I’ve written here before about my research with Betsey Stevenson showing that economic development is associated with rising life satisfaction. Some people find this result surprising, but it’s the cleanest interpretation of the available data. Yet over the past few days, I’ve received calls from several journalists asking whether Richard Easterlin had somehow debunked these findings. He tried. But he failed.

Rather than challenge our careful statistical tests, he’s simply offered a new mishmash of statistics that appear to make things murkier.

For those of you new to the debate, the story begins with a series of papers that Richard Easterlin wrote between 1973 and 2005, claiming that economic growth is unrelated to life satisfaction. In fact, these papers simply show he failed to definitively establish such a relationship. In our 2008 Brookings Paper, Betsey and I systematically examined all of the available happiness data, finding that the relationship was there all along: rising GDP yields rising life satisfaction. More recent data reinforces our findings. Subsequently, Easterlin responded in of papers circulated in early 2009. That’s the research journalists are now asking me about. But in a paper released several weeks ago, Betsey, Dan Sacks and I assessed Easterlin’s latest claims, and found little evidence for them.

Let’s examine Easterlin’s three main claims.

1. GDP and life satisfaction rise together in the short-run, but not the long-run. False. Here’s an illustrative graph. We take the main international dataset — the World Values Survey — and in order to focus only on the long-run, compare the change in life satisfaction for each country from the first time it was surveyed until the last, the corresponding growth in GDP per capita. Typically, this is a difference taken over 18 years (although it ranges from 8 to 26 years). The graph shows that long-run rises in GDP are positively associated with growth in life satisfaction.

This graph includes the latest data, and Dan generated it just for this blog post. In fact, Easterlin was responding to our earlier work, which showed each of the comparisons one could make between various waves of this survey: Wave 1 was taken in the early ‘80s; Wave 2 in the early ‘90s; Wave 3 in the mid-late ‘90s; Wave 4 mostly in the early 2000s. And in each of these comparisons, you see a positive association — sometimes statistically significant, sometimes not.

What should we conclude from this second graph? Given the typically-significant positive slopes, you might conclude that rising GDP is associated with rising life satisfaction. It’s also reasonable to say that these data are too noisy to be entirely convincing. But the one thing you can’t conclude is that these data yield robust proof that long-run economic growth won’t yield rising life satisfaction. Yet that’s what Easterlin claims.

2. The income-happiness link that we document is no longer apparent when one omits the transition economies. Also false. One simple way to see this is to note that in the first graph the transition countries are shown in gray. Even when you look only at the other countries, it’s hard to be convinced that economic growth and life satisfaction are unrelated. To see the formal regressions showing this, read Table 3 of our response. (Aside: Why eliminate these countries from the sample?)

Or we could just look to another data source which omits the transition economies. For instance, the graph below shows the relationship between life satisfaction and GDP for the big nine European nations that were the members of the EU when the Eurobarometer survey started. Over the period 1973-2007, economic growth yielded higher satisfaction in eight of these nine countries. And while we’re puzzled by the ninth — the increasingly unhappy Belgians — we’re not going to drop them from the data! And if you think Belgium is puzzling, too, then we’ve done our job.

3. Surveys show that financial satisfaction in Latin American countries has declined as their economies have grown. Perhaps true. But how are surveys of financial satisfaction relevant to a debate about life satisfaction? And why focus on Latin America, rather than the whole world? In fact, when you turn to the question we are actually debating — life satisfaction —these same surveys suggest that those Latin American countries which have had the strongest growth have seen the largest rise in life satisfaction. This finding isn’t statistically significant, but that’s simply because there’s not a lot of data on life satisfaction in Latin America! (Given how sparse these data are, we didn’t report them in our paper.)

What’s going on here?

Now it’s reasonable to ask how it is that others arrived at a different conclusion. Easterlin’s Paradox is a non-finding. His paradox simply describes the failure of some researchers (not us!) to isolate a clear relationship between GDP and life satisfaction.

But you should never confuse absence of evidence with evidence of absence. Easterlin’s mistake is to conclude that when a correlation is statistically insignificant, it must be zero. But if you put together a dataset with only a few countries in it — or in Easterlin’s analysis, take a dataset with lots of countries, but throw away a bunch of it, and discard inconvenient observations — then you’ll typically find statistically insignificant results. This is even more problematic when you employ statistical techniques that don’t extract all of the information from your data. Think about it this way: if you flip a coin three times, and it comes up heads all three times, you still don’t have much reason to think that the coin is biased. But it would be silly to say, “there’s no compelling evidence that the coin is biased, so it must be fair.” Yet that’s Easterlin’s logic.

There’s a deeper problem, too. The results I’ve shown you are all based on analyzing data only from comparable surveys. And when you do this, you find rising incomes associated with rising satisfaction. Instead, Easterlin and co-authors lump together data from very different surveys, asking very different questions. It’s not even clear how one should make comparisons between a survey (in the US) asking about happiness, a survey (in Japan) asking about “circumstances at home,” surveys of life satisfaction in Europe based on a four-point scale, and global surveys based on a ten-point scale. Easterlin’s non-result appears only when comparing non-comparable data.

If you want to advocate against economic growth — and to argue that it won’t help even in the world’s poorest nations — then you should surely base such radical conclusions on findings rather than non-findings, and on the basis of robust evidence.

A final thought

Why not look at the levels of economic development and satisfaction? The following graph does this, displaying amazing new data coming from the Gallup World Poll. There’s no longer any doubt that people in richer countries report being more satisfied with their lives.

Is this relevant? Easterlin argues it isn’t — that he’s only concerned with changes in GDP. But the two are inextricably linked. If rich countries are happier countries, this begs the question: How did they get that way? We think it’s because as their economies developed, their people got more satisfied. While we don’t have centuries’ worth of well-being data to test our conjecture, it’s hard to think of a compelling alternative.

Justin Wolfers’ column titled “Debunking the Easterlin Paradox, Again” dismisses Richard Easterlin’s work as just plain wrong. I argue here, as I have elsewhere, that where you come out on the Easterlin paradox depends on the happiness question (and therefore the definition of happiness) that you use, as well as the sample of countries and the period of time.

Richard Easterlin finds no clear country-by-country relationship between average per capita GDP and life satisfaction (among wealthy countries), despite a clear relationship between income and happiness at the individual level within countries. Easterlin also found – and continues to find, based on methods different from Wolfers’ – an absence of a relationship between life satisfaction and long-term changes in GDP per capita.

Different well-being questions measure different dimensions of “happiness”, and, in turn, they correlate differently with income (something they themselves show at the end of their last paper, and admit that the relationship between income and well-being is complex). The best possible life question – which Justin Wolfers and Betsey Stevenson primarily use in the first work, and also in the second – asks respondents to compare their life today to the best possible life they can imagine for themselves. This introduces a relative component, and, not surprisingly, the question correlates most closely with income of all of the available subjective well-being questions. Life satisfaction, which they use in the second work, also correlates with income more than open-ended happiness, life purpose or affect questions, but not as closely as the best possible life question.

Wolfers and Stevenson used the most recent and extensive sample of countries available from the Gallup World Poll, and, as the measure of “happiness”, the best possible life question therein, and challenged the Easterlin paradox. In more recent work, with Stevenson and Dan Sacks (2010), referenced in this blog, the authors look at the relationship between life satisfaction and economic growth, based on the World Values survey and GDP levels and the best possible life question, based on the Gallup World Poll. They isolate a clear relationship between life satisfaction and GDP levels, and their statistical analysis is spot on.

Recent studies by Kahneman and Deaton (2010), and Diener and colleagues (2010), for example, find that happiness in a life evaluation sense (as measured by the best possible life question) correlates much more closely with income than does happiness in a life experience sense (as measured by affect or more open ended happiness questions). This holds within the United States (Kahneman and Deaton) and across countries (Diener et al.).

My own work on Latin America, with Soumya Chattopadhyay and Mario Picon, tested various questions against each other and finds a similar difference in correlation, with affect and life purpose questions having the least correlation with income and the best possible life question the most. My work on happiness in Afghanistan found that Afghans were happier than the world average (on par with Latin Americans) as measured by an open ended happiness question, and 20 percent more likely to smile in a day than Cubans. Yet they scored much lower than the world average on the best possible life question. This is not a surprise. While naturally cheerful and able to make the best of their lot, the Afghans also know that the best possible life is outside Afghanistan.

Thus the conclusions that one draws on whether there is an Easterlin paradox or not in part rest on the definition of happiness, and therefore the question that is used as the basis of analysis. Wolfers and co-authors find a clear relationship between GDP levels and life satisfaction and best possible life – clearly important dimensions of well-being. Yet in the same paper they find much less clear relationships when they use happiness, affect and life purpose questions.  

There is also the question of the sample of countries, and whether one is examining cross section or time series data. The most recent debate with Easterlin is about the trends over time rather than cross-sectional patterns. Dropping the transition economies, as Easterlin does, may be a mistake, as Wolfers contends. But it is also important to recognize the extent to which including a large sample of countries that experienced unprecedented economic collapse and associated drops in happiness alters the slope in the cross-country income-happiness relationship (making it steeper). Wolfers also criticizes Easterlin for relying on financial satisfaction data for his Latin American time series sample (because there is not enough life satisfaction data); financial satisfaction correlates closely, but not perfectly, with life satisfaction. Easterlin’s technique allows for the inclusion of a much larger sample of middle income developing countries, a sample of countries that one can imagine is very important to the growth and happiness debate. Wolfers and co-authors use far fewer Latin American countries because comparable life satisfaction data is limited. Either approach is plausible and, as with all work with limited data, is not perfect. But I would not go as far as calling one or the other “plain wrong”.

Finally, there is the simpler question of giving credit where credit is due. We would not be having this debate, nor would we have a host of analysis on well-being beyond what is measured by income, had Easterlin not triggered our thinking on this with his original study of happiness and income over three decades ago (and his patient and thoughtful mentoring of many economists since then). In the big picture of things, Easterlin had the idea.

The Roma people, the largest minority group in Europe and in many European countries, trail other ethnic groups in almost every characteristic that defines well-being. Perhaps of greatest importance, the Roma are less educated than other ethnic groups. But they also suffer from excess health problems, high unemployment, poverty, and political weakness. The Roma population of Bulgaria is certainly no less disadvantaged than the Roma in other countries. An especially poignant example of Bulgarian Roma disadvantage is that the death rate among children under age 1, a prime indicator of children’s health in any nation, is 25 per 1,000 for Roma children as compared with 9.9 for children of Bulgarian ethnic origin. The mathematics of death almost before life gets started is a symbolic indicator of the Roma burden in Bulgaria. Similarly, research conducted for UNICEF by the University of York shows that the poverty rate among Roma children in Bulgaria is 92 percent, perhaps the highest poverty rate for any ethnic group in Europe. By contrast, the poverty rate among children of Bulgarian heritage is less than half as high at 43 percent.

It is not surprising, then, that over at least the past decade, the European Union (EU) and most European governments, joined by the Open Society Foundation, the World Bank, and other organizations, have created important initiatives to address all these problems. It is possible to think that now is an historic moment in which European governments and dominant ethnic groups, after eight or nine centuries of the most pernicious types of discrimination against the Roma, are finally, albeit often reluctantly, admitting the problems facing their Roma populations and their own role in creating and sustaining these problems. Equally important, most of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) governments, where discrimination against the Roma has been and continues to be particularly intense, are gradually adopting policies to address the problems.

To the extent that the moment of Roma opportunity has arrived, perhaps the most important force moving Bulgaria and other CEE nations in the direction of integration and inclusion is the EU. In the period leading up to the ascension of Bulgaria and other CEE nations to membership in the EU, all the new member states were required to meet a host of conditions required by the EU as the price of admission. Among these conditions were laws outlawing discrimination and requiring equality of educational opportunity. The CEE nations complied with the EU directive to pass such laws, but implementation of the laws in Bulgaria and other nations has been something less than aggressive.

Nor is EU ascension the only force driving the CEE nations to reduce discrimination against the Roma and other minorities. The Open Society, the World Bank, and a number of other private organizations, including several Roma nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have initiated a sweeping program to promote inclusion of the Roma in the civil society of the CEE nations. Called the “Decade of Roma Inclusion” (2005-2015) the initiative is notable for getting all the CEE nations (plus Spain) to participate, to commit themselves to activities designed to promote inclusion and nondiscrimination, and to make a financial commitment to a fund administered by the World Bank to promote the initiative. As a part of the initiative, Bulgaria and the other participating nations originated ten-year action plans. The Bulgarian action plan, the purpose of which is to create a set of goals and activities that will promote Roma integration, includes proposals for education, health care, housing, employment, discrimination and equal opportunity, and culture.

An important part of the Decade program was the establishment of the Roma Education Fund in 2005. Eight nations (Canada, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK), as well as several international agencies including the Open Society, pledged a total of 34 million Euros to support Fund activities during the Roma decade. The major goal of the fund is to “support policies and programs which ensure quality education for Roma, including the desegregation of education systems.”

By joining the EU, Bulgaria and the other CEE nations brought themselves into a well-developed culture of inclusion and a complex system of interlocking laws and agencies that not only outlaw exclusion and discrimination, but provide funds to implement inclusion policies and to monitor the extent to which EU nations are aggressively implementing these laws. The laws and directives include the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Racial Equality Directive, and several others. It would be a mistake to conclude that every EU member, even the original 15 EU nations with relatively more advanced economies and longer histories as democracies than the CEE nations, faithfully implement every component of the various legal requirements of being an EU member. Even so, EU requirements and funds have initiated both profound legal changes and a host of programs to increase the social, economic, political, and cultural inclusion of the Roma as well as studies and evaluations that bring some light to the actual situation of the Roma and other minorities in member nations. Given the all but inevitable distance between the laws on inclusion and discrimination the CEE nations passed in order to join the EU and the actual implementation of those laws, studies commissioned by various EU agencies and NGOs illuminate the gaps between policies and implementation.

An excellent example of such illumination is a 2006 study commissioned by the Economic and Scientific Policy program of the European Parliament. The report is a hard-hitting assessment of the status of Roma throughout Europe with regard to their legal status and socio-economic conditions. The latter category includes assessments of Roma exclusion from employment, education, social services, health care, and community integration. The upshot of the report is that although there may be some progress in these important areas of integration, the Roma are still a second-class group throughout the CEE nations. Seemingly, good laws have not yet produced good results. Laws may be changed, but changing human behavior and culture takes longer.

CEE governments and their defenders are reluctant to admit the lamentable lack of progress in Roma integration. In part for this reason, the European Commission, based on extensive evidence from evaluations, surveys, and news reports of often ferocious discrimination against the Roma, felt the need to publish “An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020” in April 2011. The need for a new framework is a clear signal that the EU Commission believes the CEE governments in general and Bulgaria in particular are not achieving the results the EU hoped for when it approved these nations for EU membership and is therefore trying to push the governments of these nations into further action.

Following publication of the Framework, the Open Society released one of the most thorough and provocative reports on the situation faced by the Roma in Europe and strategies that should be adopted to attack the wide range of Roma disadvantages. Appropriately entitled “Beyond Rhetoric,” the Open Society report includes entire chapters on two issues that I will examine in more detail below.

First, the Open Society strongly recommends that nations collect ethnically disaggregated data. Logically enough, the report holds that it is impossible to document the effects of policy initiatives on the Roma and other groups unless outcome data, including measures of health, education, housing, employment, income, and death rates by age, are collected for individual ethnic groups. So important are ethnically disaggregated data that the report goes so far as to recommend that, if necessary, governments should change their statistical systems to “incorporate ethnic data components into regular statistical surveys.” A second recommendation that deserves special attention is the report’s emphasis on early childhood education and care. Virtually every report about the Roma emphasizes the vital importance of education in fighting Roma exclusion, but the Open Society report strongly recommends that nations implementing the EU Framework should “give urgent consideration” to establishing an early child development fund to “support innovative early development programs and allow for scale up of what works.”

Beyond these specific recommendations, the Open Society report emphasizes that the EU Commission stated explicitly in its Framework document that “member states do not properly use EU money for the purpose of effective social and economic integration of Roma. As if this judgment, which seems to represent the views of many EU agencies, the World Bank, the Open Society, and many Roma groups themselves, needed additional reinforcement, a United Nations expert on minority issues visited Bulgaria this summer and called upon the government to “turn its policies on Roma integration into concrete action.” She went on to give what seems to represent the views of all these groups on the flaws in the Bulgarian government’s approach to fighting Roma exclusion: “Many policies seem to remain largely only rhetorical undertakings aimed at external audiences – official commitments that are not fulfilled in practice.” The result, according to the UN expert, is that “all the evidence demonstrates that Roma remain in desperate circumstances at the very bottom of the socio-economic ladder.” In particular, she mentioned that the access of Roma children to quality education “remains overwhelmingly unfulfilled.”

If CEE nations are now entering a period in which governments will be working, often ineffectively or at a very modest pace, to improve the conditions of the Roma, judging by the efforts of other nations to reduce discrimination against minority groups and by the stately rate of progress so far in the CEE nations, it can be assumed that the fight for Roma equality in Bulgaria will be measured in decades. In the U.S., for example, the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was largely successful. By the mid-1960s, vital court decisions had dismantled major parts of the system of legal discrimination against blacks and the federal government had enacted programs to ensure voting rights and other fundamental rights to blacks. To enhance the legal war on poverty and discrimination, the federal government also initiated an army of social programs designed to boost the education, health, employment, housing, and political participation of the poor in general and blacks in particular. Yet today, nearly half a century after achieving legal rights and the initiation of large-scale government inclusion programs, blacks (and Hispanics) still trail whites by large margins in education, income, housing, poverty levels, and health. Although achieving significant progress against discrimination may require decades or generations, discrimination will not diminish until strong legal, economic, and social forces are mobilized against it. Expecting a long struggle cannot be a reason not to begin.

If the history of making substantial progress in overcoming ethnic discrimination in the U.S. can serve as a rough comparison to the situation of the Roma in CEE nations, several factors are going to be vital in the fight of the Roma to overcome discrimination and exclusion in Bulgaria and throughout Europe. These factors include an antidiscrimination plan, aggressive implementation of the plan by all levels of government, leadership by the Roma themselves, educational progress by Roma children and young adults, political activism by the Roma people, a media committed to accurate reporting and fairness, and a civil society that reflects underlying public opinion favoring integration and opposed to discrimination. Most of these factors appear to be present in Bulgaria, often in rudimentary and brittle form, but present and in many cases moving in the right direction nonetheless. The progress that is just now beginning can be greatly enhanced by the efforts of groups that have the resources, the will, and the vision to roll up their sleeves and help promote Roma inclusion.

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"Happiness." "Contentment." "Subjective well-being." Can we measure how happy people are and if so, what can we do with this information? In this podcast, Carol Graham, the Leo Pasvolsky Senior Fellow and author of The Pursuit of Happiness: An Economy of Well-Being, explains how happiness/well-being research works and why it matters for public policy in the U.S. and globally.

In the podcast, Graham explains two dimensions of understanding well-being, the "Benthamite/hedonic" and the "Aristotelian/eudemonic." She explained them in this earlier publication:

Those of us involved focus on two distinct dimensions: hedonic well-being, a daily experience component; and evaluative well-being, the way in which people think about their lives as a whole, including purpose or meaning. Jeremy Bentham focused on the former and proposed increasing the happiness and contentment of the greatest number of individuals possible in a society as the goal of public policy. Aristotle, meanwhile, thought of happiness as eudemonia, a concept that combined two Greek words: "eu" meaning abundance and "daimon" meaning the power controlling an individual’s destiny.

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Show notes:

• "Why Aging and Working Makes us Happy in 4 Charts," Carol Graham
• Happiness Around the World, Carol Graham
• "The Decade of Public Protest and Frustration with Lack of Social Mobility," Carol Graham
• "Evidence for a midlife crisis in great apes consistent with the U-shape in human well-being," Andrew Oswald and others
• "You Can’t Be Happier than Your Wife: Happiness Gaps and Divorce," Cahit Guven and others
• Aristotle's definition of happiness
• The life of philosopher Jeremy Bentham
• Gallup World Poll

See more charts like this in Carol Graham's newest post on the relationship among work, age and happiness.

In "Why Aging and Working Makes us Happy in 4 Charts," Carol Graham describes a research paper in which she and co-author Milena Nikolova examine determinants of subjective well-being beyond traditional income measures. One of these is the relationship between age and happiness, a chart of which resembles, remarkably, a smile.

As Graham notes:

There is a U-shaped curve, with the low point in happiness being at roughly age 40 around the world, with some modest differences across countries. It seems that our veneration of (or for some of us, nostalgia, for) youth as the happiest times of our lives is overblown, the middle age years are, well, as expected, and then things get better as we age, as long as we are reasonably healthy (age-adjusted) and in a stable partnership.

The new post has three additional charts that showcase other ways to think about factors of happiness.

In a new essay, “The New Challenge to Market Democracies,” Senior Fellow William Galston argues that “the centrality of economic well-being in our politics reflects long-held assumptions about the purposes of our politics. If economic growth and well-being are in jeopardy, so are our political arrangements.”

Galston, the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies, makes the case that economic growth and well-being are indeed in jeopardy for a variety of reasons, including: wage growth that has just kept up with inflation; family and household incomes that remain below their pre-Great Recession peak; the share of national income going to wages and salaries is as low as it’s been in nearly 50 years; and a difficult jobs situation in which workers are getting paid less, the number of people working part-time who want full-time work remains high, and few new jobs offer middle range incomes. “These trends,” Galston writes, “bode ill for the future of the middle class; many parents now doubt that their children will enjoy the same opportunities that they did.”

Galston offers three broad policy prescriptions related to employment and tax reform:

1. “We should adopt full employment as a high-priority goal of economic policy and welcome the wage increases that it would generate.”
2. “We should use the tax code to restore the relationship between wage increases and productivity gains.”
3. “We should adopt a strong presumption against provisions of the tax code that treat some sources of income more favorably than wages and salaries,” which includes scrapping tax expenditures that “disproportionately benefit upper-income investors.”

Calling economic growth a “moral enterprise” as well as a material goal, Galston—acknowledging economist Benjamin Friedman—concludes that:

the central question the United States now faces is whether the next generation will again achieve broadly shared prosperity or rather experience the stagnation of living standards. Broad prosperity is both the oil that lubricates the machinery of government and the glue that binds our society together. Economic stagnation means a continuation of gridlocked, zero-sum politics and a turn away from the spirit of generosity that only a people confident of its future can sustain.

Read “The New Challenge to Market Democracies.”

Created within a year of each other, the World Bank and the United Nations were born out of a shared response to the Second World War. The war created a constituency willing to invest resources and ideals in a system of multilateral cooperation. In the words of one of their architects, these institutions were to create a “New Deal for a new world.”

Today we face another period of global disorder. The number of armed conflicts worldwide has tripled from four to 11 since 2007. 2014 was the most lethal year since the end of the Cold War, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. In the same year, the total number of deaths from terrorism increased by 80 percent, to close to 37,000, the largest yearly increase in the last 15 years, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace.

The fallout is clear. The number of people affected by humanitarian crises has almost doubled in the past decade, with 125 million people requiring humanitarian assistance. Displacement is at a post-World War II high with 60 million people around the world forced from their homes, often within their own countries. Roughly two-thirds of U.N. peacekeepers today and almost 90 percent of personnel in U.N. Special Political Missions are working in and on countries where there is little peace to keep.

Responding to this challenge, the U.N. and its member states led major reviews in 2015 of the tools and approaches used to respond to conflict. These reviews looked at peacekeeping operations, the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, and the U.N.’s peacebuilding architecture.

These reviews underscored that while humanitarian assistance can mitigate suffering, and peacekeepers can stabilize situations, they alone cannot create lasting peace, development, and prosperity. 

Responding to this challenge requires a new global partnership to prevent violent conflict, reduce humanitarian need, and sustain peace. This partnership must reaffirm our commitment to humanity and chart a course for change, as the secretary-general has called for in his recent report for the World Humanitarian Summit.

Taking place just before the World Humanitarian Summit, the ministerial meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) in Stockholm is a key moment at which the principles of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, in particular the TRUST and FOCUS components, could be used to provide a foundation for this effort.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding, however, are political. Technical instruments must be aligned with and informed by a political strategy owned by national governments and developed in consultation with its people. This is as true at the global level as it is in each country.

The first step is normative. In 2015, through the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, member states committed to a future that aims to leave no one behind. The International Dialogue, the New Deal, and the g7+ were important foundations, asserting the links between development and peace captured in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). However, the SDGs are universal. Goal 16 on just, peaceful, and inclusive societies is an ambition of all countries, not only those identified internationally as conflict-affected, and other goals—for example SDG 1 on ending poverty and SDG 10 on reducing inequality—are critical to peace in conflict-affected states. A statement at Stockholm should be made clarifying the linkages between the specific focus of the New Deal and the universal goals of the SDGs (and their affiliated processes).

The second is ownership. Peace and development are first and foremost a national responsibility. The New Deal provides a framework that brings together multilateral and bilateral partners of conflict-affected countries. However, it has functioned primarily as a tool for the targeting of aid, not its management. To achieve the SDGs in 2030 we need to equip national partners with the tools to address the drivers of conflict. That is where a revitalized New Deal can play an important role. While the SDGs are now the overarching framework, making more significant progress on the TRUST and FOCUS components of the New Deal will be essential contributions to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Commitments to ownership, the use of country systems, and mobilization of national resources should be restated and given life in Stockholm.

The last is resources. Resolving conflict requires multi-year financing addressing the drivers of conflict rather than short-term responses.  While official development assistance (ODA) to conflict-affected countries has increased over the last dozen years or so, in 2013, peacebuilding support to legitimate politics, security, and justice systems represented only 16 percent (or $6.8 billion) of the $42 billion in gross development assistance for 31 conflict-affected countries (see Figure 1). At a very moment of global crisis, as of January 1, 2016 and for the first time in its history, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund will not reach its $100 million annual allocation target endorsed by the secretary-general and donors. Stockholm needs to demonstrate a commitment to peacebuilding and statebuilding that goes beyond words, and commit to more resources devoted to conflict-affected countries and more resources targeting the drivers of conflict.

The U.N. has been a supporter of the New Deal from the beginning, recognizing it as a model for partnership between conflict-affected states and their development partners. A political, prioritized strategy for peacebuilding and statebuilding is necessary to support full implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in conflict-affected states. The New Deal provides inspiration for such a strategy. The question for Stockholm is whether inspiration alone will be sufficient.

Note: Special thanks goes to Jago Salmon for his contributions. This blog reflects the views of the author only and does not reflect the views of the Africa Growth Initiative. Similarly, the views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

This paper identifies some of the key characteristics of the emergence of a “new multilateralism.” It offers a number of practical recommendations on how to get the best out of the multilateral development system (MDS) in an increasingly complex environment.

The MDS is a set of institutions and norms that have guided development cooperation since the secondworld war. It has been based on a number of underlying principles that can be summarized as follows: doing no harm to others, solidarity with developing countries, and sharing the burden of investing in global public goods. The MDS has used a broad range of instruments but ultimately the test of its effectiveness is that it enables a collective response to solving a particular problem that is preferred to individual country responses.

To be effective, multilateralism must be a choice that is made because it is the most effective or efficient instrument available to a government. Multilateralism should not become a way of abdicating leadership. It must be a way of exercising it. For a new multilateralism to take root, what is needed is a robust approach to the use of multilateralism as an instrument of choice by a large number of member states.

The MDS has evolved over time and continues to evolve. Initially, it was organized by a small group of like-minded countries with a common vision and principles, and was designed to share the financial burden of development cooperation and to implement programs of support in an effective way. But over the last two decades there have been strong forces reshaping the system. These include shifts in economic size and the emergence of the growth economies, the increasing differentiation among developing countries and the recognition that substantial investment in global public goods is needed to reap the benefits of globalization and reduce the costs. Today, the MDS is continuing to evolve in response to the need to accommodate emerging state powers and non-state actors (business, civil society, and others) as well as the need to broaden responsibility for collective responses.

Agenda 2030, the program for sustainable development endorsed by 193 member states of the United Nations in September 2015, provides important signals for how the MDS institutional landscape should evolve over the next few years. Agenda 2030 is truly multilateral as it underlines the importance of a “goals, targets, and results” framework for every country, against which progress can be transparently monitored. But it also shows where the current MDS falls short. Agenda 2030 is universal in its scope and vision, while the MDS is still mostly organized with a frame that divides the world into developed and developing countries. Agenda 2030 is ambitious and requires solutions at scale, while the MDS today is fragmented and project-oriented. Agenda 2030 argues for integrated solutions extending across development, peace, environment, and humanitarian realms, while the MDS is siloed in its approach. Agenda 2030 calls for contributions from a range of actors, beyond governments, while the MDS, at its core, remains largely intergovernmental. Agenda 2030 requires the mobilization of substantially greater resources from all sources, domestic and external, public and private, while the MDS has focused largely on aid and budgetary contributions from member states. Finally, Agenda 2030 recognizes the importance of investing in global (and regional) public goods and starts to define other means of implementation, highlighting where gaps in the system exist.

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Hillary Clinton isn’t often in the business of offering unsolicited advice to her Republican—or even Democratic—rivals in the presidential race. However, in a CNN interview with Alisyn Camerota on January 12, 2015, Hillary Clinton did just that. She did something quite taboo. She talked about the presidential transition.

Her comments did not flow from confidence that she would be elected president—a confidence she may indeed have. Her words came from experience, pragmatism and reality. They were words that did not simply reflect her own approach to a candidacy or a prospective administration. It was advice to everyone running for president about the right thing to do—not for themselves, but for the American public.

Clinton said:

I want to think hard—if I do get the nomination, right then and there—how we organize the White House, how we organize the Cabinet, what’s the legislative agenda. You know, the time between an election and an inauguration is short. You can’t wait. I mean, you can’t take anything for granted; you need to keep working as hard as you possibly can. But I think it’s important to start planning because we know what happens if you get behind in getting your agenda out, in getting your appointments made. You lose time, and you’re not doing the work the American people elected you to do.

Presidential candidates almost never speak of a transition until they are declared the president-elect in the late hours of the Tuesday following the first Monday in November. Candidates fear being accused of taking the election for granted, or “measuring the drapes.” They worry such planning will signal to voters an off-putting overconfidence.

Those fears may be legitimate, but acting on those concerns can be dangerous. If a voter believes a candidate should not prepare for a new administration until they are officially elected, that leaves the president-elect about 11 weeks to ready themselves for the busiest, most complicated, most important job in the world. In those 11 weeks, a president-elect would need to think not just about the 15 Cabinet secretaries who serve as the most visible political appointees in government, but literally hundreds and thousands of other posts. (One dirty little secret is that the President of the United States appoints over 3,000 people to his or her administration.)

Presidents have to think about the structure, order, and sequence of their legislative agenda. They need to communicate their intentions and plans to congressional leadership. They need to think about organizing a White House. The truth is from president to president, the White House looks the same from the outside, but is structured and functions dramatically differently on the inside. Presidents have myriad important decisions to make that will set the tone and agenda for the following four years and will affect every American in some way. Eleven weeks is not enough time. Clinton acknowledges this.

Clinton’s “bold” statement actually reflects a reality in American politics. As soon as an individual accepts his or her party’s presidential nomination, they are entitled to funding, office space, and government email and technology as part of the transition process. The Office of Personnel Management is involved, as is (of late) the Office of Presidential Personnel for the outgoing administration. The presidential transition is an essential part of democracy, policymaking, administration, and the continuity of government. Every four years, the government supports two transitions—one that comes to be and one that closes up shop.

In one way however, Hillary Clinton is entirely wrong. Waiting until you receive the nomination is too late to begin thinking about the transition. As I have written before, every presidential candidate should start thinking about a transition as soon as they announce their candidacy. They don’t need a full Cabinet chosen on Day 1 of the campaign, but they should designate one or two close advisers to organize for the process, begin considering names for posts, think through the types of policies to propose in the first 100 days, and begin what is one of the most complicated managerial tasks in the world.

Hillary Clinton is right “it is important to start planning,” and it’s also never too early to do so. I hope Clinton’s claim that one should start upon securing the nomination is a reflection of that fear of the “drape measuring” accusation. I hope she is planning her transition now. I hope Bernie Sanders and Ted Cruz and Donald Trump and John Kasich and everyone else is planning their transition right now. It’s essential. Clinton knows the challenges of setting up a White House and the complications that early disorganization can cause; she saw that dysfunction first hand in 1993. But most candidates have also worked in or around the White House or have been in politics long enough to know the importance of an effective transition. And candidates who haven’t, like Donald Trump and Carly Fiorina, should be more inclined to set up a transition early, as they have more managerial experience than anyone else in the race.

To this end, I have a modest proposal. It probably won’t happen. It’s likely one that candidates would fear, and it would likely only be effective if everyone is on board. Every current presidential candidate should sign a pledge committing to two things. First, by February 1, 2016, they will designate at least one staffer, adviser or confidante as a transition director.  Second, they will not publicly criticize another candidate—of either party—for having a transition staffer or team in place. Call it a “Transition Truce.” But the reality is that such a pledge—and the actions behind it—are essential for a better functioning, better prepared, more effective administration, no matter who it is who swears the oath exactly one year from today.

Bernie Sanders may have had no foreign policy advisers until this week, but he can justly claim to have proposed one of the boldest and radical foreign policy ideas of the 2016 presidential campaign. In what he describes as the most important speech of his campaign—on Democratic Socialism at Georgetown University in November 2015—Sanders called on the United States to fight terrorism in the same way it waged the Cold War. He said: “We must create an organization like NATO to confront the security threats of the 21st century” and we must “expand our coalition to include Russia and members of the Arab League.”

NATO was created in 1949 to give the United States a way to forward-deploy its forces so they would immediately be entangled in a war if the Soviets attacked Western Europe. The most important feature of NATO was the mutual defense clause, whereby an attack on one would be treated as an attack on all. In a new NATO to fight terrorism, the United States could find itself having to deploy tens of thousands of troops throughout the Middle East to fight ISIS. The United States may even be treaty-bound to use its troops to fight alongside Russia in Chechnya. 

If that sounds very unlike Bernie Sanders, it's because it is. It is clear from the speech that Sanders had very little idea what NATO actually is or why it was founded. He was looking for a way to pass the burden of fighting terrorism on to other nations, particularly Muslim nations. Lacking any clear idea as to how to do this, a formal treaty must have seemed as good a way as any. Sanders would surely say that he meant an alliance without a mutual defense pact and without the United States taking the lead. But such an organization currently exists—it is called the counter-ISIS coalition. Presidents Bush and Obama also both sought ways to deepen cooperation with Russia and Arab countries on terrorism without a formal NATO-style alliance, which led to the situation Sanders decries. In any event, the new NATO served its purpose. Sanders could later claim to have given a speech on foreign policy. The specifics of the idea went un-scrutinized. 

Mind the gap

Bernie Sanders’ foreign policy remains a mystery because he has said so little about it. Unlike Donald Trump, who has been vocal about his foreign policy views for many decades, Sanders has focused his message on inequality and the nefarious influence of big money in politics. Recently though, he has begun to come out of his shell. He regularly invokes his opposition to the Iraq War in an effort to negate Hillary Clinton’s superior experience in foreign policy. Sanders clearly hopes that this vote will enable him to win over many Barack Obama supporters who remain suspicious of Clinton. In recent weeks, some foreign policy experts have sketched out how Sanders could build on Obama’s foreign policy legacy and distinguish himself from Clinton. 

Sanders-Obama is the real foreign policy fault-line in the Democratic Party.

The conventional wisdom of the foreign policy debate in the Democratic Party sees an Obama wing that is skeptical of military intervention and a Clinton wing that is more willing to use American power overseas. This is a paradigm that Sanders would certainly endorse and hope to capitalize on but it is not an apt description of the 2016 divide. There is a reason why Obama has come close to endorsing Clinton and has left no doubt that he sees her as his true heir. The gap between Sanders and Obama is much greater than between Clinton and Obama. Obama is an avowed globalist who looked outward, even as he was campaigning in Iowa in 2007. Sanders is a liberal nationalist who looks inward, not just in his rhetoric but in his policy. 

A Sanders nomination would be a striking repudiation not just of Clinton but of Obama’s worldview and message. Sanders-Obama is the real foreign policy fault-line in the Democratic Party. 

Obama 2008: Looking outward

Obama’s 2008 campaign is now shrouded in mythology. He is often described as unlikely a candidate as Sanders. Forgotten is the fact that weeks after he started, he secured the support of major donors and dozens of foreign policy experts. He was always the favorite of a particular part of the establishment. He was young but he had thought about the world and America’s role in it. In 2005, he hired Samantha Power to be his foreign policy adviser in the Senate. His 2006 book "The Audacity of Hope" had a chapter on foreign policy that culled ideas from think tank row. 

In April 2007, a full 18 months before the election, Obama gave a revealing interview to The New York Times' David Brooks in which he spoke about the influence that American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr had on his foreign policy. Niebuhr was a seminal figure in U.S. diplomatic thinking during the Cold War and is credited with developing the most sophisticated critique of American idealism. Obama said that Niebuhr provided:

“the compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction. I take away...the sense we have to make these efforts knowing they are hard, and not swinging from naïve idealism to bitter realism.”

Some of these themes would reappear in his extraordinary speech in Oslo in 2010 on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. 

Throughout the 2008 campaign, Obama spoke about reviving American leadership and presenting a new face to the world. In his announcement speech in Springfield in 2007, Obama said “ultimate victory against our enemies will come only by rebuilding our alliances and exporting those ideals that bring hope and opportunity to millions around the globe.” In his acceptance speech in Chicago, he spoke to “those watching tonight from beyond our shores”. “Our stories are singular,” he said, “but our destiny is shared and a new dawn of American leadership is at hand.” 

Obama’s challenge in office, and the challenge of progressives after the Iraq War, was to develop a foreign policy that remained faithful to his internationalist ideals while resisting calls for large-scale military interventions. In this, his record was mixed. The Middle East stands out as a major failure but he had successes elsewhere. He helped rescue the international financial system, he deepened U.S. engagement in Asia, he negotiated several trade deals, and he secured a controversial nuclear deal with Iran. Throughout, he articulated a case for a liberal brand of American exceptionalism and for continued U.S. global leadership. 

Sanders 2016: Drawing inward

That is now at risk, not just by the prospect of a Trump presidency but also from within the Democratic primary. Sanders has had remarkable success with a campaign message that is entirely inwardly focused. Read his speeches, whether at Georgetown or on the stump, and you will see a sharp change of tone from Obama of 2008. Gone are the passages on a new era of American global leadership. Gone are the messages for people beyond these shores. Gone is the optimism about America’s global role. Gone too is the sense that the United States, flawed as it is, has a positive and indispensable role to play in upholding the international order. 

Rhetorically, Sanders is deeply pessimistic about the United States and its role in the world. For Sanders, America is not getting better—it’s getting worse, including on Obama’s watch. And, woe betide those who think that America can be any more successful abroad. In his Georgetown speech, he said that the first element of his foreign policy would be an acknowledgement of how America gets it wrong so frequently. In addition to the Iraq War, he mentioned the toppling of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, of Goulart in Brazil in 1964, and of Allende in Chile in 1973. 

[Sanders] offered no examples of how the United States has made the world a better place.

Apart from the ham-fisted description of NATO, he offered no examples of how the United States has made the world a better place. The toppling of foreign leaders is not, for him, even partially balanced out by successes in promoting democracy in Chile in 1987 or in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, or in Indonesia in 1998. He did not mention the Kosovo intervention in 1999, which he actually supported at the time. The speech was not without irony however. Sanders organized the domestic section, on democratic socialism, around Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union speech but made no mention of FDR’s heroic—and frequently risky—efforts to win the war and the post-war world.

As the campaign has progressed, Sanders has been pressed on what he would do if he were to be elected president. He said in a February Democratic debate that the “key doctrine of the Sanders administration would be no, we cannot continue to do it alone, we need to work in coalition.” The very idea that a Democratic candidate could make the unilateralist charge against Obama, one of the most multilateral presidents in modern American history, is itself remarkable and rather implausible. 

The very idea that a Democratic candidate could make the unilateralist charge against Obama, one of the most multilateral presidents in modern American history, is itself remarkable and rather implausible.

But this has not deterred Sanders. He has repeatedly argued that the Obama administration has not done enough to get Muslim nations to fight ISIS. At Georgetown he declared, “We need a commitment from these [Muslim] countries that the fight against ISIS takes precedence over the religious and ideological differences that hamper the kind of cooperation we desperately need.” Quite how Sanders would accomplish this was left unsaid. The reason ISIS is difficult to defeat is because Muslim nations see other challenges, particularly the sectarian struggle with Iran, as a much greater threat to their vital interests. 

Simply saying that the president can will other countries to act contrary to what they see as their vital interests is about as plausible as Trump persuading Mexico to pay for his wall. Clinton has repeatedly recognized the challenges associated with persuading Muslim countries to take on more of the anti-ISIS fight, but Sanders has just doubled down on his charge against Obama. “I’ll be dammed,” he told CNN, “if the kids of Vermont have to defend the Royal Saudi family” and take the lead in the fight against ISIS, even if is just with air power. 

On economic policy, Sanders offers an even more radical departure from Obama’s legacy. Sanders has opposed all U.S. trade agreements throughout his political career, including General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In 2005, he sponsored a bill calling on the United States to withdraw from the World Trade Organization. He has called for tariffs to prevent American industry from investing in China, Vietnam, and Mexico. He was the only Democrat to vote against the Import-Export Bank and he opposed the expansion of the H1-B visa program for high-skilled workers. 

He has offered no positive vision for the world economy and sees it as a zero sum game—either American workers’ win or other nations do. Obama indulged in anti-trade rhetoric, as has Clinton, in the heat of a primary campaign, but Sanders is different. He has consistently sought to disengage from the global economy—the same one that Obama did so much to save in 2009. This is no small matter. As the global economy flirts with recession and a new crisis, this time originating in China, the rest of the world is asking if America can continue to lead or if it is all tapped out. 

He has consistently sought to disengage from the global economy.

A President Sanders would not try to destroy America’s alliances like Donald Trump or leave the Middle East entirely like Rand Paul. But, he would surely try to hide from the world and tend to matters at home. He will be immediately tested by allies and adversaries alike as they try to find the limits of his commitments. All presidents are tested of course—especially those, including Obama and Clinton, who promise to focus on the home front— but they usually try to respond in a resolute way to dispel the concerns. Obama sent additional troops to Afghanistan in 2009, for example. Sanders will probably resist the pressure and focus on his domestic agenda, thus exacerbating foreign crises. He would surely feel a sense of betrayal as America’s allies failed to take up what he considered to be a fair share of the burden. 

America in the world?

2016 is a very different world than 2008. Then, Obama and Democrats saw a world that was full of opportunity, despite the financial crisis and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They believed the United States could offer a new face, and a new form of leadership, to the world. When we look back on 2016, it will surely be the year when the United States and much of the rest of the world faced a choice about whether to look outward or turn inward. It is not just the Republican and Democratic primary. Britain will vote on June 23 whether to leave the European Union. Germany and much of the rest of Europe will decide whether to close its borders to refugees.

When we look back on 2016, it will surely be the year when the United States and much of the rest of the world faced a choice about whether to look outward or turn inward.

Of all these tests, the biggest by far is in the United States. Republican and Democratic foreign policy populism is different, of course. Trump and his supporters are both terrified by threats from overseas and determined to lash out as viciously as possible against anything and everything associated with them. To his great credit, Sanders has not peddled fear of the other. His supporters are not frightened by the world. But they are disappointed in it and largely agnostic about what happens outside the United States. The left used to be inherently internationalist, but today Sanders sees no opportunity to lead, only risks of becoming embroiled in someone else’s problems. Sanders will not tear down the liberal international order but he does want to avoid doing much to uphold it. 

Sanders, his aspiring advisers, and much of the media have an interest in situating his foreign policy worldview within the Obama-Clinton paradigm but it is simply not consistent with what he is saying or with what he has done in the very recent past (never mind decades ago). Obama and Clinton obviously differ on some elements on U.S. foreign policy. It is not about large-scale invasions, as is commonly thought. Clinton is not about to send tens of thousands of ground troops to Syria. Rather, she tends to favor small-scale action early on in a conflict to tip the balance while Obama is extremely cautious about a slippery slope. Clinton also tends to see world politics more in terms of power politics while Obama often speaks as if we are headed toward a post-national, more global system. But this all pales in comparison to fundamental questions about whether the United States ought to be engaged in the world, not just militarily but also economically. Obama was elected on a platform of renewing American leadership in the world. He will soon find out if Democrats want to stay on the broad path he set.

Editors' Note: Al-Shabab’s operational capacities and intimidation power have grown in the past year, writes Vanda Felbab-Brown. Many of Kenya’s counterterrorism policies have been counterproductive, and counterinsurgency efforts by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have at best stagnated. This piece was originally published by The Cipher Brief.

April 2 marked one year since the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab attacked the Garissa University in Kenya and killed 148 people, galvanizing Kenya to intensify its counterterrorism efforts. Yet al-Shabab’s operational capacities and intimidation power have grown in the past year. Many of Kenya’s counterterrorism policies have been counterproductive, and counterinsurgency efforts by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have at best stagnated. State building in Somalia is only creeping, with service-delivery by the federal government and newly formed states mostly lacking. Politics continues to be clan-based, rapacious, and discriminatory, with the forthcoming 2016 elections in Somalia thus far merely intensifying political infighting.

Al-Shabab: A rejuvenation

Despite internal and external threats to its effective functioning, al-Shabab is on the upswing again. It has carried out dozens of terrorist attacks within Somalia, including against hotels used by government officials as workspaces and housing, and on beaches and in markets throughout the country. It has raised fear among the population and hampers the basic government functionality and civil society mobilization.

In February 2016, al-Shabab, for the first time, succeeded in smuggling a bomb onboard a flight from Mogadishu. Disturbingly, it has been retaking cities in southern Somalia, including the important port of Merka. It has also overrun AMISOM bases and seized weapons and humvees: one such attack on a Kenyan forward-operating base was likely the deadliest ever suffered by the Kenyan military. Al-Shabab’s operational capacity has also recovered from the internal rifts between its anti-foreign-jihadi, pro-al-Qaida, pro-ISIS, and Somalia-focused factions.

Not all the power jockeying has been settled, and not all leadership succession struggles have been resolved. Moreover, an ISIS branch independent of and antagonistic to al-Shabab is trying to grow in Somalia and has been battling al-Shabab (in a way that parallels the ISIS-Taliban tangles in Afghanistan). Nonetheless, al-Shabab is once more on the rise and has recovered its financing from charcoal, sugar, and other smuggling in southern Somalia, and from taxing traffic and businesses throughout its area of operation, including in Mogadishu.

Although the terrorist violence is almost always claimed by al-Shabab, many of the attacks and assassinations are the work of politicians, businessmen, and clans, intimidating rivals or seeking revenge in their disputes over land and contracts. Indeed, with the clock ticking down to the expected 2016 national elections in Somalia, much of the current violence also reflects political prepositioning for the elections and desire to eliminate political rivals.

Kenya and AMISOM: Don’t sugarcoat it

In contrast to the upbeat mood among al-Shabab, AMISOM efforts have at best been stalled. With the training of Somali national forces going slowly and the force still torn by clan rivalries and shackled by a lack of military enablers, the 22,000-strong AMISOM continues to be the principal counterinsurgency force. Counterterrorism attacks by U.S. drone and special operations forces complicate al-Shabab’s operations, but do not alter the balance of power on the ground. In its ninth year now, and having cost more than U.S.$1 billion, AMISOM continues to be barricaded in its bases, and many of Somalia’s roads, even in areas that are supposedly cleared, are continually controlled by al-Shabab. In cities where AMISOM is nominally in charge, al-Shabab often rules more than the night as AMISOM conducts little active patrolling or fresh anti-Shabab operations even during the day. Rarely are there formal Somali forces or government offices to whom to hand over the post-clearing “holding and building” efforts. There is little coordination, intelligence sharing, or joint planning among the countries folded under the AMISOM heading, with capabilities vastly uneven. The principle benefit of the Burundi forces in Somalia, for example, is that they are not joining the ethnic infighting developing in their home country.

Ethiopia and Kenya still support their favorite Somali proxies. For Kenya, the key ally is Sheik Ahmed “Madobe,” a former high-level al-Shabab commander who defected to create his Ogadeni anti-Shabab militias, Ras Kamboni, and who in 2015 got himself elected president of the newly-formed Jubaland state. Along with Madobe and other Ogadeni powerbrokers, Kenyan Defense Forces control the Kismayo port. Like al-Shabab, they allegedly illegally tax smuggled sugar, charcoal, and other goods through the port and southern Kenya. In addition to these nefarious proceeds on the order of tens to hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars, Kenya’s other interests in Somalia often clash with those of Ethiopia and the Somali national government, including over projecting power off Somali coast and strengthening local warlords and militias who promise to keep Ogadeni mobilization in Kenya down.

At home, Kenya’s counterterrorism activities have been not only parochial, but often outright counterproductive. Post-Garissa dragnets have rounded up countless Kenyan ethnic Somalis and Somali immigrants and refugees. Entire communities have been made scapegoats. For a while, the Kenyan government tried to shut down all Somali hawala services based in Kenya as well as to expel Somali refugees and shut down their camps. Accusations of torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings by Kenyan Defense Forces, the police, and other security agencies are widespread. Meanwhile, despite U.S. counterterrorism training and assistance such as through the Security Governance Initiative, debilitating corruption plagues Kenya’s security forces and agencies.

Somalia’s government: Old and new mires

The Somali federal government and the newly formed state-level administrations mostly falter in delivering services that Somali people crave. Competition over state jobs and whatever meager state-sponsored resources are available continue to be mired in clan rivalries and discrimination. Unfortunately, even newly formed (Jubaland, Southwest, and Galmudug) and still-forming states (Hiraan and Middle Shabelle) have not escaped rapacious clan politics. Dominant clans tend not to share power and resources with less numerous ones, often engaging in outright land theft, such as in Jubaland. Civil society contributions have been marginalized. Such misgovernance and clan-based marginalization, as well as more conservative religious politics, are also creeping into Somaliland and Puntland, the two more stable states. Throughout Somalia and in Northeast Kenya, al-Shabab is skillfully inserting itself into clan rivalries and mobilizing support among those who feel marginalized.

The expected 2016 national elections further intensify these clan and elite political rivalries. The hope that the elections could take the form of one man, one vote was once again dashed, with the promise that such elections will take place in 2020. Instead, the 2016 electoral process will reflect the 4.5 model in practice since 2004, in which the four major clans get to appoint the same proportion of the 275 members of the lower chamber and the minority clans will together be allotted half the MP positions that each major clan gets. This system has promoted discriminatory clan rivalries and elite interests. The 54 members of the upper chamber will be appointed by Somalia’s states, including the newly formed and forming states. This arrangement requires that the state formation process is finished well before the elections, but also problematically increases the immediate stakes in the state formation. Finalizing the provisional constitution and getting it approved by a referendum—another key item of the Vision 2016 agreed to by the Somali government and international donors—is also in question.

Perhaps the greatest progress has been made in devolving power from Mogadishu through the formation of subnational states. But there is a real risk that rather than bonding Somalis with state structures as the international community long hoped for and prescribed, the power devolution to newly formed states will instead devolve discriminatory and rapacious politics.

Saudi Arabia, America’s oldest ally in the Middle East, is in the midst of the most profound changes in decades. The leadership is going through an unprecedented generational change and has adopted an aggressive foreign policy. The driver of change is the king’s favorite son, Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Salman.

MBS, as he’s often called, is 30 years old, remarkably energetic, and very ambitious. King Salman has promoted him to an array of powerful positions and concentrated power in his hands quickly. In addition to being third in the line of succession behind the king and his cousin Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, he often acts as the country’s top diplomat and he chairs the committee that sets economic and energy policy. He acquires new titles and responsibilities every week. Late in April he became the Saudi chief of a new cooperation council with Jordan, for example, with promises this will lead to stepped-up Saudi financial aid to Jordan.

The prince is the author of “Saudi Vision 2030,” an ambitious plan to wean the country of its dependence on oil income and create a more diverse economy. On May 7 the king issued 51 royal orders restructuring the government to implement his son’s plan, including sacking the oil minister, Ali Naimi, who had run the portfolio for two decades. The new orders also seek to encourage more foreign pilgrimage to the two holy cities of Mecca and Medinah by highlighting the opportunity for pilgrimage not just during the traditional Haj holy month, but year-round as well. Encouraging tourism is a major part of “Vision 2030.” All of the changes bear MBS’s stamp.

MBS effectively makes Saudi oil policy now. He sabotaged Naimi’s efforts to freeze or reduce OPEC oil production last month. His plan to open ARAMCO to outside investment is the centerpiece of “Vision 2030.” Oil is being used as a weapon by keeping production high to keep Iran from getting an oil bonus after the nuclear deal lifted sanctions.

The king has other and older sons with more experience than Prince Mohammed. One is Saudi Arabia’s only astronaut and another is governor of Medinah. But King Salman apparently has unique confidence in the young prince who controls access to his father and the Royal Court.

Other Saudis have been given great responsibility at an early age before. The modern kingdom’s founder, Abdelaziz ibn Saud, captured Riyadh when he was only in his late twenties. His son Faisal represented the kingdom after the First World War in London and Paris at the age of 14 and commanded an army three years later in battle. Prince Bandar became ambassador to the U.S. in his early forties. But MBS’s rise is unique for an heir to the throne in the last half-century. He is the symbol of youth in a nation where most of the population is his age or younger.

The prince is also the hand behind the creation of a new Islamic military alliance based in the kingdom. Some three dozen countries have joined. The prince envisioned the alliance as both a counter to terrorist groups like the so-called Islamic State and al Qaida as well as a counter to Iran and its allies like Hezbollah and Bashar Assad. It held large military exercises called “Northern Thunder” in the kingdom this winter.

MBS is also the architect of Saudi Arabia’s year-old war in Yemen. Initially it was called Operation Decisive Storm but then the war settled into a stalemate so the name was changed. The Saudis and their allies, especially the United Arab Emirates, captured the southern port of Aden but have been unable to wrest control of the capital Sanaa from Zaydi Shia rebels called Houthis and their partner, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

A fragile cease-fire began last month. Political talks are underway in Kuwait between the rival Yemeni groups but there has been little progress. Meanwhile the Saudis and Emiratis have driven al Qaeda out of several cities along the southeast coast of Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is regrouping and is far from destroyed. But it no longer is the main beneficiary of the war.

The Yemeni people have paid an enormous cost. Both sides have been guilty of egregious violence. The Saudi blockade has left millions of Yemenis at risk of malnutrition and without medical help. The rebels have starved the city of Taiz for months.

The Saudis claim they acted to prevent Iran from creating a puppet regime on the kingdom’s southern border. They were concerned when the Houthis set up direct air links from Sanaa to Tehran and offered use of the port of Hodeida to Iran. Hezbollah and Iran have provided some military advisers to the Houthis, but their influence on the rebels is limited.

The king and his son are pro-American but disenchanted with President Barack Obama. He has sold the kingdom over $100 billion in arms on his watch, according to the Congressional Research service. Obama has backed the Saudi-Yemen war with diplomatic, logistical, and intelligence support. U.S. advisers are now on the ground fighting al Qaeda.

But the Saudis cannot forgive Obama for abandoning Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. If one autocrat could be thrown under the bus, who might be next? They don’t like the Iran nuclear deal and believe Obama has been indecisive in Syria. MBS says he wants America to do more, not less, in the region. He is courting American journalists and think tanks.

King Salman has already dismissed one succesor. His half-brother, Crown Prince Muqrin, was removed from office a year ago without warning or explanation. The 80-year-old king could remove the current crown prince, his nephew Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, and elevate MBS at any time. The old guard in the royal family, which believes MBS is reckless and inexperienced, won’t like it, but they have few options to resist. If the king does put his son in the crown prince position the kingdom will skip a whole generation. It’s already been a remarkable journey for MBS.

This piece was originally published in The Daily Beast.

A number of policymakers and analysts in the United States have called for countries like China and India to “do more” in the Middle East. Arguably, both Beijing and Delhi are doing more—though perhaps not in the way these advocates of greater Asian engagement in the Middle East might have wanted. President Xi Jinping recently traveled to the region and India’s Prime Minister Modi will return there over the weekend. After quick trips to Brussels for the India-EU Summit and a bilateral, as well as to Washington for the Nuclear Security Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will head to Riyadh tomorrow. The trip reflects not just the importance of Saudi Arabia for India but also the Middle East (or what India calls West Asia) and the opportunity this particular moment offers to Indian policymakers.

The Middle East has been crucial for India for decades. It’s been a source of energy, jobs, remittances, and military equipment, and holds religious significance for tens of millions of Indians. It’s also been a source of concern, with fears about the negative impact of regional instability on Indian interests. But today, as Modi visits, there’s also opportunity for Indian policymakers in the fact that, for a number of reasons, India is important to Saudi Arabia and a number of Middle Eastern countries in a way and to an extent that was never true before. 

It’s a two-way street

As it has globally, India has a diversified set of partnerships in the Middle East, maintaining and balancing its relationships with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Iran, and Israel. The region remains India’s main source of imported oil and natural gas (58 percent of its oil imports and 88 percent of its liquefied natural gas imports in 2014-15 came from the Middle East). In addition, as of January 2015, there were 7.3 million non-resident Indians in the region (64 percent of the total). These non-resident Indians remitted over $36 billion in 2015 (52 percent of the total remittances to India). Add to that India’s Sunni and Shiite populations (among the largest in the world), counter-terrorism cooperation with some countries, India’s defense relationship with Israel, the desire to connect with Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iran, and the potential market and source of capital it represents for Indian companies, and it becomes clear why this region is important for India. 

But, with many Middle Eastern countries pivoting to Asia or at least giving it a fresh look, India arguably has more leverage than it has ever had in the past. There have been a number of reasons why these countries have been looking east recently: 

• traditional strategic partnerships in flux and questions about the U.S. role in the region; 
• the economic slowdown in Europe and the U.S. following the 2008 financial crisis; 
• changing global energy consumption patterns; 
• growing concerns about terrorism in the region; 
• And, in Israel’s case, the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement. 

In this context, India has some advantages. Its economy is doing relatively well compared to that of other countries and offers a market for goods and services, as well as potentially an investment destination. India, for example, has become Israeli defense companies’ largest foreign customer. 

Crucially for the oil and natural gas-producing states in the region, India also continues to guzzle significant—and growing—quantities of both. But, today, Delhi has buyer’s power. Why? Because oil prices are relatively low and there’s a lot of gas on the market, traditional buyers are looking elsewhere for fossil fuels or looking beyond them to cleaner energy sources. India, too, has more options and has been diversifying its sources of supply (compare India’s 74 percent dependence on the Middle East for oil in 2006-07 to the lower 58 percent that it gets from there now). 

India might still be dependent on the Middle East for energy, but now the Middle East also depends on India as a market.

Thus, India might still be dependent on the Middle East for energy, but now the Middle East also depends on India as a market. This has altered dynamics—and India’s increased leverage has been evident, for example, in the renegotiated natural gas supply deal between Qatar’s RasGas and India’s Petronet, which came with lower prices and waived penalties. Even countries like Iran, which now have more options for partners and have not hesitated to point that out to Delhi, still have an interest in maintaining their India option. Regional rivalries might have made Delhi’s balancing act in the region more complicated, but it also gives each country a reason to maintain its relationship with India. 

And the Modi government has been looking to take advantage of this situation. While its Act East policy received a lot more attention over the last couple of years—from policymakers and the press—this region hasn’t been missing from the agenda or travel itineraries. For example, Modi has traveled to the United Arab Emirates and met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on the sidelines of the last Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference, and the Indian president has traveled to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories. The Indian foreign minister has visited Bahrain, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Oman, and the UAE and also participated the first ministerial meeting of the Arab-India Cooperation Forum in Manama earlier this year. The Modi government has also hosted the emir of Qatar, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, the Bahraini, Iranian, Omani, Saudi, Syrian, and UAE foreign ministers, as well as the Israeli defense minister to India.

China’s increased activity in the region, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with Iran and the rush of European leaders to the latter, have led to calls for speedier action.

But there have been concerns that this engagement is not sufficient, particularly relative to that of some countries. For example, China’s increased activity in the region, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with Iran and the rush of European leaders to the latter, have led to calls for speedier action. The Indian foreign secretary’s recent comment that “we are no longer content to be passive recipients of outcomes” in this region also seemed to reflect the understanding that Delhi needs to be more proactive about deepening its relationships with the countries in the region, rather than waiting for them to take shape organically or just reacting to events as they occur. 

The Saudi connection

It is in this context that Modi travels to Riyadh. The relationship with Saudi Arabia is one of the key pillars of India’s Middle East policy. A major source of oil, jobs, and remittances, it is also a destination for over 400,000 Indians who go to the country for Hajj or Umra every year. In addition, in recent years, there has been more security cooperation, with Riyadh handing over individuals wanted in India and the two countries working together on countering money laundering and terrorism financing. 

The relationship has not been without problems from Delhi’s perspective. Just to list a few: 

• the Saudi-Pakistan relationship; 
• diaspora-related issues, including the treatment of Indian workers in-country and efforts towards Saudization that might limit employment opportunities for Indian expatriates;
• ideology-related concerns, particularly funding from Saudi Arabia for organizations in India, which might be increasing the influence of Wahhabism in the country; and
• regional dynamics, including Saudi Arabia’s rising tensions with Iran that has had consequences for Indian citizens, for example, in Yemen from where Delhi had to evacuate 4,640 Indians (as well as 960 foreigners).

More recently, incidents involving Saudi diplomats in India have also negatively affected (elite) public perceptions of the country, though the broader impact of this, if any, is unclear. Over the medium-to-long term, there are also concerns about potential instability within Saudi Arabia.

During Modi’s trip, however, the emphasis will be on the positives—not least in the hope that these might help alleviate some of the problems. The prime minister will be hosted by King Salman, who visited India as crown prince and defense minister just before Modi took office. He will also meet a slate of Saudi political and business leaders. The Indian wish-list will likely include diversification of economic ties, greater two-way investment, as well as more and better counter-terrorism cooperation. 

There will not be a large diaspora event—as Modi has done in Australia, Singapore, the UAE, United Kingdom, and the United States—but the prime minister will engage privately with members of the Indian community. He will also meet with Indian workers employed by an Indian company that is building part of the Riyadh metro. It is not hard to assess the reason for this particular engagement, given increased sensitivity in India (particularly in the media) about the treatment of citizens abroad, as well as the government’s interest in making a pitch for Indian companies to get greater market access. But, with Riyadh’s interest in creating jobs for Saudis, Modi will also try to highlight that Indian companies are contributing to the training and employment of locals (especially women) by visiting another Indian company’s all-female business process service center.

This will reflect the broader theme of highlighting to Riyadh and Saudis that it is not just India that benefits from the relationship—they do too. Some in India hope this has an additional effect: of giving Riyadh a reason not to let its relationship with Pakistan limit that with India, and perhaps occasionally making it willing to use some of its leverage with that country to India’s benefit. Despite recent irritants in the Saudi-Pakistan relationship, however, Delhi is realistic about the limits of weaning Riyadh away from Islamabad.

So does all this mean India will “do more” in the Middle East? For all the reasons mentioned above, the country has been involved in the region for a number of years—though, as the Indian foreign secretary has noted, this involvement was not in large part the product of active state policy. Indian interests in the region will likely increase in the future and, thus, so will its corporate and official engagement. But that engagement might not be what some American observers have in mind. As India’s capabilities grow, it might do more in terms of providing maritime security, intelligence sharing, evacuating expatriates when necessary, and contributing to U.N. peacekeeping operations. It could also potentially do more in terms of capacity building within these countries with the support of the host governments. There might also be scope for India to expand its West Asia dialogue with countries like the United States. But it will likely remain wary of picking sides or getting involved in non-U.N.-sanctioned military interventions in the region unless its interests are directly affected (the previous BJP-led coalition government did briefly consider—and then reject—joining the United States coalition in the Iraq war, for instance).

Editors’ Note: How do states manage their armed forces, domestic politics, and foreign affairs? Stephen Cohen, senior fellow with the India Project at Brookings, has studied this and a range of other issues in Southeast Asia since the 1960s. In a new book, titled “The South Asia Papers: A Critical Anthology of Writings,” Cohen reflects on more than a half-century of scholarship on India, describing the dramatic changes he has personally witnessed in the field of research. The following is an excerpt from the book’s preface.

[In the 1960s, questions about how states manage their armed forces] were not only unasked in the South Asian context by scholars; they were also frowned on by the Indian government. This made preparation both interesting and difficult. It was interesting because a burgeoning literature on civil–military relations in non-Western states could be applied to India. Most of it dealt with two themes: the “man on horseback,” or how the military came to power in a large number of new states, and how the military could assist in the developmental process. No one had asked these questions of India, although the first was relevant to Pakistan, then still governed by the Pakistani army in the form of Field Marshal Ayub Khan.

***

During my first and second trips [in the 1960s] my research was as a historian, albeit one interested in the army’s social, cultural, and policy dimensions. I discovered, by accident, that this was part of the movement toward the “new military history.” Over the years I have thus interacted with those historians who were interested in Indian military history, including several of my own students. 

While the standard of historians in India was high in places like the University of Calcutta, military history was a minor field, just as it was in the West. Military historians are often dismissed as the “drums and trumpets” crowd, interested in battles, regiments, and hardware, but not much else. My own self-tutoring in military history uncovered something quite different: a number of scholars, especially sociologists, had written on the social and cultural impact of armed forces, a literature largely ignored by the historians. While none of this group was interested in India, the connection between one of the world’s most complicated and subtle societies, the state’s use of force, and the emergence of a democratic India was self-evident. 

***

A new generation of scholars and experts, many of them Indians (some trained in the United States) and Indian Americans who have done research in India, have it right: this is a complex civilizational-state with expanding power, and its rise is dependent on its domestic stability, its policies toward neighbors (notably Pakistan), the rise of China, and the policies of the United States. 

The literature that predicts a conflict between the rising powers (India and China), and between them and America the “hegemon,” is misguided: the existence of nuclear weapons by all three states, plus Pakistan, ensures that barring insanity, any rivalries between rising and established states will be channeled into “ordinary” diplomatic posturing, ruthless economic competition, and the clash of soft power. In this competition, India has some liabilities and many advantages, and the structure of the emerging world suggests a closer relationship between the United States and India, without ruling out much closer ties between China and India. 

There remain some questions: Can the present Indian leadership show magnanimity in dealing with Pakistan, and does it have the foresight to look ahead to new challenges, notably environmental and energy issues that require new skills and new international arrangements? Importantly, some of the best work on answering these questions is being done in India itself, and the work of Kanti Bajpai, Amitabh Mattoo, Harsh Pant, C. Raja Mohan, Rajesh Basrur, and others reveals the maturity of Indian thinking on strategic issues. It has not come too soon, as the challenges that India will face are growing, and those of Pakistan are even more daunting.

Event Information

U.S. policy towards South Asia has changed considerably over the last seven decades. The nature of U.S. engagement with different countries in the region has varied over time, as has the level of U.S. interest. While India and Pakistan have received the most attention from Washington, the United States has also been engaging with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, albeit to different degrees. 

On May 19, The India Project at Brookings hosted a panel discussion exploring the past and present U.S approaches towards South Asia, based on Senior Fellow Stephen Cohen’s new book, “The South Asia Papers: A Critical Anthology of Writings” (Brookings Institution Press, 2016). Panelists also assessed the Obama administration’s policies toward the region, and the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the next U.S. administration. Fellow Tanvi Madan, director of The India Project, moderated the discussion.

After the discussion, the panelists took questions.

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• U.S. policy toward South Asia: Past, present, and future

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• U.S. policy toward South Asia: Past, present, and future

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In the past decade, a remarkable shift has occurred in the development landscape. Specifically, acknowledgment of the central role of the private sector in contributing to, even driving, economic growth and global development has grown rapidly. The data on financial flows are dramatic, indicating reversal of the relative roles of official development assistance and private financial flows. This shift is also reflected in the way development is framed and discussed, never more starkly than in the Addis Abba Action Agenda and the new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which the SDGs follow, focused on official development assistance. In contrast, while the new set of global goals does not ignore the role of official development assistance, they reorient attention to the role of the business sector (and mobilizing host country resources).

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been in the vanguard of donors in recognizing the important role of the private sector to development, most notably via the agency’s launch in 2001 of a program targeted on public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the estimated 1,600 USAID PPPs initiated since then. This paper provides a quantitative and qualitative presentation of USAID’s public-private partnerships and business sector participation in those PPPs. The analysis offered here is based on USAID’s PPP data set covering 2001-2014 and interviews with executives of 17 U.S. corporations that have engaged in PPPs with USAID.

The genesis of this paper is the considerable discussion by USAID and the international development community about USAID’s PPPs, but the dearth of information on what these partnerships entail. USAID’s 2014 release (updated in 2015) of a data set describing nearly 1,500 USAID PPPs since 2001 offers an opportunity to analyze the nature of those PPPs.

On a conceptual level, public-private partnerships are a win-win, even a win-win-win, as they often involve three types of organizations: a public agency, a for-profit business, and a nonprofit entity. PPPs use public resources to leverage private resources and expertise to advance a public purpose. In turn, non-public sectors—both businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—use their funds and expertise to leverage government resources, clout, and experience to advance their own objectives, consistent with a PPP’s overall public purpose. The data from the USAID data set confirm this conceptual mutual reinforcement of public and private goals.

The goal is to utilize USAID’s recently released data set to draw conclusions on the nature of PPPs, the level of business sector engagement, and, utilizing interviews, to describe corporate perspectives on partnership with USAID.

The arguments regarding “why” PPPs are an important instrument of development are well established. This paper presents data on the “what”: what kinds of PPPs have been implemented and in what countries, sectors, and income contexts. There are other research and publications on the “how” of partnership construction and implementation. What remains missing are hard data and analysis, beyond the anecdotal, as to whether PPPs make a difference—in short, is the trouble of forming these sometimes complex alliances worth the impact that results from them?

The goal of this paper is not to provide commentary on impact since those data are not currently available on a broad scale. Similarly, this paper does not recommend replicable models or case studies (which can be found elsewhere), though these are important and can help new entrants to join and grow the field. Rather, the goal is to utilize USAID’s recently released data set to draw conclusions on the nature of PPPs, the level of business sector engagement, and, utilizing interviews, to describe corporate perspectives on partnership with USAID.

The decision to target this research on business sector partners’ engagement in PPPs—rather than on the civil society, foundation, or public partners—is based on several factors. First, USAID’s references to its PPPs tend to focus on the business sector partners, sometimes to the exclusion of other types of partners; we want to understand the role of the partners that USAID identifies as so important to PPP composition. Second, in recent years much has been written and discussed about corporate shared value, and we want to assess the extent to which shared value plays a role in USAID’s PPPs in practice.

The paper is divided into five sections. Section I is a consolidation of the principal data and findings of the research. Section II provides an in-depth “data picture” of USAID PPPs drawn from quantitative analysis of the USAID PPP data set and is primarily descriptive of PPPs to date. Section III moves beyond description and provides analysis of PPPs and business sector alignment. It contains the results of coding certain relevant fields in the data set to mine for information on the presence of business partners, commercial interests (i.e., shared value), and business sector partner expertise in PPPs. Section IV summarizes findings from a series of interviews of corporate executives on partnering with USAID. Section V presents recommendations for USAID’s partnership-making.

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Brookings today releases a report USAID’s Public-Private Partnerships: A Data Picture and Review of Business Engagement, which will be the subject of a public discussion on March 8 featuring a panel of Jane Nelson (Harvard University), Ann Mei Chang (U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)), Johanna Nesseth Tuttle (Chevron Corp.), and Sarah Thorn (Wal-Mart Stores Inc.).

The report is based on USAID’s database of 1,481 public-private partnerships (PPPs) from 2001 to 2014 and a series of corporate interviews.

The value of those partnerships totals $16.5 billion, two-thirds from non-U.S. government sources – private companies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, and non-U.S. public institutions. Over 4000 organizations have served as resource partners in these PPPs.  Fifty-three percent are business entities, 32 percent are from the non-profit world, and 25 percent are public institutions. Eighty-five organizations have participated in five or more PPPs, led by Microsoft (62), Coca Cola (36), and Chevron (33).

The partnerships are relatively evenly distributed among three major regions—Africa, Latin American/Caribbean, and Asia—but 36 percent of the value of all PPPs is from partnerships that are global in reach.

In analyzing the data, the researchers found that 77 percent of PPPs included one or more business partner, and that 83 percent of these partnerships are connected to a business partner’s commercial interest (either shared value or more indirect strategic interest). In almost 80 percent of those PPPs, the business partner contributes some form of corporate expertise to the partnership.

The purpose of the March 8 panel discussion is to examine the report but also to go beyond by addressing outstanding questions like: how should the impact of public-private partnerships be identified, measured, and evaluated? Is shared value the Holy Grail linking corporate interest to public goods and achieving sustainable results? Where do public-private partnerships fit in USAID’s strategy for engaging the private sector in development, particularly in light of the emphasis on the role of business in advancing the new set of Sustainable Development Goals?

We hope you can join us for what should prove to be an engaging discussion.

Publish What You Fund’s 2016 Aid Transparency Index is out. And as a result, today we can assess whether major donors met the commitments they made five years ago at Busan to make aid transparent by the end of 2015. The index is also a window into the state of foreign aid transparency and how the U.S.—the world’s largest bilateral donor—stacks up.

On the positive side, the index found that ten donors of varied types and sizes, accounting for 25 percent of total aid, have met the commitment to aid transparency. And more than half of the 46 organizations included in the 2016 index now publish data to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) registry at least quarterly.

At the same time, the index’s assessments show more than half of the organizations still fall into the lowest three categories, scoring below 60 percent in terms of the transparency of their information.

Continuing its leadership on transparency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation comes in second overall in the index, meeting its Busan commitment and once again demonstrating that the institutional commitment to publishing and using its data continues.

Otherwise, at first glance, U.S. progress seems disappointing. The five other U.S. donors included in the 2016 index are all in the “fair” category. Seen through a five-year lens, however, these same five U.S. donors were either in the “poor” or “very poor” categories in the 2011 index. So, all agencies have moved up, and three of them—U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief—are on the cusp of “good.”

In the two biggest U.S. agencies that administer foreign assistance, USAID and the State Department, the commitment is being institutionalized and implemented through more systematic efforts to revamp their outdated information systems. Both have reviewed the gaps in their data reporting systems and developed a path forward. USAID’s Cost Management Plan identifies specific steps to be taken and is well under way. The State Department Foreign Assistance Data Review (FADR) involves further reviews that need to be executed promptly in order to lead to action. Both are signs of a heightened commitment to data transparency and both require continued agency leadership and staff implementation.

The Department of Defense, which slid backwards in the last three assessments (and began at the "very poor" category in 2011), has for the first time moved into the "fair" category.  It is still the lowest performing U.S. agency in the index, but it is now publishing 12 new IATI fields. It is moving in the right direction, but significant work remains to be done.

The third U.S. National Action Plan (NAP) announced last fall—the strongest issued by the U.S. to date—calls for improvements to quality and comprehensiveness of U.S. data and commits the U.S. to doing more to raise awareness, accessibility, and demand for foreign assistance data. This gives all U.S. agencies the imperative to do much more to make their aid information transparent and usable.  

The overall challenge has been laid out in the third NAP:

• Almost all of the U.S. agencies need to improve the breadth and depth of the information they are publishing to meet IATI standards. Far too often, basic information—such as titles—are either not published or are not useful.
• The Millennium Challenge Corporation should continue its leadership role, especially on data use. All agencies should be promoting the use of data among their own staff and by external stakeholders, especially at country level. Feedback will go a long way toward helping them improve the quality of the data they are publishing and thereby help them meet the IATI standards.
• USAID must finish the work on its Cost Management Plan, including putting IATI in the planned Development Information Solution. Additionally, more progress needs to be made on the follow-up to the Aid Transparency Country Pilot Assessment to meet the needs of partners.   
• The State Department needs to follow through on including IATI in the new integrated solution mapped out in its data review.

The leadership of all foreign affairs agencies needs to work harder to make the business case for compiling, publishing, and using data on foreign aid programs. Open data, particularly when it is comparable, timely, accessible, and comprehensive, is an extremely valuable management asset.  Agency leadership should be its champion. So far, we have not seen enough.

U.S. progress on aid transparency was slow to start. It is still not where it needs to be. But with a modest but concerted push, three additional agencies will be in the “good” category and that is a story we can start to be proud of.   

We look forward to continued progress and to the day when all U.S. foreign aid meets transparency standards—a day I believe will be an important one for the cause of greater development, better governance, democratic participation, and reduced poverty worldwide.

Spring has sprung and once again Publish What You Fund has issued its Aid Transparency Index (ATI). Once again most of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) receive high grades rated as very good. And once again I ask whether those grades are well deserved? At the heart of my question is whether aid agencies are disclosing sufficient information during the critical implementation stage of a project.

Last year we reviewed the practices of 8 aid agencies, 7 of which consistently receive the highest accolades in the ATI. What was evident from our review was the serious asymmetry of the type of aid data released to the public. A major target at Busan in 2011 when donors made commitments to aid transparency and in the establishment of the ATI has been the reporting of aid flows and the projects approved by each agency. There has been growing emphasis since then on reporting information on the results of those projects. But there has been very limited progress in the release of information during project implementation.

The importance of such information should be obvious. It is during project implementation that the various stakeholders need to monitor project progress, report on issues requiring attention, and make changes to ensure achievement of the desired results. It is insufficient to only disclose who wins a contract; consideration should be given to publishing the contracts, reporting on its execution, and disclosing amendments to the contracts. And it is not enough to simply publish the resettlement action plan for a project; how that plan is being implemented must be reported. Real time reporting is the key to being able to adapt and make changes as projects evolve.

It is very evident that the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and the ATI have had a major positive impact on raising the level of transparency of aid agencies. Discussions with various agencies illustrate how they are keen to getting higher scores each year, carefully analyzing the indicators to guide their actions. However, with only a limited focus and weighting of reporting on project implementation in the ATI, there is no incentive to fill this important gap. 

In its 2016 report, Publish What You Fund has indicated that it will be reviewing its indicators later this year and intends to raise the bar. It would be timely to include information on project implementation in those revisions. One challenge is how to develop indicators that are similarly relevant across a wide variety of aid agencies. Implementation information is most critical for agencies that finance longer-term projects, especially infrastructure, such as the MDBs.  One option is to consider a set of indicators to better “incentivize” the relevant agencies and refer to these as ATI+.

The MDB’s, in their major disclosure reforms since 2010, adopted a principle that “deliberative” information would not be disclosed in order to foster candid and open dialogue within the organization and between the organization and the client country. As per the World Bank’s policy, “The Bank, like any institution or group, needs space to consider and debate, away from public scrutiny.” This excludes emails, notes, and other exchanges either internally or with member countries.

As a result, the project supervision reports, which managements use to monitor projects under execution and are generally published twice a year, were divided between disclosed versus undisclosed sections. The undisclosed sections would offer space for reporting on confidential project concerns including potential corruption. Our review of the disclosed reports suggests that most aid agencies’ task managers tend to take a cautious approach, placing most information in the undisclosed sections. Stakeholders outside the MDB, such as local civil society groups, then, often only see truncated information.

While the adoption of the “deliberative” principle is understandable, its application places a serious responsibility on management to ensure that this is applied with considerable restraint. The MDBs should review the application of this principle and assess the type of information released during implementation.

It is indeed time to raise the bar on transparency and to focus on the most critical information required to ensure results. This is not the moment for complacency with high grades.

In the course of two days last week, the U.S. Congress passed two foreign aid bills.

What’s more, in the course of five months, Congress has passed three foreign aid bills!

All three bills passed with strong bipartisan leadership and support.

Equally important, all three bills reflect a new era of a more modernized approach to assistance.

The bills avoid many of the problems of past aid legislation, including micromanagement, earmarks, and requirement of frequent reports that are seldom read by members of Congress or their staffs. Each bill was developed in cooperation with the Obama administration and reflects its policies and civil society priorities. And they emphasize strategic approaches, results, use of data, monitoring and evaluation, and learning.

The Foreign Assistance Accountability and Transparency Act of 2016, sponsored by Republicans Sen. Marco Rubio and Rep. Ted Poe and Democrats Sen. Ben Cardin and Rep. Gerry Connolly, is grounded in important principles of foreign aid reform. It enacts into law key policies advocated by the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network and supported by the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition and many other international development and foreign policy organizations. Robust evaluation and aid transparency, first elevated as elements of the Millennium Challenge Corporation by the Bush administration and later adopted by the Obama administration across all foreign affairs agencies, are institutionalized by the bill. The bill calls for two reports 18 months after enactment, not annual, year-after-year reports, which had been the normal practice and usually resulted in shelves of unread reports. One report will be from the president outlining the monitoring and evaluation guidelines called for in the report, and the other report will be from the Government Accountability Office assessing those guidelines.

This type of independent, objective evaluation is essential to improving assistance; it assesses what we have tried and improves our understanding of what does and does not work. When aggregated across multiple evaluations of similar programs, it produces new knowledge and learning.

Transparency, another important element of aid reform, brings multiple benefits. It provides all stakeholders, including Congress, U.S. taxpayers, intended beneficiaries, government officials, and civil societies in recipient countries, with data and information that allows them to understand where and how assistance is used. It provides data that is critical to making informed decisions. And it keeps agencies and programs focused on their mission and objectives by permitting public scrutiny and accountability.

The Global Food Security Act of 2016, sponsored by Republicans Sen. Johnny Isakson and Rep. Chris Smith and Democrats Sen. Bob Casey and Rep. Betty McCollum, writes into law the administration’s initiative Feed the Future. The core of the bill is a mandate of the president to coordinate a comprehensive U.S. global food security strategy—such a forward-looking strategy will help gain stakeholder buy-in and ultimately provide more consistent, rationale policies and programs. Also included are guidelines that we know from experience produce good development—measurable goals and performance metrics, solid monitoring and evaluation, clear criteria for selecting targets, alignment with local policies and priorities, multi-sectoral approaches, building local capacity and resilience, and partnership with the private sector. The bill authorizes funding for food security but does not earmark it—meaning the funds are authorized but are not required to be expended. And the bill calls for only a single report to Congress a year after the issuance of the strategy.

The third bill, the Electrify Africa Act of 2015, sponsored by Republicans Sen. Bob Corker and Rep. Ed Royce and Democrats Sen. Ben Cardin and Rep. Elliot Engel, is centered on a comprehensive energy strategy for Africa. Similarly, the legislation calls for a strategy that is flexible and responsive to local communities and for policies that promote transparent and accountable governance, local consultation, and monitoring and evaluation. The bill requires two reports, the first within six months of enactment to transmit the strategy and the second three years after enactment to report on implementation. The bill directs U.S. government agencies to use accountable and metric-based targets to measure effectiveness of assistance and to leverage private and multilateral finance.

For those who say that Congress does not support foreign assistance, let’s hope this legislative triple-hat puts that to rest. Similarly, for those who say the Congress does not understand a more effective approach to development, maybe it’s time to become a believer.

At a legislative conference in Cambridge, Ohio, Bruce Katz stressed the importance of cities and metro areas to the state's overall prosperity. Acknowledging the decline of Ohio's older industrial cities, Katz noted the area's many assets and argued for a focus on innovation, human capital, infrastructure, and quality communities as means to revitalize the region. 

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On September 8, Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown participated in a Center for International Policy and Washington Office on Latin America event, “Using Militaries as Police in Latin America: A Discussion on Citizen Security and the Way Forward.” Felbab-Brown was joined on the panel by Adam Blackwell, secretary for multidimensional security at the Organization of American States; Richard Downie, executive vice president for global strategies at OMNITRU; and Adam Isacson, senior associate for regional security policy at the Washington Office on Latin America. Sarah Kinosian, lead researcher on Latin America at the Center for International Policy, moderated the event.

Felbab-Brown argued that police reform across Latin America over the past two decades has often been at best deficient or has failed outright. The lack of rule of law characterizes many countries in the region, including continually Mexico. Police forces are often not only corrupt, but highly abusive, and both police forces and military forces deployed for policing engage in major human rights violations. Even assumed exemplary experiments, such as the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) approach in Rio, have struggled to execute an effective handover from heavily-armed takeover forces to regular policing.

If governments choose to deploy their militaries in local policing roles, suboptimal as that is, the forces should adopt population-centric strategies, immediately develop concrete handover plans to police forces, and operate under a civilian coordinator. A key requirement for military forces is to respect human rights and due process and diligently prosecute perpetrators. Ultimately both police and military forces need to understand that their role is to protect society.

To some extent, Felbab-Brown argues, the resort to military forces for policing purposes is compounded by the lack of expeditionary police capacity by outside partners and donors, who overwhelmingly tend to deploy military forces for training policing. However, if the United States and outside donors want to make their policing assistance more effective, they should consider developing expeditionary police forces for such training purposes as well as a range of stabilization operations.

The most important factor for security efforts is citizen support. Marginalization, exclusion, and abuse from policing forces—be they police or military ones—have often prevented local populations from cooperating with law enforcement units and buying into rule of law: security or insecurity is co-produced as much as by citizens as by the police or military.