The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides a refundable tax credit to lower-income working families. In 2011, the EITC reached 27.9 million tax filers at a total cost of $62.9 billion. Almost 20 percent of tax filers receive the EITC, and the average credit amount is $2,254 (IRS 2013). After expansions to the EITC in the late 1980s through the late 1990s—under Democrat and Republican administrations—the EITC now occupies a central place in the U.S. safety net. Based on the Census Bureau’s 2012 Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), the EITC keeps 6.5 million people, including 3.3 million children, out of poverty (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities [CBPP] 2014a). No other tax or transfer program prevents more children from living a life of poverty, and only Social Security keeps more people above poverty.

Since the EITC is only eligible to tax filers who work, the credit’s impact on poverty takes place through encouraging employment by ensuring greater pay after taxes. The empirical research shows that the tax credit translates into sizable and robust increases in employment (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, 2001). Thus, the credit reduces poverty through two channels: the actual credit, and increases in family earnings. This dual feature gives the EITC a unique place in the U.S. safety net; in contrast, many other programs redistribute income while, at least to some degree, discouraging work. Importantly, transferring income while encouraging work makes the EITC an efficient and cost-effective policy for increasing the after-tax income of low-earning Americans. Yet a program of this size and impact could be more equitable in its reach. Under the current design of the EITC, childless earners and families with only one child, for instance, receive disproportionately lower refunds. 

In 2014, families with two children (three or more children) are eligible for a maximum credit of $5,460 ($6,143) compared to $3,305 for families with one child. Married couples, despite their larger family sizes, receive only modestly more-generous EITC benefits compared to single filers. Childless earners benefit little from the EITC, and have a maximum credit of only $496—less than 10 percent of the two-child credit. 

Prominent proposals seek to mitigate these inequalities. President Obama’s fiscal year 2015 budget includes an expansion of the childless EITC, a concept outlined by John Karl Scholz in 2007 in a proposal for The Hamilton Project. Notably, MDRC is currently evaluating Paycheck Plus, a pilot program for an expanded EITC for workers without dependent children, for the New York City Center for Economic Opportunity (MDRC 2014). The recent Hamilton Project proposal for a secondary-earner tax credit addresses the so-called EITC penalty for married couples (Kearney and Turner 2013). And the more generous EITC credit for three or more children was recently enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and is currently scheduled to sunset in 2017. 

Considering this broad set of EITC reforms, and recognizing the demonstrated effectiveness of the program as an antipoverty program with numerous benefits, this policy memo proposes an expansion for the largest group of  EITC recipients: families with one child. In particular, I propose to expand the one-child schedule to be on par with the two-child schedule, in equivalence scale-adjusted terms. An equivalence scale captures the cost of living for a household of a given size (and demographic composition) relative to the cost of living for a reference household of a single adult, and is a standard component in defining poverty thresholds. The proposal expands the maximum credit for one-child families to $4,641, from $3,305 under current law, an increase of about 40 percent. The expansion will lead to a roughly $1,000 increase in after-tax income for taxpayers in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution receiving the higher credit. As this paper outlines, the expansion is justified on equity and efficiency grounds. This expansion is anchored in the equity principle in that the generosity of the credit should be proportional to the needs of families of differing sizes; I use the equivalence scale implicit in the poverty thresholds of the Census SPM as a guide for household needs. This proposal is also supported by efficiency principles given the EITC’s demonstrated success at raising labor supply among single mothers. 

The target population for the proposal is low-income working families with children. Implementing this proposal requires legislative action by the federal government; it is important to note that altering the EITC schedule requires a simple amendment to the tax code, and not a massive overhaul of our nation’s tax system. The revenue cost of the proposal derives from additional federal costs of the EITC, less the additional payroll and ordinary federal income taxes. The private benefits include increases in after-tax income and reductions in poverty. The proposal would also generate social benefits through the spillover effects that the increase in income plays in improving health and children’s cognitive skills (Dahl and Lochner 2012; Evans and Garthwaite 2014; Hoynes, Miller, and Simon forthcoming).

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• Building on the Success of the Earned Income Tax Credit - Full Text

"It is fortunate that a major feature of American social policy is a series of programs, often referred to as the safety net, that are designed to provide people with cash and other benefits when they fall on hard times—which they are more likely to do during a recession," write the authors of a new report on the response of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program—the major federal welfare program that replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1996—to the Great Recession that lasted from December 2007 to June 2009.

In their report, "The Responsiveness of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program during the Great Recession," Ron Haskins, Vicky Albert, and Kimberly Howard write that "All in all, we conclude that the American system of balancing work requirements and welfare benefits worked fairly well, even during the most severe recession since the Depression of the 1930s."

Their report is based on three studies: (1) an examination of the changes in the TANF rolls compared to changes in AFDC rolls during previous recessions, plus changes in TANF rolls in relation to rising unemployment state-by-state; (2) a review of data on single mothers' likelihood to receive TANF benefits during the 2001 and 2007 recessions, their receipt of other program benefits, and what actions single mothers took to deal with the recession; and (3) interviews with 44 directors of state TANF programs to determine their state's response.

"An important question" noted by the authors at the outset "is whether the response of the nation's safety net program in general and the TANF program in particular was commensurate with the challenge posed by the huge level of unemployment during and following the Great Recession."

Some Results of the TANF Study

Haskins, Albert, and Howard arrived at a number of conclusions from the TANF/AFDC study, including:

• TANF rolls increased more in the 2001 recession and the 2007 Great Recession than did AFDC during previous, pre-welfare reform (1996) recessions.
• The increase in TANF rolls was greater during the period of rising unemployment in each state, which did not coincide exactly with the dates of the Great Recession, than during the official recession period nationally.
• The "nation's safety net as a whole performed well during the Great Recession and prevented millions of people from falling into poverty."

"The nation experienced 51 different recessions and 51 different responses by the TANF program to the recession,” they write. "But the key point is that measuring the rise of the TANF caseload in response to the unique increase in unemployment in each state reveals TANF to have been more responsive to the recession."

Some Results of the Single Mothers Study

• Compared with the 1990 recession before welfare reform, "single mothers were less likely to receive benefits from the TANF program during the 2001 and 2007 recessions."
• Single mothers were more likely to receive other "safety net" help such as Unemployment Compensation, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly food stamps), Supplemental Security Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and child care, school lunch and breakfast, and other benefits for their children.
• In all the 1990, 2001, and 2007 recessions, "single mothers took action on their own" by finding jobs, living with family, and other ways to "weather the recession."
• Based on income, "poverty among single mothers and their children was lower during the Great Recession than during the recession of 1990."

Given the array of available benefits, the authors conclude that:

a mother with two children earning even as little as $11,000 per year could and still can escape poverty, as measured by income that includes non-cash benefits and tax credits, because of the generosity of these benefits. In our view, the combination of strong work requirements and generous work support benefits is a reasonable policy, despite the fact that fewer mothers receive TANF now than in the past.

Some Results of the TANF Directors Study

"Arguably the people who know the most about the goals and operation of state TANF programs and how the programs responded to the recession are the state TANF directors," write Haskins, Albert, and Howard. "They were, after all, the point persons for state TANF programs before and during the Great Recession. Interviews with TANF directors can provide an insider's view of the TANF issues that we have so far analyzed from the outside." Some of their conclusions from these interviews include:

• Most states did not struggle to pay for growing TANF rolls during the Great Recession.
• Most state directors considered their state's response to the recession "as adequate or better."
• The directors had suggestions for improving the TANF program, including having more flexibility in work participation rates, gaining access to the Contingency Fund, and placing greater emphasis on job training.

Some Policy Recommendations

Although the authors believe that the TANF program worked well, especially in conjunction with other safety net programs, they suggest some potential reforms:

• TANF allows vocational training to count toward states fulfilling their work requirement, but only a maximum of 30 percent of the work requirement can be fulfilled by TANF recipients in education or training. In times of high unemployment, Congress could raise the percentage limit from 30 to 40 or even 50 percent when unemployment reaches some specified level in the state, given that most experts believe the unemployed should expand their skills through job training during recessions.
• Congress should consider changing the 12-week limit on job search during periods of high unemployment to as much as six months, given that the average period of search before finding a job increases sharply during periods of high unemployment.

Download and read the full report for complete methodology, analysis, and data.

In his state of the union and his budget, the President spoke of the stagnation of middle class incomes. Whatever growth we have had has not been broadly shared.  More than 78% of the growth in GDP between 1979 and 2013 has gone to the top one percent. Even Republicans are beginning to worry about this issue although they have yet to develop concrete proposals to address it.

Slow Growth in Incomes

Middle class incomes were growing slowly before the recession and have actually declined over the past decade.   In addition, according to the New York Times, the proportion of the population with incomes between $35,000 and $100,000 in inflation-adjusted terms fell from 53% in 1967 to 43% in 2013.  During the first four decades this was primarily because more people were moving into higher income groups, but more recently it was because they have moved down the ladder, not up.  One can define the middle class in many different ways or torture the data in various ways, but there is plenty of evidence that we have a problem.

What to Do

The most promising approach is what I call “the second earner solution.”  For many decades now, the labor force participation rate of prime age men has been falling while that of women has been rising.  The entry of so many women into the labor force was the major force propelling whatever growth in middle class incomes occurred up until about 2000. That growth in women’s work has now levelled off.  Getting it back on an upward track would do more than any policy I can think of to help the middle class.

Imagine a household with one earner making the average wage of today’s worker and spending full-time in the job market.  That household will have an income of around $34,000. But if he (or she) has a spouse making a similar amount, the household’s income will double to $68,000. That is why the President’s focus on a second-earner credit of $500, a tripling of the child care tax credit, expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, and providing paid leave are so important. These policies are all pro-work and research shows they would increase employment.

No Marriage = No Second Earner

One problem, of course, is that fewer and fewer households contain two potential workers.  So it would also help to bring back marriage or at least its first cousin, a stable cohabiting relationship.  My ideas on this front are spelled out in my new book, Generation Unbound. In a nutshell, we need to empower women to not have children before they have found a committed partner with whom to raise children in a stable, two-parent family. Whatever the other benefits of two parents, they have twice as much time and potentially twice as much income.    

Other Needed Responses

Shouldn’t we also worry about the wages or the employment of men?  Of course.  But an increase in, say, the minimum wage or a better collective bargaining environment or more job training will have far smaller effects than “the second earner solution.”  In addition, the decline in male employment is related to still more difficult problems such as high rates of incarceration and the failure of men to take advantage of postsecondary education as much as women have. 

Still the two-earner solution should not be pursued in isolation. In the short-term, a stronger recovery from the recession is needed and in the longer-term, more effective investments in education, research, infrastructure, and in labor market institutions that produce more widely-shared growth, as argued by the Commission on Inclusive Prosperity. But do we really expect families to wait for these long-term policies to pay off?  It could be decades. 

In the meantime, the President’s proposals to make work more appealing to existing or potential second earners deserves more attention.  

The idea of a universal basic income (UBI) is certainly an intriguing one, and has been gaining traction. Swiss voters just turned it down. But it is still alive in Finland, in the Netherlands, in Alaska, in Oakland, CA, and in parts of Canada. 

Advocates of a UBI include Charles Murray on the right and Anthony Atkinson on the left. This surprising alliance alone makes it interesting, and it is a reasonable response to a growing pool of Americans made jobless by the march of technology and a safety net that is overly complex and bureaucratic. A comprehensive and excellent analysis in The Economist points out that while fears about technological unemployment have previously proved misleading, “the past is not always a good guide to the future.”

Robert Greenstein argues, however, that a UBI would actually hurt the poor by reallocating support up the income scale. His logic is inescapable: either we have to spend additional trillions providing income grants to all Americans or we have to limit assistance to those who need it most. 

One option is to provide unconditional payments along the lines of a UBI, but to phase it out as income rises. Libertarians like this approach since it gets rid of bureaucracies and leaves the poor free to spend the money on whatever they choose, rather than providing specific funds for particular needs. Liberals fear that such unconditional assistance would be unpopular and would be an easy target for elimination in the face of budget pressures. Right now most of our social programs are conditional. With the exception of the aged and the disabled, assistance is tied to work or to the consumption of necessities such as food, housing, or medical care, and our two largest means-tested programs are Food Stamps and the Earned Income Tax Credit.

Liberals have been less willing to openly acknowledge that a little paternalism in social policy may not be such a bad thing. In fact, progressives and libertarians alike are loath to admit that many of the poor and jobless are lacking more than just cash. They may be addicted to drugs or alcohol, suffer from mental health issues, have criminal records, or have difficulty functioning in a complex society. Money may be needed but money by itself does not cure such ills. 

A humane and wealthy society should provide the disadvantaged with adequate services and support. But there is nothing wrong with making assistance conditional on individuals fulfilling some obligation whether it is work, training, getting treatment, or living in a supportive but supervised environment.

In the end, the biggest problem with a universal basic income may not be its costs or its distributive implications, but the flawed assumption that money cures all ills.