Scandal and speculation surrounding the demise of Politburo member Bo Xilai raised questions about the stability and cohesiveness of China's political elite. However as his trial comes to an end the main political challenge is not at the elite level, but in the Communist party's ability to gain legitimacy among the wider public. 

The trial of Bo Xilai for bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power has generated a number of surprises. To start with, there has been more transparency than most observers had expected, with the court issuing transcripts at regular intervals. Plus, the court used Chinese social media to post images of the proceedings.

This level of transparency is unusual in Chinese trials. However, we should be cautious about seeing this as a precedent for the future development of judicial practice. Bo's case is rather special, both because of the senior positions he held and because of the level of speculation around the case – and Bo's fate – ever since the drama began last February when Wang Lijun, Bo's former police chief in Chongqing, fled to the US Consulate-General in Chengdu. 

Wang, who is already serving a prison sentence after being convicted of abuse of power and other offences, gave testimony at Bo's trial. The exchanges between Bo and Wang will be picked over further, with their salacious details of the arguments that apparently ensued in January 2012 when Wang told Bo that Bo's wife was suspected of murdering British businessman Neil Heywood, in Chongqing the previous November. 

It is highly likely that Bo will be found guilty. Nonetheless, the trial gave Bo the opportunity to put across his views in court. He surprised observers on the first day by retracting confessions he made during the pre-trial investigation process. It is not clear whether this was expected by the prosecutors in advance of the trial, but it contributed to the trial lasting for five days – much longer than expected. 

Result already decided

Most media coverage and comment has focused on the details of the various events, which came out in court. However the political implications lie elsewhere. 

The trial should not be seen in isolation but as the culmination of a process which began in the days after Wang's attempted defection was brought to light. The party's subsequent handling of Bo Xilai proceeded in cautious stages: first the removal from his post as Party Secretary in Chongqing in March last year, then his 'suspension' from the Politburo and Party Central Committee a month later while an investigation was carried out by the party. Only in September 2012 was Bo expelled from the Communist Party and the file handed over to state authorities for prosecution.

This train of events serves as a reminder of the context in which China's judicial system operates. Whatever the transparency of proceedings in court, or the professionalism of judges and lawyers, the party's 'leadership' of judicial work means that politically important cases are often subject to direction from the party apparatus. 

Popular, not elite, politics is at stake

The Bo case has often been presented as a story of turbulence and factional infighting at the top of the party. But in November 2012 the party delivered a clear leadership transition at the top of both party and military from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, with the government handover in March this year. With the new team firmly in place, the transparency accorded to Bo's trial demonstrates confidence among the leadership, not division. 

Political challenges lie not at the top of the party, but in the ability of the party leadership to achieve legitimacy among the wider public. The revelations in the Bo case, from last spring and up to and including the trial, have increased levels of public cynicism about the behaviour of senior officials. Posts on China's social media will provide glimpses of the wider response to the trial; popular opinion is likely to be divided – as it was when Bo was still a serving official, and has remained since his removal from office. 

Given that the party seeks to present itself as being 'responsive' to public concerns, the main political implications of the trial will be seen in the impact it has on the leadership's credibility, not in elite politics. It is that imperative, not judicial reform, which explains what we have been allowed to see of the trial. 

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

It is one of the tritest statements about politics in China, one sometimes heard from the mouths of retired senior diplomats: 'all the Communist Party of China cares about is power.' Things like this make it clear that whatever the key qualities that senior diplomats in most cultures need, some capacity for deeper questioning and reflection is not amongst them. 

Functionally, of course, the statement is right. The Communist Party is focused on power, and regards a monopoly on power as its key objective. But there are many different kinds of power, and many different ways to exercise it. And for a perfect illustration of this, the fall and sentencing of Bo Xilai offers great insights. 

Destined for politics

Had there been a menu of the things that the most perfectly placed leader of the Communist Party needed in the second decade of the twenty first century to be promoted and successful, then Bo had it: sterling elite family links in a highly tribal and networked system through his father, Bo Yibo, one of the great founding immortals; excellent provincial leadership records, in both Liaoning and then Chongqing, in a system where the road to Beijing lies through China's provinces; great charisma and communicative ability, shown in the way he managed to impress visiting foreign dignitaries and in the disgruntled sounds that came from some members of the public after his fall. 

But beyond all these, Bo had something much more important, and much rarer in Chinese modern politics: a political vision which differentiated him from his colleagues. It was this, perhaps more than anything else, that meant when they had the weapons to attack, his enemies, who were numerous and highly threatened by his individualistic behaviour, could go for the kill. 

Modern China is blighted by a great contradiction. It is in one moment both rich and poor. This has been widely acknowledged, both inside and outside the country. Its status as a rich poor country creates great challenges for policy makers and politicians. It is one they have been addressing through creating more access to public goods, more empowerment policies through investment in education and poverty relief, and more focus on addressing the urban and rural divide. Bo's prescription however was a uniquely popularist one. His social housing campaign in Chongqing was the most sustained effort to allow citizens in a city in China to have a realistic shot at being homeowners. He looked precariously close to threatening some immense areas of vested interest in the construction sector, and his anti-mafia campaign, while brutal and controversial, had an element that appealed to a popularist sense of social justice. At least this time, many thought, a government leader was taking on people who were dabbling in their own form of violence rather than picking on migrants and rural protestors. 

Bo made policy attack on inequality part of his persona in Chongqing, and in effect turned the tables on those who had lobbied for him to be sent there in 2007 as a means to sideline him. He made national and international headlines, and, it should be remembered, secured vociferous support from visiting national leaders, amongst them a highly enthusiastic Xi Jinping who went to Chongqing in 2010 and gave the city a ringing endorsement – and, by association, Bo's style of leadership. 

For all the court drama and dark intrigue on show in Jinan in August, the criminal charges that were brought against Bo cannot deflect from the power issues above. Power in China is not the uniform, never-changing monolithic entity or quality that diplomats lazily refer to – but something like a form of energy, or a currency, which can mutate, change, and dissipate in ways which are often hard, and sometimes even impossible, to understand. 

Downfall

The final image of Bo is of a man allowed a voice one final time to defend himself on the narrow criminal charges. It was also of someone who knew that on the bigger political issues he had been brought down by, there was no point in trying to speak out. His political death sentence had been delivered during this fall from grace the year before. Someone weaned, nurtured, and trained to exercise power had what they most desired and felt suited for taken away when it was just within their reach. Since then, there was little else to do but tidy up. And that, in Jinan, is precisely what happened. 

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

After a year in which there were precious few high level political visits, China is now getting two in the same week: the UK Chancellor George Osborne and the Mayor of London Boris Johnson. The irritation at David Cameron and Nick Clegg's very public meeting with the Dalai Lama last year has now been replaced by an era of warmth and mutual understanding. That, at least, is what the press releases for these visits will have us believe. 

In fact, while the ministerial freeze has been on, the UK has been doing fine – having more than double the Chinese investment of any other EU member, and increasing its exports to China. Chinese visitors to the UK brought in £300 million last year – a formidable achievement in view of the highly unwelcoming visa regime the UK currently has towards people from China (something George Osborne has promised to reform while in Beijing). 

The UK and China are always keen to assert differences, but at heart they are pragmatic nations. They are both utterly at one in seeking growth, and they see in each other compatibilities that can be benignly exploited. For the Chinese, there are decent assets in the UK in the energy and manufacturing sector that are very reasonably priced, and which exist in one of the most liberal investment regimes in the world. For the UK, China is a vast market that its companies, small and large, need to conquer. Any tactical advantage in this battle for access is good in view of the competition that is going to come from other international companies, but also players inside China that want to find their way to the hearts of Chinese consumers. The next decades look set to belong to these consumers. The long term theme of Johnson and Osborne's separate visits is getting as close as possible to these new actors in global growth. 

Overcoming hurdles

Boris Johnson and George Osborne are unlikely to be publicly explicit about the challenges that British trade interests face in China, but in private meetings they have to be raised. The first is that China is becoming a master of indirect protectionism, and the treatment being given to companies ranging from GlaxoSmithKline down to small consultancies is getting harsh. The UK has a strong interest in the success of the EU in negotiating better trade access, from the right for companies to bid for government procurement in China to the perennial problems of state subsidies for Chinese companies and intellectual property rights protection. It is important to find smart ways to leverage the newfound interest China has in deploying its capital abroad, to give UK companies better deals in China. This has to be subtle work, but the primary interests in the UK are the same as our EU partners – having a liberal, rule-based, global order where China is far more integrated. 

There are also some domestic issues. Large trade missions to China have been happening since the reign of George the Third. Lord Heseltine led a vast army of companies in the early 1990s to Beijing. Trade missions have become an unquestionable part of the whole performance of UK politicians going to China. But just how much these achieve is debatable. A decade ago, in The China Dream, Joe Studwell poured cold water on some of the noisier delegations and what real business they did. Perhaps it is time for the UK government to give more support for small and medium businesses. Many of them will have to think about a China strategy if they are not already there, and will face a tough and time consuming task in making inroads in China. Some solidarity amongst them and with the government would be a big advantage. 

This impacts on the delicate business of how the UK undertakes its business and political relations with China in the first place. China is now the world's second largest economy on some measures, and George Osborne said his visit was to change UK perceptions of the country so that British people can see it as more than just an enormous factory producing cheap goods. For that to happen there needs to be a more dynamic, inclusive operation in the UK which cultivates links with Chinese business, rather than the ancient groupings of associations and dining clubs that prevail at the moment. These are good for the egos of those already doing well in China, but are not reaching out enough to the many in the UK who might find they can work in or with China. 

Academic understanding

There is a deeper values debate that China and the UK might have. Our history means that we have shared a lot of good and bad things. The UK needs to support as many young people in learning Chinese, visiting China, and knowing about China as possible. And the good news is that relations will be helped by the quarter of a million Chinese students who have studied in the UK and had experience of life here in the last 15 years. As much outreach to this group, many of whom are back in China and developing exciting careers, is important: each one is an invaluable ambassador for life here. Decades after the visit of Osborne and Johnson has faded from memory, it will be these people that truly shape the future. 

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

One year after a transition at the top of China's Communist Party, a major party gathering − the third plenum − was held on 9-12 November, with Chinese officials preparing a 'comprehensive plan for reform' in the context of apparently slowing growth in China as well as social and environmental challenges.

The speaker will comment on the outcomes of the plenum and the debates which led up to it, and examine likely policy changes and their impact on developments in China.

Despite the hype surrounding it, the gathering of the country’s ruling elite in Beijing is likely to prize measured change over dramatic reform.

If there was a clearer idea of what makes China’s new elite leadership tick, then the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party that is about to be held in Beijing would not be such a big deal. But in a polity which privileges concealment over overt statement, it is viewed widely as the one chance for outsiders to see more clearly what the leadership aims to achieve. Expectations were raised by the October statement by one of the most staid members of the current Standing Committee of the Politburo, Yu Zhengsheng, that the plenum would presage a new era of reform.

In Chinese politics reform is a word that has a wholesome, positive air about it. But the question is where and when reform will happen and who will gain from it. The plenum is not like a party convention in the Western sense. It is not an eye-grabbing, media-dominating event that produces surprises. Comparing this year’s installment with the great Third Plenum of 1978 that heralded the repudiation of late Maoism and the embracing of the market, the non-state sector and foreign capital – all anathema before then – is misleading. The significance of the 1978 meeting was only obvious in hindsight. It took years for the scale of the radical transformation of the whole strategic direction of the Communist Party to be appreciated. That 2013 will prove a similar historic moment is unlikely, perhaps even impossible.

What is much more likely is that the highly tactical leadership now in charge will reaffirm its commitment to incremental reform. It will make some statements about the radical urbanization that China is about to undergo and say something about social welfare reform. China’s leaders will do what they have always done in plenums over the last three decades, namely set the broad parameters of politically permissible activity that provinces, ministries and other stakeholders will then need to implement.

This plenum will also have to produce something about the need to achieve greater egality and balance in the economy. It needs to answer some of the questions about how Premier Li Keqiang, in particular, intends to meet the goal of 'fast, sustainable growth' when a falling overall GDP figure looks likely. It needs to communicate to as broad a constituency as possible the arch-narrative of a world where the raw statement of growth on its own is no longer the be all and end all of government policy. It needs to say something about how the party is going to fulfill the increasingly complex aspirations of the Chinese people, aspirations that exceed purely having a materially good level of life and concern broader questions of well-being that vex the politics of all developed economies.

Observers will want to see some signs too of addressing the most sensitive issues. Yu Zhengsheng talked of economic reform. Reforming the economy is now a wholly uncontroversial mantra in China. However, it impacts on one enormously important issue that reaches beyond economics: whether wealth, prosperity and development benefit the few or are accessible to the many – in other words, good, old-fashioned questions of economic and social justice. At the heart of this lies the question of how state-owned enterprises have become vehicles of profit not just for the party state, but also for tightly knit networks of vested interests. Reforms that lap at the doors of these entities also creep into the space of powerful political players, who will resist any attempt to cut down their wealth, and who have the power to resist.

China’s new leadership is proving more confident than was expected and displays a high sense of historic mission. President Xi Jinping speaks increasingly like a politician who believes it is almost his historic destiny to sit at the centre of the leadership of a renascent 'rich, strong country'. The ultimate question for the plenum is not what outside observers make of it but what the vastly complex mixture of groups in China does. For them, a sign that the leadership is willing to take on some of the entrenched vested interests that penetrate the operations of some state-owned sectors to the core is critical.

This is likely to be couched in the language of more support for the market, which is the key channel in any attack on vested interests – through widening access to wealth and economic benefits, and support for the non-state sector and entrepreneurs. It is hard to see how deeper reform can occur without these two crucial elements. And it is through these that the attitude of China’s leadership to political and legal reforms – far more complex issues that, almost certainly, will not be addressed at the plenum but will lurk in the background − will become clearer. The leadership thinks it is too early to tackle these issues directly, but this plenum will still be part of the process for it to come up with ideas for how to transform not just China’s economy, but its polity too.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

China’s leaders set out their intention to push forward with policy reform following the Third Plenum. The full decision released on 15 November makes clear the aim to loosen constraints on the market, and suggests a dilution of state-owned enterprise influence. A new national security committee could also lead to greater policy integration between domestic security and international affairs.

The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee took place in Beijing from 9−12 November. Initial reactions based on the communiqué released on the last day of the meeting were mixed. However, on 15 November the authorities published the detailed decision approved by the plenum, and an explanation given to the plenum by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping – in which he acknowledged major problems facing China.

These documents make the implications of the plenum much clearer. In sum, it offers a clear political signal that as China’s fifth-generation Party leadership enters its second year, it is intent on taking forward a ‘comprehensive deepening of reform’ across a wide range of issues. As an indication of the importance of this, a new high-level ‘leading small group’ will be established to coordinate and oversee this process. The decision spells out various new measures, and reiterates many which are already part of the government’s agenda.

More market in the economy

The most important material is on the economy, where the decision makes clear that the leadership envisages a ‘decisive’ role for market forces, and the establishment of ‘fair and equal’ competition in the economy. This will provide a guiding principle for policy-making over the coming years.

One of the ways of achieving this is to reorganize the functions of government. Here the decision reiterates the themes which the government has been working on since Premier Li Keqiang took over in March this year, namely reducing or removing the need for government approvals to businesses, freeing up the investment environment, and allowing businesses and the market to take the lead unless there is a strong reason for government intervention. Better governance is a wider theme of the decision, covering the judicial system and reforms to the party’s disciplinary organs which would clarify leadership and accountability in anti-corruption investigations.

SOE reform

A possible impediment to market reforms is the power of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the original communiqué gave the impression that nothing much would be done about SOEs. However, the ability of these so-called ‘vested interests’ to stymie market reforms has been weakened by the targeting of a number of senior SOE-related cadres in the party’s latest anti-corruption campaign, which began at the end of 2012.

Further, the detailed decision suggests further reforms are in the offing. Although the relevant section of the document begins by restating the leading role for state ownership, a series of subsequent policy aims could serve to dilute it, such as ensuring equality in property rights protection and competition; developing mixed (state and non-state) ownership through cross-shareholding and bringing private capital into state-led projects; shifting from managing SOEs to managing state investments in enterprises; better supervision of SOEs which operate in natural monopolies; and removing administrative monopolies.

International affairs

The decision talks about further opening of China’s economy, but the vast majority of the issues covered in the decision are domestic in nature, and announcements such as a further relaxation of birth control policies have attracted most attention. Even the points on military and defense issues relate more to internal management than external capacity.

There was, however, one announcement which could have important implications for China’s foreign policy, which will be watched carefully outside China, the establishment of a ‘national security committee’. Xi said that this was being set up in response to external pressures to protect national sovereignty, security and development. He also cited internal pressures to maintain political security and social stability. It is too early to judge what the exact remit of this body will be, but it could lead to greater policy coordination and integration between domestic security issues and international affairs, at a time when China is playing a more important role across the international spectrum.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Moisés Naím will share his insights into the changing nature of power in the 21st century. He will articulate what he considers to be the shift and dispersal of power between traditionally dominant actors (such as large, stable governments, corporations and armies), and newly ascendant ‘micropowers’ (such as the Tea Party, WikiLeaks, and Somali pirates). 

Crucially, however, he will argue power today is decaying. He will suggest power is easier to acquire, but harder to use, and easier to lose. Coupled with this, the drive for power makes emerging actors across many fields of endeavour vulnerable, leading to chaos, confusion and paralysis. 

There will be a reception after the event.

This is an Under 35s Forum event.

Following the Third Plenum of the Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee in November 2013, the panel will offer their thoughts on whether the economic, political and social reforms announced, such as the relaxation of the one child policy and establishment of a national security council, signal a new era for China’s domestic and foreign policies. The speakers will consider how significant these reforms will be in comparison to those announced in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping following the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee.

Rapid economic growth and more widespread political stability have catalyzed increased international engagement with Africa in the past decade, as African states develop more significant roles in the global economy and political cooperation in geopolitics. Accompanying this is a shift in British engagement with African states from one with a development aid emphasis to one focused on trade and political cooperation.

HE Professor Kwaku Danso-Boafo will reflect on his time in London, developments in UK-Africa relations, the role of diplomatic engagements in informing and strengthening bilateral relations and the prospects for intergovernmental cooperation on African and global issues.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Dr Naím will discuss the changing nature of power in the 21st century and will argue power today is decaying. He will suggest that while power is easier to acquire, it is harder to use, and easier to lose. In addition to this, the drive for power makes emerging actors across many different fields of endeavour vulnerable, leading to chaos, confusion and paralysis. The conversation will take place under the Chatham House Rule. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

On 3 March, 14 members of the UN Security Council denounced the 15th member, Russia, in unprecedentedly strong terms for the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and use of military intimidation. Even China followed suit.

The Russian ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, who is used to getting his way in the Security Council, was dumbfounded. With surprising confidence, Churkin had asked for the emergency discussion over Ukraine. Each of his arguments was swiftly dismissed as inacceptable with regard to international law, or in bad faith. He got his way with a shameful nyet to Security Council resolutions on Syria, but not here.

The Russian state has been facing growing criticism from many governments and multilateral organizations since it launched an armed incursion into Crimea. NATO, the OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe have condemned Russia’s resort to military force in Crimea. Sanctions are being discussed very seriously. And the economic and financial backlash is hurting the Russian currency, treasury and major corporations. The Kremlin has stumbled on international legal norms, which it wrongly believed it could interpret in its own free manner, with the support of China.

On 4 March, President Putin chose to express himself on Ukraine, at last. He looked nervous even though he was addressing a small and carefully selected group of young journalists for a ‘discussion-like press conference’. He told an odd story of the war he had threatened everyone with, but had never intended to wage. He repeated arguments that Churkin had already lost in New York the day before. And, with his never-abating desire to rewrite recent history, he condemned both Ukraine’s independence and the Orange Revolution of 2004.

He kept changing his mind about deposed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich’s position. He first said that Yanukovich was ‘politically dead’, but later justified Russian military ‘protection’ of Crimea’s population with Yanukovich’s supposed written request to Moscow on 1 March. Such a pretext is less convincing to the US and Europe by the day, just like Yanukovych’s use of a hastily passed anti-terrorism law to attempt to justify his order to shoot at civilian protesters on the Maidan. Today, Yanukovich is a former despot on the run. The Kremlin’s propaganda has backfired.

Negotiation is now beginning to reassert itself over confrontation. The Russian and Ukrainian governments have just renewed a fragile communication line. Kyiv and Simferopol are setting up a commission to discuss a common strategy out of the military standoff, and the status of the autonomous republic of Crimea in the Ukrainian state. The war scare is not quite over, but it now looks clear that Moscow bears the responsibility for raising the stakes all the way to the brink of armed struggle, with civilians as potential victims. Most powers, together with international organizations, agree that Russia’s behaviour has been dangerous and that the new interim Ukrainian government is legitimate.

The priority, now that armed violence is abating, is quick and robust support to the Ukrainian economy and society. And, as a necessary corollary, Western governments will have to devote time to helping the Russian president save face and stay quiet behind the Kremlin walls.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Professor John Ikenberry will examine the challenges to global order that are posed by the rise of China and current shifts in global power. He will argue that a liberal-oriented international order, as championed by the United States and Europe over the last century, remains the best hope for stability and growth in the 21st century.

Professor Ikenberry will contend that, while non-Western rising states seek greater voice and authority in the global system, they – perhaps surprisingly – still embrace the basic principles and institutions of liberal world order. Thus, the United States and Europe have powerful incentives to work together to reform the world’s governance institutions to accommodate new stakeholders and tackle problems of rising economic and security interdependence.

ASK A QUESTION: Send questions for the speaker by email to questions@chathamhouse.org or using #askCH on Twitter. A selection will be put to him during the event.

This event will be followed by a reception.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

This event will present the findings of the Transatlantic Academy’s new report, Liberal Order in a Post-Western World, which examines the future of international liberal order in a world shaped by the rise of emerging powers and a transatlantic community dealing with internal challenges. Produced by collaboration between scholars from Europe and North America, it recommends ways to build an enduring rules-based order for the 21st century.

This report serves as a record of the inaugural London Conference on Globalization and World Order, convened by Chatham House on 2–3 June 2014 at Lancaster House in London.

The London Conference has three aims: to be comprehensive in debating how best to manage the profound economic and political rebalancing taking place across the world; to go behind the headlines and debate the trends underlying and connecting current events; and to build an international community of experts with a shared understanding of the major challenges accompanying globalization.

This inaugural conference was fortunate to draw together high-quality speakers for each session, who offered perspectives reflecting their geographic and sectoral diversity. It benefited enormously from the ideas for themes, speakers and participants suggested by its steering committee. The conference would not have been possible without the generous support of its two founding partners – Accenture and Chevron – and its supporting sponsors – Bloomberg and Rio Tinto – as well as the generous cooperation that we received from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office in hosting the event at the historic Lancaster House in St James’s. And the quality of the debate, insights and ideas generated over the course of the conference was driven largely by the input from its 200 participants. Steering committee members, sponsors and participants are all listed in the next section, along with speakers’ details and the conference programme.

The report itself opens with a short essay which explores one of the main conclusions of the conference: the loss of trust that appears to be permeating relationships between governments, and between governments and their citizens, as a result of the pressures they are all under from the process of globalization. This is followed by the key insights from each of the five main sessions of the conference on 3 June.

The final section brings together the five papers written by members of Chatham House’s in-house research teams in advance of the conference in order to stimulate participants’ thinking. Even following an eventful six months since these were written, their insights and proposals retain an important salience for the future.

We look forward to hosting the second London Conference on 1–2 June 2015.

Robin Niblett
Director 

China’s rise was highlighted again recently by reports that World Bank calculations of purchasing power parity could put the Chinese economy ahead of the US this year. China’s global influence has clearly spread substantially over recent decades, though the extent and impact of the country’s rise remain debated, and its economic size is not yet matched by influence in other areas.

Within China itself, the idea that the country has become a major power has become stronger. Put alongside Chinese analysis of global flux, this has resulted in changes in China’s approaches to foreign and security policy.

The impact of these changes remain uncertain. As set out in a new report on China’s Global Personality , there are several debates in China about the country’s approach to international affairs: around the implications of its rise for its continued identity as a developing country, whether it should become more ‘revisionist’ towards international affairs, and how assertive Chinese foreign and security policy should be.

So far, China’s post-2012 leadership has taken forward a number of areas of policy change. Institutionally, the creation of a new National Security Commission, chaired by Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, is likely to strengthen policy coordination and integration across a broad range of domestic and external issues.

The Chinese leadership has also promoted a much-discussed ‘new type of major power relationship’ in its approach to the US. The aim here is to avoid conflict between the US and a rising China, and to work towards a relationship characterized by equality, including in Asia – this therefore does not imply a desire to be a regional hegemon. The outcome, however, remains to be seen, and US responses so far have been cautious.

In dealing with disputes in East Asia, Chinese policy has become more assertive since around 2010, though the leadership has also set out its desire to deepen relations with its neighbours, and Beijing has been among the first to reach out to new Indian Prime Minister Modi. However, there are clear limits to this: relations with Japan in particular are likely to remain poor, and those with Vietnam have deteriorated substantially over recent weeks.

These issues are not simply bilateral, but should be seen as part of a wider renegotiation of regional order, involving not just China, but Japan, the US, and others. The last few years have seen changes in US approaches to the ongoing evolution of the international order and in particular to East Asia – the so-called ‘rebalance’ strategy, including ongoing – but slowing – negotiations for a trade and investment Trans-Pacific Partnership. And Japan’s security policy has been changing under Prime Minister Abe.

The idea of renegotiation can also be seen in the debates around institutions of global economic governance, such as the International Monetary Fund. Our research finds that China’s engagement with the existing international order remains strong, but there is also a growing element of gradual revisionism from China (and maybe others) within that order. China’s approach is consistent with the open and rules-based way that international institutions have developed, but it looks for its voice to be considered more in the setting of those rules.

The view from Europe

The implications of this analysis are that the questions policy-makers need to address should not be framed simply in terms of dealing with the rise of China and the changes in Chinese approaches this brings. Instead, the framework should be one which takes account of global flux and policy changes by other actors.

This means that there is space for European governments, for example, to engage in shaping the future global and regional order. In doing so, there could be particular challenges if strategic difficulties in the US-China relationship continue − the perceptions of opportunities and threats in Asia as seen from Europe may increasingly diverge from Washington’s. As China’s rise continues, it will not just affect relationships with China – Europe’s relationships with the US, and their stances on questions of regional order and governance in Asia, will also be called into question.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

How changing power dynamics will affect how the international order is constituted is one of the most fundamental questions facing the world today.  Whether or not the US itself is declining, the post-war liberal world order, which is underpinned by US military and economic primacy and supported by various global institutions, is evolving. However it is unclear what, if anything, will take its place.

Amitav Acharya argues that the age of Western hegemony is over. While the US will remain a major force in world affairs, he says that it has lost the ability to shape world order in  its own interests and image. As a result the US will be one of a number of anchors, which include emerging powers, regional forces, and a concert of the old and new powers, shaping a new world order.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION IS CLOSED.

With China’s economic power on the rise, there is a growing sense among many publics around the world that the global balance of power is shifting and that China already is, or will soon be, the world’s leading power, according to a new survey. The Pew Research Center’s latest Global Attitudes survey found that despite China’s rise in economic power, the People’s Republic is not very popular in Asia, Europe and the United States. As for the US, although the ‘Obama Bounce’ effect of more positive attitudes toward the United States is waning in Europe and China, anti-Americanism in most countries remains much lower than it was during the Bush administration, but remaining consistent in the Middle East. 

Bruce Stokes will present these findings and the expert panel will discuss the insights it provides into an emerging superpower rivalry. In addition they will discuss how these nuances in global attitudes might increasingly shape the security and economic policies of governments around the world.

Reaping the benefits of more than a decade of stability and fast economic growth, Angola increasingly wields global influence. Angola seeks to diversify its bilateral partnerships and improve existing ones, and is well-placed to exert its influence in multilateral fora. 

At this roundtable event, Angola’s Secretary of State for Cooperation, Hon Dr Maria Angela Bragança, will discuss Angola’s international priorities and how Angola is helping to shape key issues of global importance in a multipolar world.

With extensive and diverse engagements across sub-Saharan Africa, China is one among a range of international partners that is evolving its policy and relations with African states. At this roundtable meeting, Ambassador Zhong Jianhua will discuss China’s interests in Africa, the challenges it has faced and how China cooperates with international governments and across sectors in Africa. 

The unprecedented victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by Narendra Modi, in India’s general election was a milestone in the recent history of India, leaving a single party with a majority in parliament for the first time in 25 years and the ruling coalition with a clear mandate. Manoj Ladwa, who worked on Modi’s election campaign, will provide his insights into the campaign and assess why it worked so well. 

The panel will consider the policy implications of the election results and, among other issues, provide insights into how this might shape India’s business outlook and foreign policy over the next five years. 

President Barack Obama’s recent visit to Asia has reanimated the debate over what America’s ‘pivot’ to Asia really means. The level of uncertainty over its regional engagement has been heightened by what many in the region, and beyond, consider an inadequate response to the events taking place in Ukraine. Rather than being reassured by the ‘rebalancing’, many Asian allies suspect the United States is becoming a less reliable ally. At the same time, concern is also growing about China’s increasing assertiveness, as demonstrated by recent events with Vietnam.

America’s Asian partners are increasingly exploring new ways to ensure their security, and they will, in time, find different ways to engage with it in the region. Unless the United States is more transparent about its intentions, and what others can expect from it, it is possible that it will be pushed towards a role not necessarily in line with its interests.

President Obama’s announcement of the ‘pivot’ to Asia in November 2011 provoked much debate over what it would mean in practice. It continues to be treated with much scepticism in the region and has raised tensions, with many fearing a military response from China (a fear that, in the eyes of many in the region, has already come to pass).

Allies have also questioned whether American rhetoric is being matched by action. US assets in the region remain strong (additional troops are being rotated in and new partnerships are being formed with the Philippines and others), but America’s will to use them appears less so.

Despite reassurances from Obama during his trip that the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands ‘fall within the scope of Article 5 of the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’ and that the United States opposes any unilateral attempts to change this, Japan was not reassured. A more ambiguous statement made last year by Secretary of State John Kerry, that the United States ‘does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands’, has left many Japanese policy-makers wondering whether the US would ultimately back their country up in a conflict. Again, they look at America’s responses to events in Ukraine, Libya and Syria and wonder what it would be prepared to commit to if China were to try to seize control of disputed territory.

This uncertainty is leading many of America’s principal allies to consider additional ways to ensure their security. There are three main paths available to them: building domestic capabilities, forming ad hoc groupings, and reinforcing established regional groups.

The allies are first looking internally: across the board, defence spending has increased; for the first time, in 2012, Asia surpassed European spending, reaching a total of $310 billion. Countries such as India are expanding their naval capabilities to enhance their power projection and Japan is moving forward a reinterpretation of its constitution to allow a more ‘normalized’ role for its military, one in which it could come to the assistance of allies.

Asia-Pacific states are also looking to engage one another in informal bilateral or plurilateral groupings. Over the past decade, a proliferation of new groups has formed for such activities as strategic dialogue, joint training or operations. Building on their similar values and concerns, Japan, Australia and India, in particular, have been prolific in creating various combinations of partnerships among themselves and the United States. There are also some more unexpected (and potentially valuable) groupings, including that established between China, Japan and South Korea.

Where they are based on similar interests, these informal groupings can be a source of moral and political support, and even perhaps in time more operational support in the security arena. They can also provide a starting point for engaging a wider audience through more traditional regional groups, such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit – the third option for allies to enhance their security.

These more established groups, while widely dismissed in the West as mere ‘talking shops’, perform a well-regarded function in the region. By supporting the broader web of networks on which states can come to depend, they provide opportunities for debating and managing (or diffusing) regional tensions.

America remains the most militarily powerful nation in the world. Its influence and common interests with its Asian allies will continue to ensure that it has strong sway in the region. Realistically, it will for the foreseeable future remain a necessary partner for its traditional allies, particularly those concerned by China’s growing assertiveness. And it remains in America’s interests to stay engaged. However, as ambiguity about its willingness to act increases, these allies will continue to reach for alternative solutions for managing their security.

While this aligns with the US desire to share more of the burdens of global citizenship, if it wants to remain a key Asia-Pacific power, America still needs its allies to need it. A little more clarity and transparency on its part, even if only stated privately, could start to rebuild trust and confidence, which would serve both America and its allies well. 

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

As Nigeria celebrates one hundred years of unity, significant differences – real and perceived – remain between different parts of the country. This event marks the Nigeria launch of the Chatham House Briefing Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria. Its author, Dr Leena Hoffmann, will discuss the effects of democratization and pacted politics on northern Nigeria, broader governance challenges, and how relations among decision-makers nationally have evolved.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The US derives significant geopolitical power by issuing the dominant reserve currency. Not surprisingly, China would like to wield similar power and is successfully promoting the use of the renminbi to settle trade. The speaker will argue that the RMB’s chances of becoming a major reserve currency are poor, as financial liberalization, although a necessary condition, is insufficient. China must also earn the unquestioning trust of global money managers. History suggests this takes decades even for a rules-bound democracy, let alone an opaque, unpredictable single-party state.

Nigeria’s prospects, with its rise to international prominence as Africa’s largest economy, are tempered by the many development and security challenges the country faces. While essential reforms in the power and agriculture sectors are underway, such efforts are balanced against the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, significant concerns around youth unemployment, and an increasingly contentious political environment in the run-up to the February 2015 elections. 

Dr Doyin Okupe, Senior Special Assistant to President Goodluck Jonathan, will discuss what steps the presidency is taking to address the country’s most urgent challenges, and how the political environment can be managed to overcome tensions that may impede progress.

Africa is now recognized for its vast potential as well as its political influence in international fora, and there has been a growing number of Africa-focused summits, with China, India, the European Union, South Korea and Turkey all hosting such events in recent years. The US has in the past given precedence to bilateral engagements in support of its ‘four pillars’ approach to implementing its Africa strategy. The first US-Africa Leaders’ Summit, held in August, marked a shift towards a complementary continent-wide engagement. 

At this roundtable, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield will discuss US policy and priorities in Africa and the significance of the summit for enhanced US-Africa relations.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The overarching theme of this event will be Korea’s changing role as a global power and its effect on the country’s relationships, including with the UK and Europe. It will aim to raise awareness of these issues to an audience of key decision-makers, and to encourage experts to think together strategically about areas of mutual interest, as well as practical ways to achieve deeper cooperation. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

This event is held in partnership with the South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo.

In light of China’s economic reforms and a high-profile anti-corruption campaign, the speaker will argue that fundamental political, economic and social shifts have changed the nature of opportunities and risks for foreign businesses in China.

Registration for this event is now closed.

This past Sunday, incumbent Dilma Rousseff defeated Aécio Neves in Brazil’s presidential runoff election, thus guaranteeing a fourth consecutive term in office for the Workers’ Party (PT). Her slim margin of victory (just over three percentage points) made this the closest presidential election in the country’s modern history, but it was also the sixth consecutive election fought between the PT and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), which led Brazil in the 1990s.

The PT-PSDB duopoly, firmly in place since the Plano Real stabilization programme in 1994, has provided Brazil with unprecedented political stability. At the same time, it has made it difficult for new actors to gain a foothold in national politics: Marina Silva of the Socialist Party (PSB) failed spectacularly in her bid to establish a third force this year.

Another problem generated by the duopoly is that it oversimplifies Brazilian politics to a competition between two recent legacies. The legacy of the PSDB’s Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) was macroeconomic stability, and the legacy of the PT’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-10) was social inclusion. Pointing to resurgent inflation, Neves ran on the Cardoso legacy of sound economic management; pointing to recent social change, Rousseff ran on the Lula legacy of pro-poor policies.

Although this style of campaigning provided useful informational shortcuts to voters, at times it seemed as if Cardoso and Lula were on the ballot themselves. Televised debates verged on shouting matches and were woefully devoid of programmatic details. At a time when Brazil faces a host of policy challenges — anaemic growth, rising prices, creaking infrastructure, corruption scandals, and an alarming credit bubble — this was the most backward-looking presidential campaign in recent memory.

Although both Rousseff and Neves called for national unity in the wake of the close result, there is no doubt that Brazil is a house divided. Since 2006, presidential elections have been characterized by strong regional and class cleavages. The more modern south and southeast regions voted solidly for Neves, while the poor northeast supported Rousseff by a margin of three to one.

Support for Rousseff in any given state or city was closely linked to the percentage of the local population receiving Bolsa Família, the popular conditional cash transfer policy introduced by the Lula government. Meanwhile, firms and investors showed their clear preference for Neves: every increase by Rousseff in pre-election polls led to drops in share prices and increased demand for dollars. Although Neves carried only 12 of Brazil’s 27 states, these 12 states are responsible for 62 per cent of Brazil’s GDP. In her second term, Rousseff will be making course corrections to her economic policy in the clear knowledge that the private sector, especially in the influential state of São Paulo, largely opposed her re-election.

…but the Opposition Advances in Congress

Rousseff will also have to contend with the most complex Congress of modern times. Of Brazil’s 32 registered parties, some 28 will be represented in the 2015-18 legislature, the highest number ever recorded. The largest party, the PT, will control only 14 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Both the PT and its principal coalition partner, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), lost ground in comparison to their performance in 2010. This means that the ruling coalition in 2015 will likely be reduced from two-third to three-fifths of the lower house, making it more difficult for Rousseff to approve constitutional amendments.

With a larger opposition bloc in Congress and a slim majority in the popular vote, Rousseff’s authority is clearly reduced. Unlike her predecessor Lula, she has only modest prestige and authority within the ruling PT, making it very unlikely that she will be able to promote an unchallenged successor from within the party ranks. Given that she cannot seek a third term, she runs the risk of facing early lame duck status. PT luminaries are already floating the name of Lula, now 69 years old, as the party’s possible candidate for 2018. To avoid sliding into irrelevance, Rousseff will need to name her new economic team (she is expected to make changes at the finance ministry and the central bank) as soon as possible, and to seize the legislative agenda in 2015.

The Path to Political Reform

A major item on Rousseff’s agenda will be political reform. Since the current constitution was introduced in 1988, every successive president has announced major proposals for changing the electoral system and the rules for campaign finance, with a few to reducing corruption and increasing accountability. Almost all of these proposals have died a slow death in Congress, so Rousseff is already advocating a plebiscite in order to preempt the expected foot-dragging by the political class.

One item that will certainly merit attention is the issue of re-election. Consecutive re-election of executives (presidents, governors and mayors) was introduced in 1997 and has revolutionized Brazilian politics. Some 65 per cent of mayors and 70 per cent of governors who attempt re-election are successful, and this has also been true of 100 per cent of presidents (Cardoso, Lula, and now Rousseff). In the past century, there has been only one other instance of three consecutive re-elected presidents in a democracy (Clinton, Bush and Obama in the US).

An end to immediate re-election was a key demand of both Aécio Neves and Marina Silva during the campaign. If Rousseff is sincere about political reform, she may set into motion the repeal of a rule that has greatly benefited her party.

The umbrella revolution in Hong Kong, precipitated by the announcement of the decision on how to hold the 2017 elections for chief executive in September, has now sprung several leaks. The passion of the initial protests which convulsed the centre of the city, and which even heavy downpours of rain could not dampen, has evaporated. Street protests only get you so far. The activists have to engage now in the delicate art of politics and compromise. This is where either the real achievements are gained or everything is lost. Street protests belong to the world of theatre. They only make a difference if they give impetus and energy to what happens afterwards, in the establishment of long term arrangements and real outcomes.

The political vision of the leadership in Beijing about the Hong Kong issue is pretty clear. The idea that China talked about 'One country, two systems' on the basis of each part of this balanced clause having equal weight is now over. It was an illusion. In fact, for the Beijing leadership, there was only ever one important part of that four word phrase – the first two words. 'One country' trumps everything. And the preservation of their idea of that one country and its best future is key. A Hong Kong which would be able to march off with a political system increasingly at odds with that presiding just over the border was never on the cards.

Now both the Hong Kongese democrats, and the outside world, are relieved of their illusions, how best to deliver a future for Hong Kong in an age when the airy empty promises of its old colonial masters, the British, are no longer relevant. First of all, there has to be a shift in thinking. Like it or not, Hong Kong figures as a province in the thinking of Beijing leaders around Xi Jinping – a special province, one that has a unique status, and significant value for them, but a province all the same. In that context, it lines up with all the other issues and problems they have to deal with, from restive western provinces to fractious and demanding central ones, to placating the demands for more freedom and space of boom towns like Shanghai or Guangzhou. Hong Kongese have to think about how they relate to all these domestic issues, and pragmatically accept that they are irrevocably tied to a system that has to handle these – its success or failure in the management of this is also their success or failure. Hong Kongese have a vested interest in the Beijing government. They have to start thinking of far smarter ways of being allies in this, rather than camping outside of it and resting on loud declarations of their privileges. A sense of entitlement inherited from the British will get them no traction in China anymore, where there are far larger priorities and battles going on.

Current Chief Executive C Y Leung has been a failure in almost every respect. He has proven poor at promoting Hong Kong’s interests in Beijing, the one place where he needs to deliver – and even poorer at delivering palatable messages back in Hong Kong. That Hong Kongese at least have some form of representation in 2017 is not much, but at least it is something. A good politician could have made something of this, messaged it differently, and used it as a basis on which to build. But Leung simply wasn’t up to this. It is hard to see him having a political life after 2017.  In many ways, he is already finished.

For the protestors, they now need to think deeply about their future strategy. They have made their point, and at least proved that the myth of Hong Kong’s apolitical population can be safely consigned to a trash can. Having politicized the city, they now need to argue, mobilize and build constituencies to support developments beyond 2017. Business is important here – the one constituency the Beijing leadership probably listen to and take seriously – so having an engagement strategy with them is crucial. Framing a demand for better quality leadership in the future is all-important here, because business, political and social constituencies all want to see this. If the Xi leadership in Beijing insists on a system where only two or three people can go through and then be voted on by the electorate, then the protesters at least have the negotiation space to demand far better quality candidates than the ones that have led the city since 1997 and its reversion to Chinese sovereignty. All three of the chief executives so far have been disappointments. Hong Kong now has the right to ask for a better deal, and insist that the people put forward are at least up to the job asked of them – something that the current incumbent evidently is not.

Does all this prove that Xi Jinping is a strong, forceful leader? Perhaps. Perhaps not. One could argue that a really strong leader would have had the courage and vision to let Hong Kong adopt a more open system in elections after 2017, and the confidence not to fear kickback from this into the mainland. What it does show is that, underneath all the heat and noise, Xi is as risk averse as his predecessor Hu Jintao, and has taken, at least domestically, a very safe option. If he had gone to Hong Kong and dared to explain directly to the people there what the Beijing government’s thinking was on this issue, that would have been even more impressive. At most, we can conclude that the Xi leadership is not radically different from their predecessors, but just aware of a vast menu of challenges they need to face domestically, of which Hong Kong is one of the least important. Beyond that, recent events over Hong Kong have shed little light into the real soul of the current Chinese leaders. At most it has proved what has long been known: that if you really want to see what they believe and what they want, then you cannot do that from Hong Kong but have to look at what they do over the border. In that sense, and only that sense, Hong Kong continues to occupy a unique position as the last place in China where its leaders can truly be themselves.

This article was originally published by IB Tauris.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

The speaker will argue that President Xi Jinping's accretion of substantial political power has rendered him the most influential Chinese leader in decades. Still, there is much debate over how President Xi intends to wield that power, and to what end. The speaker will seek to deconstruct Xi's understanding of the nature of power, speculating on his likely game plan for his tenure and exploring the implications for China, the region, and the world in the first quarter of this century.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION IS CLOSED.

How is China’s growing international status likely to affect the future trajectory of global governance? Will it operate within the confines of liberal order, or attempt to substantively revise the existing global framework? The speaker will argue that China is now playing an active role in shaping the rules, norms, and institutions of global governance. She will offer some fresh insights into this new trend in Chinese foreign policy by placing a lens upon key global policy-making realms, including the maritime commons, where conflicts over international norms and national interests are most stark.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION IS CLOSED.

The stunning victory of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in elections to Delhi’s legislative assembly on 7 February is clearly causing reverberations around India’s political establishment, and has been widely interpreted as the end of Narendra Modi’s honeymoon period. While it is not a rejection of the prime minister’s development agenda, it highlights the reality that his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has built previous electoral victories on a divided opposition.  Its implications may well spread far beyond Delhi.

Sensing Modi’s likely ascendency, many Western countries expended energy in courting him in the run-up to last year’s election. For the previous decade, many had ostracized Modi for his response to the 2002 riots that occurred in Gujarat while he was chief minister (CM). The belief that Modi was the likely prime minister, coupled with the desire to strengthen relations with India, as well as the fact that he had been cleared of complicity in the riots in each court case, meant that past concerns were put to one side. Underpinning this recalibration was a belief that Modi was a changed man; the earlier firebrand had transformed into a managerial technocrat, focusing on development issues — providing power to farmers for instance — in Gujarat.

The 2014 general election campaign did little to change that impression. The BJP’s success was built on a promise of development — house-building, access to sanitation and so forth. Progress has understandably been slower than many would have hoped. But the Delhi election does not change the fact that if successful strategies are put in place to begin delivering on promises made by, say, the third year of the current parliament, Modi may well be able to preside over a 10-year transformation of India.

Modi has also been wooing foreign investment. His bonhomie with foreign leaders, whether Chinese or American, is a powerful signal that India is open for business. India’s economic boom in the middle of the last decade was driven in part by positive investor sentiment. The subsequent realization that ‘red tape’ was still an impediment to business helped drive the slowdown. Recreating a feel-good wave could well boost economic growth; if it coincided with better governance, it could even become self-sustainable.

The Delhi election doesn’t change this, either. It reduces Modi’s air of invincibility and will mean that he faces genuine opposition, admittedly from a chief minister rather than in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament. The fact that it is India’s capital will give new Delhi CM Arvind Kejriwal much greater prominence internationally than any other CM. But given that both Modi and Kejriwal won landslides on a platform that reflected an aspiration for change rather than a promise for some form of community-based redistribution gives them a (relatively) shared agenda.

If Modi’s vision is to be implemented, it necessarily requires cooperation with chief ministers. Clearly, that is easier if states are BJP-controlled, and BJP-controlled states can be used to test economic reforms. But if a vision is to be India-wide, there has to be some level of cooperation with the majority of states, which do not have BJP governments.

Until the Delhi election, the BJP had been performing strongly in recent state elections. It may well continue to do so and edge closer to a majority in the upper house of parliament, the Rajya Sabha. But one takeaway from both the general election and the Delhi election is that the BJP is far from a majority party. It won a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha with a little over 30 per cent of the vote. Its vote was concentrated geographically, and the opposition was divided. In the Delhi election, it won 32 per cent of the vote. The obvious takeaway is that a divided opposition benefits the BJP. If the economy booms, more parties are likely to want to join hands with the BJP. If it does not, and if the opposition was united (admittedly, a very big if), the BJP will struggle to win two terms.

An alternative takeaway is that the social base of the BJP needs to be widened. The reaction to US President Barack Obama’s recent speech, in which he mentioned the need for religious tolerance, suggests sensitivity towards communal issues. Delhi witnessed a number of small-scale communal incidents — including vandalism against churches — in the run-up to the state election. If such incidents were replicated in the run-up to the Bihar election later this year, the outcome may well be much worse.

Any switch towards a more Hindutva-focused agenda would seem likely to encourage the consolidation of non-BJP parties. A serious outbreak of communal violence while Modi is PM will be bad for India, but also troubling for the West. Having portrayed himself in a presidential manner, Modi would struggle not to take some responsibility.

Thus, sticking with a development agenda must be imperative. The Delhi election should be seen as a blip for the BJP, a demonstration of the value Indian voters place on development and reinforce the need to focus on delivering that development. While voters may be getting impatient, what’s important is where India stands at the time of the next election.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Long predicted, many observers now think that China has or is about to become more powerful than the United States on the global stage. Joseph Nye will explore the facts behind these beliefs and question if the century of American centrality in the global balance of power is at an end.

LIVE STREAM: This event will be live streamed. The live stream will be made available at 18:00 BST on Tuesday 9 June.

ASK A QUESTION: We will endeavour to ensure that questions are put to the speaker from our online audience as well as from the audience in the auditorium. Questions can be sent in advance via email to questions@chathamhouse.org and during the event on Twitter using #CHEvents.

The speaker will argue that Chinese foreign policy should be viewed as an extension of domestic policy to a degree not seen in other countries. China's foreign policy aims to support domestic growth and employment, must be aligned with nationalist and narratives of ‘rejuvenation’ and the ‘China Dream’, and must help dilute hostile foreign values. The ‘One Belt, One Road’ project, also known as the ‘New Silk Road’, exemplifies this. The speaker will illustrate its origins and development, discuss how it promotes the Communist Party’s domestic agenda, as well as look at (secondary) geostrategic aims and difficulties. Finally, he will look at the lessons for Europe, and why and how this Chinese initiative should be welcomed.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION IS CLOSED.

It has become routine for China’s leaders to use high profile international events as a means of projecting a preferred image of what China stands for and how it will act as  a great power, one that is perhaps now second only to the US in the league table of global powers. So it is no surprise that Xi Jinping has used his interventions at the UN development summit and his address to the General Assembly to showcase China’s growing role as a global aid actor, and to call for greater ‘democratization’ of global governance institutions (or, in other words, a greater role and say for China and other developing countries). China’s alleged and self-proclaimed (and challenged) predilection for peace, a desire to build a ‘new type’ of (vaguely defined) international relations, and support for the UN as the sole arbiter of when sovereignty might possibly be put aside (instead of the US or a coalition of the willing) are also now relatively well-established and rehearsed Chinese positions.

In addition to wielding China’s financial power in support of this national image projection, Xi’s activities also represent a move towards mobilizing discursive power (话语权) as well. To date, and for a number of years, this discursive power has been primarily deployed in a defensive manner, with the aim of denying the supposed universal nature of many of the norms and principles of the international order. These norms, as articulated by both Chinese government officials and some supportive academic scholars, are not universal at all, but merely the product of a small number of Western countries’ histories, philosophies and developmental trajectories. So, in this formulation, while it is important to have a common set of principles and responsibilities as the basis for international interactions, each country should be free to develop its own nation-specific definitions based on its own unique histories and contexts. And it is only these Chinese-inspired definitions and aspirations – of human rights, for example, or development – that China should be judged against.

But this position has changed under Xi, with China’s leaders increasingly keen on promoting Chinese understandings and definitions as the basis for international debates and international action. Hot on the heels of Chinese attempts to take a leading role in defining the basis for global cyber diplomacy,  China is now seeking to shape the way that development is defined and understood – which of course has massive implications for how development, thus defined, might be attained.

Leading on development, missing on security

Xi’s willingness – or should that be desire – to establish Chinese potential global leadership was less apparent when it came to solving the major security challenges of the day. To be sure, there was talk about the need for new ways of dealing with insecurity that recognize the consequences of globalization and that no country can solve problems on its own – including, presumably, the United States. The pledge of more peacekeepers will cement China’s position as one of the world’s major contributors to UN overseas activities, and the promise of a military assistance fund to the African Union shows that Beijing really is an important security actor beyond its own borders. But when it comes to conflict in places like Syria, China seems content to maintain its back seat and allow Russia to take the lead in a crisis that is admittedly some distance from China’s own backyard. Expect a Chinese-led agenda for the G20 summit in 2016 in China that reinforces this differential willingness to assume leadership roles depending on the specific issue at hand.  

So for the time being, the aim seems to be primarily to confirm the idea that China is a new and very different type of great power; one that is a friend and supporter of those smaller developing states and emerging powers that had previously suffered from the asymmetric economic and military power of great powers in the West (or in some cases, still do). As part of this ‘difference’ a second related objective seems to be to establish China as a global leader on development issues.

But simply asserting something does not mean that it is true, and its something of an understatement to suggest that China’s pacific and non-interventionist self-identity has not been accepted by everybody, particularly in East and Southeast Asia. China’s developmental achievements have also been questioned. The response in Beijing to Hilary Clinton’s tweet that it was ‘shameless’ that Xi was co-host of a meeting on women’s rights shows that the defensive nature of Chinese policy remains in place: ‘those in the best position to judge the state of women's issues in China are Chinese people, particularly Chinese women’, according to the foreign ministry. And Clinton’s comments also show that the field of ideas is not being left open for China to do whatever it wants just yet; gaining widespread acceptance for Chinese preferences is not going to be an easy task and will likely face considerable resistance. But the suggestion here is that the world is likely to see a growing Chinese presence over the coming years not just as a global development and aid provider, but also as a putative developer of new global norms.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback