Jesper V. Olsen
Jun 1, 2004; 3:608-614
Technology

Leigh Anderson
Apr 1, 2006; 5:573-588
Research

Ignat V. Shilov
Sep 1, 2007; 6:1638-1655
Technology

Albrecht Gruhler
Mar 1, 2005; 4:310-327
Research

Philip L. Ross
Dec 1, 2004; 3:1154-1169
Research

Leukocidin ED (LukED) is a pore-forming toxin produced by Staphylococcus aureus, which lyses host cells and promotes virulence of the bacteria. LukED enables S. aureus to acquire iron by lysing erythrocytes, which depends on targeting the host receptor Duffy antigen receptor for chemokines (DARC). The toxin also targets DARC on the endothelium, contributing to the lethality observed during bloodstream infection in mice. LukED is comprised of two monomers: LukE and LukD. LukE binds to DARC and facilitates hemolysis, but the closely related Panton–Valentine leukocidin S (LukS-PV) does not bind to DARC and is not hemolytic. The interaction of LukE with DARC and the role this plays in hemolysis are incompletely characterized. To determine the domain(s) of LukE that are critical for DARC binding, we studied the hemolytic function of LukE–LukS-PV chimeras, in which areas of sequence divergence (divergence regions, or DRs) were swapped between the toxins. We found that two regions of LukE's rim domain contribute to hemolysis, namely residues 57–75 (DR1) and residues 182–196 (DR4). Interestingly, LukE DR1 is sufficient to render LukS-PV capable of DARC binding and hemolysis. Further, LukE, by binding DARC through DR1, promotes the recruitment of LukD to erythrocytes, likely by facilitating LukED oligomer formation. Finally, we show that LukE targets murine Darc through DR1 in vivo to cause host lethality. These findings expand our biochemical understanding of the LukE–DARC interaction and the role that this toxin-receptor pair plays in S. aureus pathophysiology.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

In Antiquity and early the Middle Ages, the main weapon was the spear. Only a few exceptions appeared: Roman legions, which used javelins instead, and Macedonian pike phalanx with its sarissa. In the later Middle Ages, the main weapon could be a pike or a polearm (such as polehammer, poleaxe, halberd etc.), before the pike made its return in early modernity. Ranged weapons were not used to cause casualties, but rather to inconvenience the enemies and break up their formation.

Weapons and tactics will adapt to each other, as well as to the terrain and the enemies faced – but adaptations will be done within the boundaries of the society. A society without a significant tradition of horse archery will not counter horse archers with their own, but rather with foot archers. Horse archery was important for nomadic societies, because they could not afford the casualties which resulted from the shock and attrition tactics of the settled societies.

Weapons and armour likewise have a relationship, but since armour is the more difficult to produce of the two, it is developments in armour which typically drive the adaptation of weapons, rather than the other way around.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Weapons & Tactics at Mythic Scribes.

Alright! The Muses sing, drawing you to the desk, pump your veins with hot blood and fill your mind with combustible imagination. You’re on fire and ready to write. The idea once tumbling in your mind is bucking with life and wants to breath words on your screen. It’s awesome. You’re awesome. All is good.

Then the passions temper under the cool, steady light of your computer screen. The process of fleshing out your idea with words demands time. So much so, you feel the vibrant energy of your story suffocate under the process. Now you’re using the logical, analytical side of your brain. Each scene or circumstance demands continuity and must fit into the internal logic of your world. Everything must make sense; else the reader will dismiss this pile of junk for amateur hubris.

With logic comes the questions. A train of them, each rumbling down the tracks uncaring of the idea which once bucked in the stables of your mind, eager for freedom, now tied to the rails. All of the doubts can easily be summarized into “Can I?”

Of course, this isn’t the real question haunting the halls of your mind.

Continue reading Can I? When Doubt Kills Your Ideas at Mythic Scribes.

AUKUS reveals much about the new global strategic context Expert comment NCapeling 17 September 2021

The new AUKUS partnership as well as the furore in Paris surrounding its announcement says a lot about the new geopolitical landscape.

The growing diplomatic drama surrounding the announcement of the new Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) risks concealing rather than highlighting what the deal reveals about profound changes in the global strategic context. Several elements stand out.

First, Australia’s decision to break off the $66 billion contract it signed with France in 2016 to purchase a new fleet of diesel electric submarines underscores the heightened level of concern in Canberra about China’s growing naval capabilities.

Despite all the industrial, legal, and diplomatic disruption, the Australian government has decided only the stealthy nuclear-powered submarines developed by Britain with US support can provide the genuine naval capability it needs long-term.

Next, in helping Australia resolve this conundrum, the British government has revealed the versatility of its new foreign policy. Part of the reason UK prime minister Boris Johnson eschewed the concept of a formal foreign policy and security treaty in the post-Brexit deal with the European Union (EU) was to pursue freely new ventures such as the recent ‘G7-plus’ summit in Cornwall, and enhanced cooperation among the Five Eyes allies. AUKUS reveals that this approach can produce real results.

Europe or the Indo-Pacific

During this week’s Polish-British Belvedere Forum in Warsaw, one of the main Polish concerns was that this ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific could overstretch Britain’s scarce resources when it should be focusing on Europe, where they are most needed.

But AUKUS does not over-extend Britain. There is no military commitment involved in the agreement. The UK also remains outside the Quad – made up of the US, India, Japan, and Australia. And the ongoing stately voyage of its new aircraft carrier from the Mediterranean into the South China Sea provides better insight into the substance of the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt.

Much derided for not carrying enough of its own aircraft – and for depending on US and Dutch escort vessels – the UK has in fact managed to coalesce a flexible group of allies around the Queen Elizabeth while enabling it to fly the British flag in Asian waters and strengthening interoperability with its allies for future joint operations.

Despite the hype, Britain’s main defence investments and deployments remain firmly focused in Europe, as laid out by the recent Integrated Review. And the decision to draft a new NATO Strategic Concept – midwifed by Britain at the 70th anniversary NATO summit hosted in London in December 2019 and confirmed during Joe Biden’s visit to NATO headquarters in June – will give Britain’s role in European security a new purpose and focus in the coming years.

Alone on the strategic landscape

For France, of course, the cancellation of its submarine deal is a painful humiliation, and a severe blow to thousands of workers in its hi-tech defence industry. It also comes at a sensitive moment politically, with Emmanuel Macron keen to demonstrate his international standing ahead of the 2022 presidential election. Instead, France now looks rather lonely on the strategic landscape alongside the more homogeneous and collectively powerful AUKUS trio.

But, rather than take the high road, a furious French reaction has compared Biden to Donald Trump and argued that this defence industrial failure for France should drive an acceleration towards European – for which, read EU – strategic autonomy.

This implies France sees European strategic autonomy as protecting and extending its own sovereign power and industrial interests rather than as a process for EU members to achieve more together in security and foreign policy than they can alone – thereby undermining rather than enhancing its case.

The gap between European strategic rhetoric and practical action was further highlighted by the AUKUS partnership being announced the evening before the EU launched its own Indo-Pacific strategy, and on the same day as China refused to allow a German frigate its first planned port visit to Shanghai.

America is still back

There is still a long way to go before the new submarine deal becomes reality. Australia needs to extricate itself from the French deal, decide how to secure the highly enriched uranium to power its new nuclear submarines, decide with the US and UK the division of labour and technology transfer of production, and assuage the International Atomic Energy Agency’s concerns about the precedent this deal sets. The fruits of this dramatic announcement will, therefore, be a long time in coming.

But, however the details play out, 15 September 2021 was a consequential day. The AUKUS announcement showed that China’s growing hard power is now eliciting a genuinely tough and structural political-military reaction.

Across the Atlantic, it also allowed President Biden – flanked ‘virtually’ by the British and Australian prime ministers – to send the global message that America is indeed back, just three weeks after the ignominious retreat from Afghanistan and chaotic exit from Kabul. And it offered him the opportunity to remind the world that the Indo-Pacific is where the US will be putting its main effort in the future.

For many in China, AUKUS now confirms their belief that the US and its principal allies are determined to contain China’s rise in its own ‘backyard’, where it believes it has the right to flex its muscles. For others, it will confirm Xi Jinping has overreached and China is now paying the price of his more assertive strategy. Either way, the Chinese are on notice that the ambivalent nature of the Obama pivot to Asia has given way to a more determined pivot under Biden.

While the US is stepping up, the UK has shown it is in the mix, leveraging opportunities as they arise. For example, the goodwill the UK has generated in Tokyo with this new partnership with Australia could help its case as it pursues membership of the Transpacific Partnership trade area in 2022.

The EU looks like a bystander in comparison and ill-equipped for the geopolitical competition inherent in this new strategic context. It is essential, therefore, once the dust has settled from these fraught few days, that the US and UK reach out to find ways to involve France and its EU partners in a meaningful, shared transatlantic approach to the Indo-Pacific.

Global Britain: One year on 29 March 2022 — 6:00PM TO 7:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 March 2022 Chatham House and Online

How has Britain positioned itself on the global stage a year after exiting the EU single market and the release of the UK government’s Integrated Review?

How has Britain positioned itself on the global stage a year after exiting the EU Single Market and the release of the Integrated Review? This event will be followed by a reception 

Global Britain in a divided world is Dr Robin Niblett’s final research paper for Chatham House as director. It assesses the UK’s performance against the objectives outlined in the UK government’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in March 2021, shortly after the UK formally left the European Union (EU) single market in the final chapter of the Brexit process.

The paper argues Britain has done a credible job of strengthening the liberal democratic community’s voice and security at a time when it was at best in recovery mode, particularly in convening and supporting international responses to COVID-19 and climate change, as well Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, to play a constructive long-term role on the world stage, the UK must rebuild its relationship with the EU and avoid being excluded from closer US-EU cooperation. In addition, Brexit has provided some new opportunities to pursue trade deals with countries whose comparative advantages are complimentary to the UK. While these deals will have a minimal economic impact, they could be important for expanding the UK’s geo-economic engagement at a time of intense geopolitical competition.

Lastly, although British soft power appears to have weathered the Brexit storm thus far, this is being undermined by recent severe cuts to foreign assistance and a failure to support refugees. As a solo middle power, accusations of hypocrisy are deeply damaging. Conversely, there will be no more precious asset in the future for Britain’s influence in the world than a reputation for consistency.

A panel of experts join Dr Niblett to explore these issues and others, such as how Britain could help contribute to international efforts to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, and the risks and opportunities of the UK’s ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific.

This event also marks the launch of the UK in the World project which brings together Chatham House’s networks and expert research to identify key priorities, partners, and pathways for the UK to project its values and interests, as well as learn from other countries, as it charts a course in an increasingly fractured and competitive world.

This event is part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on the UK’s role in the world.

Read the transcript

Redefine the Commonwealth now to safeguard its future Expert comment NCapeling 6 October 2022

Although seen as one of the Queen’s greatest legacies, the Commonwealth must provide tangible benefits to its citizens in an era of geopolitical competition.

The Commonwealth’s breadth allows a wide diversity of countries of different sizes, geographies, cultures, and values to be members – it is both rich and poor, north and south, and ethnically diverse. This makes it more interesting than many other multilateral institutions such as the G7, NATO, and the European Union (EU).

But it suffers from an unclear purpose. Since its inception, successive UK governments have grappled with its role – whether it is a preferential trading bloc or merely a source of most of Britain’s post-war immigration.

This lack of purpose – and structure – has left the Commonwealth impotent in dealing with a host of bilateral difficulties between the UK, its overseas territories, and Commonwealth partners in recent years.

Brexit could induce Britain to re-prioritize the Commonwealth, but so far the UK has only signed two new trade deals with Commonwealth members – Australia and New Zealand – while development aid, one of the most tangible ways the UK worked with many Commonwealth countries, has been cut and the UK’s defence focus has pivoted towards the Indo-Pacific and Europe’s Eastern front.

The UK also suffered embarrassing and overwhelming defeats in both the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of its continued occupation of the Chagos Islands and has avoided directly challenging India’s tacit support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the hope of securing a trade deal.

At the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), Boris Johnson reportedly attempted to depose Baroness Scotland, the Commonwealth’s Secretary General, but suffered a humiliating defeat in a vote of Commonwealth members.

These challenges are likely to continue, especially in the wake of the death of HM The Queen which could be seen by republican movements as an opportune time to rally support. Australia and New Zealand’s leaders, both republicans, downplayed the idea of a poll on the monarchy immediately after the Queen’s death, but it would be a mistake to assume this has gone quiet forever. Antigua and Barbuda’s prime minister has already said there will be a referendum on becoming a republic within three years.

Defining a new vision for the future

A concrete vision for the Commonwealth is long overdue and there is no better time to cast one than now. HM The Queen was more than just a figurehead for the Commonwealth and it remains unknown exactly what role King Charles III will see for himself.

But, unlike his mother who was a young, modern Queen heralding a post-imperial future, Charles takes the throne at a later age and at a time when important questions need to be addressed in an increasingly fractured world.

Most importantly the UK should avoid the temptation to define the Commonwealth in terms of shared principles and values. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh all abstained on the United Nations (UN) motion condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Commonwealth members are likely to be similarly divided over China’s territorial claims, the US-China conflict, the net-zero agenda, and nuclear non-proliferation.

The Commonwealth’s breadth – its greatest strength – means consensus is often impossible, and so should not be the goal. Instead the Commonwealth should focus on tangible areas of cooperation where there is mutual interest such as trade, aid, and migration.

The UK and its allies may find that diplomatic efforts – such as condemning China or Russia for human rights abuses – are more successful if they have listened to and acted on fellow Commonwealth countries’ concerns, from post-COVID vaccine provision to climate financing. Boosting the aid budget and opening borders may prove more important in engaging developing country partners than traditional diplomatic avenues.

Liz Truss’s British International Investment project could be a valuable vehicle for financing, especially if it leverages private sector funding, but many Commonwealth countries are feeling the more immediate impact of the UK’s aid cuts. In these circumstances many have already turned to Chinese infrastructure financing.

This is where the Commonwealth could be valuable. In the Pacific, it links certain island nations to the UK, Australia, and New Zealand at a time of renewed geopolitical competition with China in the Pacific. The fact the Commonwealth is not explicitly about promoting a particular ideology or countering China is helpful.

Commonwealth should be less UK-centric

There is also no reason why all the Commonwealth operations need to be based in London, which is not only expensive but also reinforces an approach to governance that assumes everything must be decided by civil servants in London. As the world’s largest democracy, India is an obvious alternative candidate although its reluctance to condemn Russia’s invasion and its domestic political tensions may count against it.

It is also important the Commonwealth’s wealthier members – the UK, Canada, and Australia – provide financing for countries such as India to take on extra responsibilities. The Commonwealth Games is a good place to start – despite having 72 competing nations and territories, the games have only been held three times outside the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

The Commonwealth also needs to be forward-looking and one of its most exciting assets is its demographic youthfulness. Europe, China, and the US have ageing populations whereas Nigeria, India, and Bangladesh have some of the world’s largest young populations.

Independent Thinking: China protests, North Korea missile tests Audio NCapeling 1 December 2022

Episode seven of our new weekly podcast examines the civil unrest in China and the ongoing development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.

Anti-lockdown protests are sweeping the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. What does the unrest say about China’s response to COVID-19? How serious a challenge is it to Xi Jinping’s legitimacy so soon after the Party Congress?

Meanwhile, 2022 has been a record year for Pyongyang’s ballistic missile launches. How far has North Korea’s nuclear programme and its missile systems developed, and what does it mean for the country’s neighbours?

Joining Bronwen Maddox in the studio this week from the Chatham House Asia-Pacific programme are its director Ben Bland and senior research fellow Dr Yu Jie. Joining the panel is special guest Ankit Panda, the Stanton senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and editor-at-large for The Diplomat magazine.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Western tanks head for Ukraine Audio NCapeling 26 January 2023

Episode 12 of our weekly podcast analyses the deployment of international battle tanks to Ukraine and the contentious diplomacy putting pressure on Germany.

The panel examines what kind of capabilities will new weapons give to Ukraine amid fears of a new Russian offensive looming in the spring, and the intense pressure Olaf Scholz’s German government has been under since the invasion of Ukraine started.

How has Germany’s standing changed over the past 12 months, and what are the challenges facing the country in its relations with Russia as a long and cold winter sets in?   

Joining Bronwen Maddox this week from Chatham House are Orysia Lutsevych, head of the Ukraine Forum, and Marion Messmer, senior research fellow in the International Security programme, along with Jeremy Cliffe, writer-at-large for The New Statesman magazine, and Ed Arnold, research fellow for European security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Myanmar, the coup two years on Audio NCapeling 2 February 2023

Episode 13 of our weekly podcast focuses on the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, marking the two-year anniversary of the coup there by the Tatmadaw armed forces.

In February 2021 the Tatmadaw overthrew the democratically-elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar and, since then, the country has descended into a brutal and complex civil war.

Our panel analyses the state of the country and its people two years on. Can Myanmar hold together, can democracy ever be restored? And is the world ignoring a major humanitarian crisis in the making?

With Bronwen Maddox to discuss the issues are two journalists who have both covered Myanmar extensively. Sebastian Strangio is an author and the Southeast Asia editor at The Diplomat, and Ali Fowle is a freelance journalist with Al Jazeera and the BBC.

Joining them in the studio from Chatham House are Ben Bland, director of our Asia-Pacific programme, and Rashmin Sagoo, director of our International Law programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Health not independence is focus for Sturgeon successor Expert comment NCapeling 15 February 2023

Nicola Sturgeon’s star may have been fading, but Rishi Sunak and Keir Starmer will be relieved at the exit of one of the UK’s most influential politicians.

Nicola Sturgeon has left at the right time, maybe even a bit late. Although one of the most influential politicians the UK has seen in recent times, she was also one of the most divisive.

Her ability to fan Scotland’s sense of difference from England brought new hope to the independence movement, but this cause – by which she measured herself above all others – has been losing ground and for now, looks to be in abeyance.

Neat and disciplined, Sturgeon could not have presented a greater contrast to Boris Johnson in the first months of the pandemic. That was one of her finest moments.

She used the powers of the devolved government to make different lockdown decisions for Scotland – never all that different from those in England but often announced just a few hours earlier.

Although analysts surmise that these made little difference to the death rate – although poverty and other health support factors make comparisons hard – she used the platform, with the cameras on her, to ram home the point that Scotland could set its own rules.

Rallying young voters to independence

Her second greatest moment was in the aftermath of Brexit. Scots voted overwhelmingly to stay in the European Union (EU) and so, she argued, they should have the right to leave the UK to join that other union. Younger voters in particular responded, rallying to the independence cause.

But two recent setbacks showed her star was fading. She lost the Supreme Court battle to hold a second independence referendum in November, when she was told Scotland simply did not have the powers to hold one on its own if Westminster said no – and the UK government did just that. It was hard to see how her campaign for independence could move forwards.

And her planned reforms to the gender recognition process in Scotland have been blocked by the UK government – but unease about her reforms within Scotland meant this rebuff did not win her the support at home she hoped for. She was also accused of playing politics by pressing ahead with unpopular reforms simply because of their potential to discomfit the UK government.

Health, education, and public services need attention

Other challenges were also building up and, even if less eye-catching, her successor is likely to focus on health and education above the birth of a new nation. Sturgeon’s critics have long argued that under Scottish National Party rule, health, education, and other public services have declined.

In elections, these factors can be eclipsed by passions about independence but it is rare in political life for a leader to be insulated from public anger on this front. This is almost certainly where her successor will want to focus first.

Independent Thinking: Russia’s invasion one year on Audio NCapeling 23 February 2023

Episode 16 of our weekly podcast examines the global impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine one year on from when Vladimir Putin launched his all-out assault.

Following a decision which unleashed the largest war seen in Europe since 1945, with hundreds of thousands of casualties on all sides, the panel examines the impact of the invasion for Ukraine and its people, but also the world.

Also under discussion are key insights from the recent Munich Security Conference, and the announcement this week by Russian president Vladimir Putin to susend his country’s participation in the vital New START nuclear weapons treaty.

Joining Bronwen on the show this week from the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House is programme director James Nixey and associate fellow Samantha de Bendern, alongside Patricia Lewis, director of our International Security programme. They are joined on the panel by Mariya Ionova, a Ukrainian opposition MP.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Nigeria votes, Northern Ireland deal Audio NCapeling 2 March 2023

Episode 17 of our weekly podcast examines the outcome of Nigeria’s presidential election and the new deal for Northern Ireland negotiated by the UK and EU.

On 24 February, millions of Nigerians went to the polls in an election widely seen as crucial for the direction of the country, with the winner Bola Ahmed Tinubu declared the new president-elect. The panel discusses the state of Nigeria’s democracy and what lies ahead for the new administration.

In addition, UK prime minister Rishi Sunak and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen announced a new deal for Northern Ireland with implications for all the UK. Three years after the UK formally left the European Union (EU), has Rishi Sunak now got Brexit done?

Joining Bronwen Maddox are Leena Koni Hoffman, associate fellow with the Chatham House Africa programme, Aanu Adeoye, West African correspondent for the Financial Times and an academy associate at Chatham House, and Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Accumulation of the microtubule-associated protein tau is associated with Alzheimer's disease (AD). In AD brain, tau is abnormally phosphorylated at many sites, and phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 plays critical roles in tau accumulation and toxicity. Microtubule affinity–regulating kinase 4 (MARK4) phosphorylates tau at those sites, and a double de novo mutation in the linker region of MARK4, ΔG316E317D, is associated with an elevated risk of AD. However, it remains unclear how this mutation affects phosphorylation, aggregation, and accumulation of tau and tau-induced neurodegeneration. Here, we report that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases the abundance of highly phosphorylated, insoluble tau species and exacerbates neurodegeneration via Ser-262/356–dependent and –independent mechanisms. Using transgenic Drosophila expressing human MARK4 (MARK4wt) or a mutant version of MARK4 (MARK4ΔG316E317D), we found that coexpression of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased total tau levels and enhanced tau-induced neurodegeneration and that MARK4ΔG316E317D had more potent effects than MARK4wt. Interestingly, the in vitro kinase activities of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D were similar. When tau phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 was blocked by alanine substitutions, MARK4wt did not promote tau accumulation or exacerbate neurodegeneration, whereas coexpression of MARK4ΔG316E317D did. Both MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased the levels of oligomeric forms of tau; however, only MARK4ΔG316E317D further increased the detergent insolubility of tau in vivo. Together, these findings suggest that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases tau levels and exacerbates tau toxicity via a novel gain-of-function mechanism and that modification in this region of MARK4 may affect disease pathogenesis.

Synapse loss is associated with motor and cognitive decline in multiple neurodegenerative disorders, and the cellular redistribution of tau is related to synaptic impairment in tauopathies, such as Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia. Here, we examined the cellular distribution of tau protein species in human tau overexpressing line 66 mice, a transgenic mouse model akin to genetic variants of frontotemporal dementia. Line 66 mice express intracellular tau aggregates in multiple brain regions and exhibit sensorimotor and motor learning deficiencies. Using a series of anti-tau antibodies, we observed, histologically, that nonphosphorylated transgenic human tau is enriched in synapses, whereas phosphorylated tau accumulates predominantly in cell bodies and axons. Subcellular fractionation confirmed that human tau is highly enriched in insoluble cytosolic and synaptosomal fractions, whereas endogenous mouse tau is virtually absent from synapses. Cytosolic tau was resistant to solubilization with urea and Triton X-100, indicating the formation of larger tau aggregates. By contrast, synaptic tau was partially soluble after Triton X-100 treatment and most likely represents aggregates of smaller size. MS corroborated that synaptosomal tau is nonphosphorylated. Tau enriched in the synapse of line 66 mice, therefore, appears to be in an oligomeric and nonphosphorylated state, and one that could have a direct impact on cognitive function.

European Hub for Contemporary China

The European Hub for Contemporary China is a three-year project focused on original research on China.

The European Hub for Contemporary China (EuroHub4Sino) is a three-year project, which began in October 2023, to produce original research on China. It also seeks to create an online platform that pools a wide array of European knowledge and expertise on contemporary China in one publicly accessible research platform. The project is run by a consortium of eight partners across six European states.

Find out more by visiting the project website.

EuroHub4Sino is co-funded by the European Union. UK participants in Horizon Europe Project European Hub for Contemporary China are supported by UKRI grant numbers 10108183 and 10108749.

What the US election means for trade policy Expert comment LJefferson 10 October 2024

Kamala Harris and Donald Trump could not be more different when it comes to trade, despite a changed economic landscape.

Trade policy is playing a relatively subdued role in this autumn’s US election. Yes, former president Trump has proposed tariffs of anywhere from 20 per cent to 100 per cent, asserting the revenue could fund policy areas from deficit reduction to childcare, all while growing US employment and promoting world peace.
  
But unlike 2020, or even more 2016, the international trade architecture has not been a lively part of this year’s campaign. The two parties now start from a shared expectation of an international economic landscape shaped more by competition and industrial policy than by continued liberalization. However, the two presidential candidates’ views of which trade tools to use, and whether to proceed with allies and partners or unilaterally, could not be more different.

New set of trade expectations

A large part of the relative calm has to do with the emergence of a new set of expectations on trade that are shared across Republicans and Democrats, and that are unlikely to shift in the next four years regardless of who occupies the White House.

First, neither party can field the support to pass a traditional comprehensive free trade agreement through Congress. While each party still has a wing of elected officials who would like to see the US return to negotiating deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or attempt expansive new deals with Europe or in the Western Hemisphere, they are unlikely to reach critical mass in the immediate future, regardless of who holds the White House – or who controls Congress.

This shift in perception of the relative value of such deals – and their potential to cause political blowback for legislators – also means that the cost to any administration that wanted to propose such a deal would be high.

Second, there is broad bipartisan support to continue measures aimed at promoting US security in the face of high-technology challenges from Beijing that have both military and security applications. This means continued US activism in export controls and other more innovative measures.

Less divergence on clean energy

While there is also cross-party enthusiasm for approaches to building up US manufacturing that fall under the rubric of industrial policy, the parties diverge significantly when it comes to specific content. However, around clean energy that divergence will be less than the campaign trail rhetoric suggests.

Because clean energy generation is spread so broadly across the United States – with a great deal of wind and solar generation in Republican-governed ‘red states,’ and investment from the Inflation Reduction Act flowing to red states as much or more than blue ones – such incentives, and their effects on trade policy, are here to stay. Despite this, a Republican presidency or Congress will certainly seek to water down or eliminate parts of the Inflation Reduction Act that focus specifically on transition away from fossil fuels.
 
Coupled with this commitment to making America a clean energy superpower, there is considerable cross-party interest in trade initiatives that promote clean energy and manufacturing – whether from a climate perspective or a pure economic competitiveness perspective. A wide range of creative proposals are buzzing around Congress and think-tanks – from a carbon border measure, to resuscitating the Global Steel Arrangement, to critical mineral-focused deals. Though the topic is often overlooked in overviews of trade policy, it is the one where we are most likely to see classic trade tools used.

A vast difference between the two candidates

Beyond those broad strokes of an emerging ‘new Washington consensus,’ as former US trade representative and current head of the Council on Foreign Relations Michael Froman describes it: who wins the presidency will make a vast difference in what Washington does on trade – and how it aims to achieve its goals.

A Harris administration will aim to develop shared economic security agendas with allies and partners – quite possibly expanding beyond the Biden Administration’s G7 focus to pursue more deals with a broader range of partners. Trump, on the other hand, has explicitly said he will pursue US economic interests at the expense of allies and partners. ‘Under my leadership,’ he said in a speech in Georgia last month, ‘we’re going to take other countries’ jobs,’ specifically citing allies Germany and South Korea as targets.

While Vice-President Harris has criticized Trump’s tariff proposals, and noted their likely negative effects on consumers, she has not signalled that she would make changes to the tariffs on China first imposed by President Trump and then adjusted by President Biden. 
A Trump administration would use tariffs aggressively, but it remains absolutely unclear how. 

How Beijing is closing surveillance gaps in the South China Sea The World Today iallan.drupal 15 October 2024

The discovery of a new radar system on China’s Triton Island military base shows that Beijing is rapidly developing its intelligence capacities in contested waters, write John Pollock and Damien Symon.

New satellite images reveal how the Chinese military is dramatically expanding its capabilities on Triton Island, which looks set to become a one of Beijing’s key signal intelligence bases in the South China Sea.

Once completed, the radar system would significantly increase China’s signals intercept and electronic warfare capabilities across the disputed Paracel Islands archipelago and add to a wider surveillance network spanning much of the South China Sea.

The enhanced facility on Triton is likely to offer a challenge to China’s competitors in the region and internationally.

China seized control of the Paracels from Vietnam in a 1974 naval battle, and competition for access to it waters has intensified since the recent discovery of oil and gas reserves. Chinese and Vietnamese maritime militia clashed off the coast of Triton in 2014.

In addition, American, British and Australian naval forces have for the past decade patrolled the waters to collectively challenge China’s contested ‘nine-dash-line’ claim to large stretches of the South China Sea. 

Overlapping anti-stealth network

A year after work was first identified on Triton, satellite images from Maxar have helped build a clearer picture of Beijing’s efforts to defend this strategic waterway.

The most striking development is the construction of a new radar system, known as SIAR – synthetic impulse and aperture radar – which purportedly detects stealth aircraft. The counter-stealth radar on Triton is characterized by its distinctive octagonal structure, which resembles another SIAR system built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, south of the Paracels, in 2017. A half-completed tower also sits near the SIAR radar on Triton, which is likely to be the operations centre.

Once completed, the radar on Triton will form what is believed to be a wider network of at least three overlapping counter-stealth radars built across Chinese bases in the South China Sea over the past decade, including on Hainan Island, home to several Chinese naval bases. 

The positioning of the radar on Triton, 320km south of Hainan, is telling, says J. Michael Dahm, Senior Resident Fellow for Aerospace and China Studies at the Mitchell Institute. 

‘SIAR radars cannot see over the curve of the Earth, which means there is a gap in China’s air surveillance coverage between Subi Reef and Hainan Island. The Triton Island site will help close that gap’, said Dahm.

The aim, he suggests, is to give China contiguous counter-stealth radar coverage of the South China Sea.

More construction underway

The satellite images reveal other building projects on Triton. One is a large pad at the end of the road network which will probably be used as a launching point for a mobile anti-ship missile battery. The building at the northeast end of the road is probably a storage building for missile transport vehicles. 

Diminishing Vietnam’s options

The development of a new counter-stealth radar system and other suspected signals intercept structures on Triton represents a notable increase in China’s intelligence capabilities in the Paracels. The Chinese Communist Party has not disclosed the purpose of the building work on Triton, but its effects on regional and global competitors are likely to be wide ranging.

For Vietnam, which is rapidly expanding its own bases in the South China Sea, the intelligence structures on Triton would significantly diminish its capacity to operate undetected in the area. Alongside existing radar on Triton which can detect sea-going vessels, Beijing now has the potential to track Vietnamese air movements and gain forewarning of Hanoi’s manoeuvres in the area, including efforts to access oil and gas deposits.

The desire to strengthen control over these resources may explain why China is fortifying Triton Island, says Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House. ‘The developments might be a warning that China is planning to mount another drilling expedition’, he suggests.

The US election could create the need for a G7 alternative – without American representation Expert comment jon.wallace 15 October 2024

Traditional allies of the US need to find a way to work together on some global policy issues even when the US itself is not engaged. A ‘G6 plus’ group could provide an answer.

When Jamaica pulled out of the nascent West Indies Federation in 1961, Trinidad and Tobago’s then prime minister, Dr Eric Williams, famously said ‘One from ten leaves nought’. In the run up to the US elections on 5 November, the US’s longstanding allies need to ask themselves if the same logic must apply to the G7. 

A Donald Trump victory will result in stark differences between the US and its closest partners on key global economic issues. US allies would no doubt try and persuade the new president to moderate his position, but experience suggests that this will have little, if any, effect.  

They may then want to work around the US, or on a parallel track. But doing so will be very hard unless they have a framework for discussing and developing ideas collectively. Could some form of ‘G6 plus’ forum help?

The role of the G7 today

The G7 no longer acts as a steering group for the global economy. However, it remains a critical forum for the US and its allies to coordinate their efforts to help solve global problems, to defend common Western interests, to resolve internal disputes and to underpin information exchange. 

In the past two years, the G7 has come to be seen by the US and other members as one of the most effective international mechanisms. It has played a critical role coordinating Western efforts to recover from the last pandemic and prepare for future ones.  

It has been pivotal in weakening Russia’s economy following the attack on Ukraine and has acted to strengthen Western economic security and resilience more broadly.  

The G7 has also responded to ‘Global South’ calls for help in dealing with the pandemic aftermath and the Ukraine war. 

Trump’s approach to the G7

The problem is that the G7’s effectiveness depends critically on full US engagement, sometimes as a leader of initiatives (such as the decision to impose an ‘oil price cap’ on Russia in autumn 2022) or as an essential partner. 

If elected, former President Trump is likely to abandon the G7 as an instrument of international economic policy. This is effectively what happened during his first presidency and there are reasons to expect this to be repeated. 

Many of Trump’s international economic policies are highly controversial with US allies, including his apparent determination to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, impose across the board 10-20 per cent tariffs and even punish countries for not using the dollar. His domestic policies, including mass deportation of undocumented immigrants and aggressive deregulation and fiscal easing could lead to further sharp disagreements.  

Furthermore, Trump demonstrates general antipathy towards multilateralism. Under his presidency, US representatives in the G7 and G20 sought to weaken core values and policies that have underpinned international economic cooperation for decades – including the importance of a rules based international system, the IMF’s global safety net role, and the responsibility of the advanced world to assist the poorest countries financially.  

Other G7 and G20 countries tried to preserve as much as possible of the previous consensus. But in the case of climate change, the only solution was to have a separate text for the US. Critically, such efforts diverted time and attention from the enormous challenges facing the world at the time. 

Trump went through four different G7/G20 Sherpas during his presidency and disowned the final declaration of the 2018 Canadian G7 summit after hundreds of hours of negotiation, and despite previously signing off on the text. The US failed to host a final leaders’ summit, even virtually, during his administration’s G7 presidency.  

Of course, how far Trump carries through his most radical policies will depend, among other things, on the outcome of the Congressional elections and the stance taken by US courts. 

He may also have second thoughts if elected. His first administration sometimes supported significant multilateral economic initiatives, notably the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative and ‘Common Framework’ for debt rescheduling. 

But, in the event of a second Trump administration, the most likely scenario for the G7 is a repeat of the paralysis of 2017-20, which would be even more costly today.

Should Vice President Kamala Harris win on 5 November, the situation should in theory be very different. She will likely continue with President Joe Biden’s collaborative approach to the G7.

Nonetheless, major issues may still arise where America’s allies want to take a fundamentally different approach and need a mechanism to do so. These could include policy on the WTO, de-risking the economic relationship with China, restricting carbon leakage, and regulating US-dominated big tech.  

How should US allies respond?

No US ally will want to be seen to be leading development of a new ‘G6’ that excludes the US. The top priority will be securing the best possible relationship with the incoming president. Political weakness and/or new governments in France, Germany, the UK and Japan will add to this hesitancy.

Any new forum will therefore need to be as low profile as possible. The concept should initially be discussed in private by sherpas from each participating country. Once established, officials should as far as possible meet online. Leaders should only meet online, at least initially.  

Participants should be fully transparent about the forum’s existence and avoid any grand ‘framing’ along the lines of the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’. Instead, it should be described as a practical, largely technocratic forum intended to coordinate activity among Western economic powers in those areas where the US chooses not to engage. A suitably innocuous name – such as the ‘the sustainable growth club’ could help.

Topics should be limited to those requiring urgent collective global action, such as climate, health, tech governance, development finance and trade – and where the US federal government is not an ‘essential’ partner. Such a forum should not therefore address defence.  

Can the world avoid a new nuclear arms race? 18 November 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

The Doomsday Clock stands at 90 seconds to midnight – the closest to global catastrophe it has ever been. As geopolitical competition intensifies, nuclear risks are resurging at an alarming rate. The collapse of key arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has removed crucial safeguards against arms races. Efforts to extend or replace existing treaties face significant hurdles in the current geopolitical climate.

Nuclear rhetoric has become more aggressive, as evidenced by Russian and North Korean nuclear threats. Several nuclear-armed states are also engaging in extensive modernization programmes of their nuclear arsenals, potentially fuelling a new arms race.

Despite these pressures, the number of nuclear possessor states has held steady so far. The ongoing Iranian efforts to build nuclear weapons is the closest attempt by a new state to acquire nuclear weapons. As the global security environment becomes more and more tense, existing nuclear possessor states increasingly rely on their nuclear weapons. This might threaten the global consensus against nuclear proliferation.

This session examines these competing pressures and propose strategies to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons use and proliferation. Our expert panel explores diplomatic initiatives, technical measures, and policy innovations to address these critical challenges.

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• Are we already in the middle of a global nuclear arms race?
• How can international arms control treaties be negotiated in the current geopolitical environment?
• Does a new US president change the nuclear calculus? Is the US still able to reassure allies of its ‘extended deterrence’?
• How can we reduce the risk of additional proliferation? Which states might want to acquire nuclear weapons and what can we do about it?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Will the next US president invest in Middle East stability or walk away? Expert comment LToremark 17 October 2024

Harris and Trump look set to continue US deprioritization of the region, but they would do better to enlist the support of their partners.

When stability in the Middle East feels so distant, it is much to the dismay of America’s partners that conflict management in the region has fallen down the list of US priorities. As Israel’s war in Gaza has reached its tragic one-year milestone, a new front has opened in Lebanon and further direct escalation between Israel and Iran seems imminent, it is hoped that the next US president will take a bolder role.

Namely, leaders in the UK, Europe and the Middle East are looking to whoever is in the White House to do more to restrain Israel, deliver self-determination – if not a peace process – for Palestine, and contain Iran’s interventionist regional role and nuclear programme.

While it is naive to expect either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump to prioritize conflict management in the Middle East above immigration, the economy, the war in Ukraine or competition with China, the past year has shown the danger of ignoring or sidestepping cascading and glaring regional challenges. 

For Harris or Trump to have a more sustainable impact in the region, they must enlist the support of European, British and Middle Eastern partners and work collectively to build multilateral processes that can set a stronger foundation for regional stability.

Repercussions of deprioritization

The Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, led many to believe that a new era of integration was possible in the Middle East. To some, it also vindicated the US decision to deprioritize the region that had started with Barack Obama’s presidency and his drawing down from ‘forever wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. Presidents Trump and Biden continued that approach, encouraging America’s partners in the Middle East to assume greater responsibility for regional stability. Notably, neither renewed negotiations with Iran despite both committing to deliver a stronger deal with Tehran.

The shock of the 7 October attacks shattered that view, and the longer overhang of the US decision to deprioritize the region has visibly played out over the past twelve months. 

While the Biden administration marshalled full political and military support for Israel and there is not – yet – a direct regional war with Iran, the US has been unsuccessful in multiple areas: delivering a ceasefire agreement, securing the release of hostages, maintaining regular humanitarian relief and producing a so-called ‘day after’ plan of action.  

Moreover, the US temporary arrangement with Iran to prevent nuclear acceleration in exchange for marginal sanctions relief has also shown the limits of compartmentalization when managing a portfolio of issues with Tehran.  

No new approach

Trump and Harris’s policy approaches to conflict in the region further show their limited intent to change course on the Middle East. Both leaders are aware that Middle East politics, particularly on Israel–Palestine and Iran – the key issues requiring urgent attention – has become a US partisan minefield that could alienate voters. Despite their different plans, with Trump inclined to be more unilateral, they will both continue the trend of gradually deprioritizing conflict management in favour of greater burden sharing by those in the region.  

President Trump has promised a tougher approach aimed at curtailing conflict and advancing US interests. On Iran, Trump has made clear that he would return to a policy of maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic, perhaps to come to new agreement with Tehran or alternatively to constrain Iran even further.  He has championed his administration’s withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. Trump has argued that this approach put economic strain on Iran and reduced its ability to fund proxy groups. 

His advisers have also indicated that they would extend this pressure campaign and provide maximum support to the Iranian opposition and activists. Yet without clear goals or a willingness to negotiate with Tehran to contain further nuclear advancements, the result may well be another round of instability.  

Should he return to office, Trump has indicated that he would immediately put an end to the war in Gaza, though how remains unclear. More broadly, he would likely double down on the agreements to promote Israeli–Saudi normalization and attempt to bypass the Palestinian leadership, focusing on broader regional normalization. But sidestepping Palestinian self-determination, which since 7 October has been the condition for broader Arab normalization, will be difficult for Saudi Arabia to sell to its broader, now politicized, public.  

Many Middle East leaders, including those from the Arabian peninsula, might welcome the return of a Trump presidency, but Trump’s ‘America First’ policy did not provide Arab Gulf leaders, especially Riyadh, with protection from Iran’s attack on Saudi oil facilities seen in September 2019.  

Trump also promised without success to deliver a bigger, better Iran deal that would extend the JCPOA and include compromises on Tehran’s support for proxy groups and constraints on its missile programme. Rather than imposing his previous strategy, a second Trump presidency would be more effective if it worked collaboratively with transatlantic and regional partners on regional security issues pertaining to Israel–Palestine and Iran.  

Continuation and reinforcement?

Despite her recent tough talk on Iran, it is expected that Harris will reinforce the current wave of diplomatic efforts to deescalate and manage tensions with Tehran, rather than advocate for ‘maximum pressure’.  

Harris would likely build on efforts to revive a new paradigm that could contain Iran’s nuclear programme. She is expected to emphasize a strategy of engagement combined with pressure to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, while addressing its regional activities.   

Now that Iran has provided missiles and drones to Russia, it is clear that Tehran’s transfer of lethal aid needs an urgent response beyond continued reliance on sanctions. Harris’s team would be wise to pursue a multilateral negotiation process bringing together Europe and the UK, who are already discussing these issues, to collectively engage Tehran on a broader deal.

Moreover, winning support from Israel and the Gulf is a necessary condition to build a more sustainable Iranian agreement. 

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2024

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.

Sinwar’s death does not make Hamas–Fatah reconciliation more likely, whoever his successor may be Expert comment jon.wallace 22 October 2024

The killing may aid Hamas recruitment – but it will not make agreement with Fatah any easier to achieve.

Western political leaders were quick to argue that Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on 17 October presented an opportunity for a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Israeli hostages.

US President Joe Biden immediately called on Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to seize the moment to negotiate, now that Israel has achieved one of its war aims.

However, that ‘moment’ has already passed. Israel’s military assault on Gaza has intensified since Sinwar was killed, leading UN Peace Process Co-ordinator Tor Wennesland to say that ‘nowhere is safe in Gaza’. It is abundantly clear Netanyahu is intent on further degrading Hamas, resetting a new ‘power balance’ and carving out a buffer zone, no matter the cost in Palestinian lives or Israeli hostages. 

But there are other implications of Sinwar’s assassination beyond the zero-sum analysis of will there or won’t there be a ceasefire.

Hamas’s ability to fight

At present, everyone has an opinion on how Sinwar’s killing will affect Hamas and its ability to resist and respond to Israel’s military. His death will have been a major blow – symbolically, operationally, and psychologically. Hamas has been downgraded and its capacity to respond compromised.

But it will recover, regenerate and retaliate in time – and Sinwar’s death will have been no surprise to Palestinians in Gaza or elsewhere. Hamas is accustomed to seeing its leaders assassinated. Since its formation in 1987, it has been ‘decapitated’ many times, only to continue with its mission to ‘liberate Palestine’.

Hamas’s portrayal of Sinwar dying in his fatigues, head wrapped in a keffiyeh and resisting until the end will persuade many young Palestinians that he died as a martyr serving the Palestinian cause. Many will be inspired to join and fortify the ranks of Hamas as a result.

The IDF’s release of drone footage showing Sinwar’s last moments will have done nothing to undermine his credibility. 

On the contrary, it will serve as a rallying call to disaffected and disenfranchised young Palestinians horrified by Israel’s bombing of civilian targets in Gaza and disaffected with Fatah’s inability to prevent Israeli settler expansion and violence in the West Bank.

Reconciliation

Some hope that if Sinwar is replaced by a more ‘moderate’ leader, his killing may smooth the path to Hamas–Fatah reconciliation – and that this could provide a foundation for a patchwork political solution when Israel and Gaza arrive at the ‘day after.’  

But the idea that a downgraded and ‘leaderless’ Hamas will be susceptible to international pressure to reconcile with Fatah is divorced from reality.  

Prospective new Hamas leaders such as Khaled al Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya are based in Qatar. 

They may be more pliable to external pressure to reconcile with Fatah in search of a political outcome, but their ability to influence events on the ground in Gaza will be limited. That was demonstrated by the Sinwar-orchestrated attacks on 7 October 2023, which took place without the blessing of the exiled leadership in Doha.

Hamas has long gone to ground in Gaza and become far more decentralized than it was before 7 October. It is now more typical of an insurgency, where Hamas cadres exercise a great degree of operational autonomy.

In other words, the disconnect between Hamas in Gaza and its political leadership in Qatar has only grown wider since this round of conflict started.

International efforts

That will undermine international efforts made by Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and others to bring about a reconciliation. Moscow and Beijing already hosted reconciliation talks in February and April early this year but made no progress in closing the chasm between the two parties. Saudi Arabia has also hosted talks.

The three Arab states, none of which have so far commented publicly on Sinwar’s killing, will likely view his death as an opportunity to bolster the political wing of Hamas – backing it with pledges of political, diplomatic and financial support.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt will have next to no influence over the succession process, but Qatar’s long-established relationship with the political wing of Hamas affords it leverage over the organization, albeit limited. They may be able to strengthen the hand of those based in Doha by promising to work harder at securing a ceasefire, guaranteeing the provision of humanitarian relief, and working towards a political solution.

The MENA uprisings: Five years on, what role is civil society playing? 31 October 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Online

Panellists examine the protest movements’ legacies in different context and how civil society continues to work towards positive change.

Five years after nation-wide protests in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan demanded systemic changes and political reforms, the situation remains largely unchanged. In some cases, it has deteriorated. Sudan is facing a humanitarian catastrophe amidst an ongoing civil war. Lebanon is dealing with Israeli aggression amidst a severe economic crisis with little response from the caretaker government. In Iraq and Algeria, relative stability masks the reality of increased suppression of dissent. This preservation of the status quo supports the entrenched political structures that strive to uphold it.

The current absence of large-scale street protests in these countries should not be taken as an indication that populations are content with the status quo. The issues that ignited the initial uprisings remain and in many cases have worsened. Despite enormous challenges, activists continue to navigate their systems to survive and instigate change. In the face of increasing difficulties, they are raising awareness of their countries’ predicaments and are finding alternative economic solutions. Additionally they are mobilizing community support, and pushing to voice their disillusionment. All these efforts aim at actively participating in shaping decisions that determines their future.

This webinar explores:

• What has been the impact of the uprisings in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan?
• How are civil society and activists contributing to change within their communities?
• What is the current landscape for civic engagement within the politics, society and economy in these countries?
• What prospects are there for solidarity and cooperation among civil society actors across these regions and beyond?

Where is Georgia now heading? 28 October 2024 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Online

After pivotal elections, experts discuss what the declared results and reactions mean for Georgia.

Following a year marked by protests over the controversial ‘Foreign Agents’ bill and broader concerns over democratic backsliding, Georgia faces pivotal parliamentary elections on 26 October. Regardless of the outcome, the results are expected to be contested as well as consequential.

In the wake of the election, experts will discuss the immediate and longer-term consequences.

Key questions:

• These were the first fully-proportional elections in Georgia. How much difference did it make
• What will the election results, as we currently understand them, mean for Georgia’s path to European integration? How will they affect Georgia’s foreign policy priorities?
• What role should the EU play? Is Georgia a test case for the EU as an aspiring geopolitical power?
• Is the oligarchic grip likely to be tightened or loosened? What role for undue influence now?
• Has Russia done all it can for now in Georgia? Or is there more it can do?

Safeguarding Europe: how to defeat and deter Russia 10 December 2024 — 10:00AM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Chatham House

Threat assessment and practical solutions.

Nearly three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the security picture for Europe remains uncertain. Questions of European states’ own resilience and ability to counter Russia and support Ukraine have not been adequately answered by key European powers. So how can European states act proactively to support not only Ukraine but also their own security?

Key questions:

• How resilient is Europe to the challenge posed by Russia?
• What more can be done to defend EU candidate states?
• What will be the impact of the US election results?
• What deters Russia? What have we learnt from Russia’s war on Ukraine?
• Are the current approaches sufficient?

This one-day, in-person conference at Chatham House will bring together experts and policymakers from across the UK, EU and US, as well as drawing from the expertise of Russian analysts in exile. Alongside analysis of Russia’s intentions towards Europe and European strategy, there will be opportunity for in-depth conversation with experts on the geopolitical and defence tools available to European states.

This conference will be hosted in-person, with the recording of the keynote address made available on the website following the event.

Participants will be selected based on expertise. Please wait for confirmation before attending.

Corporate organisations who currently do not support the Russia-Eurasia Programme or Ukraine Forum will be subject to a fee. Your registration will be reviewed by a member of our team before it is approved.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

In conversation with James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology and Society at Google 12 December 2024 — 11:15AM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

A conversation on AI’s global, societal and economic impacts.

2024 has been a landmark year for Artificial Intelligence (AI) development, deployment and use, with significant progress in AI-driven science, governance and cooperation. Looking ahead, AI continues to demonstrate economic promise and potential to expand on scientific breakthroughs in areas such as climate and health. This wave of innovation is occurring against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty and not all countries are fully able to participate. Heading into 2025, there are urgent questions about how best to maximise shared opportunities when it comes to AI and to advance global cooperation.

James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology & Society at Google, will unpack what 2025 will bring for AI in science, economics, global governance and international cooperation. 

Key questions include:

• What will be AI’s global societal and economic impact in 2025 and beyond? 
• What are the ways AI could help increase economic growth and economy-wide productivity? What factors must be in place for this to happen?
• How best can we maximise shared opportunities and advance global cooperation when it comes to AI? Where can public-private partnerships unlock scientific breakthroughs for societal progress, combatting shared global challenges such as climate change and global health issues?  
• What are the principles of safe, responsible AI, and how should companies remain responsive to their evolution and integrate them into technology design and implementation? 
• What is the current – and ideal – role of technology companies in emerging mechanisms for global cooperation and national governance on AI?

This event is being held in partnership with Google.

You will receive notice by 13:00 on Wednesday 11 December if you have been successful in securing an in-person place.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Assessing the trajectory of the Middle East conflict 4 November 2024 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Online

Experts examine how the conflict may develop and what we can expect from regional and international actors.

A year on, the war in Gaza has spilled beyond Israel and Palestine with escalation across the region intensifying.

Recent weeks have seen Israel deepening its military offensive on Lebanon and keeping the north of the Gaza strip under siege, while leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas have been successfully targeted by its forces. Israel also launched an unprecedented assault against Iran in response to Tehran’s missile attacks on Israeli territory earlier in October.

Against this backdrop, regional states, particularly in the Gulf, in line with their overall approach to the conflict, are prioritizing diplomacy over escalation. They maintain their neutrality on the hostility between Israel and Iran and its aligned groups from the axis of resistance.

The strength of old alliances is being tested while new alignments are uncovered that may reshape the geopolitical landscape of the region, particularly following the US presidential election.

In this webinar, experts will examine:

• What are Israel’s calculations at this stage and how have the domestic political dynamics changed over recent weeks?
• What are the impacts of the war on Iran and its aligned actors and what can we expect from Tehran and groups from the axis of resistance?
• How are the wars in Gaza and Lebanon connected and would ending one stop the other?
• What is the response from regional states, particularly in the Gulf, and what role can they play?
• What are the possible scenarios for a post-election US policy on Israel and the Middle East?

Independent Thinking: Why is North Korea sending troops to Russia? Audio john.pollock 31 October 2024

Orysia Lutsevych, Edward Howell and Yossi Mekelberg discuss North Korean troops fighting with Russian forces against Ukraine, as well as the issue of military conscription.

On this episode

North Korea is sending troops to Russia, but what is Kim Jong-Un hoping to get from Vladmir Putin for this military assistance against Ukraine? The panel also discuss the role military conscription plays in Israel, South Korea and Ukraine’s defence.

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Edward Howell, the Korea Foundation fellow at Chatham House, Orysia Lutsevych, the head of our Ukraine Forum and Yossi Mekelberg, a senior consulting fellow with our Middle East and North Africa Programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Independent Thinking: What does Donald Trump’s re-election mean for the world? Audio john.pollock 8 November 2024

Edward Luce, Leslie Vinjamuri and Gerald Seib join the podcast this week to discuss Donald Trump’s victory over Kamala Harris in the US presidential election.

On this episode

Donald Trump has decisively defeated Kamala Harris in the US presidential election. What does his return to the White House mean for America and the world? 

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Edward Luce, the FT’s North America editor, Gerald Seib, the former Washington bureau chief of The Wall Street Journal and Leslie Vinjamuri, the head of our US and Americas programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Trump and his growing number of European allies threaten the European project Expert comment LToremark 8 November 2024

With Trump in the White House, a key challenge for Europe will be the growing transatlantic illiberal ties which risk undermining European unity.

As the US presidential election result became clear, European leaders followed a similar formula when congratulating President-elect Trump. They offered their congratulations, mentioned previous good working relations with the US (special points for a nod to long-standing relations), and – most importantly – emphasized the need for this to continue for the benefit of the citizens of both their country and the US.

The formula was a telling sign of the political bartering most European heads of state expect with Trump back in the White House. The exception, of course, were Trump’s European allies who were simply ecstatic.

Transatlantic illiberalism

Trump’s growing number of European allies and the increase of illiberalism and populism is perhaps the most worrying development for Europe. In 2016, some of Trump’s counterparts in Europe were Angela Merkel in Germany, Emmanuel Macron in France, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, and Giuseppe Conte in Italy. Regardless of their record, they were moderates.

The picture looks very different today. Anti-war extremist parties Alternative for Germany and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance are on the rise in Germany. In France, pro-Russia Marine le Pen has been able to reduce support for Ukraine from €3 billion to €2 billion in the draft French budget. In the Netherlands, the far-right Freedom Party is the biggest coalition partner. In Italy, Prime Minister Georgia Meloni hails from a neo-fascist party. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s populist and illiberal playbook is being replicated across Europe. 

Meanwhile in Poland, moderate prime minister, Donald Tusk, is experiencing the difficulties of reversing damage done by the previous populist government.

What European populist leaders have in common is a deep-seated scepticism of the EU and a desire to erode it from within. And many of these leaders also welcome the return of Trump.

It is no coincidence that Orbán scheduled the European Political Community Summit, hosted by Hungary, to take place just days after the US election. The Trump win was an added bonus. This meant European heads of state travelled to Budapest for the summit still reeling from – or rejoicing at – the election result. 

Orbán would like to position himself as Trump’s man in Europe. He has spent the past four years building ties with the president-elect and the MAGA wing of the Republican party. Trump even namechecked Orbán – a Eurosceptic Putin-supporter – during the presidential debate.

Italy’s Meloni, meanwhile, has so far worked with EU institutions and NATO rather than against them: she has supported EU and NATO resolutions for Ukraine and demonstrated opposition to Russia. But this may have been a strategic calculation. She likely looked at her country’s balance sheet and realized she needed the European Commission’s COVID-19 recovery funds. 

But with the fund coming to an end and given her history of Euroscepticism and pro-Russian views, the transatlantic illiberal ties mean she may now feel emboldened to revise her positions. She is already deploying the illiberal playbook domestically.

Policy implications for Europe of a second Trump term 

Despite some ideological similarities, Trump’s policies will not be good for his European allies. He has threatened to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports. For Italy and the Netherlands, the second and fifth largest EU exporters to the US, this would have direct negative impacts on their economies.

Increased tariffs on Chinese goods – Trump has threatened up to 60 per cent – would also have an impact on Europe’s economies. Rerouting of Chinese goods could see China dump overproduction in Europe, one of the few remaining relatively open markets, and make European products compete with cheaper Chinese goods in Europe and on the global market. 

Neither of these developments are positive for export-led European countries. In France, the EU’s fourth largest exporter to the US, Marine le Pen – previously a strong supporter of Trump – had a notably muted response to his victory due to concerns over a trade war.

Even European leaders who might have hoped for a different election outcome may seek to hedge their bets. There are two things that are clear about Trump: he is unpredictable and transactional. 

It is quite possible that some European states, in particular frontline states with genuine fears over Russia’s imperialist ambitions, will seek to buy Trump’s support through bilateral arms deals – despite their distaste for Trump’s position vis-à-vis Russia. These countries already have some of the highest defence spending in NATO, with Poland, Estonia and Latvia leading the way, so this will not irk Trump – arms deals would simply be an additional insurance premium.

Countries rushing to make bilateral deals with the US risks a similar uncoordinated race for American arms deals as during Trump’s first term. This would in turn undermine much-needed European defence industrial cooperation efforts. As the need to reduce dependencies on third countries – even for defence equipment from historically close allies – has become increasingly clear, this would be a problematic development.

The silver lining may be that it could galvanize the UK and the EU just enough to take action on UK-EU security and defence cooperation, of which the defence industrial piece is the most essential.

Europe disunited

The transatlantic link between populist, illiberal leaders should be a concern. Trump is no longer isolated in Europe, he is rapidly accumulating allies among European heads of state. These leaders agree on the perceived existential threat posed by migration, the need for so-called ‘traditional family values’ and ‘anti-wokeism’. But beyond that, they share and want to advance an illiberal view of the world, with ramifications from security and global trade to human rights – and directly threatening the European project.

Can Trump do a deal with Putin on Ukraine? Expert comment jon.wallace 12 November 2024

The Kremlin is signalling that it is ready to talk to the incoming US administration. But Trump may find Russia’s terms make him look unacceptably weak.

The nervousness of Ukrainian leadership is understandable. Since Donald Trump’s re-election, Russian President Vladimir Putin has lost no time in preparing the ground for a direct discussion between the US and Russia about the terms for peace in Ukraine – although reports at the weekend that Trump has recently spoken to Putin by phone were swiftly denied by the Kremlin.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made determined efforts in recent months to persuade Trump that Ukraine’s future is worth fighting for. But there is no sign that his messages have brought about a change of heart. 

Trump appears to have no sympathy for Ukraine and no interest in the country – beyond preventing further US commitments to its defence. (Since February 2022, the US has provided $175 billion of economic and military aid to Kyiv, around 7 per cent of total allocated defence spending during that time).

Trump clearly regards Ukraine as an opportunity to demonstrate his power to US voters. If he can bring Putin to the table and end a war that in his view serves no purpose for the American people, it will also boost his claim that he can prevent World War 3.

Seen from Kyiv, the power relationship works in reverse. Putin is drawing Trump – said to be susceptible to flattery – into a negotiation to resolve an issue of great personal importance to him. The Russian president knows the issues in intimate detail, whereas Zelenskyy has genuine reason to fear that Trump might agree to terms whose consequences he does not fully understand.

Putin’s objectives

Putin has not deviated from his goals stated at the start of the full-scale invasion. These are the demilitarization of Ukraine and the replacement of Zelenskyy and his government by a leadership that accepts Moscow’s diktat (‘denazification’).

Putin’s highest priority for talks will be to ensure Ukraine’s neutrality. This will require a firm commitment that Ukraine will not join NATO in the foreseeable future. He will also seek to restrict the size of Ukrainian armed forces and prevent the stationing of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory. 

Putin will also hope to consolidate Russia’s grip on the Crimean peninsula by winning recognition of his annexation of Ukrainian territory. He will likely demand control of those parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions not yet occupied by Russian forces, perhaps trading occupied territories in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia for Ukrainian-held territory in Russia’s Kursk Region.

Lastly, Putin will want sanctions relief. The Russian economy has managed to adapt to US sanctions and reduce their effect, but they are a significant burden on the country’s development. 

The loss of access to Western technology and equipment has halted several major industrial products. If sanctions remain in place, such effects will become more pronounced.

Trump might readily agree to these terms. But to do so without evidence of reciprocal flexibility by Putin will expose him to accusations of naivety and weakness as a negotiator. 

Trump could easily brush aside claims that he was outsmarted by Putin. But a charge that he was a weak negotiator would offend his vanity and damage his image in the view of Chinese policymakers – who will be watching closely. 

It is fair to assume that Trump will want to avoid this perception since he has worked hard to create the impression that China, Iran and others should continue to fear him in his second term.

Putin may therefore need to offer the US a sufficiently large incentive – an outcome that will allow both Washington and Moscow to claim an advantageous agreement. It is not clear what Putin could propose that would be affordable to him and satisfy Trump’s America First agenda. 

Ukrainian hopes

Shortly before the election, Trump spoke of the need to ‘un-unite’ Russia and China. The idea that Putin could help Washington by turning away from China is fantastical.

The relationship between Beijing and Moscow is far more complex than it appears on the surface. But the two share the common strategic goal of reducing the global influence of the US and its allies and have established much deeper relations since Trump left office in 2020.

It is also hard to see a new arms control proposal coming from Moscow that would interest Trump. The hope in Kyiv is that Trump will quickly recognize that the deal he would like to strike will not materialize because the underlying and connected issues – such as Russia–China relations – are more complex than he imagines. 

The one consolation for Ukrainians is that the Kremlin was disappointed by Trump during his first term, since despite his friendly signals no major results were achieved. The Trump administration supplied anti-tank weapons to Ukraine and fiercely opposed the building of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline connecting Russia and Germany.

Who Trump listens to

While Trump’s approach to negotiating with Moscow is likely to be highly personal and idiosyncratic, the preparation of talks will depend heavily on those he appoints to key positions. At this stage, it is unclear who in the new administration will be responsible for coordinating Russia policy and to what extent they might challenge Trump’s thinking.

The break-up of Scholz’s coalition government signals the end of Germany’s old economic model Expert comment jon.wallace 12 November 2024

The coalition could not agree how to fund new support for Ukraine and failed to fully implement the ‘Zeitenwende’. A new government must push through reform.

As Europeans were still processing Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 US presidential election, an acrimonious break up occurred 4000 miles east of Washington DC.

Reports had been circulating for weeks about the fragile state of Germany’s ‘traffic light’ coalition government led by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, consisting of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party, and liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP).

The expectation had been that the coalition would hold on for a few more weeks and might even be given a new lease of life by Trump’s re-election. Instead, it collapsed on the day Trump’s win was confirmed. An unusually angry Scholtz announced in a live address that he had fired FDP Finance Minister Christian Lindner, effectively breaking up the coalition.

At the heart of the dispute was the so-called ‘debt brake’ – a constitutional mechanism which restricts Germany’s annual public deficit to 0.35 per cent of GDP. Lindner proposed a set of reforms which were unpalatable to the SPD and the Greens. 

In response, Scholz suggested declaring an emergency, which would have suspended the debt brake. That in turn was unacceptable to Lindner, leading to his sacking by the Chancellor.

Practically, this means the SPD and the Greens are now in a minority coalition, without agreement on the 2025 budget or the votes in parliament to pass it. They also still face the challenge of the debt brake.

A vote of confidence will take place in December, with elections to be held before the end of February 2025 latest.

The end of Germany’s economic model

At the root of Germany’s political crisis is the country’s economic model. For decades, Germany relied on a system that depended on cheap Russian gas, cheap imports of consumer goods from China, high-value exports – particularly in the automotive sector – and the US security umbrella.

With Russian energy no longer viable, the global economic landscape shifting, and Donald Trump on his way back to the White House, that model is no longer workable. And Germany’s economy is expected to contract by 0.2 per cent in 2024 – a contraction for the second year running.

The ‘Zeitenwende’, announced by Scholz in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, should have signalled a turnaround of both foreign and economic policy, given how much the two are interconnected. Yet on both fronts, too little changed.

Germany’s reliance on Russian gas did come to an abrupt end in 2022. And Germany is Ukraine’s second largest military aid donor after the US, while accepting the most Ukrainian refugees.

But the ‘Zeitenwende’ turnaround ended there. Scholz’s coalition government failed to prepare for long-term investment in defence at the levels required by creating an off-budget defence spending fund which would have run out in 2027. The draft budget for 2025 showed defence spending would have been cut, as would support for Ukraine.

Germany has also struggled to turn around its economic woes, with the car industry particularly affected. Cheap Chinese EVs and new energy technologies are competing with Germany’s most powerful companies. Volkswagen, the country’s largest car manufacturer, has announced plant closures and layoffs due to shrinking profit margins.  

To the west, Trump’s threat to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports meant share prices of Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedez-Benz and Porsche all dropped between 4 to 7 per cent following news of his re-election.

To the east, trade tensions between the EU and China are intensifying. Yet rather than choosing to diversify, German companies have doubled down on their bets in China, with German investment in the country rising from €6.5bn for the whole of 2023 to €7.3bn in the first half of 2024 alone – only exposing carmakers further.

Germany’s support for Ukraine

Like French President Emmanuel Macron, Scholz had already been weakened by the results of the European Parliamentary elections in June. With the collapse of his traffic light coalition, the EU’s Franco-German ‘engine’ is now well and truly stalled – until new leadership can be found. This weakness comes at a perilous moment when clear, united European leadership, and much increased funding, is needed to shore up support for Ukraine.