Political Opposition and Policy Alternatives in Zambia 31 October 2017 — 10:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 19 October 2017 Chatham House, London

In Zambia’s 2016 national election, the Patriotic Front (PF) was re-elected by a narrow margin. The PF’s Edgar Lungu secured 50.35 per cent of the vote according to the Electoral Commission of Zambia, narrowly avoiding a second round, while his main rival, Hakainde Hichilema, won 47.67 per cent. The UPND, led by Mr Hichilema, alleges electoral fraud and has challenged the result in the courts and through direct protests. Mr Hichilema was imprisoned for 100 days.

At this meeting, Hakainde Hichilema will discuss his UPND priorities, how to strengthen opposition parties and their role in Zambia’s democratic future.

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POSTPONED: Zimbabwe Futures 2025: Financial Sector Expansion and Policy Priorities 15 November 2017 — 9:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2017 Harare, Zimbabwe 

This roundtable will draw on current best practice and senior level expertise to identify policy options for financial stability and sector growth. A depoliticized analysis of the development agenda will highlight requisite conditions and prospective policies for a business-driven roadmap to the economic recovery of Zimbabwe, with a specific focus on the financial sector.

Participants will discuss macro-economic policy and stability, retail banking products and services, fintech, mobilizing domestic finance for national infrastructure and balancing consumer price index and inflation.

This event is being held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club.

PLEASE NOTE, THIS EVENT HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Business Development in Madagascar: How to Enable Entrepreneurialism 15 November 2017 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 November 2017 Chatham House, London

Tsvangirai Leaves an Important Political Legacy in Southern Africa Expert comment sysadmin 21 February 2018

The story of Zimbabwe’s ‘people’s champion’ offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

The death of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai is a loss for Zimbabwe. In nearly three decades of speaking truth to power, Tsvangirai helped to change his nation and the region.

Southern Africa’s new politics

His death marks a period of transition for regional governments and opposition parties alike. The Zuma era has ended in South Africa while Mozambique, Namibia and Angola have also seen political transitions, pushing modernization agendas to appeal to young citizenries that increasingly see politics in separate terms from the liberationist struggles of the previous generation.

Regional opposition movements also face winds of change: the longstanding opposition leader in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Etienne Tshekedi, passed away in 2017, and Mozambique’s Afonso Dhlakama and Kenya’s Raila Odinga are both aging. These movements similarly need to appeal to a younger audience or risk losing relevance.

From trade unionist to opposition leader

Tsvangirai’s career is an eloquent illustration of these challenges. Born in Buhera in rural eastern Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai worked in textiles and mining before politics – diverse experience which gave him crucial exposure to the lives of ordinary people across the country. In his early years, he also worked for ZANU-PF, before leaving to forge his own political path. He became increasingly active in mining politics, rising to the executive of the National Mineworker’s Union and, in 1989, to secretary-general of the powerful Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

In the late 1990’s, Zimbabwe was riven by questions over land, war veterans, the Congo conflict, a shrinking economy and growing doubts about ZANU-PF itself. Opposition leaders of the time could not answer them; those such as Edgar Tekere and Margaret Dongo struggled to win support beyond their local constituencies, and liberation leader Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU had been merged with ZANU-PF in the 1987 Unity Accord.

But in 2000, Zimbabwe’s ‘perfect storm’ of a divisive constitutional referendum, land redistribution and a June election made Tsvangirai and the newly minted MDC, formed in 1999, a national rival to ZANU-PF. Through subsequent national elections in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013, Zimbabwe remained polarized between competing visions of Zimbabwe future: ZANU-PF’s powerful black liberationist politics of identity and the opposition’s equally compelling liberal democracy agenda.

Tsvangirai’s achievement was to provide a credible alternative to liberation icon Robert Mugabe. Tsvangirai also resuscitated Zimbabwe’s tradition of urban nationalism, and was a successor to Benjamin Burombo and other mid-century Zimbabwean urban leaders. Tsvangirai would in turn be a touchstone for contemporary urban activists Evans Mawarire, Linda Masarira and others.

From opposition to coalition

The political struggle for Zimbabwe became global, with Mugabe and Tsvangirai both winning support from rival international power blocs. In March 2007, pictures of a beaten and bloodied Tsvangirai helped to galvanize support for the MDC in the 2008 elections. But the disputed result and violent subsequent run-off between Tsvangirai and Mugabe led the regional community to push both men into a coalition government, with Tsvangirai as prime minister.

Despite continuous ructions, the Government of National Unity (GNU) held, and stabilized Zimbabwe’s collapsed economy, until 2013. Although often politically out-manoeuvred by Mugabe, Tsvangirai deserves credit for getting the opposition a share of political power and for holding his nerve against many who wanted to collapse the GNU.

Tsvangirai was no saint; his complicated love life, and tacit approval of violent attacks on party dissenters, do him no credit. More importantly, the MDC neglected its grassroots supporters during the GNU, and paid the price in its comprehensive 2013 electoral defeat. But although diminished, Tsvangirai remained Zimbabwe’s most popular opposition politician, and the MDC’s new leaders will have quite a task ahead of them, even if they have been planning since his courageous 2016 public admission of colon cancer.

The MDC after Tsvangirai

Nelson Chamisa, one of the three MDC vice presidents, has now been appointed as acting president by the party’s national committee. Chamisa inherits a fractured and fractious party, and one which has also fallen out with the Tsvangirai family. The other two vice presidents, Thokozani Khupe and Elias Mudzuri, have also set their sights on party leadership.

At 40, Chamisa, an orator with grassroots appeal, has a huge task. With general elections due by July, he has to unite the party, counter Zimbabwe’s rising ethno-politics, prove himself as leader of a broader opposition coalition and take on a resurgent President Emmerson Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF.

Electorally, the opposition’s strongest card has always been the urban vote and the economy. But Mnangagwa has fast forwarded a comprehensive economic reform and internationalist agenda. This, and Mugabe’s exit, have forced Chamisa, Joice Mujuru and other opposition leaders to play catch-up. Zimbabwe’s elections, the first since 2000 without Mugabe and Tsvangirai as contenders, will be of global interest as the country navigates the new political dynamics.

The people’s champion

Morgan Tsvangirai’s resilience earned him respect from friends and foes alike, with Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga visiting him at home a few weeks ago. A former nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, Tsvangirai, popularly known by his totem of ‘Save’ and also called mudhara [the old man] deserves national hero status. He will certainly be remembered as the ‘people’s champion’, and a pioneer in bridging the generational and ideological fissures that have shaped Southern Africa’s politics.

With their leader now gone, the turbulent MDC will undoubtedly be hoping for a ‘remembrance vote’ in his memory to carry them through the elections. But beyond that, his story offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

Zimbabwe Ahead of the Elections: Political and Economic Challenges 8 May 2018 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 May 2018 Chatham House, London

The upcoming elections in Zimbabwe will be the first since 2000 in which former president Robert Mugabe and long-time opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai are not on the ballot paper. A key electoral issue for many voters will be the economy: recent years have been marked by high unemployment rates, chronic cash shortages and mounting public debt. Although this has traditionally been a strong campaigning issue for the opposition, President Emmerson Mnangagwa has fast-tracked comprehensive economic reforms.

At this event, Nelson Chamisa, MDC Alliance presidential candidate, will discuss his efforts to build a united opposition coalition with a strong message, the steps needed to ensure a free and fair election can take place, and the role that international partners can play in Zimbabwe’s democratic process.

South Africa's Land Reform Quandary: Scenarios and Policy 10 July 2018 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 13 June 2018 Chatham House, London

Slow delivery on expectations of land redistribution in South Africa has once again put the issue at the forefront of political debate in the country. A parliamentary public consultation process will consider whether constitutional change is required to accelerate expropriation without compensation. Policymakers face dual - often opposing - pressures due to investors’ fears of negative economic impacts as well as citizens’ frustrations over persistent inequality and hardship. State land and tribal trust land remain contentious issues for rural economic development, but with two thirds of the population now living in urban areas policy responses must be as cognizant of the country’s future as it is of its past.

At this meeting, Terence Corrigan, project manager at the South African Institute of Race Relations, will discuss the current debates on expropriation and present the institute’s latest research on future scenarios of land reform in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Public Service, Accountability and Delivery in Malawi 17 October 2018 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 October 2018 Chatham House, London

Political Reform in Angola: Challenges and Priorities for Elected Officials 31 October 2018 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 October 2018 Chatham House, London

Angola’s reformulated National Assembly has passed a series of legislative reforms since elections in August 2017, in which the ruling MPLA won a majority of 150 seats to the 51 held by the UNITA leading opposition party.

Many of the changes have targeted the revitalization of an underperforming economy and improved governance: in June 2018 parliament approved a new private investment law aimed at diversifying Angola’s fiscal base beyond oil revenues while new legislation in May mandated the return of illicitly exported capital of over $100,000.

As the appetite for measurable progress across all sectors of society remains high, and with newly constituted municipal elections scheduled for 2020, inclusive and accountable political debate will remain critical to Angola’s future.

At the event, a cross-party delegation discuss the role of the National Assembly in affecting political change and the importance of maintaining open dialogue among opposing voices to address the challenges facing Angola.

Water, Energy and Development in Angola: From Ambition to Actuality 13 December 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 November 2018 Chatham House, London

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Policy Priorities for Economic Expansion 28 February 2019 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

This roundtable draws on current best practice and senior level expertise to identify policy options for long term economic expansion in Zimbabwe and pathways for inclusive development.

Participants discuss the necessary policies and business strategies to enable and support the effective implementation of the Transitional Stabilization Programme and longer term national development plans.

The discussions highlight requisite conditions for a business-driven and inclusive process towards Zimbabwe’s long-term economic recovery.

This event was held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

South Africa’s 2019 Election: Polling Data and Party Prospects 13 March 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 March 2019 Chatham House, London

On 8 May 2019, South Africans will vote in their sixth national election. Incumbent President Cyril Ramaphosa is leading his ANC party campaign, which promises inclusive economic growth and social transformation, including through a sustainable land reform programme. However, public frustrations with the party’s record of service delivery and government corruption after 25 years in power could threaten the ANC’s electoral dominance especially in urban areas.

At this meeting, Professor David Everatt, head of the Wits School of Governance and political pollster, will present polling data and discuss the prospects and strategies of the main parties and their leaders ahead of the May election.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

South Africa After the Elections: Balancing Domestic and International Policy Priorities 16 May 2019 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 May 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government that emerges from the 8 May election in South Africa faces immediate domestic and international foreign policy demands. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to stimulate job growth, accelerating anti-corruption and good governance efforts are at the forefront of the new government’s agenda.

International ambitions will be upgraded such as UN security council reform, maximizing South Africa’s G20, BRICS and IBSA membership and preparing for South Africa’s chairmanship of the African Union (AU) in 2020.

At this meeting, the speakers – Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of SAIIA and author with Nobantu Mbeki of A Manifesto for Social Change: How to Save South Africa, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, chief executive of SAIIA and currently co-editing a volume on A South African Foreign Policy for the 2020s which will be published in 2019 – will reflect on the election and discuss the new government’s domestic and international policy agenda. The meeting will be chaired by Ann Grant, former British High Commissioner to South Africa (2000-05) with past experience working for Oxfam, Standard Chartered Bank and Tullow Oil.

Mine Action in Angola: Clearing the Legacies of Conflict to Harness the Potential of Peace Other resource sysadmin 14 June 2019

This publication draws on and updates the briefing note published following a meeting of the All- Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Angola on 26 April 2017. It also incorporates insights from a Chatham House Africa Programme conference session on the legacies of the Angolan Civil War, held on 23 March 2018; and draws on the Africa Programme’s research into conservation-driven development models in Southern Africa.

Almost two decades after the end of its civil war, Angola remains one of the most heavily landmine-contaminated countries in the world. The Angolan government has committed to clearing its landmines by 2025, and there is constructive collaboration between the government and mine clearing agencies in this endeavour, but the target will be achievable only if a decline in funding from international donors is reversed. International funding for mine clearance in Angola fell by more than 80 per cent between 2005 and 2017, and this sharp drop in external support has compounded the impact on domestic funding for national clearance efforts as a result of the downturn in prices for Angola’s main export commodities.

The national mine action agency, the Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária (CNIDAH), is supported by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the HALO Trust. By 2017, 15 years after the end of the civil war, these organizations had collectively helped clear 56 per cent of known landmine-contaminated land. State-led demining has focused principally on clearing areas designated for infrastructure projects. Now, it is critical that humanitarian demining in largely agricultural and conservation areas is prioritized to bring to an end the daily threat to Angola’s rural poor – as well as to the country’s livestock and wildlife – of injury or death as a result of landmine accidents.

Angola has some of the world’s most important remaining wilderness, including the tributary system for the unique Okavango Delta, and the country has the potential to host one of the most diverse wildlife populations on the continent. However, the presence of landmines and other remnants of the civil war render large areas of the country unsafe both for wildlife and for the local people, whose ability to derive a sustainable livelihood from their natural environment is fundamental to its protection.

Wildlife and tourism provide important economic opportunities for diversification beyond an oil-dominated economy. Critically, Angola’s economic diversification and development objectives can only be achieved if the landmines that prohibit access to land for agriculture, mining, tourism and wildlife are cleared.

There are economic opportunities for released land in the most heavily mined provinces of Cuando Cubango and Moxico. Already, some new funding for mine action in Angola, if upscaled or matched by international donors, could be transformative for its people, and for the conservation of the region’s vital biodiversity.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Sector Priorities for Policy Implementation 4 June 2019 — 9:00AM TO 5:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Policy Priorities for Industrialization, Agri-Business and Tourism 6 June 2019 — 9:30AM TO 1:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

Hope, Peace and Reconciliation: Pope Francis in Mozambique Expert comment sysadmin 4 September 2019

A papal visit will highlight the importance of the recently signed peace agreement between the government and opposition.

Pope Francis’ visit to Mozambique on 4–6 September comes at a critical political moment. The theme for the papal Africa trip (which also includes Madagascar and Mauritius) is ‘pilgrim of hope, peace and reconciliation’. This is especially relevant for Mozambique, as this is the first week of the official campaign for Mozambique’s sixth national elections on 15 October.

It is also the one-month anniversary of the Maputo Accords for Peace and Reconciliation between the government and the armed opposition, RENAMO (and the fifth anniversary of the previous such agreement in 2014).

What is unusual is that the pope accepted to visit Mozambique just after a peace accord and in the run-up to national elections. Something similar has happened only once, when Pope John Paul II visited Angola in June 1992 (following the Bicesse Accords) prior to the country’s first ever national elections in September. Unfortunately Pope John Paul’s preaching of reconciliation and pluralism failed and civil war resumed some months later, following rejection of the preliminary election results. Angola’s civil war only finally ended a decade later in 2002.

The last papal visit to Mozambique was also by Pope John Paul II in 1988, when civil war was still ongoing, and the country was still a single party state. Despite the war, massive congregations attended and RENAMO reached local ceasefires and agreements to maintain electricity supply to honour the visit. Some of the seeds for the Rome peace process were laid during this trip – especially as it also represented a formal reconciliation of FRELIMO, the ruling party, with the Catholic Church.

This papal visit to Mozambique is equally anticipated, as was highlighted several times during speeches at the 6 August peace agreement signing in Maputo. When I was in Maputo last month, sales of papal-pictured capulanas (a Mozambican sarong) were brisk and Mozambican television carried countdown clocks on many programmes for the touchdown of Pope Francis on national soil.

The Catholic Church has played an instrumental role in promoting peace in Mozambique over the years. The 1977–92 civil war ended through negotiations hosted at the Sant’ Egidio lay community in Rome, and the current Archbishop of Bologna, Dom Matteo Zuppi (who led the Sant’ Egido negotiations in 1992 and is soon to be made a cardinal) was an official witness to 6 August accords signing.

When targeted armed conflict resumed in 2013, faith groups once more re-engaged and in 2016 Sant’ Egidio once more co-led mediation efforts, less successfully than in 1991–92. Sant’ Egidio (including during a presidential visit to Rome in July) contributed to convincing the Vatican that this papal visit should occur before the October elections.

President Filipe Nyusi anxiously wanted this visit to occur before the elections. He is seeking re-election for his second and final term and a papal visit should help win some votes. His party, FRELIMO, is also worried about securing a majority in the national assembly, as it has been weakened by patchy delivery of services and ongoing high-level corruption scandals.

This year, President Nyusi’s priorities have been to show that he can attract international investment (such as Andarko’s recently announced final investment decision on its gas project), a peace agreement with RENAMO (the August agreements) and a papal visit, so a successful trip would complete his goals.

The pope’s ‘hope, peace and reconciliation’ message of his visit is important. Twice previously, the FRELIMO-led government and RENAMO have reached definitive agreements, in Rome (1992) and Maputo (2014), but failed to fully end bloodshed. This new August 2019 agreement is the third attempt, and if it is to last, it will require political goodwill, compromise and an acceptance of more inclusive national politics by both parties.

There are two immediate threats to this agreement. The first is the forthcoming 15 October elections and their conduct could make or break it. Accepting reconciliation and greater pluralism underpins this agreement, but RENAMO expects to increase its share of the parliamentary vote and win a majority in some provinces (and therefore indirectly elect their choice for governor).

A second threat is the ‘Military Junta’, a RENAMO splinter group that claims to be 500 strong, but probably accounts for 80 armed persons. It rejects the 6 August agreement and warns that it could disrupt the elections. This group has asked for mediation, and hopefully can be accommodated in a side deal to the main one agreed in August, which already provides for the reintegration of over 5,000 RENAMO supporters and combatants.

A recent Chatham House research paper on elite bargains in Mozambique concluded that the October elections will be the first immediate test of the August agreement. If the elections pass without significant electoral manipulation or violence and this August deal sticks on the third attempt, the domestic focus should then move onto poverty reduction, combating inequality, education and solving the new security crisis with Islamic militants in Cabo Delgado province.

Can Liberation Movements Really Rid Southern Africa of Corruption? Expert comment sysadmin 16 December 2019

Southern Africa’s national liberation movements have survived ‘end of decade’ elections across the region. Combating corruption has been at the heart of many of the campaigns, but the question is can they succeed?

Swapo’s victory in Namibia two weeks ago was the last in a series of recent ‘end of decade’ elections that have returned dominant parties to power across Southern Africa. However, the “enduring appeal of liberation” is wearing thin.

Experiences across the region show that if governments are to deliver on their electoral promises, they must empower institutions, actively promote a culture of accountability and transparency within their party ranks and pursue economic reforms that untangle the web of party-state-business alliances. Such actions are critical for the survival of national liberation movements as the dominant force in the politics of Southern Africa – but will be difficult to implement.

Avoid political factionalism

South Africa, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe all saw new presidents take over just before elections. All used the rhetoric of anti-corruption to distance themselves from the tainted image of their predecessors. But acting on this requires a shift in mind-set in parties that have always preferred to deal with their problems behind closed doors. High profile adversaries from past regimes make tempting targets but could also drive party divisions.

In Angola, the transition of power was safeguarded by an agreement that former president José Eduardo dos Santos would be immune from prosecution. But this week his son faced corruption charges before the country’s supreme court, a high-profile example of a wave of anti-corruption cases across Southern Africa, driven by dominant parties wary of their future.

The allegations against José Filemino De Sousa Dos Santos, nickname ‘Zenu’, include a $500-million fraud involving the country’s central bank. Pressure is also mounting on Zenu’s sister Isabel — once prominent in Angola, she is now absent from public life.

Other leaders have had to tread more carefully. Immunity was a luxury Cyril Ramaphosa was neither willing nor politically able to grant Jacob Zuma in South Africa. Reliant on a few close allies at the top of the party, Ramaphosa lacks foot soldiers at the grassroots level, and his campaign against corruption within the ANC has faced persistent opposition.

Rebuilding institutions and empowering authorities takes time, and with few high-profile cases to point to, people are getting restless. This is also the case in Zimbabwe, where a worsening economic situation has left policy reformers politically isolated.

Party, state, and business

Long term incumbency has blurred the distinction between the party and the state. Liberation movements have created vast party-linked business empires. Political allegiance grants access to economic resources through appointments to lucrative positions in state-owned enterprises, preferential bids for tenders and licenses, and direct access to decision makers.

In Angola, this was fuelled by oil revenues. In South Africa, state capture flourished in an environment where the ANC and its constituent elements had significant power on the panels that chose leaders for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In Namibia, an Icelandic fishing company paid backhanders to officials for fishing rights in what has become known as the ‘Fishrot’ scandal. Zanu-PF officials’ access to preferential foreign exchange rates present them with lucrative opportunities in Zimbabwe.

Ending this bureaucratic rent seeking goes beyond appointing ‘clean’ officials, which has been central to the anti-corruption campaigns in Angola and South Africa. Governments must also allow scrutiny of the state and empower those institutions designed for that role, such as the National Prosecuting Authority and the Public Protector in South Africa. Zimbabwe’s auditor general has published an in-depth report of the state of corruption in the country’s SOEs.

Companies must also be held to account for their role in aiding, and at worst directly benefitting, from state graft. International businesses have actively sought to benefit from corruption. They are now starting to face the consequences. A former Credit Suisse banker has pleaded guilty in the US over handling alleged kickbacks in Mozambique’s $2-billion “tuna bond” scandal. Global banks and consultancies continue to feel the squeeze for their complicity in state capture in South Africa.

Competition and pluralism

National liberation movements may only have a limited window within which to act. Across the region civil society campaigns and investigative journalists have shed light on some of the worst abuses of power. Anti-corruption campaigns are starting to bite. The state will continue to play a central role in Southern African economies, an important arbiter of economic transformation able to balance the region’s highly unequal and resource-dependent economies.

But opposition, civil society and the media are also critical for the progression towards democratic competition and pluralism in Southern Africa. Parliaments remain vital for holding rulers to account. Long used to unchallenged dominance, liberation movements have significant adjustments to make to rise to the challenge of a new era.

This article was originally published in the Mail and Guardian.

COVID-19 in South Africa: Leadership, Resilience and Inequality Expert comment sysadmin 7 May 2020

In a world looking for leadership, South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa has been remarkable. One year after he carried the time-worn ANC through a national election, South Africans are crying out for more.

In the COVID-19 crisis so far, Cyril Ramaphosa has been widely praised for displaying the decisive leadership so many hoped for when they cast their ballot for him in May 2019. Buttressed by others such as health minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, and on a simple objective to prevent transmission, South Africa has been a lesson to the world. Act fast. Act hard.

Former president Thabo Mbeki’s disastrous response to the HIV crisis cast a long shadow over his legacy, and Ramaphosa has taken note. South Africa has had one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. No exercise. No cigarettes. No alcohol.

The lockdown was imposed when the country had only around 1,000 recorded cases and just two deaths. As a result, transmission from returning travellers has not yet led to an exponential infection rate within the community. The government’s swift reaction has bought much needed time with the peak now seemingly delayed to September or October.

Continental and national leadership

Ramaphosa has also emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses. As current chair of the African Union (AU) he leads the continental engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO), and the various international finance institutions, while South African officials are working with the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on a push for African debt restructuring.

He has also been active in trouble shooting to unlock external assistance to the continent, including from China and Russia. Appointing special envoys is typical of his boardroom-honed leadership style.

International and regional partnerships are vital for resilience and the arrival of 217 Cuban doctors to South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the liberationist solidarity of the Cold War era. And regional economies remain dependent on South Africa to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Following the 2008 financial crisis, it was South Africa’s regional trading relationships that remained robust, while trade with its main global partners in China and the US dropped.

Despite the plaudits, Ramaphosa remains vulnerable to challenge at home, notably around his failure to stimulate South Africa’s moribund economy. On the eve of lockdown, Moody’s joined its peers Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in giving South Africa a below investment grade credit rating. The move was a long time coming. Long mooted economic reforms were slow to materialise, and South Africa had fallen into recession.

Ramaphosa depends on a small core of close advisors and allies, initially united in apparent opposition to the kleptocratic rule of President Jacob Zuma and the deep patronage networks he created within both the party and the state. But this allegiance is being tested by economic reality. Support within the party was already drifting prior to the crisis.

Disagreements are not just technocratic – there are big ideological questions in play around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. Energy minister and former union stalwart Gwede Mantashe is wary of job losses, and minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan protective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before coronavirus hit, Ramaphosa seemed content to allow these policy disputes to play themselves out with little decisive intervention.

Slow progress on reform, against worsening economic performance, left Ramaphosa and his allies exposed. In January the president missed the UK’s African Investment Summit in order to assert control over a party meeting at which it was expected his detractors would seek to remove Gordhan.

COVID-19 has sharpened thinking

As the independently assertive - and eminently quotable - pro-market reformist finance minister Tito Mboweni stated, ‘you can’t eat ideology’. Accelerated reform and restructuring is required if the government turns to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance.

For the first time, Gordhan has been forced to deny a bailout to beleaguered state airline South African Airways (SAA), and the government’s lockdown bailout of R500 billion has been applauded by business. Much like the fiscal stimulus and recovery plan of 2018, it relies on smart spending, targeting sectors with high multiplier effects. It also includes significant reserve bank loans.

But it has been criticised for not doing enough to help the most vulnerable. There is considerable fear of what could happen when the virus takes hold in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements where social distancing is almost impossible, basic toilet facilities are shared, and HIV and TB rates high.

There are mounting concerns of the humanitarian cost of a prolonged lockdown, and the government has been faster than others in implementing a tiered lockdown system, trying to get people back to work and keep the economy afloat.

South Africa has been criticized by the UN for the use of lethal force by security forces in enforcing lockdown and, in a society plagued by corruption, there are fears legislation to stop the spread of false information could be used to restrict legitimate reporting on the virus response or other issues.

COVID-19 shines a spotlight on societies’ fault-lines worldwide. South Africa is often touted as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world but, in a globalized economy, these divisions are international as much as they are local.

Resilience comes from within, but also depends on regional and global trading and financial systems. South Africans and international partners have long recognised Ramaphosa’s leadership qualities as an impressive voice for the global south.

But he must also be an advocate for South Africa’s poor. This crisis could accelerate implementation of his landmark pro-poor National Health Insurance and Universal Health Care programmes. Or the hit of COVID-19 on top of South Africa’s existing economic woes could see them derailed entirely. Ramaphosa must push through economic reforms at the same time as managing COVID-19 and rebuilding trust in his government.

Mozambique’s Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement: One Year On 6 August 2020 — 2:30PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2020 Online

August 6, 2020 marks one year since the Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement was signed in Maputo. The agreement, signed by the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade, and witnessed by regional and international political and religious leaders, ended the return to conflict that started in 2013.

It also paved the way for Mozambique’s national elections in October 2019. Since the agreement, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won a landslide victory in the elections, weakening RENAMO, and a splinter group has conducted targeted armed violence in Manica and Sofala provinces. Yet, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process has made progress.

At this event, senior figures reflect on the peace agreement and the key factors of its success. The event also draws upon insights from the authors of recent publications on the latest peace agreement in the context of longer term trends of democratization and peace-building in Mozambique.

A Chatham House Africa Programme research paper published in August 2019, Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky?, examined how the deal was achieved. The Portuguese version includes the full text of the peace accord. Read the research paper in Portuguese or English here.

South Africa’s foreign policy: Reflections on the United Nations Security Council and the African Union 20 January 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 January 2021 Online

HE Dr Naledi Pandor, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, discusses South Africa’s role in pursuing its regional and global goals.

To receive joining instructions, please finalise your registration by clicking the link below. Once you have registered you will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which will include the unique joining link you will need to attend.

In 2019-2020, South Africa served its third term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, seeking to strengthen its role as a bridge-builder and further justify a more permanent role for the country and continent on the body.

In February 2021, South Africa will also conclude its time as Chair of the African Union, having used its tenure to promote peace and security issues, including closer cooperation with the UNSC, and advance regional economic integration.

South Africa took up these roles at a time of global and regional upheaval. As COVID-19 tested countries’ commitment to cooperation over isolation, South Africa coordinated regional responses to address the challenges of stressed public health systems, vaccine strategies, and economic stimulus and debt support across Africa.

Its leadership has been further tested by ongoing and emerging insecurity in the Sahel, and in Cabo Delgado in neighbouring Mozambique. The crux of its regional strategy remains squaring the circle between promoting regional economic cooperation while protecting its own domestic economic priorities.

At this event, HE Dr Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa, reflects on the country’s two years on the UNSC and one year of chairing the AU, and discuss South Africa’s role in pursuing regional and global goals.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Read event transcript. 

Angola Forum 2021: Policy options to support economic recovery in Angola 7 October 2021 — 2:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 September 2021 Online

Speakers discuss policy options to support economic recovery in Angola as the country transitions away from a state-led oil economy to a private-sector-led growth model.

The government of Angola has made some progress on a range of policies targeting macroeconomic stability and structural reform. However, the country has been suffering from a recurring economic recession for six consecutive years, with the last positive annual GDP growth rate posted in 2015 at 0.9 per cent.

The national budget remains dependent on oil revenue, leaving the country highly exposed to volatile oil prices particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. While revenues collapsed, increased spending was needed to respond to the health crisis and estimates of Angola’s debt spike range from 130 to 150 per cent of its GDP by the close of 2020.

At this virtual Angola Forum, speakers discuss policy options to support economic recovery in Angola as the country transitions away from a state-led oil economy to a private-sector-led growth model.

The Forum launches the English translation of the Angola Economic Report 2019-20 by the Centro de Estudos de Investigação (CEIC) of the Catholic University of Angola in partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), and the findings of Afrobarometer’s first ever survey in Angola, Ovilongwa – Estudos de Opinião Pública, which interviewed 2,400 adult Angolans and sampled individual perceptions on democracy and economic reform in Angola.

This event will be held in English and Portuguese with simultaneous interpretation.

The Forum will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Zambia’s political and economic reform and recovery 5 November 2021 — 11:30AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 November 2021 Chatham House and Online

At this event, HE Hakainde Hichilema, president of the Republic of Zambia, discusses his vision for Zambia’s development and long-term political and economic reform and recovery.

Zambia’s new administration, following the general elections of August 2021, faces a daunting challenge of reversing economic contraction, lowering income-eroding inflation, and addressing the unsustainable national debt.

The country has been one of the few to seek debt restructuring under the G20’s new Common Framework for Debt Treatments, and its immediate priorities include a prospective agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Young Zambians are eager for jobs and improved living standards. But the government’s ambition to create more jobs and achieve middle-income status will depend on both attracting new investment into its copper sector and pursuing a programme of economic diversification supporting growth beyond the mining industry.

Addressing these economic concerns will also need to be supported by a programme of political reform and rehabilitation of citizens’ trust in the state.

South Africa’s ANC party policy conference 2022: Outcomes and prospects 10 August 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 August 2022 Online

Paul Mashatile, Treasurer-General of the African National Congress (ANC), discusses the outcomes of the 6th ANC Policy Conference 2022.

The African National Congress (ANC) recently concluded its 6th National Policy Conference in Johannesburg, in the year that the ANC has declared ‘The Year of Unity and Renewal to Defend and Advance South Africa’s Democratic Gains’. The conference was a precursor to the party’s 55th National Elective Conference to be held in December.

The conference has come less than a year after municipal polls in which the ANC garnered less than 50 per cent of votes, its lowest since 1994. Many believe internal factionalism is impeding party reform and hampering its ability to address unemployment and entrenched inequality.

At this webinar, Paul Mashatile, Treasurer-General of the ANC, will discuss the outcomes of the ANC Policy Conference 2022, including measures to accelerate inclusive growth, job creation and a just energy transition.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

The future of global trade: Beyond ‘peak globalization’? 23 November 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2022 Online

Is globalization in retreat?

The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine have highlighted how vulnerable international trade is. But, even before these recent shocks, rising protectionism in major economies around the world and concerns about the environment have weighed heavily on trade.

According to some key measures, the globalization trend appears to have slowed. But is ‘peak globalization’ a reality or a myth? What are the major phases of globaliszation and what might come next? The answer differs between trade in goods, services, capital, technology, data and people. And whether the future is a more integrated or fragmented world economy also depends on politics and the stability of the international order.

Key questions to be tackled at this event includes:

• How do recent shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine, change globalization? 

• What are the key indicators for the global integration of major economies?

• Will there be a split between a US and China-dominated ’trading sphere of influence’?

• Could trade in services offer ‘globalization’ a new phase of rapid growth?

• What impact will technology continue to have on global trade and the future of globalization?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

The discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. The Global Trade Policy Forum is supported by founding partner AIG, associate partner Boston Consulting Group and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo PLC and UPS.

Read the transcript. 

Iran: Protests, politics and power 16 November 2022 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2022 Online

Join Robert Macaire, UK ambassador to Iran (2018-21), and others to discuss what the protests mean for Iran’s domestic, regional and global power.

Protests in Iran, spurred after Masha Amini died in police custody, have drawn focus on how Iranians feel about state repression, a struggling economy and global isolation. Iran is facing the most adamant challenge to its power structure since the ‘green movement’ in 2009 with protests taking place in more than 50 cities and towns across the country. There is no sign that the government will back down but what will that decision mean for the power it can wield at home and abroad?

This conversation examines how the protests impact Iran’s domestic power, its regional relationships and its relations with the US.

• What do the protests demonstrate about Iran’s power domestically and regionally?

• How do the protests influence the JCPOA?

• What will the government gain if they hold a hard line on protesters?

• How do the protests impact Iran’s regional activities?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

What’s next in UK monetary policy? 4 November 2022 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

A panel of leading experts discuss the future direction of UK monetary policy.

The UK’s so-called ‘mini-budget’ on 23 September led to a severe market reaction and a wave of criticism at home and abroad that ultimately forced the sacking of UK chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng and contributed to the downfall of Liz Truss’s government.

The new chancellor Jeremy Hunt is due to deliver what will essentially be an entirely new budget in mid-November, with a full assessment from the Office of Budget Responsibility. This will follow the meeting of the Bank of England’s interest rate setting Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) on Thursday 3 November.

Given rising inflationary pressures worldwide, it seems highly likely that the MPC will increase interest rates once again, but by how much and how far there will have to be an additional premium linked to the government’s fiscal strategy is far from clear.

Chatham House’s Global Economy and Finance programme is pleased to partner with Fathom Consulting to host a special session of Fathom’s Monetary Policy Forum.

A presentation of Fathom’s latest economic outlook, fully updated to take account of the previous day’s MPC decision, will be followed by a discussion among four of the MPC’s original former external members. Key questions will include:

• How far has the government been able to restore its fiscal credibility?
• Did the MPC make the right decision on 3 November?
• What is the likely pace and extent of monetary tightening in the UK going forward?
• What will be the long-term consequences for the UK economy of the past month’s policy experiment?
• What are the international implications?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. 

This event is in partnership with Fathom Consulting.

The road to COP27: In conversation with US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry 27 October 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

What will progress on climate change look like at COP27?

With global attention zeroing in on COP27, policymakers and world leaders will meet in Egypt to take the next step in the fight against the climate crisis. The planet is on course to warm well beyond 1.5°C and climate hazards are increasing our exposure to climate risk. Violent and unpredictable weather events increasingly leave devastation among communities, particularly in vulnerable countries.

At the same time, the ripple effects of the conflict in Ukraine will have wide-ranging economic, social and geopolitical consequences for years to come. Whilst some finance is being made available, more is needed to properly address the damage caused by climate change and fund the transition to net zero worldwide. These challenges have become more acute as the world grapples with a growing energy crisis, the war in Ukraine and a troubling economic outlook.

Joined by US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, the following questions are considered:

• Is ‘1.5 degrees’ still on track?

• How can countries better collaborate to move to net zero faster?

• How can we achieve progress on adaptation, climate finance, and loss and damage?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.