3

Policeman's murder won't deter fight against crime says Superintendent Nicholson

A police sergeant who was shot and injured at his home in Portmore, St Catherine, on Thursday night succumbed to his injuries on Monday morning.




3

Haiti's main airport and capital frozen after a day of violence

PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti (AP) — Haiti's main airport remained closed on Tuesday, a day after violence erupted as the country swore in its new prime minister in a politically tumultuous transition.




3

The structure of a family 110 glycoside hydrolase provides insight into the hydrolysis of {alpha}-1,3-galactosidic linkages in {lambda}-carrageenan and blood group antigens [Enzymology]

α-Linked galactose is a common carbohydrate motif in nature that is processed by a variety of glycoside hydrolases from different families. Terminal Galα1–3Gal motifs are found as a defining feature of different blood group and tissue antigens, as well as the building block of the marine algal galactan λ-carrageenan. The blood group B antigen and linear α-Gal epitope can be processed by glycoside hydrolases in family GH110, whereas the presence of genes encoding GH110 enzymes in polysaccharide utilization loci from marine bacteria suggests a role in processing λ-carrageenan. However, the structure–function relationships underpinning the α-1,3-galactosidase activity within family GH110 remain unknown. Here we focus on a GH110 enzyme (PdGH110B) from the carrageenolytic marine bacterium Pseudoalteromonas distincta U2A. We showed that the enzyme was active on Galα1–3Gal but not the blood group B antigen. X-ray crystal structures in complex with galactose and unhydrolyzed Galα1–3Gal revealed the parallel β-helix fold of the enzyme and the structural basis of its inverting catalytic mechanism. Moreover, an examination of the active site reveals likely adaptations that allow accommodation of fucose in blood group B active GH110 enzymes or, in the case of PdGH110, accommodation of the sulfate groups found on λ-carrageenan. Overall, this work provides insight into the first member of a predominantly marine clade of GH110 enzymes while also illuminating the structural basis of α-1,3-galactoside processing by the family as a whole.




3

{alpha}2-Macroglobulin-like protein 1 can conȷugate and inhibit proteases through their hydroxyl groups, because of an enhanced reactivity of its thiol ester [Protein Structure and Folding]

Proteins in the α-macroglobulin (αM) superfamily use thiol esters to form covalent conjugation products upon their proteolytic activation. αM protease inhibitors use theirs to conjugate proteases and preferentially react with primary amines (e.g. on lysine side chains), whereas those of αM complement components C3 and C4B have an increased hydroxyl reactivity that is conveyed by a conserved histidine residue and allows conjugation to cell surface glycans. Human α2-macroglobulin–like protein 1 (A2ML1) is a monomeric protease inhibitor but has the hydroxyl reactivity–conveying histidine residue. Here, we have investigated the role of hydroxyl reactivity in a protease inhibitor by comparing recombinant WT A2ML1 and the A2ML1 H1084N mutant in which this histidine is removed. Both of A2ML1s' thiol esters were reactive toward the amine substrate glycine, but only WT A2ML1 reacted with the hydroxyl substrate glycerol, demonstrating that His-1084 increases the hydroxyl reactivity of A2ML1's thiol ester. Although both A2ML1s conjugated and inhibited thermolysin, His-1084 was required for the conjugation and inhibition of acetylated thermolysin, which lacks primary amines. Using MS, we identified an ester bond formed between a thermolysin serine residue and the A2ML1 thiol ester. These results demonstrate that a histidine-enhanced hydroxyl reactivity can contribute to protease inhibition by an αM protein. His-1084 did not improve A2ML1's protease inhibition at pH 5, indicating that A2ML1's hydroxyl reactivity is not an adaption to its acidic epidermal environment.




3

The cation diffusion facilitator protein MamM's cytoplasmic domain exhibits metal-type dependent binding modes and discriminates against Mn2+ [Molecular Biophysics]

Cation diffusion facilitator (CDF) proteins are a conserved family of divalent transition metal cation transporters. CDF proteins are usually composed of two domains: the transmembrane domain, in which the metal cations are transported through, and a regulatory cytoplasmic C-terminal domain (CTD). Each CDF protein transports either one specific metal or multiple metals from the cytoplasm, and it is not known whether the CTD takes an active regulatory role in metal recognition and discrimination during cation transport. Here, the model CDF protein MamM, an iron transporter from magnetotactic bacteria, was used to probe the role of the CTD in metal recognition and selectivity. Using a combination of biophysical and structural approaches, the binding of different metals to MamM CTD was characterized. Results reveal that different metals bind distinctively to MamM CTD in terms of their binding sites, thermodynamics, and binding-dependent conformations, both in crystal form and in solution, which suggests a varying level of functional discrimination between CDF domains. Furthermore, these results provide the first direct evidence that CDF CTDs play a role in metal selectivity. We demonstrate that MamM's CTD can discriminate against Mn2+, supporting its postulated role in preventing magnetite formation poisoning in magnetotactic bacteria via Mn2+ incorporation.




3

Polydisperse molecular architecture of connexin 26/30 heteromeric hemichannels revealed by atomic force microscopy imaging [Protein Structure and Folding]

Connexin (Cx) protein forms hemichannels and gap junctional channels, which play diverse and profound roles in human physiology and diseases. Gap junctions are arrays of intercellular channels formed by the docking of two hemichannels from adjacent cells. Each hexameric hemichannel contains the same or different Cx isoform. Although homomeric Cxs forms have been largely described functionally and structurally, the stoichiometry and arrangement of heteromeric Cx channels remain unknown. The latter, however, are widely expressed in human tissues and variation might have important implications on channel function. Investigating properties of heteromeric Cx channels is challenging considering the high number of potential subunit arrangements and stoichiometries, even when only combining two Cx isoforms. To tackle this problem, we engineered an HA tag onto Cx26 or Cx30 subunits and imaged hemichannels that were liganded by Fab-epitope antibody fragments via atomic force microscopy. For Cx26-HA/Cx30 or Cx30-HA/Cx26 heteromeric channels, the Fab-HA binding distribution was binomial with a maximum of three Fab-HA bound. Furthermore, imaged Cx26/Cx30-HA triple liganded by Fab-HA showed multiple arrangements that can be derived from the law of total probabilities. Atomic force microscopy imaging of ringlike structures of Cx26/Cx30-HA hemichannels confirmed these findings and also detected a polydisperse distribution of stoichiometries. Our results indicate a dominant subunit stoichiometry of 3Cx26:3Cx30 with the most abundant subunit arrangement of Cx26-Cx26-Cx30-Cx26-Cx30-Cx30. To our knowledge, this is the first time that the molecular architecture of heteromeric Cx channels has been revealed, thus providing the basis to explore the functional effect of these channels in biology.




3

Identification and biochemical characterization of Asp t 36, a new fungal allergen from Aspergillus terreus [Protein Structure and Folding]

Aspergillus terreus is an allergenic fungus, in addition to causing infections in both humans and plants. However, the allergens in this fungus are still unknown, limiting the development of diagnostic and therapeutic strategies. We used a proteomic approach to search for allergens, identifying 16 allergens based on two-dimensional immunoblotting with A. terreus susceptible patient sera. We further characterized triose-phosphate isomerase (Asp t 36), one of the dominant IgE (IgE)-reactive proteins. The gene was cloned and expressed in Escherichia coli. Phylogenetic analysis showed Asp t 36 to be highly conserved with close similarity to the triose-phosphate isomerase protein sequence from Dermatophagoides farinae, an allergenic dust mite. We identified four immunodominant epitopes using synthetic peptides, and mapped them on a homology-based model of the tertiary structure of Asp t 36. Among these, two were found to create a continuous surface patch on the 3D structure, rendering it an IgE-binding hotspot. Biophysical analysis indicated that Asp t 36 shows similar secondary structure content and temperature sensitivity with other reported triose-phosphate isomerase allergens. In vivo studies using a murine model displayed that the recombinant Asp t 36 was able to stimulate airway inflammation, as demonstrated by an influx of eosinophils, goblet cell hyperplasia, elevated serum Igs, and induction of Th2 cytokines. Collectively, our results reveal the immunogenic property of Asp t 36, a major allergen from A. terreus, and define a new fungal allergen more broadly. This allergen could serve as a potent candidate for investigating component resolved diagnosis and immunotherapy.




3

Unique active-site and subsite features in the arabinogalactan-degrading GH43 exo-{beta}-1,3-galactanase from Phanerochaete chrysosporium [Enzymology]

Arabinogalactan proteins (AGPs) are plant proteoglycans with functions in growth and development. However, these functions are largely unexplored, mainly because of the complexity of the sugar moieties. These carbohydrate sequences are generally analyzed with the aid of glycoside hydrolases. The exo-β-1,3-galactanase is a glycoside hydrolase from the basidiomycete Phanerochaete chrysosporium (Pc1,3Gal43A), which specifically cleaves AGPs. However, its structure is not known in relation to its mechanism bypassing side chains. In this study, we solved the apo and liganded structures of Pc1,3Gal43A, which reveal a glycoside hydrolase family 43 subfamily 24 (GH43_sub24) catalytic domain together with a carbohydrate-binding module family 35 (CBM35) binding domain. GH43_sub24 is known to lack the catalytic base Asp conserved among other GH43 subfamilies. Our structure in combination with kinetic analyses reveals that the tautomerized imidic acid group of Gln263 serves as the catalytic base residue instead. Pc1,3Gal43A has three subsites that continue from the bottom of the catalytic pocket to the solvent. Subsite −1 contains a space that can accommodate the C-6 methylol of Gal, enabling the enzyme to bypass the β-1,6–linked galactan side chains of AGPs. Furthermore, the galactan-binding domain in CBM35 has a different ligand interaction mechanism from other sugar-binding CBM35s, including those that bind galactomannan. Specifically, we noted a Gly → Trp substitution, which affects pyranose stacking, and an Asp → Asn substitution in the binding pocket, which recognizes β-linked rather than α-linked Gal residues. These findings should facilitate further structural analysis of AGPs and may also be helpful in engineering designer enzymes for efficient biomass utilization.




3

A highly potent CD73 biparatopic antibody blocks organization of the enzyme active site through dual mechanisms [Methods and Resources]

The dimeric ectonucleotidase CD73 catalyzes the hydrolysis of AMP at the cell surface to form adenosine, a potent suppressor of the immune response. Blocking CD73 activity in the tumor microenvironment can have a beneficial effect on tumor eradication and is a promising approach for cancer therapy. Biparatopic antibodies binding different regions of CD73 may be a means to antagonize its enzymatic activity. A panel of biparatopic antibodies representing the pairwise combination of 11 parental monoclonal antibodies against CD73 was generated by Fab-arm exchange. Nine variants vastly exceeded the potency of their parental antibodies with ≥90% inhibition of activity and subnanomolar EC50 values. Pairing the Fabs of parents with nonoverlapping epitopes was both sufficient and necessary whereas monovalent antibodies were poor inhibitors. Some parental antibodies yielded potent biparatopics with multiple partners, one of which (TB19) producing the most potent. The structure of the TB19 Fab with CD73 reveals that it blocks alignment of the N- and C-terminal CD73 domains necessary for catalysis. A separate structure of CD73 with a Fab (TB38) which complements TB19 in a particularly potent biparatopic shows its binding to a nonoverlapping site on the CD73 N-terminal domain. Structural modeling demonstrates a TB19/TB38 biparatopic antibody would be unable to bind the CD73 dimer in a bivalent manner, implicating crosslinking of separate CD73 dimers in its mechanism of action. This ability of a biparatopic antibody to both crosslink CD73 dimers and fix them in an inactive conformation thus represents a highly effective mechanism for the inhibition of CD73 activity.




3

MMP activation-associated aminopeptidase N reveals a bivalent 14-3-3 binding motif [Protein Structure and Folding]

Aminopeptidase N (APN, CD13) is a transmembrane ectopeptidase involved in many crucial cellular functions. Besides its role as a peptidase, APN also mediates signal transduction and is involved in the activation of matrix metalloproteinases (MMPs). MMPs function in tissue remodeling within the extracellular space and are therefore involved in many human diseases, such as fibrosis, rheumatoid arthritis, tumor angiogenesis, and metastasis, as well as viral infections. However, the exact mechanism that leads to APN-driven MMP activation is unclear. It was previously shown that extracellular 14-3-3 adapter proteins bind to APN and thereby induce the transcription of MMPs. As a first step, we sought to identify potential 14-3-3–binding sites in the APN sequence. We constructed a set of phosphorylated peptides derived from APN to probe for interactions. We identified and characterized a canonical 14-3-3–binding site (site 1) within the flexible, structurally unresolved N-terminal APN region using direct binding fluorescence polarization assays and thermodynamic analysis. In addition, we identified a secondary, noncanonical binding site (site 2), which enhances the binding affinity in combination with site 1 by many orders of magnitude. Finally, we solved crystal structures of 14-3-3σ bound to mono- and bis-phosphorylated APN-derived peptides, which revealed atomic details of the binding mode of mono- and bivalent 14-3-3 interactions. Therefore, our findings shed some light on the first steps of APN-mediated MMP activation and open the field for further investigation of this important signaling pathway.




3

COVID-19: The Hidden Majority in India's Migration Crisis

13 July 2020

Dr Champa Patel

Director, Asia-Pacific Programme
While the social and economic costs of coronavirus lockdowns, travel bans and social distancing initially focused on international migrants, there has been increasing attention paid to the plight of internal migrants.

2020-07-13-India-Farming-Migration

Migrant workers plant paddy in a field at Jhandi village in Patiala, India. Photo by Bharat Bhushan/Hindustan Times via Getty Images.

The World Bank estimates that the magnitude of internal migration is about two‐and‐a‐half times that of international migration. Within India, an estimated 40 million internal migrant workers, largely in the informal economy, were severely impacted by the government’s COVID-19 lockdown.

With transportation systems initially shut down, many had no recourse to travel options back to homes and villages, resulting in harrowing journeys home. Those who were able to make it home found, in some instances, villages refusing entry because of fears of transmission.

The shocking images of migrants forced to walk in desperation showed the enormity of the crisis as well as some of the challenges posed by an extended lockdown in India where so many people live hand to mouth and cannot afford not to work.

Migrant workers and the informal economy

The complete failure of the government to anticipate the needs of this group, and the subsequent distress caused, has made visible a large workforce who experience precarity of work and often live hand to mouth.

One key challenge is the lack of robust data on the scale of internal migration. While estimates abound, there is no proper data collection system in place to accurately record temporary, seasonal and circular migration patterns. However, it is estimated that more than 90% of working people in India are engaged in the informal economy, with states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar accounting for more than 80% of workers in this sector.

A recent government labour force survey estimated that more than 71% of people with a regular salary working in non-agricultural industries had no written job contract. Nearly half of workers are not eligible for social security benefits.

Daily-wage workers are particularly vulnerable, with limited or no access to social security and most living in poverty. Living hand to mouth, their loss of livelihoods has led to a lack of money to pay rents or pay for food. Women are impacted whether because of their gender, responsibilities as caregivers, or as members of disadvantaged castes and communities.

COVID-19 has massively impacted this group of workers. Stranded Workers Action Network found that 50% of workers had rations left for less than one day; 74% had less than half their daily wages remaining to survive for the rest of the lockdown period; and 89% had not been paid by their employers at all during the lockdown.

According to Supreme Court proceedings, relief camps are housing some 660,000 workers; some 2.2 million people also rely on emergency food supplies. Job losses, and home and food insecurity have left this group highly vulnerable.

In March 2020, in response to COVID-19, the Indian government instituted the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Package (PMGKB), a $22.6 billion relief package. The World Bank announced $1 billion funding to accelerate social protection support, in part through the PMGKB.

This support would work alongside pre-existing initiatives such as the Public Distribution System (PDS), which covers 800 million people, and Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT). This cash injection could help address one of the key challenges facing India’s piecemeal and uneven social protection programmes – inadequate funding. India’s spending on public social protection excluding health is just 1.3% of the GDP.

However, there are still other challenges to overcome. One is how to ensure coordination and coverage within, and across, differing states. The second is how to transition multiple schemes into one integrated system that can be accessed anywhere within the country, particularly important when many workers are on the move. There is an urgent need for a comprehensive system, which is adaptive and flexible to needs and provides adequate social and income support.

Another coverage issue relates to the use of direct cash transfers (DCTs) to support people impacted by the loss of livelihoods, where funds are deposited within bank accounts. Such measures fail to consider the significant numbers of people who do not have access to banks and will not be able to access this support.

Wider impact on livelihoods and remittances

​There is a risk, with extended lockdown and risks of further waves of infection, that labour shortages could negatively impact the economy. There is a wider need to support re-entry back into the workforce and support livelihoods. National Survey Sample data shows that between 2007 and 2008, internal remittances amounted to US$10 billion. These domestic transfers financed over 30% of all household consumption in remittance-receiving households.

But future migration for work is likely to be severely impacted. As restrictions begin to ease, employers and businesses cannot necessarily rely on cheap available labour. Having faced destitution and hardship, many may wish to stay closer to families and local support networks.

As Irudaya Rajan notes in The New Humanitarian, it is likely ‘there will be a reduction in long-distance migration in India after this’, as many migrants will be wary of being stranded again. This would be hugely detrimental to stimulating the economy as reverse migration could push down wages and subsequently demand.

Another issue may be returning migrant workers, who have been working overseas, over half of whom work in the Gulf. It is unclear if, or when, migrants will be able to return to work, with the World Bank estimating that remittances from this group could fall by about 23%.

However, what is striking has been India’s support for this group - the Vande Bharat Mission has deployed flights and naval ships to help return migrant workers, especially vulnerable groups - in marked contrast to the lack of preparation and care for internal migrants.

One factor for this may be the volume of remittances these migrant workers bring to the Indian economy, but it overlooks the contribution of internal remittances, on which there is far less robust data.

But the current challenges can also be an opportunity. The scale of the migrant crisis has made visible an often-overlooked population of workers. With political will, and investment at federal and state levels, this could be an opportunity to transform livelihoods.

As thoughts will turn to how to stimulate economies and get people back to work, it is imperative that those in authority turn their minds to how to create a more just society, that invests in healthcare, and has a social protection system that supports the most vulnerable in society.

Migrants are not just objects of charity that need support. Internal migrants are key income generators that play a vital role in Indian society and should never be overlooked again.

This article was originally published in Routed Magazine.




3

International Donors Can End Lebanon's Corruption

10 August 2020

Dr Lina Khatib

Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme
Change must come from within Lebanon, but Emmanuel Macron and others can help by ending their patronage of a disastrous regime.

2020-08-10-Lebanon-Beirut-Corruption-Protest

An anti-government protester in Beirut puts up a poster accusing corruption in Lebanon's state judiciary. Photo by Sam Tarling/Getty Images.

In the aftermath of the devastating Beirut port explosion last week, it is not just the role of the Lebanese political class that has come under scrutiny, but that of their international peers too.

Sunday’s international donor conference led by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, raised €253m (£228m) in relief funds, but it also signalled an important change in rhetoric. For the first time, donors affirmed that relief funds would directly go to the Lebanese people, and that longer-term economic assistance would be dependent on Lebanon implementing structural reforms.

This affirmation came hot on the heels of growing international attention on rampant corruption among Lebanon’s ruling political class, which is widely blamed for the port explosion. It sends the message to Lebanon’s rulers that, while their country desperately needs foreign assistance to stand on its feet, no one can help Lebanon if it does not also help itself.

But the communique issued following the conference glossed over the international community’s own role in sustaining Lebanon’s corrupt political class over a period of decades. At the aid conference, Macron said that Lebanon’s future is at stake. What donors need to recognise is that this future is a shared responsibility for them and Lebanon’s leaders alike.

With Lebanon’s debt greater than 170% of its GDP, and with the port explosion costing an estimated $15bn of damage, Lebanon needs foreign assistance to prevent it becoming a failed state. But what it needs even more desperately are reforms that would counter the corruption and lack of accountability that led it to this sorry state of affairs in the first place.

It is Lebanon’s existing political system – a power-sharing pact between different sects rather than a system of governance on the basis of competence – that facilitates its leaders’ reckless behaviour.

The international community is partly responsible for sustaining this system through cascading patronage. For decades, Lebanese leaders grew accustomed to neglecting the national interest and eventually being bailed out by international assistance. Dollar deposits would land in the central bank from Gulf donors, loans would be offered by European countries and foreign aid packages would flow to Lebanese state institutions – only for the majority of this money to end up lining the pockets of the country’s rulers, who frequently overcame their political differences to share state resources between them. The Lebanese state came to exist as a shell in the eyes of its citizens.

Lebanon’s rulers benefited from citizens’ low expectations from the state and the lack of measures ensuring transparency and accountability in the country. They brokered a social contract that cast the leaders as patrons and the people as clients rather than citizens. Foreign powers were well aware of this dynamic but they often turned a blind eye to it, and even nurtured it, because they believed the Lebanese political system brought stability and predictability following the tumultuous civil war.

With time the leaders’ greed grew, and with that the economic situation worsened. Leaders who behaved as de facto local authorities, granting constituents civil service jobs or minor privileges, provided them less and less. There was some international recognition that this dynamic was becoming unsustainable – international donors pledged $11bn during the CEDRE conference of 2018 on condition that Lebanon implemented structural reforms.

And in the wake of Lebanon’s recent economic deterioration, the International Monetary Fund said in April that any discussion of a loan to Lebanon would be subject to more reforms. On both occasions, Lebanon’s rulers ignored the calls for reform, counting on foreign support eventually coming in unconditionally as it used to in the past. International donor follow-up was sluggish.

The port explosion needs to be a wake-up call for any international entity seeking a stable Lebanon. The blast is ultimately the result of the decades during which political classes in Lebanon and outside it fostered the country’s dysfunctional political system. No long-term assistance should flow into Lebanon without strong conditions on transparency and accountability in how this assistance would be employed.

Foreign support is not the problem per se, but rather when it is handed on a plate unconditionally, maintaining the patronage cascade, exacerbating the weakness of state institutions, and further impoverishing Lebanese citizens.

With Lebanon’s economy almost crumbling in the aftermath of the explosion, there is an opportunity for the international community to exert leverage over Lebanese leaders – whose personal wealth grew partially from legal and illegal transactions through the devastated port – so that necessary reforms are implemented. Such leverage would not remove Lebanon’s defective political system, but would pressure its leaders to accept at least some basic reforms.

But for Lebanon to really turn a new page, it needs a new social contract and a new political system based on fairness, transparency and accountability. This is a change that can only start from within Lebanon, but it also depends on the international community abandoning their tacit support of a disastrous political status quo.

This article was originally published in The Guardian.




3

E3 Cooperation Beyond Brexit: Challenging but Necessary

2 September 2020

Alice Billon-Galland

Research Associate, Europe Programme

Professor Richard G Whitman

Associate Fellow, Europe Programme
In the current uncertain strategic context for Europe, the E3 is establishing itself as a go-to format for diplomatic cooperation for Europe’s ‘big three’.

2020-09-02-e3-billon-galland-whitman.jpg

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson (R), French President Emmanuel Macron (C) and German Chancellor Angela Merkel (L) speak upon their arrival for a round table meeting as part of an EU summit in Brussels on 17 October 2019. Photo by Olivier Matthys/Pool/AFP via Getty Images.

As the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy takes shape, it is increasingly clear that joint cooperation with France and Germany will be of key importance. The current dispute with the US over imposing further sanctions on Iran shows that the UK values continuing strong cooperation with its European partners on key international issues, even at the cost of a major transatlantic dispute. Moreover, the recent first meeting of the German, French and British defence ministers in an E3 (European/EU 3) format signalled political commitment by all three partners to double down on joint diplomatic cooperation despite troubled UK-EU Brexit negotiations.

The UK working with France and Germany as part of the E3 has evolved in recent years from a shared approach to diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme to include a broader range of international security issues, such as the conflict in Syria and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. E3 cooperation has so far been largely low-key, marked by close relationships and daily contacts between officials rather than high-profile summits between the leaders of the three countries. In the absence of any EU-UK negotiations on a future foreign, security and defence policy relationship, the E3 represents a key arrangement for aligning and mobilizing Europe’s ‘big three’ states. In a recent Chatham House research paper, we argue that Germany, France and the UK could and should maintain the E3 as a platform for flexible diplomatic coordination and crisis response, and expand its focus to address a new set of thematic, regional or multilateral topics. These could range from further cooperation on arms control to a reform agenda for multilateral institutions or a joint approach to the broader European neighbourhood.

The E3 countries have complementary reasons for wanting to make the format work. France and Germany recognize that the high degree of shared foreign and security policy interests with the UK require a pragmatic format for close cooperation, to provide insurance against an underdeveloped EU-UK relationship, help efficiently combine European forces and bring added value to the EU and NATO – but also to see the UK aligned with Europe on major international issues. Close foreign and security policy relationships with France and Germany will remain of interest to the UK as well, in order for it to keep playing an effective role in European security and to work with like-minded partners on key international issues.

Brexit presents both a major challenge for the E3 relationship and a major rationale for developing the format further. Neither France nor Germany see E3 cooperation as a substitute for a deal on a future EU-UK relationship or for the development of the EU’s own foreign, security and defence policy. Failure to reach a Brexit deal and a collapse of the EU-UK relationship into hostility and antagonism could make E3 cooperation politically difficult in the short term. In the longer term, were the UK and the EU to adopt very different foreign and security policies, E3 cooperation would also make less sense.

Even if an agreement is reached on the future EU-UK relationship by the end of this year, for France and Germany the challenge will be to reconcile their work with the UK through the E3 with their commitment to the EU. France and Germany have different rationales for favouring E3 cooperation. While France is more relaxed about its intergovernmental approach and prioritizes deliverables, Germany is worried about the perceived competition between the E3 and the EU. However, they both share the view that E3 cooperation should complement rather than undermine EU foreign, security and defence policy cooperation, while acting to bridge or smooth cooperation between the EU and the UK. If E3 cooperation were to conflict with broader EU policy by generating hostility from excluded member states (such as Poland or Italy) and therefore distract from building consensus for broader EU initiatives, such as post-COVID economic recovery, E3 cooperation may falter.

Another key factor for the E3 will be the evolution of transatlantic relations, and whether the next US administration presents Europe with the dilemma of choosing between broad alignment with the US or open confrontation, as in the case of the Iran nuclear deal’s ‘snapback’ mechanism. As a non-EU state, the UK may have more autonomy to set its own policies but it will not be able to escape a choice between either a broad alliance with European states or a more ambivalent and ad-hoc relationship with the continent, while also creating new formats for cooperation with other democracies such as the Five Eyes states. This type of diplomatic ‘venue shopping’ could create tensions with European partners, especially Germany and France who hope to anchor London into a broad European approach. The UK’s ongoing Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review should provide clarity as to the UK’s future European ambitions and what that means for the E3.

Given the growing instability surrounding Europe, reinforced by an eventful summer 2020– with the Iran nuclear deal in limbo, renewed tensions between Turkey and Greece in the Mediterranean, protests in Belarus, increasing US-China rivalry and further instability in the Sahel – the E3 has recently been developing a more visible profile. By convening the first meeting of E3 defence ministers in August, Germany showed leadership and a commitment to the format despite its fears of hostility from other EU member states towards increased E3 cooperation. Officially widening E3 cooperation to include defence, while mostly symbolic for now, satisfies Berlin by marking a step towards institutionalization, appeases Paris by putting on the joint agenda issues such as the recent coup in Mali and the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, and shows some political commitment by London at a time of tense UK-EU Brexit negotiations.

France, the UK and Germany all agree that the E3 is a necessary cooperation format that needs to be developed further. Recent events seem to show willingness on the part of the three countries to make it work, both in spite of and because of upcoming Brexit tensions. Longer-term challenges – relating to intra-EU tensions over the role of the E3, the future EU-UK relationship and transatlantic divergences – are still to be addressed and managed for the format to reach its full potential. Nevertheless, in today’s uncertain strategic context for Europe, the E3 is establishing itself as a go-to format for cooperation for Europe’s ‘big three’.




3

Novichok Poisons Germany's Relations with Russia

14 September 2020

John Lough

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The conclusion of a specialist German military laboratory that Alexey Navalny was poisoned with the nerve agent novichok has shocked Germany’s political class and is forcing the government to re-assess relations with Russia.

2020-09-14-Nord-Stream-2-Pipe

A worker at the construction site of a section of the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline near Kingisepp, Leningrad Region. Photo by Alexander DemianchukTASS via Getty Images.

When Chancellor Angela Merkel offered to provide medical care for Navalny in Germany after he fell ill from suspected poisoning in Russia, she could have hardly expected her humanitarian gesture would trigger a crisis in her country’s relations with Russia.

Merkel has used uncharacteristically blunt words to condemn the apparent attempt on Navalny’s life, saying the use of novichok raises serious questions that only the Russian government could answer. She described Navalny as being the ‘victim of a crime’ which was a violation of the ‘basic values and basic rights’ that Germany and its allies were committed to. Her tone and body language certainly showed how strongly she felt about the issue.

Germany’s Social Democrat foreign minister Heiko Maas then followed up by suggesting Russia’s response might force Germany to change its position on the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline which aims to double Germany’s direct gas imports from Russia under the Baltic Sea.

This is a dramatic change of position since his party has been a staunch supporter of the controversial project. Two Christian Democrat candidates for the Chancellorship called for a stop to the pipeline together with representatives from the Greens, who could be part of a government coalition after the 2021 federal election.

Claims of hostile provocation

The Russian foreign ministry shot back with a statement condemning Berlin’s ‘unsubstantiated accusations and ultimatums’ and claiming Germany was using Navalny’s hospitalisation to discredit Russia internationally. It demanded Germany share data and test results with the Russian Prosecutor’s Office, saying any failure to comply would be ‘a crude hostile provocation against Russia’ that risked consequences for the bilateral relationship as well as ‘serious complications in the international situation’.

Such strong language from Moscow towards Germany has not been seen for over 30 years, and is all the more remarkable as Putin has personally invested heavily in the relationship with Germany in view of its economic and political importance, and its strong desire for constructive ties with Russia. Until 2014, Russian analysts viewed Germany as Russia’s ‘lobbyist’ in Europe.

Berlin is now trying to downplay the situation, claiming the Navalny poisoning is not actually a Germany-Russia matter and referring it to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. By consulting with its EU and NATO allies, Berlin is further internationalising the issue to reduce impact on the bilateral relationship.

Such a forceful reaction to the poisoning reflects Germany’s increasing frustration with the Kremlin. The murder in broad daylight in Berlin in August 2019 of a Chechen wanted by the Russian authorities has been traced to the FSB. And the publication of a report in May 2020 into the hacking of the German parliament in 2015, including Merkel’s parliamentary office, was a further reminder of how far Russia had deviated from the course of partnership that Berlin believed the two countries had established in the 1990s.

Merkel described the cyberattack as ‘monstrous’, saying it was part of a strategy of hybrid warfare that includes ‘disorientation’ and ‘manipulation of facts’. Further tension has been added since the recent Belarus election as Moscow is supporting Lukashenka’s presidency whereas the EU does not recognise him as the legitimate president.

This accumulation of events is forcing German policymakers to recognise the Russian leadership is a menace to its own citizens, its neighbours and to Germany itself. Although Berlin abandoned several of its illusions about partnership with Russia in 2014 when it led the EU response to Russia’s annexation of Ukraine and destabilization of south-eastern Ukraine, it still hoped that the Kremlin would see reason and adjust its policies.

It combined sectoral economic sanctions with continuing dialogue and a joint effort to help settle the conflict in Donbas despite the obvious fact that Russia was a party to the conflict. It still believed that Moscow had an interest in finding a compromise. Instead, experience so far suggests Russia has a greater interest in keeping the conflict ‘semi-frozen’ as a way of forcing Ukraine to compromise.

Controversially, Germany also saw the need to expand energy relations with Russia in a bid to stabilise ties and draw Russia closer to Europe. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline initiated in September 2015 by Gazprom and five European companies – two of them German – is a monument to this policy.

Even though this project lacked an overall economic rationale, the German government supported it – much to the consternation of the Baltic States, Poland and others who objected to what they saw as Berlin’s insistence on a ‘Russia-first’ policy that undercut the interests of Ukraine. This was because the pipeline’s purpose is to re-route gas flows away from Ukraine, depriving it of transit revenues and a lever of influence in its relations with Moscow.

It now appears the German government is finally waking up to the fact that its attempts to encourage better Russian behaviour have failed. Policy looks set to become tougher and a moratorium on Nord Stream 2 now appears a real possibility if Russia fails to investigate the Navalny poisoning and provide adequate answers.

However, sanctioning the new pipeline is likely to provoke counter-measures against German business interests in Russia. If Berlin is determined to pursue this tougher line, it could end up facing an uncomfortable dilemma and being forced to consider alternative ways to signal displeasure at Russia’s criminal actions.




3

Priorities for implementing Ethiopia's national dialogue

Priorities for implementing Ethiopia's national dialogue 11 May 2022 — 1:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 May 2022 Online

Experts discuss challenges and priorities in shaping an inclusive and effective national dialogue in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is grappling with numerous contentious national issues – not least persistent conflict in several parts of the country – which underscore the need for large-scale dialogue and reconciliation efforts to address the country’s deep-rooted societal and political divisions. Ethiopia’s newly established National Dialogue Commission – whose 11 commissioners were appointed in February 2022 – has begun a four-phased process of preparations for a dialogue, with its initial stage focused on stakeholder engagement and local knowledge mobilization.

There are major challenges, however, in ensuring inclusivity amidst ongoing conflict and questions on how a country-wide process will sit alongside local dialogue initiatives and wider mediation and peacebuilding efforts. Linking the process to constitutional bodies will also be an important priority to ensure dialogue outcomes are effectively implemented.

At this public event, panellists will exchange perspectives on how to shape an effective national dialogue in Ethiopia, including priorities for building a credible National Dialogue Commission and the roles and responsibilities of other national, regional and local-level actors. They will also discuss key implementation mechanisms and long-term priorities for trust-building and cultivating a conducive environment for inclusive dialogue.

This webinar is part of a series of events and outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.




3

Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa

Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Europe’s ‘gas grab’ in Africa is just the latest abuse of its relationship with the continent, says Catherine Fieschi.

When Emmanuel Macron made one of his first visits to Africa as France’s recently elected young president in 2017, his speech at Ouagadougou University in Burkina Faso was designed to set the tone for a new relationship between his country and African countries. 

‘There no longer is a French policy for Africa,’ he said.

This was a signal away from ‘la Françafrique’, with its post-colonial accents and the propping up of regimes friendly to France, to something that was more strategic, equitable and transparent – more partnership and less tutelage. 

And Europe seemed to be following suit. In March 2020 the European Union and Africa decided that they would redefine their relationship. The European Commission unveiled its vision for a ‘comprehensive strategy with Africa’. The roadmap would give Africa significantly more say over the nature and extent of the relationship, more choice and more political agency.

Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another when it comes to Africa

But what, today, is left of these aspirations? Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another. 

Earlier this year, after the long-awaited 6th annual EU-African Union summit in Brussels, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa was frank when he summed up the gap between stated ambitions and the current relationship. The pandemic-weary Global South had reason to be wary. Ramaphosa laid out missed opportunities, disappointment and the low expectations that act as self-fulfilling prophecies. 

Europe’s changing focus in Africa 

From the apparent high point of the Ouagadougou speech, Macron has now turned to the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in Africa for geopolitical purposes. His primary aim is to combat the rise of Islamist militants and terrorism in the Sahel as well as to tackle the growing influence of China and Russia in the region. 

Russian inroads – via the security firm Wagner in Mali, for instance – have given France further cause to use the OIF to counter destabilization activities. Both the United Kingdom and France train African military in the Sahel, but now, with the end of France’s anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane in Mali, the subsequent withdrawal of French troops and the increasingly established presence of the Wagner group, the security situation in the region is expected to deteriorate dramatically and become increasingly impermeable to European interests and forces.

As for development aid, Britain’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy makes no bones about the fact that Asia is now a priority over Africa.

The relationship between Africa and Britain is being transformed as a result, most obviously through the cuts in development aid, with African aid cut by 66 per cent in 2021. But the nature of the relationship, which has become both more conditional and more transactional, has also changed. 

The UK is emphasizing human rights and ‘free societies’, but also pushing for free market principles rather than the kind of state involvement that some African countries often prefer as a road to accelerated and more autonomous development. 

The future of energy exports and COP27

The issue of energy exports points to what will most likely trigger the greatest disappointment in the next few years – climate and climate finance. 

Green energy deals, like the $8.5 billion COP26 package from the EU, United States and UK to South Africa, look far more problematic now in the light of Europe’s African gas-grab. Indeed, Europe is importing as much African gas as it can after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia reduced supplies. Yet African countries are still being told to curb their own use of ‘dirty’ energy. 

As an illustration, Nigeria holds 3 per cent of the world’s gas reserves, but has barely tapped them, while 40 per cent of its output is exported to Europe. In April, Italy closed deals to buy gas from Angola and the Republic of Congo, while Germany did the same with Senegal.
 

At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries pledged an annual $100 billion in climate finance to developing countries for both adaptation and mitigation. But pledges have never really materialized. The aid agency Oxfam estimates that only about a third of the money has been delivered. Climate finance was again the main focus of COP26 – and dismissed by Greta Thunberg as more ‘blah, blah, blah’.

This series of repeated resets, pledges and disappointments tells a story – indeed, several stories. First and foremost, it is one of arrogance and betrayal. That much is obvious. But it is also a story about stories – about how the narratives elaborated by various European countries and leaders never amount to more than a sum of transactions. 

Climate change places Europe, and other rich nations, at a crossroads in its relationship with Africa: the former holds the wealth, but also some of the keys and threats to the transition. COP27, to be held in Egypt in November, will be the next chapter in the story. 




3

Africa in 2023: Continuing political and economic volatility

Africa in 2023: Continuing political and economic volatility Expert comment NCapeling 6 January 2023

Despite few African trade and financial links with Russia and Ukraine, the war in Ukraine will cause civil strife in Africa due to food and energy inflation.

Africa’s economy was recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2022 when a range of internal and external shocks struck such as adverse weather conditions, a devastating locust invasion, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – all of which worsened already rapidly-rising rates of inflation and borrowing costs.

Although the direct trade and financial linkages of Africa with Russia and Ukraine are small, the war has damaged the continent’s economies through higher commodity prices, higher food, fuel, and headline inflation.

The main impact is on the increasing likelihood of civil strife because of food and energy-fuelled inflation amid an environment of heightened political instability.

Key African economies such as South Africa and Nigeria were already stuck with low growth and many African governments have seen their debt burdens increase – some such as Ethiopia and Ghana now have dollar debt trading at distressed levels – and more countries will follow in 2023.

On average the public sector debt-to-GDP ratio of African countries stood at above 60 per cent in 2022. The era of Chinese state-backed big loans and mega-projects which started 20 years ago in Angola after the end of its civil war may be coming to an end but Chinese private sector investments on the continent will continue through its Belt and Road Initiative and dual circulation model of development.

Great and middle powers building influence

Geopolitical competition in Africa has intensified in 2022, particularly among great powers such as China, Russia, the US, and the EU but also by middle powers such as Turkey, Japan, and the Gulf states.

The sixth AU-EU summit held in Brussels in February 2022 agreed on the principles for a new partnership, although the Russian invasion of Ukraine which followed disrupted these ambitions. Japan’s pledge of $30 billion in aid for Africa at TICAD 8 in August 2022 was clearly made due to the $40 billion pledged at the China–Africa summit in November 2021.

The geopolitical and geoeconomic ramifications of the war in Ukraine has directly impacted the African continent by contributing to food and cooking oil inflation and humanitarian aid delivery

The US also launched a new strategy to strengthen its partnership and held a second US-Africa Leaders’ summit in Washington in December, the first since 2014. Russia’s ambition has been curtailed by its invasion of Ukraine, postponing its second summit with African states to 2023.

The imposition of international sanctions complicated its trade and investments, and military support such as that provided by Russian paramilitary group Wagner focused on Mali, Libya and the Central African Republic (CAR) has been curtailed.

The strategic importance of Africa has resulted in all the UN P5 members calling on the G20 to make the African Union (AU) its 21st member in 2023 under India’s presidency.

International competition to secure Africa’s critical and strategic minerals and energy products intensified in 2022 and, in the energy sector, European countries are seeking to diversify away from Russian oil and gas with alternative supplies, such as those from Africa.

Western mining companies and commodity traders are also increasingly seeking alternative supplies from Africa. Decarbonization is becoming a driver of resource nationalism and geopolitical competition in certain African mining markets, home to large deposits of critical ‘transition minerals’ such as copper, cobalt, graphite, lithium, or nickel.

COP27 was hosted in Egypt in November and gave African leaders an opportunity to shape climate discussions by pushing priority areas such as loss and damage, stranded assets, access to climate finance, adaptation, and desertification. Climate adaptation in Africa is a key condition to preserving economic growth and maintaining social cohesion.

The Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia, is suffering from one of the worst droughts in memory. The geopolitical and geoeconomic ramifications of the war in Ukraine has directly impacted the African continent by contributing to food and cooking oil inflation and humanitarian aid delivery.

Thoughout 2022 the AU was undergoing intensive reform and it struggled to respond to the growing number of security crises across the continent. Hotspots in 2023 will be in the western Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, eastern DRC, and northern Mozambique, all of them crossing state borders.

In Mozambique, a 2019 peace deal assisted by the United Nations (UN) will see the last ex-guerrillas from Renamo demobilized in 2023 to reintegrate into civilian life – some having been recruited in 1978.

Jihadist activity may spread further into coastal states which has resulted in international partners such as France and the UK redesigning their security assistance strategies for the region

In eastern Congo, M23 – one of around 120 armed groups – resumed its conflict against the central government. After lying dormant for several years, it took up arms again in 2021 and has been leading an offensive in eastern DRC against the Congolese army.

According to the UN, Rwanda has been supporting M23, and Kenya’s parliament approved in November the deployment of about 900 soldiers to the DRC as part of a joint military force from the East African Community (EAC) bloc – DRC joined the EAC in March.

In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia saw an uneasy ceasefire agreed between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Islamist militant groups in Africa further expanded their territorial reach in 2022, particularly in the western Sahel where al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates are competing for influence and continued to make inroads.

The drawdown and exit of western forces from Mali, both the French Operation Barkane and international contributions for the UN’s MINUSMA mission there, adds new dimensions to regional security challenges.

Mali’s decision in May to withdraw from the G5 Sahel has also eroded the regional security architecture. Jihadist activity may spread further into coastal states which has resulted in international partners such as France and the UK redesigning their security assistance strategies for the region.

Coups on the increase again

Since 2020, there have been successful military coups in Burkina Faso (twice), Chad, Guinea, Mali (twice), and Sudan, and failed ones in the CAR, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Niger, and possibly Gambia and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Three national elections illustrate the state of African democracy in 2022. In Angola’s August elections, the ruling MPLA lost its absolute majority with the opposition UNITA winning the majority in Luanda for the first time.




3

Independent Thinking: China in Africa, conflicts in 2023

Independent Thinking: China in Africa, conflicts in 2023 Audio NCapeling 13 January 2023

Episode ten discusses Africa and the complex role China plays on the continent, and how the world should be responding to the major conflicts of 2023.

The first episode of 2023 examines Africa and the complex role China plays on the continent as a new Chatham House report highlights 22 African countries suffering from debt distress with Beijing a key creditor to many of them.

China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang is also touring several African states this week and next, with visits planned to Ethiopia, Angola, Gabon, and the headquarters of the African Union (AU).

This week Chatham House also hosted Dr Comfort Ero, president of the International Crisis Group, to discuss ten conflicts to watch in 2023. The panel examines some of the key conflicts mentioned and how the world is responding to them.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week from Chatham House are Dr Alex Vines, director of the Africa programme, Creon Butler, director of the Global Economy and Finance programme, Dr Yu Jie, senior fellow on the Asia-Pacific programme, and Armida van Rij, research fellow with the International Security programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.




3

Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030: Lessons from Mozambique

Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030: Lessons from Mozambique 17 February 2023 — 7:00AM TO 9:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2023 Addis Ababa and online

A hybrid event in Addis Ababa reflecting on Mozambique’s 2019 peace agreement and the lessons it offers for the African Union’s ‘Silencing the Guns’ agenda by 2030.

This event will explore opportunities for furthering the AU’s Silencing the Guns agenda by 2030 to assist Africa’s transformative development, highlighting lessons learnt from Mozambique’s experience.

The ‘Silencing the Guns in Africa’ agenda, a flagship initiative of the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063, aspires to end all wars and conflict, prevent genocide, and stop gender-based violence.

The 2019 peace agreement in Mozambique and the subsequent disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process supported by the United Nations (UN) but implemented by Mozambique’s government and institutions, provides experience and learning for other continental conflicts that have recently ended or resumed.

Mozambique is seeking to break from the cyclical ‘conflict trap’ where once a country experiences one civil war, it is significantly more likely to experience additional episodes of violence.

Since the end of Mozambique’s civil war in 1992, targeted armed conflict by RENAMO resumed in 2013 and ended through the new agreement in August 2019. The final reintegration into civilian life of former Mozambican combatants of opposition RENAMO will be completed in 2023.

Mozambique and Switzerland – a key supporter of successive Mozambican peace processes – have become non-permanent members of the UN Security Council for the first time in their respective histories.

At a moment when old vulnerabilities and new threats are apparent on the African continent, this seminar, held by Chatham House in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), explores opportunities to furthering the AU’s Silencing the Guns agenda by 2030 to assist Africa’s transformative development, as outlined by the UNDP in a report published in February 2022.

This hybrid event is held in partnership with the African Union Commission and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

This event will also be broadcast live via the Africa Programme Facebook page.




3

MIRD Pamphlet No. 31: MIRDcell V4--Artificial Intelligence Tools to Formulate Optimized Radiopharmaceutical Cocktails for Therapy

Visual Abstract




3

Feasibility, Tolerability, and Preliminary Clinical Response of Fractionated Radiopharmaceutical Therapy with 213Bi-FAPI-46: Pilot Experience in Patients with End-Stage, Progressive Metastatic Tumors

Visual Abstract




3

Proteome-wide Analysis Reveals Substrates of E3 Ligase RNF146 Targeted for Degradation

Litong Nie
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2015-2029
Research




3

The Mechanism of NEDD8 Activation of CUL5 Ubiquitin E3 Ligases

Ryan J Lumpkin
Dec 2, 2020; 0:RA120.002414v1-mcp.RA120.002414
Research




3

Secretory galectin-3 induced by glucocorticoid stress triggers stemness exhaustion of hepatic progenitor cells [Signal Transduction]

Adult progenitor cell populations typically exist in a quiescent state within a controlled niche environment. However, various stresses or forms of damage can disrupt this state, which often leads to dysfunction and aging. We built a glucocorticoid (GC)-induced liver damage model of mice, found that GC stress induced liver damage, leading to consequences for progenitor cells expansion. However, the mechanisms by which niche factors cause progenitor cells proliferation are largely unknown. We demonstrate that, within the liver progenitor cells niche, Galectin-3 (Gal-3) is responsible for driving a subset of progenitor cells to break quiescence. We show that GC stress causes aging of the niche, which induces the up-regulation of Gal-3. The increased Gal-3 population increasingly interacts with the progenitor cell marker CD133, which triggers focal adhesion kinase (FAK)/AMP-activated kinase (AMPK) signaling. This results in the loss of quiescence and leads to the eventual stemness exhaustion of progenitor cells. Conversely, blocking Gal-3 with the inhibitor TD139 prevents the loss of stemness and improves liver function. These experiments identify a stress-dependent change in progenitor cell niche that directly influence liver progenitor cell quiescence and function.




3

Dysregulation of hsa-miR-34a and hsa-miR-449a leads to overexpression of PACS-1 and loss of DNA damage response (DDR) in cervical cancer [Cell Biology]

We have observed overexpression of PACS-1, a cytosolic sorting protein in primary cervical tumors. Absence of exonic mutations and overexpression at the RNA level suggested a transcriptional and/or posttranscriptional regulation. University of California Santa Cruz genome browser analysis of PACS-1 micro RNAs (miR), revealed two 8-base target sequences at the 3' terminus for hsa-miR-34a and hsa-miR-449a. Quantitative RT-PCR and Northern blotting studies showed reduced or loss of expression of the two microRNAs in cervical cancer cell lines and primary tumors, indicating dysregulation of these two microRNAs in cervical cancer. Loss of PACS-1 with siRNA or exogenous expression of hsa-miR-34a or hsa-miR-449a in HeLa and SiHa cervical cancer cell lines resulted in DNA damage response, S-phase cell cycle arrest, and reduction in cell growth. Furthermore, the siRNA studies showed that loss of PACS-1 expression was accompanied by increased nuclear γH2AX expression, Lys382-p53 acetylation, and genomic instability. PACS-1 re-expression through LNA-hsa-anti-miR-34a or -449a or through PACS-1 cDNA transfection led to the reversal of DNA damage response and restoration of cell growth. Release of cells post 24-h serum starvation showed PACS-1 nuclear localization at G1-S phase of the cell cycle. Our results therefore indicate that the loss of hsa-miR-34a and hsa-miR-449a expression in cervical cancer leads to overexpression of PACS-1 and suppression of DNA damage response, resulting in the development of chemo-resistant tumors.




3

Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection up-regulates MFN2 expression to promote NLRP3 inflammasome formation [Cell Biology]

Tuberculosis (TB), caused by the infection of Mycobacterium tuberculosis (MTB), is one of the leading causes of death worldwide, especially in children. However, the mechanisms by which MTB infects its cellular host, activates an immune response, and triggers inflammation remain unknown. Mitochondria play important roles in the initiation and activation of the nucleotide-binding oligomerization domain-like receptor with a pyrin domain 3 (NLRP3) inflammasome, where mitochondria-associated endoplasmic reticulum membranes (MAMs) may serve as the platform for inflammasome assembly and activation. Additionally, mitofusin 2 (MFN2) is implicated in the formation of MAMs, but, the roles of mitochondria and MFN2 in MTB infection have not been elucidated. Using mircroarry profiling of TB patients and in vitro MTB stimulation of macrophages, we observed an up-regulation of MFN2 in the peripheral blood mononuclear cells of active TB patients. Furthermore, we found that MTB stimulation by MTB-specific antigen ESAT-6 or lysate of MTB promoted MFN2 interaction with NLRP3 inflammasomes, resulting in the assembly and activation of the inflammasome and, subsequently, IL-1β secretion. These findings suggest that MFN2 and mitochondria play important role in the pathogen-host interaction during MTB infection.




3

Transcription factor NF-{kappa}B promotes acute lung inȷury via microRNA-99b-mediated PRDM1 down-regulation [Developmental Biology]

Acute lung injury (ALI), is a rapidly progressing heterogenous pulmonary disorder that possesses a high risk of mortality. Accumulating evidence has implicated the activation of the p65 subunit of NF-κB [NF-κB(p65)] activation in the pathological process of ALI. microRNAs (miRNAs), a group of small RNA molecules, have emerged as major governors due to their post-transcriptional regulation of gene expression in a wide array of pathological processes, including ALI. The dysregulation of miRNAs and NF-κB activation has been implicated in human diseases. In the current study, we set out to decipher the convergence of miR-99b and p65 NF-κB activation in ALI pathology. We measured the release of pro-inflammatory cytokines (IL-1β, IL-6, and TNFα) in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid using ELISA. MH-S cells were cultured and their viability were detected with cell counting kit 8 (CCK8) assays. The results showed that miR-99b was up-regulated, while PRDM1 was down-regulated in a lipopolysaccharide (LPS)-induced murine model of ALI. Mechanistic investigations showed that NF-κB(p65) was enriched at the miR-99b promoter region, and further promoted its transcriptional activity. Furthermore, miR-99b targeted PRDM1 by binding to its 3'UTR, causing its down-regulation. This in-creased lung injury, as evidenced by increased wet/dry ratio of mouse lung, myeloperoxidase activity and pro-inflammatory cytokine secretion, and enhanced infiltration of inflammatory cells in lung tissues. Together, our findings indicate that NF-κB(p65) promotion of miR-99b can aggravate ALI in mice by down-regulating the expression of PRDM1.




3

Distant coupling between RNA editing and alternative splicing of the osmosensitive cation channel Tmem63b [Cell Biology]

Post-transcriptional modifications of pre-mRNAs expand the diversity of proteomes in higher eukaryotes. In the brain, these modifications diversify the functional output of many critical neuronal signal molecules. In this study, we identified a brain-specific A-to-I RNA editing that changed glutamine to arginine (Q/R) at exon 20 and an alternative splicing of exon 4 in Tmem63b, which encodes a ubiquitously expressed osmosensitive cation channel. The channel isoforms lacking exon 4 occurred in ∼80% of Tmem63b mRNAs in the brain but were not detected in other tissues, suggesting a brain-specific splicing. We found that the Q/R editing was catalyzed by Adar2 (Adarb1) and required an editing site complementary sequence located in the proximal 5' end of intron 20. Moreover, the Q/R editing was almost exclusively identified in the splicing isoform lacking exon 4, indicating a coupling between the editing and the splicing. Elimination of the Q/R editing in brain-specific Adar2 knockout mice did not affect the splicing efficiency of exon 4. Furthermore, transfection with the splicing isoform containing exon 4 suppressed the Q/R editing in primary cultured cerebellar granule neurons. Thus, our study revealed a coupling between an RNA editing and a distant alternative splicing in the Tmem63b pre-mRNA, in which the splicing plays a dominant role. Finally, physiological analysis showed that the splicing and the editing coordinately regulate Ca2+ permeability and osmosensitivity of channel proteins, which may contribute to their functions in the brain.




3

PDE5 inhibition rescues mitochondrial dysfunction and angiogenic responses induced by Akt3 inhibition by promotion of PRC expression [Bioenergetics]

Akt3 regulates mitochondrial content in endothelial cells through the inhibition of PGC-1α nuclear localization and is also required for angiogenesis. However, whether there is a direct link between mitochondrial function and angiogenesis is unknown. Here we show that Akt3 depletion in primary endothelial cells results in decreased uncoupled oxygen consumption, increased fission, decreased membrane potential, and increased expression of the mitochondria-specific protein chaperones, HSP60 and HSP10, suggesting that Akt3 is required for mitochondrial homeostasis. Direct inhibition of mitochondrial homeostasis by the model oxidant paraquat results in decreased angiogenesis, showing a direct link between angiogenesis and mitochondrial function. Next, in exploring functional links to PGC-1α, the master regulator of mitochondrial biogenesis, we searched for compounds that induce this process. We found that, sildenafil, a phosphodiesterase 5 inhibitor, induced mitochondrial biogenesis as measured by increased uncoupled oxygen consumption, mitochondrial DNA content, and voltage-dependent anion channel protein expression. Sildenafil rescued the effects on mitochondria by Akt3 depletion or pharmacological inhibition and promoted angiogenesis, further supporting that mitochondrial homeostasis is required for angiogenesis. Sildenafil also induces the expression of PGC-1 family member PRC and can compensate for PGC-1α activity during mitochondrial stress by an Akt3-independent mechanism. The induction of PRC by sildenafil depends upon cAMP and the transcription factor CREB. Thus, PRC can functionally substitute during Akt3 depletion for absent PGC-1α activity to restore mitochondrial homeostasis and promote angiogenesis. These findings show that mitochondrial homeostasis as controlled by the PGC family of transcriptional activators is required for angiogenic responses.




3

Exploitation of dihydroorotate dehydrogenase (DHODH) and p53 activation as therapeutic targets: A case study in polypharmacology [Computational Biology]

The tenovins are a frequently studied class of compounds capable of inhibiting sirtuin activity, which is thought to result in increased acetylation and protection of the tumor suppressor p53 from degradation. However, as we and other laboratories have shown previously, certain tenovins are also capable of inhibiting autophagic flux, demonstrating the ability of these compounds to engage with more than one target. In this study, we present two additional mechanisms by which tenovins are able to activate p53 and kill tumor cells in culture. These mechanisms are the inhibition of a key enzyme of the de novo pyrimidine synthesis pathway, dihydroorotate dehydrogenase (DHODH), and the blockage of uridine transport into cells. These findings hold a 3-fold significance: first, we demonstrate that tenovins, and perhaps other compounds that activate p53, may activate p53 by more than one mechanism; second, that work previously conducted with certain tenovins as SirT1 inhibitors should additionally be viewed through the lens of DHODH inhibition as this is a major contributor to the mechanism of action of the most widely used tenovins; and finally, that small changes in the structure of a small molecule can lead to a dramatic change in the target profile of the molecule even when the phenotypic readout remains static.




3

A kinetic dissection of the fast and superprocessive kinesin-3 KIF1A reveals a predominant one-head-bound state during its chemomechanical cycle [Molecular Biophysics]

The kinesin-3 family contains the fastest and most processive motors of the three neuronal transport kinesin families, yet the sequence of states and rates of kinetic transitions that comprise the chemomechanical cycle and give rise to their unique properties are poorly understood. We used stopped-flow fluorescence spectroscopy and single-molecule motility assays to delineate the chemomechanical cycle of the kinesin-3, KIF1A. Our bacterially expressed KIF1A construct, dimerized via a kinesin-1 coiled-coil, exhibits fast velocity and superprocessivity behavior similar to WT KIF1A. We established that the KIF1A forward step is triggered by hydrolysis of ATP and not by ATP binding, meaning that KIF1A follows the same chemomechanical cycle as established for kinesin-1 and -2. The ATP-triggered half-site release rate of KIF1A was similar to the stepping rate, indicating that during stepping, rear-head detachment is an order of magnitude faster than in kinesin-1 and kinesin-2. Thus, KIF1A spends the majority of its hydrolysis cycle in a one-head-bound state. Both the ADP off-rate and the ATP on-rate at physiological ATP concentration were fast, eliminating these steps as possible rate-limiting transitions. Based on the measured run length and the relatively slow off-rate in ADP, we conclude that attachment of the tethered head is the rate-limiting transition in the KIF1A stepping cycle. Thus, KIF1A's activity can be explained by a fast rear-head detachment rate, a rate-limiting step of tethered-head attachment that follows ATP hydrolysis, and a relatively strong electrostatic interaction with the microtubule in the weakly bound post-hydrolysis state.




3

Hsa-miRNA-23a-3p promotes atherogenesis in a novel mouse model of atherosclerosis

Jiayan Guo
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1764-1775
Research Articles




3

Stimulation of ABCB4/MDR3 ATPase activity requires an intact phosphatidylcholine lipid

Martin Prescher
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1605-1616
Research Articles




3

Bioavailability and spatial distribution of fatty acids in the rat retina after dietary omega-3 supplementation

Elisa Vidal
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1733-1746
Research Articles




3

Deletion of lysophosphatidylcholine acyltransferase3 in myeloid cells worsens hepatic steatosis after a high fat diet

Thibaut Bourgeois
Dec 11, 2020; 0:jlr.RA120000737v1-jlr.RA120000737
Research Articles




3

Apolipoprotein C3 and apolipoprotein B colocalize in proximity to macrophages in atherosclerotic lesions in diabetes

Jenny E. Kanter
Dec 8, 2020; 0:jlr.ILR120001217v1-jlr.ILR120001217
Images in Lipid Research




3

Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66438: You see the message "The informat $ could not be loaded, probably due to insufficient memory" after attempting to insert data into a MySQL database

For data that is being loaded from a SAS Stored Process Server, an insertion process might fail to a MySQL database with a warning, as well as an error message that says "During insert: Incorrect datetime value…"




3

Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66537: SAS Customer Intelligence Studio becomes non-responsive when you delete a calculated variable from the Edit Value dialog box

In SAS Customer Intelligence Studio, you might notice that the user interface becomes unresponsive, as shown below: imgalt="SAS Customer Intelligence Studio UI becomes unresponsive" src="{fusion_66537




3

Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66539: A new calculated variable that you create in the Edit Value dialog box is not available for selection in SAS Customer Intelligence Studio

In SAS Customer Intelligence Studio, you can choose to create a new calculated variable in the Edit Value dialog box when you populate a treatment custom detail. Following creation of the new calculated




3

Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66542: The initial loading of a rule set and a rule flow takes significantly longer in SAS Business Rules Manager 3.3 compared with release 3.2

In SAS Business Rules Manager 3.3, the initial loading of a rule set and a rule flow takes significantly longer than it does in release 3.2. When this problem happens, long time gaps are evident in the local




3

Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66391: Opening a database table returns a Segmentation Violation when you use the Metadata LIBNAME engine (META)

You might receive a Segmentation Violation when opening a database table in SAS. The SAS Log contains the error and traceback:


3

Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 33449: An error might occur when you use SAS 9 BULKLOAD= and BULKEXTRACT= options to load data to or extract data from the HP Neoview database on the HP Itanium platform

An error might occur when you use the SAS 9 BULKLOAD= and BULKEXTRACT= options load data to or extract data from HP Neoview on the HP Itanium platform. The problem occurs because Hewlett-Packard changed the name of one of




3

Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 61815: SAS Episode Analytics 3.1 - Audit table is required in order to capture user interactions with the user interface

SAS  Episode Analytics 3.1 requires the ability to capture user interactions with the user interface for auditing purposes. To support the required functionality a new table has been add




3

Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66535: You might intermittently see the error "RangeError: Maximum call stack exceeded..." when viewing a SAS Visual Analytics report

When viewing a SAS Visual Analytics report, you might intermittently see an error that includes content similar to the following:

Error Message:




3

Overview of how N32 and N34 elovanoids sustain sight by protecting retinal pigment epithelial cells and photoreceptors [Thematic Reviews]

The essential fatty acid DHA (22:6, omega-3 or n-3) is enriched in and required for the membrane biogenesis and function of photoreceptor cells (PRC), synapses, mitochondria, etc. of the CNS. PRC DHA becomes an acyl chain at the sn-2 of phosphatidylcholine (PC), amounting to more than 50% of the PRC outer segment phospholipids, where phototransduction takes place. Very long chain PUFAs (VLC-PUFAs,n-3, ≥ 28 carbons) are at the sn-1 of this PC molecular species and interact with rhodopsin. PRC shed their tips (DHA-rich membrane disks) daily, which in turn are phagocytized by the retinal pigment epithelium (RPE), where DHA is recycled back to PRC inner segments to be used for the biogenesis of new photoreceptor membranes. Here, we review the structures and stereochemistry of novel elovanoid (ELV)-N32 and ELV-N34 to be ELV-N32: (14Z,17Z,20R,21E,23E,25Z,27S,29Z)-20,27-dihydroxydo-triaconta-14,17,21,23,25,29-hexaenoic acid; ELV-N34: (16Z,19Z,22R,23E,25E,27Z,29S,31Z)-22,29-dihydroxytetra-triaconta-16,19,23,25,27,31-hexaenoic acid. ELVs are low-abundance, high-potency, protective mediators. Their bioactivity includes enhancing of anti-apoptotic and pro-survival protein expression with concomitant downregulation of pro-apoptotic proteins when RPE is confronted with uncompensated oxidative stress (UOS). ELVs also target PRC/RPE senescence gene programming, the senescence secretory phenotype in the interphotoreceptor matrix (IPM), as well as inflammaging (chronic, sterile, low-grade inflammation). An important lesson on neuroprotection is highlighted by the ELV mediators that target the terminally differentiated PRC and RPE, sustaining a beautifully synchronized renewal process. The role of ELVs in PRC and RPE viability and function uncovers insights on disease mechanisms and the development of therapeutics for age-related macular degeneration (AMD), Alzheimer’s disease (AD), and other pathologies.




3

Apolipoprotein C3 and apolipoprotein B colocalize in proximity to macrophages in atherosclerotic lesions in diabetes [Images in Lipid Research]




3

Deletion of lysophosphatidylcholine acyltransferase3 in myeloid cells worsens hepatic steatosis after a high fat diet [Research Articles]

Recent studies have highlighted an important role for lysophosphatidylcholine acyltransferase 3 (LPCAT3) in controlling the PUFA composition of cell membranes in the liver and intestine. In these organs, LPCAT3 critically supports cell membrane-associated processes such as lipid absorption or lipoprotein secretion. However, the role of LPCAT3 in macrophages remains controversial. Here, we investigated LPCAT3’s role in macrophages both in vitro and in vivo in mice with atherosclerosis and obesity. To accomplish this, we used the LysMCre strategy to develop a mouse model with conditional Lpcat3 deficiency in myeloid cells (Lpcat3KOMac). We observed that partial Lpcat3 deficiency (approx. 75% reduction) in macrophages alters the PUFA composition of all phospholipid (PL) subclasses, including phosphatidylinositols and phosphatidylserines. A reduced incorporation of C20 PUFAs (mainly arachidonic acid [AA]) into PLs was associated with a redistribution of these FAs toward other cellular lipids such as cholesteryl esters. Lpcat3 deficiency had no obvious impact on macrophage inflammatory response or endoplasmic reticulum (ER) stress; however, Lpcat3KOMac macrophages exhibited a reduction in cholesterol efflux in vitro. In vivo, myeloid Lpcat3 deficiency did not affect atherosclerosis development in LDL receptor deficient mouse (Ldlr-/-) mice. Lpcat3KOMac mice on a high-fat diet displayed a mild increase in hepatic steatosis associated with alterations in several liver metabolic pathways and in liver eicosanoid composition. We conclude that alterations in AA metabolism along with myeloid Lpcat3 deficiency may secondarily affect AA homeostasis in the whole liver, leading to metabolic disorders and triglyceride accumulation.




3

Angiopoietin-like protein 3 governs LDL-cholesterol levels through endothelial lipase-dependent VLDL clearance [Research Articles]

Angiopoietin-like protein (ANGPTL)3 regulates plasma lipids by inhibiting LPL and endothelial lipase (EL). ANGPTL3 inactivation lowers LDL-C independently of the classical LDLR-mediated pathway and represents a promising therapeutic approach for individuals with homozygous familial hypercholesterolemia due to LDLR mutations. Yet, how ANGPTL3 regulates LDL-C levels is unknown. Here, we demonstrate in hyperlipidemic humans and mice that ANGPTL3 controls VLDL catabolism upstream of LDL. Using kinetic, lipidomic, and biophysical studies, we show that ANGPTL3 inhibition reduces VLDL-lipid content and size, generating remnant particles that are efficiently removed from the circulation. This suggests that ANGPTL3 inhibition lowers LDL-C by limiting LDL particle production. Mechanistically, we discovered that EL is a key mediator of ANGPTL3’s novel pathway. Our experiments revealed that, although dispensable in the presence of LDLR, EL-mediated processing of VLDL becomes critical for LDLR-independent particle clearance. In the absence of EL and LDLR, ANGPTL3 inhibition perturbed VLDL catabolism, promoted accumulation of atypical remnants, and failed to reduce LDL-C. Taken together, we uncover ANGPTL3 at the helm of a novel EL-dependent pathway that lowers LDL-C in the absence of LDLR.




3

In Memoriam: Shozo Yamamoto (1933-2020) [Tribute]




3

Characterization of essential domains in HSD17B13 for cellular localization and enzymatic activity [Research Articles]

Human genetic studies recently identified an association of SNPs in the 17-β hydroxysteroid dehydrogenase 13 (HSD17B13) gene with alcoholic and nonalcoholic fatty liver disease development. Mutant HSD17B13 variants devoid of enzymatic function have been demonstrated to be protective from cirrhosis and liver cancer, supporting the development of HSD17B13 as a promising therapeutic target. Previous studies have demonstrated that HSD17B13 is a lipid droplet (LD)-associated protein. However, the critical domains that drive LD targeting or determine the enzymatic activity have yet to be defined. Here we used mutagenesis to generate multiple truncated and point-mutated proteins and were able to demonstrate in vitro that the N-terminal hydrophobic domain, PAT-like domain, and a putative α-helix/β-sheet/α-helix domain in HSD17B13 are all critical for LD targeting. Similarly, we characterized the predicted catalytic, substrate-binding, and homodimer interaction sites and found them to be essential for the enzymatic activity of HSD17B13, in addition to our previous identification of amino acid P260 and cofactor binding site. In conclusion, we identified critical domains and amino acid sites that are essential for the LD localization and protein function of HSD17B13, which may facilitate understanding of its function and targeting of this protein to treat chronic liver diseases.