An analysis of the growth and characteristics of the foreign-born in the Philadelphia metropolitan area between 1970 and 2006 finds:

• Among its peers, metropolitan Philadelphia has the largest and fastest growing immigrant population, which now stands at over 500,000, comprising 9 percent of the population. Between 2000 and 2006, greater Philadelphia’s immigrant population grew by 113,000, nearly as many as had arrived in the decade of the 1990s.
• Metropolitan Philadelphia has a diverse mix of immigrants and refugees from Asia (39 percent), Latin America and the Caribbean (28 percent), Europe (23 percent) and Africa (8 percent). The 10 largest source countries are India, Mexico, China, Vietnam, Korea, Italy, Ukraine, Philippines, Jamaica, and Germany.
• Immigrant growth in suburban Philadelphia has outpaced the city’s growth, but numerically, the city has the largest population of all local jurisdictions. Outside the city, Montgomery County had the earliest post- World War II suburban settlement of the foreign born and has the largest number of immigrants among jurisdictions, while Chester County saw the fastest growth during the 1970-2006 time period.
• Nearly 60 percent of the foreign-born living in metropolitan Philadelphia arrived in the United States after 1990. Although their naturalization rates and educational levels reflect their recentness of arrival, on the whole, greater Philadelphia’s immigrants are doing well on these measures as compared with some other U.S. metropolitan immigrant populations.
• Nearly 75 percent of greater Philadelphia’s labor force growth since 2000 is attributable to immigrants. Immigrants’ contributions to the labor force are considerably higher in this period than in the 1990s, when just 36 percent of the growth was due to immigrants.

A long history of immigration to Philadelphia stalled in the mid-20th century and the region became nearly entirely native born. In the past 15 years, however, immigration is emerging again as a prominent feature of life in the region. The varied immigrant groups—high-skilled professionals, refugees, and laborers from a diverse set of origin countries — bring both opportunities and challenges for policy makers, service providers, and communities throughout greater Philadelphia.


Additional Resources:
Philadelphia Immigration Event Presentation, Philadelphia Free Library, November 13, 2008 » 

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Bringing together the five counties of Southeastern Pennsylvania, the nonprofit Metropolitan Caucus, a new regional consortium there, is promoting a joint regional application for ARRA’s competitive Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant dollars. Its four-part proposal, which will add and refine partners and programs over time, draws on the collaboration of multiple regional institutions to establish and operate a loan fund for green building and retrofits; support clean energy technology deployment; assist local governments with energy efficiency plans; and measure the energy performance of public facilities.

The newly created Metropolitan Caucus of southeastern Pennsylvania is leading the bold new regional energy efficiency strategy targeting for the competitive Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants (EECBG) in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Unprecedented for the region, the Metropolitan Caucus has brought together five area counties—Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia—to make the most of the stimulus opportunity by coordinating their plans, goals, and assets to achieve maximum regional benefit. Their proposed joint EECBG competitive application for roughly $35 million calls for financing construction and retrofits, supporting clean energy companies, measuring building energy performance, and assisting local governments in implementing various sustainability solutions. To carry out each of these activities, the caucus intends to engage in broad cross-sector collaboration to leverage the strengths and unique assets of regional educational institutions, key nonprofits, and planning agencies.

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In a series of pieces during the past two weeks (see here, here, and here), I've laid out the evidence for two propositions: The president's economic record will be at the heart of the 2012 election, and he cannot win without focusing on the heartland — the swing states stretching from Pennsylvania to Iowa.

The case for the first proposition goes as follows:

To an extent that we haven't seen since 1992 (and maybe not even then), the 2012 election will focus on a single issue: economic growth and job creation.

For that reason above all, President Obama will be waging an uphill battle for reelection, because the American people are giving his management of the economy very low grades. (Recent CBS/NYT surveys have placed approval of his performance on the economy and job creation at below 40 percent.)

While for understandable reasons the president's campaign team wants to turn the election into a choice between two futures, the odds of success for that strategy seem low. Most political scientists who have studied the question conclude that when there's an incumbent in the race, the principal issue is that candidate's job performance. (That's why Reagan's "Are you better off..." was such a killer question against Carter in 1980.)

President Obama, therefore, has no choice but to address the economic question head-on, which will require him to offer a much more persuasive defense of his record than he has up to now.

The case for my second proposition — the Heartland Strategy — is this:

The president's team hopes to recreate the "new majority" strategy that expanded the playing field and led to victories in states such as Virginia, North Carolina, Colorado, and Nevada in 2008 and perhaps Arizona and Georgia as well in 2012. This does not seem realistic, however: while the president's support among African Americans remains strong, it has dropped sharply among Hispanics disappointed by what they see as his failure to push for comprehensive immigration reform and his administration's aggressive deportation strategy. And every survey and focus group points to diminished enthusiasm among the young adults whose relentless networking on Obama's behalf contributed significantly to his historic victory.

To make matters worse, the president's numbers in Florida are dismal, he trails likely Republican nominee Mitt Romney by 10 points in New Hampshire, and he has no chance of repeating his 2008 miracle victory in Indiana.

These facts underscore the crucial importance of the heartland states — especially Ohio and Pennsylvania. As a matter of history and simple arithmetic, is very unlikely that President Obama can be reelected without carrying them both.

Although Pennsylvania is usually 3 to 4 points more Democratic than Ohio, the evidence suggests that Obama is surprisingly weak there and needs to do some real work to shore up his standing in a state that Democrats often regard as being in the bag.

As for Ohio, the last Democrat to take the White house without winning that state was John Kennedy, who did it with electoral votes from Texas and other southern states that Obama will not receive. (The last Republican to win the presidency without Ohio? There hasn't been one since the founding of the party in the 1850s.)

Ohio is pivotal, election after election, because it is a demographic and political microcosm of the country. If a presidential candidate can win a majority there, he or she can almost certainly do so in the nation as well. And that's why both parties should pay close attention to the results of last week's election, in which the Ohio electorate overwhelmingly rejected both Gov. Kasich's assault on public sector unions and the individual mandate at the heart of President Obama's health reform law.

If these two core propositions are correct — if the 2012 election will be about Obama's economic stewardship and will be won or lost in the heartland — then the key question is this: How can the president defend his economic record in a region much of which has not enjoyed robust growth for quite some time?

Let's look at some basics:

It's hard to imagine Obama losing Illinois or winning Indiana in 2012. That leaves six key heartland states. Note what they have in common: despite widely varying rates of unemployment, none of them has experienced a rapid decline in that rate over the past year. Because there's no sense of dynamism in the region, hope and confidence in the future are at a low ebb. That's the reality the president must speak to, there and elsewhere.

How can Obama recast the economic discussion? Here's my best shot:

First, he must acknowledge Americans' sense of being stuck and then explain why recovery from this downturn has been so painfully slow — in particular, the impact of the financial collapse and our excessive debt burden, private as well as public.

Second, he must display some humility and acknowledge that he didn't get everything right. It was a mistake not to underscore the difficulty of our circumstances right from the start. It was a mistake to predict that unemployment would peak at 8 percent if his stimulus bill were enacted. While it was necessary to save the big financial institutions from a total meltdown, it was a mistake to ask so little from them institutions in return. And it was a mistake to act so timidly in the face of a housing and mortgage crisis that has cost the middle class many trillions of dollars in lost wealth.

Third, he should emphasize what most Americans believe: without the steps his administration took at the depth of the crisis, there might well have been a second Great Depression. Sure, "It could have been much worse" isn't much of a bumper sticker, but it's a place to start, and it has the merit of being true.

Fourth, what he has done so far has not only halted the decline but has yielded more than twenty consecutive months of growth in private sector jobs — progress that would be more noticeable if states and localities hadn't been shedding so many employees in response to the squeeze on their budgets.

Fifth, while most Americans didn't like it when his administration intervened to save GM and Chrysler, it was the right thing to do, not only for auto workers, but for much of the heartland's economy as well. Allowing these two firms to dissolve would have broken the back of regions already struggling with double-digit unemployment. Leadership means doing what's necessary and right, even when it's unpopular.

Sixth, we now have the opportunity to build on the foundation laid during this painful period in our history. Obama can emphasize steps such as: a bold new response to housing foreclosures and underwater mortgages; an infrastructure bank that mobilizes both domestic and foreign capital to put Americans back to work on projects that will strengthen our economy; and a tougher stance vis-à-vis Chinese policies that have taken their toll on American workers and firms. And yes, we need to come together around fundamental spending and tax reform that can stabilize our fiscal future without further undermining the hard-pressed middle class.

That's the guts of the affirmative case Obama can make. (No doubt he believes he's already doing it, but he hasn't been frank, comprehensive, and persistent enough to break through.) And if he does make it relentlessly until next Labor Day, he can then pivot and ask, What's the alternative? What is my opponent offering? If you think that an agenda of deregulation for big polluters, more tax breaks for the wealthy, and a laissez-faire policy that allows the housing sector to "hit bottom" is the way to jump start job creation, the by all means vote for him. If you don't, you have a chance to continue moving down a path that can move us from the shadows of stagnation to the sunlight of opportunity and to build a new economy in which all Americans — not just a favored few — enjoy the fruits of growth.

       

Last week international electronics mega-manufacturer Foxconn announced plans to invest $30 million in a new robotics plant in Harrisburg, PA. Foxconn, the notorious Chinese low-wage manufacturer of Apple’s iPhone, has become the poster child of U.S. outsourcing in the face of ruinous global labor cost competition. The calculus of manufacturing supremacy is seemingly simple: Low labor costs and taxes, proximity to a large consumer base, and manageable corruption levels equal a sure strategy to attract global firms.

So what’s going on in Harrisburg? Foxconn is beginning to realize what a number of global manufacturers have come to realize: Production sites that can leverage university, government, and private R&D, a market-ready STEM workforce, and a vibrant cluster of global manufacturing supply chains trump cheap labor and tax breaks. In this regard the Harrisburg region is a big win for Pennsylvania as well as Foxconn—a company trying to move away from a legacy of poor working conditions to one of high-value, high-skilled production.   

Harrisburg and the larger Rust Belt Pittsburgh-Youngstown region to the west are hotbeds of advanced manufacturing. Youngstown is home to the National Additive Manufacturing Innovation Institute—an internationally recognized hub for so-called “3D printing” that draws together public- and private-sector resources. Pittsburgh—with the University of Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University, and firms like Google—has redefined itself from a gilded-era steel town to a modern technology leader in software and robotics. Indeed, Foxconn is investing $10 million in Carnegie Mellon’s world class advanced robotics R&D. Finally, also in the Rust Belt and including Harrisburg, Akron and Cleveland, cheap natural gas has helped push manufacturing job and firm growth in a region that was hit extremely hard by the recession.

While Foxconn may be one of the highest profile foreign firm to relocate to the United States it is certainly not, as we’ve discussed, the first. Again and again, global firms interested in high-end manufacturing are putting a renewed premium on geographic clusters of intensive innovation. To be sure, countries with low labor costs still maintain solid advantages in a number manufacturing industries that will help their economies grow—this is the benefit and reality of a global economy. But when it comes to advanced manufacturing, U.S. metro areas and regions that foster synergies between research, skills, and production will likely continue to be highly sought after from firms looking to move up the global value chain.

       

On April 16-17, Bruce Katz, vice president and founding director of the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program, traveled to Pittsburgh for the launch of p4: People, Planet, Place, and Performance. The initiative, spearheaded by the Heinz Endowment and the City of Pittsburgh, is committed to putting urban design and economic development to the service of an inclusive society and a sustainable physical infrastructure. The two-day launch event featured urban economic development and design experts from around the globe, with several groups from the Nordic countries--leaders in sustainable architecture and high-tech infrastructure. Below are highlights:

       

With the GOP convention now in the electoral rearview mirror, attention is pivoting quickly from Ohio to Pennsylvania as the Democrats kick off their own nominating convention in Philadelphia.

Although it has voted Democratic in the last six presidential elections, political analysts have historically regarded the Keystone State as a swing state. FiveThirtyEight’s latest general election forecast projects a 46 percent vote share for Hillary Clinton, versus just under 44 percent for Donald Trump, making it the sixth-most competitive state. Pennsylvania also features what is shaping up to be a tight Senate race between incumbent Republican Pat Toomey and Democratic nominee Katie McGinty. Thus, it is useful to see how the state’s voters might view the condition of the economy, which could very well influence turnout levels and candidate preferences amid close contests this November.

Pennsylvania’s metropolitan economy

The economic perspectives of Pennsylvanians are perhaps best understood through the prism of the state’s highly distinctive major metropolitan areas. Five large metro areas span the state—Allentown, Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Scranton—and together account for 63 percent of Pennsylvania’s population and 75 percent of its GDP. Their economic specializations are diverse: trade, transportation, and manufacturing in Allentown and Scranton; financial, professional, and educational services in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh; and government in the state capital of Harrisburg. While much political news coverage of Pennsylvania is likely to focus on its iconic small towns, it is really these large metro areas that define the state demographically and economically.

A slow recovery for most

While Pennsylvania was not one of the states hardest hit by the Great Recession, most of its major metropolitan areas bounced back relatively slowly. According to the Brookings Metro Monitor, Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and Scranton ranked among the 20 slowest-growing large metropolitan economies from 2009 to 2014. All performed somewhat better on achieving increases in the local standard of living (prosperity), but Pittsburgh stood out for its 6 percent average wage growth during that time, seventh-fastest in the nation. This wage trend also seems to have propelled Pittsburgh to a better performance than other Pennsylvania metro areas on indicators of employment, wages, and relative poverty (inclusion). Allentown, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia, on the other hand, registered declines in typical worker wages during the first five years of the recovery and little to no progress in reducing poverty.

The picture over a longer timeframe is similar, though somewhat less dire. Pittsburgh posted middling growth but very strong performance on prosperity and inclusion over the past 10 to 15 years. That provided a contrast with Allentown, where the economy grew somewhat faster but productivity and average standards of living did not, and economic inclusion suffered. The remaining metro areas—Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and Scranton—all grew weakly but managed to post middling performance on prosperity and inclusion indicators.

Troubling racial disparities

Pennsylvania remains a whiter state than the national average, but its major metro areas are increasingly diverse, particularly in the southeastern part of the state around Philadelphia and Allentown. Nonetheless, Pennsylvania’s economic challenges are frequently framed around the plight of the white working class, which, as my colleague Bill Frey notes, comprises 59 percent of the state’s eligible voter population. In Allentown, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia, whites have indeed suffered long-term wage stagnation. Yet in the more manufacturing-oriented Pittsburgh and Scranton areas, median wages for whites rose significantly from 2000 to 2014. By contrast, workers of color have experienced much more troublesome wage trends, losing ground to whites in every major metro area. Across the five metro areas, typical earnings differences between whites and other workers in 2014 averaged between $10,000 and $12,000.

Reversal of fortune?

A look at the most recent job trends, from 2014 to 2016, suggests a shifting metro growth map in Pennsylvania. Over the past two years, Philadelphia and Harrisburg have posted much stronger job gains, Allentown’s average annual job growth rate has halved, and Pittsburgh’s job level has flat-lined. The state’s two largest urban centers frame this stark change. In every major industry category, average annual job growth in Philadelphia over the past two years outpaced its rate over the previous five years. In Pittsburgh, on the other hand, job growth slowed—or turned negative—in nearly every sector. The recent energy price crash has halted a fracking boom that buoyed the western Pennsylvania economy through much of the recovery, at the same time that Philadelphia is enjoying a surge in professional services and construction employment. Fittingly, Donald Trump used Allegheny County, outside Pittsburgh, as the backdrop for one of his first post-primary campaign stops, while Philadelphia’s economic momentum will be the background of the Democrats’ argument for another four years in the White House.

The Pennsylvania economy is thus not easily characterized, and the attitudes of its voters are likely to be shaped by regionally specific short-term and long-term trends. Those trends seem sure to keep the Keystone State’s electoral votes and U.S. Senate seat highly contested over the next several months.

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the focused attention of African nations, the United States, U.N. agencies and other multilateral partners has brought significant progress toward achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in health and malaria control and elimination. The potential contribution of these strategies to long-term peace-building objectives and overall regional prosperity is of paramount significance in sub-regions such as the Horn of Africa and Western Africa that are facing the challenges of malaria and other health crises compounded by identity-based conflicts.

National campaigns to address health Millennium Development Goals through cross-ethnic campaigns tackling basic hygiene and malaria have proven effective in reducing child infant mortality while also contributing to comprehensive efforts to overcome health disparities and achieve higher levels of societal well-being.

There is also growing if nascent research to suggest that health and other humanitarian interventions can result in additional benefits to both recipients and donors alike.

The social, economic and political fault lines of conflicts, according to a new study, are most pronounced in Africa within nations (as opposed to international conflicts). Addressing issues of disparate resource allocations in areas such as health could be a primary factor in mitigating such intra-national conflicts. However, to date there has been insufficient research on and policy attention to the potential for wedding proven life-saving health solutions such as malaria intervention to conflict mitigation or other non-health benefits.

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SUMMARY

Replacing inefficient kerosene lighting with electric lighting or other clean alternatives can rapidly achieve development and energy access goals, save money and reduce climate warming. Many of the 250 million households that lack reliable access to electricity rely on inefficient and dangerous simple wick lamps and other kerosene-fueled light sources, using 4 to 25 billion liters of kerosene annually to meet basic lighting needs. Kerosene costs can be a significant household expense and subsidies are expensive. New information on kerosene lamp emissions reveals that their climate impacts are substantial. Eliminating current annual black carbon emissions would provide a climate benefit equivalent to 5 gigatons of carbon dioxide reductions over the next 20 years. Robust and low-cost technologies for supplanting simple wick and other kerosene-fueled lamps exist and are easily distributed and scalable. Improving household lighting offers a low-cost opportunity to improve development, cool the climate and reduce costs.

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Editor’s Note: An interactive feature, highlighting the key findings from this report, can be found here.

Over a billion people worldwide live on less than $1.25 a day. But that number is falling. This has given credence to the idea that extreme poverty can be eliminated in a generation. A new study by Brookings researchers examines the prospects for ending extreme poverty by 2030 and the factors that will determine progress toward this goal. Below are some of the key findings:

1. We are at a unique point in history where there are more people in the world living right around the $1.25 mark than at any other income level. This implies that equitable growth in the developing world will result in more movement of people across the poverty line than across any other level.

2. Sustaining the trend rate of global poverty reduction requires that each year a new set of individuals is primed to cross the international poverty line. This will become increasingly difficult as some of the poorest of the poor struggle to make enough progress to approach the $1.25 threshold over the next twenty years.

3. The period from 1990 to 2030 resembles a relay race in which responsibility for leading the charge on global poverty reduction passes between China, India and sub-Saharan Africa. China has driven progress over the last twenty years, but with its poverty rate now down in the single digits, the baton is being passed to India. India has the capacity to deliver sustained progress on global poverty reduction over the next decade based on modest assumptions of equitable growth. Once India’s poverty is largely exhausted, it will be up to sub-Saharan Africa to run the final relay leg and bring the baton home. This poses a significant challenge as most of Africa’s poor people start a long way behind the poverty line.

4. As global poverty approaches zero, it becomes increasingly concentrated in countries where the record of and prospects for poverty reduction are weakest. Today, a third of the world’s poor live in fragile states but this share could rise to half in 2018 and nearly two-thirds in 2030.

5. The World Bank has recently set a goal to reduce extreme poverty around the world to under 3 percent by 2030. It is unlikely that this goal can be achieved by stronger than expected growth across the developing world, or greater income equality within each developing country, alone. Both factors are needed simultaneously.

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INTRODUCTION

If you are one of those government officials, finance experts, development professionals or NGO members whose eyes glaze over when you see an article on procurement, you are the audience I want to address. Procurement is the purchase of works, goods and services by individuals or firms, or government entities in the case of public procurement. We all make procurement decisions in our everyday lives. We pride ourselves on making good decisions and being able to apply discretion and judgment. Now imagine if you were improving your home and were constrained by pages and pages of legal and technical regulations that take away that discretion. You would soon question whether those regulations were relevant and whether they provide any value or simply delayed and jeopardized good decision-making. Worse yet, imagine if you had to follow rules that someone else outside your family, your community or your country set for you. While public procurement requires a higher standard of governance than personal procurement, developing countries and other stakeholders are raising these questions regarding the policies set by multilateral aid institutions.

In November 2013, the World Bank released the report of its first stage efforts in reforming its procurement policy as it relates to the projects it finances. As the World Bank enters the second stage in designing the actual reforms, the “development community” faces a crucial moment and opportunity to refine and reform a fundamental instrument in the development toolbox—one that has been treated for too long as a “plumbing and wiring” issue that ignores the broader public policy implications and the growing burden of conflicting objectives, regulations, incentives and political polemics. The purpose of this paper is to examine concerns regarding reform of multilateral agencies’ public procurement policies, enhance awareness of what is at stake and lay the groundwork for the reform discussions at development institutions that will take place over the next year.

I should alert you, however, that I am neither a procurement specialist, nor am I a lawyer or an engineer. I would describe myself as a development practitioner. After decades of working on infrastructure projects and on multilateral operational policy, I have maintained a deep respect for my procurement colleagues who have protected my proverbial “backside.” One quickly learns in this business that a mistake in procurement can result in serious consequences as one sits in the middle of the converging, and often conflicting, interests of governments, donors, private sector and, of course, affected communities. The procurement policies applied by the multilateral finance institutions have been responsible for enhancing competition, deepening transparency and raising the integrity of investment in developing countries, as well as opening markets for developed and developing countries’ businesses. As the world of public procurement has evolved, however, one also learns that procurement is becoming more than just getting the “plumbing and wiring” right. Indeed, the role and application of public procurement policies and practices is an essential element of design and implementation with crucial consequences for the quality of outcomes. The case set forth in this paper lays out the factors driving the need for major reform of multilateral banks’ procurement policies—rather than simply adapting existing policies. This paper also presents the major challenges to be addressed in designing the reforms and the tensions to be resolved or balanced as the World Bank enters the more detailed design stage of its reform effort.

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It has been nearly three years since the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (“the New Deal”) was endorsed at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. Given the minimal progress of fragile states in achieving the Millennium Development Goals1 (MDGs) and that conflict and fragility are part of the deliberations on the post-2015 global development agenda, it is appropriate to assess New Deal implementation to date and see what early lessons can be learned. This review is intended to provide insights on current efforts and provoke thought and discussion on how implementation could be improved.

Since the New Deal was endorsed in Busan, a group of fragile states known as the g7+ has emerged to champion support for fragile states. The group started in 2010 with seven members but by May, 2014, its membership spanned 20 countries from four continents. The g7+ represents the first time a genuine constituency of fragile states has begun to engage with one other and with the international community about the causes of fragility and how to address it. Despite the modest progress that has been made and the enthusiasm of New Deal focal points among donors, civil society, and g7+ pilot countries, implementation of the New Deal to date is characterized by unmet conditions, unrealistic expectations about timeframes, and a lack of sustained dialogue about the causes of conflict and fragility. Overall, the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) are being adopted into national development plans (Figure 1), but donors and civil society have concerns about the g7+ pilot countries’ commitment to use these goals as the basis for an inclusive and sustained dialogue about the causes of conflict and fragility. Conversely, although some elements of the TRUST component (Figure 1) are being implemented, g7+ pilot country governments have concerns about donors’ commitments to share risk and increase the use of country systems. Progress has been made in the implementation of the FOCUS elements (Figure 1), in terms of the number of fragility assessments conducted and compacts or mutual accountability frameworks established, but concern exists at the global level that there has been an overemphasis on the technical exercises and insufficient effort put toward political dialogue at the country level. The effort put into technical processes should not overshadow sustained political dialogue, and the tendency to rely on conditionality as the basis for New Deal partnership should be consciously avoided.

Greater investment should be made in rolling out the New Deal to reduce the amount of confusion surrounding it at the country level. This would perhaps best be accomplished by building the capacity within the different stakeholder groups, and especially by bolstering dedicated staffing for the New Deal. Donors and the g7+ should increase their domestic advocacy and educate stakeholders about the expectations inherent to New Deal participation, the potential risk-benefit tradeoffs, and the underlying assumptions about their willingness to do things differently. A combination of fewer conditions, increased investment, more inclusive political dialogue, and better domestic advocacy could render the New Deal a transformative approach to addressing the challenges and opportunities that exist in fragile and conflict-affected states.

This paper is an independent assessment of New Deal implementation. It is based on a review of New Deal documentation and interviews with focal points in g7+ pilot countries, lead donor agencies, and civil society. The interviews were conducted during April, May, and June 2014. This review focuses on the original seven pilot countries that volunteered to implement the New Deal: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, South Sudan, Sierra Leone and Timor Leste. The review also includes Somalia, given that a compact was developed there in 2013.

      

In the developing world, more than 200 million children under the age of five years are at risk of not reaching their full development potential because they suffer from the negative consequences of poverty, nutritional deficiencies and inadequate learning opportunities. Overall, 165 million children (one in four) are stunted, and 90 percent of these children live in Africa and Asia. And though some progress has been made globally, child malnutrition remains a serious public health problem with enormous human and economic costs. Worldwide, only about 50 percent of children are enrolled in preprimary education, and in low-income countries a mere 17 percent. And though more and more children are going to school, millions have little to show for it. By some accounts, 250 million children of primary school age cannot read even part of a sentence. Some of these children have never been to school (58 million); but more often, they perform poorly despite having spent several years in school, which reflects not only the poor quality of many schools but also the multiple disadvantages that characterize their early life.

Ensuring that all children—regardless of their place of birth and parental income or education level—have access to opportunities that will allow them to reach their full potential requires investing early in their development. To develop their cognitive, linguistic, socioemotional and physical skills and abilities, children need good nutrition and health, opportunities for play, nurture and learning with caregivers, early stimulation and protection from violence and neglect.

The Case for Early Interventions 

The arguments for investing in children early are simple and convincing. Early investment makes sense scientifically. The brain is almost fully developed by age three, providing a prime opportunity to achieve high gains. We know that the rapid rate of development of the brain’s neural pathways is responsible for an individual’s cognitive, social and emotional development, and there is solid evidence that nutrition and stimulation during the first 1,000 days of life are linked to brain development. 

Early investment makes sense in terms of equity. The playing field has the highest chances of being leveled early on, and we know that programs have a higher impact for young children from poorer families. In the United States, for example, increasing preschool enrollment to 100 percent for low-income children would reduce disparities in school readiness by 24 percent between black and white children and by 35 percent between Hispanic and white children. We also know that equalizing initial endowments through early childhood development (ECD) programs is far more cost-effective than compensating for differences in outcomes later in life. 

Early investment makes sense economically. Investing early prevents higher costs down the road, and interventions yield a high return on investment. There is evidence of the benefits for the individual and for society more broadly. For instance, at the level of the individual, in Jamaica children participating in an early childhood stimulation program were found to have 25 percent higher earnings 20 years later compared with children who did not participate. At the economy-wide level, eliminating malnutrition is estimated to increase gross domestic product by 1 to 2 percentage points annually, while countries with school systems that have a 10-percentage-point advantage in the proportion of students

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The United Nations will convene a major international conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from July 13 to 16, 2015, to discuss financing for the post-2015 agenda on sustainable development. This conference, the third of its kind, will hope to replicate the success of the Monterrey conference in 2002 that has been credited with providing the glue to bind countries to the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The analogy is pertinent but should not be taken too far. The most visible part of the Monterrey Consensus was the commitment by rich countries to “make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 percent of gross national product” as official development assistance (ODA). This was anchored in a clear premise that “each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development,” which includes support for market-oriented policies that encourage the private sector. While not all of the Monterrey targets have been met, there has been a considerable increase in resources flowing to developing countries, as a central plank of efforts to achieve the MDGs.

Today, aid issues remain pivotal for a significant number of countries, but they are less relevant for an even larger number of countries. The core principles of Monterrey need to be reaffirmed again in 2015, but if the world is to follow-through on a universal sustainable development agenda, it must address the multi-layered financing priorities spanning all countries. A simple “30-30-130” mnemonic helps to illustrate the point. There are 193 U.N. member states. Of these, only around 30 are still low-income countries (33 at the latest count). These are the economies that are, and will continue to be, the most heavily dependent on aid as the world looks to how it should implement the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Conversely, there are only around 30 “donor” countries (including 28 members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, or DAC) that have made international commitments to provide more aid. For the remaining 130 or so emerging middle-income economies that have achieved higher levels of average prosperity, aid discussions risk forming a sideshow to the real issues that constrain their pursuit of sustainable development. The bottom line is that for most countries, the Financing for Development conference should unlock finance from many different sources, including but not exclusively aid, to implement the SDGs.

Addis will take place in the context of sluggish global growth, an upsurge in conflict, considerable strains in multilateral 2 political cooperation, and challenging ODA prospects in many countries.

There are other differences between Addis and Monterrey. Monterrey took place after agreement had been reached on the MDGs, while Addis will precede formal agreement on the SDGs by a few months. Monterrey was focused on a government-to-government agreement, while Addis should be relevant to a far larger number of stakeholders—including businesses, academics, civil society, scientists, and local authorities. Monterrey was held against a backdrop of general optimism about the global economy and widespread desire for intensified international collaboration following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. Meanwhile, Addis will take place in the context of sluggish global growth, an upsurge in conflict, considerable strains in multilateral political cooperation, and challenging ODA prospects in many countries. In addition, regulators are working to reduce risk-taking by large financial institutions, increasing the costs of providing long-term capital to developing countries.

Against this backdrop, an Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Finance (ICESDF) crafted a report for the United Nations on financing options for sustainable development. The report provides an excellent overview of issues and the current state of global financing, and presents over 100 recommendations. But it falls short on prescribing the most important priorities and action steps on which leaders should focus at Addis.

This paper seeks to identify such a priority list of actions, with emphasis on the near-term deliverables that could instigate critical changes in trajectories towards 2030. At the same time, the paper does not aim to describe the full range of outcomes that need to be in place by roughly 2025 in order to achieve the SDGs by their likely deadline of 2030. Addis will be a critical forum to provide political momentum to a few of the many useful efforts already underway on improving global development finance. Time is short, so there is limited ability to introduce new topics or ideas or to build consensus where none already exists.

We identify three criteria for identifying top priorities for agreement in Addis:

• Priorities should draw from, and build on, on-going work—including the ICESDF report and the outputs „„of several other international workstreams on finance that are underway.
• Agreements should have significant consequences for successful implementation of the SDGs at the coun„„try, regional or global level.
• Recommendations should be clearly actionable, with next steps in implementation that are easy to under„„stand and easy to confirm when completed.

It is not necessary (or desirable) that every important topic be resolved in Addis. In practical terms, negotiators face two groups of issues. First are those on which solutions can be negotiated in time for the July conference. Second are those for which the problems are too complex to be solved by July, but which are still crucial to be resolved over the coming year or two if the SDGs are to be achieved. For this second group of issues, the intergovernmental agreement can set specific timetables for resolving each problem at hand. There is some precedent for this, including in the 2005 U.N. World Summit, which included timetables for some commitments. What is most critical is that the moment be used to anchor and advance processes that will shift toward creating a global financing system for achieving sustainable development across all countries. Committing to timetables for action and building on reforms already undertaken could be important ways of enhancing the credibility of new agreements.

In this paper, we lay out nine areas where we believe important progress can be made. In each area, we start from identifying a gap or issue that could present an obstacle to the successful implementation of the SDGs if left unattended. In some cases the gaps will affect all countries, in other cases only a subset of countries. But we believe that the package of actions, taken as a whole, reflects a balance of opportunities, responsibilities and benefits for all countries. We also believe that by making the discussion issue-focused, the needs for financing can be balanced with policy actions that will be required to make sure financing is effectively and efficiently deployed.

In addition to the nine areas listed below, there are other commitments already made which have not yet been met. We urge renewed efforts to meet these commitments, but also recognize that political and financial realities must be managed to make progress. Such commitments include meeting the Monterrey Consensus target to provide 0.7 percent of GNI in official development assistance (ODA), the May 2005 agreement of all EC-15 countries to reach that target by 2015, and bringing the Doha Development Round of trade talks to a successful conclusion. These remain important and relevant, but in this paper we choose to focus on new areas and fresh ideas so as to avoid treading over well-worn territory again.

       

Most sub-Saharan African countries have long had to rely on foreign assistance or loans from international financial institutions to supply part of their foreign currency needs and finance part of their domestic investment, given their low levels of domestic saving. But now many of them, for the first time, are able to borrow in international financial markets, selling so-called eurobonds, which are usually denominated in dollars or euros. 

The sudden surge in the demand for international sovereign bonds issued by countries in a region that contains some of the world’s poorest countries is due to a variety of factors—including rapid growth and better economic policies in the region, high commodity prices, and low global interest rates. Increased global liquidity as well as investors’ diversification needs, at a time when the correlation between many global assets has increased, has also helped increase the attractiveness of the so-called “frontier” markets, including those in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, the issuance of international sovereign bonds is part of a number of African countries’ strategies to restructure their debt, finance infrastructure investments, and establish sovereign benchmarks to help develop the sub-sovereign and corporate bond market. The development of the domestic sovereign bond market in many countries has also help strengthen the technical capacity of finance ministries and debt management offices to issue international debt.

Whether the rash of borrowing by sub-Saharan governments (as well as a handful of corporate entities in the region) is sustainable over the medium to long term, however, is open to question. The low interest rate environment is set to change at some point—both raising borrowing costs for the countries and reducing investor interest. In addition, oil prices are falling, which makes it harder for oil-producing countries to service or refinance their loans. In the medium term, heady economic growth may not continue if debt proceeds are only mostly used for current spending, and debt is not adequately managed.

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Strong Growth and Changing Composition 

External financial flows to sub-Saharan Africa (defined as the sum of gross private capital flows, official development assistance (ODA), and remittances to the region) have not only grown rapidly since 1990, but their composition has also changed significantly. The volume of external flows to the region increased from $20 billion in 1990 to above $120 billion in 2012. Most of this increase in external flows to sub-Saharan Africa can be attributed to the increase in private capital flows and the growth of remittances, especially since 2005 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: External Flows (1990-2012, in USD billions)

As also displayed in Figure 1, in 1990 the composition of external flows to sub-Saharan Africa was about 62 percent ODA, 31 percent gross inflows from the private sector, and about 7 percent remittances. However, by 2012, ODA accounted for about 22 percent of external flows to Africa, a share comparable to that of remittances (24 percent) and less than half the share of gross private capital flows (54 percent). Also notably, in 1990, FDI flows were greater than ODA flows in only two countries (Liberia and Nigeria) in sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa, but 22 years later, 17 countries received more FDI than ODA in 2012—suggesting that sub-Saharan African countries are increasingly becoming less aid dependent (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Number of Countries Where FDI is Greater than ODA (1990-2012)

But to what extent have these changes in the scale and composition of external flows to sub-Saharan Africa equally benefited countries in the region? Did the rising tide lift all boats? Is aid really dying? Are all countries attracting private capital flows and benefiting from remittances to the same degree? Finally, how does external finance compare with domestic finance? 

The False Demise of ODA

A closer look at the data indicates that, clearly, ODA is not dead, though its role is changing. For instance, middle-income countries (MICs) are experiencing the sharpest decline in ODA as a share of total external flows to the region, while aid flows account for more than half of external flows in fragile as well as low-income countries (LICs) and resource-poor landlocked countries (see Figure 3 and Appendix).

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In December over 190 countries will converge in Paris to finalize a new global agreement on climate change that is scheduled to come into force in 2020. A central part of it will be countries’ national pledges, or “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs), to be submitted this year which will serve as countries’ national climate change action plans. For Latin American countries, the INDCs present an unprecedented opportunity. They can be used as a strategic tool to set countries or at least some sectors on a cleaner path toward low-carbon sustainable development, while building resilience to climate impacts. The manner in which governments define their plans will determine the level of political buy-in from civil society and business. The implementation of ambitious contributions is more likely if constituencies consider them beneficial, credible, and legitimate.

This paper aims to better understand the link between Latin American countries’ proposed climate actions before 2020 and their post-2020 targets under a Paris agreement. We look at why Latin American climate policies and pledges merit attention, and review how Latin American nations are preparing their INDCs. We then examine the context in which five Latin American nations (Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Costa Rica, and Venezuela) are developing their INDCs—what pledges and efforts have already been made and what this context tells us about the likely success of the INDCs. In doing so, we focus on flagship national policies in the areas of energy, forests, cities, and transportation. We address what factors are likely to increase or restrain efforts on climate policy in the region this decade and the next.

Latin American countries are playing an active role at the U.N. climate change talks and some are taking steps to reduce their emissions as part of their pre-2020 voluntary pledges.

Latin American countries are playing an active role at the U.N. climate change talks and some are taking steps to reduce their emissions as part of their pre-2020 voluntary pledges. However, despite some progress there are worrying examples suggesting that some countries’ climate policies are not being implemented effectively, or are being undermined by other policies. Whether their climate policies are successful or not will have significant consequences on the likely trajectory of the INDCs and their outcomes. The imperative for climate action is not only based on Latin America’s contribution to global carbon emissions. Rather, a focus on adaptation, increasing the deployment of renewable energy and construction of sustainable transport, reducing fossil fuel subsidies, and protecting biodiversity is essential to build prosperity for all Latin Americans to achieve a more sustainable and resilient development.

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The Central African Republic (CAR), a landlocked country roughly the size of Texas, has endured a nearly constant state of political crisis since its independence from France in 1960. In fact, in the post-colonial era, the CAR has experienced only 10 years of rule under a democratically elected leader, Ange-Félix Patassé, from 1993 to 2003. Four of the CAR’s past five presidents have been removed from power through unconstitutional means, and each of these transitions has been marred by political instability and violence. Fragile attempts to build democratic political institutions and establish the rule of law have been undermined by coups, mutinies, and further lawlessness, making cycles of violence tragically the norm in the CAR.

The country’s current crisis (2012–present) stems from political tensions and competition for power between the predominantly Muslim Séléka rebel coalition and the government of President Francois Bozizé, as well as unresolved grievances from the CAR’s last conflict (2006–2007). Since the Séléka’s overthrow of the government in March 2013 and concurrent occupation of large areas of the country, the conflict has evolved to encompass an ethno-religious dimension: So-called Christian defense militias named the anti-balaka emerged to counter the Séléka alliance, but in effect sought revenge against the CAR’s Muslim minority (about 15 percent of the population), including civilians. During a March 2014 trip to the Central African Republic, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay remarked that “the inter-communal hatred remains at a terrifying level,” as reports of atrocities and pre-genocidal indicators continued to surface. Even today, horrific crimes against civilians are still being committed at a frightening frequency in one of the poorest countries in the world: The CAR has a per capita GNI of $588 and a ranking of 185 out of 187 on 2013’s United Nations Human Development Index.

Amid the escalating insecurity in 2013, African Union (AU), French, and European forces were deployed under the auspices of the African-led International Support Mission in Central Africa (MISCA) to disarm militant groups and protect civilians at a critical juncture in December, and their efforts contributed to the relative stabilization of the capital in early 2014. Meanwhile, in January 2014, Séléka leaders relinquished power to a transitional government led by former mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba-Panza, who was then tasked with preparing for national elections and establishing security throughout the country. In September 2014, the United Nations incorporated the MISCA forces into the larger Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and then in 2015 extended and reinforced its presence through 2016, in response to the ongoing violence. Despite the international military intervention and efforts of the transitional authorities to address the pervasive insecurity, reprisal killings continue and mobile armed groups still freely attack particularly remote, rural areas in the central and western regions of the country. The unguarded, porous borders have also allowed rebel forces and criminal elements to flee into distant areas of neighboring countries, including Chad and South Sudan, in order to prepare their attacks and return to the CAR.

This paper will explore the origins of the complex emergency affecting the CAR, with a particular focus on the economic causes and potential economic strategies for its resolution. It will begin by providing an overview of the core issues at stake and enumerating the driving and sustaining factors perpetuating the violence. Then it will discuss the consequences of the conflict on the humanitarian, security, political, and economic landscape of the CAR. Finally, it will highlight strategies for addressing the underlying issues and persisting tensions in the CAR to begin building a durable peace, arguing that the national authorities and international partners adopt a holistic approach to peace building that prioritizes inclusive economic recovery given the economic roots of the crisis.

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One of global society’s foremost structural changes underway is its rapid aggregate shift from farmbased to city-based economies. More than half of humanity now lives in urban areas, and more than two-thirds of the world’s economies have a majority of their population living in urban settings. Much of the gradual movement from rural to urban areas is driven by long-term forces of economic progress. But one corresponding downside is that city-based societies become increasingly disconnected—certainly physically, and likely psychologically—from the practicalities of rural livelihoods, especially agriculture, the crucial economic sector that provides food to fuel humanity.

The nature of agriculture is especially important when considering the tantalizingly imminent prospect of eliminating extreme poverty within a generation. The majority of the world’s extremely poor people still live in rural areas, where farming is likely to play a central role in boosting average incomes. Agriculture is similarly important when considering environmental challenges like protecting biodiversity and tackling climate change. For example, agriculture and shifts in land use are responsible for roughly a quarter of greenhouse gas emissions.

As a single word, the concept of “agriculture” encompasses a remarkably diverse set of circumstances. It can be defined very simply, as at dictionary.com, as “the science or occupation of cultivating land and rearing crops and livestock.” But underneath that definition lies a vast array of landscape ecologies and climates in which different types of plant and animal species can grow. Focusing solely on crop species, each plant grows within a particular set of respective conditions. Some plants provide food—such as grains, fruits, or vegetables—that people or livestock can consume directly for metabolic energy. Other plants provide stimulants or medication that humans consume—such as coffee or Artemisia—but have no caloric value. Still others provide physical materials—like cotton or rubber—that provide valuable inputs to physical manufacturing.

One of the primary reasons why agriculture’s diversity is so important to understand is that it defines the possibilities, and limits, for the diffusion of relevant technologies. Some crops, like wheat, grow only in temperate areas, so relevant advances in breeding or plant productivity might be relatively easy to diffuse across similar agro-ecological environments but will not naturally transfer to tropical environments, where most of the world’s poor reside. Conversely, for example, rice originates in lowland tropical areas and it has historically been relatively easy to adopt farming technologies from one rice-growing region to another. But, again, its diffusion is limited by geography and climate. Meanwhile maize can grow in both temperate and tropical areas, but its unique germinating properties render it difficult to transfer seed technologies across geographies.

Given the centrality of agriculture in many crucial global challenges, including the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals recently established for 2030, it is worth unpacking the topic empirically to describe what the term actually means today. This short paper does so with a focus on developing country crops, answering five basic questions: 

1. What types of crops does each country grow? 

2. Which cereals are most prominent in each country? 

3. Which non-cereal crops are most prominent in each country? 

4. How common are “cash crops” in each country? 

5. How has area harvested been changing recently? 

Readers should note that the following assessments of crop prominence are measured by area harvested, and therefore do not capture each crop’s underlying level of productivity or overarching importance within an economy. For example, a local cereal crop might be worth only $200 per ton of output in a country, but average yields might vary across a spectrum from around 1 to 6 tons per hectare (or even higher). Meanwhile, an export-oriented cash crop like coffee might be worth $2,000 per ton, with potential yields ranging from roughly half a ton to 3 or more tons per hectare. Thus the extent of area harvested forms only one of many variables required for a thorough understanding of local agricultural systems. 

The underlying analysis for this paper was originally conducted for a related book chapter on “Agriculture’s role in ending extreme poverty” (McArthur, 2015). That chapter addresses similar questions for a subset of 61 countries still estimated to be struggling with extreme poverty challenges as of 2011. Here we present data for a broader set of 140 developing countries. All tables are also available online for download.

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Executive Summary

Census 2000 underscores the many social, demographic, and economic challenges facing the City of Cleveland and its residents.

Between 1980 and 2000, Cleveland lost fully one-sixth of its population. Like other older cities in the nation's "Rust Belt," Cleveland's metropolitan area also lost residents over this period, although it managed to grow modestly in the 1990s.

What little growth there was in the region occurred far from the core. The city's downtown area grew, but nearly every other neighborhood in the city and its close-in suburbs lost residents. To be sure, Cleveland actually gained modest numbers of black, Hispanic, and Asian residents in the last decade. But at the same time it lost almost three times as many white residents. As a result, the number of married couples living in Cleveland dwindled, while households not traditionally associated with the suburbs—single persons and single parents—proliferated there. A similar evacuation of jobs has occurred, and today fewer than one-third of the region's workers are employed in the City of Cleveland.

The demographic and economic impacts of decentralization in the Cleveland metro area are striking. Segregation levels between blacks and whites, and blacks and Hispanics, remain among the highest in the U.S. Cleveland ranks 96th out of the 100 largest cities in the share of adults who have a bachelor's degree, and the educational attainment of each racial/ethnic group in Cleveland significantly lags that in other cities. Not coincidentally, the city's unemployment rate is the second-highest among large U.S. cities, and median household income is the third-lowest. In the 1990s, income among Cleveland households did rise, but nearly half of all families with children still lived below or near the poverty line in 2000. With such low incomes, many of Cleveland's families fail to benefit from the city's relatively affordable rental and ownership opportunities. In many city neighborhoods today, a lack of market demand leaves senior citizens as the largest group of homeowners.

Along these lines and others, then, Cleveland in Focus: A Profile from Census 2000 concludes that:

• The Cleveland metro area continued to decentralize in the 1990s amid slow growth region-wide. Between 1980 and 2000, the City of Cleveland lost 17 percent of its population, although the pace of decline slowed in the last decade. Meanwhile, the region's suburbs grew modestly, but the locus of that growth occurred far from the core. In the 1990s, a few neighborhoods in downtown Cleveland gained residents, but population loss was widespread throughout the remainder of the city and most inner suburbs. The city lost households of all types: The number of married couples living in the city dropped by 16,000, and for every additional single-person household the city gained, the suburbs added more than 40. Today, only one in five residents of the Cleveland region lives in the central city, and less than one-third of the region's workers are employed there.

• Cleveland remains highly segregated and profits from little international immigration. The number of whites living in Cleveland plummeted in the 1990s, and modest gains in black, Hispanic, and Asian populations were not enough to compensate for these losses. The city's foreign-born population grew by a mere 400 persons over the decade, signaling that while modest numbers of immigrants continued to arrive in Cleveland (9,300 in the 1990s), an equivalent number of earlier arrivals left the city for the suburbs or beyond. In addition, the metro area remains highly stratified along racial and ethnic lines, with blacks confined to the city's east side and eastern suburbs, Hispanics clustered on the west side, and whites located in the downtown and southern/western suburbs.

• Cleveland lacks a young, highly-educated population. During the 1990s, the number of 25-to-34 year-olds nationwide declined by 8 percent, due to the aging of the Baby Boom generation. In Cleveland, this age group shrank nearly three times as fast. Consequently, the share of adults with a college degree grew more slowly than elsewhere in the 1990s, and Cleveland now ranks 96th out of the 100 largest cities in college degree attainment. Efforts to retain students attending its own universities may help accelerate growth in educational attainment, but since Cleveland's college-student population is one of the smallest among the Living Cities, strategies to increase educational access for existing residents may be needed. Unlike in many other cities, low educational attainment is not confined to Cleveland's minority groups—whites, blacks, and Hispanics all have below-average rates of college completion.

• Incomes grew in Cleveland during the 1990s, although the city remains home to a primarily low-wage workforce. As in other Midwestern cities, median household income grew at an above-average rate in Cleveland during the 1990s. However, the city's median income still ranks 98th out of the 100 largest cities. Middle-income households declined over the decade, while the ranks of moderate-income "working poor" families grew. In fact, some 62 percent of the city's households made do with incomes below $34,000 in 2000. Families with children were especially likely to earn low wages; nearly half had incomes below or near the federal poverty line.

• Homeownership increased for some groups in Cleveland, but many families face difficulties paying for housing and moving toward homeownership. About half of Cleveland's households own their own homes. That share is typical among the 23 Living Cities, but it remains low for a city with such a large stock of single-family homes. Homeownership rose for the city's Hispanic households, 41 percent of whom now own. But black households in Cleveland did not share in these homeownership gains, and were likely impeded by their low incomes, which trail those for other racial/ethnic groups. Rents in Cleveland increased by almost 10 percent in the 1990s, but remain the lowest among the Living Cities—the median unit rents for only $465. Yet even so, 40,000 Cleveland renters still pay more than 30 percent of income on rent, suggesting that most earn too little to afford even a modestly-priced unit.

By presenting indicators like these on the following pages, Cleveland in Focus: A Profile from Census 2000 seeks to give readers a better sense of where Cleveland and its residents stand in relation to their peers, and how the 1990s shaped the cities, their neighborhoods, and the entire Cleveland region. Living Cities and the Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy hope that this information will prompt a fruitful dialogue among city and community leaders about the direction Cleveland should take in the coming decade.

Cleveland Data Book Series 1
Cleveland Data Book Series 2

      

Executive Summary

Cities are creations of their states. Their boundaries, their powers, and their responsibilities are all substantially prescribed by state law. With the advent of the new federalism—beginning in the 1970s and resurgent today—the devolution of power from Washington to state capitals has increased the importance of state decision making for cities.

Yet, this shift occurred precisely as cities were losing political clout in state legislatures due to population decline within city limits and rampant growth in suburban jurisdictions.

This paper argues that in response to shifting population distributions within states, cities need to build new coalitions to effectively achieve their legislative goals within state legislatures. Case studies—New York City, Chicago, Detroit, and the three largest cities in Ohio (Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus)—are used to more closely examine coalition-building methods.

Overall, the authors find:

• Cities' dependence on state government has increased as the federal government has ceded more power to the states. As cities' populations have declined, they have become weaker in state legislatures that have grown more powerful due to federal policy. In the peak year of 1978, about 15 percent of city revenues came from the federal government. By 1999 that had decreased to 3 percent. Concurrently, the federal government has shifted a number of programs to the states, which control the rules and revenue mechanisms cities operate under.

• Traditional political coalitions cities have used to achieve their state legislative goals are no longer as effective. Partisan (usually Democratic) coalitions are less reliable as focus has shifted to suburban swing districts. Moreover, as their power has decreased, cities' agendas have become more reactive, aiming to preserve the status quo in funding, infrastructure projects, and autonomy.

• Older, inner-ring suburbs are a logical new partner for cities in state legislatures. Increasingly, these suburbs, and some outer ones, have common interests with central cities as they address immigration, fiscal stress, and infrastructure woes. Such alliances would also better address metropolitan-wide issues on a metropolitan basis.

There remain many obstacles to forging such coalitions, however, including longtime distrust among big cities and their neighbors, racial disparities, and in some cases, growing investment in central cities while surrounding suburbs languish. Nonetheless, for cities to effectively influence their state governments more creative approaches to coalition building must be found.

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At a legislative conference in Cambridge, Ohio, Bruce Katz stressed the importance of cities and metro areas to the state's overall prosperity. Acknowledging the decline of Ohio's older industrial cities, Katz noted the area's many assets and argued for a focus on innovation, human capital, infrastructure, and quality communities as means to revitalize the region. 

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China’s economic rise is one of the factors creating strains in the international financial order. China is already the largest trading nation and the second largest economy. It is likely to emerge in the next few years as the world’s largest net creditor. It is already #2 behind Japan. Until recently, China’s main foreign asset has been central bank reserves, mostly invested in U.S. Treasury bonds and similar instruments.

In the last couple of years, however, this pattern has started to change. China’s reserves peaked at about $4 trillion at the end of 2014. Since then, the People’s Bank of China has sold some reserves, but the country as a whole is still accumulating net foreign assets as evidenced by the large current account surplus. What is new is that the overseas asset purchases are coming from the private sector and state enterprises, not from the official sector. The Institute for International Finance estimated that the net private capital outflow from China was $676 billion in 2015. (That estimate includes outward investments by China’s state enterprises, which strictly speaking are not “private”; the point is to distinguish between official holding of foreign assets at the central bank and more commercial transactions.) As investment opportunities diminish in China owing to excess capacity and declining profitability, this commercial outflow of capital from China is likely to continue at a high level.

Tilted playing field

Most of the major investing countries in the world are developed economies; in addition to making direct investments elsewhere, they tend to be very open to inward investment. China is unusual in that it is a developing country that has emerged as a major investor. China itself is an important destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), and opening to the outside world has been an important part of its reform program since 1978. However, China’s policy is to steer FDI to particular sectors. In general, it has welcomed FDI into most but not all of manufacturing. However, other sectors of the economy are relatively closed to FDI, including mining, construction, and most modern services. It is not surprising that China is less open to FDI than developed economies such as the United States. But it is also the case that China is relatively closed among developing countries.

The OECD calculates an index of FDI restrictiveness for OECD countries and major emerging markets. The index is for overall FDI restrictiveness, and also for restrictiveness by sector. China in 2014 was more restrictive than the other BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa). Brazil and South Africa are highly open, similar to advanced economies with measures around 0.1 (on a scale of 0=open and 1=closed). India and Russia are less open with overall measures around 0.2. China is the most closed with an index above 0.4. Some of the key sectors in which China is investing abroad, such as mining, infrastructure, and finance, are relatively closed at home.

This lack of reciprocity creates problems for China’s partners. China has the second largest market in the world. In these protected sectors, Chinese firms can grow unfettered by competition, and then use their domestic financial strength to develop overseas operations. In finance, for example, China’s four state-owned commercial banks operate in a domestic market in which foreign investors have been restricted to about 1 percent of the market. The four banks are now among the largest in the world and are expanding overseas. China’s monopoly credit card company, Union Pay, is similarly a world leader based on its protected domestic market. A similar strategy applies in mining and telecommunications.

China is unusual in that it is a developing country that has emerged as a major investor.

This lack of reciprocity creates an unlevel playing field. A concrete example is the acquisition of the U.S. firm Smithfield by the Chinese firm Shuanghui. In a truly open market, Smithfield, with its superior technology and food-safety procedures, may well have taken over Shuanghui and expanded into the rapidly growing Chinese pork market. However, investment restrictions prevented such an option, so the best way for Smithfield to expand into China was to be acquired by the Chinese firm. Smithfield CEO Larry Pope stated the deal would preserve "the same old Smithfield, only with more opportunities and new markets and new frontiers." No Chinese pork would be imported to the United States, he stated, but rather Shuanghui desired to export American pork to take advantage of growing demand for foreign food products in China due to recent food scandals. Smithfield's existing management team is expected to remain intact, as is its U.S. workforce. 

The United States does not have much leverage to level the playing field. It does have a review process for acquisitions of U.S. firms by foreign ones. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is chaired by Treasury and includes economic agencies (Commerce, Trade Representative) as well as the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. By statute, CFIUS can only examine national security issues involved in an acquisition. It reviewed the Smithfield deal and let it proceed because there was no obvious national security issue. CFIUS only reviews about 100 transactions per year and the vast majority of them proceed. This system reflects the U.S. philosophy of being very open to foreign investment.

A thorn in the relationship

Chinese policies create a dilemma for its partners. Taking those policies as given, it would be irrational for economies such as the United States to limit Chinese investments. In the Shuanghui-Smithfield example, the access to the Chinese market gained through the takeover makes the assets of the U.S. firm more valuable and benefits its shareholders. Assuming that the firm really does expand into China, the deal will benefit the workers of the firm as well. It would be even better, however, if China opened up its protected markets so that such expansions could take place in the most efficient way possible. In some cases, that will be Chinese firms acquiring U.S. ones, but in many other cases it would involve U.S. firms expanding into China. 

This issue of getting China to open up its protected markets is high on the policy agenda of the United States and other major economies. The United States has been negotiating with China over a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) that would be based on a small negative list; that is, there would be a small number of agreed sectors that remain closed on each side, but otherwise investment would be open in both directions. So far, however, negotiations on the BIT have been slow. It is difficult for China to come up with an offer that includes only a small number of protected sectors. And there are questions as to whether the U.S. Congress would approve an investment treaty with China in the current political environment, even if a good one were negotiated.

The issue of lack of reciprocity between China’s investment openness and the U.S. system is one of the thorniest issues in the bilateral relationship.

The issue of lack of reciprocity between China’s investment openness and the U.S. system is one of the thorniest issues in the bilateral relationship. A new president will have to take a serious look at the CFIUS process and the enabling legislation and consider what combination of carrots and sticks would accelerate the opening of China’s markets. In terms of sticks, the United States could consider an amendment to the CFIUS legislation that would limit acquisitions by state enterprises from countries with which the United States does not have a bilateral investment treaty. In terms of carrots, the best move for the United States is to approve the Trans-Pacific Partnership and implement it well so that there is deeper integration among like-minded countries in Asia-Pacific. Success in this will encourage China to open up further and eventually meet the high standards set by TPP. Greater investment openness is part of China’s own reform plan but it clearly needs incentives to make real progress. 

For more on this and related topics, please see David Dollar's new paper, "China as a global investor."

      

China’s approach to Europe is a contrasting mix of economic opportunism and strategic vision.

A continent gripped by economic weakness and debt is crying out for Chinese investment, and Chinese state enterprises and funds are eagerly participating in the sale of the century, buying up ports, prime real estate and technology firms from Greece to the U.K.

At the same time, Beijing views Europe as the terminus for its massively ambitious “One Belt, One Road” project – a string of ports, logistics hubs and other trading infrastructure stretching all the way from Southeast Asia to the north of England.

Yet a populist backlash against China is building in Europe: recent street demonstrations by European workers over Chinese steel dumping have highlighted the risks of a relationship that increasingly looks troubled.

In their book “China’s Offensive in Europe,” Philippe Le Corre, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Alain Sepulchre, a senior adviser with BCG in Hong Kong, analyze China’s rapidly expanding footprint on the continent — and what it means in global terms. They set out some of their thinking in a written Q&A with China Real Time:

You title your book “China’s Offensive in Europe.” This sounds somewhat alarming. Should we be worried?

It may have sounded slightly alarming a few years ago, but China’s economic intentions toward Europe are not just about creating jobs and value: they are about spreading influence on a weakened and somewhat divided continent (the U.K. being perhaps the most obvious example) that is also far away from the U.S., the country seen by China as the ultimate competitor. Europe is part of “the West” where China is willing to leave more than footprints.

Overall, how do you assess the relationship between the EU and China? What are the opportunities and the risks?

On one hand, China has offered to take part in major EU projects such as the European Strategic Investment Fund, launched by the European Commission to relaunch European infrastructure. It will probably become the biggest non-European stakeholder in the ESIF. But on the other hand, there is an attempt by China to divide the EU at various levels. A typical example is the “16+1” group created by China and sixteen Eastern and Central European countries in 2011. Once a year, leaders of these countries meet with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Last year in Suzhou, they also met with President Xi Jinjping. Seven countries signed memorandums of understanding with China on “one-belt, one-road.” Three of them hosted Mr. Xi recently, and were offered substantial Chinese investment promises. China has also tried to establish similar platforms with Southern Europe and Nordic countries, so far without success, but there is a risk that a large number of smaller countries (some of them non-EU members, a good example being Serbia which is getting a Chinese-made high-speed railway) will take a separate approach from the rest of Europe when dealing with China. This is not what Europe needs now.

How coordinated is Chinese investment in Europe? Is there a master plan in Beijing?

There is no “master plan” to take over Europe. First, Europe was part of the “China goes out” [investment] policy in the late 1990s. It then started accelerating with opportunities in 2008-2009 during the euro-debt crisis (and thanks to a favorable exchange rate), when China bought eurobonds and started buying into European infrastructure such as Athens’ Piraeus Harbor (which it now controls). Now, Chinese investment is taking a different dimension through the cultivation of individual European countries via the “one belt, one road” initiative as was demonstrated by Mr. Xi’s visits to the Czech Republic in May, and to Poland and Serbia more recently. Although many aspects of OBOR remain unclear, Europe is definitely a final destination for this project.

Would “Brexit” make the U.K. a less attractive destination for Chinese capital?

As a financial center, London would remain attractive to Chinese investors who would still use it as an renminbi trading hub – but they would also use Frankfurt, Paris and Luxembourg, where they have started trading, too. As for the British market, it would be treated as a medium-sized economy with some prospects but a much less important group than the 450-million consumer common market. For all its flaws, the EU is a powerful trade block with clear interlocutors on issues of importance to China, such as the Market Economy Status. Finally, it is not clear if the U.K. would remain a top destination for Chinese investments. Real estate is one thing, but projects such as the “Northern Power House,” a massive development plan in the north of England, have little chance to receive Chinese financial support if the U.K. votes to exit the EU on Thursday.

Chinese companies are on a buying spree in Europe. This is good news for job creation, yet it also creates anxiety, particularly in Germany, about the loss of key technologies. How do you see this playing out?

Overall, the mood within European elites is about welcoming Chinese investments providing they play the European way. So far Chinese investors have been targeting primarily nonsensitive sectors or companies in financial trouble. The case of [German robot maker Kuka being acquired by Chinese home appliance giant Midea] is quite unique as it involves some specific high-tech content in a sector which is of huge potential. The fact that the Chinese acquirer is perceived as low-tech and very aggressive in its domestic and international expansion strengthens the anti-China Inc. feeling.

Is there a danger of a real populist backlash in Europe against perceived unfair Chinese trading practices, including steel dumping?

It is already happening with the recent (nonbinding, but overwhelming) vote on May 12 by the European Parliament against granting market economy status to China by the end of 2016. Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the European people, and they reflect the continent’s worries over unfair trade practices from China. These are sensitive times in Europe, and China’s message is obviously not popular with European grassroots where people worry about jobs and the future of the continent’s economy.

What is behind the debate on giving China market economy status?

It is a complicated issue for Europeans as the EU itself is based on the rule of law. In this case, the law is the 2001 World Trade Organization agreement that says that China should receive MES by December 2016. Economics and politics are two other factors European leaders cannot avoid: both France and Germany are facing general elections in 2017 and populism is on the rise everywhere. It would be suicidal to grant the status to China now, as almost none of the criteria to be a market economy have been met – except perhaps the upcoming deadline. A compromise will be needed with mitigating measures at the very least, and in the current political context, it will obviously take time.

Europe complains that while its markets are wide open to Chinese investment, China is closing up. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for greater reciprocity. How can China be persuaded to level the playing field?

European cumulative overseas direct investment into China is far bigger than what China has been investing so far into Europe. China is still considered an emerging market, typically showing some kind of protectionism. At the same time, China is often not sympathetic to reciprocity be it in politics or business. Two ways could be considered to pressure China. One way – as we have just heard from Chancellor Merkel – is to be offensive by blocking some Chinese investments in deemed sensitive areas (similarly to what is taking place in the US through the CFIUS mechanism) and by finding alternative suitors to firms like Kuka that China wants to acquire. Another way would be to use the pan-European card. In many cases, European businesses and / or political bodies have been battling each other for Chinese investments. This has been going on for years, and it is time for Europeans to partner vis-a-vis China.

On her recent visits to China, Ms. Merkel has spoken out strongly on issues from human rights to the South China Sea. This compares quite markedly with the approach to China adopted by Britain, which tends to avoid sensitive issues. What accounts for Ms. Merkel’s frankness?

There is still a Chinese fascination for Germany’s economic and technological model, which has no equivalent in Europe. Although the German trade surplus with China is shrinking, many German industrial brands are recognized and vastly respected in China (Audi, Siemens, BMW, BASF…). German technology and brands give Germany an incentive. In addition, Ms. Merkel, who has been in power for almost 11 years, is seen by Beijing as Europe’s clear leader. David Cameron is only considered as his country’s prime minister, with little influence on decisions taken within the EU. The fact Ms. Merkel has spoken frankly and repeatedly about sensitive issues has not weakened her – it is the opposite. A good lesson for others, perhaps?

What is the experience so far of European companies bought by Chinese firms?

The experience so far has been a mixed bag. On the workforce front, most companies have been expanding rather than the opposite, but some have been downsizing their labor force at least initially. A typical challenge lies more at the top management / governance level: Chinese owners tend to over-manage or under-manage dispatching too many or too few skilled managers, governing too tightly or too loosely. The right balance has not been found yet. The most ‘non value-added’ factor is probably on the transfer of technology side. In many instances, Chinese investors have not been able to fully leverage the European technology content into their domestic operations. 

This interview originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal. 

       

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China’s economy has achieved astonishing growth over the past three decades, but it may be undergoing its most serious test of the reform era. In his newly published book, “China’s Guaranteed Bubble,” Ning Zhu argues that implicit Chinese government guarantees, which have helped drive economic investment and expansion, are also largely responsible for the challenges the country now faces. As growth slows, corporate earnings decline, and lending tightens for small and medium-sized businesses, the leverage ratios of China’s government and its corporations and households all have increased in recent years. How desperate is China’s debt situation, and what can be done to avert a major crisis?

On July 11, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted Ning Zhu, deputy dean and professor of finance at the Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance, Shanghai Jiaotong University. Zhu presented key findings from his research into Chinese sovereign, corporate, and household debt, and also introduced potential remedies to return China to the path of long-term sustainable growth. Following the presentation, Senior Fellow David Dollar moderated a discussion with Zhu before taking questions from the audience.

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Since 2000, China has emerged as Africa’s largest trading partner and a major source of investment finance as well. Large numbers of Chinese workers and entrepreneurs have moved to Africa in recent years, with estimates running as high as one million. China’s engagement with Africa has no doubt led to faster growth and poverty reduction on the continent. It is also relatively popular: In attitude surveys, 70 percent of African respondents have a positive view of China, higher than percentages in Asia, the Americas, or Europe.

While China’s deepening engagement with Africa has largely been associated with better economic performance, its involvement is not without controversy. This is particularly true in the West, as typical headlines portray an exploitive relationship: “Into Africa: China’s Wild Rush,” “China in Africa: Investment or Exploitation?,” and “Clinton warns against ‘new colonialism’ in Africa.” 

My forthcoming study, "China’s Engagement with Africa: From Natural Resources to Human Resources," aims to objectively assess this important new development in the world. It has six main findings:

1. First, on the scale of China’s activities in Africa: The media often portrays China’s involvement as enormous, potentially overwhelming the continent. According to data from China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the stock of Chinese direct investment in Africa was $32 billion at the end of 2014. This represents less than 5 percent of the total stock of foreign investment on the continent. Stocks naturally change slowly. But the "World Investment Report 2015" similarly finds that China’s share of inward direct investment flows to Africa during 2013 and 2014 was only 4.4 percent of the total. Of course, direct investment is not the only form of foreign financing. The Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank have also made large loans in Africa, mostly to fund infrastructure projects. In recent years, China has provided about one-sixth of the external infrastructure financing for Africa. In short, Chinese financing is substantial enough to contribute meaningfully to African investment and growth, but the notion that China has provided an overwhelming amount of finance and is buying up the whole continent is inaccurate.

2. The second main finding from the study concerns China’s direct investment and governance. China has drawn attention by making large resource-related investments in countries with poor governance indicators, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Sudan. These deals are certainly part of the picture when it comes to China’s engagement with Africa. But the more general relationship between Chinese direct investment and recipients’ governance environments is different. After controlling for market size and natural resource wealth, total foreign direct investment is highly correlated with measures of property rights and rule of law, as one might expect. This is true both globally and within the African continent. China’s outward direct investment, on the other hand, is uncorrelated with measures of property rights and the rule of law after controlling for market size and natural resource wealth. In this sense, Chinese investment is indifferent to the governance environment in a particular country. While China has investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Sudan, those are balanced by investments in African countries that have relatively good governance environments. South Africa, for instance, is the foremost recipient of Chinese investment. Furthermore, some of the big resource deals in poor governance environments are not working out well, so Chinese state enterprises may well rethink their approach in the future.

3. A third main finding emerges from examining MOFCOM’s registry of Chinese firms investing in Africa. In the aggregate data on Chinese investment in different countries, the big state enterprise deals naturally play an outsized role. MOFCOM’s database on Chinese firms investing in Africa, on the other hand, provides a snapshot of what small- and medium-sized Chinese firms—most of which are private—are doing in Africa. Unlike the big state-owned enterprise investments, these firms are not focused on natural resource extraction. The largest area for investment is service sectors, with significant investment in manufacturing as well. Many African economies welcome this Chinese investment in manufacturing and services.

4. The fourth finding relates to infrastructure finance. In recent years infrastructure financing has expanded and helped many African countries begin to rectify infrastructure deficiencies. Africa has been receiving about $30 billion per year in external finance for infrastructure, of which China provides one-sixth. Chinese financing is a useful complement to other sources, particularly as traditional finance from multilateral development banks and bilateral donors is concentrated on water supply and sanitation. Likewise, private participation in infrastructure is primarily aimed at telecommunications. China has filled a niche by focusing on transportation and power.

   Chinese financing of infrastructure has also enabled Chinese construction companies to gain a firm foothold on the continent. Evidence suggests that Chinese companies have become highly competitive, crowding out African construction companies. This is an area where a trade-off seems to exist between, on the one hand, getting projects completed quickly and cheaply and, on the other, facilitating the long-term development of a local construction industry.

5. This point leads to the fifth finding of the study. There are a lot of Chinese workers in Africa; the total is disproportionately high when compared to the amount of financing that China has provided and compared to migrants from other continents. This is a tentative conclusion because the data on this issue are particular weak. But estimates of Chinese migrants in Africa exceed one million. Many migrants initially move to Africa as workers on Chinese projects in infrastructure and mining and then, perceiving good economic opportunities, stay on. Similar to the dilemma confronting the continent’s construction industry, African countries face a tradeoff here: Chinese workers bring skills and entrepreneurship, but their large numbers limit African workers’ opportunities for jobs and training. The popular notion that Chinese companies only employ Chinese workers is not accurate, but the overall number of Chinese workers in Africa is large. Africa may want to take a page from China’s playbook and limit the ability of foreign investors to bring in workers, forcing them to train local labor instead.

The popular notion that Chinese companies only employ Chinese workers is not accurate, but the overall number of Chinese workers in Africa is large.

6. A final important finding of the study is that the foundation for the Africa-China economic relationship is shifting. China’s involvement in Africa stretches back decades, but the economic relationship accelerated after 2000, when China’s growth model became especially resource-intensive. It made sense for resource-poor China to import natural resources from Africa and to export manufactures in return.

These patterns of trade and investment are now likely to gradually shift in response to changing demographics. The working-age population in China has peaked and will shrink over the coming decades. This has contributed to a tightening of the labor market and an increase in wages, which benefits Chinese people. Household income and consumption are also rising. Compared to past trends, China’s changing pattern of growth is less resource-intensive, so China’s needs for energy and minerals are relatively muted. At the same time, China is likely to be a steady supplier of foreign investment to other countries, and part of that will involve moving manufacturing value chains to lower-wage locations.

Africa’s demographics are moving in the opposite direction. In fact, they resemble China’s at the beginning of its economic reform 35 years ago. About half of Africa’s population is below the age of 20, which means the working-age population will surge over the next 20 years, and will probably continue growing until the middle of the century or later. Roughly speaking, Africa needs to create about 20 million jobs per year to employ its expanding workforce. Twenty years from now, it will need to create 30 million jobs per year. Africa’s demographics present both an opportunity and a challenge. It is unrealistic to expect the China-Africa economic relationship to change overnight. Nor would it be reasonable to expect large volumes of Chinese manufacturing to move to the continent in the near future; it would be more natural for value chains to migrate from China to nearby locations such as Vietnam and Bangladesh. But if even small amounts of manufacturing shift, this could make a significant difference for African economies, which are starting out with an extremely low base of industrialization. And it is useful to have a long-term vision that an economic relationship that started out very much centered on natural resources should shift over time to a greater focus on human resources.

For more on China’s engagement in Africa, check out the Brookings event hosted by the John L. Thornton China Center and the Africa Growth Initiative this Wednesday, July 13, at 3:30pm.