paramount to achieving global economic, climate, and physical security.

Impact bonds have the potential to address some of the main financing and delivery constraints faced in ECD. By providing upfront private capital, impact bonds could help to address service provider liquidity constraints and leverage public capital by allowing the government to connect preventive programs with future benefits to individuals, society, and the economy. Impact bonds also have the potential to drive performance management, support monitoring and evaluation, and create accountability, which all help to address quality and capacity constraints. By fostering innovation, experimentation and adaptive learning in service delivery, cost-effective solutions could be identified through impact bonds. By producing evidence of outcome achievement, impact bonds could shift the focus toward effective ECD programs. Finally, collaboration across stakeholders—a necessary component of impact bonds—has the potential to allow for alignment of interests and a win-win situation for investors, outcome funders, and program beneficiaries alike.

The high participation of non-state actors and potentially significant returns in ECD make it a promising sector for impact bonds. Unlike other services that may have entrenched interests, the multitude of agencies and non-state entities financing and providing ECD services potentially allows for more experimentation. The preventive nature of ECD programs also fits well with the core feature of SIBs, which is that preventive investments will result in valuable short- and potentially long-term outcomes. There is evidence that ECD interventions can have immense effects on later-life outcomes. For example, a longitudinal study of a program in Jamaica, in which participants received weekly visits from community health workers over a 2-year period, was found to increase the earnings of participants by 25 percent, 20 years later.

There may, however, be some particular challenges associated with applying impact bonds in the ECD sector. Impact bonds (and other Payment by Results mechanisms tied to outcomes) require meaningful outcomes that are measureable within a timeframe that is reasonable to the outcome funder (and investors in the case of an impact bond). Meaningful outcomes are outcomes that are intrinsically or extrinsically valuable. Intrinsically valuable outcomes that are measureable within a reasonable timeframe could be extrinsically valuable if they are proxies for long-term benefits to individuals, society, or the economy. The delay between ECD interventions and later-life results may prove an impediment in some cases. By identifying appropriate interim measures such as language development, socioemotional development, and schooling outcomes that may proxy for desirable longer-term outcomes, the issue of delay could be mitigated. For example, there is evidence that early stimulation and health programs can have statistically significant effects on schooling outcomes in the short-run. An increase in focus on the intrinsic value of short-term outcomes that result from ECD interventions, such as child survival, is also important.

As the global community moves beyond the Millennium Development Goals to a set of Global Goals and associated targets linked to measurable outcomes, there is an opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to invest in future generations. Leveraging upfront funding, focusing on outcomes through adaptive learning and testing new ways to deliver early childhood interventions more effectively are all means of achieving the ECD-related goals. Despite the hype around all of the new financing mechanisms, the keys to creating high-quality, locally appropriate programs remains simple—real-time collection of outcome data, the freedom to fail, and the flexibility to course-adjust. In some circumstances social service provision based on outcomes and adaptive learning may require mechanisms like impact bonds or other Payment by Results mechanisms. In other circumstances it may not. As this very nascent field continues to grow, more research will be needed to capture lessons learned, contextualize them within the larger landscape of ECD financing and service provision, and apply them to real-world social challenges with the world’s youngest and most disadvantaged populations at the forefront of the conversation. 

Read the previous report on the landscape of impact bonds across sectors and geography »

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• Download the policy brief

“For a not-for-profit it’s the equivalent of venture capital,” said Sir Ronald Cohen, chairman of the Global Social Impact Investing Steering Group, about impact bonds in his keynote address at a recent event at the Brookings Institution. Impact bonds combine results-based financing and impact investing, where investors provide upfront capital for a social service and government agencies, or donors, agree to pay investors back based on the outcomes of the service. At their best, they could allow for innovation, encourage performance management and adaptability, promote learning through evaluation, and create a clear case for investing in what works. However, impact bonds thus far have had immense transaction costs and there are risks that poor execution of the impact bond mechanism could have negative consequences for beneficiaries.

It has been six years since the first impact bond was implemented in March of 2010, and the field is beginning to move from an exploratory stage to looking at systemic change, as Tracy Palandjian, CEO and co-founder of Social Finance U.S. described. The event, “The Global Potential and Limitation of Impact Bonds,” served as a point of reflection for stakeholders at this pivotal stage of the field, bringing together over 500 individuals in the room and on the webcast, including practitioners developing impact bonds around the world. While context matters, there were notable similarities in the motivations and challenges across regions.

In our presentations of our research and subsequent panels, we focused on the potential value and challenges of combining results-based financing and impact investing through an impact bond. Shri Naveen Jain, mission director of the National Health Mission of Rajasthan, India, who is working to develop an impact bond for maternal and child health services across his entire state, pointed out that the value of a results-based financing contract to him was in the added transparency it provides—the government is able to see what they are paying for, keep service providers accountable, and incentivize providers to achieve better outcomes. Louise Savell, a director at Social Finance U.K., the entity that first put impact bonds on the map, explained that results-based financing contracts are often arranged such that only one portion of the contract is based on results. This, she explained prescribes a model and does not allow for flexibility; furthermore, it forces service providers to bear a significant risk. Impact bonds allow for the entirety of payments to be based on results, which gives the provider full flexibility (at least in theory), but puts the risk of service performance on the investor. The shift of risk to investors could be particularly useful for service delivery in conflict affected areas, where donors are often highly concerned about how money will be used, mentioned Francois de Borchgrave, co-founder and managing director of Kois Invest, who is working on an impact bond with the International Rescue Committee of the Red Cross. The panelists also emphasized that impact bonds are more powerful than results-based financing contracts alone because, if successful, they pay real financial returns to investors. This draws a great deal of attention from policymakers and the public, and the added scrutiny helps in making the investment case for preventive interventions highly explicit. Mayor Ben McAdams of Salt Lake County, Utah said that “data and evidence is bridging a partisan divide” in his state—when the case for investment is clear, policymakers from both sides of the aisle are willing to invest. Impact bonds do not necessarily add value by increasing the total amount of funding available for social services, because investors are repaid if outcomes are achieved. Rather, impact bonds could help increase the outcomes achieved with given funding.

Overall there was agreement that impact bonds have enormous potential to lead to more outcome-focused financing that focuses on preventive interventions and incentivizes collaboration. However two critical considerations for the use of impact bonds arose throughout the day.

The first consideration discussed was whether or not impact bonds can support innovation or scale. As found in our first report, impact bonds have been relatively small in scale in terms of capital and beneficiaries. The average upfront investment in impact bonds to date is $3.7 million, reaching an average of 1,900 beneficiaries. They also have not, on average, focused on particularly innovative interventions—in fact they have almost all had a relatively strong base of evidence behind them. Views on the panel differed on whether the uses of impact bonds could be expanded—if they could be used for highly innovative pilot programs or proven large scale programs. One perspective was that impact bonds could indeed provide seed capital to test new ideas for service delivery. This would require investors who are willing to test not only the innovation but also this relatively new financing mechanism. Given the high transaction costs that impact bonds entail, however, this may not be the most efficient use of resources. Impact bonds could also reach more beneficiaries per transaction (greater scale) with changes in public procurement and the creation of markets for tradeable impact bond assets. Government can play a role in facilitating larger impact bonds by creating central government outcome payment funds, providing tax breaks for investment in impact bonds, and enabling the development of investment vehicles, all of which are being implemented in the U.K. Impact bonds could also help effective social services reach scale by encouraging government to fund programs at scale after the impact bond is over or by improving data use and performance management in government-funded services broadly.

A second, and related, discussion happened around evaluation methodology—which may differ depending on whether the impact bond is intended to test an innovative intervention or scale an intervention already backed by significant evidence. The “gold standard” randomized controlled trial (RCT) is the only methodology that eliminates the possibility that impact could be attributed to something other than the intervention, though the majority of impact bonds thus far use evaluation methodologies that are less rigorous. The panelists explained that it is important, however, to consider the status quo—currently, less than 1 percent of U.S. federal spending on social services has been shown to be effective. The same is true in low- and middle-income countries, where there are relatively few impact evaluations given the number of interventions. At the end of the day, the government agency acting as the outcome funder must decide on the importance of attribution to trigger payment through the impact bond in view of the already available evidence of program effectiveness and weigh the criticism that might ensue in the absence of a valid counterfactual.

Though impact bonds are a potentially useful tool in the toolbox of many financing mechanisms, there are some significant constraints to their implementation. The biggest barrier to impact bonds and other results-based contracts is the administrative hurdle of contracting for outcomes. Peter Vanderwal, innovative financing lead at the Palladium Group, and Caroline Whistler, co-president and co-founder of Third Sector Capital Partners, both stated that governments often are unable or do not know how to contract for outcomes, and there is a need to invest in their capacity to do so. Appropriation schedules are part of this challenge, governments are often not allowed to appropriate for future years. When an audience member asked how we go about changing the culture in government to one of contracting for outcomes, Mayor McAdams answered that impact bonds may have a contagious effect—contracting for outcomes will be the expectation in the future. Additionally, the transaction costs of establishing the partnership are large relative to other mechanisms, though they may be worthwhile. Jim Sorenson, of the Sorenson Impact Center, pointed out that service provider capacity and data collection systems could be barriers to the development of future impact bonds. There is also still a long way to go in developing outcome measures and in particular in calibrating those outcome measures to low- and middle-income countries.

The influence that impact bonds have on the provision of quality services globally depends on the quality of implementation. With a rapidly growing market, there will inevitably be “bad” impact bonds in the future. To ensure that impact bonds are used as effectively as possible, governments and the research community have a pivotal role to play in asking the right questions: Will a results-based contract help improve outcomes in this particular case? What should the outcomes be to avoid perverse incentives or potentially negative externalities? And would an impact bond structure add value? 

Announcements of new federal regulations on the use of program-related investments (PRIs) and the launch of a groundbreaking fund in Chicago are the latest signals that impact investing, once a marginal philanthropic and policy tool, is moving into the mainstream. They are also illustrative of two important and complementary paths to institutional change: fast-moving, collaborative local leadership creating innovative new instruments to meet funding demands; federal regulators updating policy to pave the way for change at scale.

Impact investing, referring to “investment strategies that generate financial returns while intentionally improving social and environmental conditions,” provides an important tier of higher-risk capital to fund socially beneficial projects with revenue-generating potential: affordable housing, early childhood and workforce development programs, and social enterprises. It is estimated that there are over $60 billion of impact investments globally and interest is growing—an annual JP Morgan study of impact investors from 2015 reports that the number of impact investing deals increased 13 percent between 2013 and 2014 following a 20 percent increase in the previous year.

Traditionally, foundations have split their impact investments into two pots, one for mission-related investments, designed to generate market-rate returns and maintain and grow the value of the endowment, and the other for program-related investments. PRIs can include loans, guarantees, or equity investments that advance a charitable purpose without expectation of market returns. PRIs are an attractive use of a foundation’s endowment as they allow foundations to recycle their limited grant funds and they count towards a foundation’s charitable distribution requirement of 5 percent of assets. However they have been underutilized to date due to perceived hurdles around their use–in fact among the thousands of foundations in the United States, currently only a few hundred make PRIs.

But this is changing, spurred on by both entrepreneurial local action and federal leadership. On April 21, the White House announced that the U.S. Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service had finalized regulations that are expected to make it easier for private foundations to put their assets to work in innovative ways. While there is still room for improvement, by clarifying rules and signaling mainstream acceptance of impact investing practices these changes should lower the barriers to entry for some institutional investors.

This federal leadership is welcome, but is not by itself enough to meet the growing demand for capital investment in the civic sector. Local innovation, spurred by new philanthropic collaborations, can be transformative. On April 25 in Chicago, the Chicago Community Trust, the Calvert Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation launched Benefit Chicago, a $100 million impact investment fund that aims to catalyze a new market by making it easier for individuals and institutions to put their dollars to work locally and help meet the estimated $100-400 million capital needs of the civic sector over the next five years.

A Next Street report found that the potential supply of patient capital from foundations and investors in the Chicago region was more than enough to meet the demand – if there were ways to more easily connect the two. Benefit Chicago addresses this market gap by making it possible for individuals to invest directly through a brokerage or a donor-advised fund and for the many foundations without dedicated impact investing programs to put their endowments to work at scale. All of the transactional details of deal flow, underwriting, and evaluation of results are handled by the intermediary, which should lead to greater efficiency and a significant increase in the size of the impact investing market in Chicago.

In the last few years, a new form of impact investing has made measurement of social return to investments even more concrete. Social impact bonds (SIBs), also known as pay for success (PFS) financing, are a way for private investors (including foundations) to provide capital to support social services with the promise of a return on their investment from a government agency if some agreed-upon social outcomes are achieved. These PFS transactions range from funding to support high-quality early childhood education programs in Chicago to reduction in chronic individual homelessness in the state of Massachusetts. Both the IRS and the Chicago announcements are bound to contribute to the growth of the impact bond market which to date represents a small segment of the impact investing market.

These examples illustrate a rare and wonderful convergence of leadership at the federal and local levels around an idea that makes sense. Beyond simply broadening the number of ways that foundations can deploy funds, growing the pool of impact investments can have a powerful market-making effect. Impact investments unlock other tiers of capital, reducing risk for private investors and making possible new types of deals with longer time horizons and lower expected market return.

In the near future, these federal and local moves together might radically change the philanthropic landscape. If every major city had a fund like Benefit Chicago, and all local investors had a simple on-ramp to impact investing, the pool of capital to help local organizations meet local needs could grow exponentially. This in turn could considerably improve funding for programs—like access to quality social services and affordable housing—that show impact over the long term.

Impact investing can be a bright spot in an otherwise somber fiscal environment if localities keep innovating and higher levels of government evolve to support, incentivize, and smooth its growth. These announcements from Washington and Chicago are examples of the multilevel leadership and creative institutional change we need to ensure that we tap every source of philanthropic capital, to feel some abundance in an era where scarcity is the dominant narrative.

Editor's Note: Alaina Harkness is a fellow at Brookings while on leave from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, which is a donor to the Brookings Institution. The findings, interpretations and conclusions posted in this piece are solely those of the authors and not determined by any donation.

Event Information

Unprecedented armed conflicts and natural disasters are now driving a global displacement crisis. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, more than 60 million people are displaced worldwide, and half of them are children. These displaced children are hindered from developing cognitive and social-emotional skills—such as perseverance, emotional regulation, and conflict resolution—which are essential for school readiness and serve as the foundation for a more peaceful and stable future. However, through the development and testing of innovative educational strategies, we can build effective practices for improving young children’s learning and developmental outcomes in crisis contexts.

On June 8, the Center for Universal Education at Brookings and Sesame Workshop co-hosted a panel discussion to explore innovative strategies to meet the needs of young children in humanitarian crises. 

Audio

• Supporting early childhood development in humanitarian crises

Transcript

• Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160608_early_childhood_transcript

“This is about governments using data for performance rather than compliance” was a resounding message coming out of the U.S. Department of Education’s conference on June 10 on the use of Pay for Success contracts in education. These contracts, known globally as social impact bonds, continue to be at the forefront of global conversations about results-based financing mechanisms, and have garnered significant momentum this week with passage of the Social Impact Partnerships for Pay for Results Act in the U.S. While limitations certainly exist, their potential to revolutionize the way we fund social projects is tremendous.

A social impact bond (SIB) is a set of contracts where a government agency agrees to pay for service outputs or outcomes, rather than funding defined service inputs, and an investor provides upfront risk capital to the service provider. The investor is potentially repaid principal and interest contingent on the achievement of the predetermined outputs or outcomes.

In our research on impact bonds at the Center for Universal Education, we have analyzed the use of SIBs for education in the U.S., other high-income countries, and low- and middle-income countries. Practitioners in each of these contexts are having far more similar conversations than they may realize—all are united in their emphasis on using SIBs to build data systems for performance. There is tremendous potential for lessons learned across these experiences and across the broader discussions of results-based financing mechanisms for education globally.

Current SIBs for education globally

There are currently five SIBs for education worldwide: two in the U.S. for preschool education, one in Portugal for computer science classes in primary school, and one each in Canada and Israel for higher education. In addition, a number of countries have used the SIB model to finance interventions to promote both education and employment outcomes for teens—there are 21 such SIBs in the U.K., three in the Netherlands, and one in Germany. There is also a Development Impact Bond (DIB), where a donor rather than government agency serves as the outcome funder, for girls’ education in India. The Center for Universal Education will host a webinar to present the enrollment and learning outcomes of the first year of the DIB on July 5 (register to join here).

U.S. activities to facilitate the use of SIBs for education

At the June 10 conference at the Department of Education, the secretary of education and the deputy assistant to the president for education said that they saw the greatest potential contribution of SIBs in helping to scale what works to promote education outcomes and in broadening the array of partners involved in improving the education system. Others pointed out the value of the mechanism to coordinate services based on the needs of each student, rather than a multitude of separately funded services engaging the student individually. In addition to using data to coordinate services for an individual, participants emphasized that SIBs can facilitate a shift away from using data to measure compliance, to using data to provide performance feedback loops.

The interest in data for performance rather than compliance is part of a larger shift across the U.S. education sector, represented by the replacement of the strict compliance standards in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 with the new federal education funding law, the Every Student Succeeds Act, signed into law in December of 2015. The law allows for federal outcome funding for SIBs in education for the first time, specifically for student support and academic enrichment programs. The recently passed Social Impact Partnerships for Pay for Results Act also allows for outcome funding for education outcomes. The Department of Education conference explored potential applications of SIBs across the education sector, including for early home visiting programs, programs to encourage completion of higher education programs, and career and technical education. The conference also analyzed the potential to use SIBs for programs that support specific disadvantaged populations, such as dual language learners in early education, children of incarcerated individuals, children involved in both the child protection and criminal justice systems, and Native American youth. Overall, there was a focus on areas where the U.S. is spending a great deal on remediation (such as early emergency room visits) and on particular levers to overcome persistent obstacles to student success (such as parent engagement).

To help move the sector forward, the Department of Education announced three new competitions for feasibility study funding for early learning broadly, dual language learners in early education, and technical education. The department is also facilitating connections between existing evaluation and data system development efforts and teams designing SIBs. The focus on early childhood development by the Department of Education is reflective of the national field as a whole: Programming in the early years is becoming a particularly fast-growing sector for SIBs in the U.S. with over 40 SIBs feasibility and design stages.

SIBs for education in low- and middle-income countries

There is only one DIB for education in low- and middle-income countries; however, there are a number of SIBs and DIBs for education in design and prelaunch phases. In particular, the Western Cape Province of South Africa has committed outcome funding for three SIBs across a range of health and development outcomes for children ages 0 to 5.

Though the number of impact bonds may be relatively small, a significant amount of work has been done in the last 15 years in results-based financing for education. The U.K. Department for International Development (DfID), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the Global Partnership for Output-Based Aid, and Cordaid had together funded 24 results-based financing initiatives for education as of 2015. Of particular interest, DfID is funding results-based financing projects through a Girls Education Challenge and the World Bank launched a new trust fund for results-based financing in education in 2015. As with impact bonds in the U.S., a primary aim of results-based financing for education in low- and middle-income countries is to strengthen data and performance systems. Early childhood development programs and technical and vocational and training programs have also been identified as sub-sectors of high potential. Here are a few final takeaways for those working on results-based financing for education in low- and middle-income countries from the U.S. Department of Education conference:

1. The differences between the No Child Left Behind Act and the Every Student Succeeds Act should be analyzed carefully to ensure other data-driven education performance management systems promote both accountability and flexibility.
2. In building data systems through results-based financing, ensure services can be coordinated around the individual, feedback loops are available for providers, and data on early education, child welfare, parent engagement, and criminal justice involvement are also incorporated.
3. There are potential lessons to be learned from the U.S. Department of Education’s effort to conduct more low-cost randomized control trials in education and the U.S. Census Bureau’s data integration efforts.
4. SIBs provide an opportunity to work across agencies or levels of government in education, which could be particularly fruitful in both low- and middle-income countries and the U.S.

As the global appetite for results-based financing continues to grow and new social and development impact bonds are implemented throughout the world, we’ll have an opportunity to learn the true potential of such financing models.