High-profile entities in India have become the target of malicious campaigns orchestrated by the Pakistan-based Transparent Tribe threat actor and a previously unknown China-nexus cyber espionage group dubbed IcePeony. The intrusions linked to Transparent Tribe involve the use of a malware called ElizaRAT and a new stealer payload dubbed ApoloStealer on specific victims of interest, Check Point

Two projects — one that maps the function of the brain’s neuronal network in unprecedented detail and another that combines robotics and light-based computer circuits to create safe self-driving vehicles — have been awarded funding through Princeton’s Eric and Wendy Schmidt Transformative Technology Fund.

Craig B. Arnold has been named Princeton’s first University Innovation Officer and heads the new office.

Charles (Charlie) Tennyson has been appointed Princeton’s new director of Transportation and Parking Services following a national search to fill the position. He previously served for five years as deputy director of the department.

Thirteen Princeton University faculty members were transferred to emeritus status in recent action by the Board of Trustees.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Exhibition co-curated by Princeton professor Deana Lawson and Michael Famighetti, editor-in-chief of Aperture magazine. Featuring work by 23 artists who explore the poetics of photography, its instability, and its latent potential. Hurley Gallery open daily 10 AM - 8 PM. Gallery closed 11/28-12/1 for Thanksgiving; reopens 12/2-5.

Life is like a mirror. Everything you see has a reflection. It can be good or bad. It can be both. We are exposed to a lot of negatives with the widespread use of the internet and social media platforms. Also, we have received a ton of positives we can take advantage of in everyday ... Read more

The post Unleash Your Potential: How Fitness Challenges Can Transform Your Life appeared first on Star Two.

New evidence suggests that the larger system the Gulf Stream is part of is approaching a tipping point that could cause dramatic shifts in global weather patterns.

The new film Emilia Pérez follows a Mexican cartel leader (Karla Sofía Gascón) who was assigned male at birth but transitions to become her true self as a woman.

This Spanish-language musical about a cartel boss who undergoes gender-affirming surgery won two big prizes at Cannes, including a shared best actress award for its four women leads.

Emilia Pérez is Netflix's new divisive musical about a Mexican cartel boss who disappears from the criminal underworld to create a new life as a woman. But when her love for her kids proves overpowering, she ingratiates herself back into their lives, posing as a distant relative. The movie stars Karla Sofía Gascón, Zoe Saldaña, and Selena Gomez.

For a second time, Kari Lake has been denied a win in an election.  First, it was for governor of Arizona, which was clearly due to election and voter fraud.  Now, it appears something similar occurred in her race against Ruben Gallego.  Now, the head of her campaign is speaking out and saying that there …

Check out the significant signings and departures in the Premier League, Scottish Premiership, EFL and Women's Super League.

1. PM Modi’s Rs 12,100 crore infrastructure push to transform Bihar’s railways and roadways – Here’s all you need to know  The Financial Express
2. PM Modi to visit Bihar on Wednesday, inaugurate projects worth Rs 12,100 Cr  Deccan Herald
3. PM Modi lays foundation stone for AIIMS Darbhanga, says NDA Govt committed to welfare of people  The Hindu
4. PM Modi Bihar Visit Live: Nitish Kumar removed 'jungle raj' in Bihar, says PM Modi in Darbhanga  Moneycontrol
5. Politics News Today Live Updates on November 13, 2024: ‘BJP trying to create controversy’: Karnataka Deputy CM Shivakumar on ‘Kaalia’ remark against Kumaraswamy  Mint

With so few words, most of them kid-friendly, it should be a piece of cake. But it depends on who’s holding the whisk. Translator Daniel Hahn say,"I believe my job as a translator is to preserve all the dimensions of a book, not just one of them. When I find complexity, my job is to keep complexity, or more accurately to reconstruct it. And some of the most complex books I’ve reconstructed have been children’s picture books."

When the Baby Boomers retire they are going to be taking their substantial knowledge with them. The younger generation to whom that knowledge should be transferred likes to consume video.  This has some very interesting implications for organizations that want to capture that knowledge, organize it, and make it easy for employees to find it and benefit from it.

Here is a link to a webcast on June 1 where Dan Rasmus, a technology strategist and author of Listening to the Future , will discuss the potential for video to serve as an all important medium for knowledge transfer and organizational learning.

Topics to be Covered:
• Knowledge Acquisition via Video
• Video as a Tool for Knowledge Management
• Use of Video or Operational Efficiency
• Practical Applications of Video for Learning in the Enterprise

Click here to register for the webcast

June 22, 2022 (New York, NY) – Will Apple’s entry into the buy now, pay later (BNPL) space upend the already competitive industry? That’s the question many are trying to […]

Mitochondria are specialized compartments that produce requisite ATP to fuel cellular functions and serve as centers of metabolite processing, cellular signaling, and apoptosis. To accomplish these roles, mitochondria rely on the genetic information in their small genome (mitochondrial DNA) and the nucleus. A growing appreciation for mitochondria's role in a myriad of human diseases, including inherited genetic disorders, degenerative diseases, inflammation, and cancer, has fueled the study of biochemical mechanisms that control mitochondrial function. The mitochondrial transcriptional machinery is different from nuclear machinery. The in vitro re-constituted transcriptional complexes of Saccharomyces cerevisiae (yeast) and humans, aided with high-resolution structures and biochemical characterizations, have provided a deeper understanding of the mechanism and regulation of mitochondrial DNA transcription. In this review, we will discuss recent advances in the structure and mechanism of mitochondrial transcription initiation. We will follow up with recent discoveries and formative findings regarding the regulatory events that control mitochondrial DNA transcription, focusing on those involved in cross-talk between the mitochondria and nucleus.

A world in transition and the future of the global workforce 15 October 2024 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 22 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

How are migration and global megatrends shaping international labour?

As the fallout of 2024’s ‘Election Super-Year’ becomes clearer, international policymakers and business leaders must now equip themselves to face the challenges and opportunities of the three key transitions that will dominate the next few decades: the journey toward a greener and healthier world; the transition to a more technologically adept society; and the development of a secure and productive economy for all.

The adaption and evolution of the global workforce is an essential component of all three of these transitions and therefore a prescient analysis of how migration, workforce policies and modern technology trends will impact this ecosystem is essential.

Upskilling the workforce will no doubt remain a key focus for stakeholders. But the question remains, how do these plans move beyond the ‘ideas-phase’ and become policies that will keep pace in the fast-paced, modern and digital workplace?

It may prove harder than ever for these ideas to come to fruition, with the rise of populist and nationalist political thinking fragmenting the balance between local and international labour. Indeed, this often leads to reduced attractiveness of skilled foreign labour in domestic markets.

This puts global business in a very powerful position though, as companies can play an important role in readdressing these narratives, shaping the future of workforce policies and using examples of best practice to improve access, mobility and ultimately economic productivity, for the benefit of all.

Through this event, in partnership with EY, the panel analyses how migration, skills development agendas and global megatrends, such as technology, sustainability and the global economy, will shape developments in the years to come.

A networking breakfast precedes this event, served between 0800 and 0900 BST.

Hdac3 is a lysine deacetylase that removes acetyl groups from histones and additional proteins. Although Hdac3 functions within mesenchymal lineage skeletal cells are defined, little is known about Hdac3 activities in bone-resorbing osteoclasts. In this study we conditionally deleted Hdac3 within Ctsk-expressing cells and examined the effects on bone modeling and osteoclast differentiation in mice. Hdac3 deficiency reduced femur and tibia periosteal circumference and increased cortical periosteal osteoclast number. Trabecular bone was likewise reduced and was accompanied by increased osteoclast number per trabecular bone surface. We previously showed that Hdac3 deacetylates the p65 subunit of the NF-κB transcriptional complex to decrease DNA-binding and transcriptional activity. Hdac3-deficient osteoclasts demonstrate increased K310 NF-κB acetylation and NF-κB transcriptional activity. Hdac3-deficient osteoclast lineage cells were hyper-responsive to RANKL and showed elevated ex vivo osteoclast number and size and enhanced bone resorption in pit formation assays. Osteoclast-directed Hdac3 deficiency decreased cortical and trabecular bone mass parameters, suggesting that Hdac3 regulates coupling of bone resorption and bone formation. We surveyed a panel of osteoclast-derived coupling factors and found that Hdac3 suppression diminished sphingosine-1-phosphate production. Osteoclast-derived sphingosine-1-phosphate acts in paracrine to promote bone mineralization. Mineralization of WT bone marrow stromal cells cultured with conditioned medium from Hdac3-deficient osteoclasts was markedly reduced. Expression of alkaline phosphatase, type 1a1 collagen, and osteocalcin was also suppressed, but no change in Runx2 expression was observed. Our results demonstrate that Hdac3 controls bone modeling by suppressing osteoclast lineage cell responsiveness to RANKL and coupling to bone formation.

Ligand bias is the ability of ligands to differentially activate certain receptor signaling responses compared with others. It reflects differences in the responses of a receptor to specific ligands and has implications for the development of highly specific therapeutics. Whereas ligand bias has been studied primarily for G protein–coupled receptors (GPCRs), there are also reports of ligand bias for receptor tyrosine kinases (RTKs). However, the understanding of RTK ligand bias is lagging behind the knowledge of GPCR ligand bias. In this review, we highlight how protocols that were developed to study GPCR signaling can be used to identify and quantify RTK ligand bias. We also introduce an operational model that can provide insights into the biophysical basis of RTK activation and ligand bias. Finally, we discuss possible mechanisms underpinning RTK ligand bias. Thus, this review serves as a primer for researchers interested in investigating ligand bias in RTK signaling.

The amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and frontotemporal dementia (FTD)–linked RNA-binding protein called FUS (fused in sarcoma) has been implicated in several aspects of RNA regulation, including mRNA translation. The mechanism by which FUS affects the translation of polyribosomes has not been established. Here we show that FUS can associate with stalled polyribosomes and that this association is sensitive to mTOR (mammalian target of rapamycin) kinase activity. Specifically, we show that FUS association with polyribosomes is increased by Torin1 treatment or when cells are cultured in nutrient-deficient media, but not when cells are treated with rapamycin, the allosteric inhibitor of mTORC1. Moreover, we report that FUS is necessary for efficient stalling of translation because deficient cells are refractory to the inhibition of mTOR-dependent signaling by Torin1. We also show that ALS-linked FUS mutants R521G and P525L associate abundantly with polyribosomes and decrease global protein synthesis. Importantly, the inhibitory effect on translation by FUS is impaired by mutations that reduce its RNA-binding affinity. These findings demonstrate that FUS is an important RNA-binding protein that mediates translational repression through mTOR-dependent signaling and that ALS-linked FUS mutants can cause a toxic gain of function in the cytoplasm by repressing the translation of mRNA at polyribosomes.

IQGAP1 is a key scaffold protein that regulates numerous cellular processes and signaling pathways. Analogous to many other cellular proteins, IQGAP1 undergoes post-translational modifications, including phosphorylation. Nevertheless, very little is known about the specific sites of phosphorylation or the effects on IQGAP1 function. Here, using several approaches, including MS, site-directed mutagenesis, siRNA-mediated gene silencing, and chemical inhibitors, we identified the specific tyrosine residues that are phosphorylated on IQGAP1 and evaluated the effect on function. Tyr-172, Tyr-654, Tyr-855, and Tyr-1510 were phosphorylated on IQGAP1 when phosphotyrosine phosphatase activity was inhibited in cells. IQGAP1 was phosphorylated exclusively on Tyr-1510 under conditions with enhanced MET or c-Src signaling, including in human lung cancer cell lines. This phosphorylation was significantly reduced by chemical inhibitors of MET or c-Src or by siRNA-mediated knockdown of MET. To investigate the biological sequelae of phosphorylation, we generated a nonphosphorylatable IQGAP1 construct by replacing Tyr-1510 with alanine. The ability of hepatocyte growth factor, the ligand for MET, to promote AKT activation and cell migration was significantly greater when IQGAP1-null cells were reconstituted with IQGAP1 Y1510A than when cells were reconstituted with WT IQGAP1. Collectively, our data suggest that phosphorylation of Tyr-1510 of IQGAP1 alters cell function. Because increased MET signaling is implicated in the development and progression of several types of carcinoma, IQGAP1 may be a potential therapeutic target in selected malignancies.

The Critical Transition: China’s Priorities for 2021 Research paper sysadmin 31 January 2017

This paper sets out the core issues for the Xi leadership, and focuses on what these might mean for the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit world and with the election of Donald Trump as US president.

In 2017 Xi Jinping will complete his first full five-year term as China’s leader. Towards the end of the year, in autumn, the country is due to hold its 19th Party Congress. This major meeting usually marks the moment when the Communist Party of China (CPC) assesses its performance over the previous five years, sets out political goals for the coming five-year period and makes new appointments.

Xi Jinping’s leadership has been characterized by a number of significant domestic and international policy strategies. China’s economic growth rate is slowing, and the country’s economy is undergoing major restructuring. Export-led manufacturing growth and capital investment in fixed assets are now being replaced by consumer-led and service-dominated expansion. Meanwhile, the role of the CPC has been rearticulated with a major anti-corruption struggle since 2013 that has sought to clear away a raft of different networks and senior officials and connected business people. Xi has proved a more communicative, more populist and more nationalistic leader than his predecessors. He is also crafting an image of himself as a more visionary leader.

Internationally, China is striving for a relevance and role that it has never had before. Its reach is felt in international organizations, regionally, and through its economic and resource needs. It has a role in global affairs that embraces places once considered on its periphery, such as Latin America, the Arctic and Antarctic Circles, and the Middle East. Its impact in Asia is particularly striking, marked by activity in the South China Sea, and a new kind of relationship with Russia, India and the US. The major Belt and Road Initiative, in particular, has started to outline a new expansiveness in China’s relations with the outside world, despite the largely abstract nature of its overall shape and form at the moment.

The themes and viewpoints in this collection of essays are particularly geared towards those with an interest in policy engagement with China. While setting out the core issues for the Xi leadership, it also focuses on what these might mean for the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit world and with the election of Donald Trump as US president. As the UK seeks a new kind of relationship with a rapidly changing China, this group of expert opinions maps out the key markers in the run up to 2021, when China is due to celebrate achieving the first of its centennial goals: the delivery of middle-income status and a moderately prosperous society.

China Needs to Make the Belt and Road Initiative More Transparent and Predictable Expert comment sysadmin 29 April 2019

The global infrastructure project must move beyond mish-mash of opaque bilateral deals

As China welcomes dozens of world leaders to Beijing for its second Belt and Road forum, it has one simple aim: relaunching President Xi Jinping’s controversial global infrastructure drive.

Since it began five years ago, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sunk hundreds of billions into port, railway and power projects stretching from south-east Asia to central Europe. But its path has been bumpy, drawing sharp criticism over the ruinous debts that some countries have racked up amid Chinese largesse.

Xi will stress sustainable financing and transparency this week, amid the usual talk of ‘win win’ cooperation. Yet BRI’s problems are structural, not presentational. For any pledges to be meaningful, China must move beyond its present mish-mash of opaque, bilateral deals.

After bad headlines last year, BRI has in fact enjoyed a good run in recent weeks. Malaysia announced it would resume a previously cancelled high-speed rail project, while Italy’s decision to join up last month marked a further European incursion. Indeed, if attendance is any guide to success, BRI looks in fine fettle. The first forum in 2017 attracted 29 world leaders. China says 37 will turn up this week. Phillip Hammond, UK chancellor, arrives hunting deals too, just a day after news that Chinese technology group Huawei will be allowed to help build 5G networks in Britain.

Even so, three interlinked problems remain at the heart of President Xi’s pet project, all of which must be addressed if BRI is to move beyond the pitfalls that have damaged its reputation.

The first and most obvious is debt. Critics allege that China ‘traps’ its BRI partners financially, often pointing to a debt-for-equity deal that handed China control of a port in Sri Lanka. These claims are exaggerated — few other projects have ended up this way. Yet poorer nations from Laos to Tajikistan are still signing up to vastly expensive Chinese schemes that offer poor value for money while straining their public finances.

The second problem is transparency. Despite its grand scale there is still no reliable list of BRI projects, no disclosure of the lending standards China follows, nor even the amount China has invested. Beijing claims more than $1 trillion; independent estimates suggest perhaps a few hundred billion. Either way, it will be hard for China to convince doubters on debts until it is open about the criteria it uses in deciding who to lend to and why.

BRI’s third and most important challenge is its muddled organization. Despite BRI’s image as a centrally run mega-project, China has allowed many deals to be struck locally, via a mix of state-backed companies, public sector banks and freewheeling regional governments. And it is here that the problems began.

Infrastructure deals are notoriously complex, especially for transnational projects like high-speed rail. Renegotiations are common, even for experienced bodies like the World Bank. Yet BRI has repeatedly seen terms negotiated behind closed doors, in countries such as Malaysia and Pakistan, come unstuck in the face of public outcry.

Rather than seeking to trap others with debt, China’s central government more often has to step in to fix dubious projects agreed by underlings lower down the chain.

These negotiations go one of two ways. Either China’s partners complain and win terms, as was true in Malaysia and in Myanmar over a multibillion-dollar deep-sea port. Or, as in the case of Sri Lanka, the renegotiations go in China’s favour, but at the cost of accusations of debt trickery. In both cases China looks bad.

Speaking last year, Xi responded to criticism of BRI by describing it as ‘an open platform for cooperation’. Yet, so far, he has proved resistant to the step that would deliver on that vision — namely turning BRI into an institution with open standards and international partners.

The reasons for his reluctance are obvious. Ending BRI’s reliance on loose bilateral deals would limit Beijing’s room for geopolitical manoeuvre. Yet what might be lost in political flexibility could easily be gained in economic credibility, while avoiding some of the painful renegotiations that have dogged many BRI projects.

At a time when China’s economy is slowing and its current account surplus is shrinking, formalising and institutionalising, BRI could also help avoid wasting scarce public resources on white elephant projects. China even has an easy template in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Beijing-based institution that has won plaudits for its project quality and openness since it started in 2016.

Whichever model is chosen, a dose of Chinese-style central planning is called for, along with more openness. Without it, the oddly chaotic and decentralised model pioneered in BRI’s first five years is unlikely to help the project thrive over the next five.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

How Women are Transforming Indonesia Interview sysadmin 20 May 2019

In a series exploring women in international affairs, Isabel Dunstan speaks to Gitika Bhardwaj about the rise of the women’s movement in Indonesia.

Southeast Asia has one of the highest records of gender-based violence in the world and Indonesia was recently ranked as the second most dangerous place for women in the Asia-Pacific. What is the state of women’s rights and gender equality in Indonesia?

It is true that Indonesia has high rates of violence against women, however, it’s difficult to know the realities of women’s experiences because in the past the data has been somewhat unreliable. This has been due to reasons such as a lack of reporting mechanisms available to survivors of violence and the fact that discussing sexual violence is a taboo and, if reported, can result in stigmatization which limits the number of survivors who have come forward.

However, the first reliable nationwide survey on gendered violence in Indonesia was conducted in 2017 by the Indonesian Ministry of Women and Child Protection and the United Nations Population Fund. Interestingly, it showed that Indonesia’s rates of violence against women are on par with the global rate which is that 1 in 3 women are affected by sexual violence in their lifetime.

It’s therefore difficult to generalize that Indonesia is an unsafe place for women because it’s an extremely diverse country. There is a growing middle class while there is pervasive poverty. There is religious diversity where the eastern-most province of Aceh is the only province in the country where Sharia law is enforced, whereas in the western-most province of West Papua, the dominant religion is Christianity and the ways of life are completely different.

Nevertheless, violence against women is high in Indonesia and can happen in all places – rich or poor, east or west – and has different manifestations from street harassment and trafficking to domestic violence and workplace harassment.

In some parts of the country there are high rates of child marriage too and, according to UNICEF, 14 per cent of girls in Indonesia are married by the time they turn 18 which is shocking when we think about how child marriage limits girls’ access to education and makes them more vulnerable to sexual violence and therefore restricts their futures.

Child marriage is high in Indonesia in part due to rooted gender norms, low levels of education and discriminating legislation, such as the marriage law, which states that, although it is legal to marry at 21, girls can marry at 16 and boys can marry at 19 with parental consent. But this can be even lower meaning parents could get their daughters married at as young as 13. So the law is fundamentally unfair between girls and boys and the women’s movement in Indonesia has been fighting extremely hard to reform legislation that discriminates against women and girls.

From the country’s first female president, Megawati Sukarnoputri​, to incumbent finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati – who was voted ‘Best Minister in the World’ in 2018 – and maritime​ and fisheries minister Susi Pudjiastuti – who has become notorious for her tough stance against illegal fishing activities – how are women progressing in Indonesian politics?

Indonesia has come a long way since becoming a democracy in 1998. Before that, the second president and dictator, Suharto, ruled the country for almost 32 years and increased the inequality gap between men and women during his reign.

Since the fall of Suharto, however, gender equality is explicitly enshrined in Indonesia’s constitution and the country has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

The country has also been undergoing a process of democratization which has involved slowly decentralizing its power. This means that greater authority has been distributed to the 34 provincial governments outside of the capital of Jakarta.

Furthermore, to aid gender equality, a quota system requiring political parties to be made up of 30 per cent women has been put in place, although remnants of Suharto’s old system of cronyism remain, limiting the impact of the quotas translating to more women in provincial parliaments.

But the defining approach to furthering gender equality in Indonesia has been through gender mainstreaming and gender-responsive budgeting which can be seen throughout provincial administrations in the country.

This means there is the intention to ensure infrastructure, health and education outcomes include results that address specific gender equality gaps. The challenge for effective gender mainstreaming, however, is the political will to translate the approach into well-resourced programmes from one province to another.

Nevertheless, we have just seen Indonesia go through the most incredible presidential and legislative elections last month – won by the current president, Joko Widodo, who has often been called the ‘Barack Obama of Southeast Asia’ and whose existing cabinet has the highest number of women in the country’s history. This is not simply a matter of filling seats in the cabinet with women – such as the wives and sisters of male politicians – because it’s required by law. But, rather, there are some incredible female political figures who are there because they are strong, smart and capable.

You’ve rightly mentioned Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, who is a fabulous role model for a lot of women particularly women who have not had tertiary education because she entered politics through an unorthodox route.

Then there’s Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, who is also the former leader of the World Bank and is such an inspiration to a lot of women who are looking to work in public life because of her experience as well as her work to include gender mainstreaming in state budgets.

There is also Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, Yohana Susana Yembise, who is a Papuan woman, as well as many more female public figures.

Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

This project aims to recommend ways for the US, UK and EU member-states to work together more effectively to achieve shared aims in the Indo-Pacific.

This project is Phase II of a wider research collaboration with the Royal United Services Institute: “An Evolving Transatlantic Agenda to Meet the Challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific”. The work is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Through interviews with policymakers and workshops, the project will:

• Identify specific areas of policy convergence and divergence;
• Establish practical recommendations for how the US, UK and EU member-states can better align and coordinate their activities in the Indo-Pacific.

The project is led at Chatham House by the Asia-Pacific Programme, working with the Global Economy and Finance Programme and the Europe Programme.

The researchers are Ben Bland (project lead), Dr Yu Jie, Dr Gareth Price, Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, and Alice Billon-Galland.

The project builds on research from Phase I, a Transatlantic Dialogue on China, which explored how transatlantic partners are responding to China’s rise and its effects in the Indo-Pacific.

National security and transatlantic unity top Biden’s agenda Expert comment NCapeling 1 February 2023

The timing of the State of the Union address is significant as Joe Biden tries to maintain focus on Ukraine and China while navigating partisanship at home.

Although primarily a domestic affair, the president’s remarks in the annual State of the Union (SOTU) telegraph the US’s foreign policy priorities to the rest of the world. They reveal the prism through which the US understands its national security and its role in the world.

The 2023 address comes as the first anniversary of the Ukraine invasion rapidly approaches, and the US is also trying to build international support for tough economic measures towards China. Domestically, Republican control of the House of Representatives will exert new pressure on US foreign policy choices. Electoral pressures are also around the corner and Joe Biden should announce soon whether he plans to run for president in 2024.

Alliances and partnerships are a driving force for Biden. As pressure to end the war in Ukraine intensifies, maintaining transatlantic unity on Ukraine will be a key priority for the president. And as US electoral politics rise to the fore, ensuring the visibility of Europe’s role as a security provider in its own backyard will be essential.

For a US president who sees China and the Indo-Pacific as America’s most significant long-term geopolitical challenge – and the only peer competitor to the US – transatlantic unity on China will also come under pressure.

Ukraine, China, and controlling domestic division

Republican leaders who now chair key committees in the House of Representatives continue to signal support for Ukraine, and polling shows a majority of US public opinion (54 per cent) favours sending either weapons or air defence systems.

But recent polls also reveal a growing gap between Democrat and Republican supporters with a slight majority of Republicans (52 per cent) now opposing further support for Ukraine.

Biden’s ability to demonstrate that America and its European partners remain unified in their policy towards Ukraine and Russia will help him ward off partisanship at home. Congressional approval of $45 billion for Ukraine in its end of year spending budget will help the president remain above the fray of partisan politics for now. But if there is an absence of clear signs Ukraine is succeeding in its war aims, the challenge of maintaining domestic support could become more difficult.

A greater US focus on China, India, and on the Indo-Pacific in 2023 is also likely. Bipartisanship is strong on China, Republicans are more singular and hawkish in their approach to China than the US president, and the public support tough measures. At a time of war in Europe, the president will place great emphasis on the need to maintain transatlantic unity and to work with a broader coalition of partners in the Indo-Pacific.

The groundwork for focus on China has already been laid. Throughout 2022, the Biden administration worked steadily, but quietly, to set out its China policy. Just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US released its new US-Indo Pacific Strategy stressing regional partnerships – especially the Quad and ASEAN – and it’s determination to shape essential norms for the region.

It stated boldly – albeit in a document which was largely unnoticed – that the objective is not to change China but to ‘shape the strategic environment in which it operates’, a policy which signifies a clear departure from the more ideological approach pursued by the US during Donald Trump’s final year in office. And in May, the US announced its economic strategy for the region, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

Now the terrain for competition with China and alignment with US partners and allies is heavily focused on technology and the daylight between national security and economic strategy in US China policy is rapidly disappearing. Biden’s policy focus of ‘invest (at home), align (with allies and partners), and compete (with China)’ has overshadowed earlier talk of cooperation between the US and China.

But as China opens its doors and Europe looks to bolster its economies, the US will have to work far harder to maintain transatlantic unity. Japan and the Netherlands embracing the US adoption of export controls on semiconductor chips is a positive sign, but the US’s economic strategy towards China may present harder choices to come for Europe. If China leans into its diplomacy, the pressure on transatlantic unity will also grow.

The new US Congress will only sharpen the president’s tough stance on China. Some Republican leaders still deny climate change and have demonstrated little interest in cooperating with China on debt relief for developing countries. The prospects for addressing critical global challenges appear dim without China’s collaboration, and the UK and Europe should work with the US president and Congress to correct this.

President Biden has clearly recognized that diplomacy will be critical in the months ahead. At a time of growing tensions, the potential for misperceptions or misunderstandings to create conflict will also increase, and so a US – and also European – commitment to broadening and deepening diplomacy with China is urgent but it also needs to be patient and sustained.

A new American industrial policy?

Those listening carefully to the State of the Union and who have followed US policy will also note the unchallenged hegemony of neoliberalism is rapidly vanishing. The American state appeared to be disturbingly absent in the early months of the US pandemic response – but now it is back and, in a surprising turn of events, is being cast as a solution not a problem.

State of the Union has lessons for transatlantic unity Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2023

Analysing key foreign policy aspects of President Joe Biden’s annual address, and what it means for the upcoming Munich Security Conference and the year ahead.

Trade and economics are key areas to watch

Daniel W. Drezner

Russia’s absence from the Munich Security Conference will allow US and European policymakers to brag about their flourishing partnership. The past year has seen repeated predictions of a fracturing transatlantic relationship – only to see repeated agreement on how to sanction Russia and which arms to ship to Ukraine.

Putin invaded because he thought the West was divided. Events have proven him wrong. When one takes a step back, however, and examines the Biden administration’s embrace of geoeconomics, Putin’s assumption becomes easier to comprehend.

The strongest throughline between the Trump and Biden administrations has been their shared mindset on weaponized interdependence. Both administrations have been wary of US interdependence with an increasingly autocratic China.

The primary difference has been that, while the Trump administration talked a good game, the Biden administration has passed laws and issued executive orders making the pivot away from trade liberalization a reality.

The passage of the CHIPS and Science Act, Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) amount to the most ambitious US attempt at industrial policy in decades, accompanied by multiple executive orders examining US supply chain resilience and imposing unprecedented export controls targeting China.

The Biden administration’s restrictions on exchange with China’s semiconductors includes the use of the ‘foreign direct product rule’, essentially a means of applying US export controls in an extraterritorial manner.

The Biden administration’s angry response to the WTO panel ruling against US steel and aluminum tariffs makes it clear the US will apply an expanded definition of national security to restrict trade. In many ways, the sanctions on Russia are a continuation of a US foreign economic policy grounded in geoeconomics.

Several of these measures have rankled European officials. The IRA massively subsidizes the North American production of environmentally-friendly cars, discriminating against European producers. And continued US hostility to the WTO leaves European officials wondering if they are the last bastion of multilateralism left in the world. In Washington and Davos last month, European policymakers made their displeasure clear.

The sanctions against Russia and export controls against China threaten to be additional sore subjects. During the strategic embargo of the Soviet Union, US officials wanted to maximize restrictions while European allies wanted more trade opportunities. Since then, Europeans have suspected that the US uses multilateral export controls regimes to advance its commercial interests, while Americans worry Europe underestimates the risks of business-as-usual with China.

The Biden administration has tried to finesse these trade tensions, and was successful at persuading the Netherlands to join the US in the export controls on China. More generally, Biden officials talk about ‘friendshoring’ and propose mechanisms for greater policy coordination, such as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. But even in these gestures, US officials have taken greater market access off the table.

In the State of the Union address, Biden bragged about how the US ‘came together to defend a stronger and safer Europe’ as well as defending his ‘buy American’ plans and pledging to make sure the ‘supply chain for America begins in America’. At the upcoming Munich Security Conference, attention should be on how much officials talk about trade and economic issues. The more that topic comes up, the clearer it will be that both sides are subtweeting each other about the future of the transatlantic economic relationship.

Division on China now would bring a high price

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

President Biden has made unity his guiding principle and chief objective, but it is a tall order. His State of the Union address touted past bipartisan backing for investments in infrastructure, climate-friendly technologies, and semiconductor chips, along with a focus on creating jobs for working-class Americans, especially in manufacturing.

Little was said that was explicitly about China, but the Biden administration has said that China is its pacing challenge, and competing with China has shaped the ambition behind these legislative successes.

In fact, the hallmark of the address was its foreign policy minimalism. Biden hailed unity in the US defence of democracy in Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression. And in defending US sovereignty in the face of China’s violations, this time with a balloon.

But the presidents temporary minimalism on foreign policy will be short-lived. And unity with America’s partners and allies will continue to be at the centre of Biden’s strategy. In the past 12 months, it is the yardstick by which he has measured America’s success with respect to Ukraine.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has so far served as a lubricant for the NATO alliance, and for the US relationship with its non-NATO allies.

This has not automatically sprung from the well of Russia’s aggression. NATO’s success, and transatlantic unity, has been achieved through the sheer force of diplomatic effort, not least by the US.

Now Biden is looking for unity on China. His administration has identified China as its pacing threat. While Ukraine will continue to demand and deserve attention, the US will be looking beyond the urgent to focus on other less urgent but crucially important challenges. That means China.

China’s balloon helps ensure unity will be an easy victory at home. For several days, the balloon floated across the US, captivating the American public, seizing the headlines, and hardening US attitudes towards its only peer competitor.

Republican leaders in Congress are determined to scrutinize US policy to ensure it is tough on China, especially on technology and deterrence. This intense domestic focus on China could put Biden in a bind as he seeks to resume diplomacy. It also explains why he was careful not to inflate the China threat in his address. Secretary Blinken’s visit to Beijing has already been postponed.

As the Munich Security Conference approaches, the president’s unity agenda will turn to Europe, but the timing is difficult. China is opening and a charm offensive across Europe is likely. Europe is vulnerable as it seeks to recover its economies, continue to hold Russia back, and inhibit greater alignment between Russia and China.

The risk for the US is that domestic pressure to take a harder line on China escalates and Europe refuses to keep up. But dividing on China would come at a high price, both for Europe and the US, so to avoid this, they should take a pragmatic and sequenced approach to cooperation.

The goal for now should be policy coordination, as success is vital to momentum and managing expectations in the current environment is critical. Alignment may be possible with discrete partners on specific topics. But the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.

The US has postponed, not cancelled, Blinken’s trip while Europe is preparing to ramp up its diplomacy with China. A collective but temporary and shared transatlantic pause on diplomacy would offer low hanging fruit to give momentum to transatlantic cooperation.

It would also signal to China a unity that has a power of its own. A clear and coordinated signal, soon, that Europe and the US are moving forward with diplomacy is essential.

Munich can move the talk into action on Ukraine

James Nixey

Russia’s excommunication from this year’s Munich Security Conference is an opportunity. The principle of inclusivity may have pros and cons, but the cons have been evident since at least 2007 – its use as a platform for Russia’s leadership to launch broadsides about ‘western injustice’ and a reflexive default to increasingly inappropriate and harmful diplomatic courtesies and allowances.

Without the distraction of listening to Russian lies, there is at least now the remote possibility of a more unified West agreeing to specific action beyond the talk. As at the recent Ramstein talks, it is unlikely Munich will result in an agreement to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. That may prove a step too far for the West or it will need further Russian atrocities inflicted upon Ukrainians on a scale horrendous enough to prick consciences once again.

However, although President Biden’s State of the Union address has promised nothing new or innovative regarding Ukraine or Russia, it did re-establish the fundamentals of US support and so can serve as a ‘pre-read’ for a newfound resolve.

Although some European countries are a lost cause, others – Germany for example – have proved able to be guilted into action. The key lesson for everyone to understand is that Ukraine is sovereign. Or at least ‘nothing about Ukraine, without Ukraine’. The difference is moot but, from these simple precepts, all else flows.

Ukrainians will be their impassioned selves at Munich. But although publicly gracious and thankful, privately they are distraught at the West’s collective failure to affirm these principles and back them with the necessary support, not just to force a stalemate or a ‘frozen conflict’ but to engineer victory.

Most Ukrainian officials would privately argue that the danger to their country comes more from the West and forums such as the Munich Security Conference than it does from Russia, which can be defeated with the requisite tangible assistance. In Munich, beyond fine words of support – watertight from some, ambiguous from others – there lurks the ever-present danger of the politician who simply wants it all to go away by offering Putin an off-ramp.

The irony of the host city of this forum is that many times over the past year compromise ‘solutions’ have been described as having ‘a whiff of Munich’ about them – a reference of course to appeasement in 1938, which still haunts.

As it should, because the failure to ensure Ukraine’s victory with an outcome the Ukrainian government and people are content with and which convinces Russia it was a disastrous mistake to escalate, will lead to a global security collapse too catastrophic to contemplate.

Middle East security challenges must be dealt with

Dr Sanam Vakil

A trifecta of security concerns – Iran’s advancing nuclear programme, the export of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to support Russia in the war in Ukraine, and a heavy-handed response towards protests in Iran – has raised alarm bells in Washington, Europe and the UK. These intersecting challenges lay bare the lack of a broader Iran strategy and the deprioritization of Middle East security among transatlantic partners.

This downgrading of the Middle East was evident in President Biden’s State of the Union speech as, for the first time in decades, the region was not even mentioned. The upcoming Munich Security conference provides a much needed opportunity for the transatlantic community to align on next steps and multilateral policy responses.

Transatlantic partners have long relied on the prism of the JCPOA negotiations as the pathway to both separate and manage nuclear tensions from broader regional challenges associated with Iran’s export of lethal aid and sponsorship of proxy groups.

Despite repeated negotiation efforts led by the Biden administration since April 2021, the JCPOA has languished due to Tehran’s fears over another US retreat. The promise of sanctions relief has also failed to incentivise Iran’s return to the deal. Tehran’s nuclear programme has accelerated without the consistent IAEA oversight which was part of the initial deal and is now at a level where it can produce enough uranium enrichment for four nuclear weapons.

Tehran’s decision to send drones to support Moscow’s war effort has further elevated transatlantic concerns, and reports have circulated that Tehran may also export its missile capabilities and build a drone factory in Russia. In tandem, the two sanctioned states have begun to strengthen their economic arrangements.

Yue Chen
May 1, 2007; 6:812-819
Research

Timothy J. Griffin
Apr 1, 2002; 1:323-333
Research