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Cloud computing services over the Internet have the potential to spur a significant increase in government efficiency and decrease technology costs, as well as to create incentives and online platforms for innovation. Adoption of cloud computing technologies could lead to new, efficient ways of governing.

On April 7, the Brookings Institution hosted a policy forum that examines the economic benefits of cloud computing for local, state, and federal government. Federal Chief Information Officer Vivek Kundra delivered a keynote address on the role of the government in developing and promoting cloud computing. Brookings Vice President Darrell West moderated a panel of experts and detailed the findings in his paper, "Saving Money through Cloud Computing," which analyzes its governmental cost-savings potential.

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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• Cloud Computing a Fiscally Smart Move
• Cloud Computing Saves Money, Makes Government More Open
• Cloud Computing Will Fundamentally Change Government Operations
• Government on Cloud Will Yield Cost-Effective System

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• The Economic Gains of Cloud Computing

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The U.S. government spends billions of dollars each year on computer hardware, software and file servers that may no longer be necessary. Currently, the public sector makes relatively little use of cloud computing, even though studies suggest substantial government savings from a migration to more Internet-based computing with shared resources.

On July 21, the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings hosted a policy forum on steps to enhance public sector adoption of cloud computing innovations. Brookings Vice President Darrell West moderated a panel of experts, including David McClure of the General Services Administration, Dawn Leaf of the National Institute for Standards and Technology, and Katie Ratte of the Federal Trade Commission. West released a paper detailing the policy changes required to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal computing.

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• Moving to the Cloud: How the Public Sector Can Leverage the Power of Cloud Computing

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Although research suggests that considerable efficiencies can be gained from cloud computing technology, concerns over privacy and security continue to deter government and private-sector firms from migrating to the cloud. By its very nature, storing information or accessing services through remote providers would seem to raise the level of privacy and security risks. But is such apprehension warranted? What are the real security threats posed to individuals, business and government by cloud computing technologies? Do the cost-saving benefits outweigh the dangers?

On October 26, the Brookings Institution hosted a policy forum on the privacy and security challenges raised by cloud computing. Governance Studies Director Darrell West moderated a panel of technology industry experts examining how cloud computing systems can generate innovation and cost savings without sacrificing privacy and security. West will also present findings from his forthcoming paper “Privacy, Security, and Innovation in Cloud Computing.”

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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Executive Summary

Cloud computing can mean different things to different people, and obviously the privacy and security concerns will differ between a consumer using a public cloud application, a medium-sized enterprise using a customized suite of business applications on a cloud platform, and a government agency with a private cloud for internal database sharing (Whitten, 2010). The shift of each category of user to cloud systems brings a different package of benefits and risks.

What remains constant, though, is the tangible and intangible value that the user seeks to protect. For an individual, the value at risk can range from loss of civil liberties to the contents of bank accounts. For a business, the value runs from core trade secrets to continuity of business operations and public reputation. Much of this is hard to estimate and translate into standard metrics of value (Lev, 2003) The task in this transition is to compare the opportunities of cloud adoption with the risks. The benefits of cloud have been discussed elsewhere, to the individual to the enterprise, and to the government (West, 2010a, 2010b).

This document explores how to think about privacy and security on the cloud. It is not intended to be a catalog of cloud threats (see ENISA (2009) for an example of rigorous exploration of the risks of cloud adoption to specific groups). We frame the set of concerns for the cloud and highlight what is new and what is not. We analyze a set of policy issues that represent systematic concerns deserving the attention of policy-makers. We argue that the weak link in security generally is the human factor and surrounding institutions and incentives matter more than the platform itself. As long as we learn the lessons of past breakdowns, cloud computing has the potential to generate innovation without sacrificing privacy and security (Amoroso, 2006; Benioff, 2009).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Many web services are examples of cloud computing, from storage and backup sites such as Flickr and Dropbox to online business productivity services such as Google Docs and Salesforce.com. Cloud computing offers a potentially attractive solution to customers keen to acquire computing infrastructure without large up-front investment, particularly in cases where their demand may be variable and unpredictable, as a means of achieving financial savings, productivity improvements and the wider flexibility that accompanies Internet-hosting of data and applications.

The greater flexibility of a cloud computing service as compared with a traditional outsourcing contract may be offset by reduced certainty for the customer in terms of the location of data placed into the cloud and the legal foundations of any contract with the provider. There may be unforeseen costs and risks hidden in the terms and conditions of such services.

This document reports on a detailed survey and analysis of the terms and conditions offered by cloud computing providers.

The survey formed part of the Cloud Legal Project at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies (CCLS), within the School of Law at Queen Mary, University of London, UK. Funded by a donation from Microsoft, but academically independent, the project is examining a wide range of legal and regulatory issues arising from cloud computing. The project's survey of 31 cloud computing contracts from 27 different providers, based on their standard terms of service as offered to customers in the E.U. and U.K., found that many include clauses that could have a significant impact, often negative, on the rights and interests of customers. The ease and convenience with which cloud computing arrangements can be set up may lull customers into overlooking the significant issues that can arise when key data and processes are entrusted to cloud service providers. The main lesson to be drawn from the Cloud Legal Project’s survey is that customers should review the terms and conditions of a cloud service carefully before signing up to it.

The survey found that some contracts, for instance, have clauses disclaiming responsibility for keeping the user’s data secure or intact. Others reserve the right to terminate accounts for apparent lack of use (potentially important if they are used for occasional backup or disaster recovery purposes), for violation of the provider’s Acceptable Use Policy, or indeed for any or no reason at all. Furthermore, whilst some providers promise only to hand over customer data if served with a court order, others state that they will do so on much wider grounds, including it simply being in their own business interests to disclose the data. Cloud providers also often exclude liability for loss of data, or strictly limit the damages that can be claimed against them – damages that might otherwise be substantial if a failure brought down an e-commerce web site.

Although in some U.S. states, in E.U. countries and in various other jurisdictions the validity of such terms may be challenged under consumer protection laws, users of cloud services may face practical obstacles to bringing a claim for data loss or privacy breach against a provider that seems local online but is, in fact, based in another continent. Indeed, service providers usually claim that their contracts are subject to the laws of the place where they have their main place of business. In many cases this is a US state, with a stipulation that any dispute must be heard in the provider’s local courts, regardless of the customer’s location.

Perhaps the most disconcerting discovery of the Cloud Legal Project’s survey was that many providers claimed to be able to amend their contracts unilaterally, simply by posting an updated version on the web. In effect, customers are put on notice to download lengthy and complex contracts, on a regular basis, and to compare them against their own copies of earlier versions to look for changes.

The cloud computing market is still developing rapidly, and potential cloud customers should be aware that there may be a mismatch between their expectations and the reality of cloud providers' service terms, and be alive to the possibility of unexpected changes to the terms.

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Our former Brookings colleague Rebecca Blank, now at the Commerce Department, is today leading the first meeting of the Obama Administration’s Innovation Advisory Board, looking at the innovative capacity and economic competitiveness of the United States.

I applaud the effort.  Nothing is more important to America’s longterm competitiveness than emphasizing innovation.  As the council looks to the private sector and global markets, I urge it to examine how the U.S. government can lead innovation and contribute to economic growth.  The best place to look is new and emerging digital technologies that can make government more accessible, accountable, responsive and efficient for the people who use government services every day.

Here are some of the recommendations I made in a recent paper I wrote with colleagues here at Brookings as part of our “Growth Through Innovation” initiative:

• Save money and gain efficiency by moving federal IT functions “to the cloud,” i.e., using advances in cloud computing to put software, hardware, services and data storage through remote file servers.

• Continue to prioritize the Obama administration’s existing efforts to put unparalleled amounts of data online at Data.gov and other federal sites, making it easier and cheaper for citizens and businesses to access the information they need.

• Use social media networks to deliver information to the public and to solicit feedback to improve government performance.

• Integrate ideas and operations with state and local organizations, where much of government innovation is taking place today. 

• Apply the methods of private-sector business planning to the public sector to produce region-specific business plans that are low cost and high impact.

These improvements in government services innovations in the digital age can help spur innovation and support a robust business climate.  And, as a sorely needed side benefit, they can also serve to eliminate some of the current distrust and even contempt for government that has brought public approval of the performance of the federal government to near historic lows.  

      

The appointment of new federal chief information officer Steven VanRoekel comes at a challenging time for President Barack Obama. The national economy continues to be weak. Congress plans to cut trillions from the federal budget. And in the time leading up to the 2012 election, American voters remain cynical about the ability of the government to address important policy problems in an effective manner.

In an era of deficit reduction and public cynicism, the tasks facing federal officials are to determine how to do more with less and persuade voters the government can become smarter and more effective. There are going to be fewer dollars for virtually every federal program so it is important to figure how ways to innovate and perform more efficiently.

Former CIO Vivek Kundra sought to do this through encouraging agencies to move software applications to the cloud, consolidating federal data centers, improving transparency, and improving the information technology procurement process. It is important to continue this progress even as agencies are forced to downsize their operations.

As shown in the private sector, government administrators should use technology to cut costs, improve worker productivity, and streamline operations. This is not just a matter of using technology in more innovative ways, but changing the operations and culture of the public sector. Public officials must improve its data mining activities to identify fraud and abuse in Medicare, Medicaid, the Defense Department, and other domestic programs.

New software gives managers better tools to evaluate how money is being spent and whether it is fulfilling intended goals. If it is not, programs need to be modified or eliminated. The most important weapon in Mr. VanRoekel’s arsenal may be the scalpel as he goes through the federal government’s $80 billion IT budget.

       

“Missed connections” is the personals ads category for people whose encounters are too fleeting to form any union – a lost-and-found for relationships.  I gave that title to my paper on the conversation between the United States and for Europe on data, privacy, and surveillance because I thought it provides an apt metaphor for the hopes and frustrations on both sides of that conversation.

The United States and Europe are linked by common values and overlapping heritage, an enduring security alliance, and the world’s largest trading relationship.  Europe has become the largest crossroad of the Internet and the transatlantic backbone is the global Internet’s highest capacity route.

[I]

But differences in approaches to the regulation of the privacy of personal information threaten to disrupt the vast flow of information between Europe and the U.S.  These differences have been exacerbated by the Edward Snowden disclosures, especially stories about the PRISM program and eavesdropping on Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone.  The reaction has been profound enough to give momentum to calls for suspension of the “Safe Harbor” agreement that facilitates transfers of data between the U.S. Europe; and Chancellor Merkel, the European Parliament, and other EU leaders who have called for some form of European Internet that would keep data on European citizens inside EU borders.  So it can seem like the U.S. and EU are gazing at each other from trains headed in opposite directions.

My paper went to press before last week’s European Court of Justice ruling that Google must block search results showing that a Spanish citizen had property attached for debt several years ago.  What is most startling about the decision is this information was accurate and had been published in a Spanish newspaper by government mandate but – for these reasons – the newspaper was not obligated to remove the information from its website; nevertheless, Google could be required to remove links to that website from search results in Spain. That is quite different from the way the right to privacy has been applied in America.  The decision’s discussion of search as “profiling” bears out what the paper says about European attitudes toward Google and U.S. Internet companies.  So the decision heightens the differences between the U.S. and Europe.

Nonetheless, it does not have to be so desperate.  In my paper, I look at the issues that have divided the United States and Europe when it comes to data and the things they have in common, the issues currently in play, and some ways the United States can help to steer the conversation in the right direction.

[I] "Europe Emerges as Global Internet Hub," Telegeography, September 18, 2013.

       

The United States exports digital goods worth hundreds of billions of dollars across the Atlantic each year.  And both Silicon Valley and Hollywood do big business with Europe every year.  Differences in approaches to privacy have always made this relationship unsteady but the Snowden disclosures greatly complicated the prospects of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.  In this paper Cameron Kerry examines that politics of transatlantic trade and the critical role that U.S. privacy policy plays in these conversations.

Kerry relies on his experience as the U.S.’s chief international negotiator for privacy and data regulation to provide an overview of key proposals related to privacy and data in Europe.  He addresses the possible development of a European Internet and the current regulatory regime known as Safe Harbor. Kerry argues that America and Europe have different approaches to protecting privacy both which have strengths and weaknesses.

To promote transatlantic trade the United states should:

• Not be defensive about its protection of privacy
• Provide clear information to the worldwide community about American law enforcement surveillance
• Strengthen its own privacy protection
• Focus on the importance of trade to the American and European economies

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The first instance of “cloud” computing came in 2006, when Amazon released its Elastic Compute Cloud, a service for consumers to lease space on virtual machines to run software. Now, the cloud enables the transfer and storage of data around the world, in an almost seamless fashion. Using cloud services are a seamless experience from the consumer perspective. This ease of use obscures significant regulation from governments on both sides of the Atlantic. The Safe Harbor Principles is a framework that ensures that personal consumer data being transferred from the EU to the US is still subject to a level of security in compliance with the EU’s stricter regulation on data protection. US companies must be certified within this framework, in order to transfer consumer data outside the EU.

A comprehensive data privacy arrangement that satisfies both sides of the Atlantic is necessary to preserve the free flow of data, and the resulting commerce, between the two regions. Speaking at the 2014 Cloud Computing Policy Conference, Cameron F. Kerry suggested that neither side of the Atlantic can afford to partition the Internet. Currently trade negotiators are assessing the viability including an update to Safe Harbor Principles as a part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

TTIP and the Future of Trade

The NSA revelations last year have only increased support for further regulation over the transfer of personal data in the cloud, especially in the European Union (EU). The revelations have also brought to light significant differences in the European and US conceptions of privacy. The ruling by the European Court of Justice on the “right to be forgotten” is a recent example of this transatlantic divide. In EU countries, citizens can now request Google to take down links from search results that lead users to potentially damaging information.

There are several disputes that negotiators must first resolve. Europeans would prefer that American regulators take a more active role in cases where US firms are violating the Safe Harbor principles. EU officials have also indicated they would like to include a mechanism to send an alert if data were improperly shared with US law enforcement officials. The expansion of the codes of conduct within the cloud would serve as a major step towards finalizing TTIP. A European Commission Analysis finds that TTIP would inject about $130 billion into the US economy. Ultimately both the EU and the US have so much to gain that both nations must find a way to resolve these thorny issues.

 

Kevin Risser contributed to this post.

       

Since 2009 the federal government started the process of replacing local computers with cloud platforms. A recent report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) provides an interesting view into the progress of these investments. It reveals the benefits that public agencies gain when using cloud services and the barriers they face when making the transition.

Advantages of Cloud Computing

Cloud computers are superior to locally-run data centers for a variety of reasons. The CRS report identifies six specific cloud benefits:

• Cost- Cloud computer platforms use resources more efficiently than local servers. An organization that uses local Information Technology (IT) must invest in the infrastructure to support computer systems at times of peak demand. However, most times companies or government agencies require only a fraction of that computing power. Cloud computing allows organizations to pay for all of the resources they need and avoid costly investments in rarely used local IT systems.
• Energy Efficiency- Cloud computing data centers benefit from economies of scale to run more efficiently than local servers. In some cases this can result in huge energy savings. For a large cloud computing center it also makes economic sense to invest in green energy sources like wind or solar for power.
• Availability- Cloud computing systems make it easy for any device with an Internet connection to access files or software. However, if a facility temporarily loses Internet access the files on cloud system are inaccessible. Alternatively, a locally administered IT system could function without Internet connectivity.
• Agility- Cloud systems can make it easier to upgrade operating systems and applications. The available computing power also means that memory intensive software packages are cost effective.
• Security- Cloud providing companies also have the financial resources to purchase the tools necessary to ensure that networks remain safe.
• Reliability- Cloud systems can save data onto multiple servers. If a single server goes down due to a cyberattack or another issue, the data is available on another server.

Government Investments in the Cloud

Determining the exact size of government cloud computing expenditures is difficult. Government spending on IT has increased every year from 2001 to 2013 when it reached a peak of $81 billion. In the three subsequent years it has decreased. Cloud computing expenditures likely represent a tiny fraction of that total. Market research firms have estimated that the federal government spends between $1.4 billion and $7 billion on cloud computers annually.

Trends in Total Federal Investment in Information Technology

Source: Congressional Research Service

Challenges for Migrating to the Cloud

The federal government has encountered several barriers in its plan to shift more functions to cloud platforms:

• High Federal Security Requirements- The government faces new advanced persistent threats routinely. System-wide security updates are necessary more often than for private sector organizations. The short update cycle provides a unique challenge to cloud providers.
• Adopting New Technologies- Government agencies have ingrained cultures that are slow to change. This shift from locally-based servers to the cloud can be slow and tedious for this reason.
• Ancillary Technologies- Cloud technologies are known for their flexibility. However, government agencies may lack the necessary IT infrastructure or speedy Internet connections that leverage the maximum potential of the cloud.
• Technical Know How- Cloud platforms require specialized knowledge to administer. Many government agencies lack the necessary experts to oversee a migration to the cloud.
• IT Expenditure- Migration to the cloud can involve expensive initial costs. Additional funding is necessary to facilitate the shift to the cloud.

The Future of the Government Cloud

An analysis of the costs and benefits of cloud migration uncover a few specific barriers that the federal government must overcome to earn the full value from new technologies. First, lawmakers must be willing to spend more now to save money later. Cloud systems are cheaper to run than local administered servers but the initial transition costs are high. Current funding levels, which are trending down, are too low to finance such a change. Privacy and security are also major challenges. Government servers host troves of data that Americans expect to remain private. Converting these systems to the cloud will require the government’s full confidence that cloud systems are at least as secure. New legislation is likely necessary to achieve the complimentary goals of privacy and security.

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In December 2009, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy conducted a day-long simulation of the diplomatic and military fallout that could result from an Israeli military strike against the Iranian nuclear program. In this Middle East Memo, Kenneth M. Pollack analyzes the critical decisions each side made during the wargame.

The simulation was conducted as a three-move game with three separate country teams. One team represented a hypothetical American National Security Council, a second team represented a hypothetical Israeli cabinet, and a third team represented a hypothetical Iranian Supreme National Security Council. The U.S. team consisted of approximately ten members, all of whom had served in senior positions in the U.S. government and U.S. military. The Israel team consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Israel with close ties to Israeli decision-makers, and who, in some cases, had spent considerable time in Israel. Some members of the Israel team had also served in the U.S. government. The Iran team consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Iran, some of whom had lived and/or traveled extensively in Iran, are of Iranian extraction, and/or had served in the U.S. government with responsibility for Iran.

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INTRODUCTION

Influencing the Islamic Republic of Iran has proven to be a perennial conundrum for American presidents. The complexity of Iranian politics and the intractability of the problems posed by Tehran’s revolutionary theocracy may explain why, over the course of three decades, each U.S. administration has been forced to revise its initial approach to Iran in hopes of achieving better outcomes. The overall result has been an American tendency to oscillate between engagement and pressure, with frustratingly limited results.

And so it goes for the Obama administration. After an initial, high-profile effort to draw Tehran into a serious dialogue both to resolve the nuclear issue as well as transcend it, Washington now finds itself pivoting away from diplomatic engagement to a more coercive policy centered around economic pressure. The shift comes amidst a dramatic new context within the Islamic Republic, characterized by historic turmoil on the streets and bitter divisions among the elites, and at a moment when the international urgency surrounding Tehran’s nuclear ambitions has never been greater. This context raises the stakes and heightens the sensitivities of getting U.S. policy on Iran right after so many years of failure.

The turn toward sanctions is a predictable one. Sanctions have proven to be an instrument of American policy toward Tehran for the past thirty years. American use of economic pressure as a means of dissuading Iranian malfeasance began with the freezing of Iranian assets after Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and culminated in the nearly comprehensive ban on trade and investment in Iran that has been in place since the Clinton administration. But, despite the appeal of sanctions, their protracted duration underlines their limitations—particularly when they are unilateral—as a mechanism for categorically revising Iranian policy. Still, many find sanctions attractive because the overall track record of Iranian decision-making demonstrates that Tehran often considers the costs and benefits of its policy options in determining its course. As Iran’s internal strife exacerbates the regime’s vulnerabilities, the prospects for international consensus around new economic restrictions appear more realistic than ever before.

To examine the options and implications for using sanctions to address the multi-faceted challenges of Iran, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution held a half-day symposium in late October 2009. The workshop featured off-the-record panel discussions led by experts on Iranian internal politics and the key actors shaping the diplomatic landscape. The conclusions from that session are presented below.

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Introduction: Despite the launch of indirect, “proximity” talks between Palestinians and Israelis, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas continues to resist a resumption of direct negotiations with Israel absent a full settlement freeze. As chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Abbas also insists that any new negotiations pick up where previous talks left off in December 2008 and that the parties spell out ahead of time a clear “endgame,” including a timetable for concluding negotiations. While these may seem like unreasonable preconditions, Palestinian reluctance to dive headfirst into yet another round of negotiations is rooted in some genuine, hard-learned lessons drawn from nearly two decades of repeated failures both at the negotiating table and on the ground.

Not only have negotiations failed to bring Palestinians closer to their national aspirations but the peace process itself has presided over (and in some ways facilitated) a deepening of Israel’s occupation and an unprecedented schism within the Palestinian polity. Such failures have cost the Palestinian leadership dearly in terms of both its domestic legitimacy and its international credibility. While it remains committed to a negotiated settlement with Israel based on a two-state solution, the PLO/PA leadership has been forced to rethink previous approaches to the peace process and to negotiations, as much for its own survival as out of a desire for peace.

Haunted by past failures, Palestinian negotiators are now guided, to varying degrees, by six overlapping and sometimes conflicting lessons:

1. Realities on the ground must move in parallel with negotiations at the table.

2. Don’t engage in negotiations for their own sake.

3. Agreements are meaningless without implementation.

4. Incrementalism does not work.

5. Avoid being blamed at all costs.

6. Don’t go it alone.

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Introduction:

In the ebb and flow of Middle East diplomacy, the two interrelated issues of an Israeli-Syrian peace settlement and Washington’s bilateral relationship with Damascus have gone up and down on Washington’s scale of importance. The election of Barack Obama raised expectations that the United States would give the two issues the priority they had not received during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration. Candidate Obama promised to assign a high priority to the resuscitation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and separately to “engage” with Iran and Syria (as recommended by the Iraq Study Group in 2006).

In May 2009, shortly after assuming office, President Obama sent the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, and the senior director for the Middle East in the National Security Council, Daniel Shapiro, to Damascus to open a dialogue with Bashar al-Asad’s regime. Several members of Congress also travelled to Syria early in Obama’s first year, including the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, John Kerry, and the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Howard Berman. In addition, when the president appointed George Mitchell as special envoy to the Middle East, Mitchell named as his deputy Fred Hof, a respected expert on Syria and the Israeli-Syrian dispute. Last summer, both Mitchell and Hof visited Damascus and began their give and take with Syria.

And yet, after this apparent auspicious beginning, neither the bilateral relationship between the United States and Syria, nor the effort to revive the Israeli-Syrian negotiation has gained much traction. Damascus must be chagrined by the fact that when the Arab-Israeli peace process is discussed now, it is practically equated with the Israeli-Palestinian track. This paper analyzes the difficulties confronting Washington’s and Jerusalem’s respective Syria policies and offers an approach for dealing with Syria. Many of the recommendations stem from lessons resulting from the past rounds of negotiations, so it is important to understand what occurred.

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INTRODUCTION

Later this month, Egyptians will go to the polls, or attempt to, in order to vote in the country’s parliamentary elections. The elections will unlikely be a democratic affair in the Western sense. In fact, opposition candidates, voters, citizen groups—essentially everyone other than government representatives—are fully expecting the elections to be a violent and rigged episode. For easy reference, one can look to the June elections for the Shura Council, or upper house of Parliament, in which the governing National Democratic Party (NDP) managed to land 80 out of a possible 84 seats. Those elections were marked by violence and allegations of rampant violations.

Elections in Egypt are not generally democratic, they do not necessarily reflect the will of the people, and they will invariably usher in a house in which the NDP has an unshakeable majority. More so, the elected body has very little control over the government and none over the president, who, thanks to some creative constitutional amendments in 2007, can dissolve the Parliament at will. Election results are apparently so preordained that many have questioned the wisdom of participating at all. Opposition groups, among them the National Alliance for Change (NAC), led by former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head and current political reformer Mohamed ElBaradei, have been calling for a boycott. ElBaradei told reporters at a Ramadan Iftar meeting on September 7 that voting “would go against the national will.” Many political analysts and some members of the opposition have echoed the belief that participation in the elections only gives credence to a fundamentally flawed system and perpetuates the state myth of a democratic nation.

The above argument certainly has its merits, but it misses the point. Elections in Egypt are not about who wins seats—that is usually a foregone conclusion. They are about the “how and the what,” in the sense that they are oases of political activity, demand, and dissension in an otherwise arid climate. In that way, every election fought represents losses and gains for the respective participants in ways that invariably influence the following elections. Also, the ballot boxes can yield surprising results—as in the case of the 2005 elections when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) gained a jawdropping 88 of 454 seats in the elections for the lower house. This outcome certainly would not have come about if the Brotherhood had not participated. To be sure, there are also significant, detrimental changes that happen as a direct consequence of the elections, among them constitutional amendments designed to hobble the opposition’s ability to field candidates and campaign. Still, for opposition parties and movements, boycotting the elections is the equivalent of throwing away the only political participation they have. It would mean relinquishing any visibility or influence and it would mean admitting to their supporters that they are essentially mere window dressings in the democratic façade. Arguably, this is a reason why these elections have only ever been boycotted once, in 1990. The Egyptian political arena is one where contestants scrabble for the smallest patch of ground. The high moral ground simply does not figure into it.

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Syria is trapped on a crumbling precipice, and however it might fall will entail significant risks for the United States and for the Syrian people.

The brutal regime of Bashar al-Asad is employing its loyal military forces and sectarian thugs to crush the opposition and reassert its tyranny. Even if Bashar fails, Syria may not be out of the woods: an increasingly likely alternative to the current regime is a bloody civil war similar to what we saw in Lebanon, Bosnia, Congo, and most recently in Iraq. The horrors of such a war might even exceed the brutal reassertion of Asad’s control, and would cause spillover into Syria’s neighbors—Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel—that could be disastrous for them and for American interests in the Middle East.

But the unrest in Syria, which is now entering its second year, also offers some important opportunities, ones that would come from the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Asad, whose family has ruled the country with an iron grip for over forty years. Syria is Iran’s oldest and most important ally in the Arab world, and the Iranian regime has doubled down on Asad, providing him with financial aid and military support to shore up his regime. Asad’s departure would deal a significant blow to Tehran, further isolating it at a time when it has few friends in the region or the world. In addition, Damascus is steadfast in its hostility toward Israel, and Asad’s regime is also a longtime supporter of terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas, and has at times aided al-Qa’ida terrorists and former regime elements in Iraq. The regime’s collapse, therefore, could have significant benefits for the United States and its allies in the region.

Actually ousting Asad, however, will not be easy. Although the Obama administration has for months called for Asad to go, every policy option to remove him is flawed, and some could even make the situation worse—seemingly a recipe for inaction. Doing nothing, however, means standing by while Asad murders his own people, and Syria plunges into civil war and risks becoming a failed state. Already the violence is staggering: as of March 2012, at least 8,000 Syrians have died and thousands more have been arrested and tortured in trying to topple the regime. At the same time, Syria is fragmenting. The Syrian opposition remains divided, and the Free Syrian Army is more a brand than a meaningful, unified force. Al- Qa’ida is urging fighters to join the fray in Syria, and sectarian killings and atrocities are growing. Should the violence continue to intensify, Syria’s neighbors may increase their meddling, and instability could spread, further weakening already-fragile neighbors like Iraq and Lebanon.

So to protect U.S. interests, Asad cannot triumph. But a failed Syria, one wracked by civil war, would be just as bad. Thus, U.S. policy must walk this tightrope, trying to remove Asad, but doing so in a way that keeps Syria an intact state capable of policing its borders and ensuring order at home. At the end of the day, however, removing Asad may not be doable at a price the United States is willing to pay. If so, the U.S. government may be forced to choose between living with a brutal but weakened Asad or getting rid of Asad regardless of the consequences.

This memo lays out six options for the United States to consider to achieve Asad’s overthrow, should it choose to do so:

1. Removing the regime via diplomacy;
2. Coercing the regime via sanctions and diplomatic isolation;
3. Arming the Syrian opposition to overthrow the regime;
4. Engaging in a Libya-like air campaign to help an opposition army gain victory;
5. Invading Syria with U.S.-led forces and toppling the regime directly; and
6. Participating in a multilateral, NATO-led effort to oust Asad and rebuild Syria.

The options are complex, and policymakers will probably try to combine several in an attempt to accentuate the positives and minimize the negatives, which will inevitably be difficult and bring out new complications. But by focusing on discrete approaches, this memo helps expose their relative strengths and weaknesses. For each course of action, this memo describes the strategy inherent to the option and what it would entail in practice. It also assesses the option’s advantages and disadvantages.

This memo does not endorse any particular policy option. Rather, it seeks to explain the risks and benefits of possible courses of action at this moment in time. As conditions change, some options may become more practical or desirable and others less so. The authors mostly agree on the advantages and disadvantages of each approach but weigh the relative rewards and costs differently.

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INTRODUCTION

A year after President Hosni Mubarak’s fall, U.S.-Egypt relations are at an all-time low. Not, as many expected, because of the rise of Islamist parties, but because America’s longtime allies in the Egyptian military have whipped up anti-American sentiment at a feverish pace. It may have started as a political ploy, a way to build support on the street and highlight the army’s nationalist credentials, but the generals soon lost control. In January, the Egyptian government announced that sixteen Americans—including the son of a top U.S. official— would be put on trial, facing up to five years in prison. Their apparent crime was working for American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and Freedom House—that offered support, funding, and election monitoring for Egypt’s uneven transition.

On March 1, the Egyptian government lifted the travel ban on seven Americans who were still in Egypt, allowing them to leave the country. A major diplomatic breach was avoided, giving the impression that the crisis had been resolved. This appears to be the interpretation of the Obama administration, which waived congressional conditions on military aid, citing the importance of maintaining a “strategic partnership” with Egypt.2 However, the charges against the Americans remain, and there is no sign that the American NGOs in question will be able to reopen anytime soon. More importantly, the vast majority of affected NGOs—which are Egyptian rather than American—still find themselves on trial and under attack.

The NGO episode, however worrying it is on its own, reflects something larger and more troubling: the slow descent from the national unity of the revolution to a fog of paranoia, distrust, and conspiracy theorizing. Who is with the revolution, and who isn’t? The roots of the problem lie in the uncertainly inherent in Egypt’s muddled transition. Unlike in Tunisia, where the Higher Committee for the Achievement of Revolutionary Objectives (HCARO)—accepted as legitimate by all of the country’s main political forces—was responsible for managing the transition, Egypt has featured various competing actors claiming their own distinct sources of power. The struggle for legitimacy between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated parliament, and the protest movement has created a fragmented political scene. Everyone wants to lead the transition, but no one wants to take full responsibility for the results.

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In the wake of the U.S. military departure from Iraq and in the midst of Iran’s continued defiance of the international community over its nuclear program, is a new security arrangement for the Gulf in order? If so, is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capable of such a task, or should other institutions be considered?

In the Saban Center’s newest Middle East Memo, Security in the Persian Gulf: New Frameworks for the Twenty-First Century, Saban Center Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack examines the possibility of developing a new security architecture for the region.

Pollack analyzes security arrangements in other parts of the world and focuses on two options:  expanding the GCC and turning it into a formal military alliance and creating an arrangement modeled on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In weighing each option, Pollack finds that the latter can better furnish a path toward peace and security.

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The potential for confrontation between the United States and Iran, stemming from ongoing tensions over Iran’s nuclear program and western covert actions intended to delay or degrade it, remains a pressing concern for U.S. policymakers. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy hosted a one-day crisis simulation in September that explored different scenarios should a confrontation occur.

The Saban Center's new Middle East Memo, A Series of Unfortunate Events: A Crisis Simulation of a U.S.-Iranian Confrontation, authored by senior fellow Kenneth M. Pollack, presents lessons and observations from the exercise.

Key findings include:

• Growing tensions are significantly reducing the “margin of error” between the two sides, increasing the potential for miscalculations to escalate to a conflict between the two countries.

• Should Iran make significant progress in enriching fissile material, both sides would have a powerful incentive to think short-term rather than long-term, in turn reinforcing the propensity for rapid escalation.

• U.S. policymakers must recognize the possibility that Iranian rhetoric about how the Islamic Republic would react in various situations may prove consistent with actual Iranian actions.

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