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Carnosine synthase deficiency is compatible with normal skeletal muscle and olfactory function but causes reduced olfactory sensitivity in aging mice [Developmental Biology]

Carnosine (β-alanyl-l-histidine) and anserine (β-alanyl-3-methyl-l-histidine) are abundant peptides in the nervous system and skeletal muscle of many vertebrates. Many in vitro and in vivo studies demonstrated that exogenously added carnosine can improve muscle contraction, has antioxidant activity, and can quench various reactive aldehydes. Some of these functions likely contribute to the proposed anti-aging activity of carnosine. However, the physiological role of carnosine and related histidine-containing dipeptides (HCDs) is not clear. In this study, we generated a mouse line deficient in carnosine synthase (Carns1). HCDs were undetectable in the primary olfactory system and skeletal muscle of Carns1-deficient mice. Skeletal muscle contraction in these mice, however, was unaltered, and there was no evidence for reduced pH-buffering capacity in the skeletal muscle. Olfactory tests did not reveal any deterioration in 8-month-old mice lacking carnosine. In contrast, aging (18–24-month-old) Carns1-deficient mice exhibited olfactory sensitivity impairments that correlated with an age-dependent reduction in the number of olfactory receptor neurons. Whereas we found no evidence for elevated levels of lipoxidation and glycation end products in the primary olfactory system, protein carbonylation was increased in the olfactory bulb of aged Carns1-deficient mice. Taken together, these results suggest that carnosine in the olfactory system is not essential for information processing in the olfactory signaling pathway but does have a role in the long-term protection of olfactory receptor neurons, possibly through its antioxidant activity.




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Peptidoglycan analysis reveals that synergistic deacetylase activity in vegetative Clostridium difficile impacts the host response [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

Clostridium difficile is an anaerobic and spore-forming bacterium responsible for 15–25% of postantibiotic diarrhea and 95% of pseudomembranous colitis. Peptidoglycan is a crucial element of the bacterial cell wall that is exposed to the host, making it an important target for the innate immune system. The C. difficile peptidoglycan is largely N-deacetylated on its glucosamine (93% of muropeptides) through the activity of enzymes known as N-deacetylases, and this N-deacetylation modulates host–pathogen interactions, such as resistance to the bacteriolytic activity of lysozyme, virulence, and host innate immune responses. C. difficile genome analysis showed that 12 genes potentially encode N-deacetylases; however, which of these N-deacetylases are involved in peptidoglycan N-deacetylation remains unknown. Here, we report the enzymes responsible for peptidoglycan N-deacetylation and their respective regulation. Through peptidoglycan analysis of several mutants, we found that the N-deacetylases PdaV and PgdA act in synergy. Together they are responsible for the high level of peptidoglycan N-deacetylation in C. difficile and the consequent resistance to lysozyme. We also characterized a third enzyme, PgdB, as a glucosamine N-deacetylase. However, its impact on N-deacetylation and lysozyme resistance is limited, and its physiological role remains to be dissected. Finally, given the influence of peptidoglycan N-deacetylation on host defense against pathogens, we investigated the virulence and colonization ability of the mutants. Unlike what has been shown in other pathogenic bacteria, a lack of N-deacetylation in C. difficile is not linked to a decrease in virulence.




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Fluctuation in O-GlcNAcylation inactivates STIM1 to reduce store-operated calcium ion entry via down-regulation of Ser621 phosphorylation [Molecular Bases of Disease]

Stromal interaction molecule 1 (STIM1) plays a pivotal role in store-operated Ca2+ entry (SOCE), an essential mechanism in cellular calcium signaling and in maintaining cellular calcium balance. Because O-GlcNAcylation plays pivotal roles in various cellular function, we examined the effect of fluctuation in STIM1 O-GlcNAcylation on SOCE activity. We found that both increase and decrease in STIM1 O-GlcNAcylation impaired SOCE activity. To determine the molecular basis, we established STIM1-knockout HEK293 (STIM1-KO-HEK) cells using the CRISPR/Cas9 system and transfected STIM1 WT (STIM1-KO-WT-HEK), S621A (STIM1-KO-S621A-HEK), or T626A (STIM1-KO-T626A-HEK) cells. Using these cells, we examined the possible O-GlcNAcylation sites of STIM1 to determine whether the sites were O-GlcNAcylated. Co-immunoprecipitation analysis revealed that Ser621 and Thr626 were O-GlcNAcylated and that Thr626 was O-GlcNAcylated in the steady state but Ser621 was not. The SOCE activity in STIM1-KO-S621A-HEK and STIM1-KO-T626A-HEK cells was lower than that in STIM1-KO-WT-HEK cells because of reduced phosphorylation at Ser621. Treatment with the O-GlcNAcase inhibitor Thiamet G or O-GlcNAc transferase (OGT) transfection, which increases O-GlcNAcylation, reduced SOCE activity, whereas treatment with the OGT inhibitor ST045849 or siOGT transfection, which decreases O-GlcNAcylation, also reduced SOCE activity. Decrease in SOCE activity due to increase and decrease in O-GlcNAcylation was attributable to reduced phosphorylation at Ser621. These data suggest that both decrease in O-GlcNAcylation at Thr626 and increase in O-GlcNAcylation at Ser621 in STIM1 lead to impairment of SOCE activity through decrease in Ser621 phosphorylation. Targeting STIM1 O-GlcNAcylation could provide a promising treatment option for the related diseases, such as neurodegenerative diseases.




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Ischemic stroke disrupts the endothelial glycocalyx through activation of proHPSE via acrolein exposure [Molecular Bases of Disease]

Infiltration of peripheral immune cells after blood-brain barrier dysfunction causes severe inflammation after a stroke. Although the endothelial glycocalyx, a network of membrane-bound glycoproteins and proteoglycans that covers the lumen of endothelial cells, functions as a barrier to circulating cells, the relationship between stroke severity and glycocalyx dysfunction remains unclear. In this study, glycosaminoglycans, a component of the endothelial glycocalyx, were studied in the context of ischemic stroke using a photochemically induced thrombosis mouse model. Decreased levels of heparan sulfate and chondroitin sulfate and increased activity of hyaluronidase 1 and heparanase (HPSE) were observed in ischemic brain tissues. HPSE expression in cerebral vessels increased after stroke onset and infarct volume greatly decreased after co-administration of N-acetylcysteine + glycosaminoglycan oligosaccharides as compared with N-acetylcysteine administration alone. These results suggest that the endothelial glycocalyx was injured after the onset of stroke. Interestingly, scission activity of proHPSE produced by immortalized endothelial cells and HEK293 cells transfected with hHPSE1 cDNA were activated by acrolein (ACR) exposure. We identified the ACR-modified amino acid residues of proHPSE using nano LC–MS/MS, suggesting that ACR modification of Lys139 (6-kDa linker), Lys107, and Lys161, located in the immediate vicinity of the 6-kDa linker, at least in part is attributed to the activation of proHPSE. Because proHPSE, but not HPSE, localizes outside cells by binding with heparan sulfate proteoglycans, ACR-modified proHPSE represents a promising target to protect the endothelial glycocalyx.




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The structure of a family 110 glycoside hydrolase provides insight into the hydrolysis of {alpha}-1,3-galactosidic linkages in {lambda}-carrageenan and blood group antigens [Enzymology]

α-Linked galactose is a common carbohydrate motif in nature that is processed by a variety of glycoside hydrolases from different families. Terminal Galα1–3Gal motifs are found as a defining feature of different blood group and tissue antigens, as well as the building block of the marine algal galactan λ-carrageenan. The blood group B antigen and linear α-Gal epitope can be processed by glycoside hydrolases in family GH110, whereas the presence of genes encoding GH110 enzymes in polysaccharide utilization loci from marine bacteria suggests a role in processing λ-carrageenan. However, the structure–function relationships underpinning the α-1,3-galactosidase activity within family GH110 remain unknown. Here we focus on a GH110 enzyme (PdGH110B) from the carrageenolytic marine bacterium Pseudoalteromonas distincta U2A. We showed that the enzyme was active on Galα1–3Gal but not the blood group B antigen. X-ray crystal structures in complex with galactose and unhydrolyzed Galα1–3Gal revealed the parallel β-helix fold of the enzyme and the structural basis of its inverting catalytic mechanism. Moreover, an examination of the active site reveals likely adaptations that allow accommodation of fucose in blood group B active GH110 enzymes or, in the case of PdGH110, accommodation of the sulfate groups found on λ-carrageenan. Overall, this work provides insight into the first member of a predominantly marine clade of GH110 enzymes while also illuminating the structural basis of α-1,3-galactoside processing by the family as a whole.




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{alpha}2-Macroglobulin-like protein 1 can conȷugate and inhibit proteases through their hydroxyl groups, because of an enhanced reactivity of its thiol ester [Protein Structure and Folding]

Proteins in the α-macroglobulin (αM) superfamily use thiol esters to form covalent conjugation products upon their proteolytic activation. αM protease inhibitors use theirs to conjugate proteases and preferentially react with primary amines (e.g. on lysine side chains), whereas those of αM complement components C3 and C4B have an increased hydroxyl reactivity that is conveyed by a conserved histidine residue and allows conjugation to cell surface glycans. Human α2-macroglobulin–like protein 1 (A2ML1) is a monomeric protease inhibitor but has the hydroxyl reactivity–conveying histidine residue. Here, we have investigated the role of hydroxyl reactivity in a protease inhibitor by comparing recombinant WT A2ML1 and the A2ML1 H1084N mutant in which this histidine is removed. Both of A2ML1s' thiol esters were reactive toward the amine substrate glycine, but only WT A2ML1 reacted with the hydroxyl substrate glycerol, demonstrating that His-1084 increases the hydroxyl reactivity of A2ML1's thiol ester. Although both A2ML1s conjugated and inhibited thermolysin, His-1084 was required for the conjugation and inhibition of acetylated thermolysin, which lacks primary amines. Using MS, we identified an ester bond formed between a thermolysin serine residue and the A2ML1 thiol ester. These results demonstrate that a histidine-enhanced hydroxyl reactivity can contribute to protease inhibition by an αM protein. His-1084 did not improve A2ML1's protease inhibition at pH 5, indicating that A2ML1's hydroxyl reactivity is not an adaption to its acidic epidermal environment.




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The heptameric structure of the flagellar regulatory protein FlrC is indispensable for ATPase activity and disassembled by cyclic-di-GMP [Protein Structure and Folding]

The bacterial enhancer-binding protein (bEBP) FlrC, controls motility and colonization of Vibrio cholerae by regulating the transcription of class-III flagellar genes in σ54-dependent manner. However, the mechanism by which FlrC regulates transcription is not fully elucidated. Although, most bEBPs require nucleotides to stimulate the oligomerization necessary for function, our previous study showed that the central domain of FlrC (FlrCC) forms heptamer in a nucleotide-independent manner. Furthermore, heptameric FlrCC binds ATP in “cis-mediated” style without any contribution from sensor I motif 285REDXXYR291 of the trans protomer. This atypical ATP binding raises the question of whether heptamerization of FlrC is solely required for transcription regulation, or if it is also critical for ATPase activity. ATPase assays and size exclusion chromatography of the trans-variants FlrCC-Y290A and FlrCC-R291A showed destabilization of heptameric assembly with concomitant abrogation of ATPase activity. Crystal structures showed that in the cis-variant FlrCC-R349A drastic shift of Walker A encroached ATP-binding site, whereas the site remained occupied by ADP in FlrCC-Y290A. We postulated that FlrCC heptamerizes through concentration-dependent cooperativity for maximal ATPase activity and upon heptamerization, packing of trans-acting Tyr290 against cis-acting Arg349 compels Arg349 to maintain proper conformation of Walker A. Finally, a Trp quenching study revealed binding of cyclic-di-GMP with FlrCC. Excess cyclic-di-GMP repressed ATPase activity of FlrCC through destabilization of heptameric assembly, especially at low concentration of protein. Systematic phylogenetic analysis allowed us to propose similar regulatory mechanisms for FlrCs of several Vibrio species and a set of monotrichous Gram-negative bacteria.




vi

Cholesterol sensing by CD81 is important for hepatitis C virus entry [Protein Structure and Folding]

CD81 plays a central role in a variety of physiological and pathological processes. Recent structural analysis of CD81 indicates that it contains an intramembrane cholesterol-binding pocket and that interaction with cholesterol may regulate a conformational switch in the large extracellular domain of CD81. Therefore, CD81 possesses a potential cholesterol-sensing mechanism; however, its relevance for protein function is thus far unknown. In this study we investigate CD81 cholesterol sensing in the context of its activity as a receptor for hepatitis C virus (HCV). Structure-led mutagenesis of the cholesterol-binding pocket reduced CD81–cholesterol association but had disparate effects on HCV entry, both reducing and enhancing CD81 receptor activity. We reasoned that this could be explained by alterations in the consequences of cholesterol binding. To investigate this further we performed molecular dynamic simulations of CD81 with and without cholesterol; this identified a potential allosteric mechanism by which cholesterol binding regulates the conformation of CD81. To test this, we designed further mutations to force CD81 into either the open (cholesterol-unbound) or closed (cholesterol-bound) conformation. The open mutant of CD81 exhibited reduced HCV receptor activity, whereas the closed mutant enhanced activity. These data are consistent with cholesterol sensing switching CD81 between a receptor active and inactive state. CD81 interactome analysis also suggests that conformational switching may modulate the assembly of CD81–partner protein networks. This work furthers our understanding of the molecular mechanism of CD81 cholesterol sensing, how this relates to HCV entry, and CD81's function as a molecular scaffold; these insights are relevant to CD81's varied roles in both health and disease.




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Evolving the naturally compromised chorismate mutase from Mycobacterium tuberculosis to top performance [Protein Structure and Folding]

Chorismate mutase (CM), an essential enzyme at the branch-point of the shikimate pathway, is required for the biosynthesis of phenylalanine and tyrosine in bacteria, archaea, plants, and fungi. MtCM, the CM from Mycobacterium tuberculosis, has less than 1% of the catalytic efficiency of a typical natural CM and requires complex formation with 3-deoxy-d-arabino-heptulosonate 7-phosphate synthase for high activity. To explore the full potential of MtCM for catalyzing its native reaction, we applied diverse iterative cycles of mutagenesis and selection, thereby raising kcat/Km 270-fold to 5 × 105 m−1s−1, which is even higher than for the complex. Moreover, the evolutionarily optimized autonomous MtCM, which had 11 of its 90 amino acids exchanged, was stabilized compared with its progenitor, as indicated by a 9 °C increase in melting temperature. The 1.5 Å crystal structure of the top-evolved MtCM variant reveals the molecular underpinnings of this activity boost. Some acquired residues (e.g. Pro52 and Asp55) are conserved in naturally efficient CMs, but most of them lie beyond the active site. Our evolutionary trajectories reached a plateau at the level of the best natural enzymes, suggesting that we have exhausted the potential of MtCM. Taken together, these findings show that the scaffold of MtCM, which naturally evolved for mediocrity to enable inter-enzyme allosteric regulation of the shikimate pathway, is inherently capable of high activity.




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Hydrogen/deuterium exchange memory NMR reveals structural epitopes involved in IgE cross-reactivity of allergenic lipid transfer proteins [Protein Structure and Folding]

Identification of antibody-binding epitopes is crucial to understand immunological mechanisms. It is of particular interest for allergenic proteins with high cross-reactivity as observed in the lipid transfer protein (LTP) syndrome, which is characterized by severe allergic reactions. Art v 3, a pollen LTP from mugwort, is frequently involved in this cross-reactivity, but no antibody-binding epitopes have been determined so far. To reveal human IgE-binding regions of Art v 3, we produced three murine high-affinity mAbs, which showed 70–90% coverage of the allergenic epitopes from mugwort pollen–allergic patients. As reliable methods to determine structural epitopes with tightly interacting intact antibodies under native conditions are lacking, we developed a straightforward NMR approach termed hydrogen/deuterium exchange memory (HDXMEM). It relies on the slow exchange between the invisible antigen-mAb complex and the free 15N-labeled antigen whose 1H-15N correlations are detected. Due to a memory effect, changes of NH protection during antibody binding are measured. Differences in H/D exchange rates and analyses of mAb reactivity to homologous LTPs revealed three structural epitopes: two partially cross-reactive regions around α-helices 2 and 4 as well as a novel Art v 3–specific epitope at the C terminus. Protein variants with exchanged epitope residues confirmed the antibody-binding sites and revealed strongly reduced IgE reactivity. Using the novel HDXMEM for NMR epitope mapping allowed identification of the first structural epitopes of an allergenic pollen LTP. This knowledge enables improved cross-reactivity prediction for patients suffering from LTP allergy and facilitates design of therapeutics.




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Nitro-fatty acids as activators of hSIRT6 deacetylase activity [Protein Structure and Folding]

Sirtuin 6, SIRT6, is critical for both glucose and lipid homeostasis and is involved in maintaining genomic stability under conditions of oxidative DNA damage such as those observed in age-related diseases. There is an intense search for modulators of SIRT6 activity, however, not many specific activators have been reported. Long acyl-chain fatty acids have been shown to increase the weak in vitro deacetylase activity of SIRT6 but this effect is modest at best. Herein we report that electrophilic nitro-fatty acids (nitro-oleic acid and nitro-conjugated linoleic acid) potently activate SIRT6. Binding of the nitro-fatty acid to the hydrophobic crevice of the SIRT6 active site exerted a moderate activation (2-fold at 20 μm), similar to that previously reported for non-nitrated fatty acids. However, covalent Michael adduct formation with Cys-18, a residue present at the N terminus of SIRT6 but absent from other isoforms, induced a conformational change that resulted in a much stronger activation (40-fold at 20 μm). Molecular modeling of the resulting Michael adduct suggested stabilization of the co-substrate and acyl-binding loops as a possible additional mechanism of SIRT6 activation by the nitro-fatty acid. Importantly, treatment of cells with nitro-oleic acid promoted H3K9 deacetylation, whereas oleic acid had no effect. Altogether, our results show that nitrated fatty acids can be considered a valuable tool for specific SIRT6 activation, and that SIRT6 should be considered as a molecular target for in vivo actions of these anti-inflammatory nitro-lipids.




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Molecular characterization of the RNA-protein complex directing -2/-1 programmed ribosomal frameshifting during arterivirus replicase expression [Protein Structure and Folding]

Programmed ribosomal frameshifting (PRF) is a mechanism used by arteriviruses like porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) to generate multiple proteins from overlapping reading frames within its RNA genome. PRRSV employs −1 PRF directed by RNA secondary and tertiary structures within its viral genome (canonical PRF), as well as a noncanonical −1 and −2 PRF that are stimulated by the interactions of PRRSV nonstructural protein 1β (nsp1β) and host protein poly(C)-binding protein (PCBP) 1 or 2 with the viral genome. Together, nsp1β and one of the PCBPs act as transactivators that bind a C-rich motif near the shift site to stimulate −1 and −2 PRF, thereby enabling the ribosome to generate two frameshift products that are implicated in viral immune evasion. How nsp1β and PCBP associate with the viral RNA genome remains unclear. Here, we describe the purification of the nsp1β:PCBP2:viral RNA complex on a scale sufficient for structural analysis using small-angle X-ray scattering and stochiometric analysis by analytical ultracentrifugation. The proteins associate with the RNA C-rich motif as a 1:1:1 complex. The monomeric form of nsp1β within the complex differs from previously reported homodimer identified by X-ray crystallography. Functional analysis of the complex via mutational analysis combined with RNA-binding assays and cell-based frameshifting reporter assays reveal a number of key residues within nsp1β and PCBP2 that are involved in complex formation and function. Our results suggest that nsp1β and PCBP2 both interact directly with viral RNA during formation of the complex to coordinate this unusual PRF mechanism.




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Lipid-tuned Zinc Transport Activity of Human ZnT8 Protein Correlates with Risk for Type-2 Diabetes [Molecular Bases of Disease]

Zinc is a critical element for insulin storage in the secretory granules of pancreatic beta cells. The islet-specific zinc transporter ZnT8 mediates granular sequestration of zinc ions. A genetic variant of human ZnT8 arising from a single nonsynonymous nucleotide change contributes to increased susceptibility to type-2 diabetes (T2D), but it remains unclear how the high risk variant (Arg-325), which is also a higher frequency (>50%) allele, is correlated with zinc transport activity. Here, we compared the activity of Arg-325 with that of a low risk ZnT8 variant (Trp-325). The Arg-325 variant was found to be more active than the Trp-325 form following induced expression in HEK293 cells. We further examined the functional consequences of changing lipid conditions to mimic the impact of lipid remodeling on ZnT8 activity during insulin granule biogenesis. Purified ZnT8 variants in proteoliposomes exhibited more than 4-fold functional tunability by the anionic phospholipids, lysophosphatidylcholine and cholesterol. Over a broad range of permissive lipid compositions, the Arg-325 variant consistently exhibited accelerated zinc transport kinetics versus the Trp-form. In agreement with the human genetic finding that rare loss-of-function mutations in ZnT8 are associated with reduced T2D risk, our results suggested that the common high risk Arg-325 variant is hyperactive, and thus may be targeted for inhibition to reduce T2D risk in the general populations.




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Is Evaluating COVID-19 About the WHO or Country Responses?

11 July 2020

Dr Charles Clift

Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme
Striking the right balance in membership and terms of reference is challenging for the evaluation panel set up to examine the coordinated international health response to coronavirus.

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Examining the global response of indivudual countries and the World Health Organization (WHO) to coronavirus. Photo Illustration by Rafael Henrique/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images.

When the resolution was passed by World Health Organization (WHO) member states at the World Health Assembly (WHA) in May requesting an evaluation ‘at the earliest appropriate moment’ of lessons learned from the WHO-coordinated international health response to COVID-19, it was generally thought the appropriate moment would be when the pandemic was on the wane.

Yet the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response has actually been established at a time when - as noted by WHO director-general Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus in his announcement of the panel - the pandemic is still accelerating.

In most of the world the virus is not under control, and cases have actually doubled in the last six weeks. So why now?

Emphasis on global solidarity

Throughout the pandemic so far, Dr Tedros has emphasised two main points – the need for urgent action by countries, and the imperative need for global solidarity. In announcing the panel, he said this is the ‘defining crisis of our age’ and that ‘we cannot defeat this pandemic as a divided world … the COVID-19 pandemic is a test of global solidarity and global leadership’.

He may well see establishing the panel now - when the pandemic still has a long way to run - as an opportunity to reinforce messages which have hitherto seemed to fall on deaf ears, notably saying ‘we are in the midst of the battle of our lives, and we have to do better’. And he has also said that we should learn lessons now that will be useful in the continuing fight against the pandemic.

Establishing both the membership of the panel and its terms of reference has been left largely in the hands of the co-chairs – distinguished ex-politicians Helen Clark of New Zealand and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia. But they will have to construct the panel in close consultation with member states on the basis of their proposals for membership – a process that will likely be fraught by the divisive politics which have already so upset Dr Tedros.

In addition, embedded in the mandate from the WHA resolution is the phrase ‘WHO-coordinated international health response’ – negotiated language which is intentionally ambiguous and reveals an unresolved tension.

Does it mean the panel should principally focus on WHO’s performance, which is what several countries – including the US – want to see? Or should it give at least equal weight to the way countries have responded individually and collectively, as Dr Tedros and the WHO may want to see?

These different interpretations mean both the construction of the panel and its terms of reference could be highly contentious. Most countries, including China and the US but also others, will not want their responses to be subjected to independent investigation. Nor will they want to include panel members likely to be critical of their responses. This suggests the possibility that there will be political pressure to focus the enquiry principally on the performance of WHO rather than that of countries – an outcome Dr Tedros would not welcome.

It remains to be seen how the co-chairs will manage these highly political issues, and avoid the panel becoming an extension of ‘pandemic politics’ by other means. Can it come to definitive conclusions in the midst of a pandemic and, if so, how likely are they to be heeded?

It is also highly likely that several other reviews will be launched, wholly independently of oversight by WHO and its member states, as happened following the 2014 Ebola outbreak. This provides opportunities for a variety of perspectives on both the performance of WHO, and of individual countries.

Already, The Lancet has announced its own Commission on COVID-19 with a broad mandate covering both the health and economic responses to the pandemic. Both this and the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response are likely to be only the first of many COVID-19 reviews.




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COVID-19: The Hidden Majority in India's Migration Crisis

13 July 2020

Dr Champa Patel

Director, Asia-Pacific Programme
While the social and economic costs of coronavirus lockdowns, travel bans and social distancing initially focused on international migrants, there has been increasing attention paid to the plight of internal migrants.

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Migrant workers plant paddy in a field at Jhandi village in Patiala, India. Photo by Bharat Bhushan/Hindustan Times via Getty Images.

The World Bank estimates that the magnitude of internal migration is about two‐and‐a‐half times that of international migration. Within India, an estimated 40 million internal migrant workers, largely in the informal economy, were severely impacted by the government’s COVID-19 lockdown.

With transportation systems initially shut down, many had no recourse to travel options back to homes and villages, resulting in harrowing journeys home. Those who were able to make it home found, in some instances, villages refusing entry because of fears of transmission.

The shocking images of migrants forced to walk in desperation showed the enormity of the crisis as well as some of the challenges posed by an extended lockdown in India where so many people live hand to mouth and cannot afford not to work.

Migrant workers and the informal economy

The complete failure of the government to anticipate the needs of this group, and the subsequent distress caused, has made visible a large workforce who experience precarity of work and often live hand to mouth.

One key challenge is the lack of robust data on the scale of internal migration. While estimates abound, there is no proper data collection system in place to accurately record temporary, seasonal and circular migration patterns. However, it is estimated that more than 90% of working people in India are engaged in the informal economy, with states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar accounting for more than 80% of workers in this sector.

A recent government labour force survey estimated that more than 71% of people with a regular salary working in non-agricultural industries had no written job contract. Nearly half of workers are not eligible for social security benefits.

Daily-wage workers are particularly vulnerable, with limited or no access to social security and most living in poverty. Living hand to mouth, their loss of livelihoods has led to a lack of money to pay rents or pay for food. Women are impacted whether because of their gender, responsibilities as caregivers, or as members of disadvantaged castes and communities.

COVID-19 has massively impacted this group of workers. Stranded Workers Action Network found that 50% of workers had rations left for less than one day; 74% had less than half their daily wages remaining to survive for the rest of the lockdown period; and 89% had not been paid by their employers at all during the lockdown.

According to Supreme Court proceedings, relief camps are housing some 660,000 workers; some 2.2 million people also rely on emergency food supplies. Job losses, and home and food insecurity have left this group highly vulnerable.

In March 2020, in response to COVID-19, the Indian government instituted the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Package (PMGKB), a $22.6 billion relief package. The World Bank announced $1 billion funding to accelerate social protection support, in part through the PMGKB.

This support would work alongside pre-existing initiatives such as the Public Distribution System (PDS), which covers 800 million people, and Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT). This cash injection could help address one of the key challenges facing India’s piecemeal and uneven social protection programmes – inadequate funding. India’s spending on public social protection excluding health is just 1.3% of the GDP.

However, there are still other challenges to overcome. One is how to ensure coordination and coverage within, and across, differing states. The second is how to transition multiple schemes into one integrated system that can be accessed anywhere within the country, particularly important when many workers are on the move. There is an urgent need for a comprehensive system, which is adaptive and flexible to needs and provides adequate social and income support.

Another coverage issue relates to the use of direct cash transfers (DCTs) to support people impacted by the loss of livelihoods, where funds are deposited within bank accounts. Such measures fail to consider the significant numbers of people who do not have access to banks and will not be able to access this support.

Wider impact on livelihoods and remittances

​There is a risk, with extended lockdown and risks of further waves of infection, that labour shortages could negatively impact the economy. There is a wider need to support re-entry back into the workforce and support livelihoods. National Survey Sample data shows that between 2007 and 2008, internal remittances amounted to US$10 billion. These domestic transfers financed over 30% of all household consumption in remittance-receiving households.

But future migration for work is likely to be severely impacted. As restrictions begin to ease, employers and businesses cannot necessarily rely on cheap available labour. Having faced destitution and hardship, many may wish to stay closer to families and local support networks.

As Irudaya Rajan notes in The New Humanitarian, it is likely ‘there will be a reduction in long-distance migration in India after this’, as many migrants will be wary of being stranded again. This would be hugely detrimental to stimulating the economy as reverse migration could push down wages and subsequently demand.

Another issue may be returning migrant workers, who have been working overseas, over half of whom work in the Gulf. It is unclear if, or when, migrants will be able to return to work, with the World Bank estimating that remittances from this group could fall by about 23%.

However, what is striking has been India’s support for this group - the Vande Bharat Mission has deployed flights and naval ships to help return migrant workers, especially vulnerable groups - in marked contrast to the lack of preparation and care for internal migrants.

One factor for this may be the volume of remittances these migrant workers bring to the Indian economy, but it overlooks the contribution of internal remittances, on which there is far less robust data.

But the current challenges can also be an opportunity. The scale of the migrant crisis has made visible an often-overlooked population of workers. With political will, and investment at federal and state levels, this could be an opportunity to transform livelihoods.

As thoughts will turn to how to stimulate economies and get people back to work, it is imperative that those in authority turn their minds to how to create a more just society, that invests in healthcare, and has a social protection system that supports the most vulnerable in society.

Migrants are not just objects of charity that need support. Internal migrants are key income generators that play a vital role in Indian society and should never be overlooked again.

This article was originally published in Routed Magazine.




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Domestic Violence in Russia: The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic

20 July 2020

Ekaterina Aleynikova

Research Assistant, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The COVID-19 pandemic has made Russia’s domestic violence problem more visible, with shifting public opinion potentially incentivizing the government to change its approach, argues Ekaterina Aleynikova.

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Campaigners during a rally held in 2019 in support of a Russian law on domestic violence. Photo: Getty Images

Russia is one of the few countries in the region to have no legal definition of domestic violence and, as a result, there are no protective measures specific to domestic violence such as restraining orders or compulsory anger management training for abusers. In fact, the government has taken steps in recent years to remove any legal distinction between assault happening in one’s home, and elsewhere, with battery among family or household members for first-time offences decriminalized in 2017.

The Russian Ministry of Justice explicitly defended this position in its response to an enquiry into Russian domestic violence cases by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in November 2019. The ministry claimed existing legislation adequately protects citizens from domestic violence, ‘even though it has never been considered a separate offence’, reiterating that there is ‘no need’ for adopting specific legislation.

However, the four cases that led to the ECtHR’s enquiry demonstrate that current legislation is not sufficient. The most prominent case is that of Margarita Gracheva whose ex-husband severed her hands in 2017 despite her having made multiple complaints to the police ahead of the act being committed. If Russian legislation had mechanisms in place to isolate victims from their abusers, then Gracheva could have been protected by the law.

Instead, systemic impunity for abusers is supported by statements from people in power excusing domestic violence. The most recent of such statements came from the head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, in June 2020. When meeting with the family of a young woman allegedly murdered by her husband, Chechnya’s leader said, husbands beating their wives ‘happens’ and that the young woman should have tried harder to hold on to her marriage. These statements send clear signals to abusers that their actions are justified, and to the victims, that they won’t be protected if they were to come forward.

Similarly, to other parts of the world, civil society organizations in Russia have reported an increase in the number of cases of domestic violence during the COVID-19 pandemic. On a personal level, the pandemic has often exacerbated many of the factors that can lead to domestic violence such as stress, economic anxiety or social isolation.

On a systemic level, many of the provisions intended to protect victims of violence, which were already ineffective in Russia, have been worsened during the lockdown. Where police may not have rapidly responded to reports of domestic violence previously, under lockdown, they have become focused on  other priorities and, where shelters and support networks for the victims may have been scarce in the past, they have been further constrained.

Unsurprisingly, the strategy of the Russian state so far has been to deny that there is a problem of domestic violence, with the Ministry of Interior reporting that, according to their statistics, the number of domestic violence cases have gone down during the lockdown. Indeed, Chairwoman of the Federation Council, Valentina Matvienko, has said she does not believe lockdown has increased domestic violence because, on the contrary, families have been  ‘brought together’, reflecting wishful thinking at best and negligence at worst.

The pandemic has also been used as an excuse to postpone discussion of a federal law on domestic violence, drafted by civil society, that was submitted for review by the Duma last year. This bill would have introduced different types of domestic violence such as psychological and economic violence and transferred domestic violence offences from private to public prosecutions to make it easier for victims to seek justice.

The government’s disregard for domestic violence reflects, in part, the patriarchal mindsets of those in power but perhaps, more significantly, the Kremlin’s belief that conservative social groups constitute its main support base. This has been made evident by the politicization of Russia’s ‘traditional’ values in recent years which was vigorously deployed throughout the constitutional amendments campaign. While it is clear that the true purpose of amending the constitution has always been to allow Vladimir Putin to stay in power beyond 2024, amendments relating to this were absent from the government’s campaign. Instead, Russians were encouraged to vote by populist socially-conservative messages, hence why respect for traditional values has been added to the constitution.

Despite this, attitudes in Russian society are changing. A February 2020 survey by the Levada Centre showed that 61 per cent of Russians – and 74 per cent of Russian women – think domestic violence is a serious problem.

Moreover, the survey shows that women are much more aware of domestic violence than men – with every third woman in Russia admits being aware of domestic violence in their social circles while only every fifth man admits the same. This could be a sign that Russian men and women, on average, have a different understanding of what constitutes domestic violence. If so, adopting a law that defines domestic violence and holding a public awareness campaign is of paramount importance to eliminate any misunderstanding.

The difference could also be a sign that victims of domestic violence are more likely to confide in women hence making domestic violence less visible to men. This awareness gap perhaps explains the difference between men’s and women’s assessments of how serious the issue in Russia is.

The pandemic has provoked a new wave of discussions of domestic violence among Russia’s population with stories and statistics widely shared in the media and on the internet. As domestic violence becomes more visible, public perceptions are likely to shift further towards recognizing, and hopefully condemning, it. But, while legislation is crucial, the experience of other countries in the region, such as Armenia or Kazakhstan, shows that adopting laws on domestic violence is not enough. Measures are needed to ensure implementation of the law including training police officers and state officials and instituting disciplinary action for negligence of victims’ complaints.

Nevertheless, admitting there is a problem with domestic violence in Russia, and introducing laws, are an essential first step. The Russian government seems to have placed its bet on the support of conservative social groups but changing public opinion may prove this strategy unsustainable.




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Domestic Violence in Ukraine: Lessons from COVID-19

23 July 2020

Kateryna Busol

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The pandemic has shed light on domestic violence in Ukraine, mobilizing civil society to demand more nuanced policy on the issue.

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A protester chants slogans on a megaphone during an International Women's Day protest on 8 March 2019 in Kyiv, Ukraine. Photo: Getty Images.

The virus of violence

During quarantine, the greater economic vulnerability of Ukrainian women has locked many of them with abusive partners. The uncertainty of personal finances, health and security in confinement has exacerbated domestic violence against women, in certain cases aggravated by the perpetrator’s war-related post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

In pre- pandemic times, only one third of domestic violence victims, 78% of whom are women, reported the abuse. During the pandemic, the calls to domestic violence helplines increased by 50% in the Donbas war zone and by 35% in other regions of Ukraine.

However, more precise estimates are hard to make. This is largely because some fractions of Ukrainian society still see domestic violence as a private family matter, which will get little assistance from the police. Also, reporting from a small confinement place permanently shared with a perpetrator during the lockdown can trigger more abuse.

The COVID-19-tested legal framework

The spike in domestic violence during lockdown has intensified the debate about the inadequacy of Ukraine’s approach.

Ukraine adopted the law on domestic violence in 2017 and made such behaviour punishable under administrative and criminal law. Importantly, the law does not limit domestic violence to physical abuse, but recognizes its sexual, psychological and economic variations. Domestic violence is further not limited to a married couple or close family members, but can be perpetrated against a distant relative or a cohabiting partner.

The extended definition of rape now includes rape of a spouse or a family member as an aggravating circumstance. A special police unit has been designated to deal with domestic abuse cases. Police can now issue protection orders in prompt reaction to an offence and immediately distance a perpetrator from a victim.

The victim can also spend time in a shelter - a system which the Ukrainian government has promised to create. A special registry of domestic violence cases has been set up for the exclusive use by the designated law enforcement and social security authorities to help them be more holistically informed in building a response.

However important, the introduced legal and institutional infrastructure was slow in proving its efficiency pre-COVID-19. It is struggling even more to stand the test of the coronavirus.

Changing the established mindset takes time. 38% of Ukraine’s judges and 39% of prosecutors still struggle to see domestic violence not as a household issue. Even though the police are becoming more reactive to home abuse complaints, getting emergency protection orders is still difficult. The court restraining orders are more effective, however they require the unnecessarily protracted and humiliating procedures of proving one’s own victimhood to different state authorities.

In response to the challenges of coronavirus for women, the police spread information posters and created a special chat-bot about the available help. However, while the domestic violence helplines of La Strada and other human rights NGOs are busier than ever, the police statistics suggest that the lockdown has not catalyzed home abuse.

This could indicate a higher trust to non-state institutions and the inability of a considerable group of women to use more sophisticated communication means such as chat-bots when they cannot call the police in the presence of an abuser. This problem is exacerbated by a current  lack of shelters in rural areas, as most are located in urban settings. Overcrowded in ordinary times, the shelters’ capacity to accept survivors during the lockdown is further limited by the social distancing rules.

Istanbul Convention – The bigger picture

Ukraine failed to ratify the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women, better known as the Istanbul Convention, largely due to the opposition of religious organizations. Concerned that the treaty’s terms ‘gender’ and ‘sexual orientation’ would contribute to the promotion of same-sex relationships in Ukraine, they argued that Ukraine’s current legislation provides adequate protection against domestic violence. However, this is not the case.

The Istanbul Convention does not ‘promote’ same-sex relationships, it only mentions sexual orientation among the non-exhaustive list of prohibited discrimination grounds. Remarkably, Ukraine’s domestic violence law itself is against such discrimination.

The Convention defines ‘gender’ as the socially constructed roles a society attributes to women and men. Ukraine’s overcautiousness about the term is ironic at least in two dimensions.

First, the 2017 domestic violence law restates its aim to eliminate discriminating beliefs about the social roles of each ‘sex’. In doing so, the law supports the rationale of what the Istanbul Convention denotes as ‘gender’ without using the term itself.

Second,  it is exactly the constraints of the rigidly defined niches for both sexes in Ukraine that have substantially contributed to the intensified domestic violence, whether it be  war or  coronavirus-related. The lack of sustainable psychological support for traumatized veterans and the stigma of mental health struggles, especially among men, mars their reintegration to peaceful life. This often results in alcohol abuse or even suicide.

As the economic uncertainty of the war and the virus prevents some men from fully living up to their traditional socially - and self-imposed - breadwinner role, this increases the risk of problematic behaviour and domestic violence.

By diverting the focus of the debate  to the term ‘gender’ used in the Istanbul Convention, conservative groups have ignored the fact that it describes the priority already enshrined in Ukraine’s 2017 law - to eliminate discriminatory beliefs about the socially constructed roles of men and women. This has drawn away time and resources needed to protect those vulnerable to domestic abuse.

Ukraine has not addressed the pigeonholing of women and men into gendered stereotypes. This has harmed men while further victimizing women and children, especially during the lockdown. Ironically, this is leading to the undermining of the very traditional family values certain opponents of the Istanbul Convention appealed to.

Fortunately, Ukraine’s ever-vigilant civil society,  dismayed at the wave of the lockdown domestic violence, petitioned President Zelenskyy to ratify the Convention. With a new draft law on ratification, the ball is now in the parliament’s court. It remains to be seen whether Ukraine’s policymakers will be up to the task.            




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Russia’s Behaviour Risks Weaponizing Outer Space

27 July 2020

Dr Beyza Unal

Deputy Director, International Security Programme

Mathieu Boulègue

Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
With negotiations in Vienna between the US and Russia hoping to prevent the weaponization of space, how much do Russia’s satellites pose a threat to the peaceful use of outer space, ask Beyza Unal and Mathieu Boulègue?

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Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, during a video link with cosmonauts on the International Space Station (ISS). Photo: Getty Images.

Days before the publication of last week’s report into Russian activity in the UK, and the subsequent call from several UK parliamentarians for a swift response to the ‘Russian threat’, Russia tested a new anti-satellite weapon capability releasing a small projectile from its Kosmos-2543 sub-satellite.

Kosmos-2543, a small satellite contained inside a larger satellite, Kosmos-2542, and 'birthed’ into orbit in late 2019, recently came under scrutiny in January 2020 when it was reportedly caught ‘buzzing’ US spy satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

By releasing a small projectile from the Kosmos-2543 sub-satellite, the US claims that Russia has launched a new projectile into orbit with relatively high speed – estimated at around 500 km per hour – leading to concerns about the potential of Russia to develop this technology as a weapon to target foreign satellites.

It is not the first time Moscow has relied on a Russian doll – or matryoshka – approach to launching satellites into outer space. In October 2017, a sub-satellite, Kosmos-2521, was ejected from its main satellite, Kosmos-2519, into a high-speed object in low orbit.

The Russian Ministry of Defence has declared that its latest activity is just for ‘routine’ inspections and surveillance of Russia’s other space assets, with the government’s official statement avoiding recognizing the existence of the new object while, at the same time, Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, recalling Russia’s commitment for the ‘complete demilitarization’ of space.

While it is possible that Russia’s matryoshka satellites have indeed been developed to carry out routine repairs of Russia’s space fleet, they also have the potential to interfere with, and destroy, other satellites with such action needing to be considered a threat until Russia demonstrates otherwise.

Russia’s use of outer space

Russia is not the only state investigating anti-satellite weaponry capabilities. There is a wider trend (e.g. China, India, US) to demonstrate advanced space capabilities with nefarious, if not directly offensive, intent. But, for the past few years, Russia in particular, has been provocative in testing its space weapon capabilities. 

For example, in April 2020, Russia launched and tested into low orbit the PL-19 Nudol direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) interceptor missile system from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome demonstrating its space assets with potential offensive capabilities, in particular, Russia’s capacity to destroy satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

In addition, the satellites, Kosmos-2535 and Kosmos-2536, launched in July 2019, are also suspected to be operating beyond their official mission of studying Russian orbital assets. It is reported that these satellites conducted a close proximity activity, coming within one kilometre from each other, which led to the creation of orbital debris.

Russia’s space strategy

By exploiting asymmetric advantages in space, Russia seeks to leverage its capabilities against competitors in space and in other domains, falling in line with its wider military strategy as well as its current Federal Space Programme for 2016 to 2025.

Russian space activities also have a cyber and electronic warfare angle. With the help of remote-sensing capabilities, Russian spy satellites potentially seek to disrupt military and civilian satellite communications and navigation systems. Indeed, in 2018, French authorities publicly accused Russia of seeking to intercept communication satellites for French and Italian armed forces putting data transmission through Western civilian and military satellites at risk of interception.

Furthermore, earlier this year, both Kosmos-2542 and 2543 came within 160 kilometres of a US spy satellite, US KH-11, similarly to Russia ‘buzzing’ around the British Isles or submarine surveillance that Norway and Sweden have been subjected to recently.

Shadowing and tailing in space is regarded as spying and this recent anti-satellite weapon test is part of a trend which demonstrates Russia’s persistent space strategy for close-proximity operations with foreign countries.

Orbital hypocrisy

Despite Russia’s calls for a treaty to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space, there remains little international trust in Russia’s behaviour in space so far with a US-Russia Space Security Exchange meeting scheduled to take place in Vienna on 27 July to discuss outer space stability and security.

This is amid a backdrop of bilateral nuclear arms control talks on the extension of the extant nuclear weapons reduction treaty, New START, which is scheduled to expire in February 2021. There is no guarantee, however, that the talks will achieve anything especially since the future of outer space requires a wider multilateral dialogue with all parties involved – including China.

Anti-satellite tests (ASATs) are a particularly dangerous form of weapon. Not only do they create major vulnerabilities in a domain where so much of humanity depends on for navigation, communications and environmental monitoring, they are also primarily a target for destabilization and undermining global positioning information in times of crisis.

And, perhaps most significantly, they possess the highly destructive potential to create even more space debris in Earth’s orbits that endanger the peaceful use of satellites and could do serious damage to large parts of the economies of developed and developing countries.

Avoiding space warfare

Space is for all but there is a risk that it is being hijacked by a few. It is time to re-assert and reinforce the rules, principles and norms of responsible state behaviour in outer space enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and its associated international agreements.

And, because the treaty specifically prohibits stationing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies, it is necessary to build on it to ban other types of weapons in space.

Space has been militarized since 1957 with the launch of Soviet satellite Sputnik. But the increasing weaponization of space adds more uncertainty, and unveils more vulnerabilities, that states need to address before space warfare becomes a reality.




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COVID-19 Teaches Resilience and the ‘Vulnerability Paradox’

7 August 2020

Dr Gareth Price

Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme

Christopher Vandome

Research Fellow, Africa Programme
Humility from decision-makers, building trust in leaders and institutions, and learning from international experience are critical if countries are to better prepare for the next global crisis.

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An information poster on preventing the spread of COVID-19 in Hanoi, Vietnam. Photo by MANAN VATSYAYANA/AFP via Getty Images.

While we must wait for the final reckoning of most successful national coronavirus responses, it does still appear those countries with memories of MERS and SARS - such as Singapore, Taiwan, Hong-Kong, and South Korea – led the way in being best prepared for COVID-19, with strong contract tracing and isolation measures.

Experience of previous outbreaks informed the containment strategies adopted by countries in East Asia in response to COVID-19. Vietnam reported its first case of COVID-19 in January but, over the following four months with rapid targeted testing, contact tracing and successful containment, only around 300 additional cases with no deaths were confirmed.

These countries learned to be flexible fast when new transmissions occurred, establishing quick lockdown measures targeted at key groups such as Singapore’s schools or South Korea’s night clubs and religious centres. In stark contrast, most European countries were overwhelmed by the pandemic despite enjoying world-class health systems, predictive models, scientific expertise, wealth, and resources.

Asia may have suffered first from coronavirus, but there is no ‘first mover advantage’ in dealing with a pandemic. The more resilient a society, the better placed it is to cope with a variety of risks and challenges. But to become resilient, a society needs to have faced setbacks and learned from them. And to remain resilient, it needs to stay aware of its own vulnerabilities and avoid complacency.

Prior experience of crises and disturbances, coupled with a ‘trial and error’ process of learning to deal with them, makes a society more resilient, whereas high levels of economic welfare and relative lack of recent crises leave some societies less prepared to face shocks. This is known as the ‘vulnerability paradox’.

Within Europe, it has actually been the Greek handling of COVID-19 that so far appears more successful than others. Greece is a country which has suffered a decade of austerity leading to a weakened healthcare system. And with one of Europe’s oldest populations, the Greek government was keenly aware of its own vulnerabilities. This prompted an early lockdown and a rapid increase in intensive care beds.

Although better state capacity and health system capability are clearly positives for mitigating disasters, citizens do tend to be less familiar with risk preparedness. This lack of experience can then breed complacency which threatens societies where risks are often complex, numerous, transboundary and inter-related.

Conversely, the absence of systemic resilience at a national level often puts the onus on family units or local communities – creating resilience as a necessary response to weak government capacity. There is little choice but to learn to look after yourself and your community.

However, although the vulnerability paradox helps explain why prior experience makes a system more resilient, societies need to stay aware of their own vulnerabilities and avoid complacency if they are to continually remain resilient.

Complacency coupled with a belief in the virtues of the free market has left some countries hit harder than others by the pandemic. In normal times, ‘just in time’ business models can be highly efficient compared to holding vast stocks. But it does not require hindsight to know that a global health crisis will see demand for protective equipment soar and these business models severely challenged.

Several societies have also witnessed a decline in trust towards institutions, especially politicians or the media. The deployment of science as justification for political decisions around coronavirus was presumably intended to help garner trust in those decisions. But when the science itself is inexact because of inadequate or emerging knowledge, this strategy is hardly fail-safe.

COVID-19 does provide an opportunity to rebuild trust by rethinking the relationship between the state and its citizens, to engage people more directly in a discussion about societal resilience with empowered citizens, and to rebuild a social contract between state and society in the context of recent significant changes and further potential threats.

It should also provide a salutary wake-up call to a range of ‘strongmen’ leaders prone to portraying issues rather simplistically. Although COVID-19 may be one of the few complex problems to which simplistic measures do apply - such as wearing a mask and using social distancing – these do not provide the whole solution.

Generally, declining trust in politicians reflects the ongoing inability of current politics to deal with a range of societal challenges. COVID-19 is certainly the most sudden and presents the biggest immediate economic shock of recent times, but it is just the latest in a long line of examples of political failure, such as conflict in the Middle East, climate change, terrorism, and cyber-attacks.

Along with the growth of automation and digitization which provide opportunities at the macro-level but threats at a more micro-level, what most of these issues have in common is that national responses are likely to fail. Restoring trust requires re-energized global governance, and this means compromise and humility – qualities which appear in short supply to many current politicians.

But, regardless of political will, building resilience to tackle ongoing or rapidly forthcoming challenges also rubs up against free market beliefs, because building resilience is a long-term investment and comes at a price. But by acknowledging vulnerabilities, avoiding complacency, implementing lessons from past experiences, and learning from others, policymakers will be better prepared for the next crisis.

Reconstructing societies through the prism of resilience creates fundamentally different outcomes to global challenges, and can build trust between elected representatives and the wider population. Accepting the vulnerability paradox and acknowledging that those generally less prone to disasters are actually less able to cope when change happens creates a powerful argument for this new approach.




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Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ukraine: An Opportunity for Gender-Sensitive Policymaking?

18 August 2020

Kateryna Busol

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Meaningful change is needed in Ukraine’s response to the conflict-related sexual violence, which affects both women and men.

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Ukrainian feminists and human rights activists carry posters at an International Women's Day protest in Kyiv, Ukraine on 8 March 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

The virus of violence

According to the UN (para. 7) and the International Criminal Court (ICC, para. 279), conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is quite prevalent in hostilities-affected eastern Ukraine. Both sexes are subjected to sexualized torture, rape, forced nudity, prolonged detention in unsanitary conditions with members of the other sex and threats of sexual violence towards detainees or their relatives to force confessions. Men are castrated. Women additionally suffer from sexual slavery, enforced and survival prostitution, and other forms of sexual abuse. Women are more exposed to CRSV: in the hostilities-affected area, every third woman has experienced or witnessed CRSV as opposed to every fourth man.

COVID-19 has redirected funding priorities, affecting the availability of medical and psychological help for CRSV survivors worldwide. In Ukraine, the very reporting of such violence, stigmatized even before the pandemic, has been further undermined by the country-wide quarantine-induced restrictions on movement and the closure of checkpoints between the government-controlled and temporarily uncontrolled areas.

Addressing CRSV in Ukraine

The stigma of CRSV, the patchy domestic legislation, and the unpreparedness of the criminal justice system to deal with such cases prevent the authorities from properly helping those harmed in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine armed conflict.

CRSV is equally traumatizing yet different in nuance for men and women. Female victims often choose not to report the violence. Women avoid protracted proceedings likely to cause re-traumatization and the disclosure of their experience, which could be particularly excruciating in small communities where everybody knows everyone.

Men also struggle to provide their accounts of CRSV. Their suppressed pain and shame of genital mutilation and other CRSV result in sexual and other health disfunctions. Combined with the post-conflict mental health struggles, this has been shown to lead to increased domestic violence and even suicide.

The very investigation of CRSV in Ukraine is challenging. Certain tests and examinations need to be done straight after an assault, which in the context of detention and grey zones of hostilities is often impossible. Specialized medical and psychological support is lacking. Investigators and prosecutors are hardly trained to deal with CRSV to the point that they do not ask questions about it during the interviews. Burdened by trauma and stigma, survivors are inclined to report torture or inhuman treatment, but not the sexualized aspects thereof.

Seven years into the conflict, the state still has not criminalized the full spectrum of CRSV in its domestic law. Ukraine’s Criminal Code contains a brief list of the violations of the rules and customs of warfare in article 438. It prohibits the inhuman treatment of civilians and POWs but does not list any types of CRSV.

The article has an open-ended reference to Ukraine’s ratified international treaties, from which the responsibility for other armed conflict violations may be derived. For the more detailed norms on CRSV, Ukraine should refer at least to Geneva Convention IV protecting civilians and two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, to which it is a party.

However, the novelty of the war context for Ukrainian investigators, prosecutors and judges and their overcautiousness about the direct application of international conventions mean that in practice, observing the treaty or jurisprudential instruction on CRSV has been slow.

Use of the Criminal Code’s articles on sexual violence not related to an armed conflict is not viable. Such provisions fail to reflect the horrible variety and complexity of CRSV committed in hostilities. They also envisage lesser punishment than a war crime of sexual violence would entail. Cumulatively, this fails to account for the intention of a perpetrator, the gravity of the crime and the trauma of its victims.

The lack of public debate and state action on CRSV understates its magnitude. Ukraine should break its silence about CRSV in Donbas and make addressing this violence part of its actionable agenda - in law and in implementation.

Ukraine should incorporate all war crimes and crimes against humanity of CRSV in its domestic legislation; ensure a more gendered psychological and medical support for both sexes; establish rehabilitation and compensation programmes for CRSV survivors; create special victims and witness protection schemes; consider the different stigmatizing effects of CRSV on men and women in criminal proceedings and engage the professionals of the same sex as the victim; map CRSV in the bigger picture of other crimes in Donbas to better understand the motives of the perpetrators; submit more information about CRSV to the ICC and educate the public to destigmatize the CRSV survivors.

The drafters of Ukraine’s transitional justice roadmap should ensure that it highlights CRSV, adopts a gendered approach to it and endorses female participation as a crucial component of reconciliation and broader policymaking.

Embracive policymaking

Although ‘the discriminatory line almost inevitably hurts women,’ 'every gender discrimination is a two-edged sword’, Ruth Bader Ginsburg famously argued before the US Supreme Court. This could not be more relevant for Ukraine. The conflict - and lockdown-related violence has reverberated deeper within Ukrainian society, raising fundamental questions about the roles of both sexes and gender equality.

The failure to address CRSV and its different stigmas for both sexes mirrors the general lack of sustainable gender lenses in Ukraine's policymaking. It is no coincidence that a June 2020 proposal for gender parity in political parties coincided with another spike of sexist remarks by top officials. While women get access to more positions in the army, sexual harassment in the military is investigated slowly. Despite all the impressive female professionals, no woman made it to the first four-member consultative civic group in the Minsk process. Such lack of diversity sends an unfortunate message that women are not important for Ukraine’s peace process.

Ginsburg said, ‘women belong in all places where decisions are being made.’ CRSV against either sex won’t be addressed properly until both sexes contribute with their talents and their grievances to all pillars of Ukraine’s state governance and strategy. Ukraine should look to engage professional women - and there are plenty - to join its public service not just in numbers, but as the indispensable equal voices of a powerful choir.




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Lessons from COVID-19: A Catalyst for Improving Sanctions?

26 August 2020

Emanuela-Chiara Gillard

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, efforts by states and humanitarian actors to stop its spread and to treat the sick are being hindered by existing sanctions and counterterrorism measures.

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Syrians walk past a mural painted as part of an awareness campaign by UNICEF and WHO, bearing instructions on protection from COVID-19, in the Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli, Syria, on 16 August 2020. Photo by Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images.

If sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, the EU, or states unilaterally, are not sufficiently targeted, and do not include adequate safeguards for humanitarian action, they can adversely affect the very populations for whose well-being they were imposed in the first place.  This is not a new concern, but one brought starkly to the fore by their impact on responses to COVID-19.

The detrimental impact of sanctions, which can prevent the supply of medical or personal protective equipment (PPE), or the provision of technical support or training to local health authorities is evident. Sanctions can also affect remote learning if support cannot be provided to local education authorities, export licences cannot be obtained for the necessary equipment and software, or if the companies providing reliable internet coverage are designated under the sanctions.

A comparison of US and EU sanctions on Syria reveals key challenges, but also opportunities for improving current arrangements for the imposition and implementation of sanctions so as to minimize adverse consequences in Syria and more generally.

The US has imposed broad sanctions, such as restrictions on the provision of funds, goods or services – even charitable contributions – to the Syrian government, including the health and education ministries, now playing a central role in the COVID-19 response.

UN agencies are exempted from these restrictions. A general license authorizes NGOs to conduct activities to meet basic needs, but it excludes those involving the government. So NGOs wishing to provide medical devices, PPE, training or other support to ministry of health staff have to apply for a specific licence.

But procedures for applying for licences are complicated, and the approval process notoriously slow.  No accommodation has been made to facilitate the COVID-19 response: no interpretative guidance – that would be valuable for all NGOs – has been issued, and no procedures established for reviewing applications more quickly.  There is no statement of policy indicating the circumstances under which specific licences might be granted.

Transactions with designated entities other than the government, such as internet providers whose services are necessary for remote learning, remain prohibited, and regulations expressly preclude applying for specific licences.

US sanctions frequently have a broad scope, both in direct and indirect application.  NGOs registered in the US, and staff who are US nationals, are directly bound by them, and grant agreements between the US government and non-US NGOs require the latter to comply with US sanctions.

This leaves the non-US NGOs in a Catch-22 situation – as they are not ‘US persons’ they cannot apply for specific licenses, but if they operate without such licences they may be violating grant requirements. This lack of clarity contributes to banks’ unwillingness to provide services, and may lead NGOs to curtail their activities.  This situation is regrettable in Syria, where the US is the first donor to humanitarian action, and also arises in other contexts where the US has imposed similar sanctions.

The EU’s sanctions for Syria are far more targeted. Of relevance to the COVID-19 response, they do not include prohibitions on the provision of support to the government that could impede assistance in the medical field.  There are, however, restrictions on the provision of certain types of PPE or substances used for disinfection, and also on transactions with designated telecommunications providers that affect continuity of education during lockdowns.  Although not prohibited, these activities must be authorized by member states’ competent authorities. Similar concerns arise about the complexity and delays of the processes.

The EU sanctions framework is complex, so the recent European Commission Guidance Note on Syria providing official clarification of how it applies to humanitarian action is welcome.  Although the note only explains the existing rules rather than amending them to facilitate the COVID-19 response, it does include a number of important elements relevant not just to Syria, but to the interplay between sanctions and humanitarian action more broadly.

First, it notes that ‘in accordance with International Humanitarian Law where no other option is available, the provision of humanitarian aid should not be prevented by EU restrictive measures’.  This recognizes that humanitarian assistance takes priority over any inconsistent restrictions in sanctions, and it also applies both to UN sanctions and unilateral measures. It is a starting premise that is frequently overlooked in discussions of whether sanctions should include exceptions for humanitarian action.  Its reaffirmation is timely, and it must guide states in drawing up future sanctions.

Second, the note states that sanctions do not require the screening of final beneficiaries of humanitarian programmes.  This means that once someone has been identified as an individual in need on the basis of humanitarian principles, no further screening is required.  This is extremely important to COVID-19 responses as it reflects a foundational principle of IHL that, to the fullest extent practicable, everyone is entitled to the medical care required by their condition without distinction.

Third, while responsibility for the implementation of sanctions, including the granting of authorizations, lies with member states, the note nudges them to adopt a number of measures to expedite and streamline such processes.  These include the suggestion that states could issue a single authorization for the provision of humanitarian aid in response to the pandemic.

The European Commission is to be commended for this initiative, which should be replicated for other contexts where the COVID-19 response may be undermined by sanctions.  These include Gaza, where it would be important to highlight that the designation of Hamas under EU counterterrorism sanctions must not prevent the provision of assistance to relevant ministries.

Failing to draw a distinction between the designated political party and the structures of civil administration risks turning targeted financial sanctions into measures akin to comprehensive sanctions.

The pandemic should serve as a catalyst for improving the system for the adoption and implementation of sanctions by the UN, the EU and individual states, including the UK as it elaborates its sanctions policy post-Brexit. The principles are clear: without prejudicing the aims for which sanctions have been imposed, humanitarian needs must always be prioritized, and met.




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Novichok Poisons Germany's Relations with Russia

14 September 2020

John Lough

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The conclusion of a specialist German military laboratory that Alexey Navalny was poisoned with the nerve agent novichok has shocked Germany’s political class and is forcing the government to re-assess relations with Russia.

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A worker at the construction site of a section of the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline near Kingisepp, Leningrad Region. Photo by Alexander DemianchukTASS via Getty Images.

When Chancellor Angela Merkel offered to provide medical care for Navalny in Germany after he fell ill from suspected poisoning in Russia, she could have hardly expected her humanitarian gesture would trigger a crisis in her country’s relations with Russia.

Merkel has used uncharacteristically blunt words to condemn the apparent attempt on Navalny’s life, saying the use of novichok raises serious questions that only the Russian government could answer. She described Navalny as being the ‘victim of a crime’ which was a violation of the ‘basic values and basic rights’ that Germany and its allies were committed to. Her tone and body language certainly showed how strongly she felt about the issue.

Germany’s Social Democrat foreign minister Heiko Maas then followed up by suggesting Russia’s response might force Germany to change its position on the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline which aims to double Germany’s direct gas imports from Russia under the Baltic Sea.

This is a dramatic change of position since his party has been a staunch supporter of the controversial project. Two Christian Democrat candidates for the Chancellorship called for a stop to the pipeline together with representatives from the Greens, who could be part of a government coalition after the 2021 federal election.

Claims of hostile provocation

The Russian foreign ministry shot back with a statement condemning Berlin’s ‘unsubstantiated accusations and ultimatums’ and claiming Germany was using Navalny’s hospitalisation to discredit Russia internationally. It demanded Germany share data and test results with the Russian Prosecutor’s Office, saying any failure to comply would be ‘a crude hostile provocation against Russia’ that risked consequences for the bilateral relationship as well as ‘serious complications in the international situation’.

Such strong language from Moscow towards Germany has not been seen for over 30 years, and is all the more remarkable as Putin has personally invested heavily in the relationship with Germany in view of its economic and political importance, and its strong desire for constructive ties with Russia. Until 2014, Russian analysts viewed Germany as Russia’s ‘lobbyist’ in Europe.

Berlin is now trying to downplay the situation, claiming the Navalny poisoning is not actually a Germany-Russia matter and referring it to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. By consulting with its EU and NATO allies, Berlin is further internationalising the issue to reduce impact on the bilateral relationship.

Such a forceful reaction to the poisoning reflects Germany’s increasing frustration with the Kremlin. The murder in broad daylight in Berlin in August 2019 of a Chechen wanted by the Russian authorities has been traced to the FSB. And the publication of a report in May 2020 into the hacking of the German parliament in 2015, including Merkel’s parliamentary office, was a further reminder of how far Russia had deviated from the course of partnership that Berlin believed the two countries had established in the 1990s.

Merkel described the cyberattack as ‘monstrous’, saying it was part of a strategy of hybrid warfare that includes ‘disorientation’ and ‘manipulation of facts’. Further tension has been added since the recent Belarus election as Moscow is supporting Lukashenka’s presidency whereas the EU does not recognise him as the legitimate president.

This accumulation of events is forcing German policymakers to recognise the Russian leadership is a menace to its own citizens, its neighbours and to Germany itself. Although Berlin abandoned several of its illusions about partnership with Russia in 2014 when it led the EU response to Russia’s annexation of Ukraine and destabilization of south-eastern Ukraine, it still hoped that the Kremlin would see reason and adjust its policies.

It combined sectoral economic sanctions with continuing dialogue and a joint effort to help settle the conflict in Donbas despite the obvious fact that Russia was a party to the conflict. It still believed that Moscow had an interest in finding a compromise. Instead, experience so far suggests Russia has a greater interest in keeping the conflict ‘semi-frozen’ as a way of forcing Ukraine to compromise.

Controversially, Germany also saw the need to expand energy relations with Russia in a bid to stabilise ties and draw Russia closer to Europe. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline initiated in September 2015 by Gazprom and five European companies – two of them German – is a monument to this policy.

Even though this project lacked an overall economic rationale, the German government supported it – much to the consternation of the Baltic States, Poland and others who objected to what they saw as Berlin’s insistence on a ‘Russia-first’ policy that undercut the interests of Ukraine. This was because the pipeline’s purpose is to re-route gas flows away from Ukraine, depriving it of transit revenues and a lever of influence in its relations with Moscow.

It now appears the German government is finally waking up to the fact that its attempts to encourage better Russian behaviour have failed. Policy looks set to become tougher and a moratorium on Nord Stream 2 now appears a real possibility if Russia fails to investigate the Navalny poisoning and provide adequate answers.

However, sanctioning the new pipeline is likely to provoke counter-measures against German business interests in Russia. If Berlin is determined to pursue this tougher line, it could end up facing an uncomfortable dilemma and being forced to consider alternative ways to signal displeasure at Russia’s criminal actions.




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Kuwait: Brighter Future Beckons for Domestic Violence Sufferers

16 September 2020

Dr Alanoud Alsharekh

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
The passing of a new family protection law is a major step forward for a country which has long suffered from high levels of hidden domestic abuse. But much work remains to be done in ensuring the principles it enshrines are translated to practical action and support for victims.

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Safa Al Hashem MP holds a red rose to mark Valentine's Day at the National Assembly in Kuwait City on February 14, 2017, the year a domestic violence bill was first introduced. Photo by YASSER AL-ZAYYAT/AFP via Getty Images.

Domestic violence has always been a complex issue in Kuwaiti culture, often tied to norms and beliefs relating to family structures and concepts of guardianship, honour and discipline. As with other forms of abuse within the family, it is also considered a private matter and therefore not addressed publicly.

Despite a lack of up to date figures, the problem is widespread, affecting 53.1% of women in Kuwait according to a 2018 study. But Kuwait’s last submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) showed only 447 domestic violence cases had been through the court system in 2016, and only 76 of those resulted in a conviction. Given the known difficulties of reporting abuse and getting a case to court, it is not a stretch to conclude the actual figures of abused women is much higher than this figure given by the Ministry of Justice.

In one recently reported case, a pregnant woman was shot in the head and killed by one of her brothers while she was recovering in the in the intensive care unit of Mubarak Hospital from being shot by her other brother the day before. The reason for such a horrific double attack was she had married without her sibling's consent, even though her father had accepted the match.

Worryingly, activists and experts claim domestic violence has been rising in Kuwait during COVID-19, in keeping with global trends during lockdowns, and aggravated by the lack of legal resources and shelters for survivors. Highlighting this unfortunate situation, along with worldwide interest in the issue of domestic violence within the current epidemic, did lead to renewed media interest in the issue in Kuwait, and brought the lack of resources available to abuse survivors into the public eye.

And it is this renewed attention – alongside the fact Kuwait is about to enter an election cycle in November – that may well have driven recent governmental and parliamentary moves on the long-awaited family protection law, which recently passed in Kuwait’s national assembly with 38 votes for, one MP abstaining, and another voting against.

But 17 MPs were conspicuously absent from the room, including the Women and Family Committee rapporteur Alhumaidi Alsubaei, known for his human rights activism. This signals how complex the social and political issues associated with domestic violence as, although the official version of the law is yet to be made public, the submitted bill contained 26 articles.

The articles call for the formation of a National Family Protection Committee to draw up plans countering the spread of domestic violence in Kuwait, as well as the review and amendment of existing national laws which may be perpetuating the violence. Other provisions cover mandatory training programs for all government sectors involved in family protection, awareness programmes on detection, reporting and survivor advocacy, and issuing an annual report about domestic violence statistics.

Article 5 specifically calls for activating a domestic violence shelter and offering rehabilitation and advisory services, while Article 13 tackles the punishment of those who try and coerce survivors not to report abuse. These two articles are especially important because, although the Fanar Advisory Service and Domestic Abuse Shelter was formally opened in 2017, it has never actually been functional due to the delay of legislation needed to make it operational. Described as a ’stillborn dream’, the unused building is surrounded by sewage water.

The new family protection law also gives important provision for cooperation with civil society organizations, such as Eithar, Abolish 153, and Soroptomists Kuwait working on this issue. Although Kuwait already has several official bodies meant to be dealing with ending violence against women, in reality it has been these groups effectively dealing with the plight of abuse survivors. With no functional shelters, dedicated hotlines or specialized resources to assist victims, Eithar and Soroptimists Kuwait provide resources and support, while Abolish 153 focuses on filling the hitherto legal vacuum.

The path to getting this law put to a vote has been a long and winding one. Back in 2017, Saleh Ashoor MP submitted the first version of the domestic violence bill when he was heading up the Women and Family Affairs Committee. At that time, the bill was signed by just four other MPs - Safa Al Hashem, Ahmad Al Fadhel, Khalil Al Saleh and Faisal Al Kanderi. But it was the starting point and, several iterations later, it is essentially a version of that proposal which has been voted into law.

Much of the delay over the past three years, both with the legislation and activation of the shelter, has been due to the fact there were many bodies involved, such as the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Social and Labor Affairs, and civil society representatives, all of whom at times had different agendas. But alongside the amendment to the press and publication law which also passed that same historic day in parliament, the family protection law is undoubtedly a major win for all those liberal civil society activists who have lobbied long and hard to change these dangerous and restrictive legislations in Kuwait.




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Inhibition of mitochondrial oxidative metabolism attenuates EMCV replication and protects {beta}-cells from virally mediated lysis [Immunology]

Viral infection is one environmental factor that may contribute to the initiation of pancreatic β-cell destruction during the development of autoimmune diabetes. Picornaviruses, such as encephalomyocarditis virus (EMCV), induce a pro-inflammatory response in islets leading to local production of cytokines, such as IL-1, by resident islet leukocytes. Furthermore, IL-1 is known to stimulate β-cell expression of iNOS and production of the free radical nitric oxide. The purpose of this study was to determine whether nitric oxide contributes to the β-cell response to viral infection. We show that nitric oxide protects β-cells against virally mediated lysis by limiting EMCV replication. This protection requires low micromolar, or iNOS-derived, levels of nitric oxide. At these concentrations nitric oxide inhibits the Krebs enzyme aconitase and complex IV of the electron transport chain. Like nitric oxide, pharmacological inhibition of mitochondrial oxidative metabolism attenuates EMCV-mediated β-cell lysis by inhibiting viral replication. These findings provide novel evidence that cytokine signaling in β-cells functions to limit viral replication and subsequent β-cell lysis by attenuating mitochondrial oxidative metabolism in a nitric oxide–dependent manner.




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The bacterial cell division protein fragment EFtsN binds to and activates the major peptidoglycan synthase PBP1b [Metabolism]

Peptidoglycan (PG) is an essential constituent of the bacterial cell wall. During cell division, the machinery responsible for PG synthesis localizes mid-cell, at the septum, under the control of a multiprotein complex called the divisome. In Escherichia coli, septal PG synthesis and cell constriction rely on the accumulation of FtsN at the division site. Interestingly, a short sequence of FtsN (Leu75–Gln93, known as EFtsN) was shown to be essential and sufficient for its functioning in vivo, but what exactly this sequence is doing remained unknown. Here, we show that EFtsN binds specifically to the major PG synthase PBP1b and is sufficient to stimulate its biosynthetic glycosyltransferase (GTase) activity. We also report the crystal structure of PBP1b in complex with EFtsN, which demonstrates that EFtsN binds at the junction between the GTase and UB2H domains of PBP1b. Interestingly, mutations to two residues (R141A/R397A) within the EFtsN-binding pocket reduced the activation of PBP1b by FtsN but not by the lipoprotein LpoB. This mutant was unable to rescue the ΔponB-ponAts strain, which lacks PBP1b and has a thermosensitive PBP1a, at nonpermissive temperature and induced a mild cell-chaining phenotype and cell lysis. Altogether, the results show that EFtsN interacts with PBP1b and that this interaction plays a role in the activation of its GTase activity by FtsN, which may contribute to the overall septal PG synthesis and regulation during cell division.




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Coronavirus infection and PARP expression dysregulate the NAD metabolome: An actionable component of innate immunity [Molecular Bases of Disease]

Poly(ADP-ribose) polymerase (PARP) superfamily members covalently link either a single ADP-ribose (ADPR) or a chain of ADPR units to proteins using NAD as the source of ADPR. Although the well-known poly(ADP-ribosylating) (PARylating) PARPs primarily function in the DNA damage response, many noncanonical mono(ADP-ribosylating) (MARylating) PARPs are associated with cellular antiviral responses. We recently demonstrated robust up-regulation of several PARPs following infection with murine hepatitis virus (MHV), a model coronavirus. Here we show that SARS-CoV-2 infection strikingly up-regulates MARylating PARPs and induces the expression of genes encoding enzymes for salvage NAD synthesis from nicotinamide (NAM) and nicotinamide riboside (NR), while down-regulating other NAD biosynthetic pathways. We show that overexpression of PARP10 is sufficient to depress cellular NAD and that the activities of the transcriptionally induced enzymes PARP7, PARP10, PARP12 and PARP14 are limited by cellular NAD and can be enhanced by pharmacological activation of NAD synthesis. We further demonstrate that infection with MHV induces a severe attack on host cell NAD+ and NADP+. Finally, we show that NAMPT activation, NAM, and NR dramatically decrease the replication of an MHV that is sensitive to PARP activity. These data suggest that the antiviral activities of noncanonical PARP isozyme activities are limited by the availability of NAD and that nutritional and pharmacological interventions to enhance NAD levels may boost innate immunity to coronaviruses.




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COP27: Navigating a difficult road to Sharm El-Sheikh

COP27: Navigating a difficult road to Sharm El-Sheikh Expert comment NCapeling 6 July 2022

Against a backdrop of rising urgency, COP27 in Egypt will bring all aspects of climate action into the spotlight – but especially the role of the host country.

As COP26 drew to a close in Glasgow, Egyptian officials announced their priorities for COP27, emphasizing climate finance and climate adaptation – a new approach given previous COPs mainly focused on mitigation, reducing emissions to limit climate damage.

This was followed by the COP27 presidency outlining its vision at MENA Climate Week 2022 to achieve ‘substantive and equal progress’ on all aspects of the negotiations, and Egypt emphasizing its intention to focus on implementing existing carbon reduction targets rather than pushing for further carbon cuts.

Egypt argues it is hosting COP27 on behalf of African nations and that, while it is promoting the interests of the developing world, it will be an impartial arbiter. However it is also useful to consider its priorities from the Egyptian government’s perspective.

Agenda drivers

Egypt has long prioritized climate finance and adaptation because it remains in need of technical and financial support to adapt, especially in agriculture and tourism.

It plans to expand its access to climate funding and investment, an area in which Egypt has been relatively successful as it currently receives 27 per cent of all multilateral climate finance in the MENA region and has issued the region’s first sovereign green bonds.

With public debt currently 94 per cent of GDP, Egyptian officials have also called for debt relief for Egypt and other developing countries.

Egypt’s Climate Change Strategy reflects this approach, aiming to enhance Egypt’s rank on the Climate Change Performance Index in order to ‘attract more investments and acquire more climate funding’.

Not pushing for more emission reductions at this critical moment risks derailing global decarbonization momentum and undermining global climate action

Limiting the mitigation scope and the focus on finance also echoes Egypt’s own reluctance to make carbon reduction commitments. The Egyptian nationally determined contribution (NDC) – its 2030 pledge under the Paris Agreement – does not include any quantifiable emission reduction targets.

Egypt is one of only a few countries which failed to submit an updated NDC in 2021 and its upcoming update will not include an economy-wide carbon reduction target.

Egypt has also never published a long-term strategy and has no decarbonization plans despite independent estimates it should cut rising emissions by one-quarter by 2030, and by two-thirds by 2050 to be aligned with the Paris Agreement. This partly explains why observers rate Egypt’s climate action as highly insufficient.

Furthermore, Egypt’s championing of ‘moving from pledges to implementation’ without having quantifiable carbon reduction pledges of its own effectively exempts it from both pledging and implementation.

As a developing country, Egypt’s negotiating position is supported by UNFCCC provisions which recognize differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of nations.

Its proposal to focus COP27 on the implementation of climate action and finance pledges is important in consolidating progress. But not pushing for more emission reductions at this critical moment risks derailing global decarbonization momentum and undermining global climate action.

According to optimistic estimates, if current climate pledges were implemented the world would still remain on track for 2°C of warming by the end of the century, with far worse impacts than if warming was curbed at 1.5°C.

Under a 2°C scenario, 37 per cent of the global population could regularly be exposed to extreme heat waves compared to 14 per cent in a 1.5°C warmer world, with developing countries expected to be worst-affected.

A 2°C trajectory also runs the risk of tipping points such as the melting of ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland, triggering runaway climate change. Time to change the warming trajectory is running out as the latest IPCC assessment warns the window of opportunity is now ‘brief and rapidly closing’, and the UN Secretary General recently called for faster carbon cuts by the end of 2022 to avoid a ‘climate catastrophe’.

A different energy transition

Egypt opted not to join any of the voluntary sectoral coalitions at COP26 on reducing methane, clean energy transition, transition to zero-emissions vehicles, or moving beyond oil and gas.

This position is explained by its growing role as an exporter and advocate for fossil gas in the energy transition. Egypt is the second-largest producer of natural gas in Africa and is emerging as a fossil gas hub for the eastern Mediterranean, which is shaping its domestic energy policy.

Egypt is open to dialogue – not just on refining the COP27 agenda but also on reviewing its own climate priorities and leveraging its energy sector for a more ambitious transition

Its 59GW electricity generation capacity is almost double the peak demand and is dominated by gas-powered electricity generation, which currently represents 42 per cent of all Africa’s gas generation.

Egypt’s climate policy is also shaped by fossil gas, and its national Climate Change Strategy encourages the expansion of gas use by promoting a transition to compressed natural gas for vehicles, the expansion of its domestic natural gas network – despite having universal access to electricity – and shifting to a gas-fuelled shipping sector.

Egypt also voiced support for other African countries to extract and deploy fossil gas and oil resources, making it one of the protagonists of the ‘great fossil gas pushback’. These advocates defend the right of developing countries to deploy fossil gas as a ‘transition fuel’ and champion its necessity to solve energy poverty.

But their position is not shared by all African and developing countries, and is rejected by some civil society groups, who argue it risks locking in greenhouse gases and local emissions for decades as well as delaying future development of low carbon energy systems.

Egypt’s huge spare generation capacity has contributed to a slowdown in renewable energy projects over the past two years. With renewables representing just 6GW, Egypt is expected to miss its renewable energy target for 2022, set at 20 per cent of generating capacity.

Engaging Egypt better

But these positions are more malleable than they seem, and Egypt is open to dialogue – not just on refining the COP27 agenda but also on reviewing its own climate priorities and leveraging its energy sector for a more ambitious transition.




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Review: Decolonization and its discontents

Review: Decolonization and its discontents The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Jenna Marshall on a lively if flawed argument to find a way forward in a debate that has descended ‘into acrimony’.

Against Decolonization: Taking African Agency Seriously
Olufemi Taiwo, Hurst, £14.99

Decolonization was once heralded as a moment of potential and possibility for the formerly imperial world to chart a new way forward no longer tied to the apparatus of empire.

It marked a period of transition to nation states – and an expansion of a rights-based international community that would dispense with the morally bankrupt regime of racism, dispossession and subjugation that characterized colonialism.  
 

The descent of the decolonization debate

Half a century later, the debate surrounding decolonization has descended into acrimony. Some factions cast the issue of decolonization as a sustained attack on British and western culture writ large; other disparate voices coalesce around related social justice issues such as inequality, climate change and education. 

Decolonization has become ubiquitous in the public domain – and its ubiquity is the problem


Decolonization has become ubiquitous in the public domain – and its ubiquity is the problem. In Against Decolonization, Olufemi Taiwo renounces a concept he conceives as having been emptied of serious study and analytical purchase; one incapable of addressing the complexities of modern global politics and more importantly, Africa’s place in it. 

Although the book attacks the inexhaustible ways in which the ‘trope of decolonization’ has been deployed, Taiwo is less bothered by the purported failures of scholars he deems ‘decolonizers’ and focuses his attention instead on the political landscape of African countries, past and present. 

Central to the book’s argument are two distinct scholarly strands on decolonization. The first, legal focus, centres on the political and economic forces of state-building. The second essays an ‘ideology’ of decolonization that rests on ‘forcing an ex-colony to forswear on pain of being forever under the yoke of colonization any and every cultural, political, intellectual, social and linguistic artefact, idea, process, institution and practice that retains even the slightest whiff of the colonial past’. 

Whether one should characterize the latter as simply a field of study or a potential set of policy arrangements remains unclear – yet what is certain is that it is too nebulous, too elastic, too open-ended to offer any substantive model or mechanism to understand postcolonial Africa. 
 

Correcting Eurocentric narcissism

 The decolonization research agenda in Africa came to prominence during the Cold War period of national liberation struggles.

The intellectual project that followed centred on dismantling Eurocentrism as colonial subjugation through its promotion of the West as the crucible of legitimate and scientific knowledge. Since then, scholars have argued that decolonization itself has become compromised by its enduringly Eurocentric gaze at the expense of the agency of African thinkers, creatives and statesmen and women. 

Taiwo seeks to correct this narcissism – and the omissions left in its wake – by introducing lesser-known Africans and pan-African scholars and cultural figures. These voices, he hopes, will illuminate issues often ignored by ‘decolonizers’ and spark a ‘renewed interest in an appreciation of the many different ways in which African thinkers have responded to the colonial experience’.
 

The decolonization of language

Taiwo challenges the decolonization of language as an oversold promise.

Romanticizing an imagined, pristine African pre-colonial past, he says, ultimately leads to nativism and atavism. As a case in point, Taiwo highlights bureaucratic instances of ‘language policy planning’ to deploy African languages in places such as Niger, Mali, Cameroon, Senegal and Nigeria that were hindered by multilingualism, education and high rates of illiteracy.

The abstract language of decolonization allows western scholars to engage with the concept without considering their own complicity in upholding systems of exclusion

The author goes on to confront the abstract language of decolonization, which, he says, allows western scholars to unproblematically engage with the concept without any serious consideration of their own complicity in upholding systems of exclusion. It entrenches their own institutional power within the academy, amplifies their perspectives at the expense of others, and limits the possibilities for understanding the problems of world politics with deleterious effects on policy.

It is a serious claim, but there are issues to be addressed: Taiwo assumes there is coherence among scholars of decolonization, which is not the case. 

When Taiwo approaches how to foster political systems that cater to the needs of their citizens he dismantles the binary of ‘West as modern’ v ‘Africa as traditional’. Chieftaincies as traditional African governance, he points out, were the product of colonial anthropology, not Africans themselves. From the Fanti Confederation of 1871 to the Egba United Government in what is now Nigeria, Taiwo demonstrates that there has been a sustained tradition towards demands for democratic values. 

As he concedes an intellectual neglect of African philosophers that underlies the design and operations of Africa’s political institutions, Taiwo’s initial dismissal of the significance of cultural decolonization deserves another look. How should political and economic drives toward self-determination be advanced in the absence of knowledge shaped and mediated through African lived experiences?

In this respect, the tale of two decolonizations – the legal alongside the ideological – suggest an unhelpful, if not false, binary.
 

The problem of reconciling modernity and colonialism

What resonates throughout the book is the idea that Europe cannot profess to hold an exclusive intellectual claim to modernity. Its universal aspirations are open to all of humanity, allowing those who have historically been marginalized to be worldmakers. 

The idea that modernity and colonialism are irreconcilable is problematic. For instance, Taiwo argues that the curtailment of capitalism in Africa by restricting the growth of the middle classes while limiting competition between African capitalists and the metropole is the consequence of colonialism.

Capitalism not only requires inequality for it to function but that race – as a mechanism for producing ‘difference’ – enshrines it

Yet the celebrated cultural anthropologist Sidney Mintz established an understanding that the matter for debate is not whether non-westerners were part of the modern system, but how and to what degree they were included and able to actualise its ideals. 

The emerging capitalist world economy needed non-western lands and labour, and so they were conscripted to this end. Recent abolitionist and black radical scholarship has built on this argument to maintain that capitalism not only requires inequality for it to function but that race – as a mechanism for producing ‘difference’ – enshrines it.

Acknowledging the unacknowledged

In the end, Taiwo communicates a palpable frustration at the state of academic discourses on contemporary Africa under the guise of emancipatory and radical scholarship. He offers an alternative approach whereby African students might rid themselves of a faddism that is ‘at best unsatisfactory’ and at worst produces ‘confusion, obscurantism, if not outright distortion and falsification’.

Yet out of this irritation, Taiwo’s greatest contribution in Against Decolonization might be to urge an acknowledgement of how and to what degree decolonization has become subdued and its political possibilities curtailed. He ultimately urges us to reconsider the purpose of the decolonization academic movement as an ethics to abide by rather than a social theory of the postcolonial world. 

This requires those ‘decolonizers’ on whose careers the term is built to adopt greater intellectual humility – to resist the posture of the anarchist radical scholar armed for the ‘good fight’. Instead, they should apply a scholarly curiosity to genuinely engage with those already on the battlefield, so to speak; those ‘doing the work’ in practice, but who have been unacknowledged until now.




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Review: the rise of Africa’s superwomen

Review: the rise of Africa’s superwomen The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

From foster care in England to colonialism’s legacy in Zimbabwe, this set of essays on race, feminism and identity is searingly honest, says Masiyaleti Mbewe.

Black and Female
Tsitsi Dangarembga, Faber, £9.99

The 1988 novel Nervous Conditions by the Zimbabwean author Tsitsi Dangarembga is considered one of Africa’s finest literary exports. It won the Commonwealth Writers’ Prize and alongside The Book of Not (2006) and This Mournable Body (2018), shortlisted for the 2020 Booker Prize, forms a trilogy of semi-autobiographical novels that grapple with the gendered colonial oppression of young black girls and women from Southern Rhodesia through to Zimbabwe. 

In Black and Female, Dangarembga continues the interrogation of these intersections in an unflinchingly honest and personal, if occasionally dense, collection of essays. Along the way, she examines the sheer magnitude of colonialism’s effects on African people, and how they ripple through her early childhood in England and her formative years as a writer, filmmaker and feminist activist in post-independence Zimbabwe.

‘Writing While Black and Female’

In 1961 Dangarembga’s parents relocated from Southern Rhodesia to the UK. While they worked and studied in London, they put their two-year-old daughter, her older brother and, later, her younger sister into private foster care in Dover, Kent (as many Africans did – a fact that was new to me). The first essay, ‘Writing While Black and Female’, takes a painful look at the four years she spent with her foster parents, Mummy-Gran and Daddy Henry. 

Blackness, she learned in those years, was a consequence of her non-whiteness. So Dangarembga writes of the momentary elation she felt when a stranger addressed her as a ‘lovely little piccaninny’, giving her ‘a category I could wield against the void of no longer being’. To cope with this sort of racialization and her abandonment, the young Dangarembga turned to disassociation and self-harm. 

Blackness is a condition imposed on me, rather than being an experienced identity

Tsitsi Dangarembga

As she writes: ‘Blackness is a condition imposed on me, rather than being an experienced identity.’ Instead of ‘black’ people, therefore, Dangarembga prefers the term ‘highly melanated people’. It is a resonant phrase, highlighting the inherently ridiculous nature of racism.

Dangarembga’s ‘Africanness’ shifts into focus upon her return to Rhodesia in 1965. At first, other children refused to play with her and her siblings, calling them ‘varungu’ (white people). As she describes it: ‘The dance of my identities … became frenetic’. 

In ‘Black, Female and the Superwoman Black Feminist’, the second essay, Dangarembga is adamant about the urgent necessity of a black feminist practice that is centred on action to provide real, material change. Along the way, she makes a distinction – a slightly uneasy one to my mind – between the patriarchy that western colonization imposed, based on private ownership, and the patriarchy of pre-colonial African society with its foundations in kinship that devolved power to an extent.

Dangarembga’s discussion of a more accommodating, pre-colonial patriarchy is nuanced, but it jars a little


‘Hence women could and did become rulers and warriors, and royal spirit mediums called mhondoro,’ Dangarembga writes approvingly. She is making a nuanced point; but the idea of a more accommodating sort of patriarchy jars a little nonetheless.

While independence may have arrived for Zimbabwe more than 40 years ago, Dangarembga argues strongly that the subjugation of women and feminists at the hands of the ruling Zanu-PF government continues as an extension of colonial rule. Indeed, beyond Zimbabwe, black feminists remain ‘a small, often embattled group’ across Africa, believes Dangarembga. 

Pointedly, she criticizes global feminism’s greater focus on optics than on practical activism

 

As a young black feminist who is part of this ‘small, embattled group’, I should say we have been able to foster large communities digitally and otherwise to work around the hostility we are often faced with. Despite internet shutdowns and restrictions, we resist – an act Dangarembga encourages.  

Resistance, she says, starts with establishing community despite these difficulties. At the nucleus of Dangarembga’s argument is the ‘superwoman’ of the essay’s title, the African woman who doesn’t require external factors to be inspired to action but who continuously draws on what Dangarembga calls ‘internal agency’ that derives from ‘an unrelenting fight for survival and dignity’.

Pointedly, she criticizes global feminism’s greater focus on optics than activism in the practical sense. One only has to observe the performative allyship and ‘Instagram activism’ rampant on the internet today to see her point.
 

The complexities of decolonization

In the final essay, ‘Decolonization as Revolutionary Imagining’, Dangarembga turns her gaze upon the ‘highly stratified’ European societies that outsourced their violent inequality to their empires and ‘the work of decolonization’. However, decolonial discourse is complex, and it is here that the writing occasionally gets bogged down. Fewer recommendations with more elaboration perhaps would have helped.

She herself acknowledges the difficulties of decolonization. Centuries of the Enlightenment and its logic of ‘racism, slavery, genocide and colonization’ are hard to uproot ‘whatever one’s melanin concentration’, she writes.

Nevertheless, Dangarembga concludes with the radical determination to dismantle that is evident throughout this searing yet hopeful collection: ‘The trajectory of current and future generations depends on that uprooting.’




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A new vision for African agency in sustainable development

A new vision for African agency in sustainable development Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2022

Change is necessary not only in global economic structures and attitudes – but in African governance too.

The conventional notion that Africa is mostly a consumer of norms and practices designed by the Global North has been repeatedly challenged and is increasingly being debunked. Increased African agency in international affairs is today a well-established and documented reality. But Africa’s influence still does not match the scale of the challenges that it faces on its pathway to sustainable development. 

Pushing for African agency in sustainable development also warrants a critical assessment of how ‘sustainable development’ should be defined, and how it can be achieved in terms of actual poverty reduction and real improvement in the lives of local poor Africans. Sustainable development has been a political catchphrase for over 30 years – but a genuine transition towards sustainability has yet to begin.

African agency today

Historically, there have been structural limitations on the agency of African stakeholders to shape development pathways. Chief among them, donor-recipient power dynamics have persistently promoted dependency and sustained institutional corruption. Many African countries are also challenged by economic incentives and infrastructure that have favoured the market demands and supply chains of former colonial powers, which largely remain reliant on natural resource extraction, and are marked by limited investment in value-addition activities and technology development.

Donor-recipient power dynamics have persistently promoted dependency and sustained institutional corruption.

Today, however, African agency is being exerted in a more assertive fashion. The African Union (AU), individual African states, civil society, the private sector and eminent and ordinary persons are all displaying Africa’s agency in steering global sustainable development priorities, namely by proposing their own development agenda, The African Union Agenda 2063, adopted in 2013. This was followed by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030), which in many ways mirror Agenda 2063 – a clear demonstration of the influence of Africa in the global arena. 

Agenda 2063 is a strategic roadmap for Africa ‘to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its own citizens and development goals representing a dynamic force in the international arena’. Prepared following a broad-based participatory consultation, it advocates for inclusion and empowerment and provides an excellent vision for African countries and African people. The SDGs address several of the key shortcomings of their predecessor – the MDGs – and incorporate a broader and more transformative agenda that more adequately reflects the complex challenges of the 21st century and the need for structural reforms in the global economy and governance norms.

In international forums on sustainable development, African countries are increasingly using their collective voice to change the discourse on how development can and should be done. For instance, by championing innovative solutions for carbon markets, African policy leaders are enabling access to climate finance for development while preserving Africa’s natural wealth.

In the post-COVID era, championing investments in and leadership of Africa’s global health architecture demonstrates a desire that in the next pandemic, Africa CDC, AMA and continental manufacturers will play leading roles in determining Africa’s public health strategy and implementation.

In trade, building on the groundwork led by the regional economic commissions, the AfCFTA will catalyse and scale regional integration, trade and cooperation, leading to promising new modes of supply chain and self-sufficiency.

Encouraging signs, but persistent shortcomings

Encouraging signs that African agency is gaining momentum cannot disguise the fact that Africa has yet to move from rhetoric to implementation in the realm of sustainable development. Continental visions often fail to go beyond declarations of intent, and have only limited influence on governance systems or national structural transformation, and African states remain vulnerable to economic shocks emanating from the global system.

African agency should not be only seen as emanating from government, but also as being exerted by independent civil society organizations and committed ordinary individuals.

Change will require governance systems that are coordinated, transparent, efficient, and inclusive, as well as tools, processes, and means (material, technical, and human) for successful implementation. There is an urgent need for a new governance paradigm in Africa and internationally, dealing with long-term social change.

Notably, African agency should not be only seen as emanating from government, but also as being exerted by independent civil society organizations and committed ordinary individuals. Effective agency needs to be multi-faceted and multi-actor, and depends on the inclusiveness of African governments and their willingness to work with civil society in their strategic engagements with external partners.

Both Agenda 2063 and the SDGs hold the potential for transformation, but implementation will depend on continued advocacy to hold authorities to account and change the dominant discourse, logic and rules of engagement at global, regional, national, and local levels. There is a need for a dynamic new model of African ‘development’.

Time for a new vision

Africa’s economic landscape is changing rapidly, with new regional and local value chains, and integrated regional economic corridors to link countries, minimize the burden of high-cost production and logistics, and boost real incomes and international competitiveness. But Africa continues to face structural challenges, including the need for large investment projects – at a time when Africa remains a net exporter of capital.

Donors and development partners must reflect upon their prior modes of engagement and commit to genuine and equitable relationships with African states. Such partnerships must reflect mutual respect of ideas and accountability, and commit to making space in international forums and multi-lateral arrangements for African people and countries to realize their own visions for progress.

More resources should be channelled to actors engaging closest to communities and people, who can better understand and communicate local needs.

But African leaders and actors must also recognize that with the advent of resources and agency comes responsibility for results and outcomes, notably the need to improve governance. Gaps in accountability, widespread corruption, and lack of successful implementation and sustainability of projects must be addressed.




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Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism

Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism 23 November 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 November 2022 Online

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025.

The eighth edition of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held in Tunisia from 27–28 August 2022, marked the second time that Japan’s now-triennial summit was hosted in an African country, after TICAD 6 was held in Kenya in 2016.

The summit was attended by 48 representatives of African countries and at least 20 heads of state and government and included a pledge by the Japanese government to commit $30 billion in public and private finance to Africa over the next three years.

In reaffirming the three pillars of TICAD 8 – revolving around the economy, societal resilience, and peace and stability – the newly adopted Tunis Declaration (28 August 2022) also outlined some of the key projects underpinning Japan’s pledge, including a $4 billion fund for a Green Growth Initiative with Africa (GGA).

2023 will mark 30 years since the inception of TICAD in 1993 and ten years since the African Union (AU)’s adoption of its flagship Agenda 2063, on which the Tunis Declaration placed distinct emphasis.

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025, exploring wider developments in summitry, Africa-Asia relations, and modes of multilateralism.

Questions explored include:

  • How has international summitry evolved over the past three decades since the inception of TICAD in 1993, which represented the first periodic high-level summit engagement with Africa by a ‘non-traditional’ partner?
  • Looking ahead to TICAD 9 in 2025, what are the priorities for enforcing the stated tenets of TICAD – ‘African ownership, international partnership, inclusivity and openness’ – in cooperation efforts?
  • What lessons can be drawn from TICAD’s co-partnership approach (with the African Union Commission and others) – particularly given increasing calls for AU membership of the G20 and Prime Minister Kishida’s pledge at TICAD 8 to support a permanent African UNSC seat during its non-permanent membership in 2023–24? Beyond membership, what are the priorities for furthering agency?
  • How are Africa-Asia relations evolving and diverging? How are Japan and other Asian countries perceived by different African countries?

This event is the third in the Chatham House – Japan House London webinar series (2022-2023). The series is held in partnership with Japan House London. You can watch previous webinars from the series here.




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Guidance and best practices for nuclear cardiology laboratories during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic: An Information Statement from ASNC and SNMMI




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[18F]F-AraG Uptake in Vertebral Bone Marrow May Predict Survival in Patients with Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer Treated with Anti-PD-(L)1 Immunotherapy

Visual Abstract




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Outcomes for Patients with Metastatic Castration-Resistant Prostate Cancer and Liver Metastasis Receiving [177Lu]Lu-PSMA-617

Visual Abstract




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Performance Characteristics of a New Generation 148-cm Axial Field-of-View uMI Panorama GS PET/CT System with Extended NEMA NU 2-2018 and EARL Standards

Visual Abstract




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SPECT/CT in Early Response Assessment of Patients with Metastatic Castration-Resistant Prostate Cancer Receiving 177Lu-PSMA-617

Visual Abstract




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From the frontlines: Our CISO’s view of Pacific Rim

On beyond “Detect and Respond” and “Secure by Design”




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Addressing Climate Catastrophe Concerns in Asthma Medication Delivery: Rethinking Inhaler Use for Environmental and Clinical Efficacy




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Novel Proteomic Profiling of Epididymal Extracellular Vesicles in the Domestic Cat Reveals Proteins Related to Sequential Sperm Maturation with Differences Observed between Normospermic and Teratospermic Individuals

Tricia Rowlison
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2090-2103
Research




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A Novel Mechanism for NF-{kappa}B-activation via I{kappa}B-aggregation: Implications for Hepatic Mallory-Denk-Body Induced Inflammation

Yi Liu
Dec 1, 2020; 19:1968-1985
Research




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Proteome analysis reveals a significant host-specific response in Rhizobium leguminosarum bv viciae endosymbiotic cells

David Durán
Nov 19, 2020; 0:RA120.002276v1-mcp.RA120.002276
Research




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Spatially Resolved Activity-based Proteomic Profiles of the Murine Small Intestinal Lipases

Matthias Schittmayer
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2104-2114
Research




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Dysregulation of hsa-miR-34a and hsa-miR-449a leads to overexpression of PACS-1 and loss of DNA damage response (DDR) in cervical cancer [Cell Biology]

We have observed overexpression of PACS-1, a cytosolic sorting protein in primary cervical tumors. Absence of exonic mutations and overexpression at the RNA level suggested a transcriptional and/or posttranscriptional regulation. University of California Santa Cruz genome browser analysis of PACS-1 micro RNAs (miR), revealed two 8-base target sequences at the 3' terminus for hsa-miR-34a and hsa-miR-449a. Quantitative RT-PCR and Northern blotting studies showed reduced or loss of expression of the two microRNAs in cervical cancer cell lines and primary tumors, indicating dysregulation of these two microRNAs in cervical cancer. Loss of PACS-1 with siRNA or exogenous expression of hsa-miR-34a or hsa-miR-449a in HeLa and SiHa cervical cancer cell lines resulted in DNA damage response, S-phase cell cycle arrest, and reduction in cell growth. Furthermore, the siRNA studies showed that loss of PACS-1 expression was accompanied by increased nuclear γH2AX expression, Lys382-p53 acetylation, and genomic instability. PACS-1 re-expression through LNA-hsa-anti-miR-34a or -449a or through PACS-1 cDNA transfection led to the reversal of DNA damage response and restoration of cell growth. Release of cells post 24-h serum starvation showed PACS-1 nuclear localization at G1-S phase of the cell cycle. Our results therefore indicate that the loss of hsa-miR-34a and hsa-miR-449a expression in cervical cancer leads to overexpression of PACS-1 and suppression of DNA damage response, resulting in the development of chemo-resistant tumors.




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Interrogation of kinase genetic interactions provides a global view of PAK1-mediated signal transduction pathways [Gene Regulation]

Kinases are critical components of intracellular signaling pathways and have been extensively investigated with regard to their roles in cancer. p21-activated kinase-1 (PAK1) is a serine/threonine kinase that has been previously implicated in numerous biological processes, such as cell migration, cell cycle progression, cell motility, invasion, and angiogenesis, in glioma and other cancers. However, the signaling network linked to PAK1 is not fully defined. We previously reported a large-scale yeast genetic interaction screen using toxicity as a readout to identify candidate PAK1 genetic interactions. En masse transformation of the PAK1 gene into 4,653 homozygous diploid Saccharomyces cerevisiae yeast deletion mutants identified ∼400 candidates that suppressed yeast toxicity. Here we selected 19 candidate PAK1 genetic interactions that had human orthologs and were expressed in glioma for further examination in mammalian cells, brain slice cultures, and orthotopic glioma models. RNAi and pharmacological inhibition of potential PAK1 interactors confirmed that DPP4, KIF11, mTOR, PKM2, SGPP1, TTK, and YWHAE regulate PAK1-induced cell migration and revealed the importance of genes related to the mitotic spindle, proteolysis, autophagy, and metabolism in PAK1-mediated glioma cell migration, drug resistance, and proliferation. AKT1 was further identified as a downstream mediator of the PAK1-TTK genetic interaction. Taken together, these data provide a global view of PAK1-mediated signal transduction pathways and point to potential new drug targets for glioma therapy.




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Clearance of intracellular tau protein from neuronal cells via VAMP8-induced secretion [Cell Biology]

In Alzheimer's disease (AD), tau, a microtubule-associated protein (MAP), becomes hyperphosphorylated, aggregates, and accumulates in the somato-dendritic compartment of neurons. In parallel to its intracellular accumulation in AD, tau is also released in the extracellular space, as revealed by its increased presence in cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Consistent with this, recent studies, including ours, have reported that neurons secrete tau, and several therapeutic strategies aim to prevent the intracellular tau accumulation. Previously, we reported that late endosomes were implicated in tau secretion. Here, we explore the possibility of preventing intracellular tau accumulation by increasing tau secretion. Using neuronal models, we investigated whether overexpression of the vesicle-associated membrane protein 8 (VAMP8), an R-SNARE found on late endosomes, could increase tau secretion. The overexpression of VAMP8 significantly increased tau secretion, decreasing its intracellular levels in the neuroblastoma (N2a) cell line. Increased tau secretion by VAMP8 was also observed in murine hippocampal slices. The intracellular reduction of tau by VAMP8 overexpression correlated to a decrease of acetylated tubulin induced by tau overexpression in N2a cells. VAMP8 staining was preferentially found on late endosomes in N2a cells. Using total internal reflection fluorescence (TIRF) microscopy, the fusion of VAMP8-positive vesicles with the plasma membrane was correlated to the depletion of tau in the cytoplasm. Finally, overexpression of VAMP8 reduced the intracellular accumulation of tau mutants linked to frontotemporal dementia with parkinsonism and α-synuclein by increasing their secretion. Collectively, the present data indicate that VAMP8 could be used to increase tau and α-synuclein clearance to prevent their intracellular accumulation.




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Visualizing, quantifying, and manipulating mitochondrial DNA in vivo [Methods and Resources]

Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) encodes proteins and RNAs that support the functions of mitochondria and thereby numerous physiological processes. Mutations of mtDNA can cause mitochondrial diseases and are implicated in aging. The mtDNA within cells is organized into nucleoids within the mitochondrial matrix, but how mtDNA nucleoids are formed and regulated within cells remains incompletely resolved. Visualization of mtDNA within cells is a powerful means by which mechanistic insight can be gained. Manipulation of the amount and sequence of mtDNA within cells is important experimentally and for developing therapeutic interventions to treat mitochondrial disease. This review details recent developments and opportunities for improvements in the experimental tools and techniques that can be used to visualize, quantify, and manipulate the properties of mtDNA within cells.




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Transcription factor NF-{kappa}B promotes acute lung inȷury via microRNA-99b-mediated PRDM1 down-regulation [Developmental Biology]

Acute lung injury (ALI), is a rapidly progressing heterogenous pulmonary disorder that possesses a high risk of mortality. Accumulating evidence has implicated the activation of the p65 subunit of NF-κB [NF-κB(p65)] activation in the pathological process of ALI. microRNAs (miRNAs), a group of small RNA molecules, have emerged as major governors due to their post-transcriptional regulation of gene expression in a wide array of pathological processes, including ALI. The dysregulation of miRNAs and NF-κB activation has been implicated in human diseases. In the current study, we set out to decipher the convergence of miR-99b and p65 NF-κB activation in ALI pathology. We measured the release of pro-inflammatory cytokines (IL-1β, IL-6, and TNFα) in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid using ELISA. MH-S cells were cultured and their viability were detected with cell counting kit 8 (CCK8) assays. The results showed that miR-99b was up-regulated, while PRDM1 was down-regulated in a lipopolysaccharide (LPS)-induced murine model of ALI. Mechanistic investigations showed that NF-κB(p65) was enriched at the miR-99b promoter region, and further promoted its transcriptional activity. Furthermore, miR-99b targeted PRDM1 by binding to its 3'UTR, causing its down-regulation. This in-creased lung injury, as evidenced by increased wet/dry ratio of mouse lung, myeloperoxidase activity and pro-inflammatory cytokine secretion, and enhanced infiltration of inflammatory cells in lung tissues. Together, our findings indicate that NF-κB(p65) promotion of miR-99b can aggravate ALI in mice by down-regulating the expression of PRDM1.




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PTPN2 regulates the activation of KRAS and plays a critical role in proliferation and survival of KRAS-driven cancer cells [Signal Transduction]

RAS genes are the most commonly mutated in human cancers and play critical roles in tumor initiation, progression, and drug resistance. Identification of targets that block RAS signaling is pivotal to develop therapies for RAS-related cancer. As RAS translocation to the plasma membrane (PM) is essential for its effective signal transduction, we devised a high-content screening assay to search for genes regulating KRAS membrane association. We found that the tyrosine phosphatase PTPN2 regulates the plasma membrane localization of KRAS. Knockdown of PTPN2 reduced the proliferation and promoted apoptosis in KRAS-dependent cancer cells, but not in KRAS-independent cells. Mechanistically, PTPN2 negatively regulates tyrosine phosphorylation of KRAS, which, in turn, affects the activation KRAS and its downstream signaling. Consistently, analysis of the TCGA database demonstrates that high expression of PTPN2 is significantly associated with poor prognosis of patients with KRAS-mutant pancreatic adenocarcinoma. These results indicate that PTPN2 is a key regulator of KRAS and may serve as a new target for therapy of KRAS-driven cancer.




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GUCY2D mutations in retinal guanylyl cyclase 1 provide biochemical reasons for dominant cone-rod dystrophy but not for stationary night blindness [Cell Biology]

Mutations in the GUCY2D gene coding for the dimeric human retinal membrane guanylyl cyclase (RetGC) isozyme RetGC1 cause various forms of blindness, ranging from rod dysfunction to rod and cone degeneration. We tested how the mutations causing recessive congenital stationary night blindness (CSNB), recessive Leber's congenital amaurosis (LCA1), and dominant cone–rod dystrophy-6 (CORD6) affected RetGC1 activity and regulation by RetGC-activating proteins (GCAPs) and retinal degeneration-3 protein (RD3). CSNB mutations R666W, R761W, and L911F, as well as LCA1 mutations R768W and G982VfsX39, disabled RetGC1 activation by human GCAP1, -2, and -3. The R666W and R761W substitutions compromised binding of GCAP1 with RetGC1 in HEK293 cells. In contrast, G982VfsX39 and L911F RetGC1 retained the ability to bind GCAP1 in cyto but failed to effectively bind RD3. R768W RetGC1 did not bind either GCAP1 or RD3. The co-expression of GUCY2D allelic combinations linked to CSNB did not restore RetGC1 activity in vitro. The CORD6 mutation R838S in the RetGC1 dimerization domain strongly dominated the Ca2+ sensitivity of cyclase regulation by GCAP1 in RetGC1 heterodimer produced by co-expression of WT and the R838S subunits. It required higher Ca2+ concentrations to decelerate GCAP-activated RetGC1 heterodimer—6-fold higher than WT and 2-fold higher than the Ser838-harboring homodimer. The heterodimer was also more resistant than homodimers to inhibition by RD3. The observed biochemical changes can explain the dominant CORD6 blindness and recessive LCA1 blindness, both of which affect rods and cones, but they cannot explain the selective loss of rod function in recessive CSNB.




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Murine GFP-Mx1 forms nuclear condensates and associates with cytoplasmic intermediate filaments: Novel antiviral activity against VSV [Immunology]

Type I and III interferons induce expression of the “myxovirus resistance proteins” MxA in human cells and its ortholog Mx1 in murine cells. Human MxA forms cytoplasmic structures, whereas murine Mx1 forms nuclear bodies. Whereas both HuMxA and MuMx1 are antiviral toward influenza A virus (FLUAV) (an orthomyxovirus), only HuMxA is considered antiviral toward vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) (a rhabdovirus). We previously reported that the cytoplasmic human GFP-MxA structures were phase-separated membraneless organelles (“biomolecular condensates”). In the present study, we investigated whether nuclear murine Mx1 structures might also represent phase-separated biomolecular condensates. The transient expression of murine GFP-Mx1 in human Huh7 hepatoma, human Mich-2H6 melanoma, and murine NIH 3T3 cells led to the appearance of Mx1 nuclear bodies. These GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies were rapidly disassembled by exposing cells to 1,6-hexanediol (5%, w/v), or to hypotonic buffer (40–50 mosm), consistent with properties of membraneless phase-separated condensates. Fluorescence recovery after photobleaching (FRAP) assays revealed that the GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies upon photobleaching showed a slow partial recovery (mobile fraction: ∼18%) suggestive of a gel-like consistency. Surprisingly, expression of GFP-MuMx1 in Huh7 cells also led to the appearance of GFP-MuMx1 in 20–30% of transfected cells in a novel cytoplasmic giantin-based intermediate filament meshwork and in cytoplasmic bodies. Remarkably, Huh7 cells with cytoplasmic murine GFP-MuMx1 filaments, but not those with only nuclear bodies, showed antiviral activity toward VSV. Thus, GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies comprised phase-separated condensates. Unexpectedly, GFP-MuMx1 in Huh7 cells also associated with cytoplasmic giantin-based intermediate filaments, and such cells showed antiviral activity toward VSV.