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Renata Dwan Joins as Deputy Director and Senior Executive Officer News Release sysadmin 19 August 2020

Renata Dwan has been appointed deputy director and senior executive officer of Chatham House.

New Strategic Partnership with the Robert Bosch Stiftung News Release jon.wallace 23 November 2020

The Robert Bosch Stiftung becomes a founding donor to Chatham House’s second century.

Supporting Civic Space: The Role and Impact of the Private Sector 23 September 2020 — 2:00PM TO 4:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 December 2020 Online

The meeting provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of – and barriers to – corporate activism.

A healthy civic space is vital for an enabling business environment. In recognition of this, a growing number of private sector actors are challenging, publicly or otherwise, the deteriorating environment for civic freedoms.

However, this corporate activism is often limited and largely ad hoc. It remains confined to a small cluster of multinationals leaving potential routes for effective coordination and collaboration with other actors underexplored.

This roundtable brings together a diverse and international group of business actors, civil society actors and foreign policy experts to exchange perspectives and experiences on how the private sector can be involved in issues around civic space.

The meeting provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of – and barriers to – corporate activism, develop a better understanding of existing initiatives, identify good practice and discuss practical strategies for the business community.

This meeting is the first of a series of roundtables at Chatham House in support of initiatives to build broad alliances for the protection of civic space. 

Supporting Civic Space: The Role and Impact of the Tech Sector 13 October 2020 — 2:00PM TO 4:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 December 2020 Online

This event brings together a diverse and international group of stakeholders to exchange perspectives and experiences on the role that tech actors can play in supporting civic space.

In a deteriorating environment for civic freedoms, tech sector actors are increasingly engaging, publicly or otherwise, on issues of civic space.

In the US, for example, a number of tech companies have cancelled contracts with the Pentagon and stopped censoring search results in China as a result of protests by employees. The Asia Internet Coalition recently wrote to Pakistan’s Prime Minister expressing human rights concerns about new rules regulating social media.

While we have recently seen technology companies show support for the social movements, including through substantial pledges, in some cases these have elicited criticism of hypocrisy, and the interventions of social media platforms on freedom of expression and privacy issues have been closely linked to the preservation of their own business models.

The COVID-19 crisis has also posed new dilemmas for the tech sector with the pervasiveness of disinformation, as well as new tools for tracking individuals which raise privacy issues.

This roundtable provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of (and barriers to) corporate activism, develop a better understanding of existing initiatives, identify good practice and routes to effective collaboration with other actors, and discuss practical strategies that could be adopted by the tech community.

It is the second of a series of roundtables at Chatham House in support of initiatives to build broad alliances for the protection of civic space.

How can companies defend civic space? 2 February 2021 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 January 2021 Online

Panellists discuss how companies can go beyond corporate social responsibility and philanthropy initiatives to protect and support civic freedoms around the world.

Please click on the below link to confirm your participation and receive your individual joining details from Zoom for this event. You will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which contains the option to add the event to your calendar if you so wish.

There is increasing pressure on companies to use their power and profits to engage with social and political causes. In doing so, companies can help to support the ‘shared civic space’ that enables the private sector and civil society organizations to benefit from a society that respects the rule of law and human rights, at a time when many of these rights are under threat around the world.

Many companies have introduced CSR initiatives, due diligence mechanisms and corporate philanthropy. Over 11,000 companies are now signatories to the UN’s Global Compact for sustainable and socially responsible business worldwide.

But as demonstrated by misguided corporate responses to the Black Lives Matter protests this year, there is a danger of corporate activism being perceived as ‘lip service’ rather than genuinely addressing the negative impacts of business operations on civic space.

Recent Chatham House research indicates that meaningful engagement by businesses on such issues must be timely, contextually sensitive and industry-relevant. For example, in 2015, Tiffany & Co. worked with other companies to intervene on behalf of Rafael Marques after he was arrested for reporting on widespread human rights abuses in the Angolan diamond industry. During COVID-19, Microsoft offered free cybersecurity software to healthcare and human rights organizations at increased risk of hacking attacks.

This panel event will draw upon practical examples of private sector support for civic space across different sectors, geographies and political environments.

Why might companies step up to defend freedom of association, expression or political participation even where this comes at a financial or political cost? How can companies resist complicity with governments or regulation that threaten civic space? And what forums exist, or should exist, for developing tactical alliances between companies and civil society actors?

This event is also the launch of a new Chatham House resource, The Role of the Private Sector in Protecting Civic Space.

Implications of post-COVID-19 Restructuring of Supply Chains for Global Investment Governance 14 July 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

As companies rethink and diversify their supply chains in order to enhance resilience, what will this mean for current and future global investment governance?

What are the risks of negative effects on inclusivity and transparency? Does this shift create an opportunity to advance good governance of cross-border investment practices?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

Insights from Climate Policy: Engaging Subnational Governments in Global Platforms 10 June 2020 — 2:45PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

How have subnational governments shaped the global agenda and created momentum on climate change where national and international governance processes could not?

Can these advances be converted into meaningful collaboration channels for policy development? What works, or does not, when it comes to engagement with multilateral negotiation processes? What ingredients are necessary for success? What are the broader implications of these trends for inclusivity and innovation in international governance?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

The Implication of Greater Use of Investment Screening 26 June 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 11 February 2021 Online

What is driving the trend towards greater use of investment screening by nation states and regional economic groupings?

• How is the COVID-19 crisis affecting this trend?
• What will the economic implications be?
• Will this help or hinder inclusivity and transparency in investment governance?
• Is there a role for international safeguards and/or international coordination of national/regional approaches to investment screening?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

The regional and international implications of restrictions to online freedom of expression in Asia 25 March 2021 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 March 2021 Online

Panellists discuss the latest developments affecting online freedom of expression in the Asia region.

Please note this is an online event. Please register using the link below to finalize your registration.

In recent years, state-led clampdowns on online freedom of expression have become widespread in several countries across Asia, further intensified by the COVID-19 crisis.

The reasons for this are complex and diverse – drawing upon history, culture and politics, in addition to external influences. Across the region, governments have been accused of silencing online criticism and failing to uphold rights to free speech.

Individuals have been arrested, fined or attacked for the alleged spread of ‘fake news’, raising concern among human rights organizations. In some countries, this has culminated in the imposition of new social media rules, which could require social media companies to censor posts and share decrypted messages.

In China, the government’s restrictive online regime has relied on a combination of legal, technical and manipulation tactics to manage control of the internet, and now includes attempts at censorship beyond its borders.

Panellists will discuss the latest regional developments affecting online freedom of expression in the Asia region, and will consider the broader regional and international implications for technology governance.

This webinar launches the publication Restrictions on online freedom of expression in China: The domestic, regional and international implications of China’s policies and practices.

Can global technology governance anticipate the future? Expert comment NCapeling 27 April 2021

Trying to govern disruption is perilous as complex technology is increasingly embedded in societies and omnipresent in economic, social, and political activity.

Technology governance is beset by the challenges of how regulation can keep pace with rapid digital transformation, how governments can regulate in a context of deep knowledge asymmetry, and how policymakers can address the transnational nature of technology.

Keeping pace with, much less understanding, the implications of digital platforms and artificial intelligence for societies is increasingly challenging as technology becomes more sophisticated and yet more ubiquitous.

To overcome these obstacles, there is an urgent need to move towards a more anticipatory and inclusive model of technology governance. There are some signs of this in recent proposals by the European Union (EU) and the UK on the regulation of online harms.

Regulation failing to keep up

The speed of the digital revolution, further accelerated by the pandemic, has largely outstripped policymakers’ ability to provide appropriate frameworks to regulate and direct technology transformations.

Governments around the world face a ‘pacing problem’, a phenomenon described by Gary Marchant in 2011 as ‘the growing gap between the pace of science and technology and the lagging responsiveness of legal and ethical oversight that society relies on to govern emerging technologies’.

This ever-growing rift, Marchant argues, has been exacerbated by the increasing public appetite for and adoption of new technologies, as well as political inertia. As a result, legislation on emerging technologies risks being ineffective or out-of-date by the time it is implemented.

Effective regulation requires a thorough understanding of both the underlying technology design, processes and business model, and how current or new policy tools can be used to promote principles of good governance.

Artificial intelligence, for example, is penetrating all sectors of society and spanning multiple regulatory regimes without any regard for jurisdictional boundaries. As technology is increasingly developed and applied by the private sector rather than the state, officials often lack the technical expertise to adequately comprehend and act on emerging issues. This increases the risk of superficial regulation which fails to address the underlying structural causes of societal harms.

The significant lack of knowledge from those who aim to regulate compared to those who design, develop and market technology is prevalent in most technology-related domains, including powerful online platforms and providers such as Facebook, Twitter, Google and YouTube.

For example, the ability for governments and researchers to access the algorithms used in the business model of social media companies to promote online content – harmful or otherwise – remains opaque so, to a crucial extent, the regulator is operating in the dark.

The transnational nature of technology also poses additional problems for effective governance. Digital technologies intensify the gathering, harvesting, and transfer of data across borders, challenging administrative boundaries both domestically and internationally.

While there have been some efforts at the international level to coordinate approaches to the regulation of – for example – artificial intelligence (AI) and online content governance, more work is needed to promote global regulatory alignment, including on cross-border data flows and antitrust.

Reactive national legislative approaches are often based on targeted interventions in specific policy areas, and so risk failing to address the scale, complexity, and transnational nature of socio-technological challenges. Greater attention needs to be placed on how regulatory functions and policy tools should evolve to effectively govern technology, requiring a shift from a reactionary and rigid framework to a more anticipatory and adaptive model of governance.

Holistic and systemic versus mechanistic and linear

Some recent proposals for technology governance may offer potential solutions. The EU publication of a series of interlinked regulatory proposals – the Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act and European Democracy Action Plan – integrates several novel and anticipatory features.

The EU package recognizes that the solutions to online harms such as disinformation, hate speech, and extremism lie in a holistic approach which draws on a range of disciplines, such as international human rights law, competition law, e-commerce, and behavioural science.

It consists of a combination of light touch regulation – such as codes of conduct – and hard law requirements such as transparency obligations. Codes of conduct provide flexibility as to how requirements are achieved by digital platforms, and can be updated and tweaked relatively easily enabling regulations to keep pace as technology evolves.

As with the EU Digital Services Act, the UK’s recent proposals for an online safety bill are innovative in adopting a ‘systems-based’ approach which broadly focuses on the procedures and policies of technology companies rather than the substance of online content.

This means the proposals can be adapted to different types of content, and differentiated according to the size and reach of the technology company concerned. This ‘co-regulatory’ model recognizes the evolving nature of digital ecosystems and the ongoing responsibilities of the companies concerned. The forthcoming UK draft legislation will also be complemented by a ‘Safety by Design’ framework, which is forward-looking in focusing on responsible product design.

By tackling the complexity and unpredictability of technology governance through holistic and systemic approaches rather than mechanistic and linear ones, the UK and EU proposals represent an important pivot from reactive to anticipatory digital governance.

Both sets of proposals were also the result of extensive multistakeholder engagement, including between policy officials and technology actors. This engagement broke down silos within the technical and policy/legal communities and helped bridge the knowledge gap between dominant technology companies and policymakers, facilitating a more agile, inclusive, and pragmatic regulatory approach.

Coherence rather than fragmentation

Anticipatory governance also recognizes the need for new coalitions to promote regulatory coherence rather than fragmentation at the international level. The EU has been pushing for greater transatlantic engagement on regulation of the digital space, and the UK – as chair of the G7 presidency in 2021 – aims to work with democratic allies to forge a coherent response to online harms.

Meanwhile the OECD’s AI Policy Observatory enables member states to share best practice on the regulation of AI, and an increasing number of states such as France, Norway, and the UK are using ‘regulatory sandboxes’ to test and build AI or personal data systems that meet privacy standards.

Not all states currently have the organizational capacity and institutional depth to design and deliver regulatory schemes of this nature, as well as the resource-intensive consultation processes which often accompany them.

So, as an increasing number of states ponder how to ‘futureproof’ their regulation of tomorrow’s technology – whether 6G, quantum computing or biotechnology – there is a need for capacity building in governments both on the theory of anticipatory governance and on how it can be applied in practice to global technology regulation.

Geopolitical shifts and evolving social challenges – what role for human rights? 29 June 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online

Speakers reflect on some of the key themes that will influence the future of human rights.

Please click on the below link to confirm your participation and receive your individual joining details from Zoom for this event. You will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which contains the option to add the event to your calendar if you so wish.

Shifts in geopolitical power and the rise of authoritarianism are disrupting the dynamics for making progress on human rights globally.

At the same time, the relevance of the global human rights framework is being called into question by some of our most acute social challenges – rapidly evolving technology, deepening inequality and the climate crisis.

Chatham House’s Human Rights Pathways project is exploring how alliances, strategies and institutions are adapting, and will need to evolve, to strengthen human rights protection in this increasingly contested and complex global environment.

At this panel event speakers reflect on some of the key themes that will influence the future of human rights, including the long-term impacts of the pandemic, the place of human rights diplomacy in the new geopolitics, the relevance of human rights to social movements, and the potential of human rights law to galvanise efforts on urgent challenges such as the climate crisis.

Strengthening Transatlantic Digital Cooperation

This project explores opportunities for increased cooperation via the transatlantic ‘tech triangle’ of the European Union, United Kingdom and United States.

This project serves as a cross-house initiative (involving the US and Americas Programme, the Europe Programme, the International Law Programme, the Digital Society Initiative and the International Security Programme).

Its long-term goal is to support the emergence of a global vision for technology governance: a vision drawing on democratic values and human rights principles. The project aims to extend the application of these principles to the digital space.

The first phase centres around a knowledge-exchange series, with findings and recommendations disseminated around targeted multilateral events such as G7, the United Nations General Assembly and the 2021 Internet Governance Forum.

Building on this exchange, the second phase will shift its focus to other democratic states and broaden digital cooperation dialogues from like-minded countries in the OECD, in addition to non-Western democracies and under-represented stakeholders from developing countries.

Learnings must become practice as the Taliban return Expert comment NCapeling 7 September 2021

There is greater awareness of the adverse impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions on humanitarian action. It is time to apply lessons learned.

The 9/11 attacks prompted the international community to adopt a wide range of counterterrorism measures. Debate continues over their compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law, and their effectiveness.

What has become clear is that some of these measures have made it difficult for humanitarian assistance to be provided to the millions of people living in areas under the control of armed groups designated as terrorist, or where such groups have a significant presence.

These include Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s Arabian peninsula, ISIL affiliates in Syria, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Hamas in Gaza, and various Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel. The lessons painfully learned need to be applied to Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

Impeding humanitarian work

Traditionally, legal counterterrorism measures criminalized acts of violence but, in recent years, measures adopted by the UN Security Council, the European Union (EU), and some states unilaterally, have expanded to address broader forms of support for terrorist acts and to groups designated as terrorist.

When these measures apply in situations of armed conflict – and in the absence of adequate safeguards – they can impede humanitarian organizations from operating as foreseen by IHL and in accordance with humanitarian principles, which require life-saving assistance to be provided in an impartial manner. Restrictions in sanctions imposed for policy objectives other than counterterrorism create similar tensions.

Prohibitions on making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to persons or groups designated as terrorist can capture incidental payments made during humanitarian operations and relief consignments which are diverted and end up in the hands of these designated groups.

The most extreme restrictions cover the provision of medical assistance, in violation of the foundational principle of IHL that everyone who is wounded and sick – civilian or fighter – is entitled to medical care without discrimination, and those who provide it must not be punished.

Humanitarian organizations have been highlighting these problems for more than a decade. Recent developments give cause for cautious optimism that a turning point has been reached, as the bodies imposing counterterrorism measures and sanctions internationally and domestically have begun to demand compliance with international law and IHL.

In 2019 the UN Security Council unanimously issued a binding demand to member states to ensure all counterterrorism measures they adopt comply with obligations under international law, including IHL.

Recent renewals of UN country-specific sanctions have included similar demands with regards to measures taken by member states to give effect to them. Although this still falls short of an express exception for humanitarian action, it is a significant development, and a strong encouragement to include appropriate safeguards when implementing UN measures domestically.

Similar encouraging practice is discernible at EU level, and new domestic counterterrorism laws adopted by several states include safeguards for humanitarian action.

Applying lessons learned to Afghanistan

It is too soon to know what policies the Taliban will adopt, and the measures that the international community will take to promote compliance with IHL, human rights, and counterterrorism objectives. Nonetheless, policymakers implementing sanctions – and considering their expansion – cannot ignore their potential adverse impact on humanitarian action. They must bear in mind five key lessons.

First, there must be clarity on current legal restrictions, starting from who is designated under sanctions and counterterrorism measures. The UN Security Council has never designated the Taliban per se. Instead, it has listed ‘individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban’. At present this list includes 135 individuals and five entities, four of which are ‘hawalas’ – money changers – the other being the Haqqani Network, a Sunni Islamist group.

UN financial sanctions require states to freeze the assets of designated persons and groups and ensure no funds, financial assets, or economic resources are made available to them, either directly or indirectly.

EU and UK sanctions simply replicate the restrictions and designations imposed by the UN, but the US has designated the Taliban as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’ which makes the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations applicable. These prohibit US nationals from making any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to, or for, the benefit of the Taliban.

Second, while listed individuals may play a role in the forthcoming Taliban administration, sanctions do not prohibit providing resources to a government department headed by a designated person.

There is a distinction between an individual and a department, and prohibitions in counterterrorism measures or sanctions on the provision of funds or other assets apply to the designated person, not to the department they may head.

Problems may arise if a designated person appropriates resources for personal benefit or to undermine policy objectives for which the sanctions were imposed. But this does not bring the department within the scope of the designation. Instead, the issue must be addressed from a prevention of diversion perspective.

Third, sanctions and counterterrorism measures must be designed so as to minimize their adverse impact on humanitarian action. One way of doing so is designating leadership figures rather than groups. The new US administration took this approach towards the Houthi in Yemen, with the designation of the group being revoked and new designations focusing on its leaders.

The chilling effect of sanctions is far broader than the actual restrictions they impose. Commercial actors in particular limit their activities in areas they perceive as high risk. In view of this, the effect of expanding existing designations to list the Taliban, now that it is in control of Afghanistan, would be to turn targeted sanctions into comprehensive ones.

In parallel, sanctions or counterterrorism measures should include express safeguards, which exclude funds, assets, and other support provided during humanitarian action from the restrictions – ideally in the form of exceptions or, if an option, general licences.

The adverse impact of the US Global Terrorism Sanctions has been limited until now, as only a small number of humanitarian actors subject to US measures operated in areas under Taliban control. This has now changed, and it is imperative the US issue a broad general licence to exclude assistance provided during humanitarian action from the sanctions.

Fourth, restrictions in funding agreements must not be more onerous than the underlying measures they aim to promote compliance with – in particular, they must not require screening or exclusion of final beneficiaries from the assistance they have been determined as requiring.

Finally, engagement with non-state armed groups for humanitarian purposes is essential for conducting operations effectively and safely, both for humanitarian organizations and the people they are trying to assist. Counterterrorism measures and sanctions do not prohibit such contact even when such groups or their members have been designated.

The past two decades have given states ample time to learn to avoid the adverse impact of sanctions and counterterrorism measures on humanitarian action. The people of Afghanistan deserve that these lessons now be applied.

Our research paper IHL and the humanitarian impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions identifies the principal points of friction between these bodies of law, clarifies outstanding issues and misunderstandings, and offers practical recommendations for resolving tensions.

The trickle-up effect of rights-based climate litigation Expert comment NCapeling 16 November 2021

With governments failing in their pledges and companies accused of ‘green-washing’, human rights-based litigation is increasingly important for accountability.

Tuvalu’s foreign minister addressing COP26 while standing knee-deep in seawater was a stark illustration of how the climate emergency directly and imminently threatens the most basic human rights protected under international law – including to the right to life, self-determination and cultural rights.

Human rights are now a fundamental component of more than 90 per cent of the climate litigation currently taking place outside the US, highlighting the international reach of human rights law and how its emphasis on protecting the most vulnerable helps diverse communities find common arguments for shared goals.

Cases are set to continue and to evolve but three types of claim are emerging, each of which is examined in a new Chatham House briefing paper.

1. Enforcing commitments

One category of cases seeks to hold states accountable for pledges they have made on climate change, such as emission reduction targets made under the framework of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Drawing on human rights obligations, governments can be charged with not taking sufficient steps to implement these pledges.

The case of Leghari v Pakistan (2015) concerned the government’s failure to carry out the National Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014-2030). The Lahore High Court held that several of the human rights enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution cover climate change and ‘provide the necessary judicial toolkit to address the government’s response to climate change’.

The court ordered the government to carry out measures such as publishing an adaptation action plan realizable within a few months of the order and establishing a Climate Change Commission to monitor progress.

2. Positive duties to mitigate risks

Many rights-based climate cases are being brought to clarify the scope of states’ positive duties under human rights law to take meaningful steps to protect their citizens against foreseeable risks to life and other rights.

This ‘trickle-up’ effect of human rights was prominent in the case of State of the Netherlands vs the Urgenda Foundation (2019) where the Dutch Supreme Court held that reducing emissions with the highest possible level of ambition amounts to a ‘due diligence standard’ for states to comply with their positive duties to adopt adequate measures to address climate change. Human rights law was also used by the court to fill in the content of the due diligence standards.

There is also a growing trend for rights-based actions to be brought against corporations, such as a recent case which drew on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to define the parameters of Shell’s duty of care and due diligence obligations in relation to carbon emissions under Dutch law. The court ordered Shell to reduce emissions by a net rate of 45 per cent by the end of 2030 – relative to 2019 figures – through its group corporate policy.

3. Avoiding harm in climate action

The global human rights regime is also increasingly invoked in litigation concerning states’ negative obligations to ensure that their climate mitigation and adaptation activities do not themselves contribute to human rights violations (including discrimination) and that states prioritize adaptation measures for those most at risk in a just and equitable way.

As Chatham House’s paper makes clear, this kind of litigation ‘puts pressure on governments to expand their approach to tackling climate change beyond purely a regulatory one to a more holistic strategy’.

Closing the climate justice gap

Climate and environmental litigation grounded in human rights is set to continue given the overwhelming scientific evidence of risks associated with human-induced climate change and the limited confidence in pledges made by states and corporations alike – including those made recently at COP26.

A growing collaboration between civil society organizations and vulnerable communities in relation to both the protection of nature and the enjoyment of their land and cultural rights was evident at COP26, and this alliance will add further momentum to the trend for rights-based climate litigation based on the rights of indigenous and other vulnerable communities, especially on issues such as deforestation.

But more challenges are coming. International human rights law recognizes a duty of international cooperation but there remain significant hurdles for climate-vulnerable communities in developing countries to compel action by richer nations despite the vast debts of ‘carbon colonialism.’

One big issue is the problem of extraterritoriality, as the extent to which states owe obligations to individuals outside their territory is contested. Courts in both Germany and the Netherlands have rejected claimants from developing countries in domestic class actions on this basis. But a recent decision of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on a complaint brought by Greta Thunberg and other youth activists against five countries opens the door for further litigation.

One of a number of cases being brought by youth claimants across the world, the committee concluded that a state’s human rights duties can – in some instances – extend to children in other countries. This includes any activities on the territory that host states have the power to prevent from causing ‘transboundary harm’ – such as emissions from the territory – where these activities ‘significantly’ impact the enjoyment of human rights of persons outside the territory.

To date, high-profile rights-based cases have argued for policy change and stronger targets underpinned by binding legislation responsive to the science. Claims are set to become more complex and contested. Building on scientific developments in climate attribution, rights-based litigation is now tackling other difficult questions such as apportioning responsibility and remedial action.

These cases examine both historically high emitters and the public and private actors who either continue specific activities or refrains from action in the face of the overwhelming science linking human activities such as extraction and burning of fossil fuels to deforestation and climatic consequences.

Courts are also likely to explore the duties that states and corporations owe to deliver a ‘just transition’ away from carbon-intensive industries, given the benefits of growth and climate action are already unevenly distributed.

A holistic human-rights based approach

Several states together with civil society are leading the charge for global recognition of the right to a healthy, clean, and sustainable environment in the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, and multi-stakeholder processes are defining what effective corporate due diligence looks like.

In addition, UN-appointed special rapporteurs are delivering practical guidance on how to devise solutions which are fair, non-discriminatory, participatory, and climate-resilient without exacerbating inequality – including difficult issues of planned relocation – and UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies are unpacking the duty of international cooperation to act in good faith to address loss and damage.

Recently the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recommended the Marshall Islands, in order to meet its duty to its citizens, should actively seek international cooperation and assistance – including climate change financing – from other countries but in particular the US, whose ‘extraterritorial nuclear testing activities have exacerbated the adverse effects of climate change and natural disasters’ in the islands.

Re-imagining trade for domestic and foreign policy Expert comment NCapeling 7 December 2021

Exploring future trade policy through issues such as the green transition, labour standards, human rights, the role of the WTO, and non-trade policy objectives.

Balancing trade and non-trade policy objectives

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

The supply chain disruptions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic highlight trade cannot be taken for granted, and economic interdependencies have both benefits and costs. As international commerce rebounds and trade policy is increasingly seen through the prism of enhancing resilience, the moment is ripe to redefine and reimagine trade.

The goal of trade policy has never been to increase trade for trade’s sake, so a new narrative and framework for global trade requires striking a careful balance between pursuing trade and non-trade policy objectives.

Protecting the environment, strengthening labour standards, and upholding human rights have long been goals for which trade policy is used as a lever, and the interaction of trade and national security interests as well as the links between trade and competition policy are not new issues either.

All these non-trade policy aspects have come to the forefront as the geopolitical context has shifted and the transition to green and digital economies has gathered force – and, at times, these different non-trade policy goals clash.

The US and European Union (EU) are promoting solar energy to fight climate change but supply chains for solar panels are heavily reliant on forced labour from Xinjiang, and hence it is not yet certain whether environmental or human rights concerns will prevail. However, it is clear trade policy tools can be part of a comprehensive solution which manages inherent tensions while still advancing both objectives.

Trade policy is also not just a foreign policy instrument but links closely to domestic policy – the populist backlash against globalization in much of the developed world, especially the US and Europe, was in part driven by anti-trade sentiment.

While American attitudes towards trade improved after the 2016 election of Donald Trump, positive views towards trade dropped sharply in 2021. The Biden administration’s worker-centred trade policy aims to address distributional effects of international economic integration which is a long-standing challenge. Thus, tackling non-trade policy issues without losing sight of this unresolved core issue requires careful calibration.

Trade policy is being pulled in many different directions at the same time as the core institution governing global trade – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – is in crisis, and it is uncertain how much of the non-trade policy agenda the WTO can handle. If the linkage to non-trade policy becomes too strong, this could be the straw that breaks the WTO’s back, but if it is too weak, the WTO risks becoming irrelevant in efforts to tackle key global challenges.

But if its 164 members can generate trade-oriented solutions to non-trade issues, they can revive the organization and mobilize domestic support for global trade at the same time. This balancing act in managing the tensions between trade and non-trade policy objectives lies at the centre of future-proofing trade policy and global trade governance.

Developing countries must be part of green trade revolution

Carolyn Deere Birkbeck

The biggest challenge in taking environmental efforts forward within the multilateral context is to successfully combine environmental ambition with an approach which engages developing countries as partners, reflects their environment-related trade priorities, and addresses their sustainable development interests.

The importance of engaging developing countries must not be underestimated because it is vital a global green economy does not leave the poorest behind, or becomes two-tier where green trade happens only between certain countries and the essential task of incentivizing and supporting sustainable production and consumption patterns in all countries is neglected.

The new member-led initiatives at the WTO do signal that, while the rulemaking and negotiating functions remain central to the global trade body, governments recognize the need for enhanced, transparent, and inclusive policy dialogue as well as problem-solving on sectoral issues and specific trade-related challenges.

Given the well-documented challenges of achieving multilateral consensus at the WTO, governments are exploring new ways to work within multilateral frameworks and to redefine what progress and successful outcomes should look like.

Therefore, there is a need for best practices, voluntary action, pledges, and guidelines to both sustain the relevance of the multilateral trading system and support policy action at the national level for trade which underpins environmental and wider sustainable goals.

Making progress on an environmental agenda which reflects sustainable development concerns requires stronger leadership, engagement, and advocacy from business, civil society, and research communities in both developing and developed countries, as well as economies in transition.

Meaningful, inclusive dialogue and action at the WTO also requires deeper efforts to build policy coherence among environment, development, and trade policymaking at home, with environmental ministries having a key role to play in bringing expertise to bear and ensuring strong regulatory environments and institutions for the implementation of national, regional, and international environmental commitments.

But at the domestic level, many countries still have to overcome complex politics and diverse interests as they work to transform their economies toward greater sustainability and tackle the costs of transition.

Social preparation holds the key to trade transitions

Bernice Lee 

Trade being often depicted as the mother of all ills should not come as a surprise, as politicians are only too happy to put the blame on trade when all sorts of exogenous shocks, such as technological change, could actually be the trigger which fires the bullet into local industries or jobs.

Admittedly trade does have a way of breaking the seams in the social fabric but the fact politicians often ignore negative impacts of trade means its benefits can be likened to Schrodinger’s cat, both real and illusive. But trade being mainly depicted as a ‘zero-sum’ pursuit and trade deals as the result of swashbuckling duels belie the reality that the real business of trade is often boring, bureaucratic, but necessary.

This is particularly true when trade provides access to a much larger variety of necessary products, such as medicine, food, and minerals, which can be expensive to make domestically. Selling products and services abroad also brings in the hard currency needed to buy these goods or to spend on trips abroad.

This does not take away the fact trade is extremely disruptive but, as a result of all the theorizing and understandable rants about trade, large swathes of the international community have effectively foregone it as a force for good or as an instrument which – while not the answer to all problems – can help smooth the path to well-being through efficiency gains and income growth, as well as putting to work the theory of comparative advantage as promised by the textbooks.

Alas, what the textbooks do not clearly spell out – until recently – is that trade brings positive benefits only if a society is ready for trade, which often means having the cushion for social protection such as healthcare, unemployment benefits, and opportunities for training and reskilling.

The ‘China shock’ literature vividly depicts how workers rarely seamlessly move from one job or sector to another and so, without adequate social protection, trade not only magnifies existing fractures, it also exacerbates inequality. As the aftershock lingers for decades, the lesson learned is the importance of social readiness for trade, especially the role played by governments in providing support for workers as part of the adjustment to trade and globalization.

Authors of this China shock literature recently suggested the next shock will be the transition from fossil fuel production, but the good news is this so-called ‘just transition’ challenge is one which proponents of green energy are well aware of.

But ultimately the China shock could be the dry run for the advent of machine intelligence, meaning better preparation is needed with solid social policies, investment in institutional readiness, and social preparedness to ensure the machines only take on monotonous and unsafe work – not our livelihoods and communities.

Trading partners must move to creating human rights impact

Dr Jennifer Zerk

The question of whether, and how, trade policy should be used as a way of addressing human rights concerns remains controversial and attempts to link the two still attract accusations of ‘protectionism’ and ‘neo-colonialism’.

Momentum appears to be behind those arguing for greater alignment between trade policy and human rights objectives – a trend which is most noticeable in the increasing willingness of trade partners to reference human rights standards in their trade agreements and in the growth of complementary activities such as human rights impact assessment and monitoring.

Evidence that these are having an impact ‘on the ground’ remains elusive. Nevertheless, efforts to enhance scrutiny of trade agreements from a human rights perspective, and to signal the importance of respect for human rights to a trading relationship, can still have value.

Even if causal relationships between trading arrangements and human rights impacts are difficult to establish conclusively, human rights impact assessment and subsequent monitoring activities provide valuable opportunities for stakeholders to weigh in on aspects of trade policy which are of concern.

Such processes not only help governments to realize rights of public participation, they also contribute to good governance by making it more likely that potential human rights problems will be recognized and addressed.

Turning to the agreements themselves, various ideas have been put forward on how to make these more responsive to human rights concerns.

Options mooted by EU institutions in recent years include an enhanced monitoring and enforcement role for consultative bodies established under specialized ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters, and better mainstreaming of human rights commitments in sector-specific chapters.

However, given the political and resource-related difficulties in developing credible monitoring systems for human rights-related issues, and the unlikelihood of actual enforcement, many view this as little more than window-dressing.

For governments wanting to see real impact, ‘supply chain due diligence’ regimes pioneered by the EU in relation to timber and conflict minerals present a promising regulatory model.

These regimes seek to curb trade in products derived from, or which aggravate, human rights abuses as well as aiming to promote more responsible sourcing of products by EU importers. They create powerful incentives within partner countries to crack down on harmful practices by producers, which are bolstered further by regulations that demand more proactive human rights risk management by EU operators throughout their supply chains. Capacity-building and aid packages have been deployed to help speed up the necessary reforms.

New regulatory measures imposing mandatory human rights due diligence obligations on companies operating in a much broader range of sectors are now under consideration by the European Commission. While the role of trade-related measures in the enforcement of this new regime is still unclear, trading partners should be sure to preserve the regulatory space for sector-level and company-level initiatives such as these in future agreements.

Understanding the impact of NTPOs on investment

Professor Michael Gasiorek

Increasingly, trade policy is not just all about achieving trade-related outcomes as international trade, by definition, involves interaction with partner countries and therefore trade policy with regard to those partner countries can be used as a means to achieve ‘non-trade policy objectives’ (NTPOs).

In turn this means trade policy is also no longer just about the domestic economy but also about policies and economies in other countries – such as poorer countries achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs), concerns about practices in other countries in areas such as governance or corruption, or a desire to address broader challenges such as climate change.

But the inclusion of NTPOs in trade policy arrangements between countries also creates possible impacts on investment flows between countries. Stronger NTPO commitments could have a negative impact both on foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment because the commitments increase costs for the companies involved which makes the investment less attractive.

However, NTPOs bringing progress on governance, or strengthening institutions, or giving more clarity on environmental regulations could signal a more stable and safe business environment, with production standards which create increased market access for exports – all of which may lead to increased incentives to invest.

A third possibility is that NTPOs do not have much effect either way because, although trade agreement increasingly include provisions on economic and social rights, or civil and political rights, or environmental protection – these are typically ‘best endeavour’ clauses which are frequently not binding or subject to dispute settlement, making them less likely to be implemented.

Why the private sector should protect civic society Explainer Video NCapeling 10 December 2021

A short animation explaining the crucial role that the private sector can play in protecting and defending civic space.

This video explainer introduces a synthesis paper which analyses how the private sector can support the protection of civic society space.

The private sector is in a unique position to work with civil society organizations to uphold and defend civic freedoms and support sustainable and profitable business environments. Companies have the capacity, resources and expertise to enhance the protection of civic space.

By doing so, this helps create a society in which fundamental rights and the rule of law are respected and exercised by governments, private citizens, and all organizations which, in turn, is critical to a sustainable and profitable business environment.  

For more information, download the report.

Transatlantic Tech Talks: Cooperation or sovereignty? Audio bhorton.drupal 15 December 2021

A new mini-series from Undercurrents explores international cooperation on regulating the tech sector.

Transatlantic Tech Talks is a three part mini-series on the Undercurrents podcast feed, produced with the support of Microsoft, which explores the state of international cooperation on digital governance between the United States, the UK and Europe.

As technological innovation accelerates, and new digital tools and business models arise, governments are working to develop a framework of regulations to safeguard the rights and interests of their citizens. Not all stakeholders agree, however, on the best way to achieve this. While some advocate a ‘digital cooperation’ approach based on transparency and data-sharing, others are more concerned with maintaining ‘digital sovereignty’.

In the first episode of this series, Ben is joined by Casper Klynge, Harriet Moynihan and Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, who set out the broad context for these debates. They assess where the major government, private sector and civil society actors stand on the question of digital governance, and how they are approaching the international negotiations.

Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications Expert comment NCapeling 24 February 2022

Russia is violating international law in Ukraine using baseless allegations, and states’ responses should be guided accordingly.

Russia has begun a large-scale military attack on Ukraine, having first declared it recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as separate states. It scarcely needs saying Russia is violating international law – violating the prohibition in the United Nations (UN) Charter on the use of force, violating the obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, and violating the prohibition on intervention.

But Russia is using the language of the law to defend its actions. In all the recent verbiage of President Vladimir Putin, some attempts at legal arguments can be elicited – but they do not stand up to scrutiny.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force with the only two Charter exceptions to this prohibition being self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council. In his speech on 23 February, Putin points to two grounds on which Russia relies on self-defence – defence in aid of the two breakaway republics and self-defence in the light of threats against Russia itself.

Donetsk, Luhansk, and collective self-defence

Putin said ‘the people’s republics of Donbass turned to Russia with a request for help’ and went on to seek to justify his military action under Article 51 of the Charter. But it is only in respect of states that the right of collective self-defence exists – humanitarian intervention on behalf of individuals in a state has not gained a place in international law. And it is only Russia which has recognized the statehood of the two regions.

Putin repeated on 23 February his earlier allegation that the people of the two breakaway republics are being repressed by the Ukraine government, and even that genocide is being committed against them. This baseless allegation is relevant not only to the claim of self-defence on behalf of these regions but also to Russia’s ‘recognition’ of them as separate states.

International law does not give the inhabitants of a part of a state the right to secede from that state. The aspect of self-determination which allows for independence of a ‘people’ applies to peoples in colonies and other overseas territories under the occupation of another state. The other aspect of self-determination is ‘internal’ and comprises the right to freely choose political status and pursue economic, social, and cultural development within the state – as the Minsk accords sought to provide for Donetsk and Luhansk.

There is a somewhat controversial theory in international law that would give a right of secession from a state if the people in question were subject to extreme abuse of human rights and systematic oppression. This is the theory of remedial secession, which some countries, such as Switzerland, used in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in relation to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia – an independence still not recognized by Russia.

But the theory has no support from the international courts and, even if it did, Russia itself has stated previously that a right of remedial secession is ‘limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question’ (see Russia’s submissions to the ICJ in the Kosovo case, para 88).

The facts do not substantiate Russia’s claims anyway. The law is as stated on behalf of the UN Secretary-General on 21 February – that Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions is a ‘violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ There are no ‘states’ which can request the use of military force.

Is Ukraine a threat against Russia?

Putin refers to the ‘further expansion of the infrastructure of the North Atlantic Alliance, the military development of the territories of Ukraine’ as creating an ‘anti-Russia’ comprising a ‘real threat not just to our interests, but to the very existence of our state, its sovereignty’.

Article 51 allows for self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This has been interpreted by many states to include defence against the threat of an imminent attack – for example, there is no requirement to wait until a nuclear strike has begun. But under no interpretation of ‘imminence’ can the situation in Ukraine constitute a threat to Russia. There have been no threats of force against Russia from Ukraine nor from NATO member states. There is nothing to support a legal justification for Russia’s military attack against Ukraine.

The myth of Ukraine never having had ‘real statehood’ also does not give any legal justification for Russian aggression. The UN is based on the ‘principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter). Ukraine retained its membership in the UN at the dissolution of the USSR, having been one of the founding members of the UN as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

What are the legal consequences of Russia’s actions?

Within the UN, it is the Security Council which has the mandate to uphold international peace and security, and act when there is a threat to the peace. But there will be no help from there with Russia’s status as a permanent member holding a veto.

The UN General Assembly may act instead. Since 2014 it has adopted a series of resolutions (the latest on 9 December 2021) requiring Russia to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Crimea. But the General Assembly does not have the powers of the Security Council, and cannot mandate peacekeepers or the use of force.

In due course there may be the need for a UN Human Rights Commission of Inquiry to be launched if there are breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law, and human rights cases may be brought against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. But international institutions do not have the necessary powers to stop what is going on right now.

International law gives the right to Ukraine, being attacked, to call for support from other states. And as well as imposing sanctions, states may wish to consider cyber countermeasures. Some of the recent cyber activity against Ukraine has been attributed by the US, UK, and Australia to the Russian Main Intelligence Unit (GRU).

Geopolitical corporate responsibility can drive change Expert comment NCapeling 26 July 2022

Russia’s long invasion of Ukraine is testing the commitment of business, but this could see the emergence of a new pillar of support for the rules-based international order.

The massive exit of more than 1,000 international companies from Russia has surpassed – by a factor of nearly ten in merely four months – the number which pulled out of apartheid-led South Africa over an entire decade.

These company exits extend beyond those industries targeted for sanctions – oil and gas, banks and financial services, aerospace, and certain technology sectors – to include hundreds in consumer products ranging from Levi’s and H&M clothing to Coca-Cola and McDonalds. Many of these companies may wish to return to a post-conflict – or post-Putin – Russia, while a few have already sold their Russian operations, as McDonald’s has to an existing Siberian licensee.

Both reputational and operational factors are driving the huge exodus: reputational as companies have chosen to disassociate themselves from Putin’s regime; operational as transportation routes and supply chains have been interrupted.

Few of these companies have made explicit the principles at stake, while many still face ‘tricky legal, operational and ethical considerations’ and some have kept operations in place. But the collective impact of the exit in response to Russia’s affront to international law has sent shockwaves around the world.

Current issues and future implications

Minds now turn to whether this exodus sets a blueprint for the future, and how companies having to make complex and sensitive risk assessments and global business planning decisions can address both current issues as well as similar future challenges.

The new Declaration from the Business for Ukraine Coalition – an international civil society initiative of organizations and individuals – encourages companies to reinforce ‘responsible exit’ from Russia ‘in response to its unprovoked, full-scale war on Ukraine’.

The declaration’s objective is to ‘block access to the economic and financial resources enabling Russian aggression’ and it urgently calls on companies that have terminated or suspended their business operations and relationships to ‘stand by those commitments until the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine within internationally recognized borders is restored.’

It also states companies yet to terminate or suspend operations in Russia should do so unless they can demonstrate through due diligence that their provision of ‘essential’ services or products – such as medicines – meet critical humanitarian needs.

The 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer Special Report: The Geopolitical Business suggests Ukraine represents an inflection point posing ‘a new test’ for business. According to an online survey of 14,000 respondents in 14 countries, including employees, NGOs, and other stakeholders, there is a ‘rising call’ for business to be more engaged in geopolitics, with CEOs ‘expected to shape policy’ on societal and geopolitical issues.

Such expectations have been intensifying with the impetus of the combined stakeholder capitalism and corporate purpose agenda, even as a political backlash in the US against the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) movement linking institutional investors and multinational corporations gains momentum.

The emergence of corporate activism is a further development – partly driven by employees and accelerated during the pandemic – on issues of economic inequality, racial injustice, and gender equality, as well as the climate crisis.

When considering what broader purpose should drive this corporate geopolitical engagement, the Business for Ukraine Declaration offers an answer, calling Russia’s aggression ‘an attack on the rules-based international order which must be protected to ‘safeguard the international community and the global economy.’

This points to broader interests and values at stake in the Russian war on Ukraine because supporting the rules-based international order can become the basis of a new geopolitical corporate responsibility. Business, especially multinational corporations and institutional investors, fundamentally depend on and have enormously benefitted from this order.

Economic development needs a stable rules-based international order

Trade and investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation – the sinews of economic development – depend on predictable, rational behaviour by states at home and abroad. Individual companies and entire industries share a stake in upholding this order at a time when its stability and even legitimacy is undergoing a severe challenge.

The rules-based international order has evolved since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and the establishment of the standards, norms and institutions that reflect and reinforce these lodestars. It defines the international community, the rule of law, accountable governance, civic freedoms, and human rights within nations. It also supports national self-determination, sovereignty, and the disavowal of the use of force to alter borders among nations, and it provides accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

Business has a fundamental stake in the international order as the framework for stability, prosperity, open societies, and markets.

A new geopolitical corporate responsibility does not need to become a doctrine but can instead be an agenda to support the international rules-based order under stress. Such an agenda may help multinationals deal with expectations they already face, such as:

Avoiding situations where they cause, contribute, or are directly linked to human rights abuses. This objective is enshrined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and companies can be further informed by the new UN Guide to Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence for Business in Conflict-Affected Contexts.

Committing to the ‘shared space’ of the rule of law, accountable governance, civic freedoms, and human rights. These are both the enablers of civil society and the underpinning of sustainable and profitable business and investment environments. The Chatham House synthesis paper The role of the private sector in protecting civic space sets forth the rationale for companies to defend these vital elements.

Supporting peace, justice, and strong institutions both within nations and across the international community as set forth by UN Sustainable Development Goal 16. The SDG 16 Business Framework: Inspiring Transformational Governance shows how companies, as well as national governments and international institutions, can contribute to these building blocks of stability and prosperity.

Demonstrating corporate responsibility at the national and geopolitical levels to enhance equity, transparency, and accountability. Multinationals are already challenged to accept minimum corporate taxation within and across jurisdictions, curb excessive executive compensation, endorse mandatory disclosure of environmental and human rights due diligence, and strengthen corporate governance of ESG risks and responsibilities, including with respect to human rights.

Diminishing inequality by tackling poverty and ensuring sustainability by arresting the climate crisis. Alongside governments and international institutions, the business community already faces increasing pressure to improve its efforts in these areas.

The ICC response to Russia’s war gives hope for justice Expert comment NCapeling 19 March 2023

The ICC’s arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova show the commission of international crimes is not without consequences.

Warrants of arrest for Russian president Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, commissioner for children’s rights in the president’s office, have been issued because the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has reasonable grounds to believe they have committed war crimes.

Following an independent investigation and evidence-gathering by the ICC prosecutor Karim Khan in his first new case since taking office, the pair are accused of committing two different war crimes – the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia, and the unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

The focus on those two war crimes is likely due to clear evidence that deportation and forcible transfer of thousands of Ukrainian children have occurred, as the Russian government was overt about its policy of taking Ukrainian children to Russia and placing them in camps or putting them up for adoption by Russian families.

Furthermore, in line with the Office of the Prosecutor’s policy on children, crimes against children are prioritized given their particularly vulnerable status.

Jurisdiction and enforcement

The ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed fully in Russia by Russian nationals, as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute which created the ICC.

However, it does have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in Ukraine irrespective of who committed them, pursuant to two declarations lodged by Ukraine in 2014 accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over its territory from November 2013.

Although a prosecution has been initiated, it is ultimately for the judges of the ICC to decide on the accused’s fate. But the chances of Putin getting arrested or tried for these offences are slim.

The ICC lacks enforcement or police powers and depends on state cooperation to execute arrest warrants. Also, because it cannot try individuals in their absence, a trial or conviction cannot occur without Putin and Lvova-Belova being in custody.

But by issuing and unsealing these arrest warrants, the ICC is relying on the symbolic function of international criminal law – it is publicly naming and shaming Putin and Lvova-Belova for the commission of serious atrocities, and it is sending a message to other leaders and the international community that such actions are not without consequence.

The arrest warrants also give victims some form of vindication or recognition for their suffering and hope for justice in the future. And making the warrants public enables the ICC to reclaim itself as a key avenue for ensuring accountability for international crimes, following a wave of criticism and disenchantment about its work in Africa and delays in advancing its investigation on Afghanistan.

International courts gearing into action

This ICC case is the latest in a series of ongoing cases related to Russia’s war in Ukraine before different international courts and tribunals. Others include at least four cases before the European Court of Human Rights for events that occurred before Russia was excluded from the Council of Europe, such as the MH17 flight case and the annexation of Crimea.

Two cases have also been brought by Ukraine against Russia before the International Court of Justice – in 2017 and 2022 – with hearings scheduled for June. An unprecedented number of states parties have sought to intervene in one or more of these cases.

Each case must be considered on its own merits and the decisions cannot be prejudged. But they showcase an important feature of the global legal system and its judicial architecture that cannot be underestimated – the ability to quickly swing into action in response to violations of international law. In this case, the response was prompted by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in breach of the United Nations Charter and fundamental principles of international law.

A starting point for a bigger case

The ICC prosecutor already has a broader investigation into other international crimes committed in Ukraine since 21 November 2013. So this is likely to be just the starting point of a much bigger case against Putin and other senior Russian officials for international crimes committed in the context of the war in Ukraine and within the ICC’s jurisdiction.

These potentially include other war crimes such as the indiscriminate or disproportionate targeting of civilians, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

Mammalian circadian clocks are driven by transcription/translation feedback loops composed of positive transcriptional activators (BMAL1 and CLOCK) and negative repressors (CRYPTOCHROMEs (CRYs) and PERIODs (PERs)). CRYs, in complex with PERs, bind to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex and repress E-box–driven transcription of clock-associated genes. There are two individual CRYs, with CRY1 exhibiting higher affinity to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex than CRY2. It is known that this differential binding is regulated by a dynamic serine-rich loop adjacent to the secondary pocket of both CRYs, but the underlying features controlling loop dynamics are not known. Here we report that allosteric regulation of the serine-rich loop is mediated by Arg-293 of CRY1, identified as a rare CRY1 SNP in the Ensembl and 1000 Genomes databases. The p.Arg293His CRY1 variant caused a shortened circadian period in a Cry1−/−Cry2−/− double knockout mouse embryonic fibroblast cell line. Moreover, the variant displayed reduced repressor activity on BMAL1/CLOCK driven transcription, which is explained by reduced affinity to BMAL1/CLOCK in the absence of PER2 compared with CRY1. Molecular dynamics simulations revealed that the p.Arg293His CRY1 variant altered a communication pathway between Arg-293 and the serine loop by reducing its dynamicity. Collectively, this study provides direct evidence that allosterism in CRY1 is critical for the regulation of circadian rhythm.

Zika virus (ZIKV) is a neurotropic flavivirus that causes several diseases including birth defects such as microcephaly. Intrinsic immunity is known to be a frontline defense against viruses through host anti-viral restriction factors. Limited knowledge is available on intrinsic immunity against ZIKV in brains. Amyloid precursor protein (APP) is predominantly expressed in brains and implicated in the pathogenesis of Alzheimer's diseases. We have found that ZIKV interacts with APP, and viral infection increases APP expression via enhancing protein stability. Moreover, we identified the viral peptide, HGSQHSGMIVNDTGHETDENRAKVEITPNSPRAEATLGGFGSLGL, which is capable of en-hancing APP expression. We observed that aging brain tissues with APP had protective effects on ZIKV infection by reducing the availability of the viruses. Also, knockdown of APP expression or blocking ZIKV-APP interactions enhanced ZIKV replication in human neural progenitor/stem cells. Finally, intracranial infection of ZIKV in APP-null neonatal mice resulted in higher mortality and viral yields. Taken together, these findings suggest that APP is a restriction factor that protects against ZIKV by serving as a decoy receptor, and plays a protective role in ZIKV-mediated brain injuries.

Reactive oxygen species (ROS) are an unavoidable host environmental cue for intracellular pathogens such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis and Mycobacterium bovis; however, the signaling pathway in mycobacteria for sensing and responding to environmental stress remains largely unclear. Here, we characterize a novel CmtR-Zur-ESX3-Zn2+ regulatory pathway in M. bovis that aids mycobacterial survival under oxidative stress. We demonstrate that CmtR functions as a novel redox sensor and that its expression can be significantly induced under H2O2 stress. CmtR can physically interact with the negative regulator Zur and de-represses the expression of the esx-3 operon, which leads to Zn2+ accumulation and promotion of reactive oxygen species detoxication in mycobacterial cells. Zn2+ can also act as an effector molecule of the CmtR regulator, using which the latter can de-repress its own expression for further inducing bacterial antioxidant adaptation. Consistently, CmtR can induce the expression of EsxH, a component of esx-3 operon involved in Zn2+ transportation that has been reported earlier, and inhibit phagosome maturation in macrophages. Lastly, CmtR significantly contributes to bacterial survival in macrophages and in the lungs of infected mice. Our findings reveal the existence of an antioxidant regulatory pathway in mycobacteria and provide novel information on stress-triggered gene regulation and its association with host–pathogen interaction.