Martha Ross spoke to the Advisory Board of the Community Foundation for Prince George’s County, describing research on the suburbanization of poverty both nationally and in the Washington region.

Despite perceptions that economic distress is primarily a central city phenomenon, suburbs are home to increasing numbers of low-income families. She highlighted the need to strengthen the social service infrastructure in suburban areas.

Full Presentation on Poverty in the Washington-Area Suburbs » (PDF)

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Inequality remained a prominent theme in public debate during 2015, likely helped by the unexpected rise and resilience of democratic socialist Bernie Sanders' run for the Democratic presidential nomination. Although the labor market continued its slow recovery, wage growth remained fairly weak—especially for middle and low earners. The upper middle class continues to pull away from the middle, not least in terms of income and wealth.

But it has also become much clearer that inequality is a geographical issue, as much as a social and economic one. Whether the focus is on the more immediate matter of income inequality or the slower-burning issue of intergenerational mobility, there is huge variation between different places in the United States.

Not all cities are created equal…

National income trends are important, of course. But they can often disguise deep differences by place. The income required to be ‘rich,’ at least by comparison to those around you, varies significantly between different cities, for example. A household income of $100,000 puts you on almost on the top rung (around the 95^th percentile) of the income ladder in Detroit. But to reach the same heights in San Jose, California, you’d need an income three times as great, according to calculations by my colleague Alan Berube.

There are also very large differences in the extent of income inequality in different metropolitan areas. Using the inequality measure used in another recent paper by Berube, the ratio between incomes at the 20^th percentile and the 95^th percentile, shows that while some cities have large gaps between rich and poor, others look almost Scandinavian in their egalitarian distributions. Here are the 20/95 ratios for the three most equal and unequal cities in the U.S.:

Intergenerational mobility varies—a lot—by place

In a groundbreaking research paper in 2014, Raj Chetty and his team at the Equality of Opportunity Project at Harvard showed that rates of intergenerational income mobility also vary considerably between different cities. It was always a stretch to compare the U.S. to Denmark on this front, given the colossal differences between the countries. But such comparisons became virtually unconscionable once the variations within the U.S. become apparent.

This year, Chetty and his co-author Nathaniel Hendren went a step further and a big step closer to showing a causal impact of place on the prospects for children raised in different locations. Again relying on large administrative datasets, the two scholars were able to show the variation in earnings for the folk hailing from, say, Baltimore versus Baton Rouge.

Professor Chetty presented his new research at a Brookings event in June (which you can view here), just weeks after the eruption of protest and violence in Baltimore following the death of Freddie Gray. One striking finding was that the worst place in America to grow up, in terms of subsequent earnings, is Baltimore City. Critically, Chetty’s research design allows him to show that these differences do not reflect the characteristics of the people of Baltimore; but the characteristics of Baltimore itself. This downward effect on earnings is particularly bad for boys, as we highlighted in an earlier blog:

In related work, Chetty and his colleagues also show that children who move to a better place see an improvement in their own earnings—and that the younger they are when they move, the bigger the impact. The children of families who move as a result of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to Opportunity program showed sizable improvements in their own outcomes, as Jonathan Rothwell highlighted in his blog, 'Sociology’s revenge: Moving to Opportunity (MTO) revisited.'

Race, place and opportunity

One of the findings from Chetty’s earlier work is that race, place, and opportunity intersect in important ways. Cities with more segregation, and those with larger black populations, tend to show weaker upward mobility patterns. In order to understand the obstacles to upward mobility, policymakers have to adopt both a place-conscious (Margery Turner) and a race-conscious perspective. This policy was the subject of another Brookings event in November, with contributions from the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, the Governor of Delaware, and the Mayor of Newton, Mass. (The event can still be viewed here; for my highlights see this piece.) Being poor and black is generally not the same as being poor and white. Being poor in Cleveland is not the same as being poor in Charlotte.

On equal opportunity: think local, act local

Many states and cities are upping their game on issues of equality and opportunity, for both bad and good reasons. The bad reason is the relative inertia of the federal government. The good reason is a growing recognition that many of the levers for improving opportunity lie in the hands of institutions and agents at the state and metro level. Colorado has adopted a life-cycle opportunity framework and is pioneering efforts to integrate health and social policy. Charlotte has a high-profile taskforce (which I advise) on improving opportunity. Cincinnati has pledged to lift 10,000 children out of poverty within five years. Louisville is leading a push on school desegregation. Kalamazoo is adding greater student supports to its existing promise of free college. Baltimore’s program to reduce infant mortality has shown remarkable success. Durham, N.C. has rolled out a universal home visiting program.

Many of these efforts are building on the emerging ideas around 'collective impact,' harnessing local resources of many kinds around a clearly-articulated, shared goal. Given the scholarship showing just how much particular places influences individual and broader outcomes, this is likely to be where much of the most important policy development will take place in coming years. In terms of equality—and especially equality of opportunity—we need to think local, and act local, too.

       

       

Editor’s note: In this post, the third in a series drawing from Fergus Hanson's new book, "Internet Wars: The Struggle for Power in the 21st Century," Hanson analyzes the growing trend of online petitioning influencing policymaking, but argues the caveat that the nature of online campaigning is not always conducive to good policy.

Last federal election, the Obama campaign spent nearly $1 billion to get 66 million voters out to support the president’s victory.

So as the 2016 election approaches, large lists of politically-minded individuals have special value. And it just so happens in the last five years some very large lists have emerged.

These lists are controlled by online citizen-aggregation sites. The largest, Change.org, now reports more than 100 million users, but others are also huge: Avaaz reports 42 million and Care2 32 million.

So far, the operators of these sites have not directed their members in the same way as some of their overseas counterparts.

Two of the largest U.S. organizations—Change and Care2—are for-profit B-corporations and sell access to their membership, often for a hefty fee. They rely almost exclusively on petitions. This is probably driven by commercial motivations to grow membership with a view to selling access to it. But petitions are limited in their ability to effect change, especially as politicians become desensitized to them.

In other parts of the world, the model has evolved to become much more overtly political. A good example is one of the first movers in the space, GetUp!, an Australian-based group. It uses crowd sourcing to fund its secretariat, raising over $5.7 million from tens of thousands of micro donations averaging $11.50 each. It uses these funds to run successful high court challenges and other publicity (and pressure) generating stunts. It stations members at polling booths during elections and uses its members’ shareholder rights to hijack corporate meetings.

This trend is one of the radical new ways the Internet has allowed the masses to aggregate their voice in order to exert influence on decision makers. Suddenly, people are able to do this on a regular basis, outside formal structures like trade unions and political parties.

It also provides great influence to the individuals leading the campaigning sites. They can exercise this by shaping which campaigns have most prominence on a site and allocating in-house resources to help the campaigns they like with editing of material, generating media, and behind the scenes lobbying.

There is a now a long list of examples where these organizations have exerted significant influence on corporations and politicians, but in many ways they are still undergoing significant evolution.

The shift to a broader repertoire than simple petitions and more hands-on political engagement seems likely.

There is also a potential evolution underway in their politics. Most campaigning sites are openly progressive in orientation, but this is changing. In late 2012, Change.org controversially shifted its policy to allow advertising from non-progressively aligned groups. Conservative groups have also started to mobilize online, a prominent example being the Heritage Foundation in the United States, which now has a significant online presence.

Whatever their political leanings, the policy reality of this new force is messy.

The nature of online campaigning is not always conducive to good policy because the groups lack institutional policymaking expertise and often launch campaigns off the backs of crises, allowing little time to think through consequences.

Ironically, these people-power sites also face a question of legitimacy. Three hundred very vocal people with a clever campaign can sometimes drive change that the majority wouldn’t necessarily support. The nature of the Internet can also occasionally make it hard to distinguish between the views of local nationals and foreign citizens voicing their concerns from abroad. Finally, there is the question of the legitimacy of the heads of these organizations who can be unelected business people with out-sized influence.

This is not the only way the Internet is empowering citizens and disrupting global power dynamics. Internet Wars looks at three messy, but intriguing ways citizen power is reshaping the world.

Read the first part in the series, “Big issues facing the Internet: Economic espionage,” and the second, "Waging (cyber)war in peacetime."

       

       

       

Ruy Teixeira joins NPR's Talk of the Nation host Neal Conan to discuss the Pennsylvania primary and the working-class vote.

NEAL CONAN: With us here in Studio 3A is Ruy Teixeira, a visiting fellow at Brookings Institution, co-author of the report "The Decline of the White Working Class and the Rise of a Mass Upper Middle Class." He's kind enough to be with us here. Thanks very much for coming in, nice to see you again.

RUY TEIXEIRA: Great to be here.

NEAL CONAN: And, what are some of the common themes that we see around these working class voters that Sherry Linkon was talking to us about?

RUY TEIXEIRA: Well, I think Sherry touched on a number of them. I think one critical theme, obviously, for this election is their level of economic discontent and their sense that the economic ground has shifted underneath their feet, and they are sort of wondering where they are going to go in the future, where their kids are going to go, sort of, where their way of life is going to go.

This is a matter of great concern to these voters because the last, you know, actually the last several years, have not been kind to them. But more broadly, you can look back, you know, 35 years and say the last 35 years has not been very kind to them. This has been a period when America, by and large, has grown not as fast as it did and incomes have not risen as fast as they used to, but it's been particularly bad for these voters.

Anyone with less than a four-year college degree has really done rather poorly since about the middle 1970s. So, there's a real question in their minds of what America has in store for them in the future. And they are very interested to hear what politicians have to say about it. So far, it hasn't seemed to work out quite so well.

And the other side of it is really touched on by the controversy that you're referring to which is their sense of cultural traditionalism, their sense that, especially the Democrats, perhaps, seem out of touch with that at times. It seems like they don't respect their way of life. It seems like their social liberalism gets in the way of connecting to these voters and really hearing what they have to say and what their commitments and priorities really are and a sense of elitism on their part.

And that's really what, I think, Obama's getting slammed on this, you know, in general, and of course, obviously the McCain and Clinton campaigns have some interest in pushing this, but it did give them an opening to raise this issue and argue that, in fact, he is elitist. And Democrats, if they wish to get away from this, they have to adopt - I think it's a little bit unfair to the remark once you look at it in context.

But nevertheless, the perception was there particularly, I think the stuff about guns and about religion. I mean, can't you, like, own a gun and go to church and not be clinging to it? Because you know, your economic way of life is deteriorating. Again, I don't think that's what he meant. But that's how it's being interpreted. And that's where the discussion is.

Listen to the entire interview »

      

       

       

       

       

In December over 190 countries will converge in Paris to finalize a new global agreement on climate change that is scheduled to come into force in 2020. A central part of it will be countries’ national pledges, or “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs), to be submitted this year which will serve as countries’ national climate change action plans. For Latin American countries, the INDCs present an unprecedented opportunity. They can be used as a strategic tool to set countries or at least some sectors on a cleaner path toward low-carbon sustainable development, while building resilience to climate impacts. The manner in which governments define their plans will determine the level of political buy-in from civil society and business. The implementation of ambitious contributions is more likely if constituencies consider them beneficial, credible, and legitimate.

This paper aims to better understand the link between Latin American countries’ proposed climate actions before 2020 and their post-2020 targets under a Paris agreement. We look at why Latin American climate policies and pledges merit attention, and review how Latin American nations are preparing their INDCs. We then examine the context in which five Latin American nations (Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Costa Rica, and Venezuela) are developing their INDCs—what pledges and efforts have already been made and what this context tells us about the likely success of the INDCs. In doing so, we focus on flagship national policies in the areas of energy, forests, cities, and transportation. We address what factors are likely to increase or restrain efforts on climate policy in the region this decade and the next.

Latin American countries are playing an active role at the U.N. climate change talks and some are taking steps to reduce their emissions as part of their pre-2020 voluntary pledges.

Latin American countries are playing an active role at the U.N. climate change talks and some are taking steps to reduce their emissions as part of their pre-2020 voluntary pledges. However, despite some progress there are worrying examples suggesting that some countries’ climate policies are not being implemented effectively, or are being undermined by other policies. Whether their climate policies are successful or not will have significant consequences on the likely trajectory of the INDCs and their outcomes. The imperative for climate action is not only based on Latin America’s contribution to global carbon emissions. Rather, a focus on adaptation, increasing the deployment of renewable energy and construction of sustainable transport, reducing fossil fuel subsidies, and protecting biodiversity is essential to build prosperity for all Latin Americans to achieve a more sustainable and resilient development.

Download the full paper »

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Before the City Club in Cleveland, Bruce Katz emphasized the importance of Ohio's older industrial cities for the state's overall prosperity and outlined, despite seemingly grim statistics, why now is the time for a rebirth of those places and how it can be achieved.

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INTRODUCTION 

Last year, President Obama delivered the first step in his promise to reach out to the Cuban people and support their desire for freedom and self-determination. Premised on the belief that Cuban Americans are our best ambassadors for freedom in Cuba, the Obama administration lifted restrictions on travel and remittances by Cuban Americans. The pent-up demand for Cuban American contact with the island revealed itself: within three months of the new policy, 300,000 Cuban Americans traveled to Havana -- 50,000 more than for all of the previous year.  Experts estimate that over $600 million in annual remittances has flowed from the United States to Cuba in 2008 and 2009 and informal flows of consumer goods is expanding rapidly.

The administration’s new policy has the potential to create new conditions for change in Cuba. However, if U.S. policy is to be truly forward looking it must further expand its focus from the Castro government to the well-being of the Cuban people. Recent developments on the island, including the ongoing release of dozens of political prisoners, have helped create the right political moment to take action.  The administration should institute a cultural diplomacy strategy that authorizes a broad cross-section of American private citizens and civil society to travel to the island to engage Cuban society and share their experiences as citizens of a democratic country.  Reducing restrictions on people-to-people contact is not a “concession,” but a strategic tool to advance U.S. policy objectives to support the emergence of a Cuban nation in which the Cuban people determine their political and economic future.

The President has the authority to reinstate a wide range of “purposeful,” non-touristic travel to Cuba in order to implement a cultural diplomacy strategy. Under President Clinton, the Baltimore Orioles played baseball in Havana and in return the Cuban national team was invited to Baltimore. U.S. students studied abroad in Cuba and engaged in lively discussions with their fellow students and host families. U.S. religious groups provided food and medicines to community organizations, helping them assist their membership.  However, in 2004, such travel was curtailed, severely limiting U.S. insights about the needs, interests and organizational capacities of community groups and grassroots organizations. Today, visitors traveling under an educational license, for example, number a meager 2,000 annually.

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The “green” or “clean” or low-carbon economy—defined as the sector of the economy that produces goods and services with an environmental benefit—remains at once a compelling aspiration and an enigma.

As a matter of aspiration, no swath of the economy has been more widely celebrated as a source of economic renewal and potential job creation. Yet, the clean economy remains an enigma: hard to assess. Not only do “green” or “clean” activities and jobs related to environmental aims pervade all sectors of the U.S. economy; they also remain tricky to define and isolate—and count.

The clean economy has remained elusive in part because, in the absence of standard definitions and data, strikingly little is known about its nature, size, and growth at the critical regional level.

Seeking to help address these problems, the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings worked with Battelle’s Technology Partnership Practice to develop, analyze, and comment on a detailed database of establishment-level employment statistics pertaining to a sensibly defined assemblage of clean economy industries in the United States and its metropolitan areas.

"Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment" concludes that:

The clean economy, which employs some 2.7 million workers, encompasses a significant number of jobs in establishments spread across a diverse group of industries. Though modest in size, the clean economy employs more workers than the fossil fuel industry and bulks larger than bioscience but remains smaller than the IT-producing sectors. Most clean economy jobs reside in mature segments that cover a wide swath of activities including manufacturing and the provision of public services such as wastewater and mass transit. A smaller portion of the clean economy encompasses newer segments that respond to energy-related challenges. These include the solar photovoltaic (PV), wind, fuel cell, smart grid, biofuel, and battery industries.

The clean economy grew more slowly in aggregate than the national economy between 2003 and 2010, but newer “cleantech” segments produced explosive job gains and the clean economy outperformed the nation during the recession. Overall, today’s clean economy establishments added half a million jobs between 2003 and 2010, expanding at an annual rate of 3.4 percent. This performance lagged the growth in the national economy, which grew by 4.2 percent annually over the period (if job losses from establishment closings are omitted to make the data comparable). However, this measured growth heavily reflected the fact that many longer-standing companies in the clean economy—especially those involved in housing- and building-related segments—laid off large numbers of workers during the real estate crash of 2007 and 2008, while sectors unrelated to the clean economy (mainly health care) created many more new jobs nationally. At the same time, newer clean economy establishments— especially those in young energy-related segments such as wind energy, solar PV, and smart grid—added jobs at a torrid pace, albeit from small bases.

The clean economy is manufacturing and export intensive. Roughly 26 percent of all clean economy jobs lie in manufacturing establishments, compared to just 9 percent in the broader economy. On a per job basis, establishments in the clean economy export roughly twice the value of a typical U.S. job ($20,000 versus $10,000). The electric vehicles (EV), green chemical products, and lighting segments are all especially manufacturing intensive while the biofuels, green chemicals, and EV industries are highly export intensive.

The clean economy offers more opportunities and better pay for low- and middle-skilled workers than the national economy as a whole. Median wages in the clean economy—meaning those in the middle of the distribution—are 13 percent higher than median U.S. wages. Yet a disproportionate percentage of jobs in the clean economy are staffed by workers with relatively little formal education in moderately well-paying “green collar” occupations.

Among regions, the South has the largest number of clean economy jobs though the West has the largest share relative to its population. Seven of the 21 states with at least 50,000 clean economy jobs are in the South. Among states, California has the highest number of clean jobs but Alaska and Oregon have the most per worker.

Most of the country’s clean economy jobs and recent growth concentrate within the largest metropolitan areas. Some 64 percent of all current clean economy jobs and 75 percent of its newer jobs created from 2003 to 2010 congregate in the nation’s 100 largest metro areas.

The clean economy permeates all of the nation’s metropolitan areas, but it manifests itself in varied configurations. Metropolitan area clean economies can be categorized into four-types: service-oriented, manufacturing, public sector, and balanced. New York, through mass transit, embodies a service orientation; so does San Francisco through professional services and Las Vegas through architectural services. Many Midwestern and Southern metros like Louisville; Cleveland; Greenville, SC; and Little Rock—but also San Jose in the West—host clean economies that are heavily manufacturing oriented. State capitals are among those with a disproportionate share of clean jobs in the public sector (e.g. Harrisburg, Sacramento, Raleigh, and Springfield). Finally, some metros—such as Atlanta; Salt Lake City; Portland, OR; and Los Angeles— balance multi-dimensional clean economies.

Strong industry clusters boost metros’ growth performance in the clean economy. Clustering entails proximity to businesses in similar or related industries. Establishments located in counties containing a significant number of jobs from other establishments in the same segment grew much faster than more isolated establishments from 2003 to 2010. Overall, clustered establishments grew at a rate that was 1.4 percentage points faster each year than non-clustered (more isolated) establishments. Examples include professional environmental services in Houston, solar photovoltaic in Los Angeles, fuel cells in Boston, and wind in Chicago.

The measurements and trends presented here offer a mixed picture of a diverse array of environmentally-oriented industry segments growing modestly even as a sub-set of clean energy, energy efficiency, and related segments grow much faster than the nation (albeit from a small base) and in ways that are producing a desirable array of jobs, including in manufacturing and export-oriented fields.

As to what governments, policymakers, and regional leaders should do to catalyze faster and broader growth across the U.S. clean economy, it is clear that the private sector will play the lead role, but governments have a role too. In this connection, the fact that significant policy uncertainties and gaps are weakening market demand for clean economy goods and services, chilling finance, and raising questions about the clean innovation pipeline reinforces the need for engagement and reform. Not only are other nations bidding to secure global production and the jobs that come with it but the United States currently risks failing to exploit growing world demand. And so this report concludes that vigorous private sector-led growth needs to be co-promoted through complementary engagements by all levels of the nation’s federal system to ensure the existence of well-structured markets, a favorable investment climate, and a rich stock of cutting-edge technology—as well as strong regional cast to all efforts. Along these lines, the report recommends that governments help:

Scale up the market by taking steps to catalyze vibrant domestic demand for low-carbon and environmentally-oriented goods and services. Intensified “green” procurement efforts by all levels of government are one such market-making engagement. But there are others. Congress and the federal government could help by putting a price on carbon, passing a national clean energy standard (CES), and moving to ensure more rational cost recovery on new transmission links for the delivery of renewable energy to urban load centers. States can adopt or strengthen their own clean energy standards, reduce the initial costs of energy efficiency and renewable energy adoption, and pursue electricity market reform to facilitate the use of clean and efficient solutions. And localities can also support adoption by expediting permitting for green projects, adopting green building and other standards, and adopting innovative financing tools to reduce the upfront costs of investing in clean technologies.

Ensure adequate finance by moving to address the serious shortage of affordable, risk-tolerant, and larger-scale capital that now impedes the scale-up of numerous clean economy industry segments. On this front Congress should create an emerging technology deployment finance entity to address the commercialization “Valley of Death” and also work to rationalize and reform the myriad tax provisions and incentives that currently encourage capital investments in clean economy projects. States, for their part, can supplement private lending activity by providing guarantees and participating loans or initial capital for revolving loan funds targeting clean economy projects using new or improved technologies. And for that matter regions and localities can also help narrow the deployment finance gap by helping to reduce the costs and uncertainty of projects by expediting their physical build-out, whether by managing zoning and permitting issues or even pre-approving sites.

Drive innovation by investing both more and differently in the clean economy innovation system. With the needed major scale-up of investment levels unlikely for now, Congress at least needs to embrace continued incremental growth of key energy and environmental research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) budgets. At the same time, Congress should continue its recent institutional experimentation through measured expansion of such recent start-ups as the Energy Frontier Research Centers, ARPA-E, and Energy Innovation Hubs programs. Two worthy additional experiments would be the creation of a water sciences innovation center and the establishment of a regional clean economy consortia initiative. States can also advance the clean economy through maintaining and expanding their own RD&D efforts, perhaps by tapping state clean energy funds where they exist. All should be focused and prioritized through a rigorous, data-driven analysis of the nature, growth, and strengths of local clean economy innovation clusters.

In addition, the “Sizing the Clean Economy“ emphasizes that in working on each of these fronts federal, state, and regional leaders need to:

Focus on regions, meaning that all parties need to place detailed knowledge of local industry dynamics and regional growth strategies near the center of efforts to advance the clean economy. While the federal government should increase its investment in new regional innovation and industry cluster programs such as the Economic Development Administration’s i6 Green Challenge, states should work to improve the information base about local clean economy industry clusters and move to support regionally crafted initiatives for advancing them. Regional actors, meanwhile, should take the lead in using data and analysis to understand the local clean economy in detail; identify competitive strengths; and then move to formulate strong, “bottom up” strategies for overcoming key clusters’ binding constraints. Employing cluster intelligence and strategy to design and tune regional workforce development strategies will be a critical regional priority.

***

The measurements, trends, and discussions offered here provide an encouraging but also challenging assessment of the ongoing development of the clean economy in the United States and its regions. In many respects, the analysis warrants excitement. As the nation continues to search for new sources of high-quality growth, the present findings depict a sizable and diverse array of industry segments that is—in key private-sector areas—expanding rapidly at a time of sluggish national growth. With smart policy support, broader, more rapid growth seems possible. At the same time, however, the information presented here is challenging, most notably because the growth of the clean economy has almost certainly been depressed by significant policy problems and uncertainties.

That question is: Will the nation marshal the will to make the most of those industries?

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• Sizing the Clean Economy

       

Event Information

To access a curated stream of tweets from the #CleanEcon event, please visit this Storify page. Below you will find this event's full webcast archive--or, you may view one of four segments taken from that webcast.

No swath of the U.S. economy has been more widely celebrated as a source of economic renewal than the “clean” or “green” economy. However, surprisingly little is really known about these industries’ nature, size and growth—especially at the regional level. As a result, debates on transitioning to a green or clean economy are frequently short on facts and long on speculation as the nation searches for new sources of economic growth.

On July 13, the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings brought together business, economic development and political leaders to review the progress of clean industries, identify policy issues and opportunities, and consider how faster and broader growth of the clean economy could be encouraged at the national, state and regional level. A report and first-of-its-kind database, produced in collaboration with Battelle’s Technology Partnership Practice, was released at the event, providing new measures of the clean economy at the national and metropolitan levels. Also featured was an interactive web tool that allows users to track jobs, growth, segments, and other variables nationally, by state and by region.

Brookings Managing Director William Antholis welcomed participants and Bruce Katz, vice president and director of the Metropolitan Policy Program, presented the findings of this major new report on the status of the U.S. clean economy. Panel discussions followed, presenting the corporate and regional perspective.

After each panel, the speakers took audience questions.

Go to the report »

Go to the interactive web tool »

Video

• Introducing the Metropolitan Clean Economy
• Panel One: The Clean Economy, Firm by Firm
• Panel Two: The Clean Economy, Region by Region
• Clean Economy Closing Dialogue
• Growing the Clean Economy in Philadelphia

Audio

• Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment
• Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment
• Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment
• Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment

       

Editor's Note: During an event to launch a new report assessing the clean economy, Bruce Katz delivered a presentation highlighting the clean sector’s contribution to boosting exports and increasing manufacturing jobs. Katz's presentation also is featured in an iBook for the iPad.

Thank you, [Brookings Managing Director] Bill [Antholis] for that introduction, and for your leadership in this institution and more broadly in the national debate on climate change.

Before proceeding, I want to first thank my colleagues, Mark Muro, Jonathan Rothwell, Devashree Saha, and our friends at Battelle, particularly Mitch Horowitz and Marty Grueber for their creativity, collegiality, and painstaking attention to detail through a long and rigorous research effort. 

I’d also like to offer a special thanks to the Nathan Cummings Foundation, the General Electric Foundation, Living Cities, and the Surdna Foundation for their support and guidance of the program’s Clean Economy work, as well as the Rockefeller Foundation, who is supporting our policy and practice work around the clean economy in states and metropolitan areas.  

Today, we celebrate not just the release of a report, “Sizing the Clean Economy” but the unveiling of an interactive web site to spur further research, policy and practice, all freely available at www.brookings.edu/cleaneconomy.

We want today’s forum to be a participatory event and urge all of you in the audience and following on our webcast to engage online early and often. Please comment on Twitter via the hashtag created for this event (#cleanecon) and feel free to engage directly with me at @Bruce_Katz and Mark at @MarkMuro1 and send us any questions at MetroQ@brookings.edu.

 

The question before us: at a time of economic uncertainty and federal polarization, can America’s cities and metropolitan areas lead the nation to a clean economy—to create jobs in the near term and retool and restructure our economy for the long haul?

 

There is no doubt in our minds that moving to a clean economy is an environmental and energy imperative.  But consumers, companies, and cities are also sending an unequivocal signal: this is a market proposition and an economic transformation as profound as the information revolution.

Consumers around the globe are starting to demand lower carbon, energy efficient products and services: one in four drivers in the U.S., Europe, China, and Japan plans to buy electric vehicles when they are readily available. That would put about 50 million electric cars on the road in places from Baltimore to Beijing, Torino to Tokyo.

Companies see the clean economy as a growth sector: three quarters of major global corporations plan to increase “cleantech” budgets from 2012 to 2014. Global private investment in clean energy alone is up more than 6 fold since 2004, reaching $154 billion in 2010.

Cities and their metropolitan areas, early adapters of sustainable practice, are now competing to build out their special niches in the clean economy. I will provide details later on Greater Seattle’s bold strategy to be the global hub of clean IT. 

For two years, the Brookings Metro Program has hammered home the notion that the United States must pursue a different growth model post recession, a “next economy” that is driven by exports, powered by low carbon, fueled by innovation and rich with opportunity—and delivered by the large metropolitan areas that drive our economy.

Today, we will literally flip the dial and place the clean economy in the center of our macro vision and unveil the scale, scope and spatial geography of this promising growth engine. 

We have three sharp and timely findings.

First, the clean economy is a significant, diverse emerging market in the United States, already populated by some 2.7 million jobs. It is disproportionately manufacturing and export intensive—and offers better prospects for low and middle skilled workers than the national economy as a whole. This is exactly the kind of economy we want to build post-recession.

Second, metropolitan areas are on the vanguard of the clean economy due to their concentration of innovative drivers, as well as the built environment in which most people live, work and play. As in exports, metros specialize in different sectors of the clean economy—and the clustering of firms is catalyzing productive and sustainable growth.

Third, the U.S. must unleash the entrepreneurial energies and dynamism of our metropolitan engines to accelerate growth of the clean economy. That will require a strategic mix of private sector innovation and public policy that is stable, supportive, and predictable.  Given the nature and scale of global competition, U.S. governments, at all levels, must “get in the game” rather than “get out of the way.”  Smart public action can leverage private investment, create desperately needed jobs, and cement our position as the leading edge of innovative growth.

The stakes are very high. Make no mistake—we have a lot to do here and we are falling behind globally. Our competitors in mature and rising economies—Germany, Japan, and China—fully understand the potential of clean, and they are working at warp speed to set favorable conditions for rapid growth and grab their share of the next market revolution. We need to get our public-private act together—in cities and metros, in state capitals, at the now polarized federal level.

So let’s start with our first finding: the clean economy is a significant, diverse emerging market in the United States  

In total, we find there are 2.7 million clean economy jobs all across the United States. To put that number in perspective: the clean economy is nearly twice the size of the biosciences field and 60 percent of the 4.8 million strong IT sector. As you can tell, the clean economy also has more jobs than fossil fuel related industries.  

 Our definition of the clean economy is as follows:

“Any economic activity—measured in terms of establishments and jobs—that produces goods and services with an environmental benefit, or adds value to such products using skills or technologies that are uniquely applied to those products.”

This definition yields a broad and varied picture of economic activity: old and new, public and private, “green” and “blue.”

At the highest level, we find establishments and jobs grouping together in 5 discernible categories: Renewable Energy; Energy and Resource Efficiency; Greenhouse Gas Reduction; Environmental Management, and Recycling; Agricultural and Natural Resources Conservation; and Education and Compliance. Here we follow the categorization the Bureau of Labor Statistics is using for its own “green jobs” assessment due next year.

These categories then naturally break down into fine-grained segments, ultimately 39 in all.

Renewable Energy, for example, has nine segments, including Solar and Geothermal power, and Renewable Energy Services.

Energy and Resource Efficiency has 13 separate segments, from Electric Vehicle Technology to Water Efficient Products.

Greenhouse Gas Reduction, Environmental Management, and Recycling has 12 segments including Green Chemical Products and Professional Environmental Services.

And so on—you get the idea.

Each of the segments, in turn, has a distinct economic profile (cutting across multiple activities, occupations and skills) and a distinct spatial geography given the special assets and attributes of different places.

Let’s drill down a little so we all get on the same page.

Under renewable energy, let’s look at solar photovoltaic, a young rapidly innovating area. This segment employs more than 24,000 people in 555 establishments.

The list includes two major solar manufacturing firms, First Solar—with a major plant in Toledo—and BP Solar—with a facility in the Washington, DC metro, and Bombard Electric in Las Vegas, which helps businesses in that region—casinos, hotels, shopping centers—shift their energy use.

Under Greenhouse Gas Reduction, let’s take a look at Professional Environmental Services, an example of the role that expert services can play in domestic and global markets. This segment boasts some 140,000 workers in 5,400 establishments.

CH2M Hill in Denver provides environmental consulting services throughout the U.S. and the world, Ecology & Environment is a science and technical services firm with a large presence in Los Angeles, and Black & Veatch, out of Kansas City, is an engineering firm specializing in areas from environmental permitting to remediation.

One more definitional cut to consider: we have identified a group of young, super innovative “Cleantech” industries that cross multiple categories and show enormous growth potential. These industries are populated by companies with a median age of 15 years or less.

Most notably, this portfolio of segments—including wind power, battery technologies, bio fuels, and smart grid—grew about 8 percent a year since 2003, or twice as fast as the rest of the economy.

The clean economy, however, is not just broad and diverse, it is disproportionately productive.

The clean economy is export intensive, already taking advantage of the demand for clean goods and services coming from abroad.

In 2009, clean economy establishments exported almost $54 billion, including about $49.5 billion in goods and an additional $4.5 billion in services.

Significantly, clean economy establishments are by our calculations twice as export intensive as the national economy: over $20,000 worth of exports is sold for every job in the clean economy each year compared to just $10,400 worth of exports for the average U.S. job.

The export orientation of the clean economy today provides a platform for more exports tomorrow. With rising nations rapidly urbanizing, the demand for sustainable growth in all its dimensions will only grow, and the U.S. has the potential to serve that demand.

The clean economy also supports a production-driven innovation economy.

We find it employs a higher percentage of scientists than the national economy. Ten percent of clean economy jobs are in science and engineering, compared to 5 percent in U.S. economy generally.

As we now know, manufacturing and innovation are inextricably linked. This provides a stark challenge to the U.S.: we will innovate less unless we produce more.

By our account, the clean economy is a vehicle for production.

Twenty six percent of all clean economy jobs are involved in manufacturing, compared to just 9 percent of jobs in the economy as a whole.

Manufacturing accounts for a majority of the jobs in over half of the clean economy segments, with many sectors having a supermajority of production-oriented jobs.

Solar and wind energy, for example, have more than two thirds of their jobs in manufacturing. And some segments, including appliances, water efficient products, and electric vehicle technologies have over 90 percent of their jobs in manufacturing.

The good news: clean manufacturing is growing, even in the face of national declines in manufacturing employment. 

Finally, the clean economy is opportunity rich, providing prospects for a wide range of workers, and good wages up and down the skills ladder.

The clean economy is easy to enter, available to people of all skill levels: 45 percent of all clean jobs are held by workers with a high school diploma or less, compared to only 37 percent of U.S. jobs.

Once a worker enters the field, he or she is more likely to receive career-building training, as 41 percent of clean jobs offer medium to long-term training, compared to 23 percent of U.S. jobs.

The payoff is higher wages: the median wage in the clean economy is almost $44,000 for the average occupation, significantly higher than the national equivalent of $38,000 and change.

In summary, the clean economy is the kind of economy we want to build: export oriented, innovation fueled, opportunity rich, and balanced.

So here is our second major finding, metros are on the vanguard of the clean economy

Here is the heart of the American economy: 100 metropolitan areas that after decades of growth take up only 12 percent of our land mass, but harbor two-thirds of our population and generate 75 percent of our gross domestic product. 

These communities form a new economic geography, enveloping cities and suburbs, exurbs and rural towns.

Our research shows the extent to which these top 100 metros, in the aggregate, are driving growth in the Clean Economy.

In 2010, they constitute an increasing share of clean economy jobs, almost 64 percent.

And they include an outsized share, 74 percent, of jobs in cleantech industries, including extraordinarily high shares in solar photovoltaic, battery technologies, smart grid, and wind energy.

Innovative clean jobs are predominately in the top 100 metros because these places concentrate the assets that drive innovation, from initial research through commercialization through ultimate deployment

The major metros are also leading the growth of clean economy jobs around the built environment. They harbor 78 percent of jobs in public mass transit, and 90 percent of the jobs in green architecture, design and construction since moving people more efficiently and making buildings energy efficient will primarily be a metropolitan act, given where most people live and travel, and businesses locate.

Incredibly, metros also include a decent share of clean jobs that are traditionally rural, with at least 23 percent of jobs in resource-intensive activities like hydropower, sustainable forestry products, and biofuels, and more than half of organic food and farming jobs.

Metro economies, of course, do not exist in the aggregate; they have distinctive starting points and distinctive assets, attributes and advantages. 

Our research digs deep to profile the clean economy potential of each of the top 100 metro areas.

Four metro areas—New York, L.A., Chicago and Washington—are supersized job centers, with more than 70,000 jobs apiece in the clean economy in 2010. The New York metro alone has more than 152,000 clean economy jobs.

Other major metros—Philadelphia, San Francisco, Atlanta, Boston, Houston and Dallas—are also key players, with more than 38,000 jobs apiece as of that year.

Yet this is not just about the largest metros. As we see here, a different group of small and medium sized metros have more than 3.3 percent of their jobs situated in the clean economy. Albany leads the way, with an impressive 6.3 percent of its jobs in the clean economy.

The power of metros is the power of agglomeration, networks and clusters. 

Our report finds that clusters—the proximity of firms to businesses in related industries—boost metros’ growth performance in the clean economy, and metros facilitate clustering.

Examples include professional environmental services in Houston, solar photovoltaic in Los Angeles, fuel cells in Boston, wind in Chicago, water industries in Milwaukee, and energy efficiency in Philadelphia.

We can talk about clusters in the abstract, but its best to see them in practice from the ground up.

So let’s travel to the Philadelphia metropolis—the nation’s fifth largest—which includes the city of Philadelphia and surrounding counties.

Philadelphia is the fifth largest clean economy job center in the country.

Here we can find the advanced research engines of the University of Pennsylvania and Drexel in University City, who have partnered together on clean energy research and have provided a steady stream of talented workers to public, private and nonprofit firms and intermediaries.

These universities are part of the Greater Philadelphia Innovation Cluster, based at the Navy Yard, on the Delaware River.  This consortium received $129 million in federal funding from multiple agencies to demonstrate the efficacy of new building energy efficient components, systems and models.

The consortium includes strong support of City Hall, led by Mayor Michael Nutter, who has pioneered smart skills training in the energy efficient sector as well as the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation, which has been an investor in the Navy Yard.

And then, of course, there are firms and companies, the fuel of the economy, located throughout the Philadelphia metropolis.

Downtown we find Veridity Energy, a small smart grid firm with powerful technology tools. The density of Center City supports a healthy mix of highly skilled service firms. Just around the corner is Realwinwin, which provides finance services to companies making capital investments in energy efficiency.

But metropolitan economies cross city and county borders because different kinds of firms require different urban and suburban footprints—so if we look out to the suburb of Radnor, just past Bryn Mawr and I-476, we find Iberdrola, the second largest wind operator in the United States and a subsidiary of a major Spanish renewable energy company and an example of the wave of foreign direct investment that can help the U.S. build out the clean economy.   

The Philadelphia story reveals why cities and metro areas power our economy: they are hyper linked networks of private firms and public and nonprofit institutions that fertilize ideas, share workers, extend innovation, enhance competitiveness and catalyze growth.

Which leads to our final proposition: to build the next economy the U.S. must unleash the entrepreneurial energies and dynamism of our metropolitan engines.

We compete in a fiercely competitive world.

While America continues to debate the legitimacy of global warming research, our competitors in established nations like Germany, Japan and the U.K. and rising nations like China are taking transformative steps to grow their clean economies in the precise places—Munich, Tokyo, London, Shanghai—that drive their national economies. 

The United States can compete with these and other nations. No other nation can match us in domestic demand, advanced research, venture capital, the power of metro concentration.

But our potential will not be realized unless we provide a strong policy platform for the build out of the clean economy. 

Four steps are essential:  

Step one: scale-up markets by catalyzing demand for clean economy goods and services.  

Step two: drive innovation by investing in advanced R&D at scale, over a sustained period and via new distributed networks.

Step three: catalyze finance to produce and deploy more of what we invent. 

And step four: align with cities and metros to realize the synergies of clustering and place.  

Our competitors know that economy shaping of this magnitude should start at the national scale.

And so, in a perfect world, we would have our federal government create a framework for growth and success.

We have seen some of that leadership in the past few years, through: the procurement driven, market scaling efforts of the Department of Defense, the creation of new innovation vehicles like ARPA-E, some of the financial investments of the Department of Energy’s Loan Guarantee Program, and the metro-supporting investments in new energy regional innovation clusters—like the Greater Philadelphia example—supported by agencies with diverse sets of missions and resources, including DOE, Commerce, Labor, Education, and SBA. 

But with our global competitors continuously upping their goals and expanding their commitments, we desperately need our federal government to go further and act with vision and ambition and consistency.

To scale-up markets, Congress should enact a national clean energy standard (CES) that signals a long term, consistent commitment to alternative energy sources.

To drive innovation, Congress should embrace the call by the American Energy Innovation Council, led by corporate titans like Bill Gates and Jeff Immelt, to invest $16 billion annually in clean energy research and development through ARPA-E and networks of institutions that are multi-disciplinary and engage seamlessly with the private sector.

To catalyze finance, Congress should authorize a technology deployment finance entity—a Green Bank for short—to provide finance of the right scale and risk tolerance to ensure that ideas generated in America lead to products made in America.

Congress should also rationalize, reform, and selectively extend the myriad tax provisions and incentives that currently support the clean economy but which are now chaotic, unstable, inconsistent, and obtuse about evoking innovation and steady price declines from maturing clean technologies.

And to align with regions, Congress should more than double the number of energy innovation hubs and clusters that are seeded and funded.

Frankly, it is not difficult to lay out what reforms and investments are needed to grow the clean economy. Our competitors have given us clear guidance on that score. The only issue is whether our federal government, riven by excessive partisanship and ideological polarization, can muster the will to get anything done.  

Fortunately in the U.S. we have a default proposition when our national government falters, our states act as our “laboratories of democracy” and, as California Lt. Governor Gavin Newsom recently observed, our cities and metros act as the laboratories of innovation.

And so that’s how, for the time being, we will need to build our clean economy in the United States, the hard way, from the ground up.

The good news: there is no shortage of policy innovation and political commitment at the state and metro scale.

To scale up markets, California has set an aggressive renewable portfolio standard of 33 percent renewable energy by 2020. With this strong foundation, San Jose and other cities and counties are doing their part to facilitate consumer adoption: streamlining or even eliminating building permitting for solar panels.

To drive innovation, Wisconsin has created the School of Freshwater Sciences at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee to leverage that metro’s rising position in the blue economy. The Milwaukee Water Council is building on this, spearheading a network of scientists and companies to realize Milwaukee’s ambition to be a global hub for freshwater research, firm creation, and business expansion. 

To catalyze finance, Connecticut recently created the Connecticut Clean Energy Finance and Investment Authority. Capitalized with some $50 million annually, this Green Bank could accelerate the generation, transmission, and adoption of alternative energy.

At the municipal level, New York City has capitalized an Energy Efficiency Corporation to spur the financing of energy efficiency in the building sector.

And, finally, smart metros are now moving to build out their distinctive industry clusters.  In Greater Seattle, for example, the Puget Sound Regional Council has developed a business plan to cement that metro’s natural position as a global hub of energy efficient building technologies. This smart public-private initiative includes the establishment of a facility to test, integrate and verify promising energy efficient products and services before launching them to market.

Significantly, this metro vision is being supported by the State of Washington, which has committed to match any federal investment in the testing network.

Let me conclude with this vision: Let’s imagine a world in 20 years where the clean economy permeates every aspect of our economic and social fabric and, in the process, enhances productivity and competitiveness, lowers energy use, spurs further innovation, and provides quality work for a broad cross section of our citizenry. 

We believe today’s research—and the power of millions of consumers, tens of thousands of companies and hundreds of cities and metros—gives us the hope that this vision can become reality.

We have the data to set a platform for sustainable growth.

We have the roadmap to set the foundation for smart investment.

We have the entrepreneurs in all sectors to innovate and replicate. 

Let’s build the clean economy—worker by worker, firm by firm, metro by metro.

Thank you.

       

A new report and interactive map, "Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment" includes a first-of-its-kind database providing new measures of the clean economy at the national and metropolitan levels. Although the clean economy employs millions of people and exists in every U.S. region, market challenges hinder its ability to keep pace with global competitors. Mark Muro talks about how this economy is a driver of growth and innovation.

Video

• Sizing the Clean Economy

       

Editor's Note: During an appearance on the Platts Energy Week program, Mark Muro discussed jobs in the green sector, using findings from the "Sizing the Clean Economy" report.

Host BILL LOVELESS: Green jobs – what are they? And can they make much of a contribution to the economy? It’s an ongoing debate in Washington, and the rest of the U.S. for that matter, and it’s a knotty one because defining the term “green jobs” is difficult.

But now the Brookings Institution has taken a crack at it with a new report, “Sizing the Clean Economy.” One of the authors, Mark Muro, with the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program, joins me now. Mark, do you think you’ve defined, once and for all, what the clean economy is?

MARK MURO: The answer to that is “no.” This has been an ongoing discussion for decades, really. On the other hand, I do think that we have done is tried to embrace good precedents, good sensible precedents from Europe. The European Statistical Agency comes at it similar to the way we did. But we’ve also anticipated where the Bureau of Labor Statistics, here in the U.S., will be next year when it offers our first U.S. official definition.

LOVELESS: A summer preview, maybe. I know the Bureau of Labor Statistics is working on that. Should this report ... tell me a little bit about this report — where the jobs are and should this in any way change the way we look at green jobs.

MURO: I think one thing that comes from this is that it’s a broad swath of, sometimes not very glamorous, industries that are very familiar. Wastewater, mass transit – those are properly viewed as green jobs because they take pressure off the environment. They keep our environment clean.

Watch Mark Muro's full interview with Platts Energy Week »

       

"Sizing the Clean Economy,” which is based on the Brookings-Battelle Clean Economy Database, is a signature project of the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings. The database is a collaborative effort of Brookings Metro and the Battelle Technology Partnership Program and aims to explore the size, growth, and geography of the "clean" or green economy through the production of detailed data on U.S. establishments and workers engaged in producing goods and services that benefit the environment, especially in the nation’s large metropolitan areas."

These data are subject to further review and possible update.  For questions and comments please contact:

Mark Muro
mmuro@brookings.edu

Jonathan Rothwell
jrothwell@brookings.edu

       

       

       

       

     

       

       

       

       

Abstract

New and emerging work relationships arising in the “online gig economy” do not fit easily into the existing legal definitions of “employee” and “independent contractor” status. The distinction is important because employees qualify for a range of legally mandated benefits and protections that are not available to independent contractors, such as the right to organize and bargain collectively, workers’ compensation insurance coverage, and overtime compensation. This paper proposes a new legal category, which we call “independent workers,” for those who occupy the gray area between employees and independent contractors.

Independent workers typically work with intermediaries who match workers to customers. The independent worker and the intermediary have some elements of the arms-length independent business relationships that characterize “independent contractor” status, and some elements of a traditional employee-employer relationship. On the one hand, independent workers have the ability to choose when to work, and whether to work at all. They may work with multiple intermediaries simultaneously, or conduct personal tasks while they are working with an intermediary. It is thus impossible in many circumstances to attribute independent workers’ work hours to any employer. In this critical respect, independent workers are similar to independent businesses. On the other hand, the intermediary retains some control over the way independent workers perform their work, such as by setting their fees or fee caps, and they may “fire” workers by prohibiting them from using their service. In these respects, independent workers are similar to traditional employees.

Evidence is presented suggesting that about 600,000 workers, or 0.4 percent of total U.S. employment, work with an online intermediary in the gig economy. Although there are probably many more workers who currently work with an offline intermediary who would qualify for independent worker status than there are who work with an online intermediary, the number of workers participating in the online gig economy is growing very rapidly.

In our proposal, independent workers — regardless of whether they work through an online or offline intermediary — would qualify for many, although not all, of the benefits and protections that employees receive, including the freedom to organize and collectively bargain, civil rights protections, tax withholding, and employer contributions for payroll taxes. Because it is conceptually impossible to attribute their work hours to any single intermediary, however, independent workers would not qualify for hours-based benefits, including overtime or minimum wage requirements. Further, because independent workers would rarely, if ever, qualify for unemployment insurance benefits given the discretion they have to choose whether to work through an intermediary, they would not be covered by the program or be required to contribute taxes to fund that program. However, intermediaries would be permitted to pool independent workers for purposes of purchasing and providing insurance and other benefits at lower cost and higher quality without the risk that their relationship will be transformed into an employment relationship.

Our proposal seeks to structure benefits to make independent worker status neutral when compared with employee status, as well as to enhance the efficiency of the operation of the labor market. By extending many of the legal benefits and protections found in employment relationships to independent workers, our proposal would protect and extend the social compact between workers and employers, and reduce the legal uncertainty and legal costs that currently beset many independent worker relationships.

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It’s a fair question to ask: what was all the fuss about last October? The elections in Georgia and Azerbaijan came and went and the results were no surprise. Azerbaijani incumbent Ilham Aliyev won and Georgia's Mikhail Saakashvilli did not. The Azerbaijani elections were bogus; the Georgian elections were not. So what? Life goes on.

But perhaps it is not that simple. Most outside observers saw these elections as a barometer of democratic progress in a region where the West — and the U.S. in particular — has invested time, resources and effort over more than 20 years to help these countries to build a better future for themselves. As stakeholders in the democratic process in the South Caucasus since Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia gained their independence in 1991, Europe and the U.S. must fuss over the outcomes of the Azerbaijani and Georgian elections. 

Beyond Election Day

Evaluating these elections and their impact on the domestic social and political landscape as well as foreign relations requires, however, a focus on more than just election day. The excellent report from the European Stability Inititive on the election observation mission to Azerbaijan makes a strong case for not judging democratic progress based only on how the elections may appear to be conducted on election day.

The Georgian elections proved that post-Soviet governments could change, politicians could change and a European path be chosen. The Azerbaijani elections proved that a regime could “buy” favorable reports from short-term observers imported for election day, carry on with election rigging, continue human rights violations and ignore international criticism, whether from the Department of State or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s long-term observer mission.

Why the difference between the two neighboring countries? There are several reasons. First, Georgia’s generally free and fair 2012 parliamentary elections set a strong example for the 2013 presidential elections, and Georgia welcomed outside involvement and observation. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, prevented the visit of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Human Rights Tom Melia before its elections. Second, Georgian political parties, including the opposition, agreed on electoral ground rules. Third, the Georgian population demanded leadership change. Fourth, the outcome of elections in Georgia was accepted as a transparent way to — for the first time in modern Georgian history — transfer political legitimacy.

Test of Democratic Evolution

The real test of democratic evolution has to do with actions — over a period of months before and after election day — as well as rhetoric that affect the integrity of the elections. The pre- and post-election environments in Azerbaijan consist of continuing intimidation of the political opposition and independent NGO leadership, suppression of freedom of expression and official dismissal of any need to change. While Georgia had a pretty good pre-election period, the post-election period remains fraught with challenges to the effectiveness of Parliament and other fragile institutions, and whether the current government will pursue criminal charges against former President Saakashvili.

Is it Our Business?

There are different views regarding whether democratic evolution — in its broadest sense — is our (e.g. the West, U.S.) business at all. Who are we — despite our support for democratic change — with all our defects to establish standards for others to follow? At least for the short-term the Maidan events in Ukraine put this point into practical focus. If a country wants to be part of the West there are certain standards of economic and political reform that must be met as part of that association. In other words values matter. The traditional excuses of geopolitical importance or interests of energy security for failure to accept even the minimal international norms for treatment of a country’s own citizens are gone.

A major issue for the post-election period has become the choice between closer association with the EU or Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Union. This choice really is about values that countries choose to be identified by. Armenia and Georgia made clear choices at Vilnius summit for the Eastern Partnership: Georgia and Moldova for the EU; Armenia for Eurasian Union. Ukraine was asked to make a decision but chose to walk the line between short-run financial expediency and a long-term commitment to a European future. Azerbaijan decided to choose none of the above; “neutrality” the regime called it. All the while proclaiming — along with its apologists in the West — the strategic importance of Azerbaijani energy for Europe’s future.

These countries can no longer talk their way around this or employ foreign surrogates to do this for them. Arguments for overlooking bogus elections, corruption and human rights abuses based on overriding strategic importance to the U.S. (e.g. war against terror, Northern Distribution Network, energy security) are excuses for inaction on the fundamental values that must be at the core of our relationships in the 21st century.

When countries like Azerbaijan fail to live up to these standards we do not walk away. Rather we continue to insist on solid, value-based behavior by those who profess they are partners with us. That means economic and political reforms to complete the transition from post-Soviet to 21st Century status. This requires observance of human rights, respect for freedom of expression, and release of political prisoners. It also requires a pattern of increasingly democratic elections. That’s why we need to care about elections in the south Caucasus.

We must congratulate Tbilisi on its accomplishments in the October electoral process. At the same time we must encourage the Georgian government to move along with strengthening institutions like Parliament and the judiciary so Georgia can avoid a political justice system.

       

       

       

Event Information

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With a U.S. Administration still popular across Europe and a new Lisbon Treaty designed to enhance the diplomatic reach of the European Union, transatlantic relations should now be at their best in years. But this is clearly not the case, with the strategic partners often looking in opposite directions. While the United States channels its foreign policy attention on the war in Afghanistan, counterterrorism and nuclear non-proliferation, Europe is turning inward. Despite its ambitions, the European Union has yet to achieve the great global role to which it aspires, or to be the global partner that Washington seeks. Moreover, the Greek financial crisis has raised questions about the very survival of the European project.

On June 2, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings and the Heinrich Böll Foundation hosted experts and top officials from both sides of the Atlantic for the 2010 CUSE Annual Conference. Panelists explored critical issues shaping the future of transatlantic relations in the post-Lisbon Treaty era, including Europe’s Eastern neighborhood and the role Russia plays, and the impact of the Eurozone crisis.

After each panel, participants took audience questions.

Audio

• From the Lisbon Treaty to the Eurozone Crisis: A New Beginning or the Unraveling of Europe?
• From the Lisbon Treaty to the Eurozone Crisis: A New Beginning or the Unraveling of Europe?
• From the Lisbon Treaty to the Eurozone Crisis: A New Beginning or the Unraveling of Europe?

Transcript

• Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20100602_eurozone

       

Inequality remained a prominent theme in public debate during 2015, likely helped by the unexpected rise and resilience of democratic socialist Bernie Sanders' run for the Democratic presidential nomination. Although the labor market continued its slow recovery, wage growth remained fairly weak—especially for middle and low earners. The upper middle class continues to pull away from the middle, not least in terms of income and wealth.

But it has also become much clearer that inequality is a geographical issue, as much as a social and economic one. Whether the focus is on the more immediate matter of income inequality or the slower-burning issue of intergenerational mobility, there is huge variation between different places in the United States.

Not all cities are created equal…

National income trends are important, of course. But they can often disguise deep differences by place. The income required to be ‘rich,’ at least by comparison to those around you, varies significantly between different cities, for example. A household income of $100,000 puts you on almost on the top rung (around the 95^th percentile) of the income ladder in Detroit. But to reach the same heights in San Jose, California, you’d need an income three times as great, according to calculations by my colleague Alan Berube.

There are also very large differences in the extent of income inequality in different metropolitan areas. Using the inequality measure used in another recent paper by Berube, the ratio between incomes at the 20^th percentile and the 95^th percentile, shows that while some cities have large gaps between rich and poor, others look almost Scandinavian in their egalitarian distributions. Here are the 20/95 ratios for the three most equal and unequal cities in the U.S.:

Intergenerational mobility varies—a lot—by place

In a groundbreaking research paper in 2014, Raj Chetty and his team at the Equality of Opportunity Project at Harvard showed that rates of intergenerational income mobility also vary considerably between different cities. It was always a stretch to compare the U.S. to Denmark on this front, given the colossal differences between the countries. But such comparisons became virtually unconscionable once the variations within the U.S. become apparent.

This year, Chetty and his co-author Nathaniel Hendren went a step further and a big step closer to showing a causal impact of place on the prospects for children raised in different locations. Again relying on large administrative datasets, the two scholars were able to show the variation in earnings for the folk hailing from, say, Baltimore versus Baton Rouge.

Professor Chetty presented his new research at a Brookings event in June (which you can view here), just weeks after the eruption of protest and violence in Baltimore following the death of Freddie Gray. One striking finding was that the worst place in America to grow up, in terms of subsequent earnings, is Baltimore City. Critically, Chetty’s research design allows him to show that these differences do not reflect the characteristics of the people of Baltimore; but the characteristics of Baltimore itself. This downward effect on earnings is particularly bad for boys, as we highlighted in an earlier blog:

In related work, Chetty and his colleagues also show that children who move to a better place see an improvement in their own earnings—and that the younger they are when they move, the bigger the impact. The children of families who move as a result of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to Opportunity program showed sizable improvements in their own outcomes, as Jonathan Rothwell highlighted in his blog, 'Sociology’s revenge: Moving to Opportunity (MTO) revisited.'

Race, place and opportunity

One of the findings from Chetty’s earlier work is that race, place, and opportunity intersect in important ways. Cities with more segregation, and those with larger black populations, tend to show weaker upward mobility patterns. In order to understand the obstacles to upward mobility, policymakers have to adopt both a place-conscious (Margery Turner) and a race-conscious perspective. This policy was the subject of another Brookings event in November, with contributions from the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, the Governor of Delaware, and the Mayor of Newton, Mass. (The event can still be viewed here; for my highlights see this piece.) Being poor and black is generally not the same as being poor and white. Being poor in Cleveland is not the same as being poor in Charlotte.

On equal opportunity: think local, act local

Many states and cities are upping their game on issues of equality and opportunity, for both bad and good reasons. The bad reason is the relative inertia of the federal government. The good reason is a growing recognition that many of the levers for improving opportunity lie in the hands of institutions and agents at the state and metro level. Colorado has adopted a life-cycle opportunity framework and is pioneering efforts to integrate health and social policy. Charlotte has a high-profile taskforce (which I advise) on improving opportunity. Cincinnati has pledged to lift 10,000 children out of poverty within five years. Louisville is leading a push on school desegregation. Kalamazoo is adding greater student supports to its existing promise of free college. Baltimore’s program to reduce infant mortality has shown remarkable success. Durham, N.C. has rolled out a universal home visiting program.

Many of these efforts are building on the emerging ideas around 'collective impact,' harnessing local resources of many kinds around a clearly-articulated, shared goal. Given the scholarship showing just how much particular places influences individual and broader outcomes, this is likely to be where much of the most important policy development will take place in coming years. In terms of equality—and especially equality of opportunity—we need to think local, and act local, too.

      

       

There is a lively debate today over whether or not campaign finance reforms have weakened the role of political parties in campaigns. This seems an odd argument in an era of historically high levels of party loyalty — on roll calls in Congress and voting in the electorate. Are parties too strong and unified or too weak and fragmented? Have they been marginalized in the financing of elections or is their role at least as strong as it has ever been? Does the party role in campaign finance (weak or strong) materially shape the capacity to govern?

In addition, the increasing involvement in presidential and congressional campaigns of large donors – especially through Super PACs and politically-active nonprofit organizations – has raised serious concerns about whether the super-wealthy are buying American democracy. Ideologically-based outside groups financed by wealthy donors appear to be sharpening partisan differences and resisting efforts to forge agreement across parties. Many reformers have advocated steps to increase the number of small donors to balance the influence of the wealthy. But some scholars have found evidence suggesting that small donors are more polarizing than large donors. Can that be true? If so, are there channels other than the ideological positioning of the parties through which small donors might play a more constructive role in our democracy?

In this paper, Thomas Mann and Anthony Corrado attempt to shed light on both of these disputed features of our campaign finance system and then assess whether campaign finance reform offers promise for reducing polarization and strengthening American democracy. They conclude that not only is campaign finance reform a weak tool for depolarizing American political parties, but some break in the party wars is probably a prerequisite to any serious pushback to the broader deregulation of campaign finance now underway.

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The Supreme Court’s recent McCutcheon decision has reinvigorated the discussion on how campaign finance affects American democracy. Seeking to dissect the complex relationship between political parties, partisan polarization, and campaign finance, Tom Mann and Anthony Corrado’s new paper on Party Polarization and Campaign Finance reviews the landscape of hard and soft money in federal elections and asks whether campaign finance reform can abate polarization and strengthen governing capacity in the United States. The paper tackles two popular contentions within the campaign finance debate: First, has campaign finance reform altered the role of political parties as election financiers and therefore undermined deal making and pragmatism? Second, would a change in the composition of small and large individual donors decrease polarization in the parties?

The Role of Political Parties in Campaign Finance

Political parties have witnessed a number of shifts in their campaign finance role, including McCain-Feingold’s ban on party soft money in 2002. This has led many to ask if the breakdown in compromise and governance and the rise of polarization has come about because parties have lost the power to finance elections. To assess that claim, the authors track the amount of money crossing national and state party books as an indicator of party strength. The empirical evidence shows no significant decrease in party strength post 2002 and holds that “both parties have compensated for the loss of soft money with hard money receipts.” In fact, the parties have upped their spending on congressional candidates more than six-fold since 1980. Despite the ban on soft money, the parties remain major players in federal elections.

Large and Small Donors in National Campaigns

Mann and Corrado turn to non-party money and survey the universe of individual donors to evaluate “whether small, large or mega-donors are most likely to fuel or diminish the polarization that increasingly defines the political landscape.” The authors map the size and shape of individual giving and confront the concern that Super PACs, politically active nonprofits, and the super-wealthy are buying out American democracy. They ask: would a healthier mix of small and large donors reduce radicalization and balance out asymmetric polarization between the parties? The evidence suggests that increasing the role of small donors would have little effect on partisan polarization in either direction because small donors tend to be highly polarized. Although Mann and Corrado note that a healthier mix would champion democratic ideals like civic participation and equality of voice.

Taking both points together, Mann and Corrado find that campaign finance reform is insufficient for depolarizing the parties and improving governing capacity. They argue forcefully that polarization emerges from a broader political and partisan problem. Ultimately, they assert that, “some break in the party wars is probably a prerequisite to any serious pushback to the broader deregulation of campaign finance now underway.”

Click to read Mann and Corrado’s full paper, Party Polarization and Campaign Finance.

      

Tom Mann and Anthony Corrado recently argued that campaign finance reform will likely have little effect on political polarization. Their new paper has sparked a host of debate over campaign finance, the strength of parties, and the ideological motivations of donors. Today, the Monkey Cage blog hosted Mann and Corrado’s response to a critique from Ray LaRaja and Brian Schaffner.

LaRaja and Schaffner argue that pumping more funding to parties and changing the rules to facilitate that practice will provide a respite from polarization; to argue their point, they examine polarization at the state legislative level. In their response, Mann and Corrado argue that the critique is off point, noting that “no causal link to campaign finance laws (and polarization) is demonstrated.” Ultimately, Mann and Corrado explain: “The link between party financial practices and regulatory regimes is often a matter of strategy than law, and the evidence offered in their (LaRaja and Schaffner) response certainly falls well short of making a case that greater party resources would reduce the polarization that undermines the capacity to govern.”

For more on this debate:

Read Mann and Corrado’s paper, “Party Polarization and Campaign Finance”

Read LaRaja and Schaffner’s critique, “Want to reduce polarization? Give Parties Money”

Read Mann and Corrado’s response, “Don’t expect campaign finance reform to reduce polarization”

And check out some other great research on Washington Post’s Monkey Cage Blog

      

Editor's Note: As part of the 2014 Midterm Elections Series, Brookings scholars and outside experts will weigh in on issues that are central to this year's campaigns, how the candidates are engaging those topics, and what will shape policy for the next two years.

Since the Citizens United decision, political spending by outside groups has been shaping voters’ opinions before Election Day and public policy afterwards.  Spending patterns that began after the 2010 decision will continue during the upcoming midterms: nonparty, outside spending will flow through two distinct pipelines—super PACs and politically active nonprofits. This time around there seems to be a partisan split to the spending, with Democrats leaning towards super PACs and Republicans relying more on dark money nonprofits. But whichever tool is used to funnel money into competitive races, imperfect or non-existent disclosure rules leave voters unable to determine whether access and influence is being sold to highest bidder.

Shining a brighter light on super PAC and nonprofit campaign spending would not cleanse the system of all of its corrupting influences, but it would help to restore citizens’ trust in government by eliminating the secrecy that makes voters believe their elected officials have something to hide. More disclosure would also result in the equally important outcome of demonstrating that government trusts us, its citizens, with information about how the influence industry works.   

When Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Whenever the people are well-informed, they can be trusted with their own government...whenever things get so far wrong as to attract their notice, they may be relied on to set them to rights,” he certainly could not have conceived of secret money’s impact on elections and policy-making. But every year that goes by with Congress failing to address secret campaign spending challenges the founding father’s time-tested wisdom.

When the Supreme Court decided Citizens United, it was either willfully blind or sorely naïve about the state of political finance disclosure. Justice Kennedy swept aside concerns about the corrupting influence of unlimited political spending by claiming that, “With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions. . . This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”

Unfortunately, no such prompt disclosure existed at the time, nor has Congress been able to pass any improvements to the transparency regime since then. In the case of super PACs, while information about donors must eventually be disclosed to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), disclosures can be delayed by up to three months.  This is not an inconsequential delay, especially when contributions come are in the multi-million dollar range.

There is even less disclosure by politically active nonprofits.  Their overall expenditures are only disclosed after the election in annual reports filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The donors to dark money groups may never be known, as the law does not require the names of donors to such groups to be disclosed. Yet more than 55 percent of advertising has been paid for by dark money groups, and 80 percent advertising benefitting Republican candidates has been paid for with undisclosed funds according to the New York Times. 

Congress and the executive branch have no shortage of methods to make money in politics more transparent, but have so far failed to demonstrate they respect voters enough to entrust us with that information.  The Real Time Transparency Act (S. 2207, H.R. 4442) would ensure that contributions of $1000 or more to candidates, parties and PACs, including super PACs, are disclosed within 48 hours. It would also require electronic filing of campaign finance reports.  The DISCLOSE Act, S. 2516, would disclose contributors to political nonprofits entrusting voters with information that currently is only known to the candidates who may benefit from dark money contributions. 

Affirmative congressional action would be the strongest signal that government trusts its citizens, but executive branch agencies can also take important steps to make political finance information more transparent. The IRS is in the process of reforming rules to better clarify when a nonprofit is a political organization and thus must disclose its donors.  The Securities and Exchange Commission can likewise modify its rules to require publicly traded companies to disclose their political activities.

Many large donors have gone to great lengths to take their political activities underground, claiming they fear attacks in the form of criticism or boycotts of their companies.  But just as participating in the political process through contributing to election efforts is an expression of free speech, so is criticizing such efforts.  Yet until campaign finance information is fully and quickly made public, the first amendment rights of voters and their ability to participate fully in our democracy are drastically shortchanged.

      

One of the fundamental arguments in the “Political Realism” debate is whether or not strong political parties could make government work better. One way to assess party strength is to look at how much money parties can raise and spend.

In this vein, political scientists Ray LaRaja and Brian Schaffner have claimed that removing limits on party funding activity would make politics less polarized. I’ve been skeptical of this claim. In fact, in a short analysis, I found that the opposite is more likely the case—that states with limits on party fundraising appear to be less polarized, though I cautioned against inferring too much from this pattern.

LaRaja and Schaffner have now responded and previewed their forthcoming book, Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail, which will be out this fall from the University of Michigan Press. So, a response to their response is now in order.

I’ll start by granting a point of agreement: LaRaja and Schaffner note that I didn’t re-produce their analysis. I didn’t do this because, based on what they’ve written, it’s not clear exactly which states they consider to be “Parties Unlimited” and “Parties Limited” states. So, until they make their list public, it will be impossible to conduct a precise replication of their analysis.

The good news is they’ve promised to make their data public in the future. As they write in their recent post, “we will be posting all the data necessary to replicate (and challenge) our results upon publication of our book this fall, and we look forward to seeing what others find when they dig into the data.” They also note in their analysis that “11 states changed their laws on party limits during the period of our study (1993-2012).” Assembling this list, they note, was “possibly the most painstaking work we did on this book.” For now, their list of changes remains a well-kept secret, though the changes appear to be driving their analysis. So it will be good when all the relevant data and categorization choices are clear and on the table.

A lot depends on which states fall into which categories. But, there is a more fundamental question: does it make sense to dichotomize states into “Parties Unlimited” and “Parties Limited” states? States with limits vary considerably. Some states limit the money into parties, but allow unlimited flows to candidates; some states allow unlimited money into parties, but limit money from parties to candidates. Some limits are high, some are low. Some have exceptions for party-building activities. Rules vary between primary and general elections, as well.

Consider California. There are limits on how much parties can raise from individuals, but those limits are quite high (they are now at $35,200), and also only cover the party accounts that go to state candidates (so, for example, ballot measures are exempt or general party activities are exempted). California also has no limits on how much parties can transfer to candidates. So should California be a “limits” or “no limits” state? California also has the most polarized legislature, as measured by the distance between party medians. Depending on how you choose to classify states, you can get very different results, especially when you are only working with 20 states (LaRaja and Schaffner limit their claims to the 20 states with the most professionalized legislatures, as per the Squire Index).

LaRaja and Schaffner’s response presents a time series regression model to “calculate the predicted level of polarization over time in a state that limited party fundraising … and spending to on where those limits were removed.” But if states that removed limits became less polarized following the removal of those limits, why not tell us what those states were, and report the actual polarization trends in the states? Put another way: Why rely on model predictions when there are real world data? Grounding this debate in the trajectories of actual states would lend some realism to the claims. Then we could debate examples.

For example, as Thomas Mann and E.J. Dionne note in a recent Brookings paper, two of the states with no limits are Texas and North Carolina. As Mann and Dionne write, “The behavior of their legislatures in recent years cannot, on any plausible definition, be described as 'moderate.'” However, neither Texas nor North Carolina shows up as excessively polarized when polarization is merely a measure of voting patterns. Moreover, if parties are so pragmatic, why did the North Carolina Republican Party (which could raise and spend unlimited sums of money) fail to stop a takeover by multi-millionaire right-wing extremist Art Pope?

This takes us to questions of how party leaders actually behave. LaRaja and Shaffner show evidence in their response that parties give more money to moderate incumbents than to extreme incumbents. This should not be surprising. Presumably, moderate incumbents are more likely to be in competitive races, since moderates are more likely to represent competitive districts.

The more relevant question is what types of candidates parties recruit. Thankfully, we have answers to this courtesy of excellent work by David Broockman, Nicholas Carnes, Melody Crowder-Meyer, and Christopher Skovron, who surveyed 6,000 county-level political party leaders. They found that, “party leaders…use their influence to discourage moderates from seeking office: they strongly prefer candidates at least as ideologically polarized as their median party member. Republican party leaders show this preference especially.”

Their findings also reinforce something that should be apparent to students of polarization—that polarization is asymmetric. Republicans have moved far to the right. Democrats have mostly stayed in place. Let me quote Broockman et al.’s paper at further length, because the findings are extremely relevant to this debate:

“Republicans are much more likely to, unprompted, mention ideology as an important factor for candidates. Our evidence suggests that not only do Republicans care more about ideology, it is also readily accessible when they think of candidate recruitment. It seems likely, then, that Republicans are much more active in recruiting ideologically polarized candidates than Democrats are.”

“Democratic chairs are most inclined to support candidates who are middle-of-the-road or slightly left with respect to the party, while Republicans prefer candidates who espouse an ideology matching or more conservative than their party. In fact, while Democratic chairs are less likely to support very liberal candidates than those nearer to their party average, Republican chairs seem to give very conservative primary candidates the same boost that Democrats give to moderates.”

This does suggest that perhaps giving parties more money and therefore more control over candidates would produce moderation in blue states, but exacerbate polarization in red states. Unfortunately, there is nothing in LaRaja and Schaffner’s analysis that addresses this possibility.

The importance of recruitment also suggests that what we really want to know is who controls the actual recruitment mechanisms in the first place. It’s possible that states with limits might have strong party recruitment mechanisms. If what we really care about is the strength of party machines, why not try to measure that more directly?

LaRaja and Schaffner seem to envision parties being run by hard-headed pragmatists who can determine outcomes with money alone. They seem to assume that if parties can get billionaires to fund them, this will enable party leaders to support more moderate candidates. They seem to ignore that the billionaires may have a few ideas of their own about how they think government should be run (see, e.g. North Carolina).

This gets to a final point, about whether we ought to care if parties rely on small or large donors. LaRaja and Schaffner dismiss the case for small donors, noting that: “the endless romanticizing of small donors as being emblematic of American voters has no empirical grounding.” They go on to note that the ideological distribution of small donors and the ideological distribution of large donors “are nearly identical,” and therefore, “[p]utting more emphasis on ideological small donors may even make our politics worse as politicians streamline their messages to cater to this minority of individuals with more extreme views.”

Let’s grant that large and small donors have the same ideological distribution. If there is no difference, then there’s no reason to think that relying more on small donors would make politics any more extreme. However, since there are many more small donors than there are large donors, a small-donor matching system would allow less extreme candidates the ability to seek out less extreme donors from a larger population of potential donors. We know large donors are polarized, so relying more heavily on them doesn’t give parties much room to moderate. Of course, this presumes that large donors want to shape party positions. But that seems a safe bet.

There are also good (small-d) democratic reasons to support small-donor programs: they bring more participants into the political process; they orient politicians to think differently about whom they represent, and they probably make politics an attractive profession for a broader set of potential candidates. I’d even trade off some polarization for a small donor system. Fortunately, based on their data, it doesn’t appear that I’d even have to.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, polarization is a function of many, many things, and it’s hard to imagine how changing limits on what parties can raise and spend would have much of an influence given the many other factors. Consider this thoughtful systems map developed by the Hewlett Foundation to analyze American politics as a system: it describes multiple factors that might influence levels of polarization. Systems thinking warns us to be careful of putting too much focus on a single point of leverage without thinking about the larger systems dynamics. This is why many reform skeptics are cautious about unintended consequences—thinking about a single variable in the absence of a larger context usually has unexpected results.

Moreover, as Mann and Dionne explain, we need to be cautious of applying lessons from the states to Washington:

"The gridlock in Washington is a consequence of the ideological polarization of the parties buttressed by vast party networks, their strategic opposition to one another throughout the legislative process fueled by the intense competition for control of the White House and Congress, the prevalence of divided party government, and the asymmetry between the parties that leads Republicans to eschew negotiation and compromise."

"The situation in the states is dramatically different. Most now have unified party governments, and gridlock is the exception, not the rule. There is little evidence of moderation in the Republican- controlled states, whatever their campaign finance laws."

I’m sure we will continue this debate for many months to come, especially after the publication of Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail this fall. I’m glad that LaRaja and Schaffner are bringing valuable data to this important question. It’s certainly far from settled.

       

       

Though possessing much economic strength, the Kansas City region faces stark barriers to its long term competitiveness, including a limited capacity for innovation, unfocused growth, and wide racial disparities. This paper—in conjunction with two companion papers delving into the region's economic assets and its life sciences economy—examines how Kansas City can overcome these challenges.

 

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