Introduction

The global community has set itself the challenge of meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 as a way to combat world poverty and hunger. In 2007, the halfway point, it is clear that many countries will not be able to meet the MDGs without undertaking significantly greater efforts. One constraint that needs to be overcome is that development interventions—projects, programs, policies—are all too often like small pebbles thrown into a big pond: they are limited in scale, short-lived, and therefore have little lasting impact. This may explain why so many studies have found that external aid has had weak or no development impact in the aggregate, even though many individual interventions have been successful in terms of their project- or program-specific goals.

Confronted with the challenge of meeting the MDGs, the development community has recently begun to focus on the need to scale up interventions. Scaling up means taking successful projects, programs, or policies and expanding, adapting, and sustaining them in different ways over time for greater development impact. This emphasis on scaling up has emerged from concern over how to deploy and absorb the substantially increased levels of official development assistance that were promised by the wealthy countries at recent G8 summits. A fragmented aid architecture complicates this task; multilateral, bilateral, and private aid entities have multiplied, leading to many more—but smaller— aid projects and programs and increasing transaction costs for recipient countries. In response, some aid donors have started to move from project to program support, and in the Paris Declaration, official donors committed themselves to work together for better coordinated aid delivery.

The current focus on scaling up is not entirely new, however. During the 1980s, as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly began to engage in development activities, scaling up emerged as a challenge. NGO interventions were (and are) typically small in scale and often apply new approaches. Therefore, the question of how to replicate and scale up successful models gained prominence even then, especially in connection with participatory and community development approaches. Indeed, the current interest among philanthropic foundations and NGOs in how to scale up their interventions is an echo of these earlier concerns.

In response to this increased focus on scaling up—and its increased urgency—this policy brief takes a comprehensive look at what the literature and experience have to say about whether and how to scale up development interventions.

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Summary

At the Gleneagles Summit in 2005, leaders of the G8 group of nations committed to increase aid to poor nations by $50 billion per year. During the same year, in a meeting in Paris, donors promised to coordinate their interventions for more effective delivery. These commitments are now often referred to as the promise of donors to “scale up aid.” Increasing aid flows and improving coordination are indeed important goals and, in fact, goals that donors seem to have trouble meeting. The international donor community met this fall in Accra and will meet in Doha in November 2008 to review progress with this aspect of scaling up aid, and it is hoped that they will recommit to meet the ambitious targets set three years ago.

Scaling up aid is only one of the challenges that donors face. A more important challenge is to “scale up through aid,” meaning that aid flows should not merely support short-lived, one-time and partial development interventions—pilot projects, short-term technical assistance, programs that only address part of the problem, but leave major bottlenecks unaddressed—but should support projects, programs and policies that scale up successful interventions in a country, region or globally to reach the entire target population. Scaling up means that programs are long-term and sustained and that external support is aligned with country needs and deals comprehensively with the development challenges—often by working in partnership with other donors and pooling resources. This is the scaling up challenge that donors should address head-on, but so far have not.

This policy brief reports on the findings of an in-depth review of the literature and practice of scaling up development interventions and focuses on the role that aid donors can play in supporting scaling up for effective development. It stresses that successful scaling up with external assistance means that donor agencies need to: work with a vision and leadership; help create the political constituencies for large-scale implementation; create linkages among project, program and policy interventions; strengthen the institutional capacity of the implementing entities; provide for effective incentives and accountabilities of their own staff and management; work together with each other; monitor and evaluate the progress of programs with special attention to the scaling up dimension; and finally make sure they focus on effective preparation and flexible implementation of the scaling up process. While this is a long-term agenda, donors can take a few practical steps right away that will provide a basis for a more ambitious effort over time.

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Abstract

Scaling up of development interventions is much debated today as a way to improve their impact and effectiveness. Based on a review of scaling up literature and practice, this paper develops a framework for the key dynamics that allow the scaling up process to happen. The authors explore the possible approaches and paths to scaling up, the drivers of expansion and of replication, the space that has to be created for interventions to grow, and the role of evaluation and of careful planning and implementation. They draw a number of lessons for the development analyst and practitioner. More than anything else, scaling up is about political and organizational leadership, about vision, values and mindset, and about incentives and accountability—all oriented to make scaling up a central element of individual, institutional, national and international development efforts. The paper concludes by highlighting some implications for aid and aid donors.

An annotated bibliography of the literature on scaling up and development aid effectiveness was created by Oksana Pidufala to supplement this working paper. Read more »

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ABSTRACT—

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has for many years stressed innovation, knowledge and scaling up as essential ingredients of its strategy to combat rural poverty in developing countries. This institutional review of IFAD’s approach to scaling up is the fi rst of its kind: A team of development experts were funded by a small grant from IFAD to assess IFAD’s track record in scaling up successful interventions, its operational policies and processes, instruments, resources and incentives, and to provide recommendations to management for how to turn IFAD into a scaling-up institution. Beyond IFAD, this institutional scaling up review is a pilot exercise that can serve as an example for other development institutions.

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Development ministers and experts will meet at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea, in November 2011 to assess their efforts to improve the impact of aid. A recent survey by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) shows that little progress has been made since they met in Accra in 2008 for their Third High Level Forum. The many good intentions to improve coordination among donors, to enhance the alignment of aid programs with the priorities of aid recipients, and to develop effective partnerships in practice have turned out to be difficult to implement.

If anything, the challenge has become greater: the number of aid agencies keeps rising, as does the number of aid-supported projects, while average project size continues to drop. According to the OECD, more than half of the 90,000 official aid projects implemented annually are now well below $100,000 in size. With so many small interventions, most of them one-time, without links to each other, driven by the short-lived preferences of individual agencies and individuals in agencies, it is no surprise that the lofty goals of aid ministers go unrealized and that the cumulative impact of the many well-intentioned small aid projects is minimal at best.

It doesn’t have to be that way. There are examples of successful development programs that have lifted millions of people out of poverty, have greatly improved health conditions and have generated new business and employment opportunities. Examples such as the Mexican government’s national program of cash transfers to poor households (“Progresa- Oportunidades”) which conditions assistance on whether children attend school and mothers take their infants for health check-ups; the multi-donor program to eradicate the deadly river-blindness disease in West-Africa; the community based microcredit and employment programs of Grameen Bank and BRAC in Bangladesh; the Chinese government’s program for the development of the loess plateau with support of the World Bank; or the program of rural poverty reduction in the highlands of Peru supported by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) – these are just a few examples of cases where the impact of development programs has been at a scale such that it made a real and lasting difference in the lives of millions of people. And success at scale is also possible in fragile and conflict-affected states as a recent review by the Brookings Institution for the Australian aid agency AusAID has shown.

This raises three questions that development ministers should consider as they prepare for and meet in Busan: What made these success stories possible? Why are they the exception rather than the rule? What needs to be done the make scaling up the norm? Let us take these questions in turn.

What made these success stories possible? Each case has its own ingredients of success, but three dimensions are common to them all:

• The programs pursued a scaling up pathway towards a long-term goal: Few successful programs followed a blueprint for long-term scaling up from the start, but they all built on the recognition that if the early steps were successfully piloted, subsequent steps needed to systematically replicate and scale up what works, adapting the approach in the light of lessons learned at each of the earlier project. A key element in this connection is that the long-term objective of scale impact is part of the program concept from the beginning; that monitoring and evaluation are designed to test not only whether an idea works, but also to measure progress against the long-term goal; and that an effort is made to identify the drivers, to create the spaces and to chart a suitable scaling up pathway for programs to move from small pilot to impact at scale.
  
  
• The programs benefitted from strong and sustained drivers for scaling up: Specifically, they had strong leadership with a clear vision of the need for large scale impact, with ideas that were suited to the challenge, ready to learn from experience, willing to stay engaged for the long haul, championing the cause, building partnerships with other like-minded actors and politically savvy in overcoming obstacles. This leadership could come from public officials, such as the President of Mexico and his Deputy Minister of Finance in the case of “Progresa”, from private individuals, such as the founders of Grameen Bank and BRAC, from a community of national experts and community leaders, as in the case of the Peru Highlands Development Program, from outside aid donors, as in the case of the West-African River- Blindness program, or be part of a wellestablished system of experimentation with replication of success as established in China’s approach to economic growth.
  
  
• The programs created the space for sustained growth: As programs expanded successfully they managed to open up financial and fiscal space by keeping costs down and finding suitable financing mechanisms; they pursued policy reforms that created favorable legal and regulatory conditions; they created the institutional space by identifying appropriate organizational approaches and building institutions for managing the programs at scale; they adapted approaches to the specific cultural realities; and they created political coalitions and operational partnerships that made it possible to grow and sustain the initiative. In the case of “Progresa- Oportunidades” the Mexican government designed a program with a long-term goal of universal coverage of all poor, but started with carefully designed pilots, which were subjected to detailed evaluation against control groups and adapted as needed during the 5-10 year scale-up phase. It created the required fiscal and financial space by abandoning other less successful social programs and by seeking the support of international financial institutions. The government also insulated “Progresa-Oportunidades” from political controversy by carefully monitoring and documenting its positive impacts and by legally assuring that it did not get caught up in party politics. Finally, it designed an institutional approach suitable for phased nation-wide scale-up with minimal bureaucratic obstacles.

Why are these success stories the exception rather than the rule? The first explanation for the lack of systematic and effective focus on scaling up lies in the nature of governmental and bureaucratic incentives and the resulting planning and implementation mechanisms in the developing countries themselves. Typically, governmental plans set out broad targets, policies and implementation modalities, but they generally do not link specific interventions, projects and programs or individual agency budgets and investment plans with the longer-term goals set forth in national or sectoral plans. Moreover, whenever governments or heads of agencies change, the new leadership has a strong tendency to discard the programs supported by the former incumbents and instead to pursue new ideas and new programs. Finally, the practice of methodically evaluating the impact of programs is poorly understood in most countries, and in any case is not well appreciated, since politicians and agencies like to claim success, but prefer not to acknowledge failures in their programs. Contrast this with the incentives for scaling up in the private sector: In a competitive market a successful new initiative, i.e., one that makes a profit, will be replicated and scaled up either by the firm that pioneered it, or by competitors who see the opportunity to garner some of the potential profit for themselves.

The second explanation can be found in the way aid agencies work. While some donors help governments with advice and technical assistance to develop a longer-term national, sub-national and sectoral plans and improved budgeting and investment planning mechanisms, the aid agencies’ own operational modalities and incentives tend to operate just like those of governments: Their operational policies, programming, management and staffing do not encourage support for systematic scaling up. On the contrary, they tend to focus on innovative initiatives and even discourage replication of successful projects and programs. They do not reward effective monitoring and evaluation against longer-term objectives. They rotate managers and staff frequently and with little attention to ensure appropriate hand-over. And the incentives for staff are to start new projects rather than focusing on implementing and building on ongoing ones. And while partnerships, coordination and handing off programs to the clients are encouraged at the level of ministers and agency heads, in practice staff have little incentive to pursue these avenues, since they take time, effort and even budgetary resources, increase risks of delay and of loss of institutional identity and control, and since fiduciary requirements for procurement and disbursements are not harmonized among donors.

What needs to be done to make scaling up the norm? Let us start with aid agencies. Donors have an obligation to do no harm, and it can be argued that their proliferation of small, one-time, uncoordinated and unevaluated interventions do more harm than good. They certainly represent an opportunity forgone, namely the opportunity to support a systematic focus on scaling up successful development interventions. Indeed, this represents an obligation that should be reflected in the mission statements of all official aid organizations, as well as in those of the larger non-governmental organizations and foundations that provide development assistance A recent assessment of donor performance in terms of their attention to scaling up concluded that donors need to address five critical gaps in their operation approach:

1. Institutional information gap: Aid agencies should review and develop their institutional approaches to scaling up.
2. Evaluation gap: Evaluations of donor projects should include an assessment of the scaling up practices of donors.
3. Incentives gap: Donors need to develop internal and external incentives (e.g., operational policies and staff incentives; replication funds, competitions) to help drive the scaling up process.
4. Partnership gap: Donors should expand the use of programmatic approaches and instruments with joint funding of programs designed to bring donors together so they can help scale up successful interventions;
5. Ownership gap: Ultimately, scaling up is a country’s job; donors need to help by setting an example, build capacity and hand off to agents in the country.

In their turn, the governments of developing countries need to make scaling up of successful interventions an explicit part of their national planning and programming, need to implement rigorous monitoring and evaluation as learning and accountability mechanisms for the political and agency leadership, and need to find ways to ensure that successful programs do not fall victim of the electoral cycle.

The good news is that progress is being made. There is now a well established body of evidence that scaling up can and does work, even in fragile states. There exists a framework for analyzing, planning monitoring and evaluating scaling up approaches, building on the scaling up pathway, drivers and incentives concepts as summarized above. Examples of governments focused on scaling up success show that it is possible to pursue this avenue to development, with China the outstanding case in point. And some aid agencies have begun to focus systematically on scaling up in their operational mission, strategy, policies, processes and incentives, among them IFAD, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The United Nations Development Program has made scaling up an explicitcriterion in its evaluation of its programs. And the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) recently issued practical guidelines for scaling up.

What is needed now, and what development ministers and agency heads should focus on in Busan and beyond, are the following three important priorities to ensure that an operational focus on scaling up becomes the rule, not the exception, in the way governments and aid agencies work:

1. Developing country governments commit themselves to introduce the scaling up objective and practice into their own planning, implementation, evaluation and accountability mechanisms.
2. Official donors and large private donors commit to introduce the objective and practice of scaling up into their mission statements, operational policies and evaluation practices.
3. Donors specifically commit to assist development partners through their technical and financial assistance to implement systematic approaches and incentive mechanisms that help drive the scaling up of successful development interventions. Scaling up success is not rocket science. It is a simple, intuitively appealing concept. And yet in practice it has been an orphan in the development literature and practice. Fortunately, this is now changing. We do not need complex models and metrics, nor do governments and aid agencies need sophisticated operational instruments. What we need is for scaling up to become the accepted goal at the political and institutional level. We need a clear vision of scaling up pathways, an assessment of the needed drivers and spaces for scaling up. And we need a readiness to evaluate progress against ultimate and intermediate goals and to adjust the scaling up pathway in light of the lessons learned.

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A key objective of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is to assist its member countries in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). UNDP pursues this objective in various ways, including through analysis and advice to governments on the progress towards the MDGs (such as support for the preparation and monitoring Poverty Reduction Strategies, or PRSs, in poor countries), assistance for capacity building, and financial and technical support for the preparation and implementation of development programs.

The challenge of achieving the MDGs remains daunting in many countries, including Tajikistan. To do so will require that all development partners, i.e., the government, civil society, private business and donors, make every effort to scale up successful development interventions. Scaling up refers to “expanding, adapting and sustaining successful policies, programs and projects on different places and over time to reach a greater number of people.” Interventions that are successful as pilots but are not scaled up will create localized benefits for a small number of beneficiaries, but they will fail to contribute significantly to close the MDG gap.

This paper aims to assess whether and how well UNDP is supporting scaling up in its development programs in Tajikistan. While the principal purpose of this assessment was to assist the UNDP country program director and his team in Tajikistan in their scaling up efforts, it also contributes to the overall growing body of evidence on the scaling up of development interventions worldwide.

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Editor's Note: With the latest coup attempt in Turkey, Turkish democracy survived a major test, and the country turned from the edge of a precipice. writes Kemal Kirisci. But Turkey’s democracy has also taken a severe blow. This article was originally published in The National Interest.

The history of Turkish politics is littered with coups and coup attempts that have occurred in roughly ten-year intervals. It is almost a genetic defect.

• The nascent Turkish democracy experienced its first coup in 1960 when it was barely into its tenth year—led by a group of left-wing “young officers,” who had also forced the General Staff into its ranks. Administrative authority was returned to civilians in October 1961, after having cost the lives of the then-Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and the Minister of Finance, Hasan Polatkan.
• The second military intervention took place in 1971 against the government of Süleyman Demirel—this time around, though, through a “coup by memorandum.” The military issued to the prime minister an ultimatum—to step aside and be replaced by a technocratic cabinet.
• Less than ten years later, in the midst of endemic violence between left- and right-wing radical groups, the military's top brass carried out another intervention. This was bloodier than the previous two interventions, costing hundreds of lives and leading to massive human-rights violations. After rubberstamping a suffocating constitution on the country, the military handed the government over to a semblance of a democratically-elected government in 1983.
• Surprisingly, Turkey broke this pattern of ten-yearly military interventions, and civilian authority continued until 1997, when there was what was termed a “post-modern coup.” The army rolled out a convoy of tanks into the streets of Ankara, and in a repeat of the coup of 1971, demanded the resignation of the coalition government led by Necmettin Erbakan.
• The next coup occurred a decade later (almost to the day) in April 2007, when the Chief of Staff staged an “e-coup” by posting a set of demands on its website. The coup was a reaction against a long list of democratic reforms that were introduced as a part of the leadership’s pro-EU agenda and were seen as a departure from the staunchly secularist, restrictive mode of governance. Bolstered by the public support for these reforms, however, the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, now the current president of Turkey, successfully withstood the “e-coup,” and for the first time, pushed the military back “into the barracks”.

The latest coup attempt—which took place on Friday, July 15—has widely been attributed to a large Gülenist faction within the military and the judiciary that circumvented the established chain of command and held the high command hostage. Gülenists are the followers of the Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, who leads a worldwide movement that claims to advocate a moderate form of Sunni Islam with an emphasis on tolerance and interfaith dialogue. Formerly allies with Erdoğan, the Gülenists were blamed for spearheading the corruption scandal in December 2013 that engulfed several government officials, ministers and people in Erdoğan’s intimate circle. Since then, Gülen and Erdoğan have been locked in a power struggle.

Back from the brink

Turkish democracy survived a major test, and Turkey turned from the edge of a precipice. The credit for the coup’s defeat goes to the Turkish people, who heeded Erdoğan’s call to resist this intervention “by any means possible and necessary" and filled the squares. TV reports were filled with eye-to-eye, tense, agitated confrontations between civilians and armed soldiers on the two bridges that connect the Asian and European sides of Istanbul. Public restraint and sobriety helped to prevent escalation of violence. There were nevertheless senseless causalities resulting from fire opened by the mutineers and especially attacks mounted on the parliament building as well as the Headquarters of the General Staff. It could have been a lot worse.

Erdoğan needs to rise above a majoritarian understanding of democracy and do justice to the aspirations of a public that heeded his call by pouring into the streets and squares to defeat the coup attempt.

Clearly, Turkey’s democracy has taken a severe blow—cushioned only by the unequivocal stance of the opposition leaders and the media against the coup. Once again, the nation managed to break this pattern of ten-year coups. This offers the country a matchless opportunity for reconciliation. Granted, Erdoğan has had an exceptionally rough weekend and his frustration with those responsible for or implicated in the coup is understandable. He is correct in calling “for their punishment under the full force of the law of the land.” It will, however, now be critical that he ensure that the rule of law is upheld and rises to the challenge of winning the hearts and minds across a deeply polarized nation. He has the tools for it in his repertoire and had successfully wielded them in the past—especially between 2003 and 2011, when he served as prime minister. In hindsight, this period is often referred to as AKP’s “golden age,” when the economy boomed, democracy excelled, and Turkey was touted as a model for those Muslim-majority countries aspiring to transform themselves into liberal democracies.

As he steers the country from the brink of civil war, Erdoğan needs to rise above a majoritarian understanding of democracy and do justice to the aspirations of a public that heeded his call by pouring into the streets and squares to defeat the coup attempt. This is the least that the Turkish public deserves. This would also be a move in the right direction for Turkey’s neighborhood, which desperately needs a respite from the turmoil resulting from the war in Syria, the instability in Iraq, Russia’s territorial ambitions and now Brexit. This is the moment when a stable, democratic, transparent, accountable and prosperous Turkey needs to come to the fore on the world-stage. The United States needs it too. As much as the White House declared its faith in the strength of Turkey’s democracy and its support for the elected leadership, there is a clear chance for forging closer cooperation between the two countries. The first step in cooperation should be in bringing to justice the perpetrators of this coup, followed by measures to enhance Turkey’s capacity to address and manage the many challenges facing Turkey and its neighborhood.

       

U.S. and EU officials have called on Turkey to show restraint amid concerns that Friday's failed coup attempt will be the pretext for an authoritarian crackdown. Turkey’s ability to investigate the putsch will be compromised by the fact that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repressed the media and weakened the judiciary, says Kemal Kirisci, of the Brookings Institution. The coup attempt will likely bolster Erdoğan’s efforts to consolidate power, and that will make any investigation into the true causes of the coup difficult, Kirisci says.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has pinned responsibility on the cleric Fethullah Gülen, who lives in self-imposed exile in the United States. Is that credible?

It is possible [that the Gülen movement is responsible], but this needs to be thoroughly investigated. The [Turkish] government has long argued that Fethullah Gülen leads a parallel state from Pennsylvania, where he has been living since 1997. The journalist and academic Ali Bayramoğlu has said that the movement, going back to the 1980s and early 1990s, began to systematically place their students in the police and military academies. These students were closely monitored and accompanied.

Other commentators have argued that it's unbelievable how F-16 pilots, on whom the state has spent more than a million dollars each to educate, attacked the Turkish parliament, military headquarters, intelligence services, and communications centers. How can a well-trained, prestigious F-16 pilot do this unless they are deeply attached to a cause? The movement also [includes] high-ranking judges and officers, including many one-star generals, who have been arrested.

Erdoğan has renewed his calls on the United States to extradite Gülen. Is this more plausible after the attempted coup?

Turkey has for a long time been seeking Gülen’s extradition, but the United States has not been cooperative, saying there was not enough evidence to build a case. However, the [U.S.-Turkey] extradition treaty refers to an obligation to extradite anyone who attempts to assassinate the leaders of one or the other country. There clearly was an attempt to assassinate Erdoğan: the hotel where he had been staying was attacked, and there was an attempt to control the airport where he was supposed to land. A necessary condition of extradition is that a convincing connection between the coup and the sought-after person is established; that should be the focus of cooperation.

Many analysts expect that Erdoğan will use the attempt as a pretense to invest the presidency with full executive powers, as he’s long sought.

The difficult issue will be to assess Erdoğan’s accusations independent of his political ends. Many commentators say the allegations put forward by the government serve his political aspirations: Erdoğan has become, de facto, the executive president of Turkey, but he wants to introduce an element of legality to it, which will require either a constitutional amendment or a completely new constitution. Opinion polls just before the coup suggested that the public, even supporters of [the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)], did not look favorably on it. This kind of threat to the system gives him considerable leverage [to codify an executive presidency], and I suspect he will follow that path rather than what some commentators are calling for, bringing the polarized country to a consensus through dialogue.

How to sort that out from the pursuit of the truth will be a difficult exercise, and I’m not sure today’s Turkey is equipped to do it, given the way the media has been repressed and the judiciary has been brought under the influence, if not control, of the government. These measures raise serious doubts about Turkey’s ability to investigate this within the realm of the rule of law.

The Incirlik air base, from which a U.S.-led coalition carries out air strikes against the self-proclaimed Islamic State, just reopened after a temporary closure. Will the coup attempt have broader implications for the anti-ISIS campaign?

Cooperation on ISIS is important, but much more so is the future of democracy in Turkey. A Turkey that is democratic is a Turkey of the rule of law, and a secular Turkey is one in which sympathy for such extremist groups is much less. Such a Turkey shares common values with the West, which makes cooperation much easier.

It looks like a large number of officers—colonels as well as one-star generals—were involved, and so the Turkish military is going to experience a period of weakness. That’s where U.S. cooperation, on intelligence and counterterrorism, is critical. Such cooperation demands trust. That trust will partially, but importantly, be a function of [cooperation over] the Gülenist dossier.

The United States and Turkey are going to have to find a way to cooperate over the PYD (Kurdish Democratic Union Party). [Editor’s note: the United States backs the Syrian Kurdish party’s militant wing, the YPG, to combat the Islamic State; Turkey says the group has aided its compatriots in Turkey, the PKK, whose insurgency against the state resumed in July 2015]. The United States enjoys leverage over the PYD, and now it’s ever more important that it keeps the PYD in line so it does not become involved in the conflict in Turkey and strengthen the hand of the PKK while Turkey is vulnerable.

Turkey hosts roughly three million refugees and the country is party to an agreement with the EU to stem migration to Europe. What will EU-Turkey relations look like in the aftermath of the coup attempt?

If the perpetrators had gained control of government, it would have led to civil war, so the very fact that the coup attempt collapsed is saving Europe from waves of Turkish asylum seekers. The EU will need to expand its basis of cooperation with Turkey, because this coup attempt will adversely impact Turkey’s ability to deal with these refugees. There will likely be a purge from some of the bureaucracies and organizations that deal with them.

More broadly, both U.S.-Turkey and EU-Turkey ties have been strained lately. Will the Turkey’s alliance with the West come out on stronger footing after their condemnation of the coup attempt?

Helping with the investigation to establish the truth will be critical. The way in which, at the end of the day, [the EU and United States came out] with support for the elected government, just as Turkish opposition parties did, should entitle them to some influence, calling on Turkey to live up to the norms, standards, and values of democratic society.

The EU and United States together must reanchor Turkey solidly within the Western alliance. Erdoğan, as much as [the United States and EU member-states] may resent him or disagree with policies, must be made to feel that he's welcome back in the ranks, the way he was between 2003 and 2010, on the condition he reforms his policies.

Erdoğan and the people around him, especially [former Prime Minister Ahmet] Davutoglu, had delusions of grandeur. They dreamed they were going to lead the ummah, the Islamic world. This is all gone now: the emperor is naked. Erdoğan seems to recognize Turkey has boxed itself into a corner and wants to come out in the direction of the West. There is nowhere else to go. Turkey needs tourism, international trade, and foreign investment, and to protect its national security. On all these grounds it needs cooperation, and it’s not going to come from Iran, China, or Russia, even if that might be their preference. It can only come from the West.

Turkey may also recognize that the West is in trouble too, and if the West cannot come out of that trouble, Turkey will be in even deeper trouble. Brexit is going to have a negative impact on Turkey's export market and tourism. An EU in trouble is not going to be able to give visa liberalization to Turkish nationals, which symbolically will anchor Turkey in the West, and is also important economically. If the EU and United States move to the right and say no to free trade agreements [and migration], Turkey will not benefit. Both sides next each other even more than in the past.

Copyright © Council on Foreign Relations 2016, republished with permission

       

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The failed coup in Turkey on July 15 to 16, organized by factions within the Turkish military in an attempt to overthrow the government of President Erdoğan, represents both a victory and a new trial for Turkish democracy. Although the Turkish citizenry brought the country back from the brink of anarchy and civil war, many analysts see last week’s events as a consequence of the political instability and discord that has been mounting for years as Erdoğan has consolidated powers, marginalized the opposition, and redefined Turkey’s democracy. How will the president react in the aftermath of the coup? Will the democratic backsliding intensify, or can the thwarted coup offer new opportunity for reconciling the deeply-polarized nation?

The upheaval and political instability in Turkey also holds significant implications for Turkey’s foreign policy and the fate of a neighboring region already in turmoil from the war in Syria and insecurity in Iraq. The West desperately needs a stable, democratic, and predictable partner in its NATO-ally Turkey to address the many challenges besetting the region and to fight the Islamic State (or ISIS). How will recent events affect regional stability and Turkey’s cooperation with the West on security issues, including the resettlement of Syrian refugees? What does the failed coup mean for the coalition against ISIS engagement in Syria?

On July 20, the Foreign Policy program (FP) at Brookings hosted a panel discussion to consider these questions and other domestic and international consequences of the coup attempt in Turkey. Brookings Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on the United States and Europe Fiona Hill introduced and moderated a wide-ranging conversation featuring FP Senior Fellows Shadi Hamid, Kemal Kirişci, Michael O'Hanlon, and Ömer Taşpınar.

After the discussion, the speakers took questions from the audience.

Video

• Turkey coup attempt was a shock
• Institutional collapse of Turkey unprecedented
• Disaster averted in failed Turkey coup
• Incirlik Air Base not irreplaceable
• Turkey after the coup attempt: Implications for Turkish democracy, foreign policy, and the future of the Syrian War

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• Turkey after the coup attempt: Implications for Turkish democracy, foreign policy, and the future of the Syrian War

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has responded to last week’s coup attempt with a hammer. Over the span of just a few days, more than 50,000 people have been fired from their jobs or detained on suspicions that they’re connected to the coup or to the Gülenist movement (which President Erdoğan blames for the coup attempt). Now emergency rule has been imposed, suggesting that more detentions may follow.

Turkish leaders are assuring everyone that the state of emergency is meant to control the situation and to preserve Turkish democracy. But many observers, including in the West, aren’t buying it: There are legitimate fears that these measures will actually further consolidate Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule. And the consequences of Turkey’s continued drift away from democracy isn’t only a human rights or governance problem—it could become a real geopolitical challenge for the West. 

The swinging pendulum

Turkey—literally the bridge between Europe and Asia—sometimes seems of two minds on governance issues. On the one hand, its leaders express a commitment to a Western form of governance based on the rule of law, liberal democracy, transparency, and accountability. On the other—and more in the vein of governance styles in Russia, Iran, and China—they sometimes reject what they see as outside interference, restrict civil liberties and government transparency, and promote a heavy state role in the economy. 

Although Turkey was welcomed into NATO and other transatlantic institutions after World War II—at a time when Soviet expansionism was a real fear—its commitment to democratic values has always been shaky. The military’s shadow loomed large over Turkish politics (last week’s coup attempt was far from the first) and the country’s human rights record was poor, particularly on minority rights. 

Many thought that all this would change when Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. They introduced political reforms that propelled Turkey toward EU membership. The Turkish economy excelled: Many people in Turkey once depended on remittances sent by Gastarbeiters (guest workers) in Germany and other West European countries, for instance, but the country quickly became host itself to immigrants from neighboring countries. Tourists, business people, students, athletes, and artists poured into the country in the millions. And Turkey enjoyed considerable soft power in the region and the world, often touted as a model in the wake of the Arab Spring of a country that properly paired mainstream Islamism and democratic governance. None of this would have been possible were it not for Turkey’s growing adherence to Western governance norms and its membership in the transatlantic community. 

But the picture has since become rather grim. The events of the past week have renewed concerns about the state of Turkish democracy, yes—but those concerns have in fact been growing for years. Turkey’s commitment to supporting freedom of expression, freedom of the media, anti-corruption efforts, and liberal markets has been in serious doubt for a while. Meanwhile, the economy has stalled, related in part to political developments and to a recent spate of terror attacks that have seriously damaged the overall security situation. It is no wonder that Turkish per capita income—which peaked at $10,800 in 2013—has now fallen to 2009 levels, at $9,950. (That’s an almost 10 percent drop in the span of just two years.) Turkey’s further slide away from Western governance norms would likely only make matters worse, making Erdoğan’s promise of putting Turkey among the largest 10 economies in the world a fantasy.

If you ask Erdoğan and his AKP colleagues why reforms sputtered out, they’re likely to answer with conspiracy theories: They’ll blame the West, the EU, the interest rate lobby, and others. But the AKP has failed to be self-critical, which could have helped it succeed. 

Turkey’s choice of orbit

So if Turkey seems to be moving away from Western norms, is it also moving away from the West? Possibly. In November 2013—after years of stop-and-go accession talks with the EU—Erdoğan sought Russian President Vladimir Putin’s support for accepting Turkey into Eurasian organizations like the Shanghai Five. That could be a big geostrategic gain for Russia, something not lost on the Russian press.

Western Europe and the United States would be the biggest losers if Turkey moved closer to Russia’s camp. Losing their partnership with Turkey would deliver a serious blow to the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, for one thing. But it would also further dim prospects that Turkey might really embrace Western-style democracy any time soon. As Ted Piccone has written, Turkey has the potential to be a linchpin of the liberal international order—and a long-term downturn in the country could have wide detrimental effects in regional and global governance. 

The path ahead

Finally, is there a role for the United States in all this? In the short term, as Ömer Taşpınar has argued, the United States should offer real help to Ankara in investigating the role of Pennsylvania resident Fethullah Gülen and his movement in last week’s coup attempt. Extradition is a highly sensitive issue, and the United States must defend its legal standards. At the same time, that kind of cooperation could build trust in U.S.-Turkey relations, calm Ankara’s paranoia about a potential U.S. role in the coup attempt (and therefore possibly help minimize the damage to Turkish democracy that Ankara itself might cause in its heavy-handed response), and help the United States build credibility on the rule of law. A thorough investigation—including into the Gülenists—is important for determining who was behind the coup attempt. And it’s in U.S. interests to know: As Turkey is a NATO member, a threat against it should be considered a threat against all members. It is in no NATO member’s interest to allow a political earthquake like this to push Turkey from its fold or towards a rival mode of governance. 

This isn’t to downplay the burden now on Ankara; the Turkish government shouldn’t forget that its respect for civil liberties and the rule of law once helped earn it a lot of international respect and a place in the Western community. It’s disappointing that the AKP and Erdoğan supporters have failed to capitalize on their country’s potential. Among its peers in the Muslim world, Turkey had once made the most progress in terms of democratic values and economic growth. Many would still like to believe that that Turkey still exists, in spite of recent setbacks. But for Turkey to win back those gains, its leadership will have to proceed very cautiously and with reason. 

       

Editors’ Note: The attempted coup in Turkey was, for many observers, reminiscent of another recent July uprising in a key American ally: the 2013 military takeover in Egypt. These coups were a disaster for U.S. policy in both cases, and would have been regardless of how they turned out, argues Jeremy Shapiro. This post originally appeared on Vox.

Friday’s attempted military coup in Turkey demonstrates that yet another U.S. partner in the Middle East seems to be descending into domestic unrest. The spectacle was, for many observers, reminiscent of another recent July uprising in a key American ally: the 2013 military takeover in Egypt. There, as in Turkey, a powerful military in a country with a history of coups rebelled against a democratically elected Islamist government.

Egyptians and Turks alike will naturally reject such comparisons and emphasize the unique nature of their respective situations—not least that the coup in Egypt succeeded and the one in Turkey failed. They have a point. The differences in the local political context are more important than the superficial similarities.

But from an American perspective, there is a key similarity: These coups were a disaster for U.S. policy in both cases, and would have been regardless of how they turned out.

In each case, the U.S. government’s immediate response to fast-moving situations was to issue bland statements urging calm and condemning violence. Regardless, it gets blamed for not acting forcefully enough, and often accused of directly instigating the violence. In the end, a relationship with the government that emerges is strained, both by such accusations and by the ensuing crackdown and human rights abuses that usually follow both successful and unsuccessful coups.

How does the United States end up in this no-win situation so frequently? Why is domestic unrest in faraway countries like Egypt and Turkey such a problem for the United States?

The essential problem is that the United States cannot just do foreign policy business with its partners. Because of America’s own values and domestic politics, it needs to get involved in their domestic political struggles. It needs to promote democracy and civil society in its partners and to take positions on controversial domestic issues such as the proper functioning of democratic institutions and the protection of human rights or media freedom.

This means that when domestic politics explodes, the United States is often caught in the middle.

Partnership isn't enough

Both Egypt and Turkey are “key security partners” of the United States. This means the U.S. government needs these countries to deal with critical security issues.

Turkey is a NATO ally that sits at the crossroads of practically every geopolitical issue in the Middle East. It is particularly critical for the fight against ISIS. The United States and its anti-ISIS coalition partners supply their partners on the ground in Syria through Turkish territory and use the military base at Incirlik in Turkey to launch airstrikes against ISIS. The foreign fighters that replenish ISIS’s ranks have also often come into Syria via Turkey.

Egypt is also seen as an important partner for counterterrorism. It is struggling to cope with jihadist groups, some of them linked to ISIS, in the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt also provides the United States military with privileged access to the strategic Suez Canal, helps keep the peace with Israel, and helps ensure that weapons that might be used to attack Israel don’t get to Hamas through Egypt’s border with Gaza.

One could argue about whether these are truly important security interests for the United States. But the key point is that successive American governments since, in the case of Turkey in the 1950s and in the case of Egypt in the 1970s, have accepted that they are.

They have accordingly sought to build an effective partnership with both countries. The United States is committed, through NATO, to defend Turkey in case of aggression. And the United States provides Egypt with more than $1.3 billion a year in military assistance and $150 million a year in economic assistance, making it the second-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the world (after Israel).

But the United States can’t just give these guarantees and this money without taking on some moral responsibility for what goes on in these countries. Debates over these countries in U.S. domestic politics reflects this sense of moral responsibility.

If the Egyptian military overthrows a democratically elected government, U.S. Congressmembers will quite naturally ask why the United States is giving nearly $1.5 billion a year to a government that shoots peaceful protesters in the street. If the Turkish government suppresses media freedom or arrests judges, U.S. human rights groups will similarly question why the United States accepts such actions by a NATO ally.

Hoping to escape from this dilemma, the U.S. government has long sought to promote the Western values of democracy and human rights in its security partners.

But particularly in the Middle East, this has rarely worked. The United States doesn’t really know how to democratize these societies, and in any case, it values its security relationship with the government too much to exert sustained pressure.

So even as the Egyptian military overthrew the democratically elected government, the United States continued to give it military aid. Even as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has moved in an increasingly authoritarian direction, the United States has stepped up its security cooperation with Turkey over ISIS.

The result is a hypocrisy that is evident and annoying to both the government and its opposition. Every effort to pressure governments on human rights elicits furious reactions and denials. And when, despite the rhetoric about human rights from U.S. officials, nothing really improves, the population grows cynical about U.S. motives.

So every effort to build up civil society organizations spawns a million conspiracy theories about U.S. involvement in domestic politics.

The crucible of a coup

Military coups or revolutions in U.S. partners always bring these tensions out into the open. They force the United States to confront in extremely fraught circumstances whether it most prizes its security relationship or its commitment to democratic values.

Usually, it can’t decide. The immediate reaction tends to be both muddled and seen through a lens of decades of built-up distrust of the United States. The conspiracy theorists find ample evidence for every preconceived notion.

The reaction to the Turkish coup has been a textbook example of this dynamic. The U.S. government condemned the coup, but it took several hours. The Turkish government interpreted this as hedging and evidence of ill will.

President Erdoğan has blamed the coup on Fethullah Gülen, a Muslim cleric in self-imposed exile in the United States, and wants the U.S. government to extradite him to Turkey.

When Secretary of State John Kerry said the United States would need solid evidence to extradite him, a Turkish government minister accused the United States of instigating the coup itself. As Kerry warned Turkey about the large number of arrests, the Turkish government temporarily restricted use of the Incirlik base and arrested its Turkish commander on suspicion of involvement in the coup. The conspiracy theorists went wild:

Ibrahim Karagul, Chief editor of pro-AKP daily: "The USA is behind this coup. I'm saying it clearly that the USA attempted to kill Erdogan."

— Turkey Untold (@TurkeyUntold) July 19, 2016

If the United States wanted to break out of the vicious cycle, it would either have to end its security partnership with Turkey or accept that that partnership means accepting Turkish authoritarianism. But if experience is any guide, the United States will not take either of those paths.

As in Egypt, the U.S. relationship with Turkey will probably survive these events, albeit in diminished form. After a period of distancing, both sides will accept that they need each other for their mutual security problems too much to allow a complete breakdown.

But at the same time, the distrust of the United States within the government and the hatred of the United States within the population will grow. The U.S.-Turkey relationship will fail to evolve into a true alliance of trust and thus be of limited use in defeating ISIS or ending the civil war with the Kurds in Turkey.

In the meantime, Turkey's roiled domestic politics will continue as Erdoğan attempts to cleanse Turkish politics of his opponents. The next coup or revolution may be the last that the strained U.S.-Turkish alliance can withstand.

       

       

       

Event Information

The year 2015 will be a milestone year, with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the post-2015 development agenda by world leaders in September; the Addis Ababa Accord on financing for development in July; and the conclusion of climate negotiations at COP21 in Paris in December. The draft Addis Ababa Accord, which focuses on the actions needed to attain the SDGs, highlights the key role envisaged for the multilateral development banks (MDBs) in the post-2015 agenda. Paragraph 65 of the draft accord notes: “We call on the international finance institutions to establish a process to examine the role, scale, and functioning of the multilateral and regional development finance institutions to make them more responsive to the sustainable development agenda.”          

Against this backdrop, on April 18, 2015, the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings held a private roundtable with the leaders of the MDBs and other key stakeholders to discuss the role of the MDBs in supporting the post-2015 development agenda.

The meeting focused on four questions:

1. What does the post-2015 development agenda and the ambitions of the Addis and Paris conferences imply for the MDBs?


Given the ability of the MDBs to leverage shareholder resources, they can be efficient and effective mechanisms for scaling up development cooperation, particularly with respect to the agenda on investing in people and to the financing of sustainable infrastructure. New roles, instruments and partnerships might be needed.

2. How can MDBs best take advantage of the political attention that is being paid to the various conferences in 2015?   


The World Bank and selected regional development banks have launched a series of initiatives to optimize their balance sheets, address other constraints and enhance their catalytic role in crowding in private finance. And new institutions and mechanisms are coming to the fore. But the responses are not coordinated to best take advantage of each MDB’s comparative advantage.

3. What are the key impediments to scaling up the role and engagement of the MDBs?


Views on constraints are likely to differ but discussions should cover policy dialogue, capacity building, capital, leverage, shareholder backing on volume, instruments on leverage and risk mitigation, safeguards, and governance. 

4. How should the MDBs respond to the proposal to establish a process to examine the role, scale and functioning of the multilateral and regional development finance institutions to make them more responsive to the sustainable development agenda?   


A proactive response and engagement on the part of the MDBs would facilitate a better understanding of the contribution that the MDBs can make and greater support among shareholders for a coherent and stepped-up role.

Event Materials

• Participant List
• MDB PostEvent Summary

       

       

       

By 2020, Millennials will comprise more than one of three adult Americans. It is estimated that by 2025 they will make up as much as 75 percent of the workforce.  Millennials’ desire for pragmatic action that drives results will overtake today’s emphasis on ideology and polarization as Boomers finally fade from the scene. Thus, understanding the generation’s values offers a window into the future of corporate America.

Morley Winograd and Michael Hais outline the cultural force of the Millennial generation on the economy as Millennials increasingly dominate the nation’s workplaces and permeate its corporate culture. Winograd and Hais argue that the current culture on Wall Street is becoming increasingly isolated from the beliefs and values of America’s largest adult generation. The authors also include data on Millennials’ ideal employers, their financial behaviors, and their levels of institutional trust in order to provide further insight into this important demographic.

Key Millennial values shaping the future of the American economy include:

• Interest in daily work being a reflection of and part of larger societal concerns.
• Emphasis on corporate social responsibility, ethical causes, and stronger brand loyalty for companies offering solutions to specific social problems.
• A greater reverence for the environment, even in the absence of major environmental disaster.
• Higher worth placed on experiences over acquisition of material things.
• Ability to build communities around shared interests rather than geographical proximity, bridging otherwise disparate groups.

Downloads

• Download the paper

      

The leaked information in the Panama Papers from the law firm Mossack Fonseca has captured the headlines for weeks and will continue to do so as further names are exposed. The scandal has placed Panama in the limelight and provided an unprecedented glimpse into the world of hidden money and tax avoidance. To understand its broader context, it is vital that we distinguish between legal corruption, like that exposed by the Panama Papers, and illegal corruption, like that exposed by the Unaoil scandal. Governments must seize the moment to take decisive action against both.  

The U.S., the U.K., and a range of other countries will announce commitments to combat corruption at the Anti-Corruption Summit on May 12, championed by Prime Minister David Cameron as a game-changing event. The question is whether these commitments will deliver concrete actions that target the most costly kinds of corruption that flourish globally today.  

Unfortunately, the world often engages in “summitry” filled with communiques, calls for coordination and exchanging information, or creating another toothless generic initiative, which offer media and photo opportunities that fulfill particular political objectives for some leaders. Let us see if it’s different this time.

Beyond Panama

Mossack Fonseca, and its home country Panama, are just a couple nodes in the vast and complex set of “enablers” of corruption and tax evasion around the world.     

For those seeking secret shelters and corporate shells, the mighty U.S. (which unsurprisingly doesn’t feature much in the Panama Papers) is one of the world’s most appealing destinations: Setting up a shell corporation in Delaware, for instance, requires less background information than obtaining a driver’s license. As seen in the chart below, this opacity, coupled with the size of the U.S. as a haven, means that it has been ranked the third most secretive jurisdiction among close to 100 assessed by the Financial Secrecy Index. Panama is 13th.

Figure 1: Financial Secrecy Index 2015 (Select jurisdictions, from the Tax Justice Network)

Source: The Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/introduction/fsi-2015-results

This graph depicts the top 40 worst performing jurisdictions as well as four select better performing jurisdictions (right of dashed line). The Index combines a qualitative secrecy score based on 15 indicators and a quantitative measure of a jurisdiction's share in global financial services exports. 

And the U.K. is an important enabler of corruption: It has stood by as its offshore jurisdictions and protectorates operate as safe havens for illicit wealth, which the Panama Papers make clear. The British Virgin Islands, for example, were the favored location for thousands of shell companies set up by Mossack Fonseca.  

Beyond tax shelters 

The Panama Papers speak only indirectly to core aspects of today’s global corruption challenge, which are neither about Panama nor taxes. We ought to view the resulting scandals in a broader light, and recognize the immense, complex webs of corruption that increasingly link economic and political elites around the globe.

Grand corruption

The most powerful figures who engage in high-level or “grand” corruption are hardly running scared following the Panama leak. These figures include kleptocrat leaders as well as oligarchs who wield enormous influence on government affairs. Often, these players interact and collude, forming high-powered public-private networks that make the traditional notion of corruption as an illegal transaction between two parties look like child’s play.

Corruption in these elite networks far transcends the unethical behavior of the typical tax avoider, as it involves the abuse of power to accumulate power and assets, often via the direct plunder of public resources, asset stripping, or large-scale bribery. The multi-billion-dollar scandal embroiling the Brazilian oil giant Petrobras illustrates the complexity of colluding networks, and how grand such corruption can inflict political and economic damage of historical proportions on a country. 

The oil sector provides many more illustrations of grand corruption. Few company officials may have been more relieved by the Panama Papers leak than those at Unaoil, whose own scandal had just erupted. Unaoil is an “enabler” company incorporated in Monaco that bribed and influenced government officials in various countries on behalf of multinational companies vying for lucrative procurement contracts. While overshadowed by the Panama leaks, the Unaoil case is at least as emblematic of the challenges in tackling global corruption. For instance, it shows the deeply ingrained practice of Iraqi government officials seeking bribes for the award of contracts and the willingness of companies to provide them.

Corrupt elites, including those embroiled in the Unaoil scandal, often use structures like shell corporations and tax havens (along with real estate and other investments) to hide their ill-gotten funds. However, even if the Panama Papers leak prompts more scrutiny on illicit financial flows and the reform of these opaque financial structures, grand corruption will continue in many locations.  It is noteworthy that the political fallout has been concentrated in relatively well-governed countries that do have accountability and anti-corruption systems in place, as illustrated by the resignations of the prime minister of Iceland, the industry minister of Spain, and the head of Chile’s Transparency International chapter. 

In sharp contrast, President Vladimir Putin brushed off the leaked Russian information as a Western anti-Putin conspiracy; in China, discussion and dissemination were muffled by media censorship; and, in Azerbaijan, exposure of details on President Aliyev’s family mining interests will hardly dent his hold on power. While reforms leading from the Panama leaks will hopefully deter tax dodgers and unethical corporations and individuals from hiding dirty assets, powerful corrupt leaders will continue to enjoy impunity.

Legal corruption and state capture   

The Panama Papers shed a sliver of light on the type of corruption that is perhaps most damaging and difficult to tackle: legal corruption and state capture. Around the world, powerful economic and political elites unduly influence laws and policies, shaping the rules of the game for their own benefit, or what has been called the “privatization of public policy and lawmaking.” This generates huge rents for the elite, increases their power, and exacerbates a country’s political and economic inequality.

Resource-rich countries provide many illustrations. In Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Venezuela, for example, political elites have used state-owned resource companies to serve patronage agendas, often—though not exclusively—through legal means.

In many industrialized countries, an example of state capture is the tax system itself. It is in the interest of elites to safeguard a worldwide network of secret offshore companies and tax havens as places to hide wealth—whether acquired legitimately or illicitly. The evidence on tax avoidance from the U.S. is telling: According to Zucman, since the 1950s the effective rate of corporate tax has decreased from 45 to 15 percent, whereas the nominal rate has only decreased from 50 to 35 percent. And U.S. companies make full use of foreign tax havens: According to a new Oxfam report, the top 50 American multinationals reported in 2008 that 43 percent of their foreign earnings came from five tax havens, accounting for only 4 percent of the companies’ foreign workforces. Further, Bourguignon reports that federal tax rates on the richest Americans fell by 15 percent between 1970 and 2004.

Risks of legal corruption in the U.S. run high because private money can so easily sway public affairs. Following the 2010 Citizen United ruling by the Supreme Court, private funds from deep pockets increasingly dominate the conduct of electoral campaigns. The avenues for private money to influence public officials may widen further, if forms of bribery traditionally considered illegal become legalized. A forthcoming Supreme Court decision could make it legal for public officials to receive gifts and other benefits from private individuals (potentially overturning the corruption conviction of a former Virginia governor for doing exactly that).  

What should be done?     

Upfront, there are no easy solutions, especially because powerful decision-makers benefit from this status quo. But there is the opportunity, and public pressure, to reform.  As mentioned, the cause of tackling corruption often attracts token gestures, and David Cameron’s announcement of a new global anti-corruption agency could be at high risk of falling into this category. Rather, countries like the U.S. and U.K. must take firm action to reform their own practices, and push for the same from their partners such as the U.K. crown dependencies and overseas territories, the European Union and G20 members, and the recipients of overseas aid.

First, take legal corruption and state capture seriously. 

Transparency can be one game changer, especially if it addresses the channels of influence through which policy becomes “privatized.” Disclosures of campaign finance contributions, conflicts of interests, assets held by (and tax returns filed by) politicians and public officials, and parliamentary deliberations and votes can all discourage abuse and reveal hidden networks at play. Encouragingly, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently issued their first salvo, the report “Financing Democracy,” focusing on a few selected case studies, and as a next step it should be empowered to develop standards and carry out assessments on political finance for all OECD countries.

Transparency will only help if citizens can actively scrutinize and engage with their governments. Civic space is under attack in many jurisdictions, with activists and journalists facing intimidation, prosecution, or worse. Securing rights of expression and assembly should be the business of any international actor concerned with anti-corruption or economic governance. For instance, when considering funding requests from governments with weak records on protecting civil society—like Angola and Azerbaijan—the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as well as donors like the U.S. should prioritize civic accountability as well as broader transparency reforms.

Furthermore, grand corruption will not decline without more effective prosecutions and other sanctions that target bribe-takers, as well as the facilitators and middlemen of corruption, be they lawyers, accountants, or fixers like Unaoil. Of course, law enforcement authorities should also remain vigilant against bribe-paying companies; and governments—including OECD members implementing to varying degrees the OECD foreign bribery convention—would do well to emulate the active enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in this regard. But bribe-takers and facilitators have not faced sufficient scrutiny and sanction.

Second, get rid of shadowy corners.

Lessons yielded by recent events from the 2008 financial crisis to the Panama Papers suggest that major global players should not allow large corners of the global economy to escape scrutiny. The U.S. and the U.K. (with its offshores), should heed the calls for dismantling secrecy and tax havens. Seeds of effort, such as the U.S. government’s decision to require banks to know the identities of the individuals behind shell companies, are now coming to light, but broader efforts, including legislation, will also be required.  

Beneficial ownership transparency should become standard operating procedure, with governments following the example of the U.K., the Netherlands, and others in setting up public registries, and joining the movement toward a global registry. In the case of resource-rich countries, establishing sector-specific registries may be the right place to start. This practice is now mandated by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Within the extractive sector, home country governments should subject commodity traders to payment disclosure requirements when doing business with governments and state-owned companies. Governments of countries like Switzerland, the U.K., and Singapore that are home to corporate actors shoulder significant responsibility, especially in the current era of low commodity prices, when traders are entering into profitable new deals with cash-strapped resource-producing countries. Shining light in dark corners like these will render them less susceptible to abuse.

Third, prioritize transparency and scrutiny when public resources are allocated.

Whenever a government allocates resources for exploitation, it ought to do so in a fully transparent fashion. The Open Contracting Partnership has made great strides in defining a gold standard for such reporting, including guidance on issues such as open data, corporate identifiers, and beneficial ownership reporting.

Natural Resource Governance Institute research on oil and mining sector corruption shows that multiple types of high-value allocations require scrutiny and contract disclosure. These include the allocation of exploration and production licenses, but also on export, import, or transport rights, which have been associated with corruption in countries such as Indonesia, the Republic of Congo, and Ukraine. And most of the oil sector cases prosecuted under the U.S. FCPA have arisen around the award of service contracts, a segment of the oil industry where the Unaoil and Petrobras scandals also took place. Transparency should be the default setting for any transactions that allocate public resources. Further scrutiny is also needed on the abuse of (mis-)managed exchange rate regimes that generates rents for the few and creates major economic distortions, such as currently in Nigeria, Venezuela, and Egypt.

Concrete impact will also require a major attack on impunity since transparency and freedom of expression are necessary, but insufficient. And governments including those of the U.S. and the U.K. should adopt reforms to address legal corruption and various forms of opacity—whether addressing the capture by money in politics or the “dark corners” among oil traders headquartered in Geneva and London. 

An ambitious commitment to tackling corruption and impunity is not only needed now, but demanded by societies, as events in Brazil and elsewhere show. This is a potentially “game-changing” global moment to make real progress.  

This piece is also available in Spanish and French. 

       

La fuite des informations du cabinet juridique Mossack Fonseca dans l’affaire des « Panama Papers » a fait et fera la une des journaux pendant des semaines à fur et à mesure de la révélation de nouveaux noms des personnes impliquées. Le scandale a placé le Panama sur le devant de la scène et a donné un aperçu inédit du monde de l’argent caché et de l’évasion fiscale. Afin de mieux saisir le contexte général, il est important de faire la distinction entre la corruption légale, révélée par l’affaire des « Panama Papers » et la corruption illégale, exposée par le scandale Unaoil. Le moment est venu pour les gouvernements de prendre des mesures radicales contre l’une et l’autre.  

Les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et plusieurs autres pays annonceront leurs engagements pour lutter contre la corruption lors du sommet anticorruption le 12 mai, dont le Premier ministre David Cameron affirme qu’il changera la donne. La question est de savoir si ces engagements se traduiront par des mesures concrètes à l’égard des types de corruption les plus coûteux qui, aujourd’hui, se prolifèrent à l’échelle mondiale.  

Malheureusement, le monde s’engage souvent dans des  sommets, riches en communiqués, en appels à la coordination et à l’échange d’informations. Parfois, ces sommets mettent en place une initiative inefficace supplémentaire : donnant l’opportunité de créer et promouvoir des articles et photos qui servent les objectifs politiques précis de certains leaders politiques. Voyons si ce sommet sera diffèrent.

Au-delà du Panama

Le cabinet juridique Mossack Fonseca et son pays respectif, le Panama, ne sont que deux éléments dans le vaste et complexe ensemble de « facilitateurs » de la corruption et de l’évasion fiscale à l’échelle mondiale.     

Pour ceux qui sont à la recherche de refuges discrets et de sociétés-écrans, la puissante nation des États-Unis (qui sans surprise n’apparaît pas beaucoup dans les Panama Papers) est une des destinations les plus attrayantes du monde : par example, dans l’état du Delaware la loi requiert  moins de documents pour établir une société-écran que pour obtenir un permis de conduire. Comme on le voit dans l’illustration ci-dessous, c’est cette opacité, conjuguée à la taille du refuge qu’offrent les États-Unis, qui met le pays à la troisième place des juridictions les plus secrètes parmi une centaine évaluée par l’indice d’opacité financière (FSI). Le Panama est à la treizième place.

Illustration 1 : Indice d’opacité financière 2015 (Juridictions sélectionnées, d’après le réseau pour la justice fiscale)

Source : Indice d’opacité financière du Réseau pour la justice fiscalehttp://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/introduction/fsi-2015-results

Ce graphique présente les 40 juridictions les moins performantes ainsi que quatre juridictions choisies pour leurs meilleurs résultats (à droite des pointillés). L’indice présente un score de secret qualitatif basé sur une quinzaine d’indicateurs et une mesure quantitative de l’importance d’une juridiction dans les exportations de services financiers à l’échelle mondiale. 

Le Royaume-Uni est un important facilitateur de corruption : il n’a engagé aucune action contre ses juridictions et protectorats d’outre-mer qui servent de refuge aux richesses illicites, comme le démontrent clairement les  « Panama Papers ». Les Iles Vierges britanniques, par exemple, est le lieu préféré  de milliers de sociétés-écrans établies par Mossack Fonseca.  

Au-delà des refuges fiscaux 

L’affaire des « Panama Papers » ne concerne qu’indirectement les aspects essentiels de la question de la corruption mondiale, qui ne sont liés ni au Panama ni à la fiscalité. Nous devons envisager les scandales suscités sous un angle plus large et reconnaître les immenses et complexes réseaux de la corruption, qui lient de plus en plus les élites économiques et politiques mondiales.

La grande corruption

Les puissants individus qui s’engage dans la corruption à haut niveau, c’est-à-dire la corruption à large échelle ne sont pas inquiétés par l’affaire des « Panama Papers ». On trouve parmi ces individus des dirigeants kleptocrates ainsi que des oligarques qui exercent une influence majeure sur les affaires gouvernementales. Souvent, ces acteurs interagissent et s’associent, en formant des réseaux public-privé très puissants qui font passer pour un jeu d’enfant la définition traditionnelle de la corruption comme étant une transaction illégale entre deux parties.

Dans ces réseaux élitistes, la corruption excède largement le comportement immoral du fraudeur type, puisqu’elle utilise l’abus de pouvoir pour accumuler biens et pouvoir, souvent par le pillage direct des ressources publiques, la confiscation d’actifs ou la corruption à grande échelle. Le scandale à plusieurs milliards de dollars qui touche le géant pétrolier Petrobas au Brésil illustre la complexité de ces réseaux d’entente, et les moyens avec lesquels, la corruption à large échelle  peut provoquer des dégâts politiques et économiques d’ampleur historique dans un pays. 

Le secteur pétrolier offre de nombreux example de corruption à large échelle. Les dirigeants de la société Unaoil, dont un scandale similaire a récemment fait surface,  ont sans doute été soulagés par l’affaire des « Panama Papers » Unaoil est une société monégasque  « facilitatrice » de droit qui a versé des pots-de-vin et influencé des responsables gouvernementaux dans différents pays pour le compte de compagnies multinationales se disputant de juteux contrats d’approvisionnement. Bien qu’éclipsé par l’affaire du Panama, le cas d’Unaoil est aussi emblématique les enjeux inhérents à la lutte contre la corruption mondiale. Il illustre par exemple la pratique fortement enracinée des responsables gouvernementaux irakiens qui demandent des dessous de table en échange de l’attribution de contrats, ainsi que l’empressement des entreprises à verser ces pot-de-vin.

Les élites corrompues, notamment celles qui sont impliquées dans le scandale Unaoil, utilisent souvent des structures telles que les sociétés-écrans et les paradis fiscaux (et les investissements immobiliers ou autres) pour dissimuler leur biens mal-acquis. Toutefois, si l’affaire des Panama Papers incite à plus de vigilance sur les flux financiers illicites et engendre la réforme de ces structures financières opaques, la corruption à large échelle se poursuivra dans nombreux endroits.  Il est à noter que les retombées politiques se sont concentrées dans des pays relativement bien gouvernés, qui ont instauré des systèmes anticorruptions et de responsabilisation, comme en témoignent les démissions du Premier ministre islandais, du ministre de l’industrie espagnol et du dirigeant de la section chilienne de Transparency International. 

En revanche, le président Vladimir Poutine a balayé d’un revers de la main les fuites d’information sur la Russie, les considérant comme une conspiration occidentale contre sa personne. En Chine, le débat et la diffusion de ces informations ont été étouffés par la censure des médias ; en Azerbaïdjan, la révélation des détails concernant les intérêts miniers de la famille du président Aliyev ne menace guère sa mainmise sur le pouvoir. Il est à espérer que les réformes découlant de l’affaire du Panama dissuaderont les fraudeurs ainsi que les entreprises et les particuliers aux pratiques immorales de dissimuler leur argent bien mal acquis. Toutefois, les dirigeants corrompus continueront à bénéficier de l’impunité.

Corruption légale et captation de l’État   

Les Panama Papers ont mis en lumière le type de corruption qui est sans doute le plus dévastateur et le plus dure à contrecarrer : la corruption légale et la captation de l’État.  Partout dans le monde, de puissantes élites économiques et commerciales influencent indûment les lois et les politiques, en redessinant les règles du jeu pour leur propre bénéfice, un phénomène aussi connu sous le nom de « privatisation de la politique publique et des lois ». Une pratique qui génère des revenus exorbitants pour les élites, renforce leur pouvoir et exacerbe les disparités politiques et économiques d’un pays.

Les pays riches en ressources naturelles fournissent de nombreux exemples. En Angola, en République démocratique du Congo, au Nigéria et au Venezuela, par exemple, les élites politiques ont utilisé des sociétés publiques exploitant les ressources naturelles pour servir leur népotisme, souvent - mais pas uniquement - par des moyens légaux.

Dans beaucoup de pays industrialisés, le système fiscal est en lui-même un exemple de captation de l’État. Il est dans l’intérêt des élites de conserver un réseau mondial de sociétés offshore et de paradis fiscaux secrets pour pouvoir dissimuler leur patrimoine - qu’il ait été acquis légitimement ou non. Les preuves d’évasion fiscale aux États-Unis sont révélatrices : selon Zucman, depuis les années 1950, le taux réel de l’impôt sur les sociétés a été réduit de 45 à 15 pour cent, alors que le taux nominal est seulement passé de 50 à 35 pour cent. Et les sociétés américaines font un usage optimal des paradis fiscaux à l’étranger : d’après un nouveau rapport d’Oxfam, les 50 plus grandes multinationales américaines ont rapporté en 2008 que 43 pour cent de leurs revenus réalisés à l’étranger provenaient de cinq paradis fiscaux, représentant seulement 4 pour cent des effectifs étrangers de ces sociétés. En outre, Bourguignon rappelle que les taux d’imposition fédéraux des Américains les plus riches ont diminué de 15 pour cent entre 1970 et 2004.

Le risque de corruption légale aux États-Unis est important, l’argent privé pouvant très facilement influencer les affaires publiques. Suite à l’arrêt Citizen United rendu par la Cour suprême en 2010 [qui permet la participation financière des entreprises aux campagnes politiques], les fonds privés issus de poches bien garnies dirigent de plus en plus les campagnes électorales. Les moyens par lesquels l’argent privé influence les représentants publics pourraient encore se multiplier, si les formes de corruption traditionnellement considérées comme illégales devenaient légales. Selon une décision en instance de la Cour Suprême, il pourrait désormais être légal pour les responsables publics d’accepter les dons en nature des particuliers (ce qui pourrait annuler la condamnation d’un ancien gouverneur de l’État de Virginie accusé précisément de ce délit).  

Quelles mesures prendre ?     

En Bref, Il n’y a pas de solutions simple  et directe, d’autant plus que les décideurs tirent profit de ce statu quo.  Mais l’opportunité de réforme et la pression publique sont actuellement présentes. Comme nous l’avons évoqué, la question de la lutte contre la corruption entraîne souvent des mesures symboliques et l’annonce par David Cameron d’une nouvelle agence mondiale anticorruption pourrait très bien tomber dans cette catégorie. Les pays comme les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni devraient plutôt prendre des mesures concrètes pour réformer leurs propres pratiques et pousser leurs partenaires à faire de même, qu’il s’agisse des dépendances de la Couronne et des territoires britanniques d’outre-mer, de l’Union européenne et des membres du G20 ou des bénéficiaires d’une aide internationale.

Premièrement, il faudrait prendre la corruption légale et la captation de l’État au sérieux 

La transparence peut changer les règles du jeu, particulièrement si elle s’attaque aux réseaux d’influence par lesquels la politique se « privatise ». La divulgation des contributions financières aux campagnes électorales, des conflits d’intérêts, des avoirs détenus par les hommes politiques et les responsables publics (et de leurs avis d’impôts), des délibérations et votes parlementaires sont autant de moyens d’éviter les abus et de révéler les réseaux cachés qui sont à l’œuvre. La publication récente de la première salve de l’Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques (OCDE) est encourageante : son rapport « Le financement de la démocratie », s’attache à quelques études de cas. La suite logique serait d’habiliter l’organisation à développer des normes et mener des évaluations sur le financement politique de tous les pays de l’OCDE.

La transparence ne sera utile que si les citoyens peuvent mener un examen attentif de leurs gouvernements et dialoguer avec eux.  L’espace civique est en danger dans de nombreuses juridictions où les activistes et les journalistes sont la cible d’intimidations, de poursuites, voire pire. Garantir la liberté d’expression et de réunion devrait être l’affaire de tout acteur international concerné par la lutte contre la corruption ou la gouvernance économique. Par exemple, lors de l’examen des demandes de financement de gouvernements ayant un piètre bilan en matière de protection de la société civile - comme c’est le cas de l’Angola et de l’Azerbaïdjan - la Banque Mondiale et le Fonds Monétaire International, ainsi que les donateurs comme les États-Unis, devraient privilégier la responsabilisation citoyenne et des réformes de transparence plus ambitieuses.

En outre, la corruption à large échelle ne s’évincera pas en l’absence de poursuites ou d’autres sanctions efficaces contre ceux qui se laissent corrompre ou contre les facilitateurs et les intermédiaires de la corruption qu’ils soient avocats, comptables ou entremetteurs comme Unaoil. Bien sûr, les autorités chargées d’appliquer la loi doivent aussi rester vigilantes vis-à-vis des sociétés qui versent les pots-de-vin et à cet égard, les gouvernements - notamment les membres de l’OCDE instaurant, à des degrés divers, la Convention de l’OCDE sur la lutte contre la corruption - feraient bien d’imiter la mise en œuvre effective de la loi américaine sur la corruption dans les transactions à l’étranger (FCPA). Mais les individus corrompus et les facilitateurs n’ont pas été suffisamment surveillés et sanctionnés.

Deuxièmement, il faudrait se débarrasser des zones d’ombre.

Les leçons tirées des événements récents, de la crise financière de 2008 à l’affaire des Panama Papers, indiquent que les principaux acteurs internationaux ne devraient pas permettre que de vastes fractions de l’économie mondiale échappent à un examen attentif. Les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni (et ses territoires d’outre-mer) devraient répondre aux appels à mettre fin à l’opacité et aux paradis fiscaux.  Quelques premières tentatives  émergent, telle que la décision du gouvernement américain demandant aux banques de révéler l’identité des individus se cachant derrière les sociétés-écrans. Des mesures plus ambitieuses seront toutefois nécessaires, ceci comprend des dispositions législatives.  

La transparence sur la propriété réelle doit devenir une procédure opérationnelle standard, avec des États qui suivent l’exemple du Royaume-Uni, des Pays-Bas et d’autres pays qui ont établi des registres publics et soutiennent le projet d’un registre mondial. Quant aux pays riches en ressources naturelles, un bon point de départ serait d’établir des registres spécifiques au secteur. Cette pratique est maintenant imposée par l’Initiative pour la Transparence dans les Industries Extractives.

Au sein du secteur extractif, les gouvernements des pays d’accueil devraient soumettre les négociants de matières premières à des exigences de divulgation des paiements lorsqu’ils font affaire avec les gouvernements et les entreprises publiques. Les gouvernements de pays comme la Suisse, le Royaume-Uni et Singapour, qui abritent des acteurs du monde de l’entreprise, ont une lourde responsabilité, particulièrement dans le contexte actuel de faible prix des matières premières, où les négociants concluent de nouveaux contrats profitables avec des pays producteurs de ressources à court d’argent. Eclaircir telles zones d’ombre les rendra moins vulnérables aux abus.

Troisièmement, il faudrait donner la priorité à la transparence et au contrôle lors de l’allocation de ressources publiques.

Lorsqu’un gouvernement attribue des ressources pour l’exploitation, il doit le faire de façon tout à fait transparente. L’initiative Open Contracting Partnership a fait de grandes avancées dans la définition d’une norme de référence pour de telles informations, notamment en matière d’orientation sur les questions de l’ouverture des données, des identificateurs des sociétés et de la propriété réelle.

Les recherches sur la corruption dans les secteurs pétrolier et minier menées par le Natural Resource Governance Institute montrent que de multiples allocations à forte valeur nécessitent un examen attentif et une divulgation du contrat. Elles comprennent l’attribution des permis d’exploration et de production, mais aussi des droits d’exportation, d’importation ou de transport, qui ont été associés à la corruption dans des pays comme l’Indonésie, la République du Congo et l’Ukraine. La plupart des affaires liées au secteur pétrolier et portées devant les tribunaux dans le cadre de la FPCA aux États-Unis ont surgi à l’occasion de l’attribution de marchés de service, un segment de l’industrie pétrolière qui concernait également les scandales Unaoil et Petrobras. La transparence devrait être le « paramètre par défaut » de toute transaction allouant des ressources publiques. Il est nécessaire d’exercer un contrôle supplémentaire des régimes de taux de change mis en œuvre et abusifs, qui génèrent des revenus pour quelques-uns et engendrent des disparités économiques majeures, comme c’est le cas actuellement au Nigeria, au Venezuela et en Égypte.

Pour espérer un impact réel, il faudra aussi s’attaquer frontalement au principe d’impunité, puisque la transparence et la liberté d’expression sont certes nécessaires, mais insuffisantes.  Et les Etats, y compris les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni, devront adopter des réformes pour lutter contre la corruption légale et l’opacité sous toutes ses formes, que ce soit en s’attaquant à la mainmise de l’argent en politique ou aux « zones d’ombre » entourant les négociants pétroliers installés à Genève et Londres. 

Un engagement ambitieux à lutter contre la corruption et l’impunité n’est pas seulement une nécessité actuelle, mais aussi une revendication de nos sociétés, comme l’ont montré les événements au Brésil et ailleurs. Ce pourrait être le moment décisif de faire de réelles avancées à l’échelle mondiale.  

This piece is also available in English and Spanish. 

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

America is becoming a more class-stratified society, contrary to the nation’s self-image as a socially dynamic meritocracy. In particular, the barriers are hardening between the upper middle class and the majority below them. As New York Times contributor Tom Edsall writes (“How the Other Fifth Lives"), “The self-segregation of a privileged fifth of the population is…creating a self-perpetuating class at the top, which is ever more difficult to break into.”

This separation of the upper middle class by income, wealth, occupation and neighborhood has created a social distance between those of us who have been prospering in recent decades, and those who are feeling left behind, angry and resentful, and more like to vote for To-Hell-With-Them-All populist politicians. As I told Charles Homans, also writing on class for the Times, “The upper middle class are surprised by the rise of Trump. The actual middle class is surprised we’re surprised.”

Edsall cited my earlier essay, “The Dangerous Separation of the American Upper Middle Class,” and quoted me as follows:

“The top fifth have been prospering while the majority lags behind. But the separation is not just economic. Gaps are growing on a whole range of dimensions, including family structure, education, lifestyle, and geography. Indeed, these dimensions of advantage appear to be clustering more tightly together, each thereby amplifying the effect of the other.”

Multidimensional affluence

Just as certain disadvantages can cluster together, creating multidimensional poverty, so advantages may cluster together, resulting in multidimensional advantage. Is there more clustering of advantages at the top of American society? Yes.

The top fifth of households by income obviously have more money than the 80 percent below them. What about other advantages? Let’s take just three: marriage, employment and education. (See Sean Reardon and Kendra Bischoff’s paper on the geographical segregation of affluence). You would expect people in top-quintile households to be more likely to have a graduate or professional degree; to have two earners in the family; and perhaps also to be married. You would be right.

The difference in the proportion of the top fifth with each of these other advantages compared to the bottom four-fifths is around 20 percentage points (we restrict our analysis to those aged 40-50). For example, in 1979 a forty-something year-old in the top income quintile was about 6 percentage points more likely to be married that one in the bottom 80 percent. Now the gap is 17 percentage points.

This is hardly surprising. More education and more earners in the home will increase the chances that you make it into the top quintile for your age cohort. But it is noteworthy that the extent to which these different dimensions of advantage overlap has been steadily increasing over time. Along with the increased association between top-quintile income and marriage, the differentials for graduate education and two-earner status have each increased by around 10 percentage points between 1979 and 2014.

How to inherit upper middle class status: Marriages and master’s degrees

Particularly striking is the increase in the “marriage gap” between the upper middle class and the rest. This is an important factor in the transmission of class status to the next generation, since married couples are more likely to stay together, and stable families predict better outcomes for children.

Similarly, the adults with high levels of education are likely to raise children who end up towards the top of the educational distribution. In fact, the intergenerational persistence of education is even greater than of income, as some of our earlier work shows (“The Inheritance of Education”). Almost half (46 percent) the children of parents in the top education quintile end up in the top education quintile themselves. Three in four (76 percent) stayed in one of the top two education quintiles.

Class gaps

F. Scott Fitzgerald famously said: "Let me tell you about the very rich. They are different from you and me.” Ernest Hemingway’s later response was: “Yes, they have more money.” Today what separates the rich from the rest is not just money, but family life, education, zip code, and so on. This is a point made by a number of scholars, including recently both Robert Putnam in Our Kids and Charles Murray in Coming Apart. Our empirical analysis confirms that different kinds of advantage are increasingly overlapping with each other.

The framing of inequality in terms of social class used to feel distinctly un-American. No longer.

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Editor’s note: This piece originally appeared in Real Clear Markets.

      

       

       

       

       

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Unprecedented armed conflicts and natural disasters are now driving a global displacement crisis. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, more than 60 million people are displaced worldwide, and half of them are children. These displaced children are hindered from developing cognitive and social-emotional skills—such as perseverance, emotional regulation, and conflict resolution—which are essential for school readiness and serve as the foundation for a more peaceful and stable future. However, through the development and testing of innovative educational strategies, we can build effective practices for improving young children’s learning and developmental outcomes in crisis contexts.

On June 8, the Center for Universal Education at Brookings and Sesame Workshop co-hosted a panel discussion to explore innovative strategies to meet the needs of young children in humanitarian crises. 

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President Obama’s emphasis on “smart power” diplomacy has thrust the need for international volunteer service into the global spotlight. On June 23, Global Economy and Development at Brookings and Washington University’s Center for Social Development (CSD) will host a forum examining how international volunteer service can address multiple global challenges simultaneously and build international cooperation. The forum will frame international service as an effective tool for increasing international social capital as well as building sustainable cross-cultural bridges.

This event begins with an address by service champion, Ambassador Elizabeth Frawley Bagley, who leads the Department of State’s Global Partnerships Initiative. Bagley is well poised to foster innovative public-private partnerships, an approach she describes as “Ubuntu Diplomacy: where all sectors belong as partners, where we all participate as stakeholders, and where we all succeed together, not incrementally but exponentially.” The need for multilateral approaches to development has been analyzed by Brookings scholars Jane Nelson and Noam Unger, who explore how the U.S. foreign assistance system works in the new market-oriented and locally-driven global development arena.

This spirit of cross-sector collaboration will carry the June 23^rd forum, beginning with a research panel releasing beneficiary outcome data from a Peace Corps survey completed with over 800 host country nationals, including community members, direct beneficiaries, and collaborators. Peace Corps colleagues, Dr. Susan Jenkins and Janet Kerley, will present preliminary findings from this multi-year study measuring the achievement of “helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women” and “promoting a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served”. Aggregate data about respondents’ views of Americans before and after their interaction with the Peace Corps will be discussed.

This work complements the release of new data on the impact of international service on volunteers, which is supported with funding from the Ford Foundation and a joint Brookings-Washington University academic venture capital fund. Washington University’s CSD has studied international service over the last decade. The current research, first in a series from the quasi-experimental study, compares international volunteers’ perceived outcomes to a matched group who did not volunteer internationally: volunteers are more likely to report increased international awareness, international social capital, and international career intentions.

Building on the demonstrated potential of international service, policymakers and sector leaders will then discuss options for enhancing international service, and provide recommendations for bringing international service to the forefront of American foreign policy initiatives. This policy plenary will introduce and discuss the Service World policy platform: a collaborative movement led by the Building Bridges Coalition, National Peace Corps Association and the International Volunteering Initiative at Brookings. This powerhouse of sector leaders aims to scale international service to the levels of domestic volunteer service with increased impact through smart power policy proposals. What Service Nation did to unite Americans around domestic service as a core ideal and problem-solving strategy in American society, Service World hopes to do on a global scale.

Next week in New York City, the Points of Light Institute and the Corporation for National and Community Service will convene to further spotlight the Service World Platform at the 2010 National Conference on Volunteering and Service. This event will bring together more than 5,000 volunteer service leaders and social entrepreneurs from around the world, including local host Mayor Bloomberg. Michelle Nunn, CEO of Points of Light Institute noted in Huffington Post that “demand, idealism and presidential impact are leading American volunteerism to its…most important stage – the movement of service to a central role in our nation’s priorities.”

Nunn’s statement illustrates the momentum and power that make the voluntary sector a unique instrument in the “smart power” toolbox. According to successive polling from Terror Free Tomorrow, American assistance, particularly medical service, is a leading factor in favorable opinions toward the United States. A 2006 survey conducted in Indonesia and Bangladesh showed a 63 percent favorable response among Indonesian respondents to the humanitarian medical mission of “Mercy,” a United States’ Navel Ship, and a 95 percent favorable response among Bangladeshi respondents.

Personifying the diplomatic potential of medical service abroad is Edward O’Neil’s work with OmniMed. In the Mukono District of Uganda, OmniMed has partnered with the U.S. Peace Corps and the Ugandan Ministry of Health as well as local community-based organizations to implement evidence-based health trainings with local village health workers. Dr. O’Neil is now working with Brookings International Volunteering Initiative and Washington University’s CSD on a new wave of rigorous research: a randomized, prospective clinical trial measuring the direct impact of over 400 trained village health workers on the health of tens of thousands of villagers. 

In the words of Peace Corps architect and former U.S. Senator Harris Wofford, the pairing of new data and policy proposals on June 23^rd will support a “quantum leap” in the scale and impact of international service, advancing bipartisan calls to service from President Kennedy to Bush 41, Bush 43, Clinton and Obama.