si

UK Charm Offensive in China

15 October 2013

Professor Kerry Brown

Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme

After a year in which there were precious few high level political visits, China is now getting two in the same week: the UK Chancellor George Osborne and the Mayor of London Boris Johnson. The irritation at David Cameron and Nick Clegg's very public meeting with the Dalai Lama last year has now been replaced by an era of warmth and mutual understanding. That, at least, is what the press releases for these visits will have us believe. 

In fact, while the ministerial freeze has been on, the UK has been doing fine – having more than double the Chinese investment of any other EU member, and increasing its exports to China. Chinese visitors to the UK brought in £300 million last year – a formidable achievement in view of the highly unwelcoming visa regime the UK currently has towards people from China (something George Osborne has promised to reform while in Beijing). 

The UK and China are always keen to assert differences, but at heart they are pragmatic nations. They are both utterly at one in seeking growth, and they see in each other compatibilities that can be benignly exploited. For the Chinese, there are decent assets in the UK in the energy and manufacturing sector that are very reasonably priced, and which exist in one of the most liberal investment regimes in the world. For the UK, China is a vast market that its companies, small and large, need to conquer. Any tactical advantage in this battle for access is good in view of the competition that is going to come from other international companies, but also players inside China that want to find their way to the hearts of Chinese consumers. The next decades look set to belong to these consumers. The long term theme of Johnson and Osborne's separate visits is getting as close as possible to these new actors in global growth. 

Overcoming hurdles

Boris Johnson and George Osborne are unlikely to be publicly explicit about the challenges that British trade interests face in China, but in private meetings they have to be raised. The first is that China is becoming a master of indirect protectionism, and the treatment being given to companies ranging from GlaxoSmithKline down to small consultancies is getting harsh. The UK has a strong interest in the success of the EU in negotiating better trade access, from the right for companies to bid for government procurement in China to the perennial problems of state subsidies for Chinese companies and intellectual property rights protection. It is important to find smart ways to leverage the newfound interest China has in deploying its capital abroad, to give UK companies better deals in China. This has to be subtle work, but the primary interests in the UK are the same as our EU partners – having a liberal, rule-based, global order where China is far more integrated. 

There are also some domestic issues. Large trade missions to China have been happening since the reign of George the Third. Lord Heseltine led a vast army of companies in the early 1990s to Beijing. Trade missions have become an unquestionable part of the whole performance of UK politicians going to China. But just how much these achieve is debatable. A decade ago, in The China Dream, Joe Studwell poured cold water on some of the noisier delegations and what real business they did. Perhaps it is time for the UK government to give more support for small and medium businesses. Many of them will have to think about a China strategy if they are not already there, and will face a tough and time consuming task in making inroads in China. Some solidarity amongst them and with the government would be a big advantage. 

This impacts on the delicate business of how the UK undertakes its business and political relations with China in the first place. China is now the world's second largest economy on some measures, and George Osborne said his visit was to change UK perceptions of the country so that British people can see it as more than just an enormous factory producing cheap goods. For that to happen there needs to be a more dynamic, inclusive operation in the UK which cultivates links with Chinese business, rather than the ancient groupings of associations and dining clubs that prevail at the moment. These are good for the egos of those already doing well in China, but are not reaching out enough to the many in the UK who might find they can work in or with China. 

Academic understanding

There is a deeper values debate that China and the UK might have. Our history means that we have shared a lot of good and bad things. The UK needs to support as many young people in learning Chinese, visiting China, and knowing about China as possible. And the good news is that relations will be helped by the quarter of a million Chinese students who have studied in the UK and had experience of life here in the last 15 years. As much outreach to this group, many of whom are back in China and developing exciting careers, is important: each one is an invaluable ambassador for life here. Decades after the visit of Osborne and Johnson has faded from memory, it will be these people that truly shape the future. 

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




si

China Looks Serious About 'Decisive' Market Reforms

20 November 2013

Dr Tim Summers

Senior Consulting Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme (based in Hong Kong)

2131120Third Plenum.jpg

Farmers harvest in the village of Gangzhong in China's eastern Zhejiang province, 19 November 2013, days after China's ruling party unveiled a list of sweeping changes including reforms to the land ownership system, loosening controls over state-owned enterprises, relaxing the controversial one-child policy, and eventually shuttering forced labour camps. Photo by Peter Parks/AFP/Getty Images.

China’s leaders set out their intention to push forward with policy reform following the Third Plenum. The full decision released on 15 November makes clear the aim to loosen constraints on the market, and suggests a dilution of state-owned enterprise influence. A new national security committee could also lead to greater policy integration between domestic security and international affairs.

The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee took place in Beijing from 9−12 November. Initial reactions based on the communiqué released on the last day of the meeting were mixed. However, on 15 November the authorities published the detailed decision approved by the plenum, and an explanation given to the plenum by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping – in which he acknowledged major problems facing China.

These documents make the implications of the plenum much clearer. In sum, it offers a clear political signal that as China’s fifth-generation Party leadership enters its second year, it is intent on taking forward a ‘comprehensive deepening of reform’ across a wide range of issues. As an indication of the importance of this, a new high-level ‘leading small group’ will be established to coordinate and oversee this process. The decision spells out various new measures, and reiterates many which are already part of the government’s agenda.

More market in the economy

The most important material is on the economy, where the decision makes clear that the leadership envisages a ‘decisive’ role for market forces, and the establishment of ‘fair and equal’ competition in the economy. This will provide a guiding principle for policy-making over the coming years.

One of the ways of achieving this is to reorganize the functions of government. Here the decision reiterates the themes which the government has been working on since Premier Li Keqiang took over in March this year, namely reducing or removing the need for government approvals to businesses, freeing up the investment environment, and allowing businesses and the market to take the lead unless there is a strong reason for government intervention. Better governance is a wider theme of the decision, covering the judicial system and reforms to the party’s disciplinary organs which would clarify leadership and accountability in anti-corruption investigations.

SOE reform

A possible impediment to market reforms is the power of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the original communiqué gave the impression that nothing much would be done about SOEs. However, the ability of these so-called ‘vested interests’ to stymie market reforms has been weakened by the targeting of a number of senior SOE-related cadres in the party’s latest anti-corruption campaign, which began at the end of 2012.

Further, the detailed decision suggests further reforms are in the offing. Although the relevant section of the document begins by restating the leading role for state ownership, a series of subsequent policy aims could serve to dilute it, such as ensuring equality in property rights protection and competition; developing mixed (state and non-state) ownership through cross-shareholding and bringing private capital into state-led projects; shifting from managing SOEs to managing state investments in enterprises; better supervision of SOEs which operate in natural monopolies; and removing administrative monopolies.

International affairs

The decision talks about further opening of China’s economy, but the vast majority of the issues covered in the decision are domestic in nature, and announcements such as a further relaxation of birth control policies have attracted most attention. Even the points on military and defense issues relate more to internal management than external capacity.

There was, however, one announcement which could have important implications for China’s foreign policy, which will be watched carefully outside China, the establishment of a ‘national security committee’. Xi said that this was being set up in response to external pressures to protect national sovereignty, security and development. He also cited internal pressures to maintain political security and social stability. It is too early to judge what the exact remit of this body will be, but it could lead to greater policy coordination and integration between domestic security issues and international affairs, at a time when China is playing a more important role across the international spectrum.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




si

Managing the Emergence of Rising Powers: A Western Response

Research Event

22 May 2014 - 5:00pm to 6:15pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Trine Flockhart, Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Academy
Patrick W Quirk, Fellow, Transatlantic Academy
Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, SOAS

This event will present the findings of the Transatlantic Academy’s new report, Liberal Order in a Post-Western World, which examines the future of international liberal order in a world shaped by the rise of emerging powers and a transatlantic community dealing with internal challenges. Produced by collaboration between scholars from Europe and North America, it recommends ways to build an enduring rules-based order for the 21st century.

Department/project




si

A Changing Role for the United States in Asia-Pacific

18 June 2014

Xenia Wickett

Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs
Unless the United States finds ways to be more transparent in its intentions and willingness to act in the region, it might find that its allies there have different ideas about its role.

20140618JapanIndia.jpg

Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and India's then prime minister, Manmohan Singh, at Hyderabad House, New Delhi, India, on 25 Jan 2014, during the first visit to India by a Japanese leader since 2011. Photo by Graham Crouch/Bloomberg/Getty Images.

President Barack Obama’s recent visit to Asia has reanimated the debate over what America’s ‘pivot’ to Asia really means. The level of uncertainty over its regional engagement has been heightened by what many in the region, and beyond, consider an inadequate response to the events taking place in Ukraine. Rather than being reassured by the ‘rebalancing’, many Asian allies suspect the United States is becoming a less reliable ally. At the same time, concern is also growing about China’s increasing assertiveness, as demonstrated by recent events with Vietnam.

America’s Asian partners are increasingly exploring new ways to ensure their security, and they will, in time, find different ways to engage with it in the region. Unless the United States is more transparent about its intentions, and what others can expect from it, it is possible that it will be pushed towards a role not necessarily in line with its interests.

President Obama’s announcement of the ‘pivot’ to Asia in November 2011 provoked much debate over what it would mean in practice. It continues to be treated with much scepticism in the region and has raised tensions, with many fearing a military response from China (a fear that, in the eyes of many in the region, has already come to pass).

Allies have also questioned whether American rhetoric is being matched by action. US assets in the region remain strong (additional troops are being rotated in and new partnerships are being formed with the Philippines and others), but America’s will to use them appears less so.

Despite reassurances from Obama during his trip that the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands ‘fall within the scope of Article 5 of the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’ and that the United States opposes any unilateral attempts to change this, Japan was not reassured. A more ambiguous statement made last year by Secretary of State John Kerry, that the United States ‘does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands’, has left many Japanese policy-makers wondering whether the US would ultimately back their country up in a conflict. Again, they look at America’s responses to events in Ukraine, Libya and Syria and wonder what it would be prepared to commit to if China were to try to seize control of disputed territory.

This uncertainty is leading many of America’s principal allies to consider additional ways to ensure their security. There are three main paths available to them: building domestic capabilities, forming ad hoc groupings, and reinforcing established regional groups.

The allies are first looking internally: across the board, defence spending has increased; for the first time, in 2012, Asia surpassed European spending, reaching a total of $310 billion. Countries such as India are expanding their naval capabilities to enhance their power projection and Japan is moving forward a reinterpretation of its constitution to allow a more ‘normalized’ role for its military, one in which it could come to the assistance of allies.

Asia-Pacific states are also looking to engage one another in informal bilateral or plurilateral groupings. Over the past decade, a proliferation of new groups has formed for such activities as strategic dialogue, joint training or operations. Building on their similar values and concerns, Japan, Australia and India, in particular, have been prolific in creating various combinations of partnerships among themselves and the United States. There are also some more unexpected (and potentially valuable) groupings, including that established between China, Japan and South Korea.

Where they are based on similar interests, these informal groupings can be a source of moral and political support, and even perhaps in time more operational support in the security arena. They can also provide a starting point for engaging a wider audience through more traditional regional groups, such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit – the third option for allies to enhance their security.

These more established groups, while widely dismissed in the West as mere ‘talking shops’, perform a well-regarded function in the region. By supporting the broader web of networks on which states can come to depend, they provide opportunities for debating and managing (or diffusing) regional tensions.

America remains the most militarily powerful nation in the world. Its influence and common interests with its Asian allies will continue to ensure that it has strong sway in the region. Realistically, it will for the foreseeable future remain a necessary partner for its traditional allies, particularly those concerned by China’s growing assertiveness. And it remains in America’s interests to stay engaged. However, as ambiguity about its willingness to act increases, these allies will continue to reach for alternative solutions for managing their security.

While this aligns with the US desire to share more of the burdens of global citizenship, if it wants to remain a key Asia-Pacific power, America still needs its allies to need it. A little more clarity and transparency on its part, even if only stated privately, could start to rebuild trust and confidence, which would serve both America and its allies well. 

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback





si

Politics in Northern Nigeria: The Impacts of Democratic Transition

Invitation Only Research Event

14 July 2014 - 9:00am to 10:00am

Abuja, Nigeria

Event participants

Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann, Centre for Population, Poverty and Public Policy Studies; Author, Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria; ERANDA Junior Research Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House (2013)
Chair: Elizabeth Donnelly, Assistant Head, Africa Programme, Chatham House

As Nigeria celebrates one hundred years of unity, significant differences – real and perceived – remain between different parts of the country. This event marks the Nigeria launch of the Chatham House Briefing Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria. Its author, Dr Leena Hoffmann, will discuss the effects of democratization and pacted politics on northern Nigeria, broader governance challenges, and how relations among decision-makers nationally have evolved.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Event attributes

External event

Department/project




si

Nigeria’s Priorities for Progress: Imperatives for Stability and Inclusive Growth

Research Event

24 July 2014 - 2:30pm to 3:30pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Dr Doyin Okupe, Senior Special Assistant on Public Affairs to the President of Nigeria 

Nigeria’s prospects, with its rise to international prominence as Africa’s largest economy, are tempered by the many development and security challenges the country faces. While essential reforms in the power and agriculture sectors are underway, such efforts are balanced against the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, significant concerns around youth unemployment, and an increasingly contentious political environment in the run-up to the February 2015 elections. 

Dr Doyin Okupe, Senior Special Assistant to President Goodluck Jonathan, will discuss what steps the presidency is taking to address the country’s most urgent challenges, and how the political environment can be managed to overcome tensions that may impede progress.

Department/project

Christopher Vandome

Research Fellow, Africa Programme
+44 (0) 20 7314 3669




si

Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Invitation Only Research Event

6 October 2014 - 8:30am to 7 October 2014 - 1:45pm

Seoul, Republic of Korea

The overarching theme of this event will be Korea’s changing role as a global power and its effect on the country’s relationships, including with the UK and Europe. It will aim to raise awareness of these issues to an audience of key decision-makers, and to encourage experts to think together strategically about areas of mutual interest, as well as practical ways to achieve deeper cooperation. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

This event is held in partnership with the South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo.

Event attributes

External event

Joshua Webb

+44 (0)20 7314 3678




si

Business in China: Risks and Opportunities

Research Event

23 October 2014 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Jeremy Gordon, Director, China Business Services
Chair: Roderic Wye, Associate Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House

In light of China’s economic reforms and a high-profile anti-corruption campaign, the speaker will argue that fundamental political, economic and social shifts have changed the nature of opportunities and risks for foreign businesses in China.

Registration for this event is now closed.

Joshua Webb

+44 (0)20 7314 3678




si

Assessing the danger of war: parallels and differences between Europe in 1914 and East Asia in 2014

12 November 2014 , Volume 90, Number 6

Joachim Krause




si

Vortex Advertising CPA-network | Exclusive offers | Personal support




si

Is it possible to extract entire blogspot blog?




si

Is it really possible to rank a website on Google in 3 months?




si

Best free plugin for tracking hits to my website.




si

Shortle.Link | Best URL Shortner | Up to $5/1000 views | Min Payout $5 | Signup Bonus $3




si

Ranking a new website on Google page 1




si

What's the best wording for "In Stock" using a shopping cart?




si

$100 for Restaurant Menu Design




si

Keyword Service & Site Audit




si

Looking for graphic designer




si

Need logo Designed for my client. $25 Fast Paypal to Winner




si

After Five Bloody Years in Syria, Russia Is Turning Against Iran—and Assad

GAZIANTEP, Turkey—After five years fighting to preserve Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Russia now appears inclined to dispose of its infamous client. Assad’s persistent brutality and corruption, and his inability to establish even the semblance of a functioning state, has grown to be a burden Moscow would prefer not to bear.And then there’s the problem of Iran. Assad, members of his family, and his Alawite clansmen enjoy close, perhaps unbreakable, bonds to the regime in Tehran and to Iranian-backed militias in Syria. All of which undermines Moscow’s primary mission there: to rehabilitate the Assad regime as a symbol of stability capable of attracting hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign investment for reconstruction, which Russian firms would then be poised to receive. As long as Assad’s relatives continue to function as a mafia and give free rein to Iranian troops using Syria as base of operations to threaten Israel and plan attacks against U.S. troops in Iraq, those countries likely to foot the bill for Syrian reconstruction—the nations of Europe and the Gulf—are unlikely to come up with the cash. Amid Escalating Syrian Carnage, Turkey Shoots Down Assad’s PlanesThis has not gone unnoticed by the United States.“Assad has done nothing to help the Russians sell this regime,”James Jeffrey, the U.S. special envoy for the Coalition to Defeat ISIS, told reporters in a State Department briefing on Thursday. “You find Assad has nothing but thugs around him, and they don't sell well either in the Arab world or in Europe. We have heard repeatedly from Russians we take as credible that they understand how bad Assad is.” The Syrian president’s “refusal to make any compromises” in order to secure diplomatic recognition and acceptance for his regime has jeopardized “hundreds of billions of dollars in reconstruction assistance” for Syria, according to Jeffrey. Yet the Trump administration is unlikely to exploit this growing rift. “Getting Russia out of Syria,” Jeffrey said, “has never been our goal. Russia has been there for 30 years. It has a long-term relationship with Syria. We don’t think it has been healthy for the region. We don’t think it really is even healthy for Russia. But that’s not our policy.”  MEDIA FRENZYJeffrey’s statements come just one week after Russian state media unleashed a slew of reports and editorials targeting Assad, portraying the beleaguered president as hopelessly corrupt and unfit to govern, and suggesting the time had come to replace him with a new leader.The first batch of articles was published by the Russia’s Federal News Agency (FNA), an outlet owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch and chairman of several companies implicated in the 2016 U.S. elections scandal. Appearing over the course of a mere three hours on April 17, they would shake Syria to its core. The first of the three articles in question highlighted a corruption scheme carried out by the regime in summer 2019 in which the Syrian prime minister purportedly lied to citizens about oil and gas scarcities in order to justify the occurrence of long power outages while selling Syrian electricity to businessmen in Lebanon. The second piece cited an opinion poll claiming only 32 percent of Syrians would vote for Assad in the country’s upcoming 2021 presidential election. The third and final article, entitled, “Corruption is Worse than Terrorism,” chastized President Assad for personally failing to combat corruption, prevalent at all levels of the state.  That these were published by Prigozhin’s news agency was the kind of signal it would be hard for Assad to miss. Prigozhin, who first built his fortune as a caterer, is sometimes known as “Putin’s chef.” But of particular relevance to Syria is his role as chairman of the Wagner Group, whose mercenaries have fought alongside Assad regime forces since October 2015 and helped the latter take back control of key revenue generating infrastructure such as the al-Sha’ir gas field in Homs province.Deputy Assistant Secretary Christopher Robin told the same State Department briefing Thursday, “Wagner is often misleadingly referred to as a Russian private military company, but in fact it’s an instrument of the Russian government which the Kremlin uses as a low-cost and low-risk instrument to advance its goals.”The article on corruption would also point out, suggestively, that the Assads are not the only powerful family in Syria, “there are also the Makhloufs.”Rami Makhlouf, who is in fact Bashar al-Assad’s first cousin, is Syria’s wealthiest man, and also, it would seem, Russia’s man. Certainly he has strong ties to the Kremlin and for years has been one of the most vocal critics of Iran’s presence in Syria. In July 2018, the al-Watan newspaper, one Syria’s most prominent pro-regime mouthpieces and owned by Rami Makhlouf since 2006, published a then unprecedented public rebuke to Iran, accusing it of sponsoring Islamist fanaticism throughout the Middle East alongside Turkey and Qatar, the main backers of Syria’s opposition. (Rami Makhlouf’s father Muhammad and brother Hafiz meanwhile are alleged by some to be living in Russia.) The April 17 articles published by Prigozhin’s FNA preceded the release of a wave of other articles and items in the media over the next 12 days that would further drive home the point that Moscow was considering options other than Assad to rule Syria. TASS, Russia’s largest state-run news agency, wrote in one editorial that, “Russia suspects that Assad is not only unable to lead the country anymore, but also that the head of the Syrian regime is dragging Moscow towards the Afghani scenario.” This is like evoking the Vietnam War for an American audience, a reference to the Kremlin’s botched campaign through the 1980s that helped bankrupt the Soviet Union and finally break it apart.Amid this coverage, TASS would also take swipes at Iran, claiming that the Islamic Republic has “no interest in achieving stability in the region, because it considers it a battlefield with Washington”.On April 30, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), a think tank established by Moscow’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, released a scathing report saying Russia was in talks with other parties to the Syrian conflict to draw up plans for a political resolution that did not include Bashar al-Assad as president. The report highlighted purported Russian efforts to compel the Syrian regime to commit to ceasefires with both American-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) opposition, while beginning steps to form a new unity government that would include representatives from both. That day, Rami Makhlouf, whose assets were frozen five months earlier as part of a tax dispute, uploaded a video onto his personal Facebook page accusing the Assad regime of corruption. In a state known for carrying out the full-scale slaughter of those who test its authority, Makhlouf’s videos, coming on the heels of the unprecedented Russian attacks in the media, sent shockwaves throughout the country.  THE ROYAL FAMILYWhile the Makhlouf clan clearly has thrown its lot in with Russia, key members of Bashar al-Assad’s immediate family and others with ties to Qardaha in Syria’s largely Alawite Latakia province, are among the most prominent Iranian-backed militia leaders in Syria. It’s an alliance that traces back to his father Hafez al-Assad, who was born in Qardaha, and who forged ties with the Iranian revolution almost from its beginning more than 40 years ago. The Iranians responded by offering religious legitimacy to the Alawite sect, which is regarded as heretical by Sunnis and indeed by many Shi’a.These Qardaha militia leaders have regularly engaged in armed clashes against Russian backed units. They are among the most egregious violators and abusers of power, overseeing wide networks of corruption similar to those lamented in the Russian media. And foremost among them is Bashar’s younger brother, Maher al-Assad. Since April 2018, Maher al-Assad has commanded the Syrian Army’s 4th Armored Division, one of country’s oldest, best equipped and overwhelmingly Alawite brigades. After the 2011 outbreak of the Syrian revolution, when the loyalty of much of the army was in doubt, it became a refuge for numerous Alawite-Shi’a dominated pro-regime militias.Currently, the 4th Armored Division’s members control many smuggling operations throughout the country, in cities from Albu Kamel on Syria’s eastern border with Iraq to Latakia on the Syrian coast, where the port was leased to Iran on October 1 last year. It has since become one of the biggest export hubs for drugs headed to markets in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. Examples abound: On July 5, 2019, Greek coast guard and drug enforcement officials announced the biggest drug bust in history, seizing 5.25 tons (33 million pills) of Captagon amphetamines worth $660m hidden in shipping containers loaded at the Latakia port in Syria. That followed a long string of such seizures made by Greek authorities. More recently, in late April, customs officials in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt also announced the seizure of similar quantities of drugs in containers traced back to Latakia. Local reports have accused a range of actors including Maher al-Assad’s 4th Division, Hizbollah, Rami Makhlouf, and others of profiting from the massive drug exports emanating from the port. In January 2019 the 4th Armored Division launched attacks on the Russian-backed Tiger Forces unit in an attempt to wrest control of smuggling routes between regime- and opposition-held territory in Idlib province. The clashes led to the death of 70 fighters. These and other skirmishes prompted Russia to back a major campaign to arrest 4th Division and other Iranian-backed units throughout the country beginning in April 2019, which succeeded in rounding up numerous mid-ranking Iranian-backed officers. Among those targeted in the campaign was Bashar Talal al-Assad, a cousin to the president (similar name, different people) who was wanted on drug and weapons trafficking charges. Unlike others who were detained in the roundup, Bashar Talal al-Assad and his ‘Areen Brigade managed to fight off Russian-backed forces that sought to arrest him in Qardaha. He then pledged to attack Russia’s Hmeimim military base, located 17 miles east of Latakia city, in the event the regime sought to arrest him again.For Russia, the threat of such attacks on its military infrastructure is a real concern. The Hmeimim base—from which Moscow has directed its entire military campaign in Syria—had already been subject to a series of attacks from January to October 2018 by other Iranian-backed militias in the area. The threat posed by both Iran’s acquisition of the Latakia port and its support for local Assad family proxies in Syria’s coastal region is exacerbated by the fact that Tehran has also begun making progress toward completing construction of its Shalamcha railroad, which, via stops in Basra, Baghdad, Albu Kamel and Damascus, will give Tehran direct access to the Syrian and Lebanese coasts. If Iran succeeds in integrating the Latakia port with the Shalamcha rail line, this will cut off Hmeimim from Russian forces in central and southern Syria and enable Tehran to quickly deliver weapons to proxy forces in Latakia that are already engaged in clashes against Russian-backed groups. WORLDWIDE CONSENSUSMoscow’s inability to control Iranian backed Syrian militiamen engaged in widespread crime, corruption, and assaults on Russian forces has infuriated the Kremlin. But Russia is not the only major player on the ground with scores to settle against Iran, and the Russian military leadership in Syria has ignored if not largely encouraged Israeli strikes on Iranian troops throughout the country.It may not be coincidental that the Israeli attacks have increased in pace and scope since April, following the flurry of Russian media articles attacking Assad and his regime. “We have moved from blocking Iran’s entrenchment in Syria to forcing it out of there, and we will not stop,” Israel’s new defense minister, Naftali Bennett, declared on April 28. Without Russia, Iran has found itself the odd man out in Syria, the single party still seeking to push for war at a time when most other international players have been struck with fatigue and simply seek to put Syria’s pieces back together. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, the last patron of Syria’s battered FSA opposition, has himself made peace with Moscow, effectively agreeing last March to cede control of wide swaths of rebel held territory after a particularly bloody Russian led campaign against the last FSA holdout in Idlib province that ended in victory for regime forces. Ironically, Erdoğan’s long-held desire to overthrow Syria’s president may still come to fruition, albeit not as he expected, as Assad’s ouster may come at the hands of Russia itself, and not the revolution. Read more at The Daily Beast.Get our top stories in your inbox every day. Sign up now!Daily Beast Membership: Beast Inside goes deeper on the stories that matter to you. Learn more.





si

South Dakota Governor demands Sioux tribes 'immediately' remove COVID-19 checkpoints because they interfere with traffic

South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem sent letters to two Sioux tribes demanding they remove COVID-19 checkpoints because they interfere with traffic.





si

White House won't consider another stimulus bill in May -Kudlow

The White House has halted talks with Congress over any further coronavirus stimulus package as it waits for more information about how U.S. state reopenings affect the economy, White House top economic adviser Larry Kudlow told reporters on Friday. The Senate and House of Representatives have already passed four major bills to address the novel coronavirus outbreak, including three aimed at stabilizing the economy as most Americans have sheltered in place and unemployment has soared.





si

China reports first coronavirus case in Wuhan since April 3 among 14 new infections

China's National Health Commission reported 14 new confirmed coronavirus cases on May 9, the highest number since April 28, including the first for more than a month in the city of Wuhan where the outbreak was first detected late last year. While China had officially designated all areas of the country as low-risk last Thursday, the new cases according to data published on Sunday represent a jump from the single case reported for the day before. The new Wuhan case, the first reported in the epicentre of China's outbreak since April 3, was previously asymptomatic, according to the health commission.





si

Canada PM 'worried' about situation in Montreal

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau called Saturday for caution and expressed concern about loosening lockdown measures in Montreal, the epicenter of Canada's coronavirus outbreak. While several Canadian provinces, including Quebec, are preparing reopening measures and a gradual revival of their economies, Trudeau stressed prudence and said that the country is not yet out of danger. Quebec is the worst-hit province in Canada, with more than half of both the country's 67,000 cases of coronavirus and 4,700 deaths.





si

The federal government finally announced initial plans to distribute Gilead's coronavirus drug remdesivir after days of confusion

The government said it's distributing the promising coronavirus drug, remdesivir, to some hard-hit states. Eventually, all 50 states should get it.





si

Structural insight into the recognition of pathogen-derived phosphoglycolipids by C-type lectin receptor DCAR [Protein Structure and Folding]

The C-type lectin receptors (CLRs) form a family of pattern recognition receptors that recognize numerous pathogens, such as bacteria and fungi, and trigger innate immune responses. The extracellular carbohydrate-recognition domain (CRD) of CLRs forms a globular structure that can coordinate a Ca2+ ion, allowing receptor interactions with sugar-containing ligands. Although well-conserved, the CRD fold can also display differences that directly affect the specificity of the receptors for their ligands. Here, we report crystal structures at 1.8–2.3 Å resolutions of the CRD of murine dendritic cell-immunoactivating receptor (DCAR, or Clec4b1), the CLR that binds phosphoglycolipids such as acylated phosphatidyl-myo-inositol mannosides (AcPIMs) of mycobacteria. Using mutagenesis analysis, we identified critical residues, Ala136 and Gln198, on the surface surrounding the ligand-binding site of DCAR, as well as an atypical Ca2+-binding motif (Glu-Pro-Ser/EPS168–170). By chemically synthesizing a water-soluble ligand analog, inositol-monophosphate dimannose (IPM2), we confirmed the direct interaction of DCAR with the polar moiety of AcPIMs by biolayer interferometry and co-crystallization approaches. We also observed a hydrophobic groove extending from the ligand-binding site that is in a suitable position to interact with the lipid portion of whole AcPIMs. These results suggest that the hydroxyl group-binding ability and hydrophobic groove of DCAR mediate its specific binding to pathogen-derived phosphoglycolipids such as mycobacterial AcPIMs.




si

NF-{kappa}B mediates lipopolysaccharide-induced alternative pre-mRNA splicing of MyD88 in mouse macrophages [Signal Transduction]

Although a robust inflammatory response is needed to combat infection, this response must ultimately be terminated to prevent chronic inflammation. One mechanism that terminates inflammatory signaling is the production of alternative mRNA splice forms in the Toll-like receptor (TLR) signaling pathway. Whereas most genes in the TLR pathway encode positive mediators of inflammatory signaling, several, including that encoding the MyD88 signaling adaptor, also produce alternative spliced mRNA isoforms that encode dominant-negative inhibitors of the response. Production of these negatively acting alternatively spliced isoforms is induced by stimulation with the TLR4 agonist lipopolysaccharide (LPS); thus, this alternative pre-mRNA splicing represents a negative feedback loop that terminates TLR signaling and prevents chronic inflammation. In the current study, we investigated the mechanisms regulating the LPS-induced alternative pre-mRNA splicing of the MyD88 transcript in murine macrophages. We found that 1) the induction of the alternatively spliced MyD88 form is due to alternative pre-mRNA splicing and not caused by another RNA regulatory mechanism, 2) MyD88 splicing is regulated by both the MyD88- and TRIF-dependent arms of the TLR signaling pathway, 3) MyD88 splicing is regulated by the NF-κB transcription factor, and 4) NF-κB likely regulates MyD88 alternative pre-mRNA splicing per se rather than regulating splicing indirectly by altering MyD88 transcription. We conclude that alternative splicing of MyD88 may provide a sensitive mechanism that ensures robust termination of inflammation for tissue repair and restoration of normal tissue homeostasis once an infection is controlled.




si

Polarization of protease-activated receptor 2 (PAR-2) signaling is altered during airway epithelial remodeling and deciliation [Immunology]

Protease-activated receptor 2 (PAR-2) is activated by secreted proteases from immune cells or fungi. PAR-2 is normally expressed basolaterally in differentiated nasal ciliated cells. We hypothesized that epithelial remodeling during diseases characterized by cilial loss and squamous metaplasia may alter PAR-2 polarization. Here, using a fluorescent arrestin assay, we confirmed that the common fungal airway pathogen Aspergillus fumigatus activates heterologously-expressed PAR-2. Endogenous PAR-2 activation in submerged airway RPMI 2650 or NCI–H520 squamous cells increased intracellular calcium levels and granulocyte macrophage–colony-stimulating factor, tumor necrosis factor α, and interleukin (IL)-6 secretion. RPMI 2650 cells cultured at an air–liquid interface (ALI) responded to apically or basolaterally applied PAR-2 agonists. However, well-differentiated primary nasal epithelial ALIs responded only to basolateral PAR-2 stimulation, indicated by calcium elevation, increased cilia beat frequency, and increased fluid and cytokine secretion. We exposed primary cells to disease-related modifiers that alter epithelial morphology, including IL-13, cigarette smoke condensate, and retinoic acid deficiency, at concentrations and times that altered epithelial morphology without causing breakdown of the epithelial barrier to model early disease states. These altered primary cultures responded to both apical and basolateral PAR-2 stimulation. Imaging nasal polyps and control middle turbinate explants, we found that nasal polyps, but not turbinates, exhibit apical calcium responses to PAR-2 stimulation. However, isolated ciliated cells from both polyps and turbinates maintained basolateral PAR-2 polarization, suggesting that the calcium responses originated from nonciliated cells. Altered PAR-2 polarization in disease-remodeled epithelia may enhance apical responses and increase sensitivity to inhaled proteases.




si

Cell-specific expression of the transcriptional regulator RHAMM provides a timing mechanism that controls appropriate wound re-epithelialization [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

Prevention of aberrant cutaneous wound repair and appropriate regeneration of an intact and functional integument require the coordinated timing of fibroblast and keratinocyte migration. Here, we identified a mechanism whereby opposing cell-specific motogenic functions of a multifunctional intracellular and extracellular protein, the receptor for hyaluronan-mediated motility (RHAMM), coordinates fibroblast and keratinocyte migration speed and ensures appropriate timing of excisional wound closure. We found that, unlike in WT mice, in Rhamm-null mice, keratinocyte migration initiates prematurely in the excisional wounds, resulting in wounds that have re-surfaced before the formation of normal granulation tissue, leading to a defective epidermal architecture. We also noted aberrant keratinocyte and fibroblast migration in the Rhamm-null mice, indicating that RHAMM suppresses keratinocyte motility but increases fibroblast motility. This cell context–dependent effect resulted from cell-specific regulation of extracellular signal-regulated kinase 1/2 (ERK1/2) activation and expression of a RHAMM target gene encoding matrix metalloprotease 9 (MMP-9). In fibroblasts, RHAMM promoted ERK1/2 activation and MMP-9 expression, whereas in keratinocytes, RHAMM suppressed these activities. In keratinocytes, loss of RHAMM function or expression promoted epidermal growth factor receptor–regulated MMP-9 expression via ERK1/2, which resulted in cleavage of the ectodomain of the RHAMM partner protein CD44 and thereby increased keratinocyte motility. These results identify RHAMM as a key factor that integrates the timing of wound repair by controlling cell migration.




si

Development of a novel {beta}-1,6-glucan-specific detection system using functionally-modified recombinant endo-{beta}-1,6-glucanase [Methods and Resources]

β-1,3-d-Glucan is a ubiquitous glucose polymer produced by plants, bacteria, and most fungi. It has been used as a diagnostic tool in patients with invasive mycoses via a highly-sensitive reagent consisting of the blood coagulation system of horseshoe crab. However, no method is currently available for measuring β-1,6-glucan, another primary β-glucan structure of fungal polysaccharides. Herein, we describe the development of an economical and highly-sensitive and specific assay for β-1,6-glucan using a modified recombinant endo-β-1,6-glucanase having diminished glucan hydrolase activity. The purified β-1,6-glucanase derivative bound to the β-1,6-glucan pustulan with a KD of 16.4 nm. We validated the specificity of this β-1,6-glucan probe by demonstrating its ability to detect cell wall β-1,6-glucan from both yeast and hyphal forms of the opportunistic fungal pathogen Candida albicans, without any detectable binding to glucan lacking the long β-1,6-glucan branch. We developed a sandwich ELISA-like assay with a low limit of quantification for pustulan (1.5 pg/ml), and we successfully employed this assay in the quantification of extracellular β-1,6-glucan released by >250 patient-derived strains of different Candida species (including Candida auris) in culture supernatant in vitro. We also used this assay to measure β-1,6-glucan in vivo in the serum and in several organs in a mouse model of systemic candidiasis. Our work describes a reliable method for β-1,6-glucan detection, which may prove useful for the diagnosis of invasive fungal infections.




si

Glucocerebrosidases catalyze a transgalactosylation reaction that yields a newly-identified brain sterol metabolite, galactosylated cholesterol [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

β-Glucocerebrosidase (GBA) hydrolyzes glucosylceramide (GlcCer) to generate ceramide. Previously, we demonstrated that lysosomal GBA1 and nonlysosomal GBA2 possess not only GlcCer hydrolase activity, but also transglucosylation activity to transfer the glucose residue from GlcCer to cholesterol to form β-cholesterylglucoside (β-GlcChol) in vitro. β-GlcChol is a member of sterylglycosides present in diverse species. How GBA1 and GBA2 mediate β-GlcChol metabolism in the brain is unknown. Here, we purified and characterized sterylglycosides from rodent and fish brains. Although glucose is thought to be the sole carbohydrate component of sterylglycosides in vertebrates, structural analysis of rat brain sterylglycosides revealed the presence of galactosylated cholesterol (β-GalChol), in addition to β-GlcChol. Analyses of brain tissues from GBA2-deficient mice and GBA1- and/or GBA2-deficient Japanese rice fish (Oryzias latipes) revealed that GBA1 and GBA2 are responsible for β-GlcChol degradation and formation, respectively, and that both GBA1 and GBA2 are responsible for β-GalChol formation. Liquid chromatography–tandem MS revealed that β-GlcChol and β-GalChol are present throughout development from embryo to adult in the mouse brain. We found that β-GalChol expression depends on galactosylceramide (GalCer), and developmental onset of β-GalChol biosynthesis appeared to be during myelination. We also found that β-GlcChol and β-GalChol are secreted from neurons and glial cells in association with exosomes. In vitro enzyme assays confirmed that GBA1 and GBA2 have transgalactosylation activity to transfer the galactose residue from GalCer to cholesterol to form β-GalChol. This is the first report of the existence of β-GalChol in vertebrates and how β-GlcChol and β-GalChol are formed in the brain.




si

An enzyme-based protocol for cell-free synthesis of nature-identical capsular oligosaccharides from Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae serotype 1 [Enzymology]

Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae (App) is the etiological agent of acute porcine pneumonia and responsible for severe economic losses worldwide. The capsule polymer of App serotype 1 (App1) consists of [4)-GlcNAc-β(1,6)-Gal-α-1-(PO4-] repeating units that are O-acetylated at O-6 of the GlcNAc. It is a major virulence factor and was used in previous studies in the successful generation of an experimental glycoconjugate vaccine. However, the application of glycoconjugate vaccines in the animal health sector is limited, presumably because of the high costs associated with harvesting the polymer from pathogen culture. Consequently, here we exploited the capsule polymerase Cps1B of App1 as an in vitro synthesis tool and an alternative for capsule polymer provision. Cps1B consists of two catalytic domains, as well as a domain rich in tetratricopeptide repeats (TPRs). We compared the elongation mechanism of Cps1B with that of a ΔTPR truncation (Cps1B-ΔTPR). Interestingly, the product profiles displayed by Cps1B suggested processive elongation of the nascent polymer, whereas Cps1B-ΔTPR appeared to work in a more distributive manner. The dispersity of the synthesized products could be reduced by generating single-action transferases and immobilizing them on individual columns, separating the two catalytic activities. Furthermore, we identified the O-acetyltransferase Cps1D of App1 and used it to modify the polymers produced by Cps1B. Two-dimensional NMR analyses of the products revealed O-acetylation levels identical to those of polymer harvested from App1 culture supernatants. In conclusion, we have established a protocol for the pathogen-free in vitro synthesis of tailored, nature-identical App1 capsule polymers.




si

Processivity of dextransucrases synthesizing very-high-molar-mass dextran is mediated by sugar-binding pockets in domain V [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

The dextransucrase DSR-OK from the Gram-positive bacterium Oenococcus kitaharae DSM17330 produces a dextran of the highest molar mass reported to date (∼109 g/mol). In this study, we selected a recombinant form, DSR-OKΔ1, to identify molecular determinants involved in the sugar polymerization mechanism and that confer its ability to produce a very-high-molar-mass polymer. In domain V of DSR-OK, we identified seven putative sugar-binding pockets characteristic of glycoside hydrolase 70 (GH70) glucansucrases that are known to be involved in glucan binding. We investigated their role in polymer synthesis through several approaches, including monitoring of dextran synthesis, affinity assays, sugar binding pocket deletions, site-directed mutagenesis, and construction of chimeric enzymes. Substitution of only two stacking aromatic residues in two consecutive sugar-binding pockets (variant DSR-OKΔ1-Y1162A-F1228A) induced quasi-complete loss of very-high-molar-mass dextran synthesis, resulting in production of only 10–13 kg/mol polymers. Moreover, the double mutation completely switched the semiprocessive mode of DSR-OKΔ1 toward a distributive one, highlighting the strong influence of these pockets on enzyme processivity. Finally, the position of each pocket relative to the active site also appeared to be important for polymer elongation. We propose that sugar-binding pockets spatially closer to the catalytic domain play a major role in the control of processivity. A deep structural characterization, if possible with large-molar-mass sugar ligands, would allow confirming this hypothesis.




si

Structural basis of substrate recognition and catalysis by fucosyltransferase 8 [Protein Structure and Folding]

Fucosylation of the innermost GlcNAc of N-glycans by fucosyltransferase 8 (FUT8) is an important step in the maturation of complex and hybrid N-glycans. This simple modification can dramatically affect the activities and half-lives of glycoproteins, effects that are relevant to understanding the invasiveness of some cancers, development of mAb therapeutics, and the etiology of a congenital glycosylation disorder. The acceptor substrate preferences of FUT8 are well-characterized and provide a framework for understanding N-glycan maturation in the Golgi; however, the structural basis of these substrate preferences and the mechanism through which catalysis is achieved remain unknown. Here we describe several structures of mouse and human FUT8 in the apo state and in complex with GDP, a mimic of the donor substrate, and with a glycopeptide acceptor substrate at 1.80–2.50 Å resolution. These structures provide insights into a unique conformational change associated with donor substrate binding, common strategies employed by fucosyltransferases to coordinate GDP, features that define acceptor substrate preferences, and a likely mechanism for enzyme catalysis. Together with molecular dynamics simulations, the structures also revealed how FUT8 dimerization plays an important role in defining the acceptor substrate-binding site. Collectively, this information significantly builds on our understanding of the core fucosylation process.




si

Inhibition of glycosphingolipid biosynthesis reverts multidrug resistance by differentially modulating ABC transporters in chronic myeloid leukemias [Cell Biology]

Multidrug resistance (MDR) in cancer arises from cross-resistance to structurally- and functionally-divergent chemotherapeutic drugs. In particular, MDR is characterized by increased expression and activity of ATP-binding cassette (ABC) superfamily transporters. Sphingolipids are substrates of ABC proteins in cell signaling, membrane biosynthesis, and inflammation, for example, and their products can favor cancer progression. Glucosylceramide (GlcCer) is a ubiquitous glycosphingolipid (GSL) generated by glucosylceramide synthase, a key regulatory enzyme encoded by the UDP-glucose ceramide glucosyltransferase (UGCG) gene. Stressed cells increase de novo biosynthesis of ceramides, which return to sub-toxic levels after UGCG mediates incorporation into GlcCer. Given that cancer cells seem to mobilize UGCG and have increased GSL content for ceramide clearance, which ultimately contributes to chemotherapy failure, here we investigated how inhibition of GSL biosynthesis affects the MDR phenotype of chronic myeloid leukemias. We found that MDR is associated with higher UGCG expression and with a complex GSL profile. UGCG inhibition with the ceramide analog d-threo-1-(3,4,-ethylenedioxy)phenyl-2-palmitoylamino-3-pyrrolidino-1-propanol (EtDO-P4) greatly reduced GSL and monosialotetrahexosylganglioside levels, and co-treatment with standard chemotherapeutics sensitized cells to mitochondrial membrane potential loss and apoptosis. ABC subfamily B member 1 (ABCB1) expression was reduced, and ABCC-mediated efflux activity was modulated by competition with nonglycosylated ceramides. Consistently, inhibition of ABCC-mediated transport reduced the efflux of exogenous C6-ceramide. Overall, UGCG inhibition impaired the malignant glycophenotype of MDR leukemias, which typically overcomes drug resistance through distinct mechanisms. This work sheds light on the involvement of GSL in chemotherapy failure, and its findings suggest that targeted GSL modulation could help manage MDR leukemias.




si

Endorepellin evokes an angiostatic stress signaling cascade in endothelial cells [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

Endorepellin, the C-terminal fragment of the heparan sulfate proteoglycan perlecan, influences various signaling pathways in endothelial cells by binding to VEGFR2. In this study, we discovered that soluble endorepellin activates the canonical stress signaling pathway consisting of PERK, eIF2α, ATF4, and GADD45α. Specifically, endorepellin evoked transient activation of VEGFR2, which, in turn, phosphorylated PERK at Thr980. Subsequently, PERK phosphorylated eIF2α at Ser51, upregulating its downstream effector proteins ATF4 and GADD45α. RNAi-mediated knockdown of PERK or eIF2α abrogated the endorepellin-mediated up-regulation of GADD45α, the ultimate effector protein of this stress signaling cascade. To functionally validate these findings, we utilized an ex vivo model of angiogenesis. Exposure of the aortic rings embedded in 3D fibrillar collagen to recombinant endorepellin for 2–4 h activated PERK and induced GADD45α vis à vis vehicle-treated counterparts. Similar effects were obtained with the established cellular stress inducer tunicamycin. Notably, chronic exposure of aortic rings to endorepellin for 7–9 days markedly suppressed vessel sprouting, an angiostatic effect that was rescued by blocking PERK kinase activity. Our findings unravel a mechanism by which an extracellular matrix protein evokes stress signaling in endothelial cells, which leads to angiostasis.




si

Re: Face masks for the public during the covid-19 crisis




si

Classifying deaths from COVID-19: Why the official statistics will never reflect the true mortality from coronavirus, and how future studies could try to address this




si

Re: Covid-19: Brazil’s president rallies supporters against social distancing




si

Re: Prognosis of unrecognised myocardial infarction determined by electrocardiography or cardiac magnetic resonance imaging: systematic review and meta-analysis




si

Rising drug prices drive US manufacturers’ revenues, analysis finds




si

Double vision




si

US drug costs are rising faster than overall health spending, officials report




si

Environment may play significant role in multiple sclerosis




si

Australian neuroscientist given two year suspended sentence for falsifying Parkinson's research




si

Health anxiety: the silent, disabling epidemic




si

South Dakota illegally placed disabled people in nursing homes, federal investigation finds




si

“Impressive results” in stem cell treatment for multiple sclerosis




si

Disease modifying therapies for relapsing multiple sclerosis