Thinking out loud: Is disinformation here to stay? 10 November 2022 — 6:00PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 25 October 2022 Chatham House

This event is postponed.

Have you ever wondered how Chatham House researchers approach the big deals that become research? Do you enjoy meeting other Chatham House members and engaging with questions that open your mind? ‘Thinking Out Loud’ invites a small group of members to a live, unscripted discussion with a Chatham House researcher. This in-person event is a way for researchers and members to think out loud to help shape ideas for future research.

Kate Jones, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme at Chatham House will pose some key questions facing how speech is governed in an online world:

• How has big tech influenced the way we think about speech and its limitations?

• Can disinformation be eliminated or even greatly reduced?

• Where should the responsibilities fall between government and business when it comes to speech regulation?

• What might the information landscape look like in 10 years’ time? Should that affect how we tackle disinformation today?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Brexit: Then, now and the future 2 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 November 2022 Chatham House and Online

How has Britain’s negotiations with the EU set it on a post-EU path?

The Brexit negotiations went down to the wire between the UK and the EU in December 2020. By January 2021, the UK’s departure from the EU had taken place, but the new relationship was by no means stable. The UK and EU have since clashed on trade, migration and the Northern Ireland Protocol which are all left unresolved. 

This year, both sides have had to deal with domestic political instability, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a global energy crisis that has changed the dynamics of its relationship. In the years ahead, both sides will need to address shared challenges, from the rise of China and climate change to security on the European continent. 

This discussion includes those who were in the room during the Brexit negotiations, including Michel Barnier’s adviser, to get an inside look on how the UK and EU negotiated Brexit. Combining insight from the new book, Inside the Deal – How the EU Got Brexit Done, with expert analysis the panel assesses where the post-Brexit negotiations are today.

Key questions include:

• What issues in the deal still need to be fixed?

• How has the EU evolved since Brexit?

• How would a future Labour government approach the UK-EU relationship?

• What are the best and worst case scenarios for UK-EU relations in 2030?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

The future of the Russia-China relationship 9 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

What lies ahead for the ‘unlimited friendship’ between Moscow and Beijing?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised new questions about the nature of the relationship between Russia and China, with the war seen as having the potential to shift Russia from a close ally to a liability in the eyes of the Chinese government.

This event explores the latest developments in extent of the relationship and interactions between the two: new convergences and divergences, energy links and limitations, declared alliances and private disagreements.

Experts on the panel explore:

• How has the relationship changed since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine?
• What do the Russian and Chinese people make of the relationship?
• How could a war-weakened Russia be viewed by China?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Chatham House exhibition - In conversation with the future 19 April 2023 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 March 2023 Chatham House

Hear from the innovative leaders and companies driving change towards a more sustainable future.

This event is an opportunity to hear from the innovative leaders and companies driving change towards a more sustainable future.

The evening begins with a panel discussion then, over sustainably sourced drinks and canapés, you are invited to walk through Chatham House and explore the innovative and experimental ideas enabling radical shifts to allow us to prosper without exhausting our planet’s resources.

Our exhibiting partners include Earthshot Prize winner NotPla, Hawkins Brown, Polymateria, and BEEN London. 

Bronwen Maddox, director of Chatham House, opens the evening at 6pm and introduces our panel of experts, chaired by Ana Yang, head of Chatham House’s Sustainability Accelerator. 

Please note that this event is operating a ballot for in-person attendance. Your place will be confirmed by Wednesday 12 April if you are successful.

Can rhetoric match reality? Britain’s international development future 27 April 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 12 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Andrew Mitchell, minister of state, UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 

Last month’s updated Integrated Review positioned international development as a key pillar of British foreign policy which sets out the importance of the UK’s efforts to shape the ‘global strategic environment’.

Focusing heavily on Africa and the Indo-Pacific, international development will be central to the ambition of a ‘Global Britain’.

The Integrated Review outlines seven priority areas to revitalize the drive to meet the Global Goals, with a climate security strategy at its heart, while seeking to go beyond official development assistance (ODA).

However, there are major challenges ahead. Since 2021, the UK’s ODA has been cut from 0.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent gross national income (GNI). Some are concerned that since being subsumed by the UK Foreign Office, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has diluted the effectiveness of UK international development. Then there is the question of the strength of British public support for development assistance at a time of domestic economic hardship.

Can rhetoric match reality?

This event tackles questions including:

• What does the UK’s vision for international development mean in practice?
• Will aid and development help push Britain’s influence around the world?
• Can policymakers and politicians garner domestic support for international aid in times of economic uncertainty, and if so, how?
• Can the UK rebuild its reputation in the world while it doesn’t meet its 0.7 per cent GNI target?

This event will be balloted for in-person attendance. Register your interest to join and a confirmation email will be sent to you on Tuesday 25 May at 12:00 BST to confirm your place at the event.

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

A coffee reception will immediately follow this event.

The future of Europe post-Brexit 28 September 2021 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 August 2021 Online

In conversation with Michel Barnier, Chief Brexit Negotiator, European Union (2016-2019).

Drawing on the diary he kept during the 1600 days of complex and acrimonious Brexit negotiations, Michel Barnier explores the political and practical implications for Europe post-Brexit.

Britain’s departure from the European Union has been a long and difficult journey. Many questions remain about what future lies ahead for the UK and EU and the relations between them.

• To what extent were UK negotiating positions shaped by politics within the ruling Conservative government? How did domestic politics in EU member states shape EU positions? What were key turning points in the negotiations?
• What are the hopes and expectations for bilateral relations between the UK and EU states?
• What is the scope for UK – EU cooperation on transatlantic issues and relations with China

This event forms part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on Effective Multilateralism.

Read a transcript.

As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation. Attending this event and watching the full event video is for Chatham House members only. Not a member? Find out more.

Undercurrents: Europe's far-right educational institutions Audio bhorton.drupal 8 October 2021

In Hungary, France and Spain, new political movements from the far-right are attempting to reshape their education systems.

Under the supportive eye of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the recently established National University of Public Service seeks to embed nationalist illiberal values in a new generation of Hungarian students. Meanwhile in France and Spain, far-right public figure Marion Maréchal has turned away from the electoral politics of the Front Nationale to set up a new conservative research institute, ISSEP.

Both of these developments represent a challenge to the liberal values which underpin the existing international order. To find out more, Ben spoke with Professor Dorit Geva and Dr Felipe Santos, whose recent article in International Affairs considers the implications of this illiberal educational turn. 

The West must face down Putin The World Today MVieira 1 February 2022

If Russia’s ambitions are not checked, the implications will be global, warns James Nixey

After seven years of invasions, annexations, assassinations, abuses and now the current crisis in European security over the fate of Ukraine, one thing has been laid bare: the true nature of the Russian state.

Moscow made its ambition clear in mid-December with the unprecedented and public issuing of ultimatums in the form of draft treaty proposals.

Portrayed by Russia as an attempt to end Nato’s expansion eastwards, the Kremlin is in fact demanding that the United States and western institutions roll back their security guarantees to Eastern Europe. 

These are not two sides of the same coin if one believes and accepts the principles of the Helsinki Accords that the successor states to the Soviet Union are just as independent and sovereign as Russia.

Russia’s demands laid bare equate to giving it a free hand in Eastern Europe. This should not be reduced to simplistic labels such as ‘territorial expansionism’ or a ‘return to the Soviet Union’, both of which can be picked at for a lack of accuracy.

But it is, in Russia’s own words, the most explicit statement yet of its long-standing desire to return to a former age, where great powers directed their respective spheres of influence – a yearning for a time of empire and a disregard for the flow of history.

The intense diplomatic and media focus since then suggests there is a consensus that Russia has gone beyond being an awkward player at the negotiation table or a bully who can be dealt with further down the line.

But this has not as yet led to the operational conclusion that Russia must be challenged and ultimately faced down, no matter how unpalatable.

The logical response to the exposure of Russia’s true intentions would be an overhaul of western policy. Yet the West persists in its article of faith that dialogue with Russia will bring about a change in its behaviour – despite all evidence to the contrary. 

Western politicians have been anxious to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. But the Kremlin is likely to see this course of action as confirmation that it can proceed unchecked. When Moscow has chosen the path of conflict, efforts at dialogue rarely bring a peaceful resolution. 

Russia is blessed with particularly talented negotiators. While it has its fair share of angry ultra-nationalists who are easily dismissed, it also has more subtle brains at official and unofficial levels with whom western politicians are eager to engage to claim morsels of intelligence or to show that the Kremlin is not beyond redemption.

Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, is an intelligent and experienced man, who is adept at dismissing the protests of most of his western counterparts. In such circumstances, and with such a pressing need to avoid a war, dialogue must be tightly contained as it has the potential to lead to compromise in areas where there should be none.

Russia’s ambitions for a land empire

Eastern European states which were part of the Soviet Union or signatories to the Warsaw Pact are geographically closer to Russia and as a result more physically at risk. But their history and close relations with Moscow in the past have allowed them to acquire experience and expertise in dealing with their more powerful neighbour.

They uphold principled stances on sovereign rights, which has led the Kremlin to brand the Baltic states, Ukraine and more recently Moldova as traitors. To the West, on the other hand, they can often be seen as awkward or getting in the way.

While the sandwiched eastern states may have much to teach us about dealing with Russia, some central European countries have a closer relationship with Moscow. Serbia’s security services have recently been exposed as being under the influence of Russia’s own FSB, the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB, and have colluded in repressing Moscow’s political opponents. At the same time, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary continues to defy the European Union with its repressions and is one of the few states that looks to Russia as a model. 

What is at stake here is a basic grasp of the nature of relations between states in the 21st century. What Russia is insisting on is its right to a land empire which is entirely at odds with the principles of statehood that now govern Europe, and indeed much of the rest of the world.

By failing to address the real nature of Russia’s demands, Europe is avoiding critical decisions that will affect its future security for generations to come. The implications of that avoidance do not only affect Europe – they are global in importance. 

Other powers, most notably China, will watch closely how the West responds to Russia and gauge its willingness to support allies, friends and partners against aggression.

Any failure to respond firmly to Russia’s approach of demanding limits on the sovereignty of its neighbours, backed by the threat of military force, can only encourage similar strong-arm tactics elsewhere. It is notable that, from Chechnya to Syria, Russia has not yet suffered an unambiguous defeat when it has asserted its ambitions through military power. 

Resolving the incompatibility between the way Russia sees itself and what the rest of Europe views as the acceptable limits of Russian power will be a long, painful process. Facing down Russia will take skill, time, spine, money, grit and self-sacrifice. Sanctions, for example, hurt those imposing them as well as the receiver. These are attributes in short supply in what Russia considers to be the weak, decadent West. 

Since such resources are unlikely to be found, the unappetizing future for relations is most likely to involve Russia continuing to chip away at European sovereignty while its own structural flaws further weaken it to the point of irrelevance, or to push it to take ever more extreme risks.

Putin’s Eurasian dream may soon become a nightmare Expert comment NCapeling 3 May 2022

The Ukraine invasion has detrimental consequences for the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, a project which has been stumbling since its inception.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – consisting of Russia with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan – represents the culmination of Russia’s pursuit of regional integration with its post-Soviet neighbours.

Officially, the Union has an ambitious economic goal – the creation of a market based on common rules for its five member states and their 180 million citizens – and Russia likes to portray the EAEU as an Eurasian replica of the European Union (EU).

But although a common market was placed at the heart of the EAEU as a way to appeal to member states, it is of marginal importance for the Russian economy. For Moscow, the EAEU is primarily a geopolitical tool to help re-assert its regional and global role.

In a world of evermore powerful trading blocs, Moscow wants to use the EAEU to establish its own economic power base in the new polycentric world order. But Russia’s limited interest in the technocratic intricacies needed for the economic union to live up to its lofty proclamations exposes the real geopolitical ambitions.

The Kremlin has no qualms about disregarding the common rules when they clash with Russia’s own foreign policy, and it soon became evident the EAEU was a means to an end rather than an equitable institution within which Russia would accept constraints on its unilateral behaviour.

A crisis in the making

Although the EAEU has enabled some internal trade liberalization as well as the movement of people and labour to the benefit of its members reliant on labour migrant remittances, it has failed to tackle institutional barriers or promote growth and development policies.

It has been hampered by weak common institutions and a lack of institutional capacity of its member states, while Russia’s dubious commitment is also problematic. The EAEU lacks the institutional features of a genuine common market and any attempts to address these shortcomings have been essentially empty promises.

EAEU membership does benefit the political elites of its member states, because its hub-and-spoke model relies on bilateral high-level political deals between Russia and each member state individually. And by using the enticement of security guarantees and both political and financial support, Moscow has succeeded in attracting new members to join.

But a member’s political survival – or defence against political and economic reform – is dependent on military, economic, financial, and political support from Russia. This has been evidenced by the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, and by Russia’s backing of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus and the Tokayev government in Kazakhstan.

The design of the EAEU ties it to Russia’s own fate, and so the impact of harsh sanctions imposed on Russia for invading Ukraine are in stark evidence across its member states. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are reeling from the adverse effects on their domestic currencies and remittances, and the trade bans of key commodities.

And although the ban Russia imposed on grain export to EAEU members has softened, it shows the extent to which Russia was prepared to disregard the rules and sacrifice the EAEU to rescue its own economy. Members are incurring direct economic losses from Putin’s war against Ukraine and the fluctuation of the rouble has created a major impediment to trade with Russia.

Russia seems to increasingly view the Union as a convenient tool to bypass sanctions, with massive implications for its partner countries. And the supposed advantages of EAEU membership – enhanced trade, growth, and modernization – have simply not materialized.

Due to the rapid economic decline of Russia – a fall of 10-15 per cent is anticipated for 2022 – the EAEU is even less likely to deliver the promised economic benefits, while also putting members at risk of secondary sanctions.

The Ukraine invasion has also reignited domestic sensitivities and regional tensions. In Kazakhstan, Tokayev has failed to endorse Russia’s justification for the invasion and refuses to recognize the ‘independence’ of the separatist LNR and DNR.

Meanwhile Azerbaijan has pursued territorial gains in Nagorno-Karabakh while Russia is distracted by its invasion of Ukraine, and has requested the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping from the disputed territory.

Russia is keen for partner countries to help mitigate the economic impact of sanctions by providing alternative transit routes for imports to Russia. But the EAEU faces challenges even at its most basic level because the sharing of custom duties among member states was denominated in dollars, which Russia now wants to move away from.

No easy escape

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly reduces the benefits of Eurasian integration even further than before and imposes higher cost on the partner countries than were envisaged when they joined. They have been dragged into a geopolitical calamity over which they have no control – the inability of EAEU institutions to mediate or constrain Russia’s behaviour is stark.

War in Ukraine: Can the EU survive without Russian oil and gas? Audio NCapeling 5 May 2022

The fourth episode of our podcast mini-series examines how reliant the European Union (EU) is on Russian energy.

What would an all-out ban on Russian oil look like? Which countries would be most affected? Does this offer an opportunity for renewable energy?

Clips used: Bloomberg News

This episode was produced by Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.

Reshaping NATO for an uncertain future The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

A Chatham House expert panel outlines the challenges for delegates at the Madrid summit where the roadmap for the transatlantic alliance will be created

This year had already been earmarked as pivotal for the shape and direction of European security even before Russia, a nuclear superpower, rolled its tanks into Ukraine.

On the agenda at the NATO summit in Madrid in June is the Strategic Concept, which sets out the alliance’s direction and priorities for the next decade. There is much to discuss. From shared values to the state of the security environment, the Strategic Concept will have a direct impact on the global security landscape.

Ten years ago, the world was a very different place. The United States had just withdrawn from its bloody war in Iraq and was still embroiled in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban. In China, Xi Jinping was poised to become the next president, while refugees escaping the vicious civil war in Syria were heading towards Europe. In Africa, Islamist activity in Mali was about to spread throughout the Sahel.

Now, Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine rages on NATO’s doorstep, spurring the once neutral countries of Sweden and Finland to seek membership. How will Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine affect the western security agenda and what will be the shape of the new NATO that emerges from these talks?  To help answer these questions, The World Today convened a panel of Chatham House experts to consider what the next 10 years holds for NATO.

Here is what they said.

Alice Billon-Galland
We shouldn’t expect a revolution, but more an adaptation of reforms that have taken place at NATO for quite a long time, especially since the Wales summit in 2014. NATO allies will have to decide on the Russian threat perception and decide how they want to reinforce their deterrence and defence posture in the East, and how this affects their ability to maintain a 360-degree approach and to carry out the ambitious NATO 2030 agenda.

Patricia Lewis
We need to understand how deterrence works far better and we should have better metrics by now. Russia and NATO do not wish to engage in conventional warfare with each other, which suggests that Nato’s conventional deterrence is working. That said, Putin’s nuclear threats have not been within the framework of deterrence. But nuclear deterrence has not worked in the way strategists imagined since the end of the Cold War, and we need a much clearer hard look at these weapons once this is all over.

Had we followed through on disarmament in the 1990s, Putin would have held very little sway today. Nuclear weapons and despots are not a good mix and with these weapons there are no small mistakes. We would be foolish to imagine that rationality will hold when it comes to nuclear decision-making.

It is time to put arms control back on the agenda and strengthen our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. We need to put the elimination of these weapons back on the UN Security Council agenda.

Andrew Dorman
Finland and Sweden coming into NATO completely transforms the Baltic. It makes the deployment of reinforcements to the Baltic states an awful lot easier. From the Kremlin’s point of view, the last thing they want is another border with NATO. Russia is already overly committed and hasn’t got enough forces to deal with Ukraine. Its border with Finland is enormous. And NATO would be gaining two very robust, well-organized military forces. You are seeing a lot more NATO assets starting to look at the high north.

Hans Kundnani
I am actually slightly less worried about the Russian threat to NATO countries than I was before February 24. The war has demonstrated how weak the Russian military is, and so the idea that it might present a threat to Finland and Sweden seems less plausible than before. It is not even clear to me that Russia could do very much in other south-eastern European countries. It already seems pretty overstretched. This should make us more relaxed, rather than more worried, about threats to other countries and in particular to NATO countries or to Finland and Sweden.

Leslie Vinjamuri
Sweden and Finland moving forward with their requests for membership is a sign of success for the West, but it also raises important questions for the future of European security. The possibility that we lock in a division that might suit Europe and the United States now does not bode well for a Russia maybe 10 years out or with a different leader.

Alice Billon-Galland
We need to avoid mission creep, but we also need to avoid going back to a position where NATO only focuses on Russia and then set an agenda for 10 years based on that threat assessment alone. We will risk missing out on the next big challenge if we go back on something too specific. We risk being reactive, whereas the Strategic Concept is an exercise that should be proactive and provide a space for transatlantic partners to share broader common security concerns.

Patricia Lewis
NATO is open to all countries in the transatlantic area, and it is even possible that Russia could join in the future should they wish to apply. But it is important to remember that NATO is a political-military alliance, and its politics are fundamental to its cohesion, far more than that of any weapon system or a specific enemy. It will continue to address a wider range of threats as it has in, for example, Afghanistan and many of those will be directly related to the impacts of climate change.

One thing to note, in light of Russia’s nuclear threats, is that NATO’s characterization of itself as a ‘nuclear alliance’ should be revised. NATO needs to be resilient to ebbs and flows of weapon systems and not become over-reliant on one system which has recently demonstrated severe negative impacts.

Hans Kundnani
During the Cold War, what held the alliance together was a shared perception of a threat from the Soviet Union – not a set of shared values. After all, there were authoritarian states in NATO. After the end of the Cold War that overwhelming sense of a shared threat from the Soviet Union disappeared and NATO tried to reinvent itself as a community alliance of democracies with shared values.

But we now once again have authoritarian states in NATO. So it was really in danger of being pulled apart. The war in Ukraine has refocused NATO on its original, historic mission: collective security in relation to Russia. In that sense it has given NATO a lifeline.

Creon Butler
Shared values are still an awful lot stronger as an element of what ties NATO together now than they were in the past. I think you now have the threat perception coming back full force. But I still think you have that very strong element of values, indeed the extra countries that are coming in are very strong democratic countries.

The interesting question is the out-of-area stuff – the Afghanistan-related stuff and counterterrorism more generally, and how important those threats remain. I guess there is an element to that which is a global kind of threat, counterterrorism, but there is also the out-of-area activity which obviously has been transformed following the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Alice Billon-Galland
The crisis management mandate needs to be looked at again with some of the lessons learnt after Afghanistan and Libya, especially given what happened in Kabul, and all the discussion around cooperative security. The question is not only how do we work with partners and countries in the region, but how do we want to engage with China, for instance? How do we want to work on new technologies? How do we want to work with the European Union, with the United Nations?

The alliance must decide what it wants to do versus  what it wants to set aside and have other organizations do, while it refocuses on its core historic tasks.

Andrew Dorman
One of the sensitive, ongoing debates within NATO is whether it has a global role or whether it has a more transatlantic role. There are divisions within NATO about which is its focus. I think the answer, to a degree, is both. One of the real challenges for policymakers, particularly the Biden administration, is that they are going to be pushing for NATO to act as a global player.

This is one of the dilemmas that NATO faces. It could spend all its time focused purely on the short term – that is Russia –  and ignore China, and then suddenly need to think, ‘Oh heck’. What happens if , as a result of this, Russia is essentially dropped into the China camp and Putin becomes Xi Jinping’s poodle? That is a real dilemma, and why I think the US is going to focus on a global NATO.

Leslie Vinjamuri
NATO may have a role to play in Washington’s China strategy. But it won’t be the most important institution. The Biden administration is relying on multiple frameworks for engaging in the Indo-Pacific. For example, the Quad – a partnership between the US, Japan, India and Australia – is designed to secure India’s participation. Pulling India into the region where it has economic power, influence, military and security capabilities and can move the needle. It is both an intelligent and pragmatic strategy to have a number of groupings, a patchwork of overlapping partnerships, including existing alliances. That seems right to me.

Patricia Lewis
It is unlikely that the US would want to create a global NATO. The US and its allies in other regions may wish to model future alliances on NATO, that have strong relationships with it in areas such as political coherence, interoperability, and joint training and exercises and such. But political decision-making would be better suited to sit within specific regional contexts.

Washington has formal alliances in the Indo-Pacific region that commit the US to, for example, the defence of Australia through the Anzus security treaty, as well as Japan. As Washington increases its focus on the Pacific, the existing political-military relationships in the region could become more coherent. We might see a version of a Pacific-Asia Treaty Organization emerge – a Pato. All this depends on how China uses its power and how perspectives in the region evolve.

Creon Butler
I am not sure it is a problem that NATO does not have a specific focus on dealing with the China threat. It potentially has a role in dealing with those things that are seen by the membership as common threats. Which clearly is Russia now but has added terrorism in the past and may well include other things. China is not a common threat in the way that Russia is perceived to be. Of course, something could happen, not least something with Taiwan, which would change that, but that is not where NATO is at present.

Alice Billon-Galland
I think we should really avoid a false dichotomy between ‘NATO should do only Russia’ and ‘NATO should do everything’ because there are lots of activities in the middle where the alliance can bring some added value – and that is exactly what we should be discussing. The issue around China and NATO is being completely overblown. We need to be very clear that the purpose of NATO is to defend the Euro-Atlantic space, but that may include keeping an eye on ‘when China comes to us’, as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg often says.

Hans Kundnani
None of the regional partners in Asia that you need to deal with the China challenge are in NATO – and can’t be – so it is just the wrong vehicle to deal with the Indo-Pacific. But there is also a bit of a tension here between Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic. People in Asia also look at the different threat perceptions in completely different ways than we do in Europe. There are a number of reasons why people in India do not support the war in the Ukraine, but one of them is that they see China, not Russia, as the real threat.

Andrew Dorman
I think so much of the debate we have had so far is about political NATO as supposed to military NATO. One of its key roles is how military forces operate, engage and conduct operations, plan operations through deterrents and so forth. NATO as the template of the West does work. That is why it is in the interest of the US to keep this going. It is one of the ways of making sure, for example, the US Pacific fleet remains compatible with the US Atlantic fleet by forcing them to operate the same system, which is the NATO system.

It is one of the things the American forces learnt out of Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a NATO way which is a global footprint. NATO’s role within the African Union is as a template for peacekeeping operations. You have got the likes of Australia and South Korea and Japan very much integrated into NATO. It doesn’t have to be a formal political NATO, but it does strike me to be in the interest of the West to have them reach forces capable of operating with one another.

Patricia Lewis
One of the most interesting developments in the past year has been the creation of Aukus, the security pact between Australia, Britain and the United States. That grew out of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership which led to the need to develop new, interoperable equipment such as nuclear-powered submarines. We will have to see how it develops, but maybe it could be the start of a PATO in the region.  

Creon Butler
In the current situation, we have a crucial partnership between NATO and the EU over Russia, in terms of the long-term future they hold out for Ukraine, but also with the G7 because that is the place to organize the financial support for Ukraine and the economic and financial sanctions against Russia. They are different memberships but the combination of the EU, G7 and NATO is an absolutely crucial alliance of different alliances, with different memberships serving different purposes but having an overall impact that can potentially be very effective.

Leslie Vinjamuri
We work with the institutions that we have, but not always with a clear recognition of their limitations. We are facing a dark moment for the UN Security Council, with one of its founder members blatantly violating the UN’s most important norm. Yet many people in the rest of the world say, ‘Yes, but in 2003, the United States violated Iraq’s sovereignty …’ Where the West sees moral clarity, and so condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is an assumption by much of the rest of the world of moral equivalence between these two invasions.

Working through the UN Security Council is going to be difficult for some time. This means that states are probably going to find different strategies for working around, rather than through, the Security Council.

Russia's war: How will it shape the region's future? 1 December 2022 — 9:00AM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 August 2022 Chatham House and Online

This conference takes a deep-dive into the implications of the war for the wider region.

You will receive an email in advance of the conference with further details on accessing the event.

The video on this page is of the opening session only. To view all the session videos, please visit the conference playlist on YouTube.

How will Russia’s war shape the region’s future?

Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine is on such a scale that it will have a seismic effect on all the countries that once formed the Soviet empire. Vladimir Putin’s decisions have accelerated trends across the region leading to unintended consequences.

Now it is more crucial than ever – not only for those concerned with the region’s economic and democratic development, but for all those with a stake in the future security of Europe.

For some states, this will mean a faster break from the legacy of the USSR and from Russia’s ‘Geopathological embrace‘ while, for others, maybe even a fresh start at democracy and good governance.

In isolated cases, the war will conceivably hasten assimilation with Russia. But the two principal combatants, Ukraine and Russia, will diverge even further. Ukraine, though fighting for its survival now, will at least get the opportunity to ‘build back better’ if it achieves some form of victory.

Whatever the course of the war, however, Russia’s aspirations to be a global power again are doomed as it is gradually deglobalized from Western structures.

This conference analyses:

• How Russia’s war will affect the broader regional economy and whether this will hasten Vladimir Putin’s exit
• What to hope for, what to fear and the key trends that will dominate the region going forward.
• Unique expertise in an independent forum on what’s at stake for Europe. 

How Russia’s war affects politics in southeast Europe 4 April 2023 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 March 2023 Online

This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe.

This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe. How have the governments and publics responded to the war?

The panel will discuss Russia’s goals and leverage in the region, including the impact of its disinformation campaigns. Are the governments reassessing their foreign policy options?

The granting of EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova has brought attention to the stalled accession process in the Western Balkans. What lessons from the Western Balkans can be applied in Ukraine and Moldova? Have new linkages emerged between the two regions?

Africa and Europe: Climate security for the future 20 April 2023 TO 21 April 2023 — 7:30AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 March 2023 Slovenia and Online

The 12th Africa Day International Conference hosted in Slovenia offers a platform for interregional exchange and policy cooperation between African and European countries on climate security.

The 12th Africa Day International Conference offers a platform for inter-regional exchange and cooperation to further contribute to progress on climate security.

The 12th Africa Day International Conference is hosted by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, in collaboration with the European Commission and the Chatham House Africa Programme. This high-level annual event seeks to improve policy outcomes for citizens in Europe and Africa on the basis of mutual understanding and cooperation between the two regions, while strengthening bilateral relations between Slovenia and African countries.

Climate change poses one of the most serious threats to global security. No individual country or region can face it alone; strong regional and international partnerships are crucial. Analysing risk and taking action can help towards achieving a number of SDGs and a more secure and sustainable future. Addressing climate security is essential for the well-being and future stability of nations and societies around the world, and for the global community as a whole.

This conference will offer a platform for interregional exchange and cooperation on the topic of climate security policy. It will bring together decision-makers and experts from Europe, Africa and across the globe to identify the key challenges and policy priorities in addressing climate security.

The conference will be broadcast live on the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage, and on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Fibroblast activation protein (FAP) is abundantly expressed in the stroma of most human solid tumors. Clinical-stage radiolabeled FAP ligands are increasingly used as tools for the detection of various cancer lesions. To unleash the full therapeutic potential of FAP-targeting agents, ligands need to remain at the tumor site for several days after administration. We recently described the discovery of OncoFAP, a high-affinity small organic ligand of FAP with a rapid accumulation in tumors and low uptake in healthy tissues in cancer patients. Trimerization of OncoFAP provided a derivative (named TriOncoFAP, or OncoFAP-23) with improved FAP affinity. In this work, we evaluated the tissue biodistribution profile and the therapeutic performance of OncoFAP-23 in tumor-bearing mice. Methods: OncoFAP-23 was radiolabeled with the theranostic radionuclide ¹⁷⁷Lu. Preclinical experiments were conducted on mice bearing SK-RC-52.hFAP (BALB/c nude mice) or CT-26.hFAP (BALB/c mice) tumors. ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP and ¹⁷⁷Lu-FAP-2286 were included in the biodistribution study as controls. Toxicologic evaluation was performed on Wistar rats and CD1 mice by injecting high doses of OncoFAP-23 or its cold-labeled counterpart, respectively. Results: ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP-23 emerged for its best-in-class biodistribution profile, high and prolonged tumor uptake (i.e., ~16 percentage injected dose/g at 96 h), and low accumulation in healthy organs, which correlates well with its potent single-agent anticancer activity at low levels of administered radioactivity. Combination treatment with the tumor-targeted interleukin 2 (L19-IL2, a clinical-stage immunocytokine) further expands the therapeutic window of ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP-23 by potentiating its in vivo antitumor activity. Proteomics studies revealed a potent tumor-directed immune response on treatment with the combination. OncoFAP-23 and ^natLu-OncoFAP-23 exhibited a favorable toxicologic profile, without showing any side effects or signs of toxicity. Conclusion: OncoFAP-23 presents enhanced tumor uptake and tumor retention and low accumulation in healthy organs, findings that correspond to a strongly improved in vivo antitumor efficacy. The data presented in this work support the clinical development of ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP-23 for the treatment of FAP-positive solid tumors.

To date, the imaging and diagnosis of hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) rely on CT/MRI, which have well-known limitations. Glypican-3 (GPC3) is a cell surface receptor highly expressed by HCC but not by normal or cirrhotic liver tissue. Here we report initial clinical results of GPC3-targeted PET imaging with [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-DOTA-RYZ-GPC3 (RAYZ-8009), a peptide-based GPC3 ligand in patients with known or suspected HCC. Methods: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 was obtained after labeling the peptide precursor with ⁶⁸Ga from a ⁶⁸Ge/⁶⁸Ga generator and heating at 90°C for 10 min followed by sterile filtration. After administration of [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009, a dynamic or static PET/CT scan was acquired between 45 min and 4 h after administration. Radiotracer uptake was measured by SUVs for the following tissues: suspected or actual HCC or hepatoblastoma lesions, non–tumor-bearing liver, renal cortex, blood pool in the left ventricle, and gastric fundus. Additionally, tumor–to–healthy-liver ratios (TLRs) were calculated. Results: Twenty-four patients (5 patients in the dynamic protocol; 19 patients in the static protocol) were scanned. No adverse events occurred. Two patients had no lesion detected and did not have HCC during follow-up. In total, 50 lesions were detected and analyzed. The mean SUV_max of these lesions was 19.6 (range, 2.7–95.3), and the mean SUV_mean was 10.1 (range, 1.0–49.2) at approximately 60 min after administration. Uptake in non–tumor-bearing liver and blood pool rapidly decreased over time and became negligible 45 min after administration (mean SUV_mean, <1.6), with a continuous decline to 4 h after administration (mean SUV_mean, 1.0). The opposite was observed for HCC lesions, for which SUVs and TLRs continuously increased for up to 4 h after administration. In individual lesion analysis, TLR was the highest between 60 and 120 min after administration. Uptake in the gastric fundus gradually increased for up to 45 min (to an SUV_max of 31.3) and decreased gradually afterward. Conclusion: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 is safe and allows for high-contrast imaging of GPC3-positive HCC, with rapid clearance from most normal organs. Thereby, [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 is promising for HCC diagnosis and staging. Further research is warranted.

Single-domain antibodies (sdAbs) demonstrate favorable pharmacokinetic profiles for molecular imaging applications. However, their renal excretion and retention are obstacles for applications in targeted radionuclide therapy (TRT). Methods: Using a click-chemistry–based pretargeting approach, we aimed to reduce kidney retention of a fibroblast activation protein α (FAP)–targeted sdAb, 4AH29, for ¹⁷⁷Lu-TRT. Key pretargeting parameters (sdAb-injected mass and lag time) were optimized in healthy mice and U87MG (FAP⁺) xenografts. A TRT study in a pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma (PDAC) patient-derived xenograft (PDX) model was performed as a pilot study for sdAb-based pretargeting applications. Results: Modification of 4AH29 with trans-cyclooctene (TCO) moieties did not modify the sdAb pharmacokinetic profile. A 200-µg injected mass of 4AH29-TCO and an 8-h lag time for the injection of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-PEG₇-tetrazine resulted in the highest kidney therapeutic index (2.0 ± 0.4), which was 5-fold higher than that of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-4AH29 (0.4 ± 0.1). FAP expression in the tumor microenvironment was validated in a PDAC PDX model with both immunohistochemistry and PET/CT imaging. Mice treated with the pretargeting high-activity approach (4AH29-TCO + [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-PEG₇-tetrazine; 3 x 88 MBq, 1 injection per week for 3 wk) demonstrated prolonged survival compared with the vehicle control and conventionally treated ([¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-4AH29; 3 x 37 MBq, 1 injection per week for 3 wk) mice. Mesangial expansion was reported in 7 of 10 mice in the conventional cohort, suggesting treatment-related kidney morphologic changes, but was not observed in the pretargeting cohort. Conclusion: This study validates pretargeting to mitigate sdAbs’ kidney retention with no observation of morphologic changes on therapy regimen at early time points. Clinical translation of click-chemistry–based pre-TRT is warranted on the basis of its ability to alleviate toxicities related to biovectors’ intrinsic pharmacokinetic profiles. The absence of representative animal models with extensive stroma and high FAP expression on cancer-associated fibroblasts led to a low mean tumor-absorbed dose even with high injected activity and consequently to modest survival benefit in this PDAC PDX.

Cancer of unknown primary (CUP) represents a heterogeneous group of metastatic tumors for which standardized diagnostic work-up fails to identify the primary site. We aimed to describe the Peter MacCallum Cancer Centre experience with ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT in extracervical CUP with respect to detection of a primary site and its impact on management. A secondary aim was to compare overall survival (OS) in patients with and without a detected primary site. Methods: CUP patients treated between 2014 and 2020 were identified from medical oncology clinics and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT records. Information collated from electronic medical records included the suspected primary site and treatment details before and after ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT. Clinicopathologic details and genomic analysis were used to determine the clinically suspected primary site and compared against 2 independent masked reads of ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT images by nuclear medicine specialists to determine sensitivity, specificity, accuracy, and the rate of detection of the primary site. Results: We identified 147 patients, 65% of whom had undergone molecular profiling. The median age at diagnosis was 61 y (range, 20–84 y), and the median follow-up time was 74 mo (range, 26–83 mo). Eighty-two percent were classified as having an unfavorable CUP subtype as per international guidelines.¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT demonstrated a primary site detection rate of 41%, resulted in a change in management in 22%, and identified previously occult disease sites in 37%. Median OS was 16.8 mo for all patients and 104.7 and 12.1 mo for favorable and unfavorable CUP subtypes, respectively (P < 0.0001). Median OS in CUP patients when using ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT, clinicopathologic, and genomic information was 19.8 and 8.5 mo when a primary site was detected and not detected, respectively (P = 0.016). Multivariable analysis of survival adjusted for age and sex remained significant for identification of a potential primary site (P < 0.001), a favorable CUP (P < 0.001), and an Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group status of 1 or less (P < 0.001). Conclusion: ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT plays a complementary role in CUP diagnostic work-up and was able to determine the likely primary site in 41% of cases. OS is improved with primary site identification, demonstrating the value of access to diagnostic ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT for CUP patients.

Webinar: Turkey’s Challenging Post-COVID 19 Outlook 7 May 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 April 2020

Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy: A story of mutual creation? 1 November 2022 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 October 2022 Online

Panellists discuss the link between Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies under President Erdoğan.

From Turkey’s ongoing rapprochement with its erstwhile Middle Eastern antagonists to its Syria policy and earlier approach towards the West, there has been extensive discussion on the domestic drivers behind Ankara’s foreign policy.

Less discussed but no less important is how Turkish foreign affairs have shaped its internal politics. Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s foreign and domestic policies have mutually reshaped each other.

In this webinar, launching Gönül Tol’s new book Erdoğan’s War: A Strongman’s Struggle at Home and in Syria, panellists will take stock of how Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies under the leadership of President Erdoğan have influenced and shaped each other. Speakers will also discuss the internal drivers behind Turkey’s current reset in relations with the Middle East, and examine how Ankara’s foreign affairs play into the country’s political and identity fault lines.

The event will be held on the record and will be live-streamed on the MENA Programme’s Facebook page.

Earlier this month, the United States and the Republic of Korea reached an agreement on greater cooperation on civil nuclear energy projects, the U.S. Department of Energy said this week.

Prognosticators anticipate the Federal Reserve on Thursday will announce a second rate cut after lowering the federal lending rate by 0.5% in September.

Planet Fitness is seeking to further grow its number of locations in a second bid for the Blink Fitness chain of workout facilities, according to new reports.

As Nissan on Thursday reported a roughly half-billion- dollar revenue drop in 2024, the Japanese automaker said it will cut 9,000 jobs and reduce manufacturing capacity by 20%.

SpaceX has reportedly struck a deal with LG Energy Solution Ltd. to supply cylindrical lithium-ion batteries for Elon Musk's Starship rocket, expected to launch early next year, according to industry sources.

Genetic-testing lab 23andMe plans to cut its workforce by 40% and end its therapeutics program in an effort to cut costs, the company announced Monday.

Costco voluntarily recalled 79,200 pounds of two types of its store-brand butter over the past month because their labels may not have said the products contain milk.

2025 Luis J. Alvarez and Admiral Grace M. Hopper Postdoc Fellowship in Computing Sciences - 102564 Division: AC-Computing Luis J. Alvarez Postdoctoral Fellowship and Admiral Grace M. Hopper Postdoctoral Fellowship in Computing Sciences The Computing Sciences Area (https://cs.lbl.gov/) at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (https://www.lbl.gov) is now accepting applications for two distinguished postdoctoral fellowships in Computing Sciences: • Luis W. Alvarez Postdoctoral Fellowship, and • Admiral Grace M. Hopper Postdoctoral Fellowship. Researchers in computer science, mathematics, data science, or any computational science discipline who have received their Ph.D. no earlier than January 1, 2022 but no later than September 30, 2025 are encouraged to apply. Only one (1) application is needed and it will be considered for both postdoctoral fellowships. The successful candidates will participate in research activities in computer science, mathematics, data science, or any computational science discipline of interest to the Computing Sciences Area and Berkeley Lab. Alvarez Fellows apply advances in computer science, mathematics, computational science, data science, machine learning or AI to computational modeling, simulations, and advanced data analytics for scientific discovery in materials science, biology, astronomy, environmental science, energy, particle physics, genomics, and other scientific domains. Hopper Fellows concentrate on the development and optimization of scientific and engineering applications leveraging high-speed network capability provided by the Energy Sciences Network or run on next-generation high performance computing and data systems hosted by the National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center at Berkeley Lab. Since its founding in 2002, Berkeley Lab’s Luis W. Alvarez Postdoctoral Fellowship (go.lbl.gov/alvarez) has cultivated exceptional early career scientists who have gone on to make outstanding contributions to computer science, mathematics, data science, and computational sciences. The Admiral Grace Hopper Postdoctoral Fellowship (go.lbl.gov/hopper) was first awarded in 2015 with the goal of enabling early career scientists to make outstanding contributions in computer science and high performance computing (HPC) research. About Computing Sciences at Berkeley Lab: Whether running extreme-scale simulations on a supercomputer or applying machine-learning or data analysis to massive datasets, scientists today rely on advances in and integration across applied mathematics, computer science, and computational science, as well as large-scale computing and networking facilities, to increase our understanding of ourselves, our planet, and our universe. Berkeley Labs Computing Sciences Area researches, develops, and deploys new tools and technologies to meet these needs and to advance research in our core capabilities of applied mathematics, computer science, data science, and computational science. In addition to fundamental advances in our core capabilities, we impact such areas as astrophysics and cosmology, accelerator physics, chemical science and materials science, combustion, fusion energy, nuclear physics, biology, climate change, and HPC systems and network technology. Research areas in Computing Sciences include but are not limited to: • Developing scientific applications and software technologies for extreme-scale and energy-efficient • Developing mathematical modeling for complex scientific problems • Designing algorithms to improve the performance of scientific applications • Researching digital and post-digital computer architectures for science • Developing and advancing extreme-scale scientific data management, analysis, and visualization • Developing and advancing next-generation machine learning, AI, and data science approaches for science • Advancing quantum computing and networking technologies, software, algorithms and applications • Evaluating or developing new and promising HPC systems and networking technologies • Researching methods to control and manage next-generation networks • Managing scientific data and workflows in distributed environments Qualifications: • Requires a Ph.D. in computer science, mathematics, computational science, or related discipline. • Candidates must have no more than 3 years of Postdoctoral Researcher or similar experience. • Expertise with advanced algorithms, software techniques, HPC systems and/or networking in a related research field. • Demonstrated creativity and the ability to perform independent research. • Demonstrated excellence in a related research field. • Ability to develop new cross-disciplinary partnerships that use advanced computational and/or mathematical techniques to produce unique lab capabilities. • Excellent communication skills with the ability to facilitate communications and collaborations with internal and external stakeholders. Additional Desired Qualifications: • Knowledge of advanced computing and high-performance computing. Application Process: 1. As part of your application process, you must upload and submit the following materials with your online application. 1. Cover letter 2. CV, with publication list included 3. Research Statement (no more than five (5) pages in length when printed using standard letter-size (8.5 inch x 11 inch) paper with 1-inch margins (top, bottom, left, and right) and a font size not smaller than 11 point; figures and references cited, if included, must fit within the five-page limit) 4. Contact information (name, affiliation, and email address) of at least three (3) individuals who will be able to provide letters of reference. 2. Application deadline: October 31, 2024. * It is highly advisable that you have all the required application materials and information ready and available prior to completing and submitting your application. Your application will not be considered complete if any of the above information is missing. Tentative Application Timeline: The Computing Sciences Fellowship Selection Committee is made up of a diverse representation of scientists and engineers across Berkeley Lab’s Computing Sciences Area who will conduct a thorough review of all applications received. • Application deadline: October 31, 2024 • Review and Selection: October 2024 - December 2024 • Decisions made: January/February 2025 Want to learn more about working at Berkeley Lab? Please visit: careers.lbl.gov How To Apply Apply directly online at http://50.73.55.13/counter.php?id=290341 and follow the on-line instructions to complete the application process. Berkeley Lab is committed to inclusion, diversity, equity and accessibility and strives to continue building community with these shared values and commitments. Berkeley Lab is an Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Employer. We heartily welcome applications from women, minorities, veterans, and all who would contribute to the Labs mission of leading scientific discovery, inclusion, and professionalism. In support of our diverse global community, all qualified applicants will be considered for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability, age, or protected veteran status. Equal Opportunity and IDEA Information Links: Know your rights, click here (http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/posters/ofccpost.htm) for the supplement: Equal Employment Opportunity is the Law and the Pay Transparency Nondiscrimination Provision (https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ofccp/pdf/pay-transp_%20English_formattedESQA508c.pdf) under 41 CFR 60-1.4.

CAMBRIDGE, England, Oct. 15, 2024 — Nu Quantum has announced a proof-of-principle prototype that advances the development of modular, distributed quantum computers by enabling connections across different qubit modalities and […]

The post Nu Quantum Unveils Qubit-Photon Interface to Enable Distributed Quantum Computing Networks appeared first on HPCwire.

CHANDLER, Ariz., Oct. 23, 2024 — The global edge computing market is expected to grow by more than 30 percent in the next five years, serving mission-critical applications in the […]

The post Microchip Expands 64-Bit Portfolio with High-Performance PIC64HX Microprocessors for Edge Computing appeared first on HPCwire.

HANOVER, Md., Nov. 5, 2024 — Ciena has announced that its optical and routing and switching innovations will once again support the SCinet network at SC24, taking place November 17–22 […]

The post Ciena Powers SC24’s SCinet with High-Speed Connectivity and Advanced Optical Solutions appeared first on HPCwire.

Oct. 24, 2024 — The San Diego Supercomputer Center (SDSC), part of the School of Computing, Information and Data Sciences at UC San Diego, has been leading the Open Storage Network (OSN) program for years, and along […]

The post SDSC Leads Expansion of Open Storage Network to More Campus Computing Sites appeared first on HPCwire.

A hologram of a sex worker who was murdered in Amsterdam more than a decade ago could help solve the cold case, investigators hope.

Zapata Computing, which was founded in 2017 as a Harvard spinout specializing in quantum software and later pivoted to an AI focus, is ceasing operations, according to an SEC filing […]

The post Zapata Computing, Early Quantum-AI Software Specialist, Ceases Operations appeared first on HPCwire.

Oct. 22, 2024 — In September, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced $65 million in funding for research to advance quantum computing at more than 20 institutions across the nation. […]

The post Argonne Scientists Receive DOE Awards to Advance Quantum Computing appeared first on HPCwire.

RICHLAND, Wash.—Some computing challenges are so big that it’s necessary to go all in. That’s the approach a diverse team of scientists and computing experts led by the Department of Energy’s […]

The post PNNL-Microsoft Collaborate on Cloud Computing for Chemistry, More to Come appeared first on HPCwire.

Last week NSF issued a request for the next round of proposals for its Quantum Leap Challenge Institutes (QLCI). First established in 2020, the QLCI program, as directed by National […]

The post NSF Seeks Proposals for Next Round of Quantum Leap Challenge Institutes appeared first on HPCwire.

The demand for high-performance computing (HPC) and artificial intelligence (AI) is rising dramatically as organizations rush to put their data to work. Several industries see a significant increase in HPC […]

The post Harness Insights with Cutting-edge AI Capabilities from HPE appeared first on HPCwire.

How can manufacturers apply lessons learned from the dawn of the “Exascale Era” to Computer-Aided Engineering to achieve results like never before? Join Addison Snell, CEO, Intersect360 Research, Bill Mannel, VP, High Performance […]

The post Leveraging Exascale Era Technology for Advanced Computer-Aided Engineering appeared first on HPCwire.

Oct. 29, 2024 — ORCA Computing today announced the unveiling of the PT-2, the latest advancement in its PT Series of photonic quantum systems. Building on the success of the […]

The post ORCA Computing Unveils PT-2 to Integrate Quantum Computing with Generative AI and HPC appeared first on HPCwire.

Oct. 29, 2024 — NVIDIA has announced that xAI’s Colossus supercomputer cluster comprising 100,000 NVIDIA Hopper GPUs in Memphis, Tennessee, achieved this massive scale by using the NVIDIA Spectrum-X Ethernet […]

The post NVIDIA Ethernet Networking Accelerates xAI’s Colossus AI Supercomputer appeared first on HPCwire.

Oct. 31, 2024 — Giga Computing, a subsidiary of GIGABYTE and a leader in generative AI servers and advanced cooling technologies, will participate in today’s AI Accelerator Skyscraper Congress, hosted […]

The post GIGABYTE Joins AI Accelerator Skyscraper Congress to Highlight Sustainable Supercomputing Advances appeared first on HPCwire.

A South Carolina woman ended up calling the police for help after she walked into her apartment's bathroom and found a large ball python behind her toilet.

Police in a small South Carolina town are warning residents to keep their doors and windows locked after 43 monkeys escaped from a research facility.

A black bear with a sweet tooth visited the front porch of a Connecticut home to raid a bowl of Halloween candy and steal a pumpkin.

June 24, 2024 — Haiqu, a quantum computing startup, announced the release of its new open-source toolkit – Rivet. This new toolkit is made to help developers streamline the execution of […]

The post Haiqu Releases Open-Source Rivet for Quantum Workflow Execution appeared first on HPCwire.

Australian Defense Minister Peter Dutton called for alliances to protect the nations and people of the Indo-Pacific region.

COLLEGE PARK, Md., Nov. 11, 2024 — IonQ, a leader in the quantum computing industry, has announced that it is developing photonic integrated circuits (PICs) and chip-scale ion trap technology for […]

The post IonQ Partners with imec to Advance Quantum Computers with Photonic Integrated Circuits appeared first on HPCwire.

Data center infrastructure running AI and HPC workloads requires powerful microprocessor chips and the use of CPUs, GPUs, and acceleration chips to carry out compute intensive tasks. AI and HPC […]

The post QCT QoolRack: An Optimized Liquid Cooling Solution for HPC/AI Workloads appeared first on HPCwire.