There is growing attention to human rights in debates on economic inequality. In the UK, concerns about the disproportionate impact of economic policy on vulnerable groups have been raised recently by the UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights – who issued a statement criticizing the Conservative government’s austerity policies – as well as in a report from the UK government’s independent Equality and Human Rights Commission. These reports echo global concerns about fiscal policies, poverty and extreme economic inequality.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights – which celebrates its 70th anniversary today – and the human rights treaties it inspired do not expressly address income and wealth gaps. But international human rights law is playing an increasing role in addressing economic polarization. Those concerned about inequality should consider how, especially over the past 25 years, the principles of socioeconomic rights have been clarified by courts and other human rights mechanisms. 

While the focus in the Global North has historically been on civil and political rights, such as the prohibition on torture or the right to fair trial, international human rights law does set out economic and social rights. For example, Article 23(4) of the Declaration – which is replicated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other treaties – calls for the right to collective bargaining in employment. Weakening protection in this area has been raised as a partial cause of the current escalation in income inequality. 

Human rights law also guarantees rights, including to education, healthcare and social security, that have redistributive potential and so have the potential to mitigate inequality.

Human rights law recognizes that fulfilment of economic and social rights, unlike civil and political rights, can be limited by the resources available to different states, and this conditionality – along with a lack of guidelines to assist with implementation and monitoring – has historically shielded fiscal policies from human rights scrutiny. However, attitudes have shifted.

For example, international human rights law has come to embody a commitment to tackling substantive inequalities which impair human dignity.  This requires the state regulate markets, and redistribute resources, in order to prevent discrimination against disadvantaged groups such as the poor. 

The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other human rights bodies assert that states have an immediate obligation, even during times of resource constraint, to ensure the fulfilment, without discrimination, of the minimum essential levels of socioeconomic rights, for example essential subsistence and basic shelter. Thus, austerity measures that scale back the enjoyment of rights may breach human rights standards. In order to justify such measures, governments need to first demonstrate they have considered ‘less restrictive’ avenues, including taxation options.

Although the application of human rights standards to economic policy is an emerging area, human rights campaigners have been successfully leveraging these protections to address the causes and consequences of the inequality crisis. 

For example, in case No. 66/2011 the European Committee of Social Rights overturned austerity measures that would have brought wages under the poverty level, citing breaches of labour rights and protections against discrimination. In Brazil, a coalition of civil society actors successfully used human rights standards to legitimize their critiques of a 2008 tax reform bill that would have given additional tax breaks to the wealthy while withdrawing resources for social services.

Beyond legal enforcement, framing concerns within the architecture of human rights can shift power to rights-bearers and move debates on tackling extreme inequality from the policy sphere into one where the state has a duty for which it is accountable. While the state bears primary responsibility for realizing human rights, non-state actors such as businesses have responsibilities to respect human rights. Thus, human rights can also help communities to recast the scope of the crisis to one of shared responsibility.

While human rights have seen many normative developments and advocacy successes since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the last 70 years also offer several lessons and strategies to adopt going forward. 

As highlighted at a recent Chatham House event, the continued emphasis on civil and political rights in the discussion about human rights is at odds with the lived experience of individuals and communities worldwide, who may not feel their economic and material concerns are reflected in campaigns for human rights.

There will need to be a greater emphasis on adapting messaging to be more inclusive and to build alliances between disparate groups. Human rights analysis will also need to move beyond documenting the impact of systemic issues towards tackling root causes and creating a positive vision for economic inclusion and governance.

China’s involvement in UN peacekeeping contributions has been on the rise for some time. China is also stepping up its own military and security operations abroad to protect its commercial and strategic interests, particularly in Africa. In doing so, China is exposing itself to a more complex set of issues – including international legal issues – with which it is only just starting to grapple.

China’s contribution to UN peacekeeping over the last 10 years has expanded dramatically. In September 2016, it pledged $1 billion to help fund UN peace, security and development activities, while in 2018 it supplied 10.3 per cent of the UN peacekeeping budget, up from 3.93 per cent in 2012. China is also the largest contributor of peacekeeping forces among the five permanent members of the Security Council. As well as its regular troop contributions, it has also established a stand-by rapid deployment force of 8,000 peacekeeping troops.

For China, increased involvement in UN peacekeeping offers what it likes to refer to as a ‘win-win’ situation. China’s contribution is very valuable at a time when peacekeeping is in need of resources, given the cutbacks from the other four permanent members of the Security Council in both financial and personnel contributions, waning US support for the UN and pressures on the UN budget.

At the same time, the increased role in UN peacekeeping helps to cement China’s image as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international order. China’s contributions to peacekeeping missions also help to promote stability in countries in which China has significant strategic and commercial interests, such as Senegal, South Sudan and Mali. 

China’s increased involvement in UN peacekeeping has coincided with the adoption of a more pragmatic position in relation to its traditionally staunch adherence to the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention.

China was initially sceptical of the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, endorsed by member states in 2005, which seeks to protect populations from gross human rights violations, and which can include recourse to use of force by the international community, if authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Over time, though, Beijing has softened its stance to intervention and has gradually acknowledged the ability to respond to humanitarian catastrophes in certain circumstances, for example voting in favour of the Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013. 

The softening of China’s stance on non-intervention is also evident in the significant rise not only in the involvement of Chinese troops in UN peacekeeping, but also in the deployment of Chinese military and security forces in a number of African states in order to protect China’s investment and infrastructure projects located there.

In 2017, China established its first foreign naval base in Djibouti, and in 2018 it held military drills in several African countries. The significant increase in China’s military presence in Africa since 2015 gives rise to a number of more complex issues for both China and the local communities involved. According to a recent report, China’s growing military and security presence in Africa is leading to concern in some local constituencies. The fact that China’s state-centric perception of security and development downplays the importance of human rights is likely to compound these tensions on the ground.

New international law implications

The growing presence of Chinese peacekeeping, police and security forces abroad also carries implications for China in a number of different areas of international law with which it has only recently started to grapple. These include the law on the use of force and, given that many Chinese infrastructure projects are situated in fragile states, the law of armed conflict.

The mushrooming presence of Chinese companies and investments abroad also carries implications for the Chinese state, and for the companies concerned, under international human rights law (particularly the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights). The international law on state responsibility could also be relevant if security companies owned or employed by the Chinese government, where their actions are attributable to China, become complicit in breaches of international law by other governments (such as human rights abuses).

Compared to other areas of international law, such as international economic law and the law of the sea, China has not invested much to date in education in these areas, which may leave it exposed as it increases its global footprint. It was clear from a recent Chatham House roundtable at Columbia Law School in New York that China is now seeking to rapidly upskill in these areas.

China’s global economic and security ambitions appear to be tilting China towards a more interventionist approach, which is extending beyond UN peacekeeping contributions towards security and military missions of its own. Time will tell how China will respond to the challenge of burnishing its image as a good global citizen while maintaining an approach to peacekeeping, security and development which is closely informed by its own economic and security interests.

In discussions to date about how international law applies in cyberspace, commentators have tended to focus their attention on how the rules on the use of force, or the law of armed conflict, apply to cyber activities conducted by states that give rise to physical damage, injury or death.

But in practice, the vast majority of state cyberattacks fall below this threshold. Far more common are persistent, low-level attacks that may leave no physical trace but that are capable of doing significant damage to a state’s ability to control its systems, often at serious economic cost.

Such cyber incursions might include network disruptions in the operation of another government’s websites; tampering with electoral infrastructure to change or undermine the result; or using cyber means to destabilize another state’s financial sector.

For these kinds of cyber operation, the principle of sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention in another state’s internal affairs, are the starting point.

A UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) agreed in 2013 and 2015 that the principles in the UN Charter, including sovereignty and the prohibition on intervention in another state’s affairs, apply to states’ activities in cyberspace. The 2015 GGE also recommended eleven (non-binding) norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

However, states have not yet reached agreement on how to apply these principles. Until recently, there has also been very little knowledge of what states actually do in cyberspace, as they usually conduct cyber operations covertly and have been reluctant to put their views on record.

A new Chatham House research paper analyses the application of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention to state cyberattacks that fall below the principle of use of force. As well as analysing the application of the law in this area, the paper also makes recommendations to governments on how they might best make progress in reaching agreement in this area.

Existing rules or new rules?

As the research paper makes clear, there is currently some debate, principally between countries in the West, about the extent to which sovereignty is a legally binding rule in the context of cyberspace and, if so, how it and the principle of non-intervention might apply in practice.

In the last few years, certain states have put on record how they consider international law to apply to states’ activities in cyberspace, namely the UK, Australia, France and the Netherlands. While there may be some differences in their approaches, which are discussed in the paper, there also remains important common ground: namely, that existing international law already provides a solid framework for regulating states’ cyber activities, as it regulates every other domain of state-to-state activity.

There is also an emerging trend for states to work together when attributing cyberattacks to hostile states, enabling them to call out malign cyber activity when it violates international law. (See, for example, the joint statements made in relation to the NotPetya cyber attack and malicious cyber activity attributed to the Russian government).

However, other countries have questioned whether existing international law as it stands is capable of regulating states’ cyber interactions and have called for ‘new legal instruments’ in this area.

This includes a proposal by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (led by Russia and China) for an International Code of Conduct on Information Security, a draft of which was submitted to the UN in 2011 and 2015, without success. The UN has also formed a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) under a resolution proposed by Russia to consider how international law applies to states’ activities in cyberspace.

The resolution establishing the OEWG, which began work earlier this year, includes the possibility of the group ‘introducing changes to the rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States’ agreed in the 2013 and 2015 GGE reports. In the OEWG discussions at the UN in September, several countries claimed that a new legal instrument was needed to fill the ‘legal vacuum’ (Cuba) or ‘the gap of ungoverned areas’ (Indonesia).

It would be concerning if the hard-won consensus on the application of international law to cyberspace that has been reached at past GGEs started to unravel. In contrast to 2013 and 2015, the 2017 meeting failed to reach an agreement.

On 9 December, a renewed GGE will meet in New York, but the existence of the OEWG exploring the same issues in a separate process reflects the fact that cyber norms have become an area of geopolitical rivalry.

Aside from the application of international law, states are also adopting divergent approaches to the domestic regulation of cyberspace within their own territory. The emerging trend towards a ‘splinternet’ – i.e. between states that believe the internet should be global and open on the hand, and those that favour a ‘sovereignty and control’ model on the other  – is also likely to make discussions at the GGE more challenging.

Distinct from the international law concept of sovereignty is the notion of ‘cybersovereignty’, a term coined by China to describe the wide-ranging powers it assumes under domestic law to regulate its citizens’ access to the internet and personal data within its territory. This approach is catching on (as reflected in Russia’s recently enacted ‘Sovereign Internet Law’), with other authoritarian states likely to follow suit.

The importance of non-state actors

In parallel with regional and UN discussions on how international law applies, a number of initiatives by non-state actors have also sought to establish voluntary principles about responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, a multi-stakeholder body that has proposed principles, norms and recommendations to guide responsible behaviour by all parties in cyberspace, recently published its final report. The Cybersecurity Tech Accord  aims to promote collaboration between tech companies on stability and resilience in cyberspace. President Macron’s ‘Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace’ has to date received the backing of 67 states, 139 international and civil society organizations, and 358 private-sector organizations.

It remains to be seen in the long term whether the parallel processes at the UN will work constructively together or be competitive. But notwithstanding the challenging geopolitical backdrop, the UN GGE meeting next week at the least offers states the opportunity to consolidate and build on the results of past meetings; to increase knowledge and discussion about how international law might apply; and to encourage more states to put their own views of these issues on the record.

Internet regulation is increasing around the world creating positive obligations on internet providers and exerting negative unintended consequences on the internet infrastructure. In some ways, most of this regulatory activity is justifiable. Governments are concerned about the increased risk that the use of the internet brings to societies. As a response, many governments have been enacting regulations as their main approach to dealing with these concerns. The main challenge is that most of the current regulations are either ill-defined or unworkable.  

On the one hand, several governments have established procedures that seek to analyze the impacts of new regulatory proposals before they were adopted. However, there hasn’t been enough attention aimed at analyzing regulations after they have been adopted and only a few have measures in place to evaluate the impacts of the procedures and practices that govern the regulatory process itself.

On the other hand, much of the regulation creates unintended consequences to the internet itself. It undermines many of its fundamental properties and challenges the integrity and resiliency of its infrastructure.  

This event discusses current practices in internet-related regulation and the related challenges. Panellists will discuss how governments can enforce regulations that achieve their intended purpose while at the same time protecting the internet’s core infrastructure and its properties, including its openness, interoperability and global reach.

Summary

• The application of ‘security by design’ in nuclear new builds could provide operators with the opportunity to establish a robust and resilient security architecture at the beginning of a nuclear power plant’s life cycle. This will enhance the protection of the plant and reduce the need for costly security improvements during its operating life.
• Security by design cannot fully protect a nuclear power plant from rapidly evolving cyberattacks, which expose previously unsuspected or unknown vulnerabilities.
• Careful design of security systems and architecture can – and should – achieve levels of protection that exceed current norms and expectations. However, the sourcing of components from a global supply chain means that the integrity of even the most skilfully designed security regime cannot be guaranteed without exhaustive checks of its components.
• Security by design may well include a requirement for a technical support organization to conduct quality assurance of cyber defences and practices, and this regime should be endorsed by a facility’s executive board and continued at regular intervals after the new build facility has been commissioned.
• Given the years it takes to design, plan and build a new nuclear power plant, it is important to recognize that from the point of ‘design freeze’ onwards, the operator will be building in vulnerabilities, as technology continues to evolve rapidly while construction fails to keep pace with it. Security by design cannot be a panacea, but it is an important factor in the establishment of a robust nuclear security – and cybersecurity – culture.

This roundtable is part of a series under the project, 'Implementing the Commonwealth Cybersecurity Agenda', funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The roundtable aims to provide a multi-stakeholder, pan-Commonwealth platform to discuss how to implement the Commonwealth Cyber Declaration with a focus on its third pillar 'To promote stability in cyberspace through international cooperation'.

In particular, the roundtable focuses on points 3 and 4 of the third pillar which revolve around the commitment to promote frameworks for stability in cyberspace including the applicability of international law, agreed voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour and the development and implementation of confidence-building measures consistent with the 2015 report of the UNGGE. 

The workshop also focuses on the commitment to advance discussions on how existing international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international humanitarian law, applies in cyberspace.

The roundtable addresses the issue of global cyber governance from a Commonwealth perspective and will also include a discussion around the way forward, the needed capacity of the different Commonwealth countries and the cooperation between its members for better cyber governance.

Participants include UNGGE members from Commonwealth countries in addition to representatives to the UN Open-Ended Working Group from African countries as well as members from academia, civil society and industry.

New technology such as 5G, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and robotics have become, now more than ever, intertwined with geopolitical, economic and trade interests. Leading powers are using new technology to exert power and influence and to shape geopolitics more generally.

The ongoing race between the US and China around 5G technology is a case in point. Amid these tensions, the impact on developing countries is not sufficiently addressed.

Arguably, the existing digital divide will increase leading developing countries to the early, if not hasty, adoption of new technology for fear of lagging behind. This could create opportunities but will also pose risks.

This panel discusses how new technology is changing the geopolitical landscape. It also discusses the role that stakeholders, including governments, play in the creation of standards for new technologies and what that means for its deployment in key markets technically and financially.

Finally, the panel looks at the issue from the perspective of developing countries, addressing the choices that have to be made in terms of affordability, development priorities and security concerns.

This event was organized with the kind support of DXC Technology.

The GCC states have invested significantly in cybersecurity and have made large strides in protecting governments, businesses and individuals from cyber threats, with the aim of delivering on their ambitious national strategies and future visions. However, several challenges to cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the region persist, putting those ambitious plans at risk.

These challenges include the uneven nature of cybersecurity protections, the incomplete implementation of cybersecurity strategies and regulations, and the issues around international cooperation. Such challenges mean that GCC states need to focus on the more difficult task of cyber resilience, in addition to the simpler initial stages of cybersecurity capacity-building, to ensure they harness the true potential of digital technologies and mitigate associated threats.

Set against this background, this workshop will explore opportunities and challenges to cyber resilience in the GCC focusing on four main pillars:

1. Cyber resilience: in concept and in practice
2. Building an effective cybersecurity capacity
3. The potential of regional and international cooperation to cyber resilience
4. Deterrence and disruption: different approaches

This event will be held in collaboration with the Arab Regional Cybersecurity Centre (ARCC) and OMAN CERT.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 

A shaky truce remains broadly in place among rival Libyan forces fighting for control of Tripoli. However, a durable ceasefire to bring an end to the current bout of conflict, which was initiated by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ (LAAF) offensive on the capital in April 2019, has not been reached. In recent weeks attention has focused on talks hosted in Moscow and Berlin, with the former aimed at agreeing a ceasefire and the latter seeking to reach agreement among international actors to bring an end to external military support for Libyan warring actors, and to craft a way forward for future intra-Libyan talks. Yet, there has been little emphasis on Libyan actors – beyond Haftar and prime minister Fayez al-Serraj – in this process.
 
This roundtable will bring together experts and policymakers to discuss means of de-escalating the conflict and seeking a lasting resolution through the development of interconnected intra-Libyan social and security negotiation tracks. Mr Usama Otman Essed of the Libya Center for Strategic and Future Studies (LCSFS) will present his research group’s ideas on these issues and discuss their ongoing efforts to promote dialogue among social and security actors.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

At this webinar, part of the Chatham House MENA Programme Online Event Series, experts will explore how the coronavirus pandemic is impacting the economy, state-society relations and healthcare throughout the Middle East and North Africa. How are governments handling this crisis and what measures have they put in place to stop the spread of the virus? Why are some governments withholding information about the number of cases? What has the response from the public been so far? How is this affecting the region and how does it compare to the global picture?

The event will be held on the record.

In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, many global leaders have invoked war analogies – from the Pearl Harbor attack to the collective spirit on display during the Second World War – to highlight past lessons learned or rally their populations.

For Iran’s leadership, more recent war analogies hold resonance and help explain the ideological and political conundrum limiting an effective COVID-19 response. While the Islamic Republic has weathered a multitude of challenges, COVID-19 is putting unprecedented strain on Iran’s already fragile, heavily-sanctioned economy and further exposing domestic political fissures amid ongoing international tensions.

Iran has been identified as the regional epicentre of the pandemic with a steadily rising number of deaths, including several of the country’s political and military elite. Yet the Iranian government has not evoked the collective memory of the war as an opportunity for national resistance and mobilization.

Sluggish and poorly managed

This is unsurprising, because thus far the Iranian government’s response to COVID-19 has been sluggish and poorly managed. After an initial slow response, Iran then attempted to downplay the impact of the virus, covering up the number of cases and deaths and blaming the United States, before implementing a poorly coordinated action plan marred by government infighting.

For the Iranian leadership, the Iran-Iraq war has been the single most influential and defining period – it has impacted its political ideology, domestic and security policies and international relations. More than half a million Iranians died, and a paranoid worldview and sense of isolation was cemented among many elite leaders such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The war created a valiant culture of leadership from Qassem Soleimani to presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani and, over time, has resulted in the development of Iran’s asymmetrical defense capabilities.

The war enabled a dark purge of political opponents and the gradual birth of Iran’s reformist faction, all while the ethos of sacrifice and martyrdom was linked to the collective notions of resistance.

These would be carried forward in other resistance campaigns both regional and economic. Most defining was Ayatollah Khomeini’s infamous 1988 decision to ‘drink the poisoned chalice’ and end the long war. Three decades later, Iran continues to contend with those outcomes.

To acknowledge that the COVID-19 crisis could have equally profound consequences would add further pressure to the Islamic Republic at a time of incomparable vulnerability. Even before this crisis, the Iranian government linked sanctions to economic warfare, making future negotiations conditional on sanctions relief.

Iranian hardliners used the opportunity to promote Iran’s subsistence-based resistance economy designed to insulate Iran’s economy from external shocks such as sanctions. While both groups recognize the economic urgency, their contending strategies help explain the muddled government response and the ongoing ideological competition between the political elites.

Rouhani has argued that a full lockdown of the Iranian economy is impossible because it is already under significant strain from sanctions - the Iranian economy experienced a 9.5% contraction in 2019 and is expected to worsen in the coming year.

That said, through Iran’s New Year holidays the government did take action to slow the spread of the virus, discouraging travel and shutting schools, pilgrimage sites and cancelling Friday prayers. Finally, on 4 April, after receiving permission from Khamenei to do so, Rouhani withdrew $1 billion from Iran’s National Development Fund and is distributing the money through loans and credits to 23 million households.

Aid from a number of Iran’s parastatal agencies was also announced. Conversely, in his annual New Year’s speech the supreme leader securitized the crisis by laying blame on the United States for spreading the virus as a form of biological terrorism. Iran’s army chief of staff Major General Bagheri was tasked with building hospitals and the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps given authority to clear the streets.

The recent expulsion of Médecins Sans Frontières from Iran highlights the mix of paranoia and resistance culture still on display. US sanctions on Iran have significantly weakened Iran’s economy and limited Tehran’s ability to purchase much needed medical supplies and equipment. Unable to access its foreign reserves due to sanctions, the Rouhani government has applied for a $5 billion loan from the IMF.

European countries alongside a number of US members of congress have appealed to the Trump administration to ease sanctions on humanitarian grounds. While Washington continues to pursue its steadfast approach, referring to Iran’s campaign as a ‘sanctions relief scam’, Germany, France, and the UK have offered $5 million in aid and launched INSTEX – a trading mechanism designed to circumvent sanctions to allow non-sanctioned humanitarian trade.

The impact of coronavirus on Iranian society remains to be seen. But the impact of sanctions has placed heavy economic and psychological burden on the people. Feeling abandoned by the Iranian state and the United States could produce a mix of contradictory nationalistic and independent impulses.

The social contract – already fragile amid protests and government repression – reveals declining trust. Without national mobilization and calls for unity reminiscent of the war period, Iranians have stepped in, highlighting the continued resilience of civil society. Support for the medical establishment has been celebrated throughout the country and on social media. Charities, the private sector - through one initiative known as Campaign Nafas (Breathe) - and diaspora groups have initiated fundraising drives and assistance measures.

Iran’s relations with the international community, and specifically the United States, remain an unresolved consequence of the war. The 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement was the closest Tehran and Washington came to resolving decades of tensions, containment and sanctions.

COVID-19 has further heightened the trajectory of tensions between Tehran and Washington suggesting that any new deal, while necessary, is not on the cards. Tit-for-tat military exchanges have been on the rise in Iraq and Yemen while American and Iranian leaders issue threats and warnings of potential escalation.

Abdullah Nasseri, an advisor to Iran’s reformists, recently stated that in order to manage the coronavirus crisis, the Iranian government needed to make a decision akin to the 1988 United Nations resolution 598 that ended war hostilities. Ayatollah Khomeini famously commented on that ceasefire, stating: ‘Happy are those who have departed through martyrdom. Unhappy am I that I still survive.… Taking this decision is more deadly than drinking from a poisoned chalice. I submitted myself to Allah's will and took this drink for His satisfaction’. 

While a similar compromise today might appear deadly to the political establishment, it is clear that a paradigm shift away from the shadows of Iran’s last war is urgently needed to manage the challenges stemming from COVID-19.

Three private roundtable meetings were convened in the first quarter of 2019, with the aim of generating informed and constructive new thinking on policy options and reforms that could help Sudan build a more economically prosperous, stable and inclusive nation. The roundtables were held under the Chatham House Rule.

The project sought to offer a neutral space for discussion to policymakers and influencers from a broad range of backgrounds: Sudanese government officials, opposition figures, economists, experts on Sudan’s political economy and governance, civil society figures, representatives of international financial institutions, and other international policymakers.

This paper draws together the key themes and findings from each of the three roundtables, ranging from broad structural economic issues to sector-specific priority interventions. It presents options and recommendations for Sudanese leaders, including the transitional government, in support of building a more economically prosperous, peaceful and inclusive nation.

Central to the research process was the Zimbabwe Futures 2030 roundtable series, complemented by additional interviews and research. Participants at the three roundtables, held in Harare and Bulawayo in the first half of 2019, discussed the necessary policies and business strategies to enable and support the effective implementation of the Mnangagwa administration’s Transitional Stabilisation Programme, Vision 2030, and other longer-term national development plans.

This process was conducted by the Chatham House Africa Programme, the Zimbabwe Business Club and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS); and in partnership with the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries for a roundtable in Bulawayo. The project was supported by KAS and the Dulverton Trust.

China has been a major market for elephant ivory for centuries. However, the Chinese government recently enacted bans on imports and exports of ivory (2015) and on the domestic ivory trade (2017). These bans appear to have come in response to intensive influence campaigns and public shaming from domestic and foreign activists, who cited declining elephant populations and highlighted China's role. However, this shaming-narrative is at odds with conventional wisdom regarding Chinese policy-making: China typically resists international pressures and its authoritarian government is thought to be largely insulated from domestic efforts by civil society groups. This article reconciles Beijing's ivory policy with these conventional beliefs about policy-making in China. I argue that the Chinese government saw unique benefits to banning the ivory trade, under growing international scrutiny, as doing so enhanced Chinese soft power while having very little impact on its sovereignty or development. Non-government organizations (NGOs) operating both inside and outside of China played a role as well: NGOs in China helped to shift Chinese public opinion towards favouring the bans, while those operating abroad led public relations efforts to publicize Chinese demand for ivory to foreign audiences. Efforts by the latter group of NGOs intensified pressure on the Chinese government to rein in the ivory market, while increasing the soft power benefits that banning ivory would bring to Beijing.

Strong economic growth in Côte d'Ivoire – with annual GDP growth averaging eight per cent since 2012 – is interlinked with an increase in spending on national infrastructure. In 2018, the government announced a $7 billion injection for the sector over five years, for projects including a new 7.5km bridge spanning two districts of Abidjan and a highway extending to Burkina Faso. A public-private partnership to build a new $1.5 billion metropolitan railway system in the capital received formal approval in October 2019.

But the government of Côte d'Ivoire has struggled to make the country’s impressive growth inclusive: Côte d’Ivoire ranked 165th out of 189 on the 2019 United Nations Human Development Index, and the poverty rate is around 46%. Translating significant infrastructural investment into benefit for ordinary and vulnerable Ivorian citizens, including through how project development is managed with communities, will be a critical issue in the lead up to elections scheduled for October 2020 and beyond.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

 

Africa’s media landscape has undergone a significant change over the last decade as digitalization and new forms of media consumption have weakened state control of information. Social media has provided an opportunity for African citizens and journalists to take agency over how the continent is presented to the wider world, and many emerging African voices bring clarity to this digitally disrupted marketplace. But significant external support is required to make these efforts sustainable.  

There is no one ‘African’ story. African media remains as diverse as the 55 states in the African Union, with each national media ecosystem dependent on patterns of culture and governance - most importantly the power gap between those in leadership and their voters.

Journalists from Egypt, Eritrea and Cameroon - states in the 2019 global top 10 for putting their colleagues in prison - have different perspectives from those in other more liberal African countries.

This is most visible in traditional media where a business model based on advertising revenue has allowed African media houses to grow. But it is susceptible to manipulation from state and business actors holding outlets to ransom in exchange for editorial influence or control – a particularly acute problem in states where business and political elites are closely intertwined, and a middle-class consumer base to fund market-driven advertising has yet to develop.

Those African countries with relatively open borders, stronger passports and a more vibrant civil society also tend to have a more diverse and vibrant media environment. Open borders allow for easier movement, granting journalists the opportunity to travel, benchmark and participate in exchange programs.

The power of online networking

The advent of the social media age has begun to disrupt the links between governance and media health, as the large operations required by ‘serious’ media organizations have been replaced by mobile phone cameras and social media timelines.

Many African journalists are at the forefront of this innovation, unrestricted by historical perceptions of how journalism should be presented, and free to disrupt and change the established narratives to better engage with their ever-growing audiences.

And, far from replacing journalism, social media has actively empowered African journalists and media professionals. Instead of acting as sources for international media outlets as in the past, African journalists can publish their work on their own platforms, enabling greater ownership of how issues in their localities are globally framed. This local voice is often the key to avoiding the endemic oversimplifications and generalisations that have coloured much external coverage of the continent.

Obviously, these changes bring risks. Individual uploaders are largely free to publish what they like, and misinformation can - and often has - lead to devastating consequences, evident in recent violence across central Mali, South Africa and the middle belt of Nigeria.

But journalists on the African continent have an increasingly important role in preventing the spread of misinformation, not only as purveyors of news but also as fact-checkers, able to discern the difference between valid opinion and dubious rhetoric on social media, while new pan-African digital networks and discussion groups enable journalists to share knowledge, expertise, and story ideas, or quickly verify information from across the continent.

It is now possible to quickly find authentic voices for TV, radio or online commentary through digital platforms, present on the ground and able to speak with real authority. Many online networks also include Africa-focused journalists from outside the continent, and any biased or incorrect coverage of the African continent can be ‘called out’ and heavily critiqued, with challenges shared and solutions generated. While journalists remain independent, their working practices and professional standards are being shaped by the discourse in the groups like never before.

Online networking has also exposed the existence of lingering cultural differences between journalists of different national backgrounds, such as a hesitancy to discuss sensitive issues – the health of leaders for instance – for fear of being targeted by the authorities, or the level to which government statements are uncritically accepted.

While journalists search for truth, how they go about it is still very dependent on the state of democracy in their country. Though the cross-fertilisation of best practices and critical scrutiny can only improve the quality of journalism on the continent, in many places there remains a long way to go.

Drive for better resources

Across the world, digital media has struggled to create models which can provide news free at the point of access while also successfully monetizing content. This is even more palpable on the African continent, as the subscription-based models employed as a remedy elsewhere are not feasible on such a large scale in countries without a well-established middle-class.

African media needs resources to keep operating at a time when revenue is dwindling, and talented journalists are decamping to join the marketing, communication and sales sectors in search of better wages. Structures to support more in-depth investigative journalism are vital in Africa because that seems to be the only thing those in power still truly fear.

This means more training opportunities, fellowships, and exchange programs to allow the exchange of ideas and expertise. And, as social media has given a platform to talented local voices from across Africa, then an international community which truly wants to understand the nuances of the continent must hire them.   

The government of South Africa is pursuing a programme of reform to revitalize the economy, strengthen institutions and combat corruption. The State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 13 February and the budget speech of 26 February represent the most significant articulation of the government’s economic strategy. Central to this is the government’s plans for the energy sector, which is fundamental for reviving the economy, and the reform of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). But questions remain about possible divergence of the approach taken by government ministers from the policy position of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and what this might mean for the sustainability and progress of reform.  

At this event, Paul Mashatile, Treasurer General of the ANC, will discuss the party’s assessment of reform efforts to date and priorities for delivering on inclusive growth.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

African policymakers face a dilemma when it comes to COVID-19. The first hope is to prevent the virus from gaining a foothold at all, and many African states have significant experience of managing infectious disease outbreaks. The establishment of the Africa Centre for Disease Control highlights the hugely increased focus on public health in recent years.

But capacities to track, test and isolate vary wildly, notably between neighbours with porous and poorly controlled borders and, in most cases, sustained national-level disease control is difficult. Initial clusters of COVID-19 cases are already established in many places, but a lack of testing capacity makes it hard to know the full extent of transmission.

It is not obvious what African states should do as a response. Lack of information about COVID-19 means the proportion of asymptomatic or mild cases is not known, still less the ways in which this is influenced by human geography and demographics.

Africa is an overwhelmingly young continent with a median age under 20. But it also faces chronic malnutrition, which may weaken immune responses, and infectious diseases such as malaria, TB and HIV are widespread which could worsen the impact of COVID-19, particularly if treatment for these diseases is interrupted.

Complex and unknown

Ultimately, how all these factors interact with COVID-19 is complex and remains largely unknown. Africa may escape with a relatively light toll. Or it could be hit harder than anywhere else.

What is clear, however, is that cost of simply following the rest of the world into lockdown could be high. Africa is relatively rural but has higher populations living in informal settlements than anywhere in the world. Many live in cramped and overcrowded accommodation without clean water or reliable electricity, making handwashing a challenge and working from home impossible.

And the benefits appear limited. The goal of lockdowns in most places is not to eliminate the virus but to accept the economic and social costs as a price worth paying in order to ‘flatten the curve’ of infection and protect healthcare systems from being overwhelmed. But this logic does not hold when many of Africa’s healthcare systems are barely coping with pre-coronavirus levels of disease.

Africa suffers in comparison to much of the rest of the world in terms of access to quality and affordable healthcare, critical care beds and specialist personnel. For example, in 2017, Nigeria had just 120 ICU beds for a country of 200 million, equating to 0.07 per 100,000 inhabitants compared to 12.5 per 100,000 in Italy and 3.6 per 100,000 in China.

The pandemic’s ruinous economic impacts could also be more acute for Africa than anywhere else. The continent is highly vulnerable to potential drops in output and relies heavily on demand from China and Europe. Many states are already facing sharply falling natural resource revenues, and investment, tourism and remittances will suffer - all on top of a high existing debt burden.

Analysis by the World Bank shows that Africa will likely face its first recession in 25 years, with the continental economy contracting by up to 5.1% in 2020. Africa will have scant financial ammunition to use in the fight against COVID-19 with currencies weakening, food prices rising, local agri-food supply chains disrupted and food imports likely to decrease as well. A food security emergency appears a strong possibility.

So, although several states have imposed national lockdowns and others closed major urban centres, lockdowns are difficult to manage and sustain, especially in places where the daily hustle of the informal sector or subsistence agriculture are the only means of survival and where the state has neither the trust of the population nor the capacity to replace lost earnings or meet basic needs.

Of course, this is not simply a binary choice between lockdown or no lockdown - a range of intermediate options exist, such as some restriction on movement, curfews, shutting places of worship, banning only large gatherings, or closing pubs, schools and borders.

A significant number of African states have so far taken this middle path. This will not prevent the virus from spreading nor, in all probability, be enough to ensure adequate healthcare for all Africans infected with COVID-19. But it may help slow the spread and buy invaluable time for African states and partners to prepare.

How this time is used is therefore of paramount importance. Popular trust in the state is low in many African countries so strategies must empower communities, not alienate them. Africa’s experience of previous epidemics and long traditions of collective resilience and community-based crisis response - which persist in many places – are significant strengths.

The right messages must be carried by the right messengers, and policies - including cash transfers and food distribution - implemented sensitively. If not, or if responses become militarized, public consent is unlikely to be sustained for long.