Moldova and Georgia face crucial elections – and diverging paths Expert comment LToremark 16 October 2024

The two countries face unusually consequential elections where their populations must choose between moving unambiguously towards the West – or towards closer ties with Russia.

Moldova and Georgia both go to the polls at the end of October; Moldova for presidential elections on the 20^th and Georgia for parliamentary elections on the 26^th. The two countries share a number of similarities – beyond their justified reputation as world-class wine producers. They are both small, low- to middle-income countries that have struggled to consolidate their democracies and have experienced oligarchic political influence. Both are candidate countries for EU membership, with Moldova a step ahead having been invited to start negotiations. 

For both countries these elections represent a fork in the road: either move unambiguously into the Western world, or step back from it and become more closely tied to Russia again and its way of governance. However, the second option has caused yet-to-be-resolved territorial conflicts in both countries – Transnistria for Moldova, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia.

Some would say it should not be such a ‘zero sum’ choice. Why must a nation choose between Russia and the West? While that may be a fair statement for countries like India or South Africa, it does not work for Russia’s former colonies, which Moscow wishes to control. 

Moldova and Georgia’s final similarity is that they face Russian interference and attempts to manipulate votes in their elections. In Moldova this has been especially brazen with the uncovering in September of a $15 million vote-buying scheme, including instructions on who to vote for distributed to over 130,000 citizens. Russian interference in Georgia’s election is less overt but at the same time more endemic considering its government has in effect been captured by pro-Russia forces.

Diverging paths

But this is where the similarities end and the contrasts become clear.

Moldova has a young, pro-Western and equality-conscious government, and 44 of the 100 MPs in its parliament are women. In this election, Maia Sandu is seeking her second and final term as president. The election is combined with a referendum asking the people if they wish to embed Moldova’s EU aspirations into the country’s constitution. The results of both the presidential election and the EU referendum will be close, reflecting a genuine split in attitudes (and debate) in the country. 

Georgia’s EU aspirations, meanwhile, are already embedded in its constitution – but that has not prevented Tbilisi from pivoting away from the West. Polls show   that around 80 per cent of Georgia’s population desires EU (and NATO) membership – rising to 90 per cent among the under 30s – but its government seems determined to deny them that future. 

Its new ‘foreign agents’ law is seemingly copy-pasted from Russia – and incompatible with EU membership. The election can be seen as a de facto referendum on the EU too. Georgia’s accession is suspended until its political crisis is resolved. 

Georgia faces other challenges to its democracy. Due to the country’s limited presidential powers, Georgia is in effect run by the unelected Bidzina Ivanishvili – founder of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party – whose relationship with Russia is murky at best. Judging by his recent speeches, Ivanishvili now blames the Western world not just for igniting the war in Ukraine, but also for the war in Georgia 16 years ago which resulted in the loss of 20 per cent of its territory at the hands of Russia. This extraordinary position is both factually incorrect and out of step with the Georgian people.

Both countries are now at a critical point. Whatever the outcome in Moldova, the election will pass off peacefully and competently. Its problems (Russia aside) are demographic and economic, and the country’s pro-Russian opposition is relatively weak.

Georgia’s election looks like it is going to be messy. Ivanishvili’s party will likely manipulate the election to a win. There is still a chance that Georgia’s pro-Western but also weak opposition will regain power and return the country to its European path. But if the manipulation by the incumbency is heavy, people will likely take to the streets in protest, as in April this year – and in the 2003 Rose Revolution.

Regime change via popular revolution shows political immaturity but the Georgian people may feel it is the only way they can have their views represented and their ambitions realised. 

Independent Thinking: How can France survive its budget crisis? Audio john.pollock 17 October 2024

Sophie Pedder and Shahin Vallée join the podcast to discuss France’s contentious budget and political drama, and the potential impact on Europe and beyond.

On this episode

France is facing political turmoil. The survival of Michel Barnier’s new government rests on whether he can pass a controversial budget intended to rescue the country from its huge fiscal deficit. Bronwen Maddox is joined by Sophie Pedder, the Paris bureau chief of The Economist, Shahin Vallée, a former adviser to Emmanuel Macron and Armida van Rij, the head of our Europe Programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

The killing of Yahya Sinwar won’t change the course of the Gaza war Expert comment jon.wallace 18 October 2024

Israel has larger ambitions for Gaza beyond the Hamas leader’s death and the armed group is still asserting its influence despite its degradation.

After a year of being hunted as one of the most wanted men in the Middle East, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by Israeli forces on 17 October, in the city of Rafah in the Gaza Strip.

Hailing from Khan Younis refugee camp, Sinwar was imprisoned in Israel in 1989 for the abduction and killing of two Israeli soldiers. He was freed alongside 1,000 other prisoners during a major 2011 exchange, gradually building a notorious reputation as an intelligent and ruthless political figure.

As Hamas’ Gaza chief since 2017, Sinwar oversaw the consolidation of the movement’s authoritarian rule in the Strip and co-directed its military confrontations with Israel. He is regarded as a chief architect of Hamas’ deadly assault of 7 October, which killed 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians, in southern communities.

Many world leaders and pundits were quick to embrace Sinwar’s death as an opportunity to press for a ceasefire in Gaza and secure the release of roughly 100 Israeli hostages still held by Hamas and other groups. It is too early to know the full repercussions of this development, but these hopes are largely misplaced – and reflect a reluctance to confront the larger obstacles and motivations that are preventing an end to the war.

Morale amid aimlessness

For Israelis, Sinwar’s death is undoubtedly a morale booster. It is a symbolic victory over a man deemed responsible for the 7 October massacres, and a tactical success that rids Israel of a formidable foe – one who was also an invested ally of Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Israeli politicians and generals will relish the news as another step towards restoring their reputations after their failure to prevent the 7 October attack.

Yet contrary to some wishful thinking, Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Israel’s calculus in Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose popularity has been slowly recovering in recent months, described the news as ‘the beginning of the end’ but warned that ‘the task before us is not yet complete’.

The intensification of Israel’s war with Hezbollah – including a ground invasion of Lebanon, airstrikes across the country, and the displacement of over 1 million people – has shifted Israelis’ focus away from Gaza over the past month, especially as Hezbollah rockets disrupt life in Israel’s central cities as well as the north.

During that time, the Israeli army has begun a major offensive in the northern part of the Strip, implementing what appears to be the first part of the so-called ‘General’s Plan’ – an operation to besiege and force out roughly 300,000 Palestinian civilians who remain in the area. It could also pave the way for Israel’s absorption of part of the territory. (Israel’s military has denied pursuing the plan).

As such, the Israeli government has relegated the importance of the hostages. Netanyahu is eager to divert the public’s frustration with his months-long sabotage of a deal, while the military – despite its clashes with the prime minister – is seizing the chance to redraw Israel’s geopolitical environment. Even if a deal is struck in the wake of Sinwar’s death, Israel’s bombing and carving-up of Gaza and south Lebanon will likely continue.

Dynamic but degraded

For Hamas, the killing of its fiery politburo chief – just over two months after the assassination of his predecessor Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran – is certainly a blow to its leadership and internal stability. But the Islamist movement’s dynamism has not changed. Hamas’s decision-making processes are not pegged to specific individuals, and other figures, whether in Gaza or in exile, will be rotated into senior positions.

It is unclear whether Hamas will promote a leader who shares Sinwar’s hardline orientation, or drift back to a more moderate figure similar to Haniyeh. Regardless, Hamas’s core demands in any ceasefire and hostage negotiations are unlikely to shift significantly. The movement is still seeking a permanent end to the war, and Israel is still refusing to grant it.

Hamas’s military capacity has been severely degraded by the Israeli offensive, not least by the fact that much of Gaza has been made unliveable and ungovernable. But the movement is far from destroyed. Its militants continue to fight a guerrilla war to undermine Israel’s foothold in Gaza, while trying to reassert Hamas control over public order, the war economy, and the distribution of aid.

Moreover, as the history of movements like Hamas and Hezbollah shows, the devastating nature of Israel’s campaigns and occupations are planting the seeds for further militancy among Palestinians, whether organized under Hamas or smaller, decentralized groups. The war has brutally decimated Gaza’s society, and the notion that killing figures like Sinwar will dissuade future recruits to fight Israel is fanciful.

On the Palestinian political level, Hamas and Fatah are still in talks about forming a unity agreement, though negotiations have so far remained fruitless. Even if a pact is made, Israel’s relentless targeting of Hamas personnel, the perception of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) as feckless collaborators, and Palestinians’ feeling of total abandonment raise doubts about the parties’ ability to regain popular support or legitimacy – whether to lead an interim government or the wider national movement.

The gravest threat

The killing of Sinwar is a significant marker in the Gaza war, with important ramifications for the movement he led and the conflict he seismically shaped. Israel will portray his death as validation of its aggressive military approach, and a further step in the erosion of Iran’s regional influence – an agenda the US has actively supported.

Where is Georgia now heading? 28 October 2024 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Online

After pivotal elections, experts discuss what the declared results and reactions mean for Georgia.

Following a year marked by protests over the controversial ‘Foreign Agents’ bill and broader concerns over democratic backsliding, Georgia faces pivotal parliamentary elections on 26 October. Regardless of the outcome, the results are expected to be contested as well as consequential.

In the wake of the election, experts will discuss the immediate and longer-term consequences.

Key questions:

• These were the first fully-proportional elections in Georgia. How much difference did it make
• What will the election results, as we currently understand them, mean for Georgia’s path to European integration? How will they affect Georgia’s foreign policy priorities?
• What role should the EU play? Is Georgia a test case for the EU as an aspiring geopolitical power?
• Is the oligarchic grip likely to be tightened or loosened? What role for undue influence now?
• Has Russia done all it can for now in Georgia? Or is there more it can do?

As the ruling party claims victory in Georgia’s disputed election, Western condemnation is no longer enough Expert comment LToremark 29 October 2024

As tens of thousands take to the streets to protest the election results, Georgia faces a familiar crisis – with a few key differences.

As the people of Georgia went to the polls on 26 October, many were hoping not only for a democratic change of government but also for an end to one-party dominance and a return to the path of European integration. The previously weak and divided opposition had grouped itself into four major electoral centres, promising a coalition government and framing these elections as a choice between Europe and Russia. 

Ahead of the election, President Salome Zourabishvili had put forward the Georgian Charter, a blueprint for a stable and democratic transition to a new style of governance and for initiating reforms to fulfil conditions for EU accession. It was signed by all pro-European and pro-Western opposition parties. 

The official election results gave the ruling Georgian Dream party a 54 per cent majority in contrast with exit polls that gave the opposition a 10 per cent lead. President Zourabishvili and the opposition parties refuse to recognize the results, beginning a long process of contestation with allegations of fraud and street protests. As the disappointment sets in and the streets once again replace the ballot box as a conduit for democratic change, there is a sense of déja vu.

Georgia has seen this before. A party sweeps to power on the tide of popular protest, initiates reforms to meet public expectations but, by the end of its second term, it takes an authoritarian turn. As it overstays its welcome, it starts manipulating elections to cling to power. People once again take to the streets and a new party wins by a landslide only to repeat the same cycle. But with each turn, the grip the ruling elites have on power gets stronger and the methods they use become more sophisticated. State security becomes equated with regime stability, leaving no space for normal democratic contestation or expressions of dissent. 

Although what is happening in Georgia fits this familiar pattern, there are some consequential differences. 

First, these were the first fully proportional elections. Previously, a mixed system of representation meant that the incumbency always had an advantage by dominating majoritarian districts. A new electoral system had created a not unreasonable expectation that these elections, if held freely, would result in a coalition government. The hope was this could help break the vicious cycle of Georgian politics, sustained by an extreme form of majoritarianism and a winner-takes-all political culture.

The Georgian Dream party was contesting its fourth consecutive term against a backdrop of falling popularity and growing societal mobilization in opposition to its authoritarian inclinations. Despite all this, it secured – some would insist manufactured – an absolute majority in elections that international observers say were marred by serious irregularities and fell short of democratic standards. 

The second important difference is that these elections were not only about saving Georgia’s democracy but also about rescuing its European perspective. Since Georgia was granted EU candidate status in December 2023, its parliament has adopted Russian-style laws on foreign agents and combating LGBTIQ+ ‘propaganda’. 

It has also adopted a strongly Eurosceptic political discourse, pushing back on international criticism and accusing EU and US officials of interference in domestic affairs and disregard for Georgia’s sovereignty. In response, the EU has suspended accession talks with Georgia indefinitely while the US has imposed targeted sanctions on high-ranking Georgian officials and judges. 

Georgia’s democratic backsliding at home and its pivot away from the West are both simultaneous and interrelated. It was widely hoped these elections would be a course correction and return Georgia to the path of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The election results, if they stick, will prevent this from happening. A Georgian Dream government will not work to fulfil conditions for EU accession, viewed as a challenge to its hold on power. 

The third and final difference is that these elections took place in the context of heightened geopolitical confrontation. The Georgian Dream ‘victory’ is a win for anti-liberal, conservative forces around the world championed, among others, by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. He was the first to congratulate Georgian Dream for its declared success and even visited Tbilisi in a show of solidarity and ideological alignment. 

The election result is also a win for Russia. It strengthens Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus, which has waned as a result of the war in Ukraine and the fall of Nagorny-Karabakh. Russian officials and propagandist were quick to congratulate Georgian Dream, wishing them success in standing up to Western pressures and offering help in case things got tough. 

From Moscow’s perspective, Georgia’s elections are part of a global hybrid war. They represent a local battle in the ongoing geopolitical contest between Russia and the West, between the rules-based global order and competitive multipolarity. 

As Georgia repeats a familiar pattern, what do the election results mean for its future? While clear predictions are difficult at this stage, it is worth bearing in mind that as the democratic resilience of the Georgian society has strengthened over time, so too has the state capacity to supress and control. 

In conversation with Julien Harneis, UN Assistant Secretary-General 18 November 2024 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 November 2024 Chatham House and Online

In this discussion, Julien Harneis will give critical insights into the UN’s humanitarian response in Yemen and the importance of maintaining independent humanitarian assistance.

According to the United Nations, Yemen has faced the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in the last decade, with over 20 million people in need of assistance. Years of ongoing conflict have devastated infrastructure, displaced millions, and caused widespread food insecurity and health emergencies. Access to essential services remains a daily struggle, and the escalating economic collapse has left vulnerable communities facing critical shortages in food, water, and medical supplies.

However, humanitarian actors are continually facing challenges in delivering aid to Yemen due to security threats and supply chain barriers, highlighting the urgent need for coordinated and sustainable international assistance.

UN Assistant Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, Julien Harneis, will provide an account of the humanitarian mission and evolving strategies in Yemen, the impact of regional conflicts in the delivery of aid and discuss other key questions including:

The break-up of Scholz’s coalition government signals the end of Germany’s old economic model Expert comment jon.wallace 12 November 2024

The coalition could not agree how to fund new support for Ukraine and failed to fully implement the ‘Zeitenwende’. A new government must push through reform.

As Europeans were still processing Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 US presidential election, an acrimonious break up occurred 4000 miles east of Washington DC.

Reports had been circulating for weeks about the fragile state of Germany’s ‘traffic light’ coalition government led by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, consisting of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party, and liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP).

The expectation had been that the coalition would hold on for a few more weeks and might even be given a new lease of life by Trump’s re-election. Instead, it collapsed on the day Trump’s win was confirmed. An unusually angry Scholtz announced in a live address that he had fired FDP Finance Minister Christian Lindner, effectively breaking up the coalition.

At the heart of the dispute was the so-called ‘debt brake’ – a constitutional mechanism which restricts Germany’s annual public deficit to 0.35 per cent of GDP. Lindner proposed a set of reforms which were unpalatable to the SPD and the Greens. 

In response, Scholz suggested declaring an emergency, which would have suspended the debt brake. That in turn was unacceptable to Lindner, leading to his sacking by the Chancellor.

Practically, this means the SPD and the Greens are now in a minority coalition, without agreement on the 2025 budget or the votes in parliament to pass it. They also still face the challenge of the debt brake.

A vote of confidence will take place in December, with elections to be held before the end of February 2025 latest.

The end of Germany’s economic model

At the root of Germany’s political crisis is the country’s economic model. For decades, Germany relied on a system that depended on cheap Russian gas, cheap imports of consumer goods from China, high-value exports – particularly in the automotive sector – and the US security umbrella.

With Russian energy no longer viable, the global economic landscape shifting, and Donald Trump on his way back to the White House, that model is no longer workable. And Germany’s economy is expected to contract by 0.2 per cent in 2024 – a contraction for the second year running.

The ‘Zeitenwende’, announced by Scholz in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, should have signalled a turnaround of both foreign and economic policy, given how much the two are interconnected. Yet on both fronts, too little changed.

Germany’s reliance on Russian gas did come to an abrupt end in 2022. And Germany is Ukraine’s second largest military aid donor after the US, while accepting the most Ukrainian refugees.

But the ‘Zeitenwende’ turnaround ended there. Scholz’s coalition government failed to prepare for long-term investment in defence at the levels required by creating an off-budget defence spending fund which would have run out in 2027. The draft budget for 2025 showed defence spending would have been cut, as would support for Ukraine.

Germany has also struggled to turn around its economic woes, with the car industry particularly affected. Cheap Chinese EVs and new energy technologies are competing with Germany’s most powerful companies. Volkswagen, the country’s largest car manufacturer, has announced plant closures and layoffs due to shrinking profit margins.  

To the west, Trump’s threat to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports meant share prices of Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedez-Benz and Porsche all dropped between 4 to 7 per cent following news of his re-election.

To the east, trade tensions between the EU and China are intensifying. Yet rather than choosing to diversify, German companies have doubled down on their bets in China, with German investment in the country rising from €6.5bn for the whole of 2023 to €7.3bn in the first half of 2024 alone – only exposing carmakers further.

Germany’s support for Ukraine

Like French President Emmanuel Macron, Scholz had already been weakened by the results of the European Parliamentary elections in June. With the collapse of his traffic light coalition, the EU’s Franco-German ‘engine’ is now well and truly stalled – until new leadership can be found. This weakness comes at a perilous moment when clear, united European leadership, and much increased funding, is needed to shore up support for Ukraine.