A shaky truce remains broadly in place among rival Libyan forces fighting for control of Tripoli. However, a durable ceasefire to bring an end to the current bout of conflict, which was initiated by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ (LAAF) offensive on the capital in April 2019, has not been reached. In recent weeks attention has focused on talks hosted in Moscow and Berlin, with the former aimed at agreeing a ceasefire and the latter seeking to reach agreement among international actors to bring an end to external military support for Libyan warring actors, and to craft a way forward for future intra-Libyan talks. Yet, there has been little emphasis on Libyan actors – beyond Haftar and prime minister Fayez al-Serraj – in this process.
 
This roundtable will bring together experts and policymakers to discuss means of de-escalating the conflict and seeking a lasting resolution through the development of interconnected intra-Libyan social and security negotiation tracks. Mr Usama Otman Essed of the Libya Center for Strategic and Future Studies (LCSFS) will present his research group’s ideas on these issues and discuss their ongoing efforts to promote dialogue among social and security actors.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

There is a broad consensus that Libya’s rentier, patronage-based system of governance is a driver, and not only a symptom, of Libya’s continuing conflict. The dysfunction of Libya’s economic system of governance has been exacerbated by the governance split that has prevailed since 2014 whereby rival administrations of state institutions have emerged. Despite these challenges, a system of economic interdependence, whereby forces aligned with Field Marshal Haftar control much of the oil and gas infrastructure and the UN-backed Government of National Accord controls the means of financial distribution, has largely prevailed. Yet, at the time of writing, this is under threat: a damaging oil blockade is being implemented by forces aligned with Haftar and those state institutions that do function on a national basis are finding it increasingly difficult to avoid being dragged into the conflict.

This roundtable will bring together analysts and policymakers to discuss these dynamics and look at possible remedies. Jason Pack, non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute, will present the findings of his latest paper on the issue which recommends the formation of 'a Libyan-requested and Libyan-led International Financial Commission vested with the requisite authorities to completely restructure the economy.' Tim Eaton, who has been leading Chatham House’s work on Libya’s conflict economy, supporting UNSMIL’s efforts in this field, will act as respondent.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

To understand Lebanon’s financial collapse, look to its politics.

The country has been deeply damaged by an increasingly dysfunctional political system. A series of compromises have alienated it from its main markets in the Gulf and strangled its economy; anyone that has glanced at fluctuations in Lebanese bank deposits over the last 10 years can see the correlation.

Imagine if Boris Johnson or Donald Trump were obliged to form joint governments with Jeremy Corbyn or Bernie Sanders. The result would be paralysis and lack of accountability as each party pulls the country in opposite directions and blames the other for the state of limbo. This has been the state of affairs in Lebanon since the Doha agreement of 2008. 

That agreement followed an 18-month siege that paralyzed Beirut and an attack on the city by Hezbollah’s ‘black shirts’. The Doha formula imposed governments of national unity between Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s pro-Saudi camp and Hezbollah’s pro-Iran camp and their respective internal allies.

The pattern was set: each period of subsequent paralysis was followed by further compromise as the tug of war pulled the country away from its principal economic partners, the Arab Gulf states, with the regional balance of power tilting towards Hezbollah. 

It was not supposed to be like this. The Baabda Declaration in June 2012, reached after a process of national dialogue, was meant to secure Lebanon’s neutrality in regional conflicts, with both sides promising to hold back on external alliances and coexist despite difference over major regional issues like the war in Syria, the standoff between the US and Iran or relations with Israel or the Gulf states.

This has worn away. The Baabda declaration itself became a sham when Hezbollah inserted itself into the war in Syria in support of the Assad regime and overtly got involved in Iraq and Yemen as an Iranian proxy. This was followed by Saudi opposition to concessions by Hariri that led to the election of General Michel Aoun, an ally of Hezbollah, as president in October 2016; again, after a political paralysis that lasted 29 months with no active government and no head of state.  

The Saudis were also furious when President Aoun’s son-in-law, Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, abstained from condemning the burning of the Saudi embassy in Tehran at an Arab League meeting in Cairo in January 2016, citing the need to preserve national unity.

Fearing that he was simply providing Hezbollah with protection in the guise of compromise, the Saudis pressured Hariri to resign in November 2017 during a trip to Riyadh, but he later challenged that by retracting on his resignation when back in Beirut. Lebanon was caught between two sides, and as the regional conflict intensified from tension to open confrontation, neutrality was no longer an option.

Gulf connections

An estimated 350,000 Lebanese expats live and work in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. These countries are also the main clients for Lebanese contractors, consultants and advertising companies, some of which have offices there. The domestic tourism industry relies heavily on Arab Gulf visitors and they are a principal source of foreign investments especially in the real estate sector.

Lebanon also enjoyed a certain degree of political and economic protection from the US and the Gulf, and Hezbollah benefited indirectly from that protection, as it also shielded it to a certain degree from sanctions.

The deterioration of relations meant that the country was cut off by its Gulf partners. This was manifested in travel bans for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nationals to Lebanon and a decrease in investments and bank deposits, as well as a decrease in remittances from Lebanese expats, partly because of economic crisis in the Gulf countries themselves.

Saudi Arabia withdrew $4 billion of aid to the Lebanese army and internal security forces, and no aid or deposits were forthcoming as the economic and financial situation deteriorated. 

The costs to the Lebanese economy include the opportunity cost created by the annual threat of war with Israel, after which trips are cancelled and projects postponed. Hezbollah also controls a section of Beirut port where it pays no duty or taxes. Add to that the economic fallout from the war in Syria, such as the impact on exports, the inflow of refugees and the cost of Hezbollah’s involvement.

The burden of these political factors is difficult to estimate but it constitutes the ransom that the Lebanese economy bears as a cost of the compromise. This is not to absolve Lebanese politicians from corruption or bankers of mismanagement but to add that political factors cannot be ignored.

The cumulative cost and economic impact of being cut off from its main economic partner eventually bankrupted the country. The fiscal and financial aspects, with Lebanon’s inability to service its debt, are but a reflection of these political factors. In the long run, the key to avoiding complete collapse is to restore relations with the GCC and free Lebanon from that very costly grip.

Neither Cameroon nor Malaysia has made progress in tackling illegal logging since 2010, according to new reports from Chatham House. Corruption, lack of political will and a lack of transparency pose problems in both countries. 

Illegal logging is much more widespread in Cameroon, where entrenched corruption, weak institutions and unclear and inappropriate laws are all impeding reform. Although Malaysia does not have such high levels of illegality, problems remain, particularly in the state of Sarawak.

Alison Hoare, Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House, said: 'Illegal logging has a devastating impact on some of the world’s most valuable remaining forests and on the people who live in them and rely on the resources they provide.'

'It is disappointing how little progress Cameroon and Malaysia have made in tackling illegal logging, which exacerbates deforestation, climate change, and poverty. In both countries corruption is a major issue, and the governments need to do much more to address the problem and its underlying drivers.' 

In Cameroon, the principle of transparency has not been accepted within the government, enforcement is weak and information management systems are inadequate. The misuse of  small permits, often granted to allow clearance of forests for infrastructure projects or agricultural expansion, is particularly problematic and could be increasing.

Meanwhile, a huge amount of illegal production takes place in the informal artisanal sector – accounting for around half of all timber produced in the country. Artisanal loggers mainly supply the domestic market, but their timber is also exported.

In Malaysia, governance varies significantly from region to region but there are high levels of deforestation across the country. Expansion of timber, pulp and agricultural plantations is the primary cause of forest loss, with the area of plantations expected to double by 2020. 

Adequate recognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights is also a serious challenge in Malaysia and has held up the negotiation of a Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the European Union. Recent enhanced efforts to tackle corruption, including in Sarawak, could mark a turning point. 

Alison Hoare: 'In both countries, more concerted efforts are needed to tackle corruption, increase consultation, and improve transparency and availability of information. The Cameroonian government also needs to pay more attention to the informal sector and the domestic market.'

The global health system has contributed significantly to improved health and life expectancy in recent decades. However, the existing architecture needs to be reformed in order to address future challenges and meet the health targets in the Sustainable Development Goals. Rethinking the Global Health System, a new Chatham House report, analyses how fit for purpose the current system is and identifies priority areas for reform. 

The Ebola crisis has shown that weak systems make individual countries more vulnerable and that strong, resilient and equitable systems at country level are needed to protect global health security. There is a pressing need for enhanced global disease surveillance and detection capacity, as well as improved international coordination in responding to emerging health threats.

In addition, addressing determinants of health outside the health sector requires cross-sectoral collaboration and linkages to other policy domains. Historically, the focus has rested on directly reducing illness and death, but the need to address other influences on health outcomes – safe drinking water, proper sewage treatment, good education – is now well recognized.

The report says that stronger leadership in global health is therefore required and the report lends support to calls for the creation of a new organization that would bring together United Nations agencies with health-related mandates – UN-HEALTH. Just as UNAIDS created a more coherent response for HIV, a UN-HEALTH organization could achieve a similar but more wide-reaching effect by bringing together and streamlining all UN agencies working on global health issues.

Professor David Harper, who led the Chatham House project that resulted in the report, said: 

'This report is intended to make a substantial contribution to the international debate on what the world will require of the health architecture of the future. It offers some options for political leaders to consider, but it is just a starting point. More work is urgently needed to develop the ideas introduced in this project and to help generate the high-level political traction that is so vital in any change process.'

The risk of a serious cyber attack on civil nuclear infrastructure is growing, as facilities become ever more reliant on digital systems and make increasing use of commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ software, according to a major new report from Chatham House.

Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks is the result of an 18-month study that draws on in-depth interviews with 30 leading industry practitioners based in more than eight countries. It found that the trend to digitization, when combined with a lack of executive-level awareness of the risks involved, means that nuclear plant personnel may not realize the full extent of their cyber vulnerability and are thus inadequately prepared to deal with potential attacks. 

Specific findings include:                

• The conventional belief that all nuclear facilities are ‘air gapped’ (isolated from the public internet) is a myth. The commercial benefits of internet connectivity mean that a number of nuclear facilities now have VPN connections installed, which facility operators are sometimes unaware of.
• Search engines can readily identify critical infrastructure components with such connections.
• Even where facilities are air gapped, this safeguard can be breached with nothing more than a flash drive.
• Supply chain vulnerabilities mean that equipment used at a nuclear facility risks compromise at any stage.
• A lack of training, combined with communication breakdowns between engineers and security personnel, means that nuclear plant personnel often lack an understanding of key cyber security procedures.
• Reactive rather than proactive approaches to cyber security contribute to the possibility that a nuclear facility might not know of a cyber attack until it is already substantially under way.

In the light of these risks, the report outlines a blend of policy and technical measures that will be required to counter the threats and meet the challenges. 

Recommendations include:

• Developing guidelines to measure cyber security risk in the nuclear industry, including an integrated risk assessment that takes both security and safety measures into account.
• Engaging in robust dialogue with engineers and contractors to raise awareness of the cyber security risk, including the dangers of setting up unauthorized internet connections.
• Implementing rules, where not already in place, to promote good IT hygiene in nuclear facilities (for example to forbid the use of personal devices) and enforcing rules where they do exist.
• Improving disclosure by encouraging anonymous information sharing and the establishment of industrial CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Team).
• Encouraging universal adoption of regulatory standards.

This event will launch the US Project’s latest research paper on the way ahead for NATO and, in particular, examine what can be achieved at the NATO summit in September. The paper crystallizes the principal findings of a series of workshops and makes recommendations on the next steps for NATO. This event will bring together senior representatives from NATO and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office to discuss the paper, respond to its key conclusions, and share their own thoughts on the future of NATO.

This event will be followed by a drinks reception until 19:00.

About the project

2014 is a pivotal year for NATO.  Prompted by defence austerity, Russian activities in Ukraine, and the conclusion of NATO’s major operations in Afghanistan, allies are raising important questions about NATO’s future in the run-up to the summit in September.  

As part of the project, NATO: Charting the Way Forward, Chatham House has held a series of expert roundtables to discuss these challenges and NATO’s role for the coming decades. Bringing together senior officials from both the public and private sectors, as well as from the academic and think-tank communities, these workshops have explored different aspects of NATO’s purpose, priorities and capabilities.  

This project is supported by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, and the Canadian Department of National Defence.

Over the course of this year, Chatham House convened a series of expert roundtables to answer some of these questions. This report draws on the findings of those meetings and makes recommendations for NATO’s next steps in the lead-up to its 2014 Summit in Wales.

The paper suggests six principal actions for NATO:

• Find ways to caucus smaller groups within NATO rather than requiring all 28 members to make all decisions. NATO’s 28 member states all have their own interests and appetites for risk and bring diverse capabilities to the table. Yet rather than being a source of weakness, these differences of opinion can become a strength if properly managed. 
   
• Enhance interoperability. With operations in Afghanistan winding down, and in light of declining defence spending, NATO militaries must find new ways to improve their ability to work with one another on the ground, at sea and in the air. 
   
• Improve planning and positioning of forces together. For meaningful joint defence planning, and to share the burden of resources and responsibilities, NATO needs to facilitate collaborative discussions on challenges and capabilities. 
   
• Develop better acquisition systems. In the context of declining defence spending, bridging the gap between strategy and resources will require NATO members to streamline acquisition systems, make tough choices about national defence industries, and become more collaborative on procurement. 
   
• Rebuild public understanding and support for NATO. Public support is vital if member-state politicians are to make hard internal decisions on resources and to demonstrate the will and resilience required for effective deterrence and reassurance. 
   
• Build on NATO’s partnerships and differentiate them better. With defence budgets tightening, NATO needs to recognize and take advantage of the fact that many non-NATO states and other institutions have similar interests to those of members.

In the wake of the Paris attacks and the destruction of a Russian plane by a bomb in Sinai, Russia had been once more calling for a new level of engagement with Western partners over operations in Syria. Even an ‘anti-terrorism coalition’ appeared to gain traction after the terrorist attacks in Paris. But Russian attacks on Western-backed opposition groups in Syria and continuing violation of Turkish airspace narrowed the window of opportunity for engagement between NATO member states and Russia in Syria, and Tuesday’s incident – where Turkey shot down a Russian bomber − fundamentally challenged this option. NATO allies and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg were quick to call for ‘calm and de-escalation’ of the situation. But they face a problem: in the absence of a strategy, NATO lacks a mechanism—a form of transparent process for crisis resolution—between member states and partner nations when and if a dispute or disagreement arises.

NATO has three essential core tasks—collective defence (Article 5), crisis management and cooperative security; it does not prioritize one task over the other. Whereas collective defence applies to member states like Turkey, cooperative security involves engagement with partner nations, such as Russia, to assure Euro-Atlantic security. NATO’s role, in this sense, goes beyond protecting a member’s state’s sovereignty. This aspiration to provide enduring cooperation and cooperative security beyond members lies behind the now-obsolete NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, signed in 1997.

NATO’s balance between these tasks and its role vis-à-vis partner states is ill-defined, and among the core issues the Alliance must consider at or before its next summit in Warsaw in July 2016. These discussions must include prioritizing and grouping partner nations—Russia and Sweden, for instance, are clearly not partners in equal terms – and clarifying the role of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC is a venue for political dialogue that includes consultation, cooperation and joint action, but does not have a crisis resolution mechanism. From 2014 onwards, the NRC has not functioned, yet it is the only venue where NATO and Russia could have discussions regarding the future of Syria, focusing on ISIS as a major threat both to the Alliance and to the partner nations. Neither Russia nor the Alliance will benefit from escalation; thus, both sides should bear in mind that a troubling partnership is better than an adversarial relationship.

This is even more important because NATO member states do not have a cohesive strategy regarding Syria’s future. For some countries, like Germany, the efforts lie on refugee relief policies, while for others, such as France, the focus is the military fight against ISIS. Russia is clearly testing NATO’s response mechanisms through hybrid warfare techniques. Yet, NATO also does not have a coherent policy regarding Russia’s assertiveness in Ukraine, involvement in Syria and its annexation of Crimea.  NATO officials are in general agreement that there can be ‘no grand bargain with Russia’ as long as it continues to violate international treaties and norms. Russian aggression and assertiveness is a long-term problem for the Alliance to tackle. So far, though, NATO benefits from ‘avoid[ing] that situations, incidents and accidents spiral out of control’, as the NATO secretary general noted in his speech after the extraordinary North Atlantic Council meeting. Solidarity among allies and protecting Turkish territorial integrity is a clear role for NATO, but the Alliance’s response mechanism in crisis situations should not be exhausted and undermined with small-scale, bilateral disagreements and disputes.

NATO could move to incorporate a crisis resolution mechanism, in specified non-escalatory terms and processes, between member states and partner states, where NATO member states and Russia meet together as equals in case of a crisis. This could re-establish a communication channel between NATO and Russia in particular, especially when the NRC is not functioning. If such a mechanism were in existence today, Turkey could have taken the issue to NATO’s crisis management system and pointed out its concerns over airspace violations, rather than shooting down the Russian bomber. This could have enabled the Alliance and Russia to participate in a dialogue that has been silent for more than a year. Instead, this incident demonstrates the delicate strategy of balancing deterrence policies with engagement between a member state and a rather troubling partner nation.

When Syria’s future is discussed, as it will be, at the Warsaw summit, Russia will be an unavoidable part of the discussion. But until there is a way to de-escalate these small-scale incidents, it will be increasingly difficult for Russia and NATO to determine whether they do in fact have any scope for cooperation, or at the least collaboration, on shared challenges and threats.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

With Britain’s decision to leave the EU, the clouds of uncertainty hanging over the proposed US-EU free trade deal (known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or TTIP) have become darker. The negotiations were formally launched three years ago and have stalled because of transatlantic differences (for instance over issues of investor protections and public procurement) as well as growing public opposition. For now, both the US and the EU negotiators are determined to weather the storm and continue talks when they meet in Brussels from 11-15 July.

The result of the UK’s EU referendum will blow a strong wind into the face of TTIP negotiators on three fronts. First, the Brexit vote will delay the TTIP talks as EU officials will focus their attention and political capital on the future UK-EU relationship. Once the UK government triggers Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, both sides have two years to sort out the separation proceedings. Only after it has become clear what Britain’s relationship with the EU will look like will the European side stop navel-gazing. The TTIP negotiations will likely continue in the meantime, but will be put on the back-burner.

Second, any progress on TTIP will require clarity on what both sides are bringing to the negotiating table. But until the final nature of the UK-EU relationship is known, it will be difficult for the American side to assess exactly how valuable the access to the remaining EU market is. This raises the question of whether American negotiators will put forth their best offers if they don’t know what benefits they will obtain for making concessions.

Third, with Britain’s vote to leave the EU, TTIP has just lost one of its greatest cheerleaders. French and German officials are increasingly expressing concerns about TTIP. Within three days of the Brexit vote, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls dismissed the possibility of a US-EU trade deal, stating TTIP was against ‘EU interests’. In addition, 59 per cent of Germans oppose TTIP – up from 51 per cent – according to the most recent Eurobarometer survey. Britain’s voice for further trade liberalization will be sorely missed by American negotiators eager to strike a deal.

Despite the dark Brexit clouds on the TTIP horizon, there might be a silver lining. Britain’s decision to leave the EU could bring some benefits to the US-EU trade talks in two ways. First, financial services regulation might no longer be a sticking point in the TTIP negotiations. Given London’s role as a financial centre, the UK had insisted on including a financial services chapter in the trade deal. The US, however, has resisted this. The removal of this friction could help move the TTIP negotiations along.

Second, European trade negotiators will no longer have to address British fears that TTIP could put the National Health Service (NHS) at risk. Much of the TTIP-debate in Great Britain has focused on how this deal might impact the NHS. Opponents of TTIP have argued that including healthcare in the agreement could lead to privatization and ultimately the death of the NHS. EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström spent resources and energy in correcting these misconceptions. UK withdrawal from the EU means that she can now focus on fighting other myths surrounding TTIP, which could potentially help advance the trade deal.

For now and the immediate future, Britain will remain a member of the EU and the European Commission will continue to negotiate trade deals on behalf of all 28 member states. Both the US and EU negotiators are committed to advancing the trade deal despite Brexit. The British decision to leave the EU has not weakened the case for TTIP. Speaking on the outcome of the EU referendum, United States Trade Representative Michael Froman said ‘the economic and strategic rationale for TTIP remains strong’. And his counterpart Cecilia Malmström went even further, saying that the British decision to leave the EU creates more of an impetus for TTIP to be finished this year.

Though this timeline is unlikely to be met, TTIP is likely to survive the British decision to leave the EU. However, Brexit is a serious blow that will probably push back the conclusion of TTIP by at least two years. Any deal will need to take into account the future nature of the UK-EU trade deal, which may not be known before 2018. Meanwhile, elections in Germany and France (two countries with strong public opposition to TTIP) will take place in 2017. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US presidential election adds yet another layer of uncertainty as the trade policy of the next administration remains unknown. When US and EU trade negotiators meet again this week, they should not be too worried about the Brexit storm but rather the changing climate for TTIP in France, Germany and the US.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Please note this an online-only event.

According to a previously agreed timetable for phase two of Brexit talks, negotiations on the future EU-UK trade relations were scheduled to begin in March. Then a global pandemic hit. Despite the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak, the UK government insists that the Brexit negotiations are on track and there are currently no plans to extend the transition period beyond 2020.

However, the original timetable for trade talks was already widely seen as extremely constrained. Can negotiations still be done in time? With the decision on any possible extension to be made by July at the latest, can the two sides make sufficient progress by that point? Or would the ongoing public health crisis make requesting an extension to the transition period more politically viable for the UK government? Finally, if there is no extension, could Britain still leave the EU with no deal?

In this webinar, the speaker will discuss how the need to manage other challenges, such as the current COVID-19 outbreak, might affect the government’s approach to the negotiations with the EU. He will also share his insights on what to expect from the second phase of negotiations and on the most important lessons from phase one. 

Please note this an online-only event.

Norway is one of the few European countries that remains outside of the European Union. After the country’s population rejected the prospect of joining the EU twice, Norway’s relationship with the Union has been based on its membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), alongside Iceland and Liechtenstein.

The ‘Norway Model’ was often mentioned in the run up to the Brexit vote as a possible basis for Britain’s future relationship with the bloc, not least because it offers the least disruption to the current arrangement. Equally, Norway is not subject to the EU fisheries policy - an anticipated major issue in the next phase of Brexit talks. Nor is it part of the EU Customs Union.

Even though Prime Minister Johnson has now ruled out the type of deep economic and regulatory integration with the EU that Norway enjoys through its EEA membership, the country’s experience can still offer valuable lessons for the UK as it prepares to exit the transition period at the end of 2020.

In this session, the speaker will share Norway’s experience as a long-standing EEA member and discuss the challenges of engaging with the EU from the outside. What lessons can Norway offer the UK ahead of the negotiations on the future of UK-EU relations? What are the limits of its current arrangement with the EU? And is there any appetite among the Norwegian population to revisit it?

Several disciplines outside the natural sciences, including International Relations (IR), have engaged with the Anthropocene discourse in order to theorize their relevance and translate their practical value in this new phase of the Earth's history. Some IR scholars have called for a post-humanist IR, planet politics, a cosmopolitan view, and ecological security, among other approaches, to recalibrate the theoretical foundations of the discipline, making it more attuned to the realities of the Anthropocene. Existing discussions, however, tend to universalize human experience and gravitate towards western ontologies and epistemologies of living in the Anthropocene. Within this burgeoning scholarship, how is the IR discipline engaging with the Anthropocene discourse? Although the Anthropocene has become a new theoretical landscape for the conceptual broadening of conventional IR subjects, this review reveals the need for sustained discussion that highlights the differentiated human experiences in the Anthropocene. The existing IR publications on the Anthropocene locates the non-spatial narratives of vulnerability and historical injustice, the non-modernist understanding of nature, the agency of the vulnerable, and the amplification of security issues in the Anthropocene. It is in amplifying these narratives that the IR discipline can broaden and diversify the discourse on the Anthropocene and, therefore, affirm its relevance in this new geological age.

In April 2018, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), held in London, saw the creation and the adoption of the Commonwealth Cyber Declaration. The declaration outlines the framework for a concerted effort to advance cybersecurity practices to promote a safe and prosperous cyberspace for Commonwealth citizens, businesses and societies. 

The conference will aim to provide an overview on the progress made on cybersecurity in the Commonwealth since the declaration was announced in 2018. In addition, it will examine future challenges and potential solutions going forward.

This conference is part of the International Security Programme's project on Implementing the Commonwealth Cybersecurity Agenda and will convene a range of senior Commonwealth representatives as well as a selection of civil society and industry stakeholders. This project aims to develop a pan-Commonwealth platform to take the Commonwealth Cyber Declaration forward by means of a holistic, inclusive and representative approach.

Please see below meeting summaries from previous events on Cybersecurity in the Commonwealth:  

• A cyberspace that supports economic and social rights online (London)
• Build the foundations of an effective national cybersecurity response (Barbados)
• Promote stability in cyberspace through international cooperation (Addis Ababa)

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Moisés Naím will share his insights into the changing nature of power in the 21st century. He will articulate what he considers to be the shift and dispersal of power between traditionally dominant actors (such as large, stable governments, corporations and armies), and newly ascendant ‘micropowers’ (such as the Tea Party, WikiLeaks, and Somali pirates). 

Crucially, however, he will argue power today is decaying. He will suggest power is easier to acquire, but harder to use, and easier to lose. Coupled with this, the drive for power makes emerging actors across many fields of endeavour vulnerable, leading to chaos, confusion and paralysis. 

There will be a reception after the event.

This is an Under 35s Forum event.