Webinar: South Africa's Economic Recovery Beyond COVID-19 27 May 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 May 2020

South Africa's Economic Outlook 20 August 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 August 2020 Online

South Africa’s long mooted economic reforms have been slow to materialize. The economy had fallen into recession even before the COVID-19 pandemic, and had been stripped of its international investment grade rating. The reserve bank is now forecasting a contraction in GDP of over seven percent for 2020.

There are significant questions around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. The mandate and independence of the South African Reserve Bank has also been a subject of public debate. The IMF has approved a US$4.3 billion emergency financial assistance package to help mitigate the health and economic shock to the country. But it has also made clear that there is a pressing need to ensure debt sustainability and implement structural reforms to support recovery and achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

At this event, Lesetja Kganyago, the governor of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), gives his assessment of the expected trajectory of the South African economy in the short and medium term. He discusses the IMF package and the implications for economic reform, and the role of the reserve bank in delivering sustainable and inclusive growth.

Zimbabwe's Economy During the Coronavirus Pandemic and Beyond 8 September 2020 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020

COVID-19 has had a devastating effect on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy. Important foreign currency earning industries have virtually stopped, and across the country livelihoods are at risk and an increasing number of people are reliant on government grants.

Businesses are having to become more flexible but are constrained by a weak policy environment and lack of confidence in the economy. Since 2017, the government has been pursuing an economic reform agenda and Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP), which was scheduled for completion by the end of 2020. The deepening challenges highlight the need to accelerate economic reform and build confidence in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

At this webinar, speakers discuss the measures that government, businesses, and individuals are adopting in response to the COVID-19 economic challenge, and the policies required for recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

South Africa's Economic Reform and Employment in the Context of the Coronavirus Pandemic 3 September 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020 Online

President of COSATU, Zingiswa Losi, discusses the organization’s priorities for protecting jobs and workers, and working with other stakeholders to build a sustainable post-pandemic economy.

Employment in South Africa fell by an estimated 18 per cent between February and April 2020. The measures imposed to control the spread of COVID-19 suffocated an already weak economy and unemployment has hit a new high.

The stated aims of the government’s economic reform plans include the support of job creation in labour intensive industries, but the reform of the state and rebalancing of the economy and fiscus could lead to further job losses in state agencies and enterprises.

Protecting jobs while ensuring the health and safety of workers are dual priorities, and require the joint commitment and ‘social compact’ of labour, business and government.

Zimbabwe’s Economic Governance and Regional Integration 17 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2020 Online

Panellists discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration in the context of the shocks caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

At this virtual event, panellists and participants will discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration.

The government of Zimbabwe has emphasized its commitment to economic reform and its ambition to achieve upper-middle-income status by 2030, but there are considerable challenges to overcome.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing economic fragility. Improving the business climate to attract international private-sector investment will be contingent on clear, consistent and coherent policy and implementation, including targeting abuse and corruption.

Zimbabwe has, in recent years, successfully strengthened its regional trade integration, although some trade frictions remain. This is an important factor not only for catalysing economic growth in Zimbabwe, but for supporting regional prosperity and post-COVID recovery.

This webinar is the second in a series of events held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic reform and recovery.

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This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Inclusion, agency and influence: The role of women in Zimbabwe’s economy 8 July 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 July 2021 Online

Speakers discuss the changing role of women in Zimbabwe’s economic structures and the priorities for promoting greater economic inclusion, agency and influence of women.

Zimbabwe’s National Development Strategy of 2021-2025 highlights the importance of gender sensitivity in policymaking and of women’s economic participation in attaining the government’s Vision 2030.

However, women have been among the worst affected groups by the devastating effects that COVID-19 has had on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy, which has exacerbated the challenges they face in economic life, such as access to credit, financial services and social security.

Leveraging existing structures such as women’s groups, micro-finance facilities, education and training, and national gender mechanisms, as well as supporting wider financial and digital inclusion in Zimbabwe, is central for the country’s sustained economic recovery.

This event also focuses on the differing impacts of COVID-19 on women’s economic activities across various sectors, as well as along rural-urban and formal-informal economy lines.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is part of a series of events in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic recovery and reform.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Angola Forum 2021: Policy options to support economic recovery in Angola 7 October 2021 — 2:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 September 2021 Online

Speakers discuss policy options to support economic recovery in Angola as the country transitions away from a state-led oil economy to a private-sector-led growth model.

The government of Angola has made some progress on a range of policies targeting macroeconomic stability and structural reform. However, the country has been suffering from a recurring economic recession for six consecutive years, with the last positive annual GDP growth rate posted in 2015 at 0.9 per cent.

The national budget remains dependent on oil revenue, leaving the country highly exposed to volatile oil prices particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. While revenues collapsed, increased spending was needed to respond to the health crisis and estimates of Angola’s debt spike range from 130 to 150 per cent of its GDP by the close of 2020.

At this virtual Angola Forum, speakers discuss policy options to support economic recovery in Angola as the country transitions away from a state-led oil economy to a private-sector-led growth model.

The Forum launches the English translation of the Angola Economic Report 2019-20 by the Centro de Estudos de Investigação (CEIC) of the Catholic University of Angola in partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), and the findings of Afrobarometer’s first ever survey in Angola, Ovilongwa – Estudos de Opinião Pública, which interviewed 2,400 adult Angolans and sampled individual perceptions on democracy and economic reform in Angola.

This event will be held in English and Portuguese with simultaneous interpretation.

The Forum will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Zambia’s political and economic reform and recovery 5 November 2021 — 11:30AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 November 2021 Chatham House and Online

At this event, HE Hakainde Hichilema, president of the Republic of Zambia, discusses his vision for Zambia’s development and long-term political and economic reform and recovery.

Zambia’s new administration, following the general elections of August 2021, faces a daunting challenge of reversing economic contraction, lowering income-eroding inflation, and addressing the unsustainable national debt.

The country has been one of the few to seek debt restructuring under the G20’s new Common Framework for Debt Treatments, and its immediate priorities include a prospective agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Young Zambians are eager for jobs and improved living standards. But the government’s ambition to create more jobs and achieve middle-income status will depend on both attracting new investment into its copper sector and pursuing a programme of economic diversification supporting growth beyond the mining industry.

Addressing these economic concerns will also need to be supported by a programme of political reform and rehabilitation of citizens’ trust in the state.

Angola forum 2022: Prospects for Angola's social and economic future 15 December 2022 — 1:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 November 2022 Online

At this online Angola forum, experts will discuss Angola’s social and economic future, and what to expect from 2023.

At this virtual Angola Forum, speakers will discuss Angola’s social and economic future and what to expect from 2023.

Angola experienced positive economic momentum in 2022 allowing it to exit its six-year recession, with the economy taking centre stage in the August national multiparty elections. Increased oil prices and high levels of production have driven Angola’s economic growth and improved macroeconomic conditions, as well as helping the country to reduce its public debt to 56.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (down from 79.7 per cent in 2021).

However, a global economic downturn in 2023, with increased inflation, means Angola’s re-elected MPLA government will need to focus on job creation, greater economic inclusivity and diversifying away from an oil-led economy. It will also require Angola to navigate its international partnerships more effectively in this era of heightened geopolitical rivalries.  

At this online Angola forum, experts will discuss Angola’s social and economic future and what to expect from 2023. Speakers will reflect on the social and economic trends seen in 2021-22 and explore election trends, human rights and international relations.

This Angola Forum is supported by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Advanced technologies in the face of war 24 October 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 October 2022 Online

How is NATO strengthening its technological edge?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought with it a heavy focus on technology and weaponry, particularly as casualties mount and large numbers of equipment are lost on both sides. The conflict has highlighted how states and their militaries seek technological superiority and how access to advanced capabilities can help shape the course of the war.

Aiming to sharpen the Alliance’s technological edge, NATO is working to support the development of emerging and potentially disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, biotechnologies and quantum technologies that are seen as presenting both risks and opportunities for the Alliance.

As part of this work, NATO’s newly formed Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), hosted by both the UK and Estonia, brings together academia, industry and government to support the development of critical technologies to deter and defend against existing and future threats.

Key questions to be considered by the panel include:

• How will the technologies that form the focus of DIANA’s efforts strengthen the Alliance and prepare it to better deal with threats to peace and security across the region?

• How will these technologies be applied and used in war?

• To what extent can a war be won by technology?

• Is Ukraine, and other future conflict zones, in danger of becoming a testing ground for emerging technologies?

• What has the war in Ukraine taught NATO about modern warfare and how should the Alliance respond to this?

• After the commotion of AUKUS, how will the Alliance manage the sharing of technologies and IP among member states?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

Nigeria's 2023 elections: Security, economic and foreign policy imperatives 5 December 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 November 2022 Chatham House and Online

Bola Ahmed Tinubu, presidential candidate for the All-Progressives Congress, discusses his vision and recently-unveiled manifesto for ‘renewing hope’ in Nigeria.

Nigeria is scheduled to hold presidential and national assembly elections on 25 February 2023 as well as governorship and other subnational elections on 11 March 2023.

The elections will end President Muhammadu Buhari’s two terms in office since his election in 2015 and will mark the first time that he is not engaging in a presidential poll since Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule in 1999 – an important marker in Nigeria’s trajectory of democratic consolidation.

Nigeria’s recently enacted Electoral Act has contributed to improved hope around the election process, reflected in the addition of 12.29 million new voters in Nigeria’s voter registration exercise across the federation’s 36 states and 1,491 constituencies.

Yet Nigeria stands at a critical juncture, having suffered from two recessions in the past six years, unprecedented levels of food insecurity, persistent fuel scarcity and high levels of crude oil theft.

Civic fatigue also remains an important challenge and President Muhammadu Buhari’s three main policy pillars of security, economy and corruption continue to be defining issues for citizens.

At this event, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, presidential candidate for the All-Progressives Congress, discusses his vision and recently unveiled manifesto for ‘renewing hope’ in Nigeria including his policy proposals for economic reform and revival and how to deliver secure and inclusive job opportunities for Nigerian citizens.

Download a transcript

This event is a members and Africa programme event and is part of a series of events and outputs examining Nigeria’s 2023 elections and political developments.

As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

Brexit: Then, now and the future 2 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 November 2022 Chatham House and Online

How has Britain’s negotiations with the EU set it on a post-EU path?

The Brexit negotiations went down to the wire between the UK and the EU in December 2020. By January 2021, the UK’s departure from the EU had taken place, but the new relationship was by no means stable. The UK and EU have since clashed on trade, migration and the Northern Ireland Protocol which are all left unresolved. 

This year, both sides have had to deal with domestic political instability, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a global energy crisis that has changed the dynamics of its relationship. In the years ahead, both sides will need to address shared challenges, from the rise of China and climate change to security on the European continent. 

This discussion includes those who were in the room during the Brexit negotiations, including Michel Barnier’s adviser, to get an inside look on how the UK and EU negotiated Brexit. Combining insight from the new book, Inside the Deal – How the EU Got Brexit Done, with expert analysis the panel assesses where the post-Brexit negotiations are today.

Key questions include:

• What issues in the deal still need to be fixed?

• How has the EU evolved since Brexit?

• How would a future Labour government approach the UK-EU relationship?

• What are the best and worst case scenarios for UK-EU relations in 2030?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Disruptive technologies by nation states and malign cyber actors – the US response 16 February 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Lisa Monaco, the US deputy attorney general, discusses how autocratic governments and malign cyber actors use disruptive technologies to project power and engage in illicit activity.

Weaponizing data, ransomware attacks and other illicit cyber activity represent significant threats to national security. 

Governments and malicious cyber actors around the world exploit disruptive technology to engage in criminal activity, track citizens and coerce other countries thereby weakening the rules-based order and fundamental principles of democracy. 

Lisa Monaco discusses how the world is at an inflection point when it comes to meeting this challenge and describes how the US and partner nations are responding to protect their citizens and the broader international community.

Key questions to discuss include:

• What steps does the US government need to take to properly address this threat?
• How are countries coordinating policies to confront the problem?
• To what extent does this challenge go beyond US-China competition?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Is China's economy on the rebound? 5 April 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Exploring the domestic and international signals from the first annual session of the 14th National People’s Congress.

2022 proved to be a difficult year for China. War, COVID-19 and economic turbulence presented a cocktail of significant challenges for the ruling CCP in China. Having dispensed of the infamous zero-COVID-19 policy, China is apparently back open for business.

On the international front, continued tensions with the West, war in Europe and climate change are just some of the obstacles standing in the way of Chinese economic recovery. 

Domestically, China must find ways to reinvigorate demand and move on from a low of 3 per cent GDP growth in 2022. With a frustrated population, people are also keen to be freed from the shackles of a stream of lockdowns and quarantining.

The in-tray for the 14th National People’s Congress, as it begins its first session, is substantial. The implications, at home and abroad, from its recent summit in Beijing reverberate around the world.

The experts on the panel discuss:

• What has been the true extent of COVID-related damage to China’s economy and wider society?
• What economic scars are visible post-recovery?
• Will there be longer-term implications for China’s economic and diplomatic footprint globally post-COVID? 

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Russia and 9/11: Roads not taken Expert comment NCapeling 9 September 2021

Many Russia watchers recall the fleeting moment 20 years ago when the country could have moved away from a path of confrontation with the US.

On 12 September 2001, Russian president Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to call George W. Bush to express his condolences – and to offer him support.

Just the previous year, Putin had said Russia joining NATO was a possibility and it suited Russia to draw parallels between the terrorist attacks on the US and its own ‘anti-terrorist’ campaign in Chechnya at the time.

Even though much of the Russian commentary about 9/11 professed empathy rather than sympathy, in their eyes the US was both a victim – as Russia likes to see itself – and ‘had it coming’ while Russia was blameless.

At that time, many in the West were still tempted by the idea Putin’s Russia might develop in a liberal direction, and Putin himself wanted to be seen as constructive especially after Chechnya. He may also have also assumed that, if Russia joined the international alliance, it would be as a co-leader with the US.

An offer which was never stated

Whether he was sincere in his condolences or not, Putin was of course not offering something for nothing – but then few countries ever do. Although less than one-tenth into his time in control of Russia (so far), Putin was still feeling his way but was not a naive president having already been through the controversial sinking of the Kursk submarine.

His first move was to facilitate access to bases in Central Asia for the US campaign in Afghanistan – vital initially but less so later. Apparently, this offer was against the wishes of many of his senior military commanders – although the extent to which it was in his gift to grant such access is questionable.

The quid pro quo, unstated and only dawning on Washington much later, was for the US to keep out of what Russia saw – and still sees – as its backyard. Putin probably misjudged that the US would have neither the inclination nor the capacity to be in that region for anything other than supply chain purposes. And he hoped America now needed Russia after the humiliations of the 1990s.

Common interests could once have been the basis of a partnership with Russia; but to Moscow that meant a partnership of equals which recognized the Kremlin’s self-declared right to conduct out-of-area operations. But the US took a different view and, with nothing written down and no memorandum ever signed, the ensuing disappointment for Russia was gradual but inexorable.

A purely practical reason for declining the ‘offer’ was that, despite its own illusions, Russia had little to bring to the table which was useful and could be offered on acceptable terms. Subsequent initiatives – from specific joint terrorism initiatives to a ‘grand reset’ – could not narrow differences to the point where the character of the relationship changed.

The Northern Distribution Network for supplying US forces in Afghanistan – Russia’s most practical contribution to the notional common cause – took almost a decade to be established and was plagued by problems which often come with a dependence on Russian goodwill.

The Kremlin also had the pleasure of watching US hubris lead to failure in Iraq. And, although knowing the US intervention in Afghanistan would never end well, even Russia could not have foreseen the scale of the defeat and humiliation of chaotic withdrawal.

US achievements with Russia’s neighbours

When it comes to Russia’s post 9/11 ‘offer’ and subsequent expectations, many of the other newly independent countries might never have achieved what they have over the past 20 years if the US had agreed – tacitly or otherwise – to sit back and accept Moscow’s droit de regard over them.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, these states were Russia’s ‘kith and kin’ but it underestimated US willingness to support smaller states over a ‘great power’ – especially as George H.W. Bush pleaded to those states not to go too far too fast. Albeit uneven, most have benefitted from US support for their own independence as well as practical assistance to strengthen their institutions and diversify external relationships.

The three Baltic states consolidated their democracies while their economies, which severed many ties with Russia early, are flourishing and prosperous in contrast to those still in the Russian orbit. They are not only members of NATO and the European Union (EU) but have on occasion been moral leaders as in the case of Lithuania facing down both Belarus and China.

Ukraine has undergone two revolutions in attempting to follow the paths of the Baltic states that continues today. After many false starts Moldova has undergone a similar change recently but at the ballot box not on the streets, to give itself another shot at the prize of true democracy and international acceptance.

Georgia conducted the most radical governance reforms seen in the region after its own revolution although it has taken a few steps backwards of late. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have strengthened their independence since then and adjusted their modus vivendi with Russia to their advantage. Putin would hardly be able to give the same assurances about use of bases there today – and indeed reportedly brushed off a request by Biden to use them in the current withdrawal.

Only a minority of formerly Soviet republics have made no progress whatsoever at the governmental level – Belarus and Turkmenistan for sure, perhaps Azerbaijan and Tajikistan too depending on the criteria.

The roads not taken

America’s failure was not so much rejecting Russia’s offer of partnership but failing to pay sufficient attention to it because Russia was still regarded as weak despite being relatively strong in its immediate neighbourhood.

The question of whether it was worth alienating Russia is a moral one. Refusing to sign the Paris Charter – which recognizes the right of independent states to form their own alliances – would have been a further betrayal of people who have long been subjected to their future being decided by stronger powers around them. But Russia may have chosen a path of confrontation anyway as, for the Kremlin, suzerainty over its former republics is considered an entitlement which comes with being a great power.

Although impossible to conclusively prove, all previous frameworks of Russian assumptions and habits of Russian behaviour indicate Moscow would have pocketed the deal and simply moved on anyway. It certainly seems likely that Russia’s other outrages and offenses over the years – from the murders of Litvinenko and Skripal in the UK to the manipulation of information and elections – would still have occurred even if a shabby deal had been made over the heads of the new states on Russia’s borders.

The atrocity of 9/11 was really an opportunity for Russia, a genuine potential turning point and a chance to create a new relationship with the outside world – but its expectations were unrealistic. Russia blew it with demands at the time that could not be met – and rightly were not met. The US rarely receives credit for withstanding Russian blandishments at a moment when its own aura of strength had been so cruelly and effectively punctured by the most brazen of attacks.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Africa and Europe: Cooperation on digital transitions and new technologies 26 May 2022 — 8:00AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 May 2022 Online

The 11th Africa Day International Conference takes place under the auspices of the president of the Republic of Slovenia, HE Mr Borut Pahor, and within the framework of the Bled Strategic Forum.

Slovenia’s annual high-level Africa event seeks to improve policy outcomes for citizens in Europe and Africa as a result of a mutual understanding and strengthened cooperation between the two regions.

The event is co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, the Chatham House Africa Programme and the European Commission.

Expert discussions at this year’s edition will examine collaborative links between Africa and Europe in promoting responsible innovation and governance of emerging technologies, as well as the role of technology in shaping creative and cultural economies.

The conference will be broadcast live on this website, on the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Culture notes: Populists of the world unite The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

America’s hard-right has successfully played a long game at home, and now it’s schmoozing Europe. We should be worried, says Catherine Fieschi

The politics of advanced democracies is a rather Janus-faced affair these days. No sooner have we breathed a sigh of relief at the results of the French presidential election than a leaked United States Supreme Court document on Roe v Wade signals American abortion rights are under threat. 

Yes, Europe seems to be maintaining political unity in its support of Ukraine, and the US is lavishing eye-watering sums on it both in military and humanitarian aid. Yet one cannot help but feel that these might be short-lived spells of relief in the face of mounting storm clouds on the political horizon. Both at the domestic and international level, populist politics looks to be gathering pace still. 

On the domestic front, we should be cautious in our relief. In the French elections Emmanuel Macron was indeed re-elected, and comfortably so, but there is no denying the space occupied by populist politicians on the left and the right. In the first round, Marine Le Pen gained 23 per cent of the vote, left populist candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon 22 per cent, and far-right candidate Éric Zemmour 7 per cent. Add to this a record low turnout, and the picture is one of a system in which mainstream politics has overall been rejected in favour of various populist options. 

The Hungarians weren’t so lucky, and Viktor Orbán’s capture of the media and quashing of the opposition over his years in power delivered solid victory. 

What should be cause for further concern is what is happening in the United States, as well as its potential impact on European politics. A quick flick through American politics today suggests dysfunctionalities of staggering magnitude and depth, and the full extent of the success of the right-wing Republican project, as confirmed by the intention to reverse Roe v Wade. 

Any reversal of Roe v Wade is a further step towards a drastic re-territorialization of American politics: into red states and blue states, into urban v rural, into places where taxes fund public education and public goods and where they won’t. It is also about a re-territorialization of institutional power away from the federal and into state institutions. 

The words of JD Vance, the Ohio Republican senatorial candidate – author of the rather good memoir Hillbilly Elegy – pander to an ‘American heartlands’ view of the United States’ role in the world. Asked about the fate of Ukraine, Vance simply replied that he ‘didn’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another’. 

On an even more basic level, we would do well to keep in mind that there were 440 anti-voter bills in 49 states at the end of 2021 and rising, calling into question citizens’ basic rights to vote. Republicans have pursued this agenda relentlessly. They have played a long game and invested in media, education and minor and not so minor projects – all of which have secured them a social and political base that is well-disposed towards the deep reversal of the American liberal global project and that of its allies across the world.

And it is perhaps on this last point that we should be most alarmed. Between May 18-20, the Conservative Political Action Conference, an American conclave of the right, was held in Europe. Viktor Orbán gave the keynote speech, and other speakers included the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Eduardo, and the president of Spain’s far-right party Vox, Santiago Abascal, as well as some well-known American Trumpian voices, including Trump himself. Marine Le Pen, whose earlier appearance at the conference had met with rapturous applause, chose not to cosy-up too closely to Orbán in the run-up to the French parliamentary elections in June but she sent her deputy. 

The export of the Fox News-driven conference from across the Atlantic is deeply worrying. Up until now populists have failed in their attempts at international alliances. At the European Union level their nationalism has always been in the way of their working together, and their groups tend to be short-lived or ineffective as a result. As for American attempts in Europe, the one led by Steve Bannon, the former White House adviser, in 2020 that aimed to create an Academy for the Judeo-Christian West ended as a damp squib – possibly not helped by his dismissal from the White House amid charges of defrauding donors.

But something may be changing: the conference’s embrace of Orbán and an international smattering of ‘strongmen’ hailing from the hard-right, aligned with Putin and sup-ported by Trump and a media empire, suggests that we are entering a Trumpian-infused second act that in its triumphal revanchism is seeking to create an international right-wing populist, or even authoritarian front. This is about politics, media, but also money – something European populist parties have been short of. As Marine Le Pen explained to French voters, her party is so poor it had to borrow money from a Russian bank.  

As some have pointed out, the Russian aggression against Ukraine has complicated matters when it comes to Russian funding of disinformation to the West. Many routes have been shut down. But a new route between the US and Hungary as a platform to floss Europe with dirty money is a good replacement to the old Russian route. 
 

Interview: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

Belarus’s exiled democratic opposition leader tells Roxanne Escobales about her unexpected political career and President Lukashenka’s wavering support for Putin

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is the face of the Belarusian democratic movement. In 2020, she stood as a presidential candidate against Aliaksandr Lukashenka after her husband, an anti-corruption campaigner and the main opposition candidate, was arrested on the campaign trail and imprisoned. Lukashenka, autocratic ruler of Belarus for more than 30 years, was re-elected. Since then, Sviatlana has lived in exile in Lithuania meeting with western leaders and calling for regime change in her native land. Her husband Sergey remains in prison serving an 18-year sentence.

You have said in the past that there will be no free Belarus without a free Ukraine. How is the fate of the two countries connected?

The Kremlin wants to drag our countries into the past, and we are looking into a future which we want to choose for ourselves. The Kremlin doesn’t recognize Ukraine or Belarus as independent countries – it sees them as part of Russia. While the current regime is in our country, there will be a constant threat of aggression from Russia. But we are absolutely independent countries with our own languages, cultures and so on.

The fate of Belarus depends a lot on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it is evident. When Ukraine wins – and they definitely will win – it will mean the Kremlin is weak and that Lukashenka is weak. Every day we create multiple points of pressure on the regime from within the country, from outside the country. For countries like Ukraine and Belarus the support of strong democracies is very important.

It is very important for European society to understand that it is not just a war between Russia and Ukraine. It is a war between democratic values and dictatorship on the territory of Ukraine. It is very important for democracy to have a strong voice at the moment.

Recently Lukashenka said the war was taking too long. Do you think he understood what he was getting into when he supported Vladimir Putin by allowing his illegal invasion to be launched from Belarus?

The support between the Kremlin and Lukashenka has always been situational – it is not a real friendship. Lukashenka got huge political and economic support in 2020 after the protests, and now he owes a debt to the Kremlin and had to show his loyalty.

And we see how his rhetoric is changing because the situation in Ukraine is changing. At the beginning Lukashenka always said that, ‘Me and Putin will take Ukraine in three days’, and when this blitzkrieg failed, now he wants to get out of the situation. Now he wants to say, ‘Look, we are for peace. We didn’t have any intention to invade Ukraine.’ He wants to act like he is a peacemaker.

He only cares about his own interest, not his country or its people. He just wants to keep his power.

You have been living in exile in Lithuania for two years, and a lot has happened in that time. What is the state of the Belarusian democratic movement now?

We have been a grassroots movement since the first day. There is no leader who says you have to do this or that. My role is to work on the political level. My task is to go to the European Union, to the United States, and ask for packages to assist civil society. With this technical assistance from our democratic partners, we have managed to build structures in exile, and people in Belarus have managed to build structures inside the country.

Another task of mine is to inspire people, and to explain to the international community what is going on and to show them that Belarus is not just Lukashenka’s regime – it is people who want change.

I communicate with Belarusian people almost every day, especially those who are in the country. We have to keep close ties. It is important to understand how dangerous it is in Belarus to communicate on different channels like Telegram or even to subscribe to some media sources. But people do this. They understand the threats and the consequences, but their energy is still so alive.

We have to keep this energy strong and to give this assurance to people that in case something happens to them, or their families, they will get help from outside. This is how it works.

This struggle has come at a very personal cost to you and your husband, Sergey, who is in prison for his political activities. How is he doing?

I communicate with my husband through his lawyer, who visits him once a week. It has to be short messages because there is no privacy. Our children can send him letters and they receive letters back from him.

There are thousands of people like Sergey, and we have to take care of all of them. The treatment of political prisoners is much worse than criminals because they are like Lukashenka’s personal enemies. That is why it is so important to support human rights organizations who provide lawyers to political prisoners. It is important to fund support for them and for families of political prisoners.

You were a teacher when you took over your husband’s presidential campaign. If you could go back in time, what advice would you give yourself?

I would wish I could have had more confidence. I didn’t have any political experience – I was an ordinary woman and wife, the same as millions of other Belarusians. At the beginning, I didn’t feel confident because I didn’t know about politics. I didn’t know how to communicate with the political leaders of different countries. I was scared.

What motivated you to step into your husband’s shoes?

It was an accidental choice. It was terrible for my husband. But I saw millions of people on the streets, and when you see people standing shoulder to shoulder it inspires you. Every day thousands of people call me who want to help, and I understand that we are not alone. This motivates me.

Also, the fact that thousands of children want to see their mothers and fathers who are in jail gives me strength. When sometimes you think you can’t do this any more because it is so difficult, you think about those who haven’t seen their children for two years. It is awful.

So, every day, you find something that gives you a small energy and it doesn’t let you give up.

NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy Expert comment NCapeling 21 June 2022

As the war in Ukraine becomes prolonged and unpredictable, risks for the transatlantic alliance will increase, as will the global shockwaves of the conflict.

As a revitalized NATO alliance deals with a crisis that has major economic and humanitarian as well as military dimensions, the need for it to develop both a European and a global containment strategy grows ever more urgent.

Bolstering NATO’s defences so as to provide the capability to repel any form of Russian attack on land, at sea, in the air, or through space and cyberspace is a key aspect of this strategy as, in recent weeks, more combat forces able to defend territory have taken the form of additional troops, ships, and aircraft reinforcing the Baltic states and the Black Sea coastlines of Poland and Romania.

Ten allies have so far contributed to this effort, placing 40,000 troops under direct NATO command. Those sceptical about the future of the transatlantic security relationship have been confounded by the major role the US has played in this effort, sending parts of the 82nd Airborne Division and 3rd Armoured Division to Poland, and redeploying US Stryker brigades from Germany and Italy to the Baltic states and Romania.

Although many other allies have sent useful assets – such as French and UK aircraft to Romania or German and Netherlands Patriot batteries to Slovakia – the US contribution still surpasses all European efforts put together. The US now has 100,000 troops in Europe, the most it has deployed there since the mid-1990s.

Transitioning from temporary to permanent deployment

NATO has also mobilized its high-readiness Reaction Force for the first time and aims to establish four new multinational battalions in the Black Sea region – with France offering to lead the one in Romania, Italy in Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic in Slovakia. Most of these deployments are on a temporary basis, but the receiving allies would understandably like them to stay longer and for NATO to commit to permanent stationed forces.

Although this would oblige the alliance to break formally from the pledge it made to Moscow in 1997 not to station substantial combat forces or nuclear weapons or build military infrastructure on the territory of its new member states in eastern Europe, this was a political undertaking linked to circumstances prevailing at the time.

Given Russia’s behaviour, there is no reason why NATO should not now abandon it. There is also a question over whether NATO could also repeal the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council, or simply leave them in suspension for a future, more cooperative, and less bellicose Russian regime.

Beyond showing the flag along its eastern flank, NATO does face longer-term issues which need to be clarified in its new Strategic Concept. First is whether to abandon its current strategy of reinforcement and military mobility across Europe – known as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the NATO jargon – in favour of the deployment of heavy armoured brigades or even divisions in fixed positions close to borders.

This will be expensive in the long-run and deprive allies of the flexibility they have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War to use their forces as and where they wish – from deployments in the Sahel or Afghanistan to fighting forest fires or building emergency hospitals for COVID-19 patients at home. The only exception is when they have put forces on rotation into the NATO high readiness forces or the European Union (EU) Battle Groups.

Germany’s commitment gives NATO more options

The decision of Germany to increase its defence spending to two per cent of GDP and to devote €100 billion to modernizing the Bundeswehr makes it technically possible for NATO to move to a Cold War-style forward, armoured defence. But it is unclear how quickly Berlin could raise its new divisions given its problems with procurement and government/industry relations in the defence sector.

It may make more sense for Germany not to launch new acquisition programmes but to buy existing off-the-shelf capabilities – as it has recently done with its decision to buy 35 US F35 aircraft – which other European countries are also acquiring, offering economies of scale and cheaper operating and maintenance costs.

But if Germany abandons ambitious defence projects with France – which prefers a ‘buy European’ approach – such as the Future European Air Combat System, the relationship with France will become strained and French plans for EU self-reliance in the military field put at risk.

As a country averse to war fighting and narrow military approaches to security, it is uncertain how much of the conventional defence burden in NATO Germany would be willing to take on, so this could be the opportunity to create more integrated European units with France, the Benelux, Poland, and Italy, even with the post-Brexit UK.

The UK has doubled the size of its forces in Estonia and sent 1,000 troops to Poland, as well as devoting a substantial portion of its army, navy, and airforce to regular NATO exercises in the Baltic region. London was also the first ally to grant Sweden and Finland a temporary security guarantee pending full integration into the alliance.

NATO will likely settle on a compromise, increasing the size of its battalions on its eastern flank – turning them into battle groups – but giving each one a larger reserve force which will remain in Germany or other European allied countries.

A NATO strategic plan is now needed

The other issue for NATO is to develop a single theatre-wide strategic plan managed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the NATO command structure. In reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank, allies have sent forces to wherever they like and largely under national command, but this would not work in a real war.

NATO must revise its exercises to prepare and train for the new threat level, ensuring its forward deployed forces are fully integrated with local forces and the police and border guards to anticipate and respond to any Russian hybrid war tactics. It also needs to step up its joint planning and interoperability with Sweden and Finland and bring their territories into its standing defence plans.

One thing NATO has done well in this crisis is its political messaging. As Russia has become more threatening and reckless, it has been essential for NATO to be consistent and predictable. Re-affirming its core defensive purpose, calmly rejecting Putin’s nuclear posturing, and refusing to put NATO forces in Ukraine may be frustrating for some but it is vital not to play into Putin’s playbook regarding an ‘aggressive NATO’ or give him the sense he is being pushed into a corner. However, NATO strategic ambiguity can be useful when considering how to respond to a Russian escalation in Ukraine itself, such as using chemical weapons.

The key questions for NATO are:

• What should be the balance between permanently deployed and rotational forces in NATO’s new posture?
• What should be the balance of US/Canadian and European forces in this posture?
• How can the capability development programmes under EU Strategic Autonomy (such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund) be geared to support the European role and responsibility in the alliance? Air and missile defence would seem to be priorities given Russia’s reliance on long range strikes.
• How can the EU’s Strategic Compass, NATO’s next Strategic Concept and the third NATO-EU Joint Declaration be harmonized to bring the two institutions more closely together in responding to Russian hybrid operations and influence campaigns, and in assisting both Ukraine and others such as Georgia and Moldova?
• What should be the balance between forces for collective defence with heavy armour and directed artillery fire, and those for expeditionary missions beyond Europe such as counterterrorism, stabilization and peacekeeping?

NATO is revived and refocused

Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a catastrophe for Ukraine and Europe more generally, the multilateral system has discovered a new energy and sense of purpose as NATO has been revived and refocused on its core mission.

The EU and the US have pulled together with daily coordination of their policies and actions, and the EU is also facing up to its geo-political role, as recognizing the EU aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as well as the countries of the western Balkans shows its responsibility for the security and economic integration of the whole of Europe.

Why the UK must deliver on Nordic-Baltic security Expert comment NCapeling 16 December 2022

Hard choices are needed but it is crucial the UK provides security and leadership to its European partners given the wider context of the war in Ukraine.

The UK’s role in Nordic-Baltic security has been growing over the past decade. The region is key to core British strategic interest and engagement, and UK threat assessment closely aligns with long-held regional perspectives – the 2021 Integrated Review defines Russia as ‘the most acute threat to our security’.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK’s strong stance towards Moscow and the concrete steps taken to assist Ukraine and strengthen defence and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank have been widely appreciated in the Nordic-Baltic region.

The UK is seen as a reliable partner but, for it to continue to deliver in the region, difficult choices must be made with regards to UK defence spending and military capabilities, and London’s more global ambitions.

The UK is a major contributor to NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank, serving as a framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battlegroup in Estonia, and contributing to another battlegroup in Poland.

UK remains crucial to regional security

Coupled with its contribution to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission and maritime forces in the area, the UK is a crucial security partner both in the region and in a broader arch across Europe.

Over the past decade and a half, the UK has been developing a dense network of bilateral and minilateral relations in the region which are major assets in the current security environment.

It leads the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) which is a military cooperation format highly valued for its flexibility in responding to the needs of the participating nations – including non-NATO Sweden and Finland – and is increasingly focused on the North Atlantic, High North and wider Baltic areas. The UK has also seen increased bilateral defence cooperation with Norway, Denmark, Estonia, and other regional allies and partners.

There are reasonable expectations that Germany or France may at some point assume a greater role in this part of Europe, building on France’s participation in the EFP in Estonia, and Germany’s lead of the EFP in Lithuania.

However, while Paris remains more focused on NATO’s southern (and south-eastern) flank and building the European Union’s defence role, Berlin often underperforms as a leading or an organizing power of collaborative efforts across Europe.

Both also have a credibility problem in the Nordic-Baltic region due to their past policies towards Russia that occasionally reappear when discussing military support to Ukraine or how to treat Russia in the post-war European security order.

By contrast, the UK offers military capability, strong political will, a long-standing tradition of engagement in the Nordic-Baltic area, and fast decision-making.

The latter is exemplified by the bilateral security guarantees provided to Sweden and Finland during their accession to NATO, and the surge of assets sent to the region in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine such as an additional battlegroup and Chinook helicopters to Estonia, as well as forward-deployed elements of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to Latvia and Lithuania as part of the JEF.

Such pragmatic and resolute engagement help substantiate the UK’s post-Brexit claim that although it left the EU, it did not leave Europe. London also understands and facilitates the pivotal role that the US plays in European security – a shared perspective with the Nordic-Baltic partners.

Only the US – which has just recently decided to step up its military presence in the Baltics – has a greater appeal than the UK as a major ally. But Washington’s truly global responsibilities make it more difficult for it to play a regional leadership role.

With the context of the war in Ukraine, the centre of gravity of European security is moving east. The Nordic-Baltic region is likely to feature more prominently in the upcoming refresh of the UK’s Integrated Review, as the war in Ukraine and NATO’s new forward defence approach will focus UK attention and military capabilities on Europe for the foreseeable future.

But the UK still has limited resources and, despite the worsening security environment, there is currently no commitment by the Rishi Sunak government to increase defence spending beyond two per cent of GDP, as set out in the recently-published Autumn Statement.

This difficult fiscal reality contrasts UK ambition to also increase its footprint and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region highlighted by Rishi Sunak in his first foreign policy speech. London is already confronted with increasing expectations from its Nordic and Baltic partners, which are rattled by Russia’s aggression and seek more engagement and commitments from larger and more resourceful allies, and are insisting on prompt implementation of NATO’s new defence and deterrence plans.

This all comes on top of the resources that further assistance to Ukraine will require in the coming months and years. Balancing competing priorities and demands from partners is routine for a major power with global ambition but, in the current context, if the UK government fails to prioritize and increase resources, over-extension is in sight for its armed forces.

The war in Ukraine confirms that, beyond the rhetoric around the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, the Euro-Atlantic is – and will remain – the priority theatre of engagement for the UK. To keep delivering in the Nordic-Baltic region and remain a reliable partner, UK ambitions should be set clearly, and expectations managed with regional partners.

A good example is the recent UK-Estonia joint statement and defence roadmap, which is an attempt to reconcile London’s vision of modern deterrence with Tallinn’s preference for ‘more boots on the ground’.

The joint statement also clarifies initial misunderstandings regarding the upcoming withdrawal of the second UK battlegroup deployed to Estonia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – support Tallinn expected to continue ‘as long as necessary’ but London saw as temporary. It offsets the poor political ‘optics’ of the withdrawal while providing solid ground for deepening the common agenda in the near future.

By the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, progress on implementing the roadmap will be a crucial measure of success for the bilateral relationship, and for the UK’s broader regional role. It should serve as an opportunity for the UK to reflect on its force development priorities and balance, with Baltic partners arguing in favour of the UK rebuilding some mass in its armed forces and providing more resources to the land component.

Much to gain for the UK

The UK gains many benefits from deepening and widening its engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, and not only by showcasing its regional leadership at a time of dire need or having more weight in Europe and across the Atlantic in strategic debates about future security architecture.

Culture notes: Will the EU find its voice at last? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanized the bloc, but doubt remains about how it can capitalize on this moment, writes Catherine Fieschi.

Despite its reticence to believe that Russia would attack Ukraine, once Vladimir Putin’s tanks rolled across the Donbas, the European Union finally grasped the momentous nature of the events unfolding on its eastern flank. The immediate reaction of Europe’s member states was one of unity, resolve and uncharacteristically rapid decision-making, at least on sanctions and energy policy.

That they would need to act in concert across a concatenation of crises that would be either triggered (energy), worsened (inflation) or heightened (geopolitical instability) by Putin’s move was obvious. And so, Europe’s collective narrative of this past year slid into place, and it goes something like this: We gave Russia the benefit of every doubt, including after their invasion of Crimea when we still tried to bring them back to the negotiating table, but Putin has made the fundamental choice of turning away from democracy and the rule of law.

Now, the narrative goes on, we have to treat them as enemies and give ourselves the means to become resilient in the face of aggression as Ukraine is all that stands – both symbolically and geographically – between us and the chaos of a Europe-wide war.

Like any good narrative, it is anchored in previous trials and exploits. Having learnt from its failure to coordinate action during the eurozone crisis and then the migration crisis, Europe was keen to make the most of its resilience in the face of the Covid pandemic in the form of the joint vaccine purchases and a massive recovery plan.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an added – albeit dramatic and costly – opportunity to pursue further collective action and discover the next chapter of its shared purpose, as a political and perhaps even a defence alliance.

Europe had long been in need of an arc to follow. In the aftermath of the Second World War, peace and prosperity seemed enough. But the new multipolar world that emerged from the ashes of the Cold War and then 9/11 were more difficult to navigate for a largely commercial and regulatory alliance.

Could the EU, then, ever find its political voice?

David vs Goliath

While Brexit and Covid created rallying points, the shock and tragedy of the invasion delivered everything the EU needed in narrative terms: a David and Goliath story, with the opportunity to feature on Team David in European terms while allying with the United States, and a ‘band of brothers’ element to shore up a union bruised by the defection of a key but troubled member. Above all, the appearance of an arch-villain in the form of Vladimir Putin put Europe back into the familiar and mythical territory of the 1940s and then the Cold War.

When on May 28, 2016, Putin seated himself on the throne of the Byzantine emperors in Mount Athos’ Protaton Church in Greece in a scene truly worthy of Game of Thrones, the writing should have been on the wall. That day he explicitly laid out his aim to appoint himself as the new Eastern emperor who would fight the decadence of the West.

‘Today,’ Putin told the world, ‘we restore the values of patriotism, historical memory and traditional culture.’ Later, he cited Ukraine as the biggest unfinished mission of his years in power. That Europe – and Germany in particular – had taken so long to decipher Putin’s dark designs only adds to the narrative’s epic quality, positioning Europe as a victim of its own good faith and open heart.

Cracks in the narrative

But the narrative is not free from cracks. The Baltic states would argue that they had long warned of Putin’s nefarious intentions; and Poland has always been convinced of the threat posed by its neighbour.

Quantification of ¹⁸F-FDG PET images is useful for accurate diagnosis and evaluation of various brain diseases, including brain tumors, epilepsy, dementia, and Parkinson disease. However, accurate quantification of ¹⁸F-FDG PET images requires matched 3-dimensional T₁ MRI scans of the same individuals to provide detailed information on brain anatomy. In this paper, we propose a transfer learning approach to adapt a pretrained deep neural network model from amyloid PET to spatially normalize ¹⁸F-FDG PET images without the need for 3-dimensional MRI. Methods: The proposed method is based on a deep learning model for automatic spatial normalization of ¹⁸F-FDG brain PET images, which was developed by fine-tuning a pretrained model for amyloid PET using only 103 ¹⁸F-FDG PET and MR images. After training, the algorithm was tested on 65 internal and 78 external test sets. All T₁ MR images with a 1-mm isotropic voxel size were processed with FreeSurfer software to provide cortical segmentation maps used to extract a ground-truth regional SUV ratio using cerebellar gray matter as a reference region. These values were compared with those from spatial normalization-based quantification methods using the proposed method and statistical parametric mapping software. Results: The proposed method showed superior spatial normalization compared with statistical parametric mapping, as evidenced by increased normalized mutual information and better size and shape matching in PET images. Quantitative evaluation revealed a consistently higher SUV ratio correlation and intraclass correlation coefficients for the proposed method across various brain regions in both internal and external datasets. The remarkably good correlation and intraclass correlation coefficient values of the proposed method for the external dataset are noteworthy, considering the dataset’s different ethnic distribution and the use of different PET scanners and image reconstruction algorithms. Conclusion: This study successfully applied transfer learning to a deep neural network for ¹⁸F-FDG PET spatial normalization, demonstrating its resource efficiency and improved performance. This highlights the efficacy of transfer learning, which requires a smaller number of datasets than does the original network training, thus increasing the potential for broader use of deep learning–based brain PET spatial normalization techniques for various clinical and research radiotracers.

Radiolabeled small-molecule DOTA-haptens can be combined with antitumor/anti-DOTA bispecific antibodies (BsAbs) for pretargeted radioimmunotherapy (PRIT). For optimized delivery of the theranostic - and β-emitting isotope ¹⁷⁷Lu with DOTA-based PRIT (DOTA-PRIT), bivalent Gemini (DOTA-Bn-thiourea-PEG4-thiourea-Bn-DOTA, aka (3,6,9,12-tetraoxatetradecane-1,14-diyl)bis(DOTA-benzyl thiourea)) was developed. Methods: Gemini was synthesized by linking 2 S-2-(4-isothiocyanatobenzyl)-DOTA molecules together via a 1,14-diamino-PEG4 linker. [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini was prepared with no-carrier-added ¹⁷⁷LuCl₃ to a molar-specific activity of 123 GBq/μmol and radiochemical purity of more than 99%. The specificity of BsAb-¹⁷⁷Lu-Gemini was verified in vitro. Subsequently, we evaluated biodistribution and whole-body clearance for [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini and, for comparison, our gold-standard monovalent [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-S-2-(4-aminobenzyl)-DOTA ([¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-Bn) in naïve (tumor-free) athymic nude mice. For our proof-of-concept system, a 3-step pretargeting approach was performed with an established DOTA-PRIT regimen (anti-GPA33/anti-DOTA IgG-scFv BsAb, a clearing agent, and [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini) in mouse models. Results: Initial in vivo studies showed that [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini behaved similarly to [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-Bn, with almost identical blood and whole-body clearance kinetics, as well as biodistribution and mouse kidney dosimetry. Pretargeting [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini to GPA33-expressing SW1222 human colorectal xenografts was highly effective, leading to absorbed doses of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini for blood, tumor, liver, spleen, and kidneys of 3.99, 455, 6.93, 5.36, and 14.0 cGy/MBq, respectively. Tumor–to–normal tissue absorbed-dose ratios (i.e., therapeutic indices [TIs]) for the blood and kidneys were 114 and 33, respectively. In addition, we demonstrate that the use of bivalent [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini in DOTA-PRIT leads to improved TIs and augmented [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini tumor uptake and retention in comparison to monovalent [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-Bn. Finally, we established efficacy in SW1222 tumor-bearing mice, demonstrating that a single injection of anti-GPA33 DOTA-PRIT with 44 MBq (1.2 mCi) of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini (estimated tumor-absorbed dose, 200 Gy) induced complete responses in 5 of 5 animals and a histologic cure in 2 of 5 (40%) animals. Moreover, a significant increase in survival compared with nontreated controls was noted (maximum tolerated dose not reached). Conclusion: We have developed a bivalent DOTA-radiohapten, [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini, that showed improved radiopharmacology for DOTA-PRIT application. The use of bivalent [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini in DOTA-PRIT, as opposed to monovalent [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-Bn, allows curative treatments with considerably less administered ¹⁷⁷Lu activity while still achieving high TIs for both the blood (>100) and the kidneys (>30).

To date, the imaging and diagnosis of hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) rely on CT/MRI, which have well-known limitations. Glypican-3 (GPC3) is a cell surface receptor highly expressed by HCC but not by normal or cirrhotic liver tissue. Here we report initial clinical results of GPC3-targeted PET imaging with [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-DOTA-RYZ-GPC3 (RAYZ-8009), a peptide-based GPC3 ligand in patients with known or suspected HCC. Methods: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 was obtained after labeling the peptide precursor with ⁶⁸Ga from a ⁶⁸Ge/⁶⁸Ga generator and heating at 90°C for 10 min followed by sterile filtration. After administration of [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009, a dynamic or static PET/CT scan was acquired between 45 min and 4 h after administration. Radiotracer uptake was measured by SUVs for the following tissues: suspected or actual HCC or hepatoblastoma lesions, non–tumor-bearing liver, renal cortex, blood pool in the left ventricle, and gastric fundus. Additionally, tumor–to–healthy-liver ratios (TLRs) were calculated. Results: Twenty-four patients (5 patients in the dynamic protocol; 19 patients in the static protocol) were scanned. No adverse events occurred. Two patients had no lesion detected and did not have HCC during follow-up. In total, 50 lesions were detected and analyzed. The mean SUV_max of these lesions was 19.6 (range, 2.7–95.3), and the mean SUV_mean was 10.1 (range, 1.0–49.2) at approximately 60 min after administration. Uptake in non–tumor-bearing liver and blood pool rapidly decreased over time and became negligible 45 min after administration (mean SUV_mean, <1.6), with a continuous decline to 4 h after administration (mean SUV_mean, 1.0). The opposite was observed for HCC lesions, for which SUVs and TLRs continuously increased for up to 4 h after administration. In individual lesion analysis, TLR was the highest between 60 and 120 min after administration. Uptake in the gastric fundus gradually increased for up to 45 min (to an SUV_max of 31.3) and decreased gradually afterward. Conclusion: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 is safe and allows for high-contrast imaging of GPC3-positive HCC, with rapid clearance from most normal organs. Thereby, [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 is promising for HCC diagnosis and staging. Further research is warranted.

Cancer of unknown primary (CUP) represents a heterogeneous group of metastatic tumors for which standardized diagnostic work-up fails to identify the primary site. We aimed to describe the Peter MacCallum Cancer Centre experience with ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT in extracervical CUP with respect to detection of a primary site and its impact on management. A secondary aim was to compare overall survival (OS) in patients with and without a detected primary site. Methods: CUP patients treated between 2014 and 2020 were identified from medical oncology clinics and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT records. Information collated from electronic medical records included the suspected primary site and treatment details before and after ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT. Clinicopathologic details and genomic analysis were used to determine the clinically suspected primary site and compared against 2 independent masked reads of ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT images by nuclear medicine specialists to determine sensitivity, specificity, accuracy, and the rate of detection of the primary site. Results: We identified 147 patients, 65% of whom had undergone molecular profiling. The median age at diagnosis was 61 y (range, 20–84 y), and the median follow-up time was 74 mo (range, 26–83 mo). Eighty-two percent were classified as having an unfavorable CUP subtype as per international guidelines.¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT demonstrated a primary site detection rate of 41%, resulted in a change in management in 22%, and identified previously occult disease sites in 37%. Median OS was 16.8 mo for all patients and 104.7 and 12.1 mo for favorable and unfavorable CUP subtypes, respectively (P < 0.0001). Median OS in CUP patients when using ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT, clinicopathologic, and genomic information was 19.8 and 8.5 mo when a primary site was detected and not detected, respectively (P = 0.016). Multivariable analysis of survival adjusted for age and sex remained significant for identification of a potential primary site (P < 0.001), a favorable CUP (P < 0.001), and an Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group status of 1 or less (P < 0.001). Conclusion: ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT plays a complementary role in CUP diagnostic work-up and was able to determine the likely primary site in 41% of cases. OS is improved with primary site identification, demonstrating the value of access to diagnostic ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT for CUP patients.

This study evaluates the diagnostic utility of PET/MRI for primary, locoregional, and nodal head and neck squamous cell carcinoma (HNSCC) through systematic review and metaanalysis. Methods: A systematic search was conducted using PubMed and Scopus to identify studies on the diagnostic accuracy of PET/MRI for HNSCC. The search included specific terms and excluded nonhybrid PET/MRI studies, and those with a sample size of fewer than 10 patients were excluded. Results: In total, 15 studies encompassing 638 patients were found addressing the diagnostic test accuracy for PET/MRI within the chosen subject domain. Squamous cell carcinoma of the nasopharynx was the most observed HNSCC subtype (n = 198). The metaanalysis included 12 studies, with pooled sensitivity and specificity values of 93% and 95% per patient for primary disease evaluation, 93% and 96% for locoregional evaluation, and 89% and 98% per lesion for nodal disease detection, respectively. An examination of a subset of studies comparing PET/MRI against PET/CT or MRI alone for evaluating nodal and locoregional HNSCC found that PET/MRI may offer slightly higher accuracy than other modalities. However, this difference was not statistically significant. Conclusion: PET/MRI has excellent potential for identifying primary, locoregional, and nodal HNSCC.

Tumor hypoxia, an integral biomarker to guide radiotherapy, can be imaged with ¹⁸F-fluoromisonidazole (¹⁸F-FMISO) hypoxia PET. One major obstacle to its broader application is the lack of standardized interpretation criteria. We sought to develop and validate practical interpretation criteria and a dedicated training protocol for nuclear medicine physicians to interpret ¹⁸F-FMISO hypoxia PET. Methods: We randomly selected 123 patients with human papillomavirus–positive oropharyngeal cancer enrolled in a phase II trial who underwent 123 ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT and 134 ¹⁸F-FMISO PET/CT scans. Four independent nuclear medicine physicians with no ¹⁸F-FMISO experience read the scans. Interpretation by a fifth nuclear medicine physician with over 2 decades of ¹⁸F-FMISO experience was the reference standard. Performance was evaluated after initial instruction and subsequent dedicated training. Scans were considered positive for hypoxia by visual assessment if ¹⁸F-FMISO uptake was greater than floor-of-mouth uptake. Additionally, SUV_max was determined to evaluate whether quantitative assessment using tumor-to-background ratios could be helpful to define hypoxia positivity. Results: Visual assessment produced a mean sensitivity and specificity of 77.3% and 80.9%, with fair interreader agreement ( = 0.34), after initial instruction. After dedicated training, mean sensitivity and specificity improved to 97.6% and 86.9%, with almost perfect agreement ( = 0.86). Quantitative assessment with an estimated best SUV_max ratio threshold of more than 1.2 to define hypoxia positivity produced a mean sensitivity and specificity of 56.8% and 95.9%, respectively, with substantial interreader agreement ( = 0.66), after initial instruction. After dedicated training, mean sensitivity improved to 89.6% whereas mean specificity remained high at 95.3%, with near-perfect interreader agreement ( = 0.86). Conclusion: Nuclear medicine physicians without ¹⁸F-FMISO hypoxia PET reading experience demonstrate much improved interreader agreement with dedicated training using specific interpretation criteria.

Turkey Is on the Road to a Severe Economic Crisis Expert comment sysadmin 12 July 2018

The deteriorating state of the economy is President Erdoğan’s Achilles’ heel and the biggest threat to his currently unrivalled leadership.

Fifteen days after Turkey’s parliamentary and presidential elections, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed a new government under radically enhanced executive powers granted by the constitution. He chose 16 loyalists and partisan figures to ensure that he remains front and centre in decision-making and policy formation.

Most notably, Erdoğan sacrificed the former deputy prime minister and ex-Merrill Lynch chief economist Mehmet Şimşek in favour of his inexperienced son-in-law Berat Albayrak as finance and treasury minister to manage the fragile economy. Whether he has the competence to placate jittery financial markets and foreign investors is debatable.

Erdoğan will prioritize short-term growth at all costs to the detriment of macroeconomic and financial stability. That entails foregoing interest rate hikes needed to contain runaway double-digit inflation and to support a plummeting lira that depreciated nearly 20 per cent this year. It also means loosening the purse strings, flooding the markets with cheap credit and sponsoring rampant construction and mega-infrastructure projects.

True to his promise, he has appropriated to himself, by presidential decree, the right to hire the central bank governor, deputies and monetary policy committee members for a four-year term. This completes the politicization of the once-respected and independent central bank and is in line with his unorthodox monetary views that higher interest rates equates with higher inflation.

Erdoğan associates progress with gleaming high-rise buildings, gargantuan infrastructure show-pieces and elevated growth rates. He is spiking the fuel to boost the speed of the sputtering mid-sized Audi-style Turkish economy to achieve superior Ferrari growth rates. As any mechanic knows, these tactics are unsustainable in the long term. Eventually, the engine will burn out.

He does not seem to appreciate that Turkey’s growth model requires an overhaul to join the league of rich economies. It is too reliant on consumer spending and government-sponsored infrastructure and construction projects funded by speculative financial flows rather than on sustained private investment and exports.

Net result: the corporate sector’s foreign-exchange liabilities have climbed to a record $328 billion as of the end of 2017. When netted against foreign-exchange assets, it is still a worrying $214 billion. Its US dollar and euro debt pile has more than doubled since 2008, 80 per cent of which is held by domestic banks. Given these acute balance-of-payments conditions, it is not farfetched that Turkey may impose capital controls in the short-to-medium term to restrict the outflow of foreign assets. At $50 billion, the current account deficit – defined as the sum of the trade balance and financial flows – is not even covered by the central bank’s net international reserves at nearly $45 billion.

Unsurprisingly, some major Turkish companies are negotiating with their bondholders to restructure their sizeable foreign loan obligations as lira devaluation increases the financial burden. Should a significant number of Turkish corporates default on their foreign obligations, this would reverberate across the Turkish economy, cause mass consumer panic, shake the confidence of international financial markets and potentially lead to a crisis within the Turkish financial system and to a deep and prolonged economic recession.

Revealingly, Erdoğan’s nationalist allies, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), refused to join his government. Perhaps Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP leader, learned the lessons of the 2001 financial crisis as a member of a three-party government. So he is opting to project influence from the outside, rather than risk being tainted with responsibility for an economic downturn.

Turkey’s president is doubling down on his singular approach to governance irrespective of the fallout. Notwithstanding his current political dominance, the deteriorating state of the economy is his Achilles’ heel and the biggest threat to his currently unrivalled leadership.

A Credit-fuelled Economic Recovery Stores Up Trouble for Turkey Expert comment sysadmin 17 February 2020

Turkey is repeating the mistakes that led to the 2018 lira crisis and another freefall for the currency may not be far off.

Since the 2018 economic crisis, when the value of the lira plummeted and borrowing costs soared, Turkey’s economy has achieved a miraculous ‘V-shaped’ economic recovery from a recession lasting three quarters to a return back to quarterly growth above 1 per cent in the first three months of 2019.

But this quick turnaround has been built on vast amounts of cheap credit used to re-stimulate a consumption and construction boom. This so-called ‘triple C’ economy generated a rapid growth spurt akin to a modestly able professional sprinter injected with steroids.

This has made the currency vulnerable. The lira has steadily depreciated by 11 per cent against the US dollar since the beginning of 2019 and crossed the rate of 6 lira versus the US dollar on 7 February. And there are further warning signs on the horizon.

Credit bonanza

Statistics reveal that Turkish domestic credit grew by around 13 per cent on average throughout 2019. The credit bonanza is still ongoing. Mortgage-backed home sales jumped by a record high of 600 per cent last December alone and the 2019 budget deficit catapulted by 70 per cent due to higher government spending.

Turkey’s central bank fuelled this credit expansion by cutting interest rates aggressively to below inflation and, since the start of this year, purchasing lira-denominated bonds equivalent to around one-third of total acquisitions last year to push yields lower.

Equally, it has linked bank lending to reserve requirements – the money that banks have to keep at the central bank – to boost borrowings via state and private banks. Banks with a ‘real’ loan growth (including inflation) of between 5 and 15 per cent enjoy a 2 per cent reserve ratio on most lira deposits, which authorities adjusted from an earlier band of 10-20 per cent that did not consider double-digit inflation.

Cumulatively, bond purchases (effectively quantitative easing) and reserve management policies have also contributed to eased credit conditions.

Commercial banks have also reduced deposit rates on lira accounts to less than inflation to encourage consumption over saving. Together with low lending rates, the boost to the economy has flowed via mortgages, credit card loans, vehicle leasing transactions and general business borrowings.

Accordingly, stimulus is at the forefront of the government’s economic approach, as it was in 2017 and 2018. It does not seem to be implementing structural change to re-orient growth away from consumption towards productivity.

In addition, governance is, again, a central issue. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s near total monopolization of policymaking means he guides all domestic and external policies. He forced out the previous central bank governor, Murat Cetinkaya, in July 2019 because he did not share the president’s desire for an accelerated pace of interest rate reductions.

New challenges

Despite the similarities, the expected future financial turbulence will be materially different from its 2018 predecessor in four crucial respects.

Firstly, foreign investors will only be marginally involved. Turkey has shut out foreign investors since 2018 from lira-denominated assets by restricting lira swap arrangements. Unsurprisingly, the non-resident holdings of lira bonds has plummeted from 20 per cent in 2018 to less than 10 per cent today.

Secondly, the Turkish government has recently introduced indirect domestic capital controls by constraining most commercial transactions to the lira rather than to the US dollar or euro to reduce foreign currency demand in light of short-term external debt obligations of $191 billion.

Thirdly, the Turkish state banks are intervening quite regularly to soften Lira volatility, thereby transitioning from a ‘free float’ to a ‘managed float’. So far, they have spent over $37 billion over the last two years in a futile effort to buttress the lira. This level of involvement in currency markets cannot be maintained.

Fourthly, the Turkish state is being far more interventionist in the Turkish stock exchange and bond markets to keep asset prices elevated. Government-controlled local funds have participated in the Borsa Istanbul and state banks in sovereign debt to sustain rallies or reverse a bear market.

All these measures have one running idea: exclude foreign investors and no crisis will recur. Yet, when the credit boom heads to a downturn sooner or later, Turks will probably escalate lira conversions to US dollars; 51 per cent of all Turkish bank deposits are already dollar-denominated and the figure is still rising.

If Turkey’s limited foreign reserves cannot satisfy the domestic dollar demand, the government may have to impose comprehensive capital controls and allow for a double digit depreciation in the value of the lira to from its current level, with significant repercussions on Turkey’s political stability and economic climate.

To avoid this scenario, it needs to restore fiscal and monetary prudence, deal the with the foreign debt overhang in the private sector and focus on productivity-improving economic and institutional reforms to gain the confidence of global financial markets and Turks alike.

Turkey Needs Radical New Direction to Save the Economy Expert comment NCapeling 23 November 2020

Turkey should emulate the reformist approach it adopted after the 2001 crisis to prevent an economic and financial breakdown - but this looks highly unlikely.

Although Ankara has witnessed what appears to be an abrupt change of its top economic team with two fresh appointments to key positions – Naci Ağbal as governor of the central bank and Lütfi Elvan as finance and treasury minister – a cardinal rule of thumb in Turkish politics is that the more drama one sees, the less policy change there will actually be.

Financial markets reacted positively to the moves in the expectation they will signal a change of Turkey’s overall economic approach, but the reality is Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is simply putting loyalists into key bureaucratic positions to help ensure the primary role of these functions becomes ‘selling’ his policies more effectively, rather than altering them.

The hope from the markets – which saw the beleaguered Turkish lira appreciate against the US dollar at the news – is that Turkey adopts substantial interest rate increases as well as measures to repress liquidity expansion in order to temper its controversial so-called ‘Triple C’ approach of using cheap credit to stimulate growth with an unsustainable consumption and construction boom.

But instead, Erdoğan’s declaration after the appointments were made indicates the new restrictions in which they will now operate, saying ‘we are in a historic struggle against those who want to force Turkey into modern capitulations through the shackles of interest rates, foreign exchange rates and inflation’.

Learn from past successes

To resolve its current underlying economic problems, Turkey should actually be looking to its recent past and aiming to emulate the approach pursued by former prime minister Bülent Ecevit during the 2001 financial crisis when he recruited Kemal Derviş, a senior World Bank official with extensive experience and international contacts in economic, financial, and monetary affairs.

As economy minister with a broad mandate to spearhead a durable economic recovery plan, Dervis established independent market regulatory agencies covering banking, telecommunications, energy, and other key sectors, and strengthened the competition authority.

He also either liquidated or merged insolvent banks, granted central bank autonomy to guarantee price stability, and ensured recruitment was based on competence, expertise, and meritocracy. Crucially, his productivity-enhancing restructuring blueprint was designed in Turkey rather than being imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or another external agency.

Ecevit also turbocharged reforms motivated in part by a desire to join the EU with constitutional, political and legal modernization which widened personal freedom, significantly curtailed capital punishment, liberalized the cultural environment for Kurds, and fortified the rule of law. And one of his coalition partners in that work, the right-wing pro-Turkish National Action Party (MHP), is now allied with the current ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

His foreign minister Ismail Cem also enhanced Turkey’s relations with both Europe and the US, initiated the so-called ‘earthquake diplomacy’ with his Greek counterpart George Papandreou after twin tragedies struck both nations in 1999, and largely avoided entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts.

The net result of all these actions was that Turkey emerged from the crisis with greater resilience, a more robust regulatory framework, upgraded political and economic institutions, rapidly decreasing inflation, a credible central bank, a stronger financial system, closer relations with the EU and US, and heightened domestic and foreign investor confidence.

But now that similar woes are engulfing Turkey anew, is Erdogan and the AKP/MHP alliance able – and willing – to repeat the Ecevit recipe? Present signs indicate they are highly unlikely to as they are too committed to entrenching the Triple C model.

Although this model will likely further consolidate their power, it will also empty the civil service of qualified professionals, restrict civil liberties and freedoms, and create more ideological politics, affecting Turkey’s foreign policy.

Such a stubborn refusal to shift direction is increasing the inevitability of a deep economic and financial breakdown and so, unless Turkey undertakes a serious policy departure instead of continuing to resort to the quick fix approach, there is real likelihood it will simply accelerate towards disaster.

Prognosticators anticipate the Federal Reserve on Thursday will announce a second rate cut after lowering the federal lending rate by 0.5% in September.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has determined commonly used oral phenylephrine is "not effective" and has proposed its removal from over-the-counter nasal decongestants.

Oct. 31, 2024 — SNIA is pleased to return to SC24 as part of the Open Standards Pavilion, Booth 1815. At SC24, five SNIA groups and six SNIA Alliance and Collaboration […]

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Ukraine's military intelligence has intercepted what it claims are radio communications between North Korean soldiers in Russia, amid media reports of a massive troop buildup ahead of an attack in the Kursk region.

The Japanese parliament on Monday re-elected Liberal Democratic Party chief Shigeru Ishiba as prime minister in a rare runoff vote after the ruling LDP lost its majority in the lower legislative chamber.

Dozens of people were killed in Israeli military strikes on northern Lebanon and the Gaza strip, including as many as 20 children, authorities said.

There will be no cease-fire in Lebanon, Israel's new defense minister declared Tuesday, countering claims from Israel's foreign minister, who said that progress had been made to end the fighting with Hezbollah.

North Korea ratified a defense treaty with Russia, state media reported Tuesday, formally deepening military cooperation that has seen Pyongyang send thousands of troops to help Moscow in its war against Ukraine.

Oct. 16, 2024 — The ISC High Performance Jack Dongarra Early Career Award and Lecture Series is an annual event that honors the remarkable contributions of Professor Jack Dongarra to […]

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Oct. 17, 2024 — UC San Diego Alumnus Roman Gerasimov, who recently earned his doctorate from the university, has received the International Astronomical Union (IAU) Stars and Stellar Physics Division Award […]

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SANTA CLARA, Calif., Oct. 25, 2024 — ServiceNow has announced that enterprise software industry veteran Amit Zavery will join the company as president, chief product officer (CPO), and chief operating officer […]

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Gerry Faust, who won five Ohio high school football state titles before taking over as coach at Notre Dame in the early 1980s, has died, his family announced. He was 89.