La fièvre des élections s’empare de l’Afrique centrale. Pour la seconde fois depuis la fin des guerres qui ont dévasté la région, les scrutins s’enchaînent au Burundi, au Rwanda, en République centrafricaine et au Congo.

Cameroon, until now a point of stability in the region, faces potential instability in the run-up to the presidential elections scheduled for late 2011.

En Guinée, la période trouble sous la domination de la junte ne sera bientôt plus qu’un mauvais souvenir – si tout va bien. Le capitaine Dadis Camara, qui a été acclamé lors de son arrivée à la tête de l’Etat suite à la mort du président Conté, a fait de 2009 une année que les Guinéens veulent oublier, son évènement le plus marquant ayant été le massacre de 160 personnes dans le stade national en septembre 2009.

While the prospect of Guinea's return to constitutional rule after its recent election is cause for hope, the recent resurgence of military takeovers in Africa may not yet have run its full course.

For more than a year and a half, UN peacekeepers have continuously supported military operations conducted by the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) against the Rwandan rebels of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in North and South Kivu.

Después de 28 años bajo el gobierno de Paul Biya, Camerún se encuentra en una situación de inestabilidad grave que no sólo podría echar a perder las próximas elecciones presidenciales en 2011, sino que también pone en riesgo su papel como principal pilar de estabilidad en África Central.

The approaching elections could be important steps toward reviving democracy in Chad, but only if President Idriss Déby opens political space for the opposition beforehand.

Dans de nombreux pays, le pétrole suscite des débats controversés sur son rôle de moteur de changements économiques, sociaux et géopolitiques. Depuis quelques années, les réflexions sur la question du pétrole ont démontré une corrélation négative entre son exploitation, le développement socioéconomique, la gouvernance et le regain des conflits dans les pays producteurs.

In numerous countries, the exploitation of oil has generated debate about its economic, social and geopolitical consequences.

The UN's release of a long awaited report on crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 1993-2003 is not only an opportunity to re-examine the historical record of mass violence in DRC -- the scale and nature of which was often overlooked in the wake of the genocide in neighboring Rwanda -- but is also a chance to correct the terms of the deceptive and fragile peace some leaders wish to proclaim in the resource-rich Great Lakes region of Africa.

Es ist eine einmalige Chance, die sich dieser Tage bietet: Die Veröffentlichung eines lang erwarteten Berichts der Vereinten Nationen über Verbrechen in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo (DRK) ist die Gelegenheit für eine Wiederaufarbeitung der Geschichte der massiven Gewalt im Kongo zwischen 1993 und 2003.

The attempt by Congo and Rwanda to end the deadly conflict in eastern Congo by a secret presidential deal and military force is failing and must be changed fundamentally by the Kinshasa government and the international community.

Despite three agreements between the rebels and the government, peace is still elusive in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The Kivus need regional dialogue and a clear, fair repatriation plan, argues Thierry Vircoulon at the International Crisis Group.

Extreme poverty and armed conflict in the diamond-rich areas of the Central African Republic (CAR) put thousands of lives in danger and demand urgent reform of the mining sector.

The international watchdog which seeks to prevent diamonds from fuelling conflict, the Kimberley Process, should take a very close look at the situation in the Central African Republic

Le processus électoral hors délai constitutionnel qui se déroule depuis le 23 janvier en Centrafrique n'est pas seulement une nouvelle opportunité manquée pour la démocratisation du pays mais c'est aussi un risque sérieux pour la paix.

A la veille de l’entrée en vigueur le 15 avril de l’obligation de rendre publique l’origine des minerais pour les grandes compagnies basées aux Etats-Unis, ICG a effectué une mission au Nord Kivu afin d’évaluer les différentes stratégies de lutte contre les minerais des conflits et leur impact sur le terrain.

As legislation requiring large U.S. companies to disclose the origins of the minerals they use is meant to come into force this year, Crisis Group sent a mission to North Kivu to assess the different strategies used to fight conflict minerals and their impact in the field.

Faced with the dilemma of respecting the constitutional deadline and organising botched elections, or ignoring that deadline and sliding into a situation of unconstitutional power, the Congolese authorities have chosen the first option.

On 15 June 2011 the Congolese Parliament adopted, after nearly three months of de-bate, the new electoral law. The Senate, or upper house, controlled by the opposition, and the National Assembly, or lower house, controlled by the ruling coalition, both voted for an electoral law which ultimately remains very similar to that governing the 2006 elections. Parliament took three months of debate to reject most of the amend-ments proposed by the ruling party (PPRD). In doing so it demonstrated that the ex-ecutive could not simply trump its interests.

5 mois après la publication du rapport Burundi : du boycott électoral à l’impasse politique, la dynamique de régression que nous décrivions en détails dans ce texte produit ses effets dévastateurs. La fin du consensus d’Arusha et le pourrissement du climat politique consécutif au boycott électoral de 2010 ont conduit à une violence qui, en dépit du lénifiant discours officiel, ne cesse de prendre de l’ampleur.

The technical preparations for the presidential and legislative elections scheduled on 28 November and the beginning of the electoral campaign in the East of Congo have generated suspicion that risks developing into a crisis of confidence in the whole electoral process.

Der Abbau seltener Mineralien ist ein Grund für die Gewalt im Kongo. Die EU könnte hier eine wirkungsvolle Regelung durchsetzen.

Trois semaines après la réélection contestée de Joseph Kabila en République démocratique du Congo (RDC), Thierry Vircoulon, responsable de l'Afrique centrale à l'International Crisis Group dresse un premier bilan des élections congolaises.

Despite the establishment of anti-corruption agencies, Burundi is facing a deepening corruption crisis that jeopardises prospects for lasting peace and stability.

La rechute est le risque majeur des pays post-conflit et l'une des principales raisons de cette rechute s'appelle la corruption.

François Hollande semble hésiter à se rendre à Kinshasa en octobre pour le sommet de la francophonie. Il serait bien inspiré de ne pas offrir au président, Joseph Kabila, une telle occasion de s’afficher réconcilié avec les démocraties après les élections présidentielle et législative calamiteuses en République démocratique du Congo (RDC) qui privent le régime d’une véritable légitimité démocratique. En se rendant à Kinshasa, François Hollande enverrait un message plus que trouble aux pays d’Afrique où la démocratisation est encore une lutte quotidienne que l’on paie au prix du sang.

Renewed oil interest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) could nurture communal resentments, exacerbate deep-rooted conflict dynamics and weaken national cohesion.

The Kivus region of eastern Congo again faces escalating violence, including by a rebel force acting as a proxy of neighbouring Rwanda. To stop the repetitive cycle of rebellion and avoid large-scale killing, donors and African mediators need to move from crisis management to conflict resolution with the right set of pressures on Kigali and Kinshasa.

Rising piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which supplies around 40 per cent of Europe’s oil and 29 per cent of the U.S.’s, demands effective regional security cooperation and better economic governance to prevent the region becoming another Gulf of Aden.

The fight against entrenched armed groups in eastern Congo such as the ADF-Nalu needs to switch from a military to an intelligence-based approach.

The collapse of the state and the disappearance of security forces from a large part of the territory may turn the Central African Republic (CAR) into a source of instability in the heart of Africa.
Please note the full report is only available in French.

The Framework Agreement signed by the UN, African organisations and eleven countries and the deployment of an intervention brigade in North Kivu are positive steps, but conflicts in the Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo also require a bottom-up approach aimed at improving intercommunal relations and restoring peace at the local level.

Los conflictos en los países pequeños suelen agravarse debido a la indiferencia internacional. Sin embargo, en el caso de la República Centroafricana (RCA), el problema es ligeramente distinto. Hay una importante presencia internacional en este Estado, pero los actores principales han decidido mantenerse al margen y esperar en vez de intervenir activamente en la crisis.

To avoid a revival of past ethnic tensions between Hutu and Tutsi, Burundi needs to find the right balance between land restitution and national reconciliation.

Le Burundi est l’un des pays les plus pauvres (le taux de pauvreté atteint 67 %) et les plus petits d’Afrique (27 834 kilomètres carrés) avec l’une des plus grandes densités humaines du continent (près de 400 habitants par kilomètre carré). C’est du reste un pays profondément rural où seulement 11 % de la population réside en ville. Alors que l’accès à la terre et à la propriété est un véritable enjeu socio-économique, le Burundi fait face à de sérieux problèmes agricoles.

By failing to engage when Crisis Group and others warned that the Central African Republic had become a phantom state, the international community has now had to become much more heavily involved, at much greater expense, after horrifying loss of life and massive displacement, with much greater odds of failure.

Incapable d’agir quand Crisis Group et d’autres organisations envoyaient des signaux d’alerte et qualifiaient la Centrafrique d’Etat fantôme, la communauté internationale doit dorénavant s’impliquer massivement, à des coûts largement supérieurs, suite aux pertes humaines considérables et aux déplacements massifs de population, et avec des chances de succès beaucoup plus faibles.

The United Nations Security Council decided on 10 April to deploy a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) which will take over the mission of the African Union (MISCA), which itself succeeded the mission of the Economic Community of Central African States (MICOPAX).

The crisis that has been occurring in CAR is certainly the most dramatic in its history: more than 600 000 Central Africans are internally displaced or sought refuge in neighbouring countries; according to the United Nations, 1.7 million live in a constant situation of food insecurity and 878 000 need immediate medical assistance; Muslim communities are fleeing Bangui and the western region, subsistence economy no longer exists and the de facto partition of the country, caused by the sectarian violence, is gradually becoming a reality.

To stabilise the Central African Republic (CAR), the transitional government and its international partners need to prioritise, alongside security, action to fight corruption and trafficking of natural resources, as well as revive the economy.

Cameroon’s apparent stability belies the variety of internal and external pressures threatening the country’s future. Without social and political change, a weakened Cameroon could become another flashpoint in the region.

A new consensus and strategy are urgently needed to tackle the numerous, brutal armed groups in eastern Congo and to save the February 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) in the Great Lakes region.

The ever-decreasing likelihood of a free and fair presidential election is in growing conflict with a popular desire for change in Burundi. To safeguard the Arusha principles agreed in 2000 to end Burundi’s civil war, the opposition and President Nkurunziza in particular must return to the path of democracy and dialogue.

With the 2016 presidential elections approaching, tension in the Democratic Republic of Congo is increasing. President Kabila is nearing the end of his second term and political manoeuvring within the government to create conditions for a third term is mobilising popular opposition, testing the country’s fragile democratisation and stability. International pressure is now vital to find a peaceful way forward.

Since President Paul Biya came to power in 1982, Cameroon has been a sleepy regime with a soft and aging dictator, a nation all but forgotten in a remote corner of the African continent. This has dramatically changed with the spillover of Boko Haram from Nigeria into Cameroon in 2014 and its transformation into a regional threat. Now there is not a single day without reports of Boko Haram attacks in northern Cameroon. Even before it realized what it meant, the Cameroonian regime had become part of the fight against terrorism. After initially downplaying the problem, Cameroon’s leaders are now discovering the challenges and dangers of this new war. This rising, external threat sheds a new light on a forgotten country with a strategic position in Africa. The geography of Cameroon is both its blessing and its curse—a pivot between West and Central Africa, divided by language, culture, and history, its very existence depending on a regional stability so often beyond its grasp.

Tous les éléments d’une confrontation violente sont en place en Burundi. En observant les derniers développements, il semble que les éléments qui ont conduit par le passé à des massacres et à une longue guerre civile au début des années 1990 se remettent en place.

Le 20 août, Pierre Nkurunziza a été investi pour la troisième fois. Son investiture, annoncée le matin même, a eu lieu presque en catimini et les ambassadeurs européens et américains accrédités à Bujumbura étaient visiblement absents tout comme l’Union africaine. La multiplication des assassinats en août a conduit la présidence à organiser l’investiture à la sauvette.

​Religious intolerance is a growing but seriously underestimated risk in Cameroon, both between and inside the major faiths. To halt the spread of violent extremism in the country, Cameroon needs to bring all sects into a new social compact and within the bounds of a charter for religious tolerance.