On its third anniversary, South Sudan is teetering on the brink of humanitarian disaster. Without urgent action, some parts of the country face famine as a result of conflict, a poor harvest and high, pre-existing levels of malnutrition and poverty. If all this sounds eerily familiar, it should. In July 2011 similar conditions saw famine strike in Somalia, just as South Sudan gained its independence. It is estimated that more than a quarter of a million people died during this catastrophe, most of them children.

The situation in South Sudan shows the lessons of 2011 have not been learned. Early warnings of disaster in Somalia accumulated for almost a year before famine was eventually declared by the UN. The threat was first explicitly raised by the Famine Early-Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) in March 2011 and again in May. Yet the humanitarian system remained dormant. Had donors and agencies intervened early, they could have prevented the downward spiral into destitution and starvation. The reasons why early warnings did not lead to early action were documented in a major Chatham House report that concluded with numerous recommendations for how programmes, funding and decision-making should be reformed to avoid such a failure ever happening again.

Fast forward to 2014 and head 1,000 miles west, and little seems to have changed. FEWSNET warned of famine in South Sudan in early May, yet official UN data reveals no subsequent increase in funding. If anything, contributions to the South Sudan emergency appeal appear to have slowed, with April, May and June showing markedly less being received than in previous months. With the lean season (when food insecurity peaks) now well underway, the appeal is less than half-funded.

Experience shows that the thing most likely to mobilize emergency funding is not early warning but media coverage, which can lead to pressure from publics for donor governments to act. News of the situation in South Sudan has been muted, however. According to Google Trends, there was no increase in the number of headlines on South Sudan following the famine warning in May for example. Three years ago in Somalia, it was not until famine was declared that the crisis caught the global media’s attention and donors finally responded. By then it was, by definition, too late to avert catastrophe.

Despite these alarming similarities, it is not inevitable that South Sudan will mark its third anniversary with famine. Like all complex forecasts, famine early warnings do not deal in certainties. And, although the window of opportunity for preventive action has probably closed by now and the challenge of reaching communities in the midst of conflict is huge, it is still possible for humanitarian actors to mitigate the worst-case scenario with a concerted and coordinated push to distribute aid and scale-up emergency infant nutrition programmes in the worst-affected areas. But even if famine is avoided, communities in South Sudan will be left weaker, poorer and more vulnerable to the next crisis. The risk will remain. 

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Disputes between international companies and national governments commonly arise in the extractive industry where high expectations from producer countries often run alongside emotive issues of ‘ownership’ and ‘exploitation’. In 2013, Chatham House published the report Conflict and Coexistence in the Extractives Industries, examining the rising occurrence of long-running and expensive company-government disputes. Continuing the conversation, the speakers will share their personal insights regarding doing business in Africa's oil and gas sector and preparing for crisis situations. They will outline why they believe the effective management of any crisis is critical to achieving an early settlement and why arbitration is the best formal mechanism for resolving disputes in Africa. They will also discuss what the preconditions of success are, and how companies must adjust to new commercial and political realities when engaging with national companies. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Governments are increasingly using public procurement policy to promote the use of legal and sustainable timber, thereby helping to reduce deforestation and illegal logging and encouraging sustainable forestry. 

At least 26 countries, mostly in the EU, currently possess some form of timber procurement policy at central government level. Although some have been implemented more recently than others and all tend to vary in their design, the evidence suggests that they are having a positive effect on increasing market share for verified legal and sustainable timber. Although government purchasing accounts for only a limited share of the market, the evidence also suggests that these timber procurement policies are having a broader impact on consumer markets, partly through their impact on suppliers and partly through the signals they send to the market. 

These policies are also relatively straightforward to introduce: many countries already possess some form of green procurement policy, and criteria for legal and sustainable timber can easily be tailored to fit. In general no new legislation is needed, though the more comprehensive policies benefit from training and advice to government purchasers. 

The gradual spread of the EU Green Procurement Policy programme, and commitments by an increasing number of private companies to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains are likely to encourage further uptake of procurement policies for sustainable timber. Timber procurement can also provide valuable lessons to governments when developing sustainable procurement policies for other products associated with deforestation, such as palm oil. 

Disputes over resources are a persistent challenge to international peace and security. Natural resources (such as oil, natural gas, minerals, timber and water) are a major source of national income for many countries and, alongside land, are essential to the livelihoods of many millions of people. There is a growing recognition among researchers and decision-makers that in many fragile states disputes over these resources have fed into, and underpinned, violent conflict and instability. 

Although international engagement in national resource disputes is not always desirable or feasible, where it is necessary and possible to support, supplement (or even substitute) national dispute resolution processes it is important to think through the parameters of such action: Who gets involved? With what financial resources? When does an intervention begin? How do they act? 

This one-day roundtable will bring together around 30 experts from policy, academia and business to discuss these questions and more.

The event will be held under the Chatham House Rule. Attendance is by invitation only.

In 2012, Kenya joined the swathe of East African countries with recent significant oil and gas discoveries. Long-established as a regional leader in terms of economic growth, foreign investment and technological innovation, Kenya's leaders are now assessing how to establish an effective policy framework to manage oil revenues while at the same time managing the expectations of its citizens.  

At this event, the panel will discuss how transparency and accountability can be strengthened as Kenya moves to become an oil-producing nation. This event will mark the UK launch of a report by the Kenyan Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas, entitled Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya's Oil and Gas Resources.

LIVE STREAM: This event will be live streamed. The live stream will be made available at 12:00 BST on Wednesday 8 October 2014.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION IS CLOSED.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The Japanese government has continued to engage on the issue of illegal logging and related trade, but its approach remains focused on ‘soft’, voluntary measures rather than establishing legally binding requirements. It has been actively promoting the country’s legality verification system, known as the goho-wood system, and this is helping to raise awareness of the issue of illegal logging in Japan. However, the system is not only voluntary but has serious design weaknesses which limit its ability to eliminate illegal products from Japan’s market.

While the number of companies registered as goho-wood suppliers has increased, this may be occurring at the expense of sustainability certification, which is more demanding and expensive. The number of companies in Japan with FSC chain-of-custody certification remains low.

Japan’s imports of timber-sector products at high risk of illegality are estimated to have declined significantly since the start of the century, though levelling off since 2010, while imports of high-risk paper-sector products are estimated to have gradually increased over this period. Levels of high-risk imports remain significantly above those of the other consumer countries reviewed. These are currently estimated to comprise 12 per cent and seven per cent of total timber- and paper-sector products respectively.

It is recommended that the government develop further legislation to control imports of illegal products, including a requirement for risk assessment and mitigation as well as third-party monitoring. Such legislation would also help support the government’s policy to promote the domestic timber industry. Until such legislation is passed, Japanese industry should implement more robust risk assessment and mitigation procedures.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The French government has been engaged on the issue of illegal logging and the related trade: the government played an active part in the development of the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan and has been supporting the negotiation and implementation of voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs) in producer countries.

The government has also been actively promoting the production and consumption of sustainable timber, providing funding for forest-management related projects in producer countries and establishing the National Group on Tropical Forests to facilitate a multi-stakeholder dialogue on forest policy. Media coverage of illegal logging has increased considerably since 2007, indicating greater awareness of the issue among the general public.

This response, as well as increased sourcing of sustainably certified products by the private sector, is thought to have been a factor in the decline in imports into France of timber-sector products likely to be illegal. The proportion of timber-sector imports at high risk of illegality is currently estimated to be two per cent. The proportion of highly processed products such as furniture has grown significantly, as has the share coming from China, with a parallel decline in imports of logs and sawnwood from central and West Africa.

However, there remain a number of areas for improvement by the government. In particular, with legislation now in place to implement the EUTR, this should be rigorously enforced and sufficient resources put in place to enable this. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the sanctions regime should be monitored. The planned review of the public procurement policy should be undertaken, and monitoring of its implementation should also be introduced.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade.

The United Kingdom has shown a strong response to the problem of illegal logging and related trade; of the five consumer countries studied, it scored highest in the assessment of laws, regulations and policies related to this issue.

The government played an active part in the development of the EU’s FLEGT Action Plan and has subsequently been supporting the negotiation and implementation of voluntary partnership agreements with producer countries. The government has also been providing a significant amount of funding, through the Forest Governance, Markets and Trade Programme, to initiatives aimed at tackling the trade in illegal timber and improving forest governance.

The private sector in the UK has also been proactive, as reflected in the increase in the number of companies with chain-of-custody certification and in the amount of certified wood-based products on the UK market. A high level of media coverage of illegal logging also indicates that there is widespread awareness of this issue.

This response is thought to be partly responsible for the decline in imports into the UK of timber-sector products likely to be illegal, currently estimated to comprise three per cent of the total. However, there has been a significant shift in the types and sources of high-risk products coming into the UK, reflecting changes in the global timber industry: a growing proportion is coming from China and comprises more highly processed products such as furniture.

While the UK has been one of the most proactive European countries in addressing illegal logging and the related trade, further action could be taken. Cooperation with the Chinese government and its private sector would be beneficial. Systematic monitoring of the UK’s timber procurement policy is also required, and the efforts made to date to enforce the EUTR will need to be maintained.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

Efforts to tackle the problem of illegal logging and related trade have continued in the United States; the Lacey Act amendments in 2008 have influenced behaviour within the industry and high-profile enforcement cases have increased awareness of the issue. 

The impact of the Lacey Act on levels of illegal imports into the US is uncertain. The proportion of imports of high-risk timber-sector products is estimated to have declined since 2010, while that of paper-sector products has stayed at about the same level: in 2013, high-risk imports were estimated to comprise five per cent and two per cent of the totals respectively. However, there has been a significant shift in the types and sources of high-risk products coming into the country, reflecting changes in the global timber industry: a growing proportion is coming from China and comprises more highly processed products such as furniture.

Though the Lacey Act is an important piece of legislation for tackling the trade in illegal timber, several implementation and enforcement challenges have arisen since the amendments were enacted, in particular the interpretation of ‘due care’. Improvements to the procedure for processing import declaration forms are also required to ensure effective enforcement of the act. In order to effectively tackle illegal logging and the related trade, the US government should also continue to encourage its trading partners to strengthen their forest governance.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The Netherlands has shown a strong response to the problem of illegal logging and related trade: the government played an active part in the development of the EU’s FLEGT Action Plan, and has been supporting the negotiation and implementation of Voluntary Partnership Agreements with producer countries.

The government has also been promoting the production and consumption of sustainable timber. It has a comprehensive procurement policy, established the Sustainable Trade Initiative and helped to launch the European Sustainable Tropical Timber Coalition.

As a result both of these government actions and of promotion by the private sector, there is a high proportion of certified wood-based products on the Dutch market as well as a large number of companies with chain-of-custody certification. A high level of media coverage on the issue of illegal logging also indicates that there is widespread awareness of this issue.

This response is thought to be partly responsible for the decline in imports into the Netherlands of timber-sector products likely to be illegal, currently estimated to comprise two per cent of the total. However, there has been a significant shift in the types and sources of high-risk products coming into the country, reflecting changes in the global timber industry: a growing proportion is coming from China and comprises more highly processed products such as furniture.

While the Netherlands has been one of the most proactive European countries in addressing illegal logging and the related trade, further action could be taken. A key challenge will be effective enforcement of the EU Timber Regulation given the Netherlands’ role as a major conduit for timber to the rest of Europe. Systematic monitoring of its timber procurement policy is also required.

This paper accompanies a series of Chatham House assessments on China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, the US and Vietnam and provides details on how the estimates of the level of illegality of imports of wood-based products into those countries were derived. The assessments are part of a research project that monitored levels of illegal logging and related trade in selected consumer, producer and processing countries in order to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to tackle this problem.

The paper describes the methodology for estimating the levels of wood-based products at high risk of illegality that are being imported into consumer and processing countries. The methodology was developed in order to provide quantitative estimates of the scale of such imports and to assess how they have changed over time. The figures adopted for the assessments are based on the best available evidence; but, given the challenges of quantifying levels of illegal logging and the limited information available for some countries, they should not be regarded as definitive. Rather, they indicate the likely levels of illegality and, perhaps more important, how they may have changed over time.

At the end of November amidst much speculation, OPEC kept its formal production level of 30 million barrels per day in what appears to be an oversupplied market. This controversial decision was taken because cutting production would cede market share to the growing production flooding out of the US. The immediate result was a significant fall in oil prices.

The 'official' logic behind the decision was twofold. First, it was contended that weak demand was temporary because of slow economic growth and would recover next year. Second, the argument went, lower prices would close high-cost production from the shale technology revolution. In other words, current prices were too low and the market, allowed to operate, would rectify this.  Many (rightly) saw this decision as a significant landmark in global oil markets. In effect, OPEC had ceded any semblance of control over the market and prices, instead launching the oil price onto a sea governed by market forces.

Those with knowledge of oil market history will see this as a very dangerous gamble based on two serious misconceptions. After the oil shocks of the 1970s, the market was in a similar position as now. Demand was falling and non-OPEC supply was rising. In response, to defend prices, OPEC (but effectively Saudi Arabia) cut production because the fall in demand was seen as temporary as a result of global recession and would shortly recover. It did not. Then when the oil price eventually collapsed in 1986, the OPEC view was that lower prices would quickly reverse as they would shut in high-cost production, specifically in the North Sea. These views in the 1980s were conceptual mistakes, still relevant today and likely to undermine OPEC’s current strategy. The mistakes are a failure to understand the difference between an income effect and a price effect on demand and the failure to understand the difference between a break-even price (what investors consider when deciding whether to invest in new producing capacity) and a shut-in price (what existing operators consider will cover variable costs and if not, will stop production from existing wells.).

While some of the fall in demand in the 1980s was because of the recession (an income effect), some was due to genuine demand destruction as the result of much higher prices (a price effect). Recession-induced lower demand reverses itself when the global economy recovers, but demand destruction is permanent. Today, part of the fall in oil demand is because oil prices have inexorably risen (from $32.40 in 2002 to $108.66 in constant 2013 dollars). Furthermore, many sources of recent oil demand growth, notably China and India, have been moving from subsidized domestic oil prices to higher border-based prices. OPEC’s expectations of quickly recovering demand may be optimistic as they were in the early 1980s.

OPEC is hoping lower break-even prices will reduce shale production.  Various estimates for the US shale break-even price have been bandied around (usually in the realm of $60-$80 per barrel). Most are far too high, because they ignore the fact that the recent boom in shale operations has grossly inflated project costs. If investment in new capacity slows, then project costs − and hence the break-even price − will fall.

However, in terms of OPEC’s current strategy, the break-even price is the wrong metric. What matters in the next few years is the shut-in price.  After the 1986 price collapse, a number of stripper wells in US (with high variable costs) did close, but the loss of production was minimal. North Sea production, which had been OPEC’s prime target, was hardly affected and actually increased in 1987. The current level of shut-in price for shale oil is again debatable, but almost certainly is well below $40 per barrel. Thus it will be some time before existing shale oil production falls, even if prices stay low.

Should the oil price fall towards variable costs, threatening shale supply, it will be the OPEC producers who must blink first. They will then try to take back control of the market, if they can.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback 

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. The Chinese government has made notable progress in its efforts to tackle illegal logging and the associated trade. This has included the development of a draft national timber legality verification system (TLVS) and its active engagement with a number of consumer countries. The government’s plans to establish bilateral trade agreements with producer countries are also encouraging, although no formalized commitments have yet been made. Reflecting the growing awareness of the impact of Chinese companies overseas, the government has also been developing further guidance to promote sustainable forest products trade and investment.

The private sector is also taking action, with continued growth in the uptake of chain-of-custody (CoC) certification. Industry associations have been promoting legal and sustainable sourcing, and they will have an important role to play in testing the draft TLVS.

These steps are likely to have had an impact on the volume of illegal wood-based products being imported into China. However, trade data discrepancies and analysis of trade flows both indicate that illegal trade remains a significant problem. While imports of high-risk products are estimated to have declined since 2000, these are reckoned to comprise 17 per cent of the total by volume in 2013. This proportion is high compared with other timber-importing countries examined in this assessment.

In order to build on its response to illegal logging and related trade, the Chinese government should establish binding regulations and stringent controls on the import and export of illegal wood-based products. The draft TLVS should be further developed, including through pilot projects with timber-exporting countries and effective consultation with industry, civil society and other consumer-country governments. The government’s procurement policy should be strengthened through the clarification of its legality and sustainability requirements, the inclusion of a wider range of products within its scope, and the development of a robust mechanism to monitor compliance. 

Increased training for the private sector on due diligence, market regulations and legality requirements in consumer countries is required to stimulate further action by industry, and the work to elaborate further guidelines for companies operating overseas in the forest products trade should be continued. Awareness-raising initiatives for Chinese consumers should also be extended, in order to increase demand for verified legal wood-based products.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The Vietnamese government has made some progress towards tackling illegal logging and the associated trade. It has negotiated a voluntary partnership agreement (VPA) with the EU, a process that has prompted a review of relevant legislation and improved the government’s engagement with civil society. In addition, it has signed agreements with Lao PDR and Cambodia in which it has committed to coordination on forest management and trade. However, there has been little progress in policy reform, and there is still no legislation regulating illegal timber imports.

There is a high level of awareness of illegal logging and associated trade within the private sector: Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) chain-of-custody (CoC) certification has increased rapidly, particularly in the furniture sector. But efforts are hampered by poor access to third-party verified raw material.

Both trade data discrepancies and analysis of trade flows indicate that illegal trade remains a serious problem. The volume of imports of wood-based products at a high risk of illegality is estimated to have increased since 2000, while its share in the volume of total imports of wood-based products gradually declined until 2009 and then increased slightly: they are estimated to have comprised 18 per cent of the total by volume in 2013.

In order to build on its response to illegal logging and related trade, the government should establish a legal responsibility for Vietnamese importers to ensure that their timber sources are legal. Furthermore, to increase domestic demand for legal products, it should establish a public procurement policy requiring the use of verified legal products. Within the framework of the VPA, broad and effective multi-stakeholder engagement will be vital to ensure that a robust timber legality assurance system is developed. In addition, proactive partnerships should be forged with high-risk supply countries to establish legality criteria and indicators that reflect the full scope of the relevant legislation in those countries.

The discovery of valuable natural resources such as hydrocarbons or minerals in conflict-affected states or disputed regions can be a double-edged sword. While economic growth may help overcome conflict and consolidate peace, much of the academic literature links the economic, social and environmental impacts of resource development with an increased risk of violent conflict between or within fragile states. 

Recently however, the role of business in advancing peace has emerged as a topic of increasing discussion in academia and in forums such as the UN Global Compact. Resource development has also become a key objective for donor development strategies in fragile states such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Myanmar, on the assumption that extractive sector development can contribute to stability and security. 

This event will gather key stakeholders from business and policy to investigate if and where natural resource development has contributed to peace-building, built cooperation among stakeholders or helped to resolve, rather than exacerbate, tensions. If so, it will endeavour to draw out common, replicable lessons of what made these developments successful from a peace-building perspective.

The event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

Recommendations

Enhanced dialogue and intensified international cooperation in four areas could significantly improve the functioning of global mineral markets:

1. Deal with the last remnants of producer-country cartels 
   Consumer countries should make a publicly visible case that in an age of interdependence and global supply chains, any remaining forms of producer-country cartels are an anachronism. Given limited means to coerce governments to stop supporting the last remaining mineral cartels in potash, a ‘naming and shaming’ approach in key forums such as the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is likely to be most effective. Such action could be initiated by the three largest potash importers China, India and Brazil, and should seek support from others such as the EU and Japan.
    
2. Prevent damaging export restrictions through win-win arrangements
   WTO litigation against export restrictions is unlikely to be a silver bullet and in the short term cooperative policy dialogues, such as those pursued by the OECD, offer the best prospects for concrete results. Such dialogues should also be initiated by major emerging economies and could focus on providing incentives such as investment packages or technology-sharing to entice producer countries to abstain from imposing restrictions. Consumers should continue to push for more specific and stricter WTO rules on export restrictions. Japan, the EU and the US should seek to include similar measures in regional trade negotiations.
    
3. Strengthen cooperation among regulators on clandestine private cartels and other anti-competitive practices 
   Concerted action will be required by governments to tackle anti-competitive practices such as clandestine cartels, price-fixing and territorial agreements. Key regulators, such as those in the EU and China, should expand collection and sharing of data and best practice on anti-trust enforcement in minerals markets. In key cases they could also coordinate prosecution. Sustained investment in institutional capacity is required in many emerging economies; this should be supported through bilateral cooperation and via regional forums. Governments should also resuscitate the stalled negotiations on the WTO’s role in competition policy.
    
4. Enhance governance for transnational market platforms and pricing mechanisms
   The responsibility to regulate key nodes in global minerals markets will remain in the hands of national bodies, but coordination is vital given interconnected global markets. International organizations and regulators should strengthen structural cooperation and exchange in the area of physical markets and with greater involvement of emerging economies. An informal high-level forum on regulating physical markets could reinvigorate debate, foster new perspectives and stimulate new partnerships. Governments in key consumer countries should also give their national regulators a clear mandate in minerals markets.

Katanga Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is immensely wealthy in minerals such as copper, uranium and gold, and is home to around fifty per cent of the world’s cobalt reserves. Rising outputs from the province’s copper and cobalt mines have contributed to the DRC’s average GDP growth of 8.5 per cent over the past two years. However, despite visible infrastructure developments in the province to service the industry, few Congolese are benefiting from the revenues and the economy is yet to diversify.

Moïse Katumbi Chapwe, the governor of Katanga Province, will discuss his approach to resource governance and will examine how regional governments can capitalise on resource revenues to improve livelihoods. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade. 

This assessment of the extent of illegal logging in Cameroon and the response to this issue suggests that progress has stalled since 2010. The reform of the legislative framework for the forest sector has yet to be completed; and while there have been improvements in the availability of forestry information, there remain many gaps. Furthermore, the principle of transparency has yet to be broadly accepted within the government. Enforcement is weak and information management systems are deemed inadequate. Most important, corruption remains widespread and the political will needed to drive change is felt to be lacking.

While there is evidence of progress in the private sector – the area of forests with legality verification and certification has increased – illegal activities are rife throughout the forest sector. Half of all timber production is estimated to come from the informal artisanal sector – mainly supplying the domestic market. However, illegal activities are also common in supply chains for export: timber originating from ‘small permits’ and sales of standing volume permits is thought to be particularly problematic. This is of particular concern, as the supply of timber from such permits is expected to increase owing to the growing pressure on forests from other sectors.

Since 2000 trade has shifted away from sensitive markets: the EU market’s significance as a destination for Cameroon’s exports of timber-sector products has decreased, while China’s significance has increased enormously. This has important implications for strategies on how best to tackle illegal logging in Cameroon.

In order to make further progress, markets for legal timber need to continue to be developed in key consumer countries – which, in the case of Cameroon, are now both the EU and China. Within Cameroon, further analysis of the political economy of the forest sector is required. Attempts to tackle corruption should be reinforced, and this would be facilitated by examining the experience of anti-corruption efforts elsewhere in the world. Further improvements to transparency are needed; the establishment of a new independent observer will be important in achieving this goal.

The next stages of legal reform will require broad consultation among stakeholders, in particular small-scale producers as well as local communities and indigenous peoples. Efforts to promote a legal domestic market should be intensified, including more extensive training and outreach for small-scale producers and processors. Finally, to improve enforcement efforts, continued investment in the training of enforcement agents and the provision of adequate resources are required.