Rising wage inequality and stagnant real wages have contributed to inequality in family incomes during the past three decades. While the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) have helped mitigate the impact on low-income families (Bitler and Hoynes 2010), federal minimum wage policy has not contributed to the solution. The federal minimum wage has failed to keep pace with both the cost of living and the median wage in the labor market. As a consequence, working full-time at the minimum wage does not allow many families to escape poverty, or to attain economic self-sufficiency.

State and local governments can set minimum wages in excess of the statutory federal minimum wage. Indeed, state and local governments have played an important role in establishing minimum wages across the country; as a result, thirty-seven states had state minimum wages exceeding the federal level in 2007 prior to the most recent federal increase. Cities, too, have begun setting higher minimum wages, as evidenced by city-level wage minimums in Albuquerque, San Francisco, San Jose, Santa Fe, Seattle, and Washington, DC; other cities are actively exploring possibilities of raising minimum wages. 

In this policy memo, I propose a framework for effective state and local minimum wage policy. First, I propose using half the local-area median wage as an important gauge for setting an appropriate level of the minimum wage. Second, I propose that state and local governments take into account the local cost of living as a relevant consideration in setting a minimum wage, and I provide estimates of how state minimum wages would vary if they reflected cost-of-living differences. I also recommend the use of regional consumer price indexes (CPIs) to index the local minimum wage. Finally, I propose that cities and counties coordinate regional wage setting to mitigate possible negative effects of local mandates. 

The implementation of the state and local framework does not override the need for reform at the federal level. Thoughtful reforms to the federal minimum wage can help reduce poverty and mitigate inequality. The federal minimum wage has been the focus of substantial debate by academics and policymakers; this proposal focuses on state and local reforms that have received substantially less attention. These state and local reforms can be an important part of the policy portfolio for reducing the incidence of poverty and for helping low-income families support themselves as they strive toward the middle class. In particular, although the federal minimum wage serves as a floor in the labor market, there is some room for additional increases in higher-wage areas.

Downloads

• Designing Thoughtful Minimum Wage Policy at the State and Local Levels - Full Text

Reducing inequality and expanding opportunity are central challenges increasingly acknowledged by leaders across the political spectrum. Policymakers generally agree that one key solution is to prepare young people and adults with the skills to earn a good income. Unlike other advanced countries, however, reform proposals in the United States have typically included little or nothing about apprenticeship—a highly cost-effective mechanism for developing workplace skills and for reducing youth unemployment. However, interest in apprenticeship models is building in the United States, partly because of the recent successes of Britain and South Carolina in stimulating major expansions of apprenticeship training. A robust apprenticeship system is especially attractive because of its potential to reduce youth unemployment, improve the transition from school to career, upgrade skills, raise wages of young adults, strengthen a young worker’s identity, increase U.S. productivity, achieve positive returns for employers and workers, and use limited federal resources more effectively.

Apprenticeship prepares workers to master occupational skills and achieve career success. Under apprenticeship programs, individuals undertake productive work for their employer, earn a salary, receive training primarily through supervised work‐ based learning, and take academic instruction that is related to the apprenticeship occupation. The programs generally last from two to four years. Apprenticeship helps workers to master not only relevant occupational skills, but also other work‐related skills, including communication, problem solving, allocation of resources, and dealing with supervisors and a diverse set of coworkers. The course work is generally equivalent to at least one year of community college. Completing apprenticeship training yields a recognized and valued credential attesting to mastery of skill required in the relevant occupation. Unlike the normal part-time jobs held by high school and college students, apprenticeship integrates what young people learn on the job and in the classroom. Box 7-1 describes a successful youth apprenticeship program in Georgia. (See the PDF for Box 7-1).

In some ways, apprenticeship offers an alternative to the “academic-only” college focus of U.S. policymakers. Increasingly, placing all of our career-preparation eggs in one basket is leaving young adults, especially minority young men, well behind. Among young adults ages twenty-five to thirty-four in 2013, 49 percent of all women and 37 percent of African American women had earned at least an Associate degree; for men, the comparable figures were 40 percent and 28 percent, respectively. Furthermore, in 2011–12, nearly two African American women earned a bachelor’s degree for every African American male who earned one (National Center for Education Statistics 2013). Despite the well-documented high average returns to college, variations in interests, capacities, and learning styles suggest many young people would benefit far more from alternative pathways to rewarding careers than they do from academic-only pathways. 

Apprenticeship can narrow the postsecondary achievement gaps in both gender and race. Having learning take place mostly on the job, making the tasks and classroom work highly relevant to their careers, and providing participants with wages while they learn are especially beneficial to men, particularly minority men. Apprenticeship can give minorities increased confidence that their personal efforts and investment in skill development will pay off, giving graduates a genuine sense of occupational identity and occupational pride. 

Additionally, apprenticeship is a useful tool for enhancing youth development. Young people work with natural adult mentors who offer guidance but allow youth to make their own mistakes (Halpern 2009). Youth see themselves judged by the established standards of a discipline, including deadlines and the genuine constraints and unexpected difficulties that arise in the profession. Supervisors provide the close monitoring and frequent feedback that helps apprentices keep their focus on performing well at the work site and in the classroom. 

Furthermore, apprenticeship is distinctive in enhancing both the worker supply side and the employer demand side of the labor market. On the supply side, the financial gains to apprenticeship are strikingly high. U.S. studies indicate that apprentices do not have to sacrifice earnings during their education and training and that their long-term earnings benefits exceed the gains they would have accumulated after graduating from community college (Hollenbeck 2008). The latest reports from the state of Washington show that the gains in earnings from various education and training programs far surpass the gains from all other alternatives (Workforce Training and Education Coordinating Board 2014). A broad study of apprenticeship in ten states also documents large and statistically significant earnings gains from participating in apprenticeship programs (Reed et al. 2012). 

On the demand side, employers can feel comfortable upgrading their jobs knowing that their apprenticeship programs will ensure an adequate supply of well-trained workers. High levels of apprenticeship activity in Australia, Canada, and Britain demonstrate that even companies in labor markets with few restrictions on hiring, firing, and wages are willing to invest in apprenticeship training. While no rigorous evidence is available about apprenticeship’s costs and benefits to U.S. employers, research in other countries indicates that employers gain financially from their apprenticeship investments (Lerman 2014). 

In general, firms reap several advantages from their apprenticeship investments. They save significant sums in recruitment and training costs, in reduced errors in placing employees, in excessive costs when the demand for skilled workers cannot be quickly filled, and in all employees being well versed with company procedures. One benefit to firms that is rarely captured in studies is the positive impact of apprenticeship on innovation. Well-trained workers are more likely to understand the complexities of a firm’s production processes and therefore to identify and implement technological improvements, especially incremental innovations to improve existing products and processes. A study of German establishments documents this connection and finds a clear relationship between the extent of in-company training and subsequent innovation (Bauernschuster, Falck, and Heblich 2009). In the United States, evidence from surveys of more than 900 employers indicates that the overwhelming majority of them believe their programs are valuable and involve net gains (Lerman, Eyster, and Chambers 2009). Nearly all sponsors reported that apprenticeship programs help them meet their skill demands—87 percent reported that they would strongly recommend registered apprenticeship programs, and another 11 percent recommended apprenticeship programs with some reservations. Other benefits of apprenticeship include reliably documenting appropriate skills, raising worker productivity, increasing worker morale, and reducing safety problems.

While apprenticeship offers a productivity-enhancing approach to reducing inequality and expanding opportunity, activity in the United States has declined in recent years to levels about one-tenth of those in Australia, Canada, and Britain. Some believe the problems include inadequate information and familiarity with apprenticeship, an inadequate infrastructure, and expectations that sufficient skills will emerge from community college programs. Others see the main problem as an unwillingness of U.S. companies to invest, no matter how favorable government subsidies and marketing policies are. In considering these explanations, we should remember that even in countries with robust apprenticeship systems, only a minority of firms actually hires apprentices. Since the number of apprenticeship applicants already far exceeds the number of apprenticeship slots, the main problem today is to increase the number of apprenticeship openings that employers offer. Counseling young people about potential apprenticeship opportunities is a sensible complementary strategy to working with the companies, but encouraging interest in apprenticeship could be counterproductive without a major increase in apprenticeship slots. 

Developing a more robust support system for apprenticeship programs requires action at various levels of government. This proposal consists of a series of targeted initiatives that rely on both state and federal support. At the state level, governments could develop marketing campaigns to persuade employers to create apprenticeship programs, and to build on existing youth apprenticeship programs. At the federal level, the government could provide federal subsidies to encourage take-up of existing vouchers for apprenticeship programs; designate occupational standards for apprenticeship through a joint Office of Apprenticeship (OA)–Department of Commerce (Commerce) team; and develop an infrastructure of information, peer support, and research within the Departments of Commerce and Labor.

Downloads

• Expanding Apprenticeship Opportunities in the United States - Full Text

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides a refundable tax credit to lower-income working families. In 2011, the EITC reached 27.9 million tax filers at a total cost of $62.9 billion. Almost 20 percent of tax filers receive the EITC, and the average credit amount is $2,254 (IRS 2013). After expansions to the EITC in the late 1980s through the late 1990s—under Democrat and Republican administrations—the EITC now occupies a central place in the U.S. safety net. Based on the Census Bureau’s 2012 Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), the EITC keeps 6.5 million people, including 3.3 million children, out of poverty (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities [CBPP] 2014a). No other tax or transfer program prevents more children from living a life of poverty, and only Social Security keeps more people above poverty.

Since the EITC is only eligible to tax filers who work, the credit’s impact on poverty takes place through encouraging employment by ensuring greater pay after taxes. The empirical research shows that the tax credit translates into sizable and robust increases in employment (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, 2001). Thus, the credit reduces poverty through two channels: the actual credit, and increases in family earnings. This dual feature gives the EITC a unique place in the U.S. safety net; in contrast, many other programs redistribute income while, at least to some degree, discouraging work. Importantly, transferring income while encouraging work makes the EITC an efficient and cost-effective policy for increasing the after-tax income of low-earning Americans. Yet a program of this size and impact could be more equitable in its reach. Under the current design of the EITC, childless earners and families with only one child, for instance, receive disproportionately lower refunds. 

In 2014, families with two children (three or more children) are eligible for a maximum credit of $5,460 ($6,143) compared to $3,305 for families with one child. Married couples, despite their larger family sizes, receive only modestly more-generous EITC benefits compared to single filers. Childless earners benefit little from the EITC, and have a maximum credit of only $496—less than 10 percent of the two-child credit. 

Prominent proposals seek to mitigate these inequalities. President Obama’s fiscal year 2015 budget includes an expansion of the childless EITC, a concept outlined by John Karl Scholz in 2007 in a proposal for The Hamilton Project. Notably, MDRC is currently evaluating Paycheck Plus, a pilot program for an expanded EITC for workers without dependent children, for the New York City Center for Economic Opportunity (MDRC 2014). The recent Hamilton Project proposal for a secondary-earner tax credit addresses the so-called EITC penalty for married couples (Kearney and Turner 2013). And the more generous EITC credit for three or more children was recently enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and is currently scheduled to sunset in 2017. 

Considering this broad set of EITC reforms, and recognizing the demonstrated effectiveness of the program as an antipoverty program with numerous benefits, this policy memo proposes an expansion for the largest group of  EITC recipients: families with one child. In particular, I propose to expand the one-child schedule to be on par with the two-child schedule, in equivalence scale-adjusted terms. An equivalence scale captures the cost of living for a household of a given size (and demographic composition) relative to the cost of living for a reference household of a single adult, and is a standard component in defining poverty thresholds. The proposal expands the maximum credit for one-child families to $4,641, from $3,305 under current law, an increase of about 40 percent. The expansion will lead to a roughly $1,000 increase in after-tax income for taxpayers in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution receiving the higher credit. As this paper outlines, the expansion is justified on equity and efficiency grounds. This expansion is anchored in the equity principle in that the generosity of the credit should be proportional to the needs of families of differing sizes; I use the equivalence scale implicit in the poverty thresholds of the Census SPM as a guide for household needs. This proposal is also supported by efficiency principles given the EITC’s demonstrated success at raising labor supply among single mothers. 

The target population for the proposal is low-income working families with children. Implementing this proposal requires legislative action by the federal government; it is important to note that altering the EITC schedule requires a simple amendment to the tax code, and not a massive overhaul of our nation’s tax system. The revenue cost of the proposal derives from additional federal costs of the EITC, less the additional payroll and ordinary federal income taxes. The private benefits include increases in after-tax income and reductions in poverty. The proposal would also generate social benefits through the spillover effects that the increase in income plays in improving health and children’s cognitive skills (Dahl and Lochner 2012; Evans and Garthwaite 2014; Hoynes, Miller, and Simon forthcoming).

Downloads

• Building on the Success of the Earned Income Tax Credit - Full Text

Downloads

• Policies to Address Poverty in America -- Full Book

British debates about welfare reform have often been influenced by American ideas. The Clinton-era welfare reforms were echoed in some of Tony Blair’s alterations to British benefits. Gordon Brown, as Chancellor, introduced a new Working Tax Credit as a direct result of studying the Earned Income Tax Credit. Brown particularly liked the political advantages of a ‘tax cut for hard-working families’, as opposed to a ‘benefit handout to welfare families’.

But now the transatlantic traffic in ideas on welfare is going the other way. The U.K.’s introduction of a single, unified system of transfer payments – the Universal Credit – is getting quite a bit of attention in the wonkier regions of D.C. politics. Paul Ryan, at a Brookings summit on social mobility, mentioned the Universal Credit (UC) as a possible inspiration for a new round of welfare reform. (Ryan is giving a speech at AEI in a couple of weeks: we’re likely to hear more about his thinking then.) When the architect of the UC, Iain Duncan Smith, visited D.C. recently, he held a series of meetings with leading Republicans to discuss his reforms.

The main attractions of the Universal Credit are fourfold:

1. Simplicity. By unifying five cash benefits and an ‘in kind’ benefit (Housing Benefit) into a single, monthly payment, the complexity of the system from the point of view of the recipient will be greatly reduced.
   
   
2. Cost control. Housing Benefit is paid directly to the landlord, which reduces the tenant’s incentive to control costs.  Add that to the crazily overheated U.K. housing market, and should come as no surprise that Housing Benefit has become a major strain on the system, quintupling in cost in real terms over the last two decades to hit £24 billion a year (c. $41bn), to become the second-biggest element of the U.K.’s system, after pensions.  By including an allowance for housing in the single cash payment in UC, the recipient will be incentivized to control their own housing costs.
    
3. Stronger work incentives. The UC has a flatter ‘taper’ than existing benefits, meaning that cash payments are reduced more slowly as earnings rise. In particular, the UC will allow benefit recipients to work part-time (less than 16 hours a week), and still keep claiming. On the downside, incentives for second earners in two-adult families will be reduced. 
   
   
4. Tighter and more targeted work requirements. The UC will contain stronger requirements to seek work than existing benefits, and importantly, has a ‘sliding scale’ of requirements, depending on the position of the recipient. For example, parents with children under the age of 1 will be exempt from work requirements; those with children aged between  1 and 5 will be obliged to attend for interviews with a case worker to prepare for a return to work; those with children at school will be required to ‘actively seek work’.

Sounds pretty good, doesn't it? And in fact it is, on paper at least. In practice the introduction of UC has been marked with huge overspend and delay on the required new IT system. The whole exercise has also been made much harder by cuts in many of the relevant cash benefits, as well as the introduction of a ‘household cap’ on total welfare receipts. The Universal Credit as an idea has a lot of support. As so often, it has been putting the idea a reality that has been difficult.

What—if anything—can the U.S. take from the UC? Short answer: not much. 

Many of the problems the UC addresses do not really apply in the U.S. Work incentives are already pretty strong in the U.S., thanks to the relative generosity of the EITC, and the relative meanness of out-of-work welfare supports. Also, there are already much stronger work requirements in the U.S. system. Some want to go further, and add work requirements to the receipt of food stamps, for example. But this would not require a major overhaul.  As Melissa Boteach and her colleagues at the Center for American Progress write,“the primary problem that the Universal Credit is supposed to address in the United Kingdom—the lack of incentive for jobless workers to enter the labor force—is far less of an issue in the United States”.

The UC also further centralizes an already highly centralized system, by getting rid of Housing Benefit, which is currently administered by Local Authorities. The U.S. system is much less centralized, with states and cities having a high degree of control over the way TANF and SNAP are administered. It is hard to see how anything like a UC could work in the U.S. at anything higher than State level. A Wisconsin Universal Credit makes sense in a way that a U.S. Universal Credit does not.  But if shifting towards block grants to states is really what this is about (see Marco Rubio’s ‘flex fund’ idea),that’s a whole different debate.

A final point. Simplicity and ease of use for the recipient is a key goal of the UC, and a worthy one. The stress and difficulties faced by low-income families just in applying for assistance is unacceptable in the 21st century. But it is not clear that the whole system has to be upended to achieve this goal. Technology ought to allow a single access point to the system, with the complexity out of sight of the user. 

In the U.K. the Universal Credit has a strong rationale, despite the implementation challenges. In the U.S., it is a solution in search of a problem. 

"It is fortunate that a major feature of American social policy is a series of programs, often referred to as the safety net, that are designed to provide people with cash and other benefits when they fall on hard times—which they are more likely to do during a recession," write the authors of a new report on the response of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program—the major federal welfare program that replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1996—to the Great Recession that lasted from December 2007 to June 2009.

In their report, "The Responsiveness of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program during the Great Recession," Ron Haskins, Vicky Albert, and Kimberly Howard write that "All in all, we conclude that the American system of balancing work requirements and welfare benefits worked fairly well, even during the most severe recession since the Depression of the 1930s."

Their report is based on three studies: (1) an examination of the changes in the TANF rolls compared to changes in AFDC rolls during previous recessions, plus changes in TANF rolls in relation to rising unemployment state-by-state; (2) a review of data on single mothers' likelihood to receive TANF benefits during the 2001 and 2007 recessions, their receipt of other program benefits, and what actions single mothers took to deal with the recession; and (3) interviews with 44 directors of state TANF programs to determine their state's response.

"An important question" noted by the authors at the outset "is whether the response of the nation's safety net program in general and the TANF program in particular was commensurate with the challenge posed by the huge level of unemployment during and following the Great Recession."

Some Results of the TANF Study

Haskins, Albert, and Howard arrived at a number of conclusions from the TANF/AFDC study, including:

• TANF rolls increased more in the 2001 recession and the 2007 Great Recession than did AFDC during previous, pre-welfare reform (1996) recessions.
• The increase in TANF rolls was greater during the period of rising unemployment in each state, which did not coincide exactly with the dates of the Great Recession, than during the official recession period nationally.
• The "nation's safety net as a whole performed well during the Great Recession and prevented millions of people from falling into poverty."

"The nation experienced 51 different recessions and 51 different responses by the TANF program to the recession,” they write. "But the key point is that measuring the rise of the TANF caseload in response to the unique increase in unemployment in each state reveals TANF to have been more responsive to the recession."

Some Results of the Single Mothers Study

• Compared with the 1990 recession before welfare reform, "single mothers were less likely to receive benefits from the TANF program during the 2001 and 2007 recessions."
• Single mothers were more likely to receive other "safety net" help such as Unemployment Compensation, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly food stamps), Supplemental Security Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and child care, school lunch and breakfast, and other benefits for their children.
• In all the 1990, 2001, and 2007 recessions, "single mothers took action on their own" by finding jobs, living with family, and other ways to "weather the recession."
• Based on income, "poverty among single mothers and their children was lower during the Great Recession than during the recession of 1990."

Given the array of available benefits, the authors conclude that:

a mother with two children earning even as little as $11,000 per year could and still can escape poverty, as measured by income that includes non-cash benefits and tax credits, because of the generosity of these benefits. In our view, the combination of strong work requirements and generous work support benefits is a reasonable policy, despite the fact that fewer mothers receive TANF now than in the past.

Some Results of the TANF Directors Study

"Arguably the people who know the most about the goals and operation of state TANF programs and how the programs responded to the recession are the state TANF directors," write Haskins, Albert, and Howard. "They were, after all, the point persons for state TANF programs before and during the Great Recession. Interviews with TANF directors can provide an insider's view of the TANF issues that we have so far analyzed from the outside." Some of their conclusions from these interviews include:

• Most states did not struggle to pay for growing TANF rolls during the Great Recession.
• Most state directors considered their state's response to the recession "as adequate or better."
• The directors had suggestions for improving the TANF program, including having more flexibility in work participation rates, gaining access to the Contingency Fund, and placing greater emphasis on job training.

Some Policy Recommendations

Although the authors believe that the TANF program worked well, especially in conjunction with other safety net programs, they suggest some potential reforms:

• TANF allows vocational training to count toward states fulfilling their work requirement, but only a maximum of 30 percent of the work requirement can be fulfilled by TANF recipients in education or training. In times of high unemployment, Congress could raise the percentage limit from 30 to 40 or even 50 percent when unemployment reaches some specified level in the state, given that most experts believe the unemployed should expand their skills through job training during recessions.
• Congress should consider changing the 12-week limit on job search during periods of high unemployment to as much as six months, given that the average period of search before finding a job increases sharply during periods of high unemployment.

Download and read the full report for complete methodology, analysis, and data.

In his state of the union and his budget, the President spoke of the stagnation of middle class incomes. Whatever growth we have had has not been broadly shared.  More than 78% of the growth in GDP between 1979 and 2013 has gone to the top one percent. Even Republicans are beginning to worry about this issue although they have yet to develop concrete proposals to address it.

Slow Growth in Incomes

Middle class incomes were growing slowly before the recession and have actually declined over the past decade.   In addition, according to the New York Times, the proportion of the population with incomes between $35,000 and $100,000 in inflation-adjusted terms fell from 53% in 1967 to 43% in 2013.  During the first four decades this was primarily because more people were moving into higher income groups, but more recently it was because they have moved down the ladder, not up.  One can define the middle class in many different ways or torture the data in various ways, but there is plenty of evidence that we have a problem.

What to Do

The most promising approach is what I call “the second earner solution.”  For many decades now, the labor force participation rate of prime age men has been falling while that of women has been rising.  The entry of so many women into the labor force was the major force propelling whatever growth in middle class incomes occurred up until about 2000. That growth in women’s work has now levelled off.  Getting it back on an upward track would do more than any policy I can think of to help the middle class.

Imagine a household with one earner making the average wage of today’s worker and spending full-time in the job market.  That household will have an income of around $34,000. But if he (or she) has a spouse making a similar amount, the household’s income will double to $68,000. That is why the President’s focus on a second-earner credit of $500, a tripling of the child care tax credit, expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, and providing paid leave are so important. These policies are all pro-work and research shows they would increase employment.

No Marriage = No Second Earner

One problem, of course, is that fewer and fewer households contain two potential workers.  So it would also help to bring back marriage or at least its first cousin, a stable cohabiting relationship.  My ideas on this front are spelled out in my new book, Generation Unbound. In a nutshell, we need to empower women to not have children before they have found a committed partner with whom to raise children in a stable, two-parent family. Whatever the other benefits of two parents, they have twice as much time and potentially twice as much income.    

Other Needed Responses

Shouldn’t we also worry about the wages or the employment of men?  Of course.  But an increase in, say, the minimum wage or a better collective bargaining environment or more job training will have far smaller effects than “the second earner solution.”  In addition, the decline in male employment is related to still more difficult problems such as high rates of incarceration and the failure of men to take advantage of postsecondary education as much as women have. 

Still the two-earner solution should not be pursued in isolation. In the short-term, a stronger recovery from the recession is needed and in the longer-term, more effective investments in education, research, infrastructure, and in labor market institutions that produce more widely-shared growth, as argued by the Commission on Inclusive Prosperity. But do we really expect families to wait for these long-term policies to pay off?  It could be decades. 

In the meantime, the President’s proposals to make work more appealing to existing or potential second earners deserves more attention.  

Thanks for inviting me to testify on the important topic of challenges facing low-income families. It is an honor to testify before the Human Resources Subcommittee. I applaud your purposes and hope that I can help the Subcommittee members understand our current circumstances regarding work, benefits, and poverty by single mothers a little better.

For well over a decade, my Brookings colleague Isabel Sawhill, a Democrat and former member of the Clinton administration, and I have been analyzing data and writing about the factors that influence both poverty rates and economic mobility.[i] We long ago concluded that education, work, and marriage are major keys to reducing poverty and increasing economic opportunity. We also emphasize the role of personal responsibility in all three of these vital components of building a path to the American Dream. But government programs to help low-income American parents escape poverty and build opportunity for themselves and their children are also important.

In today’s hearing, the Subcommittee is taking testimony about marriage and work, two of these three keys to reducing poverty and increasing opportunity. Brad Wilcox from the University of Virginia will discuss the decline of married-couple families, the explosion of births outside marriage, and the consequent increase in the number of the nation’s children being reared by single (and often never-married) mothers. The increase in the proportion of children in female-headed families contributes to substantial increases in poverty by virtue of the fact that poverty rates in female-headed families are four to five times as great as poverty rates in married-couple families.[ii] If the share of the nation’s children in female-headed families continues to increase as it has been doing for four decades, policies to reduce poverty will be fighting an uphill battle because the rising rates of single-parent families will exert strong upward pressure on the poverty rate.[iii] But perhaps of even greater consequence, children reared in single-parent families are more likely to drop out of school, more likely to be arrested, less likely to go to college, more likely to be involved in a nonmarital birth, and more likely to be idle (not in school, not employed) than children from married-couple families.[iv] In this way, a disproportionate number of children from single-parent families carry poverty into the next generation and thereby minimize intergenerational mobility.

So far public and nongovernmental programs have not been able to reverse falling marriage rates or rising nonmarital birth rates, but there is a lot we have done and can do to increase work rates, especially the work rates of low-income mothers. The goal of my testimony today is to explain the government policies that have been adopted in recent decades to increase work rates and subsidize earnings, which in turn have led to substantial declines in poverty.

I make two points and a small number of recommendations. The first point is that the employment of low-income single mothers has increased over the two decades, in large part because of work requirements in federal programs, especially Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The recessions of 2001 and 2007-2009 caused the employment rate of single mothers to fall (as well as nearly every other demographic group), but after both recessions work rates began to rise again.

The second point is that the work-based safety net is an effective way to boost the income of working families with children that would be poor without the work supports. In my view, this combination of work requirements and work supports is the most successful approach the nation has yet developed to fight poverty in single-parent families with children. Here’s the essence of the policy approach: first, encourage or cajole single mothers to work by establishing work requirements in federal welfare programs; second, subsidize the earnings of low-income workers, both to increase their work incentive and to help them escape poverty. The primary work-based safety-net programs are the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the Additional Child Tax Credit, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), child care, and Medicaid.

Downloads

• Full Testimony

At 77 years of age, the federal minimum wage deserves a respite from the day-to-day combat of political life. Today, protestors around the country are demanding a $15 minimum. But few observers think this level is economically desirable: even fewer think that it is likely.

Democrats want a higher minimum, and say so loudly. Republicans of a free-market persuasion mostly do not—but tend to stay silent because they know that swing voters look positively at raising the wages of low-earners.

The minimum wage is lagging…

Congressional political stalemate has meant the U.S. wage floor has lagged behind median earnings. In contrast wage growth in other OECD countries has performed much better, as this graph produced by the Hamilton Project shows:

Advanced nations have de-politicized minimum wage decisions

The federal minimum wage is an established piece of the U.S. policy furniture—and one that is quite dated. It now makes sense to consider taking some of the power and responsibility for setting the wage rate out of the hands of politicians—just as interest rates are set by the Federal Reserve.

This is not a novel proposal in international terms. In most advanced economies, minimum wage decisions are not purely political. Out of 66 countries studied by Tito Boeri in 2009, 24 delegate the determination the minimum wage level to a tripartite body; 26 countries set the minimum wage after taking advice following formal consultation between the Government and representatives of employers and workers; and just 16 countries (including the U.S.) set the minimum wage through a simple legislative vote.

Over in the U.K., the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron just jacked up the national minimum wage by 3% up to £6.70, with barely a squeak of protest from employers or the right wing of his own party. Why? Because, like his two predecessors, he simply followed the advice of the Low Pay Commission, which is comprised of nine commissioners—three each from trade unions, employer organizations and academia.

Two options for taking the political heat out of the U.S. minimum wage

Can the U.S. follow suit? And if it can, what might the new system look like? Two options at least are worth considering.

1. A Federal Minimum Wage Advisory Board. This could be made up (like the U.K. version) of nine members: three representatives of employer organizations, three from labor organizations, and three independent labor economists. The Board would recommend a rate for the national minimum wage each year, which would then be enacted by Congress in the usual manner. The Board would have a strong incentive to set a rate likely to be adopted by Congress, in order to establish and maintain its reputation: there is, after all, little point in sitting on a Board that is ignored. The Board’s recommendation would not be binding and would not become the legal ‘default’ level. But because the advice is likely to be sensible, Congress would likely be inclined to follow it.

2. Wage Indexation. An alternative—favored by my Brookings colleague Gary Burtless—would be to simultaneously raise the minimum wage and introduce automatic indexing, lifting the minimum wage at the same rate as either consumer prices or the median wage—preferably the latter. In effect, this would do for the minimum wage what President Nixon did for Social Security. Congress would have the power to suspend a rise—perhaps if unemployment reached a certain threshold—but the default position would be to link changes in the minimum wage to changes in the median wage or in the broader consumer economy.

Policy commitment devices in action

These are both examples of what I have called policy commitment devices—in a new paper, Ulysses Goes to Washington—that help to overcome political myopia in order to support longer-term policy objectives. In the first case, taking advice from an independent commission, the commitment is somewhat less binding, although as James Madison knew, ‘the counsels and checks of friends’ can carry plenty of weight. Indexation would be a tighter form of binding, since inaction on the part of politicians would lead to an uprating of minimum wage, rather than the current stasis.

For both sides, there are political attractions to sub-contracting some decision-making power over the minimum wage. By accepting the advice of an independent body or allowing indexation to do its silent work, Republicans can keep their business donors and right-wing critics at bay; Democrats can do the same for unions and the political left. Sometimes the most powerful thing politicians can do is give some power away. The minimum wage is now perhaps a case in point.

House Republicans recently approved the “Death Tax Repeal Act of 2015.”  If we care about our debt obligations, social mobility, or equality of opportunity, we should consider doing just the opposite: raising the tax and applying it to more of the super-wealthy.

Currently, the estate tax doesn't touch the first $5.43 million of an individual’s assets and the first $10.86 million of couples’ assets. The tax kicks in after that amount, eventually rising to a top rate of 40 percent.  

Proponents of repeal make a number of claims to make their case. Let’s examine the most common.

1. The estate tax affects a significant portion of Americans. Only about 5,400 estates will pay any estate tax this year. That’s about 0.2% of all estates – that’s right, just two tenths of one percent.  That’s a fortieth of the 1970’s share. Americans worried about the Estate Tax have nothing to fear but fear itself. 
2. The estate tax hurts small farms and businesses. In fact, the estate tax touches virtually no small farms or businesses. The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy estimated how many farm and business estates worth under $5 million paid any tax in 2013. Twenty did. Twenty small farms and businesses paid any estate tax in 2013. And those 20 estates faced an average tax rate of 4.9%. Only 660 farm estates—of any size—paid the tax in 2013, and 100 of those farms had assets worth over $20 million. The USDA estimates that 0.6% of all farm estates owed federal estate tax in 2013. This is because families who farm for a living have access to generous deductions: up to $1 million for continuing to farm the land for the next 10 years and up to $500,000 for adopting conservation easements. They can also delay payment and lighten their tax liability by gifting their land to heirs. Small businesses have similarly generous carve-out.
3. Repealing the estate tax doesn't affect the budget, because it’s a small share of federal revenue. In 2014, the estate tax represented 0.6% of federal collections, or roughly $20 billion annually, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation. But part of the reason that’s so low is because Congress has increased the exemption and lowered the rate in recent years; in 2001, the top rate was 55% and the exemption was only $675,000. Still, even today, repealing the tax is costly. The JCT estimates that repeal would cost the government $269 billion over the next decade.
4. The estate tax represents double taxation. Well, maybe. It is true that people  pay taxes on their income when earned and then may have to pay again when they pass it on to their heirs.  However, because the super-wealthy keep much of their assets as unrealized capital gains (55% for those estates worth over $100 million), the estate tax is the only way, right now, to tax these capital gains. In that sense it can be viewed as a partial corrective within our funhouse of a tax system. Some capital gains, to be sure, are the fruits of hard work and entrepreneurial creativity but a lot are simply the result of gains among those wealthy enough to participate in speculative ventures. 

One thing is true: repeal would mean a large tax break for the wealthiest 0.2% of the population. The 1,336 families with estates worth more than $20 million would get almost three-fourths of the benefit from the repeal and enjoy an average windfall of $10 million each, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. The 318 families with estates worth more than $50 million would see an average windfall of $20 million each.

These facts are often obscured by our penchant for individual stories. One Washington Post story for example, acknowledges many of the statistics above, but then goes on to give two examples of farmers who had to sell land to meet their tax burden, one of which is several decades old, when the exemption was much lower. Elected officials love these kinds of stories and tell them often. Are they unaware of the generous special provisions for this group?  Do they truly believe that very wealthy families are the ones we should be helping? Or are they thinking about who is going to finance their next campaign?

The estate tax is one of the most progressive aspects of our tax system. In a time of increasing inequality, it provides a way to counteract the formation of a “permanent ownership class.” If anything, we should consider raising the rate and lowering the exemption to pay down debt and invest in opportunities for the unlucky children at the bottom of the wealth ladder. We could start by closing the stepped-up basis loophole and raising the estate tax to Clinton-era levels. We could do so in a way that protects real farmers and small business owners. Wealthy heirs, meanwhile, will still do very well, much better than the rest of America. A serious estate tax would allow us to come closer to our national ideal, in which no child is born a prince, and every child can become as rich as a king.

Note: An earlier version of this post said that the estate tax only applies to assets in excess of the exemption, which is incorrect. The estate tax is levied on the entire estate but is offset by a credit equal to the tax on the first $5.43 million. This version is corrected.

Improving data in the field of workforce development is a necessary step to evaluating programs and replicating success. What does current data tell us about the populations served? What outcomes should we measure to ensure programs are meeting America’s workforce development needs?

Earlier this month, we convened an expert group of policy makers, practitioners and scholars to address this problem, along with other challenges in workforce development. Previously, we interviewed Kate Blosveren Kreamer on the need to strengthen bridges from school to work. Next up in our Q&A series is Beth Weigensberg, a researcher at Mathematica Policy Research.

A: Although there is increasingly more rigorous research to assess effectiveness of programs, I feel a missing piece is understanding how to replicate and scale-up effective strategies. Often times workforce development programs that are deemed effective in one place do not always succeed when implemented in another. Research that evaluates effectiveness of programs should assess the role of contextual factors (including organizational, leadership, community, and political factors) to identify what is needed to successfully implement, replicate, and scale successful programs.

A: The workforce development field has an unfortunate history of “creaming”—programs selectively work with individuals most likely to succeed at finding employment, leaving those “harder-to-serve” individuals struggling to find assistance. Individuals that are often considered “hard-to-serve” include those who are homeless, disabled, formerly incarcerated, older workers, non-English speakers, low-income, and youth who are disconnected from school and employment. Increasing efforts to focus on these “harder-to-serve” populations include specialized targeted programs and strategies to help address the complex needs of these individuals, which often extend beyond skill development and finding a job. These specialized programs often provide additional support services to help address their complex needs, which can serve as additional barriers to obtaining and retaining employment.

A: Intermediate measures of engagement and skill development would provide interim measures of progress, while the ultimate objectives are obviously employment and educational attainment. Ongoing evaluation on interim measures allows for earlier acknowledgment of achievement and identification of those struggling to progress. Assessing outcomes in ways that control for different populations or barriers to employment, such as using risk-adjusted methodologies, can help us evaluate workforce development programs in an equitable manner.

One of the biggest challenges in the field is ensuring we have valid and reliable data to accurately estimate outcomes. The data available to assess outcomes are usually limited by what is collected in management information systems, which are often developed to be responsive to reporting requirements of publically-funded programs. But these siloed data do not allow for comprehensive assessment of workforce development outcomes within a state, locality, or even within a community-based employment and training organization that relies on numerous funding sources. Efforts are needed to integrate data and assess standardized outcome measures across program and funding silos to allow for more comprehensive assessment of outcomes within the field.

Improving the labor market and encouraging work are central to our goals of achieving greater responsibility and opportunity in America. The private economy is the arena where most Americans work hard to realize their dreams.

But employment today is failing to achieve the promise it did a few decades ago. Wages of unskilled workers have been fairly stagnant in real terms (especially among men) and have fallen relative to those of more-educated workers; and some groups of Americans (like less-educated men generally and black men, specifically) are working considerably less than they once did.

Stagnant wages and low work participation among some groups of workers are blocking progress. Both must be addressed.

In Chapter 4 of a new report from the AEI-Brookings Working Group on Poverty and Opportunity, the Working Group recommends policies that:

1. Expand opportunities for the disadvantaged by improving their skills;
2. Make work pay better than it does now for the less educated;
3. Expand both work requirements and opportunities for the hard-to-employ while maintaining an effective work-based safety net for the most vulnerable members of our society, especially children; and
4. Make more jobs available.

Downloads

• Download Chapter 4: Work
• Explore the full report

Americans often think of our country as being one of great opportunity – where anyone can rise from very modest circumstances, if they work hard and make good choices. We believe that often remains true.

But, for children and youth growing up in poverty, such upward mobility in America is too rare. Indeed, just 30 percent of those growing up in poverty make it to middle class or higher as adults. Though we’ve made progress in reducing poverty over the past several decades, our poverty rates are still too high and our rate of economic advancement for poor children has been stuck for decades. That is an embarrassment for a nation that prides itself on everyone having a shot at the American Dream.

What can we do to reduce poverty and increase economic mobility? In our polarized and poisoned political atmosphere, it is hard to reach consensus on policy efforts. Both progressives and conservatives want lower poverty; but progressives want more public spending programs to improve opportunity and security for the poor, while conservatives generally argue for more responsibility from them before providing more help.

Even so, progressives and conservatives might not be as far apart as these stereotypes suggest. The two of us—one a conservative Republican and the other a progressive Democrat—were recently part of an ideologically balanced group of 15 scholars brought together by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution. Our charge was to generate a report with policy proposals to reduce poverty and increase upward mobility. An additional goal was simply to see whether we could arrive at consensus among ourselves, and bridge the ideological divide that has so paralyzed our political leaders.

Together we decided that the most important issues facing poor Americans and their children are family, education and work. We had to listen to each other’s perspectives on these issues, and be open to others’ truths. We also agreed to be mindful of the research evidence on these topics. In the end, we managed to generate a set of policy proposals we all find compelling.

To begin with, the progressives among us had to acknowledge that marriage is a positive family outcome that reduces poverty and raises upward mobility in America. The evidence is clear: stable two-parent families have positive impacts on children’s success, and in America marriage is the strongest predictor of such stability. Therefore marriage should be promoted as the norm in America, along with responsible and delayed child-bearing.

At the same time, the conservatives among us had to acknowledge that investing more resources in the skills and employability of poor adults and children is crucial if we want them to have higher incomes over time. Indeed, stable families are hard to maintain when the parents – including both the custodial mothers and the (often) non-custodial fathers – struggle to maintain employment and earn enough to support their families. Investing in proven, cost-effective, education and training programs such as high-quality preschool and training for jobs in high-growth economic sectors can improve the skills and employability of kids from poor families and lift them out of poverty through work.

Another important compromise was that progressives acknowledged that expecting and even requiring adults on public assistance to work can reduce poverty, as we learned in the 1990s from welfare reform; programs today like Disability Insurance, among others, need reforms to encourage more work. And reforms that encourage innovation and accountability would make our public education programs for the poor more effective at all levels. We need more choice in public K-12 education (through charter schools) and a stronger emphasis on developing and retaining effective teachers, while basing our state subsidies to higher education institutions more heavily on graduation rates, employment, and earnings of their graduates.

Conservatives also had to acknowledge that requiring the poor to work only makes sense when work is available to them. In periods or places with weak labor markets, we might need to create jobs for some by subsidizing their employment in either the private or public sector (as we did during the Great Recession). We agreed that no one should be dropped from the benefit rolls unless they have been offered a suitable work activity and rejected it. And we also need to “make work pay” for those who remain unskilled or can find only low-wage jobs – by expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit (especially for adults without custody of children) and modestly raising the minimum wage.

We also all agreed on other topics. For instance, work-based learning—in the form of paid apprenticeships and other models of high-quality career and technical education—can play an important role in raising both skills and work experience among poor youth and adults.  And, if we raise public spending for the poor, we need to pay for it—and not increase federal deficits. We all agree that reducing certain tax deductions for high-income families and making our retirement programs more progressive are good ways to finance our proposals.

As our report demonstrates, it is possible for progressives and conservatives to bridge their differences and reach compromises to generate a set of policies that will reduce poverty and improve upward mobility. Can Congress and the President do the same?

Editor's Note: this piece first appeared in Inside Sources.

Downloads

• Explore the full report

In the course of my graduate work at Harvard University, I paid hundreds of Americans living in poverty the equivalent of about $2 an hour. It was perfectly legal for me to do so, and my research had the approval of my university’s ethics board. I was not alone, or even unusual, in basing Ivy League research on less-than-Walmart wages; literally thousands of academic research projects pay the same substandard rates. Social scientists cannot pretend that the system is anything but exploitative. It is time for meaningful reform of crowdsourced research.

This is what crowdsourced research looks like. I posted a survey using Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a website run by Amazon.com. Across the country, hundreds of MTurk workers (“turkers”) agreed to fill out the survey in exchange for about 20 cents apiece, and within a few days I had my survey results. The process was easy, and above all, cheap. No wonder it is increasingly popular with academics; a search on Google Scholar returns thousands of academic papers citing MTurk, increasing from 173 in 2008 to 5,490 in 2014.

Mechanical Turk is a bargain for researchers, but not for workers. A survey typically takes a couple minutes per person, so the hourly rate is very low. This might be acceptable if all turkers were people with other jobs, for whom the payment was incidental. But scholars have known for years that the vast majority of MTurk tasks are completed by a small set of workers who spend long hours on the website, and that many of those workers are very poor. Here are the sobering facts:

• About 80 percent of tasks on MTurk are completed by about 20 percent of participants that spend more than 15 hours a week working on the site. MTurk works not because it has many hobbyists, but because it has dedicated people who treat the tasks like a job.
• About one in five turkers are earning less than $20,000 a year.
• A third of U.S. turkers call MTurk an important source of income, and more than one in ten say they use MTurk money to make basic ends meet.

Journal articles that refer to Mechanical Turk. Source: PS: Political Science and Politics

It is easy to forget that these statistics represent real people, so let me introduce you to one of them. “Marjorie” is a 53-year-old woman from Indiana who had jobs in a grocery store and as a substitute teacher before a bad fall left her unable to work. Now, she says, “I sit there for probably eight hours a day answering surveys. I’ve done over 8,000 surveys.” For these full days of work, Marjorie estimates that she makes “$100 per month” from MTurk, which supplements the $189 she receives in food stamps. Asked about her economic situation, Marjorie simply says that she is “poverty stricken.”

I heard similar stories from other MTurk workers—very poor people, often elderly or disabled, working tremendous hours online just to keep themselves and their families afloat. I spoke to a woman who never got back on her feet after losing her home in Hurricane Rita, and another who had barely escaped foreclosure. A mother of two was working multiple jobs, plus her time MTurk, to keep her family off government assistance. Job options are few for many turkers, especially those who are disabled, and MTurk provides resources they might not otherwise have. But these workers that work anonymously from home are isolated and have few avenues to organize for higher wages or other employment protections.

Once I realized how poorly paid my respondents were, I went back and gave every one of my over 1,400 participants a “bonus” to raise the survey respondent rate to the equivalent of a $10 hourly wage. (I paid an additional $15 to respondents who participated in an interview.) This cost me a little bit more money, but less than you might imagine. For a 3-minute survey of 800 people, going from a 20-cent to a 50-cent payment costs an additional $240. But if every researcher paid an ethical wage, it would really add up for people like Marjorie. In fact, it would likely double her monthly income from MTurk.

Raising wages is a start, but it should not be up to individual researchers to impose workplace standards. In this month’s PS: Political Science and Politics, a peer-reviewed journal published for the American Political Science Association, I have called for new standards for crowdsourced research to be implemented not only by individual researchers, but also by universities, journals, and grantmakers. For instance, journal editors should commit to publishing only those articles that pay respondents an ethical rate, and university ethics boards should create guidelines for use of crowdsourcing that consider wages and also crowdsourcers’ lack of access to basic employment protections.

The alternative is continuing to pay below-minimum-wage rates to a substantial number of poor people who rely on this income for their basic needs. This is simply no alternative at all.

This post originally appeared on the TechTank blog.

In the course of my graduate work at Harvard University, I paid hundreds of Americans living in poverty the equivalent of about $2 an hour. It was perfectly legal for me to do so, and my research had the approval of my university’s ethics board. I was not alone, or even unusual, in basing Ivy League research on less-than-Walmart wages; literally thousands of academic research projects pay the same substandard rates. Social scientists cannot pretend that the system is anything but exploitative. It is time for meaningful reform of crowdsourced research.

This is what crowdsourced research looks like. I posted a survey using Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a website run by Amazon.com. Across the country, hundreds of MTurk workers (“turkers”) agreed to fill out the survey in exchange for about 20 cents apiece, and within a few days I had my survey results. The process was easy, and above all, cheap. No wonder it is increasingly popular with academics; a search on Google Scholar returns thousands of academic papers citing MTurk, increasing from 173 in 2008 to 5,490 in 2014.

Mechanical Turk is a bargain for researchers, but not for workers. A survey typically takes a couple minutes per person, so the hourly rate is very low. This might be acceptable if all turkers were people with other jobs, for whom the payment was incidental. But scholars have known for years that the vast majority of MTurk tasks are completed by a small set of workers who spend long hours on the website, and that many of those workers are very poor. Here are the sobering facts:

• About 80 percent of tasks on MTurk are completed by about 20 percent of participants that spend more than 15 hours a week working on the site. MTurk works not because it has many hobbyists, but because it has dedicated people who treat the tasks like a job.
• About one in five turkers are earning less than $20,000 a year.
• A third of U.S. turkers call MTurk an important source of income, and more than one in ten say they use MTurk money to make basic ends meet.

Journal articles that refer to Mechanical Turk. Source: PS: Political Science and Politics

It is easy to forget that these statistics represent real people, so let me introduce you to one of them. “Marjorie” is a 53-year-old woman from Indiana who had jobs in a grocery store and as a substitute teacher before a bad fall left her unable to work. Now, she says, “I sit there for probably eight hours a day answering surveys. I’ve done over 8,000 surveys.” For these full days of work, Marjorie estimates that she makes “$100 per month” from MTurk, which supplements the $189 she receives in food stamps. Asked about her economic situation, Marjorie simply says that she is “poverty stricken.”

I heard similar stories from other MTurk workers—very poor people, often elderly or disabled, working tremendous hours online just to keep themselves and their families afloat. I spoke to a woman who never got back on her feet after losing her home in Hurricane Rita, and another who had barely escaped foreclosure. A mother of two was working multiple jobs, plus her time MTurk, to keep her family off government assistance. Job options are few for many turkers, especially those who are disabled, and MTurk provides resources they might not otherwise have. But these workers that work anonymously from home are isolated and have few avenues to organize for higher wages or other employment protections.

Once I realized how poorly paid my respondents were, I went back and gave every one of my over 1,400 participants a “bonus” to raise the survey respondent rate to the equivalent of a $10 hourly wage. (I paid an additional $15 to respondents who participated in an interview.) This cost me a little bit more money, but less than you might imagine. For a 3-minute survey of 800 people, going from a 20-cent to a 50-cent payment costs an additional $240. But if every researcher paid an ethical wage, it would really add up for people like Marjorie. In fact, it would likely double her monthly income from MTurk.

Raising wages is a start, but it should not be up to individual researchers to impose workplace standards. In this month’s PS: Political Science and Politics, a peer-reviewed journal published for the American Political Science Association, I have called for new standards for crowdsourced research to be implemented not only by individual researchers, but also by universities, journals, and grantmakers. For instance, journal editors should commit to publishing only those articles that pay respondents an ethical rate, and university ethics boards should create guidelines for use of crowdsourcing that consider wages and also crowdsourcers’ lack of access to basic employment protections.

The alternative is continuing to pay below-minimum-wage rates to a substantial number of poor people who rely on this income for their basic needs. This is simply no alternative at all.