The idea of a universal basic income (UBI) is certainly an intriguing one, and has been gaining traction. Swiss voters just turned it down. But it is still alive in Finland, in the Netherlands, in Alaska, in Oakland, CA, and in parts of Canada. 

Advocates of a UBI include Charles Murray on the right and Anthony Atkinson on the left. This surprising alliance alone makes it interesting, and it is a reasonable response to a growing pool of Americans made jobless by the march of technology and a safety net that is overly complex and bureaucratic. A comprehensive and excellent analysis in The Economist points out that while fears about technological unemployment have previously proved misleading, “the past is not always a good guide to the future.”

Robert Greenstein argues, however, that a UBI would actually hurt the poor by reallocating support up the income scale. His logic is inescapable: either we have to spend additional trillions providing income grants to all Americans or we have to limit assistance to those who need it most. 

One option is to provide unconditional payments along the lines of a UBI, but to phase it out as income rises. Libertarians like this approach since it gets rid of bureaucracies and leaves the poor free to spend the money on whatever they choose, rather than providing specific funds for particular needs. Liberals fear that such unconditional assistance would be unpopular and would be an easy target for elimination in the face of budget pressures. Right now most of our social programs are conditional. With the exception of the aged and the disabled, assistance is tied to work or to the consumption of necessities such as food, housing, or medical care, and our two largest means-tested programs are Food Stamps and the Earned Income Tax Credit.

Liberals have been less willing to openly acknowledge that a little paternalism in social policy may not be such a bad thing. In fact, progressives and libertarians alike are loath to admit that many of the poor and jobless are lacking more than just cash. They may be addicted to drugs or alcohol, suffer from mental health issues, have criminal records, or have difficulty functioning in a complex society. Money may be needed but money by itself does not cure such ills. 

A humane and wealthy society should provide the disadvantaged with adequate services and support. But there is nothing wrong with making assistance conditional on individuals fulfilling some obligation whether it is work, training, getting treatment, or living in a supportive but supervised environment.

In the end, the biggest problem with a universal basic income may not be its costs or its distributive implications, but the flawed assumption that money cures all ills.  

In an interview on NPR's Fresh Air, Jeffrey Rosen discusses how technological changes are challenging basic Constitutional principles of freedom of speech and our own individual autonomy.

TERRY GROSS, HOST:This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross. The digital world that we've come to rely on - the Internet, social networks, GPS's, street maps—also creates opportunities to collect information about us, track our movements and invade our privacy. Add to that brain scans that might reveal criminal tendencies and new developments in genetic medicine and biotechnology, and you have a lot of potential challenges to basic Constitutional principles that our founding father couldn't possibly have imagined.

My guest, Jeffrey Rosen has put together a new book that explores those challenges. Along with Benjamin Wittes, he co-edited Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change. It's a publication of the Brookings Institution's Project on Technology and the Constitution, which Rosen directs. He's also a law professor at George Washington University and legal editor for The New Republic.

His new book is a collection of essays in which a diverse group of legal scholars imagine plausible technological developments in or near the year 2025 that would stress current Constitutional law, and they propose possible solutions.

Jeffrey Rosen, welcome back to FRESH AIR. So what are the particular parts of the Constitution that you think really come into play here with new technologies?

JEFFREY ROSEN: Well, what's so striking is that none of the existing amendments give clear answers to the most basic questions we're having today. So, for example, think about global positioning system technologies, which the Supreme Court is now considering. Can the police, without a warrant, put a secret GPS device on the bottom of someone's car and track him 24/7 for a month?

Well, the relevant constitutional text is the Fourth Amendment which says the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. But that doesn't answer the question: Is it an unreasonable search of our persons or effects to be monitored in public spaces?

Some courts have said no. Several lower court judges and the Obama administration argue that we have no expectation of privacy in public, because it's theoretically possible for our neighbors to put a tail on us or for the police to track us for 100 miles, as the court has said. Therefore, we have to assume the risk that we're being monitored, ubiquitously, 24/7 for a month.

But not everyone agrees. In a visionary opinion, Judge Douglas Ginsburg on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit said there's a tremendous difference between short-term and long-term surveillance. We may expect that our neighbors are watching when we walk on the street for a few blocks, but no one in practice expects to be tailed or surveilled for a month.

Ginsburg said we do have an expectation of privacy in the whole of our movements, and therefore when the police are going to engage in long-term surveillance, because they can learn so much more about us, they should have a warrant.

There was a remarkable moment in the oral argument for the global positioning system case. Chief Justice John Roberts, who asked the first question, he said: Isn't there a difference between 100-mile search of the kind we've approved in the past and watching someone for a month?

The government's lawyer resisted, and Roberts said: Is it the U.S. government's position that the police could put GPS devices inside the clothes of the members of this court, of these justices, or under our cars and track us for a month? And when the government's lawyer said yes, I think he may have lost the case.

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Technology unimaginable at the time of the nation’s founding now poses stark challenges to America’s core constitutional principles. Policymakers and legal scholars are closely examining how constitutional law is tested by technological change and how to preserve constitutional principles without hindering progress. In Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change (Brookings Institution Press, 2011), Governance Studies Senior Fellow Benjamin Wittes and Nonresident Senior Fellow Jeffrey Rosen asked a diverse group of leading scholars to imagine how technological developments plausible by the year 2025 could stress current constitutional law. The resulting essays explore scenarios involving information technology, genetic engineering, security, privacy and beyond.

On December 13, the Governance Studies program at Brookings hosted a Judicial Issues Forum examining the scenarios posed in Constitution 3.0 and the challenge of adapting our constitutional values to the technology of the near future. Wittes and Rosen offered key highlights and insights from the book and was joined by two key contributors, O. Carter Snead and Timothy Wu, who discussed their essays.

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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Although we are early in the twenty-first century, breathtaking changes in technology are posing stark challenges to our constitutional values. From free speech to privacy, from liberty and personal autonomy to the right against self-incrimination, basic constitutional principles are under stress from technological advances unimaginable even a few decades ago, let alone during the founding era. In Constitution 3.0, we asked a group of provocative thinkers to imagine the ways in which technological change will challenge our constitutional and legal values in the year 2030.

Will privacy become obsolete, for example, in a world where ubiquitous surveillance is becoming the norm? Imagine that Facebook and Google post live feeds to public and private surveillance cameras, allowing 24/7 tracking of any citizen in the world. How can we protect free speech now that Facebook, Google, and other private intermediaries have more power than any king, president, or Supreme Court justice to decide who can speak and who can be heard? How will advanced brain-scan technology affect the constitutional right against self-incrimination? And on a more elemental level, should people have the right to manipulate their genes and design their own babies? Should we be allowed to patent new forms of life that seem virtually human? And we then asked our contributors to propose ways of translating and preserving constitutional values in the year 2030, in the face of dizzying technological change.

The launch event for the book, held on December 13 at Brookings, provoked a vigorous conversation that mirrored the debates in the book itself. My co-editor Ben Wittes and I invited Tim Wu and Carter Snead to discuss their contributions to Constitution 3.0 and to debate a question the U.S. Supreme Court is now considering: should the police be allowed, without a valid warrant, to secretly put a Global Positioning System device on the bottom of a car of a suspected drug dealer in order to track his movements, 24/7, for a month? The panelists disagreed about the proper outcome: Tim Wu argued that Google and Facebook now have more power over our private data than any police agent or Supreme Court justice, and yet the Constitution, as currently interpreted, restricts private corporations far less rigorously than it constrains the police. Carter Snead insisted that it’s not enough for judges to predict how much privacy people actually expect in the face of new technologies; instead, they need to identify how much privacy we should demand in order to live in a free society rather than a police state. Benjamin Wittes dissented, arguing that Congress, rather than the Courts, should protect the privacy of our geo-locational information, whether collected by GPS devices or stored on cell phones. And I channeled the spirit of the patron saint of Constitution 3.0, Justice Louis Brandeis. Brandeis would have been impatient, I think, with the government’s statements that we have no expectations of privacy in public; instead, Brandeis would have insisted on translating the constitutional Framers’ prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures into the 21st century. Now that GPS devices and cell phones can reveal far more about our movements, thoughts, and activities outside of the home than old style home break-ins could have revealed in the 18th century, Brandeis might have insisted that long term surveillance is unreasonable without a warrant.

If you watch the webcast, you’ll get a sense of debate among the panelists about who is best equipped to protect constitutional values in the face of new technologies: the Supreme Court, Congress, administrative agencies, private companies like Google and Facebook, political activism groups, or some combination of all of the above. Regardless of where you come out on these issues, I hope you’ll find the project of trying to imagine the constitutional challenges of the next few decades as challenging and rewarding as we did in writing the book.

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On April 10 and 11, 2015, the Seventh Summit of the Americas will bring together the heads of state and government of every country in the Western Hemisphere for the first time. Recent efforts by the United States to reform immigration policy, re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, and reform our approach to drug policies at home and abroad have generated greater optimism about the future of inter-American relations. This Summit provides an opportunity to spark greater collaboration on development, social inclusion, democracy, education, and energy security.

However, this Summit of the Americas is also convening at a time when the hemisphere is characterized by competing visions for economic development, democracy and human rights, and regional cooperation through various institutions such as the Organization of American States, the Union of South American Nations, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

On Friday, April 3, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings hosted Assistant Secretary of State Roberta S. Jacobson for a discussion on the Seventh Summit of the Americas and what it portends for the future of hemispheric relations.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #VIISummit

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As the United States and Cuba rebuild formal relations, certain challenging topics remain to be addressed. Among these are outstanding U.S. property claims in Cuba. In this report, Richard E. Feinberg argues that it is in both countries’ interests to tackle this thorny issue expeditiously, and that the trauma of property seizures in the twentieth century could be transformed into an economic opportunity now.

The report looks closely at the nearly 6,000 certified U.S. claims, disaggregating them by corporate and individual, large and small. To settle the U.S. claims, Feinberg suggests a hybrid formula, whereby smaller claimants receive financial compensation while larger corporate claimants can select an “opt-out” option whereby they pursue their claims directly with Cuban authorities, perhaps facilitated by an umbrella bilateral claims resolution committee. In this scenario, the larger corporate claimants (which account for nearly $1.7 billion of the $1.9 billion in total U.S. claims, excluding interest) could select from a menu of business development rights, including vouchers applicable to tax liabilities or equity investments, and preferred acquisition rights. Participating U.S. firms could also agree to inject additional capital and modern technology, to ensure benefits to the Cuban economy.

Though it is often argued that Cuba is too poor to pay some $2 billion of claims, the paper finds that Cuba can in fact manage payments if they are stretched out over a reasonable period of time and exclude interest. The paper also suggests a number of mechanisms whereby the Cuban government could secure funds to pay compensation, including revenues on normalization-related activities.

The Cuban government does not dispute the principle of compensation for properties nationalized in the public interest; the two governments agree on this. Cuba also asserts a set of counter-claim that allege damages from the embargo and other punitive actions against it. But a grand bargain with claims settlement as the centerpiece would require important changes in U.S. sanctions laws and regulations that restrict U.S. investments in Cuba. The United States could also offer to work with Cuba and other creditors to renegotiate Cuba’s outstanding official and commercial debts, taking into account Cuba’s capacity to pay, and allow Cuba to enter the international financial institutions.

Feinberg ultimately argues that both nations should make claims resolution the centerpiece of a grand bargain that would advance the resolution of a number of other remaining points of tension between the two nations. This paves the way for Cuba to embrace an ambitious-forward-looking development strategy and for real, notable progress in normalizing relations with the United States.

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Editors' Note: Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Richard Feinberg reports from Havana on President Obama's historic visit to the island. 

Havana is abuzz at the sheer weight of the president of the United States arriving in Cuba. In the hours before President Obama’s arrival, astonished Cubans told tales of planeloads of black limousines and massive Suburbans, of heavily armed security personnel, of sunglass-sporting secret service officers arriving at the airport and making their way through the city.

Cubans have anticipated the arrival of the Obama family with considerable joyfulness, but the festive mood is colored by a certain reticence, a deep-seated fear of, once again, being overwhelmed by the Colossus from the North. 

The government has bargained hard with Obama’s advance team to hem him in, to limit his direct contact with the Cuban people. There will be no large outdoor speech—rather on Tuesday morning Obama will address a hand-picked audience in the newly renovated Grand Theatre with its limited seating capacity—although the Cuban government agreed to live television coverage. The U.S. president will also meet with local entrepreneurs, but in a constricted venue, and ditto for his meeting with independent civil society and political dissidents.

On Tuesday afternoon the president will be the guest of honor at an exhibition game between the visiting Tampa Bay Rays (their chance selection was by lottery) and the Cuban national team. The White House has hinted that he will throw out the first ball, but this could not be confirmed. On a prior occasion, Jimmy Carter did indeed throw out the first ball, but that was during a visit long after his presidency.

Putting the lanky, athletic Obama on the mound would run a certain risk for the Cubans. Suppose the excited crowd begins to cheer, “Obama, Obama…” Even more dangerous, imagine if the exuberant Cubans follow with, “USA, USA, USA…”

Back home, critics of the Obama administration say he’s made too many concessions to the Cuban government without reciprocity. Cuba is no closer to a liberal democracy, they argue, than it was on December 17, 2014, when Barack Obama and Raúl Castro announced their decision to normalize diplomatic relations. But these skeptics miss this vital point: By befriending the president of the United States, the president of Cuba and first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) has exploded his regime’s long-standing national security paradigm organized around the imminent danger posed by a hostile empire. The rationale for the state-of-siege mentality, the explanation for the poor economic performance, no longer resonates. The ruling political bureau of the PCC stands exposed before the Cuban people.

Hence, the government is working hard to persuade the people that it has not forsaken its nationalist credentials: the PCC’s daily newspaper, Gramna, ran a fierce editorial warning for Obama not to try to step on their little island, not to intervene in its internal affairs; rather, he must arrive as a classic Greek suitor bearing gifts. But no Trojan horses, the Cubans are too wary to be fooled so easily.

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, passing through Havana this week, pointedly remarked: “The hearts of the Cuban and Venezuelan people are warm and true. Not like others who come with smiles but hide a clenched fist.”

In truth, most Cubans very much want the trip to succeed. They want more tourists, more remittances from Cuban-Americans living in Florida and New Jersey. They would welcome more trade, more access to famous U.S. consumer brands. Many would even welcome U.S. investment—with the promise of good jobs and better wages. All would love to be able to travel freely between their island and the outside world, especially to the nearby United States. In short, they yearn for normality.

And savvy Cubans sense the link between the more relaxed diplomatic atmosphere and the gradual opening of political space so evident on the island. While not yet living in a fully open society, Cubans are now more willing to express their views openly, to foreigners and among themselves. Some are even forming proto-civil society groupings, to advance gender equality, environmental stewardship, religious freedom, and human rights.

Bathing in these new liberties, Cubans worry that something, anything, could go wrong during the visit. In such a highly scrutinized setting, one misstep, one awkward phrase, one misinterpretation of Cuban history, would give ammunition to hardliners to set the clock back and to restore the old national security paradigm.

Raúl Castro has pinned his own legacy too closely to the young U.S. president to allow any stumbles during this historic visit, to stand idly by while the visit was twisted by his internal opponents. And Raúl and his confidants retain control over the mass media in Cuba, and the PCC will loyally pass along the party line, as set by the political bureau and echoed all along the chain of command, down to the district and village level.

So the visit will be declared a success. Most likely, it will truly be a marvelous moment, because Obama is just the right person to stretch out the U.S. hand to the long-aggrieved Cuban people. The very traits for which Obama is so often criticized at home will serve him well in Cuba: his humility, his respectfulness, his sense of irony—these are just what Cubans have been harking for from the United States for so many decades.

The Cubans will also love Michelle Obama and the two teenage Obama daughters, especially if Sasha and Malia are freed to wander forth and meet their contemporaries at one of Havana’s clubs where young people gather—the Cuban media and public will bask in the respect being paid to Cuban music and dance, to “Cubanismo.”

Obama and Castro share some goals, and conflict on others. Both wish for a peaceful transition to a more prosperous Cuba, more open to the world and to global commerce. But they differ on the endgame: Obama would like to see a more liberal, pluralistic polity, while Castro presumably wants to see his Communist Party retain its grip on power. But that chess match will be waged later, by their successors. 

For Barack Obama and Raúl Castro, today their interests are convergent. Hence, we can predict that, most likely, the visit will be a great success, a historic legacy for which both statesmen will be justly proud.

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For Cubans, “D17”—December 17, 2014—changed everything. On that day, the United States and Cuba announced that the two countries would renew diplomatic relations nearly 60 years after Fidel Castro came to power. For both countries, a new transformation has begun—but this time, it is the promise of Cuba’s insertion in the globalized economy and the crumbling U.S. embargo that is catalyzing change on the island.

On May 31, the Brookings Book Club hosted Nonresident Senior Fellow Richard E. Feinberg and NPR Correspondent Tom Gjelten for a discussion of Feinberg’s new book, “Open for Business: Building the New Cuban Economy” (Brookings Institution Press, 2016). The discussion focused on the factors that guided this monumental decision: international diplomacy; changes already underway in Cuba; successful Cuban entrepreneurs and foreign investments; and scenarios for Cuba’s future development path.

Three young Cuban leaders, including two whose vignettes appear in the book, “Open for Business,” joined the discussion and shared their personal experiences with the economic realities in Cuba today, as well as the opportunities created by the shift in Cuban-American relations.

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On April 2, 2011, Ethiopia embarked upon the construction of what is expected to be the biggest hydroelectric power plant in Africa.  Called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), it will be located on the Blue Nile, 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the border with the Republic of Sudan and will have the capacity to produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity.  The GERD, once completed and made operational, is expected to ameliorate chronic domestic energy shortages, help the country’s households (especially those located in the rural areas) switch to cleaner forms of energy and allow the government to earn foreign exchange through the exportation of electricity to other countries in the region.  Although authorities in Addis Ababa believe that the dam will contribute  significantly to economic growth and development—not just in Ethiopia, but also in neighboring countries, such as Sudan—its construction has been very controversial.  The major controversies revolve around Ethiopia’s decision to fund the building of the dam from its own sources and the potential impacts of the dam on downstream countries, especially Egypt.  

Ethiopia opted to source funds for the construction of the GERD through selling bonds to citizens at home and abroad.  Government employees have been encouraged to devote as much as one or two months of their salaries to the purchasing of the GERD bonds.  Most public workers in Ethiopia earn relatively low wages and face a significantly high cost of living.  Hence, they are not likely to be able to sacrifice that much of their salaries to invest in this national project.  Nevertheless, many of them have been observed purchasing the GERD bonds, primarily because of pressure from the government and the belief that participation in this national project is a show of one’s patriotism.

The government of Ethiopia has also encouraged the private sector to invest in the GERD project.  Specifically, private domestic banks and other business enterprises are expected to purchase millions of Birr worth of these bonds.  The government also hopes that Ethiopians in the diaspora will contribute significantly to this massive effort to develop the country’s hydroelectric power resources.  However, many Ethiopians in the diaspora have not been willing to invest in the GERD project, citing pervasive corruption in the public sector and dictatorial government policies as reasons why they would not commit the resources necessary to move the project forward.  Additionally, Ethiopians living outside the country have argued that the present government in Addis Ababa continues to impede the country’s transition to democracy by making it virtually impossible for opposition parties to operate, using draconian laws (e.g., anti-terrorism laws) to silence legitimate protests and generally denying citizens the right to express themselves.  For these reasons, many of them have refused to invest in the GERD project.  Finally, Ethiopia’s traditional development partners, including such international organizations as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, appear to be unwilling to lend the country the necessary funds for the construction of the dam given the controversies surrounding the dam and their policies on the building of megadams.

Egypt has registered its opposition to the construction of the GERD.  In fact, before he was ousted, former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi made it known to authorities in Addis Ababa that Egypt would not support the project.  The Egyptians, as they have done before, have invoked the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1929, which granted Egypt veto power over all construction projects on the Nile River and its tributaries.  According to Cairo, then, Ethiopia was supposed to obtain permission from Egypt before embarking on the GERD project.

In May 2010, five upstream riparian states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania) signed the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which, they argue, would provide the mechanism for the equitable and fair use of Nile River waters.  On June 13, 2013, the Ethiopian Parliament ratified the CFA and incorporated it into domestic law.  The other four signatories have not yet ratified the treaty but plan to do so eventually.  Egypt and Sudan, however, have refused to sign the CFA and continue to argue that the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, as well as the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan, represent the only legal mechanisms for Nile River governance.  Recently, however, the government of Sudan has indicated its support for the GERD, and South Sudan, which gained its independence from Khartoum on July 9, 2011, does not oppose the project either.

Significant increases in population in Egypt, the need for the country to expand its irrigated agricultural base, as well as other industrial needs have significantly increased the country’s demand for water.  Unfortunately for Egyptians, the only viable source of water in the country is the Nile River.  Thus, Egyptians, as made clear by their leaders, are not willing to relinquish even one drop of water.  The country’s bitter opposition to the GERD stems from the fact that it will reduce the flow of water into the Nile River and force Egyptians to live with less water than now.  Egyptian leaders are not willing to accept the assertion made by the Ethiopian government that the construction of the dam will not significantly reduce the flow of water from the Blue Nile into Egypt.  Thus, Cairo has hinted that it would employ all means available to stop the construction of the GERD.

The site of the GERD was identified during geological surveys conducted between 1956 and 1964 by the United States Bureau of Reclamation.  Although studies determining the feasibility of a dam on the Blue Nile were completed almost half a century ago, previous Ethiopian governments did not make any attempt to build such a structure on the Blue Nile.  This inaction may have been due to Egypt’s ability to lobby the international donor community and prevent it from providing Addis Ababa with the necessary financial resources to complete the project, Ethiopia’s chronic internal political instability, or Egypt’s military strength and its strong ties with neighboring Sudan (the latter shares the same interests as Egypt regarding the waters of the Nile River).  In fact, the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 bilateral agreement between Sudan and Egypt granted both countries complete control of all the waters of the Nile River.

Since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has been weakened significantly, politically, economically and militarily.  The struggle between the military and civil society for control of the government has been a major distraction to the Egyptian military, and it is unlikely that it can effectively face a relatively strong and more assertive Ethiopian military.  Hence, it appears that this might be the most opportune time for Ethiopia to initiate such a construction project.  Perhaps more important is the fact that virtually all of the upstream riparian states are no longer willing to allow both Egypt and Sudan to continue to monopolize the waters of the Nile River.  In addition, Ethiopia is relatively at peace and maintains good relations with its neighbors, particularly the Republic of Sudan, which would be critical in any successful attack on Ethiopia by Egypt.  Of course, Addis Ababa has also invoked and relied on the Cooperative Framework Agreement which, besides Ethiopia, has been signed by four other upstream riparian States—the CFA favors the equitable and fair use of the waters of the Nile River.  Authorities in Addis Ababa believe that the GERD will contribute to such fair and equitable use; after all, the Blue Nile (which is located in Ethiopia) provides 86 percent of the water that flows into the Nile River.  Up to this point, Ethiopia has made virtually no use of that water, allowing Egypt and Sudan alone to dictate its usage.

Critics of the GERD, including some Ethiopians within and outside the country, argue that Addis Ababa initiated the building of the dam just to divert public attention away from internal political tensions associated with lack of religious freedom, human rights violations, suppression of the press, and the economic and political polarization that has become pervasive throughout the country during the last several decades. 

Given the economic significance of the Blue Nile for the source country (Ethiopia) and downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan), it is critical that these countries engage in constructive dialogue to find a mutually beneficial solution for the project.  Such negotiations should take into consideration the fact that the status quo, characterized by Egyptian monopolization of the waters of the Nile River and the exclusion of Ethiopia from exploiting its own water resources for its development, cannot be maintained.  Thus, the construction of the GERD should be taken as a given and the three countries—Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia—should find ways to maximize the benefits of the dam and minimize its negative impacts on the downstream countries.  As part of that negotiation, both Egypt and Sudan should abandon their opposition to the CFA, sign it and encourage their legislatures to ratify it.  The Nile River and its tributaries should be considered common property belonging to all Nile River Basin communities and should be managed from that perspective.

In recent years, relations between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the African Union have been crumbling. Relations between the two were once solid with strong support from AU member countries.  The ICC has had support from African countries because of the court’s ability to prevent Rwandan genocide-type atrocities and ease power differentials between small and large African nations in international trial situations. 

Brookings nonresident scholar, John Mukum Mbaku, discusses the rising tensions between the ICC and African countries in his contribution to Foresight Africa, a collection of short briefs on the top challenges and opportunities for Africa in 2014.

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According to John Mbaku, some African countries see the ICC as quite problematic because of the perceived bias that the court brings mostly African criminal cases to trial.  Other countries feel their sovereignty is threatened by the court.  The African Union has gone so far as to ask member countries not to comply or cooperate with the ICC and has attempted (unsuccessfully) to withdraw from The Hague.  A major trigger for these the recent issues with the ICC and African countries was the election of Uhuru Kenyatta as president of Kenya. Kenyatta was indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity and for allegedly inciting ethnic violence following the highly disputed 2007 elections in Kenya.  

John argues that repairing the ties between African countries and the ICC will be difficult, but might be possible through reforms to the ICC process and commitment to stronger judicial systems in African nations.

Read Foresight Africa 2014, which details the top priorities for Africa in the coming year, to learn more about the prospects for strengthening  international justice in Africa, and other critical issues for the region.

For many years, Africans have complained that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has concentrated its efforts exclusively in Africa, a process that has made a mockery of the court’s claims to bring about an end to global impunity. Some Africans have even argued that the ICC’s claims that it is helping bring about justice in Africa are not unlike those made by proponents of the colonial order established by the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885.

On Tuesday, March 11, I participated in a panel discussion entitled, “The International Criminal Court in Africa: Bias, Legitimate Objections, or Excuses for Impunity?” co-hosted by New York University’s School of Continuing and Professional Studies (SCPS), Center for Global Affairs and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).  The program brought together experts interested in justice and peaceful coexistence in Africa to examine the role that the International Criminal Court (ICC) can play in minimizing impunity in the continent.

I was joined by Ambassador Tiina Intelmann, president of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court; Richard Dicker, director of the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch; and Jennifer Trahan, clinical associate professor at the New York University’s School of Continuing and Professional Studies (SCPS), Center for Global Affairs.  David Tolbert, president of the International Center for Transitional Justice, moderated the discussion.

The most important conclusions from what was a robust dialogue were that (i) it is very important that African countries develop the legal and institutional capacity to deal effectively and fully with impunity and other extra-legal activities that impede human development and peaceful coexistence; (ii) the international community should help African countries develop that capacity; (iii) the ICC should make a concerted effort to open dialogue with the African Union in particular and Africans generally in order for the court to gain a better insight into African problems, while, at the same time, help Africans understand and appreciate the nature of the ICC’s work, how it functions, and why it is a critical international body in the fight against impunity; and (iv) the ICC needs to improve openness and transparency in its activities. To make the ICC a truly international court, important countries such as the United States, India, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation need to be brought aboard. Obviously, more dialogue is needed and it is my hope that soon, we will be able to undertake a discussion of this type somewhere in Africa.

During my presentation, I argued that an important part of improving relations between Africa and the ICC is that Africans must take ownership of their problems and find ways to resolve them themselves. For one thing, justice is most effectively delivered locally. Hence, the first line of business is for each African country to develop the legal and institutional capacity to deal with impunity and other governance problems. External actors, notably the ICC, should only be considered conflict-resolution instruments of last resort.

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On Friday, October 31, 2014, President Blaise Campaoré, who had ruled Burkina Faso for the last 27 years, was forced out of office. The resignation and subsequent military takeover of the government has created instability and questions over leadership in the country—especially since the constitutional line of succession has been broken by the insertion of military leaders. The power of the military is clear, especially since it has already influenced a second change in leadership. This interruption, subsequent transition and suspension of the constitution, then, have seriously threatened the strength of the rule of law and the future of the Burkinabé government.

The violent demonstrations that eventually forced President Campaoré to flee with his family into exile in Côte d’Ivoire could have been avoided had he not considered himself above the law. The impetus for the mass demonstrations was his attempt to change the country’s constitution in order to secure for himself another five-year term in office. Campaoré’s initial reaction to the violent demonstrations was to dissolve the government but retain his position as president until new elections were carried out to select a new government. He also agreed not to seek another term in office. The opposition, however, insisted that he resign. Interestingly, in his resignation statement, issued shortly before he fled the country, President Campaoré called for “free and transparent” elections to be held in 90 days to form a new government.

Shortly after the president’s resignation, General Honoré Traoré, Campaoré’s aide de camp, proclaimed himself president of the republic. This immediate military intervention into Burkinabé politics betrays either a lack of appreciation for constitutional democracy or a willful attempt by the military to take advantage of the instability occasioned by the planned constitutional changes to maximize their corporate interests. But, could someone who had risen to the head of the Burkinabé military have such little understanding of and appreciation for the constitutional order? In announcing that he had assumed the office of head of state, Traoré actually stated as follows: “In line with constitutional measures, and given the power vacuum . . . I will assume as of today my responsibilities as head of state.”

Importantly, there is no provision in the constitution of Burkina Faso for the head of the military or some other military officer to assume the powers of the president in case of a vacancy in the office. Succession, in the case of a vacancy in the presidency of the republic, is governed by Article 43 of the Constitution of Burkina Faso, 1991, which states that, in a case like this, the functions of the presidency should be performed by the president of the senate. [1]

After Traoré’s quick takeover, the leaders of the protests rejected the government headed by such a close and trusted advisor of the ousted president, claiming it would not represent a full and effective break with the painful past, especially the attempted constitutional changes. In fact, according to Al Jazeera, many of the protesters proclaimed that “[t]he general is linked to Campoaré, and they don’t want anyone linked to Campaoré to lead the country.”

Thus, early on Saturday, November 1, 2014, Colonel Isaac Zida declared that the army had taken control of the state to prevent further violence and that he had assumed the functions of head of state, leading what he referred to as a “peaceful transition”—one that would guarantee the “continuity of the [Burkinabé] state.” He, however, was extremely vague, providing few details, especially regarding how long this transitional government would stay in power or if the elections planned for 2015 will be held. Again, it is difficult to imagine that Zida, like Traoré, was not aware that the resignation and subsequent exit of the president from the political scene did not call for military intervention in the political system. In fact, a military officer of his standing should have had enough familiarity with the constitution to be aware of Article 43.

Oddly, the protesters appeared to have accepted the leadership of Zida, who is said to have been the deputy head of Campaoré’s elite presidential guard. It appears that the deciding factor in the struggle between the two men to assume the position of head of state was acceptance by the military: In a statement issued early on Saturday, November 1, 2014, the military indicated that Zida had been unanimously elected by military chiefs to lead the post-Campaoré transitional government. But, again, in making this decision, were these military leaders not aware of Article 43 of the constitution, which sets out the succession procedures in case of a temporary or permanent vacancy in the presidency? If, indeed, they had knowledge of the provisions of Article 43, then why did they interfere with what should have been a constitutionally mandated succession?

The international community has called on all sides in the Burkinabé political crisis to follow “constitutionally mandated” procedures for the transfer of power. The international community (especially the African Union) is asking the Burkina Faso military not to exploit the constitutional crisis for its own benefit but to respect the desire of the majority of Burkinabé for democracy and peaceful coexistence. That, of course, calls for respect by all Burkinabé, including the military, for the constitution.

The president’s resignation in itself did not create a constitutional crisis in Burkina Faso. The Constitution of 1991 specifically anticipates the resignation or incapacitation of the president and prescribes procedures for succession. According to Article 43, if the president is temporarily incapacitated and is incapable of carrying out his or her duties, “his powers shall be provisionally exercised by the Prime Minister.” As noted above, in this particular case, where the president has resigned and created a permanent vacancy in the presidency, the constitution states that the functions of the presidency should be performed by the president of the senate. [2] The military should not have intervened—military intervention in the country’s political system actually created what is fast becoming a major constitutional crisis. The military has suspended the constitution and, without the guidance provided by it, the military is now governing the country extra-constitutionally through decrees. The military can end this unfolding crisis by restoring the constitution and handing power back to a civilian regime, led, as prescribed by their constitution, by the president of the senate. The latter will, of course, serve as a transitional head of state until elections are completed in 2015 to select a permanent president. International organizations, including especially the African Union, support this approach—on November 3, 2014, the AU issued a statement asking the Burkinabé military to exit the political system and hand power to a civilian ruler.

But what about the riots and violence that had enveloped the city of Ouagadougou and were gradually spreading to other cities? Should the army not have been called upon to quell the riots and bring about peace? In virtually all countries, including Burkina Faso, the police—not the army—should be the institution enforcing the law and maintaining order. There is no indication that military intervention was necessary to bring the rioting under control or that it actually did. Most of the people participating in the riots voluntarily stopped their activities after the president resigned and left the country.

However, what the army did was interfere with the constitutional process and in doing so, actually created this constitutional crisis—shortly after declaring himself head of state and leader of the transition, Zida suspended the constitution, as noted above. Although Zida has assured the people that the military will strive to quickly return Burkina Faso to democratic governance, such guarantees appear hollow, especially given the military’s past history of intervention—every time the Burkinabé military has intervened in politics, it has remained in power for a very long time, 27 years in the case of the Campaoré-led intervention of 1987.

Article 43 of the Constitution of Burkina Faso also states that elections should be held between 60 and 90 days after a vacancy has been declared in the presidency. Zida, who is now the de facto head of state in Burkina Faso, has stated that his would be a transitional government and that it would seek input from all stakeholders to organize and undertake democratic elections to choose a new government. However, the constitution, which would have provided the necessary guidelines for carrying out such elections, has been suspended. In addition, he has closed the country’s borders and imposed a general curfew, which severely restricts the right of citizens to live freely. Such restrictions could have a significant impact on economic activities and negatively affect what is already a relatively fragile economy. These initial draconian and extra-constitutional measures do not augur well for an early exit of the military from politics and the return of constitutional rule to the country. If history teaches us anything about the military and Burkinabé politics, it is that this military, like the one that intervened in 1987, is likely to stay in politics much longer than the 90 days needed to elect a new civilian government.

[1], [2] This is in line with the constitutional amendment of June 11, 2012 (Loi No. 033-2012/AN du 1 juin 2012).

Later this month, Sudanese voters will head to the polls to elect their next president. Like many of Sudan's earlier elections, this one is not without controversy: Current President Omar al-Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) have been in power for decades and are under intense criticism for human rights abuses and for their failure to significantly improve living conditions for most of the Sudanese people. The NCP is the expected favorite, largely due to current regional violence and lack of government openness, among other problems.

Thus, opposition leaders have called on the country to postpone the elections until certain critical issues are resolved—including peace agreements with various groups that are fighting the central government and the adoption of major constitutional reforms. Similarly, Minni Minnawi, leader of the Sudan Liberation Army that has been fighting national government forces in Darfur, believes that the April election will not resolve the country’s governance and development quagmire. In fact, arguing that their participation would help legitimize the process, many of the opposition parties, led by the National Consensus Forces (NCF), a coalition of political parties opposed to the NCP, has indicated that it will not participate in the April exercise and has, in fact, launched a campaign for the boycott of the elections. Then again, some commentators argue that this decision is ill-advised and could further marginalize the opposition, destroying its ability to participate in governance in the future.

President al-Bashir rose to power in a 1989 bloodless coup and declared himself president in 1993. Since that time and despite the efforts of pro-democracy movements to change the status quo, al-Bashir has managed to maintain his monopoly on power. In addition to the fact that he has been helped by a brutal civil war and the opposition’s decision to boycott elections, al-Bashir and his government have outlawed political parties and engaged in the brutalization of many regions of the country. In fact, in 2008, the International Criminal Court called for his arrest for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Darfur. In addition, in January of this year, the country’s parliament, which is dominated by al-Bashir’s NCP, enacted a series of constitutional amendments granting the president additional powers, effectively strengthening what has been an imperial presidency, reinforcing the country’s highly centralized and authoritarian governing process.

Despite the fact that as many as 15 individuals are running for president, both al-Bashir and the NCP are likely to emerge victorious. According to the National Election Commission, six presidential candidates are being sponsored by their political parties; the rest are running as independents. The largest opposition party, the National Umma Party (NUP), led by seasoned politician al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, has decided to boycott the 2015 elections. Al-Mahdi and the NUP want the elections postponed, and a transitional government of unity formed and granted the power to oversee the amendment of the constitution. As argued by the opposition, once a new, democracy-enhancing constitution has been drafted and ratified, the country can proceed with elections to pick a permanent government. Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party (PCP) and some factions within the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) are also boycotting the 2015 elections.

The fact that the government in Khartoum has persistently refused to consider the opposition’s arguments that the elections should be postponed until the national dialogue has been completed, a transitional government of unity formed, and a more acceptable constitution drafted and adopted means that there is likely to be much controversy. In addition, given the fact that most of the opposition has already indicated that it would boycott the election, making sure that the election is fair, free, and credible is challenging. Recently, the opposition has accused security forces of making it difficult for them to express themselves and educate Sudanese citizens about the government’s continued suppression of individual freedoms, including the right to express opinions not favored by or favorable to the incumbent regime in Khartoum. Given the fact that a large part of the Sudanese electorate believes that the present political environment within the country is not conducive to the carrying out of a fair and free election, those individuals and groups are not likely to accept the results or consider the process as fair and free—and that will definitely put the legitimacy of the government to question. If the international community also concludes that the elections were neither credible nor free and fair, which is also quite likely, that could further isolate the regime in Khartoum and hamper any efforts to resolve conflicts in various regions of the country and generally improve the environment for investment and economic growth.  

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has not been able to provide itself with institutional arrangements and a governing process that guarantees the rule of law. The failure of the country’s laws and institutions to adequately constrain the state has allowed state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political elites) to behave with impunity and engage in activities (e.g., corruption) that have constrained economic growth and development, endangered the peaceful coexistence of the country’s diverse population groups, alienated the international community, significantly reduced foreign investment, and endangered the country’s international standing. In addition, many government policies during most of the post-independence period have been viewed by several groups as marginalizing them and pushing them to the economic and political periphery. Some of these groups have been engaged in armed conflict against the national government for many years.

If, on the highly unlikely chance that al-Bashir capitulates to the opposition and forms its proposed transitional government, many questions need to be answered. How would it be chosen? Would al-Bashir and the NCP be part of it? Given the fact that the NCP has not been willing to participate in any efforts to reform the country’s political system and provide for more transparency in government communications, as well as improved accountability of the government to the people, how likely is it that a transitional government involving the NCP would be able to successfully undertake the reforms suggested by the opposition?

On the other hand, assuming that the 2015 elections are carried out as scheduled and al-Bashir and the NCP win, will the new government undertake the reforms necessary to enhance Sudan’s ability to take its place among the other democratic countries of the world—specifically, those that respect human rights, provide legal mechanisms for their citizens to organize their private lives and live together peacefully, and enhance the creation of the wealth needed to deal fully and effectively with poverty and high rates of material deprivation? 

President al-Bashir and the National Congress Party have ruled Sudan with significant levels of discretion for many decades. During this period, little effort has been made to engage the Sudanese people in the type of institutional reforms that would have provided the country with more democracy-enhancing institutional arrangements, that is, those that guarantee the rule of law. In his campaign speeches, President al-Bashir has alluded to his government’s supposed interest in peace and development. However, during nearly two decades in power, [1] he and the NCP have either been unwilling or incapable of spearheading the reforms needed to bring about peaceful coexistence and genuine development in Sudan. In fact, the constitutional amendments implemented by the NCP-dominated legislature in January this year significantly increased the powers of the presidency and effectively negated efforts by the opposition to transition the country to democratic governance. Thus, while it is possible that al-Bashir and the NCP might surprise us after the elections, decide to shed their authoritarian image, form a unity government that will undertake necessary institutional reforms (some of which are mentioned above), and transition this important country to democracy, with laws and institutions that guarantee the rule of law, and hence, enhance peaceful coexistence and the creation of the wealth that the country needs to fight poverty and improve national living standards, it is hard to be optimistic, especially given al-Bashir’s and his government’s long history of political opportunism.

Regardless of the winner (though it is most likely to be al-Bashir and the NCP), the post-election government will have to deal with several urgent and critical issues facing the country:

• First, the new government must engage all relevant stakeholder groups in Sudan in constitutional talks to develop and adopt a development-oriented constitution and one that is acceptable to all of the country’s different groups. The new government must steer the country away from authoritarianism and toward democracy and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This can be accomplished, first, by forming a transitional government of national unity, one that provides representation for all of the country’s relevant stakeholders, and then empowering that government to engage the people in robust constitution making to develop and adopt a constitution that adequately constrains the state, enhances peaceful coexistence, and guarantees the rule of law. Such a governing process, for example, can be characterized by a separation of powers with effective checks and balances. Perhaps, some sort of national sovereign conference, to be attended by representatives of all of the country’s relevant stakeholder groups, including especially historically marginalized regions such as Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile states, can be granted the power to draw up the political principles that would guide and form the foundation for the construction of the country’s permanent constitution. As I note above, this new transitional government will face complex challenges, especially regarding the NCP’s role in it. The question on everyone’s minds is: How likely is it that such a transitional government would be formed if al-Bashir and the NCP are victorious in the April 2015 election?
• Second, the new government must make an effort to resolve the conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, the Blue Nile states, and other parts of the country, enhance the peace, and provide an enabling environment for the peaceful coexistence of groups, as well as for economic growth and development. In a recent campaign speech, al-Bashir intimated that Sudan is a rich country with significant endowments of resources that could be used to meet the needs of all its citizens. He then called on groups who have taken arms against the government to seek peace so that the country could proceed with its development agenda. So far, the country’s civil wars and regional conflicts have squandered resources (including scarce human capital) that could have been used to develop the country. Nevertheless, Khartoum and the new government must reach out to historically alienated groups and give them a reason to lay down their arms and negotiate in good faith so that the country can achieve the peace necessary to begin the process of genuine political and economic development in the country.
• Relatedly, national identity needs to be strengthened. Many groups in Sudan, especially those living in peripheral areas, unsurprisingly consider themselves alienated from the government in Khartoum. National integration and nation-building must be at the top of any post-election government’s policy priorities.
• Fourth, the new government must deal with a relatively high unemployment rate, especially among young people, by significantly increasing investment in education and job training, especially for people living in areas of the country that have, historically, been pervaded by conflict. It is important that these economically and politically marginalized regions be fully integrated into the country’s economy and be made full participants in wealth creation and economic growth. Additionally, the new government must make certain that genuine efforts are made to improve access to education for other historically marginalized groups, notably girls and women. In a recent campaign speech, al-Bashir announced that his government intends to invest heavily in higher education and provide opportunities for all Sudanese to acquire human capital. While higher education is critical to Sudan’s industrial transformation, it is important for the government to recognize the fact that a robust, well-funded, and easily accessible system of primary and secondary schools is the foundation for any sustainable industrialization scheme.    
• Fifth, the new government needs to improve its relations with the international community and with its neighbors—better relations should improve the country’s ability to participate gainfully in the global economy, as well as create opportunities for foreign investment flows, cultural and educational exchanges, and improved protection of human rights, especially those of ethnic and religious minorities. Of critical importance is the need for Sudan’s post-election government to settle its disputes with its neighbor South Sudan, especially on Abyei, the border, the use of Sudan’s pipelines to transport South Sudan’s oil to export markets, South Kordofan, and the status of refugees.
• Finally, al-Bashir and the National Congress Party, the likely winners of the 2015 elections, must ask themselves how they want posterity to judge and remember them. African political elites rarely think about the type of legacy that they are likely to leave to future generations. For al-Bashir and the NCP, the April 2015 election offers a rare opportunity for them to rehabilitate themselves and emerge as public servants with truly transformative development agendas, and not as opportunistic exploiters whose only interest was self-enrichment.

[1] Although al-Bashir came into office in 1989, the National Congress party was came into being in 1996.

Note: This article was amended on April 1, 2015 to reflect the delay of the elections to April 13.

Professor Mwangi S. Kimenyi, senior fellow and former director of the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI), passed away on Saturday, June 6, 2015, in Baltimore, Maryland.

Professor Kimenyi was the heart and soul of the Africa Growth Initiative, something that all of us care about. He believed very much in AGI’s mission, its work, and perhaps, more importantly, its people. His scholarship and work ethic were only matched by his dedication to the AGI team and the issues that we were (and are) striving to accomplish.

Professor Kimenyi not only cared about the right things, but he was also keen about addressing them and doing so in the right way, no matter how difficult or challenging. In many ways, if the world worked like this, the world would be a much better place for all of us to live. In all AGI activities, Professor Kimenyi tried to bring people together, help colleagues advance their careers, and nurture the expertise that is needed in the long term.

Professor Kimenyi dedicated himself to utilizing the resources and prestige of the Brookings Institution to enhance governance, peaceful coexistence, the protection of human rights—especially those of vulnerable groups—and economic and human development in Africa. During his short tenure at AGI and the Brookings Institution, he achieved a lot. Through his leadership and thanks to the generosity of the Brookings Institution, AGI has contributed significantly to the improvement of the policy environment in Africa, as well as to a better understanding of African issues by U.S. policymakers.

Professor Kimenyi was an accomplished man: Before he came to AGI and Brookings, Professor Kimenyi was a professor at the University of Mississippi and the University of Connecticut. He was the founding executive director of the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA, 1999-2005); a resource person with the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC); and a research associate with the Center for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford. Professor Kimenyi earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Nairobi (Kenya), and completed graduate work at Ohio University and George Mason University. He received a Ph.D. in economics  from the Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University in 1986.

Through his research, he sought to enhance governance and economic development in Africa. He was especially interested in poverty reduction, pro-poor economic growth, and peaceful coexistence on the continent. He authored or co-edited eight books, many policy monographs, and several chapters in edited volumes. He also published many papers in refereed journals.

Professor Kimenyi was also the recipient of many honors and awards, including the Outstanding Research Award (2001) from the Global Development Network, and the Georgescu-Roegen Prize in Economics (1991). He was recognized by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Mississippi for his work on the public transit system. In 1994, Professor Kimenyi was named by Policy Review (Washington, D.C.) among the top 10 young market economists in the United States. During his tenure as the executive director of KIPPRA, the institute was ranked the top policy institution in Africa and was recognized as an international center of excellence.

At KIPPRA, he believed in and promoted excellence, leading the institute from its founding in 1999 to Africa’s premier research and policy institution by the time he left in 2005. KIPPRA remains an important and influential source of policy advice for Kenya and the region, thanks to the solid foundation laid by Professor Kimenyi.

He was not afraid to criticize or be controversial when he believed that something important needed to be said. In many of the blogs that he wrote about policy issues in Africa, for example, he challenged President Obama and his administration to take a more active part in Africa. He rebuked the government of South Sudan for its decision to ban all foreign workers from the country and replace them with nationals—a decision that Professor Kimenyi argued would undermine badly needed foreign investment. Nevertheless, in seeking to hold governments accountable, Professor Kimenyi was professional, respectful, and polite.

Despite his extraordinary professional and academic accomplishments, Professor Kimenyi was humble, extremely kind, and loyal to his friends and colleagues. I have worked very closely with Professor Kimenyi on projects in Africa since 1986, and have often been taken aback by the patient and kind manner in which Professor Kimenyi treated young scholars who approached him and asked him to help them further their education or research.

I can recall a particularly memorable incident at Mount Kenya in 2002: We were at the Mount Kenya Lodge to consult with then-vice president of Kenya, Professor George Saitoti, who was working on his vision for holistic development in Africa. While we were eating breakfast, a couple of young people recognized Professor Kimenyi and came to talk to him about their plans for graduate school. He patiently talked to each one of them, gathered as much information from them, gave each person that he talked to his business card, and promised to contact them once he had an opportunity to research their issues further. Despite the fact that his breakfast was going cold, he calmly advised these young people and told them that it was important that they remained hopeful because they held the future of Kenya in their hands. He was truly inspiring. Of course, during nearly 30 years of friendship with me, he remained a loyal and supportive friend to me and my family.

There is no question that Professor Kimenyi was a talented and well-regarded economist. Nevertheless, his colleagues, students, and the many people whom he worked with and whose lives he touched will remember him more for his kindness, warmth, and willingness to mentor younger scholars.

Professor Kimenyi’s untimely passing is a great loss, not only to his colleagues and friends at AGI, but also to the many scholars whom he has mentored in Africa and around the world. He will be greatly missed, not only at AGI, but also at the many institutions that he has worked with to improve economic and human development in Africa.

Our thoughts and prayers are with his family. May his soul rest in peace.