Public housing has long been criticized as a breeding ground for concentrated poverty, under-achieving schools and for its lack of access to services. As a means to expand opportunity to some of the nation’s most impoverished communities, the Obama administration has proposed the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, a program that aims to take the current HOPE VI program beyond public housing by transforming these neighborhoods in a new way.

Video

• Choice Neighborhoods Initiative will Revitalize Poor Communities

      

Since December 2007, working families and communities across the country have faced an increasingly difficult economic reality. Growing unemployment and cutbacks in work hours and wages have made it harder and harder for people to make ends meet.

So the census numbers released in September really just confirmed what many Americans have already been feeling during this “Great Recession.” U.S. poverty is once again on the rise. In the first year of the downturn alone, the poor population grew by 2.6 million people to reach a total of 39.8 million, or 13.2 percent of the population.

But that’s not the whole story. The national lens obscures an important fact: place matters. Yes, 2008 brought a significant uptick in poverty, but whether or not your community was a part of this trend has a lot to do with where you live and what kind of jobs are located there.

Certain regions of the country have disproportionately borne the brunt of this recession. Areas hit hardest by the collapse of the housing market and those metro areas that depend on auto manufacturing have experienced the deepest downturns, while regions concentrated in more recession-proof industries – like educational and medical institutions or government – have fared better.

The 2008 poverty numbers reflect this varied experience. Out of the 100 largest metros areas, a little more than one in five saw a significant change in its poverty rate between 2007 and 2008, most of them increases (see map). Not surprisingly, many of these metro areas are located in California and Florida. The early timing of the burst of the housing bubble put these Sun Belt metro areas on the leading edge of what is sure to be a more widespread upward trend in poverty, reflecting a recession that deepened and spread in 2009. In contrast, metro areas like El Paso and Houston actually experienced a decline in poverty rates from 2007 to 2008, reflecting the later onset and milder effects of the downturn in much of Texas.

Although they represent regional economies, metro areas are themselves collections of cities and suburbs that do not necessarily experience poverty or respond to economic shocks uniformly.

Cities remain poorer places overall. In 2008, city residents in the 100 largest metro areas were almost twice as likely as their suburban counterparts to live in poverty—18.3 percent versus 9.5 percent. However, over the first year of the downturn, suburbs actually added more than twice as many poor people (578,000) as cities (218,000). Sun Belt suburbs – like those in the Florida metros of Lakeland, Palm Bay, Tampa, and Miami – led the list for increased poverty. These numbers reflect the fact that the suburbs are home to more people than their primary cities, but they also reflect the growing economic diversity of America’s suburbs.

In fact, an important shift has taken place in the geography of metropolitan poverty over the course of this decade. Between 2000 and 2008, the suburban poor population grew almost five times as fast as the city poor population, so that suburbs are now home to almost 1.9 million more poor people than their primary cities.

Brookings’ recent study on the “Landscape of Recession” within the country’s largest metro areas suggests that the current downturn will further accelerate the suburbanization of poverty.

More so than in the last recession, suburbs are bearing the brunt of this downturn alongside cities. City and suburban unemployment rates increased by nearly equal degrees and in May 2009 were separated by less than a percentage point—9.6 and 8.7 percent, respectively. And rather than concentrating in the older suburbs that surround cities, problems have spread to lower-density “exurbs” and “emerging suburbs” at the metropolitan fringe. These types of suburban communities showed the greatest spikes in their unemployed populations, with an increase of roughly 77 percent.

Clearly, city and suburban residents alike are experiencing increased economic stress, and the coming months and years will test the adequacy and availability of local safety net and emergency services. Here again, place makes a difference.

Case in point: as poverty increased in 2008, more families turned to food stamps (now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP) to help make ends meet. Just as the poor population grew faster in the suburbs, so did SNAP receipt. And yet participation in the program remains much higher in urban counties (8.9 million recipients) than suburban counties (5.3 million recipients). This disparity raises questions about whether families in suburban communities know how to connect to safety net services like food stamps, and how accessible these services are in these communities.

Understanding the shifting local geography of poverty is a critical first step in effectively addressing its alleviation. In our largest metropolitan areas, safety net services and social service providers traditionally have been concentrated in central city neighborhoods. As the geography of metropolitan poverty continues to change, policymakers and service providers must ask whether or not the growing suburban poor population has access to the same kinds of services and programs that can help families weather downturns in the economic cycle or connect to opportunities to work their way out of poverty.

The Great Recession is only likely to exacerbate gaps between available services and growing need, as government programs and nonprofit providers struggle to do more with less. Knowing where the need is, and where it is growing fastest, can help regions more effectively align existing social services and programs to respond to the new map of metropolitan poverty.

Editor's Note: This article originally appeared in the online forum Spotlight on Poverty and Opportunity on October 19, 2009.

      

An important federal program that tends to fly under the radar received some unprecedented real estate this past weekend--an enormous spread on page A1 of Sunday’s New York Times.

Jason DeParle’s article, and some nifty interactive maps on the Times website, portray the recent rapid growth of the food stamp program, now officially known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or by its rather unfortunate acronym, SNAP. DeParle documents how, in the wake of welfare reform in the mid-1990s, successive administrations--from Clinton to Bush, and now Obama--have worked in a bipartisan fashion to erase the stigma that once haunted the program, and ensure that eligible families receive access to its benefits.

Because welfare reform transformed what was an individual entitlement into a block grant to states, cash welfare caseloads in many states have remained relatively flat despite the worst recession in generations. As a result, food stamps--which remain a federal entitlement--have become an even more important countercyclical tool for fighting poverty, and enrollment has expanded by about one-third since 2007. DeParle charts that rise over the past two years across a broad cross-section of U.S. communities, all of which are feeling the economic pain of rising foreclosures, mounting job losses, and declining family incomes.

Of particular note, the article discusses the significant increases in food stamp receipt occurring in many suburban communities, now that a majority of the nation’s metropolitan poor live outside central cities. Indeed, the counties in which food stamp receipt has doubled, and which have at least 5,000 recipients today, are largely suburbs--around Atlanta, Florida’s Gulf Coast, Austin, and Youngstown. As my colleagues Elizabeth Kneebone and Emily Garr reported earlier this year, however, increases in food stamp enrollment in outer suburban counties have been somewhat lower than might be expected based on the rapid unemployment increases they have suffered. Lack of familiarity, distance to the nearest welfare office, stigma, or real eligibility differences may be to blame for under-enrollment in these farther-out areas.

All of which is to say, as food stamps become the de facto federal support system for millions of families during the next few years of elevated unemployment, plugging participation gaps in suburbia may be an important new frontier for fighting hunger and poverty in America.

      

Two years after the country entered the Great Recession, there are signs the national economy has slowly begun to recover. Thus far recovery has meant the return of economic growth, but not the return of jobs. And just as some communities have felt the downturn more than others, recovery has not and will not be shared equally across the nation’s diverse metropolitan economies.

Within metropolitan areas, many communities continue to struggle with high unemployment and increasing economic and fiscal challenges, while at the same time poverty and the need for emergency and support services continue to rise. Even under the best case scenario of a sustained and robust recovery, cities and suburbs throughout the nation will be dealing with the social and economic aftermath of such a deep and lengthy recession for some time to come.

An analysis of unemployment, initial Unemployment Insurance claims, and receipt of Supplementary Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps) benefits in urban and suburban communities over the course of the Great Recession reveals that:

• Between December 2007 and December 2009, city and suburban unemployment rates in large metro areas increased by roughly the same degree (5.1 versus 4.8 percentage points, respectively). By December 2009, the gap between city and suburban unemployment rates was one percentage point (10.3 percent versus 9.3 percent)—smaller than 24 months after the start of the first recession of the decade (1.7 percentage points) and the downturn in the early 1990s (2.2 percentage points).
  
  
• Western metro areas exhibited the greatest increases in city and suburban unemployment rates—5.8 and 5.6 percentage points—over the two-year period ending in December of 2009. Increases in unemployment rates tilted more toward primary cities in Northeastern metro areas (a 5.3 percentage-point increase versus 4.2 percentage points in the suburbs), while suburbs saw slightly larger increases in the South (5.0 versus 4.4 percentage points).
  
  
• Initial Unemployment Insurance (UI) claims increased considerably between December 2007 and December 2009 in urban and suburban areas alike. The largest increases in requests for UI occurred in the first year of the downturn—led by lower-density suburbs—with new claims beginning to taper off between December of 2008 and 2009.
  
  
• SNAP receipt increased steeply and steadily between January 2008 and July 2009 across both urban and suburban counties. Urban counties remain home to the largest number of SNAP recipients, though suburban counties saw enrollment increase at a slightly faster pace during the downturn—36.1 percent compared to 29.4 percent in urban counties.
  

Even as signs point to a tentative economic recovery for the nation, metropolitan areas throughout the country continue to struggle with high unemployment. Within these regions, the negative effects of this downturn—as measured by changes in unemployment and demand for safety net services—have been shared across cities and suburbs alike. Standardizing sub-state data collection and reporting across programs would better enable policymakers and services providers to effectively track indicators of recovery and need in the nation’s largest labor markets.

Read the Full Paper » (PDF)
Read the Related Report: Job Sprawl and the Suburbanization of Poverty »

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• Full Paper
• Appendix A
• Appendix B
• Appendix C

      

When my wife and I relocated from D.C.’s Logan Circle to Capitol Hill five years ago, the most tumultuous change in our lifestyle (aside from my not being able to walk to Brookings every day) concerned the much farther distance we’d have to travel to the nearest supermarket. We had the luxury of shopping at a very nice, if spendy, grocery store about two blocks from our home, which meant that we often did “just-in-time” dinner shopping on the way home from work. Now we were moving to a house where the distance to the nearest supermarket was 1.5 miles, not so walkable at 7 pm.

Did we live in a “supermarket desert?” On the one hand, Capitol Hill is a pretty densely populated part of D.C., so 1.5 miles felt like a long way. And while the Hill is an economically diverse area, it’s large with significant pockets of affluence. On the other hand, like a lot of our neighbors, we own a car. So while nightly trips to the supermarket were out, it was hardly an onerous trip on the weekends.

There are, however, many communities nationwide in which that trip to the supermarket is a long one, and most have much lower incomes than the Hill. That’s the conclusion from new research we conducted with help from The Reinvestment Fund (TRF), a community development financial institution and research organization based in Philadelphia. TRF played a lead role in designing and implementing the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative, a program that provides grants and low-cost capital to facilitate the location of new supermarkets and fresh food retailers in that state’s underserved communities. That initiative is now the model for several other state and local programs, as well as the inspiration for a major new federal budget initiative that seeks to improve community health and economic development outcomes through supermarket attraction and expansion.

With TRF, we looked at 10 metro areas across the country, ranging in size from Jackson, Miss. to Los Angeles. Unlike a lot of previous research that attempted to identify “food deserts,” TRF’s analysis looks at factors beyond distance to a supermarket that matter for access, including a community’s population density and level of car ownership. And it uses household income and expenditure data to help pinpoint the communities that have a significant untapped local demand for supermarkets.

Across the 10 metro areas, about 1.7 million people (5 percent of total population) live in low- and moderate-income communities that are significantly underserved by supermarkets. African Americans, children, and very low-income families are over-represented in these areas. Greater Los Angeles alone accounts for half a million of the underserved; and in the Cleveland metro, more than one in nine residents lives in a low-supermarket-access community. Estimates suggest that upwards of $2.6 billion annually in grocery expenditures may “leak” out of these communities due to a lack of nearby supermarkets.

The real upside of this research project is that all of the results are viewable online, through TRF’s PolicyMap service. So local economic development officials, neighborhood-based organizations, retailers, and others can examine the location and characteristics of low-supermarket-access areas in their own communities. On Capitol Hill, the analysis suggests that we’re pretty well served. Lots of car owners, and it’s really not that far to the store. Cross the Anacostia River, however, and it’s another story altogether. Pinpointing and describing the untapped opportunities for supermarket development is hopefully a first step toward reducing market obstacles to higher-quality, lower-cost food options for residents of communities like Ward 7 and Ward 8 nationwide.

      

The Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program and The Reinvestment Fund (TRF) performed a detailed analysis of supermarket access in 10 metropolitan areas, and the results are discussed in a new video, “Getting to Market."

Results from the analysis encourage users to view the locations of, and generate reports about, low-supermarket-access communities within the 10 metropolitan areas. This is highly useful data for those working at the national and local levels to tackle the problem of inadequate access through public policy and private investment. You can also access these data alongside any of PolicyMap’s 10,000 data indicators and full functionality at www.policymap.com

For those interested in other metropolitan areas, TRF has made available a nationwide analysis of low-supermarket-access communities at www.trfund.com.

Media Memo »


Profiles of 10 Metropolitan Areas (PDFs)

Atlanta, GA	Little Rock, AR
Baltimore, MD	Los Angeles, CA
Cleveland, OH	Louisville, KY
Jackson, MS	Phoenix, AZ
Las Vegas, NV	San Francisco, CA

Below are samples of data found on our interactive map

Map of the San Francisco area showing Low Access Areas with the access score for the area. Access scores are the degree to which a low/moderate-income community's residents are underserved by supermarkets.

Map of Baltimore showing Low Access Areas against the estimated percentage of families that live in poverty.

Map of Cleveland showing Low Access Areas against the estimated population above the age of 65.

Video

• Supermarket Access in Metro Areas

      

Martha Ross spoke to the Advisory Board of the Community Foundation for Prince George’s County, describing research on the suburbanization of poverty both nationally and in the Washington region.

Despite perceptions that economic distress is primarily a central city phenomenon, suburbs are home to increasing numbers of low-income families. She highlighted the need to strengthen the social service infrastructure in suburban areas.

Full Presentation on Poverty in the Washington-Area Suburbs » (PDF)

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• Full Presentation

       

As the first decade of the 2000s drew to a close, the two downturns that bookended the period, combined with slow job growth between, clearly took their toll on the nation’s less fortunate residents.

Over a ten-year span, the country saw the poor population grow by 12.3 million, driving the total number of Americans in poverty to a historic high of 46.2 million. By the end of the decade, over 15 percent of the nation’s population lived below the federal poverty line—$22,314 for a family of four in 2010—though these increases did not occur evenly throughout the country.

An analysis of data on neighborhood poverty from the 2005–09 American Community Surveys and Census 2000 reveals that:

After declining in the 1990s, the population in extreme-poverty neighborhoods—where at least 40 percent of individuals live below the poverty line—rose by one-third from 2000 to 2005–09. By the end of the period, 10.5 percent of poor people nationwide lived in such neighborhoods, up from 9.1 percent in 2000, but still well below the 14.1 percent rate in 1990.

Concentrated poverty nearly doubled in Midwestern metro areas from 2000 to 2005–09, and rose by one-third in Southern metro areas. The Great Lakes metro areas of Toledo, Youngstown, Detroit, and Dayton ranked among those experiencing the largest increases in concentrated poverty rates, while the South was home to metro areas posting both some of the largest increases (El Paso, Baton Rouge, and Jackson) and decreases (McAllen, Virginia Beach, and Charleston). At the same time, concentrated poverty declined in Western metro areas, a trend which may have reversed in the wake of the late 2000s housing crisis.

The population in extreme-poverty neighborhoods rose more than twice as fast in suburbs as in cities from 2000 to 2005–09. The same is true of poor residents in extreme-poverty tracts, who increased by 41 percent in suburbs, compared to 17 percent in cities. However, poor people in cities remain more than four times as likely to live in concentrated poverty as their suburban counterparts.

The shift of concentrated poverty to the Midwest and South in the 2000s altered the average demographic profile of extreme-poverty neighborhoods. Compared to 2000, residents of extreme-poverty neighborhoods in 2005–09 were more likely to be white, native-born, high school or college graduates, homeowners, and not receiving public assistance. However, black residents continued to comprise the largest share of the population in these neighborhoods (45 percent), and over two-thirds of residents had a high school diploma or less.

The recession-induced rise in poverty in the late 2000s likely further increased the concentration of poor individuals into neighborhoods of extreme poverty. While the concentrated poverty rate in large metro areas grew by half a percentage point between 2000 and 2005–09, estimates suggest the concentrated poverty rate rose by 3.5 percentage points in 2010 alone, to reach 15.1 percent. Some of the steepest estimated increases compared to 2005–09 occurred in Sun Belt metro areas like Cape Coral, Fresno, Modesto, and Palm Bay, and in Midwestern places like Indianapolis, Grand Rapids, and Akron.

These trends suggest the strong economy of the late 1990s did not permanently resolve the challenge of concentrated poverty. The slower economic growth of the 2000s, followed by the worst downturn in decades, led to increases in neighborhoods of extreme poverty once again throughout the nation, particularly in suburban and small metropolitan communities and in the Midwest. Policies that foster balanced and sustainable economic growth at the regional level, and that forge connections between growing clusters of low-income neighborhoods and regional economic opportunity, will be key to longer-term progress against concentrated disadvantage.

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• Download the Full Paper

Video

• Concentrated Poverty Grips Communities

       

Buried in the middle of Table 1 in our new paper, Growth still is good for the poor, is a remarkable statistic: in a sample of 118 countries the average change in the income share of the bottom quintile of the population during the 2000s was 0.004. This is a small change, but what is striking is that it is positive. A common concern these days is that the people in the bottom part of the income distribution are being left behind. But these data show that there is no global trend in that direction. Similarly for the income share of the bottom 40%, there is no trend across countries, either in the 2000s or in earlier decades.

The other striking finding in this study, written together with Tatjana Kleineberg of Yale and Aart Kraay of the World Bank, is that changes in income share of the poor are uncorrelated with growth. In general, the relationship between the growth of mean income and the growth of income of the bottom 20% (or bottom 40%) is one-to-one; hence the title. Furthermore, about three-fourths of the variation in income of the poor across countries and over time can be accounted for by growth of average income. There are some interesting exceptions to the one-to-one relationship: Latin America in the 2000s had pro-poor growth with income of the poor rising significantly faster than mean income, while Asia had the opposite, pro-rich growth. We try to explain the changes in income share of the poor with a large number of variables covering dimensions of globalization, macroeconomic policy, and social policy (for example, government expenditure on health and education, primary school enrollment, or Gini coefficient on educational attainment). This part of the paper leads to a non-result: there are no robust correlates with changes in income shares.

What are the policy implications? I see both good news and bad news here. The fact that there is no worldwide trend towards lower income shares for the poor is good news. If there were such a trend it would suggest that globalization or some other general force was biased against the poor, and it would be hard to resist such a trend. But that is not the case. The rising inequality that we see in the U.S., for example, is not a general trend in rich countries. Other countries have found ways to maintain or increase the income share of the poor. It is also good news that growth will tend to raise the income of the poor proportionately, as it should always be possible to get most of the population to support a growth agenda. On the other hand, to the extent that we care about poverty reduction, it is bad news that we cannot explain what leads to changes in income shares of the poor and in particular what might bring about pro-poor growth.

Our findings do not imply that interventions aimed directly at the poor are pointless. But given the key role of growth in poverty reduction I favor interventions that build up the assets of the poor and enable them to participate in the market economy. A good example would be programs to ensure that the poor have access to maternal and child health services and early childhood education. Intuitively, you may think that such programs should shift income distribution in favor of the poor, and perhaps in some cases they do. But it also possible that the programs have powerful spillover benefits for the whole economy (more skilled labor, less crime – not to mention that the next potential Einstein will probably be born to a poor family in the developing world). If programs aimed at the poor have the side effect of stimulating the whole economy we should be happy about the higher growth, not disappointed that it is not pro-poor.

Read and download the paper at worldbank.org »

       

Seattle Mayor Ed Murray recently announced a plan to raise the minimum wage in his city to $15/hour over the next few years. The plan emerged from a special business/labor advisory committee, approved by 21 out of 24 its members, after four months of hearings, academic studies, and debate . The measure awaits approval by the City Council, but the move to $15/hour in Seattle seems well underway.

Seattle may be the first, but it won’t be the last, city to take this bold step. Granted, there were some peculiarities in Seattle’s case, including a $15/hour minimum wage ballot initiative that succeeded in the nearby city of SeaTac in November, and the election of a new Socialist Party Seattle City Council member who campaigned on the issue. But with inequality taking center stage as a political issue in big cities around the country, mayors, businesses, and labor advocates are watching Seattle closely.

However, the focus on big cities shouldn’t obscure the fact that wages are a function of regional economics. Seattle is indeed a big city, with 635,000 residents and (by our count) nearly 500,000 jobs. But it’s only part of King County, Washington, which has roughly 2 million residents and more than 1 million jobs. And King County is just one of three counties that make up the wider Seattle metropolitan area, with a population of 3.5 million and 1.8 million jobs.

While low-wage jobs are prevalent in Seattle, they’re even more prevalent in its nearby suburbs. Using data from the American Community Survey, my colleague Sid Kulkarni and I calculated that between 2009 and 2011, there were on average 149,000 jobs (full-time and part-time) in the city of Seattle that paid less than $15/hour. Over the same period, the remainder of King County had an average of 216,000 jobs that paid hourly wages below that threshold. These low-wage jobs represented 30 percent of all jobs in Seattle, and 34 percent of all jobs in the rest of King County.

It stands to reason that low-wage jobs are more suburban than high-wage jobs. Typically, the highest-value jobs in a region are located in central cities. High-paying sectors like finance, advanced health care, information technology (Redmond notwithstanding), and higher education tend to be more urban than suburban. Yes, cities also have lots of low-paying jobs in hospitality and retail, but so do suburbs. Those jobs tend to follow people, and most people in major metro areas live in suburbs. As my colleague Elizabeth Kneebone has found, as population sprawls, so does low-wage work.

To be sure, many people who live in the King County suburbs of Seattle will benefit from a $15/hour Seattle minimum wage, because they work in the city. According to a University of Washington study conducted for Mayor Murray’s Income Inequality Advisory Committee, fully four in 10 people who earn less than $15/hour working in Seattle jobs—and who would thus presumably benefit from the minimum wage increase—live outside of the city. That’s particularly important in a region like Greater Seattle, where suburbs are home to most of the poor. At the same time, the UW study finds that nearly as many Seattle residents in sub-$15/hour jobs work outside the city limits.

None of this amounts to an argument against Seattle taking the first step toward increasing its minimum wage. Residential and commercial demand is so strong in the city these days that Seattle may have more latitude than its suburbs to boost its minimum wage significantly without encountering negative employment effects. And maybe the city needs to move first in order to convince its neighbors (and itself) that a $15/hour minimum wage won’t make the sky fall.

But these statistics offer an important reminder that the problems of low wages, inequality, and social mobility do not stop at city borders. Ultimately, more cities might try acting in coordination with their surrounding jurisdictions, as the District of Columbia did with two Maryland counties, to boost their minimum wages and ameliorate any “border effects.” And as Seattle contemplates other key policy initiatives, like universal preschool and backfilling state cuts to transit funding (a King County ballot initiative failed last month), it should keep open the lines of communication with its neighbors, and act as one county—or region—where it can.

       

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• Appendix Tables

       

Gentrification – the migration of wealthier people into poorer neighborhoods – is a contentious issue in most American cities. Many fear that even if gentrification helps a city in broad terms, for instance by improving the tax base, it will be bad news for low-income residents who are hit by rising rents or even displacement. But this received wisdom is only partially true.

The Problem of Concentrated Poverty

A recent study published by City Observatory, an urban policy think-tank, and written by economist and former Brookings scholar Joseph Cortright with Dillon Mahmoudi , challenges this prevailing pessimism.  Examining population and income changes between 1970 and 2010 in the largest cities, they find that the poverty concentration, rather than gentrification, is the real problem for the urban poor.  

Cortright and Mahmoudi examine more than 16,000 census tracts[1] – small, relatively stable, statistical subdivisions (smaller than the zip code), of a city – within ten miles of the central business districts of the 51 largest cities. Their key findings are:

1. High-poverty neighborhoods tripled between 1970 and 2010: The number of census tracts considered “high-poverty” rose from around 1,100 in 1970 to 3,100 in 2010. Surprisingly, of these newly-impoverished areas, more than half were healthy neighborhoods in 1970, before descending into “high-poverty” status by 2010. Our Brookings colleague Elizabeth Kneebone has documented similar patterns in the concentration of poverty around large cities.
2. Poverty is persistent: Two-thirds of the census tracts defined as “high-poverty” in 1970 (with greater than 30% of residents living below the poverty line), were still “high-poverty” areas in 2010. And another one-quarter of neighborhoods escaped “high-poverty” but remained poorer than the national average (about 15% of population below FPL )
3. Few high-poverty neighborhoods escape poverty: Only about 9 percent of the census tracts that were “high-poverty” in 1970 rebounded to levels of poverty below the national average in 2010.

The Damage of Concentrated Poverty

Being poor is obviously bad, but being poor in a really poor neighborhood is even worse. The work of urban sociologists like Harvard’s Robert J. Sampson and New York University’s Patrick Sharkey  highlights how persistent, concentrated neighborhood disadvantage has damaging effects on children that continue throughout a lifetime, often stifling upward mobility across generations.  When a community experiences uniform and deep poverty, with most streets characterized by dilapidated housing, failing schools, teenage pregnancy and heavy unemployment, it appears to create a culture of despair that can permanently blight a young person’s future.

Gentrification: Potentially Benign Disruption

So what has been the impact of gentrification in the few places where it has occurred? There is some evidence, crisply summarized in a recent article by John Buntin in Slate, that it might not be all bad news in terms of poverty. A degree of gentrification can begin to break up the homogenous poverty of neighborhoods in ways that can be good for all residents. New wealthier residents may demand improvements in schools and crime control. Retail offerings and services may improve for all residents – and bring new jobs, too. Gentrifiers can change neighborhoods in ways that begin to counteract the effects of uniform, persistent poverty.  On the other hand, gentrification can hurt low-income households by disrupting the social fabric of neighborhoods and potentially “pricing out” families. It depends on how it’s done. We’ll turn to that tomorrow. 

       

Poverty is heavily concentrated in a growing number of urban neighborhoods, which as we argued yesterday, is bad news for social mobility. By breaking up semi-permanent poverty patterns, a degree of gentrification can bring in new resources, energy and opportunities.

Gentrification and poverty: A contested relationship

As we noted yesterday, work by Cortright and Mahmoudi suggests that almost 10% of high-poverty neighborhoods escaped the poverty trap between 1970 and 2010—especially in Chicago, New York, and Washington D.C. Is this good or bad news for the residents of these formerly very poor neighborhoods?

Researchers disagree: the standard fear, supported by a considerable body of qualitative research, is that low-income families will be priced out and displaced out of improving neighborhoods. But there is growing evidence in the economics literature that casts doubt on prevailing views about the risks of displacement. These neighborhoods may become mixed neighborhoods rather than switching from homogenously poor to homogenously wealthy. This could be good news for the poor households who are now living in non-poor areas.

Gentrification: It depends how you do it

Whether gentrification benefits the poor depends in part on the nature of the process. Gentrification is not all the same. Gentrification can mean “walled-up” and gated communities for the wealthy and it can sometimes create damaging disruptions in the tenuous social fabric of neighborhoods, such that there are few beneficial spillover effects of from gentrification.

So while many neighborhoods previously mired in poverty may experience positive impacts from gentrification, others may be directly hurt by it. According to an extensive literature review by the Urban Institute, the impact of living in mixed-income communities for low-income families varies quite widely. Low-income families tend to benefit from improvements in neighborhood services, but the effects on their education and economic outcomes are unclear.   

Some cities, such as Washington DC, have started using their regulatory powers to require developers to preserve or expand modest-income housing alongside higher-priced housing. It is too early to assess the impact of these programs so, but such “smart” gentrification policies may be a good strategy to turn around chronically poor neighborhoods in ways that benefit the original population.

One advantage of the migration of wealthier people into depressed neighborhoods is the restoration and use of dilapidated buildings, which can have positive spillover effects throughout the community. But there are other ways to achieve this, including investments in charter or community schools and other community institutions that then become “hubs” for a range of medical and other services, as well as improved education.

Gentrification certainly comes with attendant dangers for low-income families, which policy makers should be on guard against. But it comes with potential benefits too, so we should be careful about simply “protecting” neighborhoods from the process.  Policies and regulations that insulate impoverished neighborhoods from gentrification could end up condemning these communities to yet another generation of deep poverty and segregation. 

       

In “Water Crimes: a Global Crisis on the Rise,” a lecture given on February 20, 2015 at Brookings Mountain West Lecture Series, Vanda Felbab-Brown explains that urbanization, population growth, environmental degradation, water pollution, climate change, and increased living standards are some of the main reasons for intense competition for water. As surface water depletes, there is increased pressure for ground water usage, which is more difficult to regulate for use, abuse, and theft. Water theft and smuggling are perpetrated by both the wealthy and those who are chronically deprived of water, says Felbab-Brown, as she provides examples from California, southern Europe, Nigeria, Kenya, the Middle East, and South Asia. In many parts of world, elaborate smuggling of water with complex network chains and water mafias has emerged. Smuggling modes vary and among others include the development of illegal pipelines, illegal truck deliveries as well as the cooptation of water regulators complicit in licensing fraud and broader government acquiescence to illegal water delivery. Illegally sourced and smuggled water is used for personal consumption, agriculture, industry, and sometimes for other other illegal activities, such as the production of illegal narcotics.

For many reasons, the illegal use and delivery of water is difficult to address, says Felbab-Brown. Large-scale agriculture and industry often exercise great influence over regulators and law enforcement. In slum areas, mostly unconnected to legal pipelines, the suppression of illegal water distribution can sever access to water and hence threaten the physical survival of the most marginalized and poor. Across the world, citizens tend to be vehemently opposed to increased water pricing. Yet without effective regulation, appropriate pricing, and suppression of water crimes, the sustainability, long-term viability, and inclusive and equitable use of water cannot easily be achieved.

Among the ways to improve water policy and suppress water smuggling, Felbab-Brown notes: (1) Recognizing the extent of water misuse, abuse, and crimes; (2) developing better inventories and water-level monitoring capacity, better regulation, including pricing, greater transparency, and a broadly-based external oversight of water authorities; (3) increasing stakeholder-participation of water regulation, including farmers, businesses, and the poor who are traditionally excluded; and (4) selectively licensing some currently illegal water distributors to areas without legal water distribution systems while cracking down on the most usury, unreliable, and abusive ones. Looking ahead, coping with scarcity will require not just more innovation, but particularly better conservation.

       

Inequality remained a prominent theme in public debate during 2015, likely helped by the unexpected rise and resilience of democratic socialist Bernie Sanders' run for the Democratic presidential nomination. Although the labor market continued its slow recovery, wage growth remained fairly weak—especially for middle and low earners. The upper middle class continues to pull away from the middle, not least in terms of income and wealth.

But it has also become much clearer that inequality is a geographical issue, as much as a social and economic one. Whether the focus is on the more immediate matter of income inequality or the slower-burning issue of intergenerational mobility, there is huge variation between different places in the United States.

Not all cities are created equal…

National income trends are important, of course. But they can often disguise deep differences by place. The income required to be ‘rich,’ at least by comparison to those around you, varies significantly between different cities, for example. A household income of $100,000 puts you on almost on the top rung (around the 95^th percentile) of the income ladder in Detroit. But to reach the same heights in San Jose, California, you’d need an income three times as great, according to calculations by my colleague Alan Berube.

There are also very large differences in the extent of income inequality in different metropolitan areas. Using the inequality measure used in another recent paper by Berube, the ratio between incomes at the 20^th percentile and the 95^th percentile, shows that while some cities have large gaps between rich and poor, others look almost Scandinavian in their egalitarian distributions. Here are the 20/95 ratios for the three most equal and unequal cities in the U.S.:

Intergenerational mobility varies—a lot—by place

In a groundbreaking research paper in 2014, Raj Chetty and his team at the Equality of Opportunity Project at Harvard showed that rates of intergenerational income mobility also vary considerably between different cities. It was always a stretch to compare the U.S. to Denmark on this front, given the colossal differences between the countries. But such comparisons became virtually unconscionable once the variations within the U.S. become apparent.

This year, Chetty and his co-author Nathaniel Hendren went a step further and a big step closer to showing a causal impact of place on the prospects for children raised in different locations. Again relying on large administrative datasets, the two scholars were able to show the variation in earnings for the folk hailing from, say, Baltimore versus Baton Rouge.

Professor Chetty presented his new research at a Brookings event in June (which you can view here), just weeks after the eruption of protest and violence in Baltimore following the death of Freddie Gray. One striking finding was that the worst place in America to grow up, in terms of subsequent earnings, is Baltimore City. Critically, Chetty’s research design allows him to show that these differences do not reflect the characteristics of the people of Baltimore; but the characteristics of Baltimore itself. This downward effect on earnings is particularly bad for boys, as we highlighted in an earlier blog:

In related work, Chetty and his colleagues also show that children who move to a better place see an improvement in their own earnings—and that the younger they are when they move, the bigger the impact. The children of families who move as a result of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to Opportunity program showed sizable improvements in their own outcomes, as Jonathan Rothwell highlighted in his blog, 'Sociology’s revenge: Moving to Opportunity (MTO) revisited.'

Race, place and opportunity

One of the findings from Chetty’s earlier work is that race, place, and opportunity intersect in important ways. Cities with more segregation, and those with larger black populations, tend to show weaker upward mobility patterns. In order to understand the obstacles to upward mobility, policymakers have to adopt both a place-conscious (Margery Turner) and a race-conscious perspective. This policy was the subject of another Brookings event in November, with contributions from the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, the Governor of Delaware, and the Mayor of Newton, Mass. (The event can still be viewed here; for my highlights see this piece.) Being poor and black is generally not the same as being poor and white. Being poor in Cleveland is not the same as being poor in Charlotte.

On equal opportunity: think local, act local

Many states and cities are upping their game on issues of equality and opportunity, for both bad and good reasons. The bad reason is the relative inertia of the federal government. The good reason is a growing recognition that many of the levers for improving opportunity lie in the hands of institutions and agents at the state and metro level. Colorado has adopted a life-cycle opportunity framework and is pioneering efforts to integrate health and social policy. Charlotte has a high-profile taskforce (which I advise) on improving opportunity. Cincinnati has pledged to lift 10,000 children out of poverty within five years. Louisville is leading a push on school desegregation. Kalamazoo is adding greater student supports to its existing promise of free college. Baltimore’s program to reduce infant mortality has shown remarkable success. Durham, N.C. has rolled out a universal home visiting program.

Many of these efforts are building on the emerging ideas around 'collective impact,' harnessing local resources of many kinds around a clearly-articulated, shared goal. Given the scholarship showing just how much particular places influences individual and broader outcomes, this is likely to be where much of the most important policy development will take place in coming years. In terms of equality—and especially equality of opportunity—we need to think local, and act local, too.

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

Editor's Note: On December 3, Richard Bush delivered testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Read his testimony below and watch the hearing online.

There has been a wide range of views in Hong Kong about the value of democratic elections.

So far, the Chinese government has consistently chosen to engineer the Hong Kong electoral system so that no individual it mistrusts could be elected chief executive (CE) and no political coalition that it fears could win control of the Legislative Council (or LegCo). To elect the chief executive, it created an election committee composed mainly of people it trusts. For LegCo, it established functional constituencies that give special representation to establishment economic and social groups. These functional constituencies together pick half the members of LegCo. As a result, Hong Kong’s economic elite has dominated those institutions.

Major economic interests in Hong Kong have been happy with the current set-up because it provides them with privileged access to decision-making and the ability to block initiatives proposed by the democratic camp. Within this establishment, there is long-standing belief that majority rule would create irresistible demands for a welfare state, which would raise taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals and sap Hong Kong’s competitiveness.

The public, on the other hand, supports democratization. In the most representative election races (for some LegCo seats), candidates of the pro-democracy parties together get 55 to 60 percent of the vote. Those parties have tried for over twenty years to make the electoral system more representative and to eliminate the ability of Beijing and the establishment to control political outcomes.  But there are divisions within the pan-democratic camp between moderate and radical factions, based on the degree of mistrust of Beijing’s intentions.

There is a working class party and a labor confederation that supports Beijing and is supported by it. On electoral reform, it has followed China’s lead.

Of course, any electoral system requires the protection of political rights. The Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law protected those rights on paper, and the judiciary generally has upheld them. But there are serious concerns in Hong Kong that political rights are now being whittled away.

The August 31^st decision of the PRC National People’s Congress-Standing Committee on the 2017 Chief Executive election confirmed the fears of Hong Kong’s pan-democratic camp that Beijing does not intend to create a genuinely democratic electoral system. That decision almost guaranteed there would be with some kind of public protest.

Before August 31^st, there had been some hope in Hong Kong that China’s leaders would set flexible parameters for the 2017 election of the chief executive, flexible enough to allow an election in which candidates that represented the range of local opinions could compete on a level playing field. Instead, the rules the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress laid down were interpreted as ensuring that Beijing and the local Hong Kong establishment, by controlling the nominating committee, could screen out candidates that they saw as a threat to their interests.

I happen to believe that before August 31^st there was available a compromise on the nomination process. The approach I have in mind would have liberalized the composition of the nominating committee so that it was more representative of Hong Kong society and set a reasonable threshold for placing someone in nomination. This would have been consistent with the Basic Law (a Chinese requirement) and likely ensured that a pan-Democratic politician could have been nominated (the democrats’ minimum hope). Hong Kong voters would have had a genuine choice. There were Hong Kong proposals along these lines. Such an approach would have had a chance of gaining the support of moderate Democrats in Legislative Council, enough for reaching the two-thirds majority required for passage of the election plan.

Reaching such a compromise was difficult because of the deep-seated mistrust between the Hong Kong democratic camp and Beijing, and within the democratic camp. If there was to be movement towards a deal Beijing would have had to signal that it was serious about such a compromise, in order to engage moderate democrats. It chose not to, and an opportunity was lost.

Why Beijing spurned a compromise is unclear.

Perhaps it interpreted its “universal suffrage” pledge narrowly, to mean one-person-one-vote, and not a competitive election. Perhaps it wished to defer a truly competitive contest until it was sure that one-person-one-vote elections would not hurt its interests. Perhaps Beijing was overly frightened about the proposed civil disobedience campaign called “Occupy Central.” Perhaps it judged that radical democrats would block their moderate comrades from agreeing to a compromise. Perhaps China actually believed its own propaganda that “foreign forces” were behind the protests. Perhaps it never had any intention of allowing truly representative government and majority rule. But if Beijing believed that taking a hard line would ensure stability, it was badly mistaken.

Whatever the case, the majority in Hong Kong saw the August 31^st decision as a bait-and-switch way for Beijing to continue to control the outcome of the CE election and as a denial of the long-standing desire for genuine democracy. A coalition of student leaders, Occupy Central supporters, democratic politicians, radical activists, and middle class people resorted to the only political outlet they had: public protest. If the Chinese government had wished to empower Hong Kong radicals, it couldn’t have hit upon a better way.

Although Beijing’s August 31^st decision guaranteed a public response in Hong Kong, the form it took was unexpected. Student groups preempted the original Occupy Central plan, and the takeover of three separate downtown areas resulted, not from a plan but from the flow of events. The Hong Kong Police did overreact in some instances, but each time it sought to reestablish control, there was a surge of public support for the core protester groups, mobilized by social and other media.

The protests were fueled by more than a desire for democracy.

Also at work were factors common in other advanced societies. Hong Kong’s level of income and wealth inequality is one of the highest in the world. Young people tend to believe that they will not be able to achieve a standard of living similar to that of their parents. Real wages have been flat for more than a decade. Buying a home is out of reach for young people, in part because a small group of real estate companies control the housing supply. Smart and ambitious individuals from China compete for good jobs.

Hong Kong students have gotten the most attention in the current protests. Just as important however, are older cohorts who are pessimistic about their life chances. They believe that the Hong Kong elite, which controls both economic and political power, is to blame for these problems. They regard genuine democracy as the only remedy.

The Hong Kong government’s response has been mixed but restrained on the whole.

The Hong Kong police did commit excesses in their attempt to control the crowds. Teargas was used once early on, and pepper spray on a number of occasions since then. There was one particular incident where police officers beat a protester excessively (for which seven of the officers involved were arrested last week).

It is worth noting that the scenario for which the police prepared was not the one that occurred. What was expected was a civil disobedience action in a relatively restricted area with a moderate number of protesters who, following their leaders’ plan, would allow themselves to be arrested. What happened in late September was very different. There were three venues instead of one. Many more protesters took part, and they had no interest in quickly offering themselves for arrest. Instead, they sought to maintain control of public thoroughfares, a violation of law, until Beijing and the Hong Kong government made major concessions. Even when courts have ordered some streets cleared, those occupying have not always complied.

After the initial clashes, the Hong Kong government chose not to mount a major crackdown but instead to wait out the protesters. It accepted the occupation for a number of weeks, and now seeks to clear some streets pursuant to court order. Moreover, the government undertook to engage at least one of the students in a dialogue over how to end the crisis. In the only session of the dialogue to occur, on October 21^st, senior officials floated ideas to assuage some of the protesters’ concerns and to improve upon the electoral parameters laid down by Beijing.

The dialogue has not progressed for two reasons. First of all, the Hong Kong government is not a free agent in resolving the crisis. Beijing is the ultimate decider here, and the Hong Kong government must stay within the guidelines it sets. Second, the student federation leaders who took part in the dialogue are not free agents either. They represent only one of the student groups, and other actors are involved. With its leadership fragmented, the movement has never figured out its minimum goals and therefore what it would accept in return for ending the protest. It underestimated Beijing’s resolve and instead has insisted on the impossible, that Beijing withdraw the August 31^st decision. Now, even though the Hong Kong public and the leaders of the original Occupy Central effort believe that the protesters should retire to contend another day, the occupation continues.

For those who believe that the rule of law is a fundamental pillar of Hong Kong’s autonomy, the last two months have been worrisome. Once some members of a community decide for themselves which laws they will obey and which they won’t; once the authorities pick and choose which laws they will enforce and abide by, the rule of law begins to atrophy. The protesters’ commitment to democracy is commendable. The generally restrained and peaceable character of their protest has been widely praised. But something is lost when both the community and its government begin to abandon the idea that no-one is above the law.

Regional views and implications

Observers have believed that the implications of the Umbrella Movement are greatest for Taiwan, because Beijing has said that Taiwan will be reunified under the same formula that it used for Hong Kong (one-country, two systems). And there was momentary media attention in Taiwan when the Hong Kong protests began, but it quickly dissipated. The vast majority of Taiwan citizens have long since rejected one-country, two systems. China’s Hong Kong policies only reconfirm what Taiwan people already knew.

Hong Kong events also send a signal to all of East Asia’s democracies, not just Taiwan. Anyone who studies Hong Kong’s politics and society comes to the conclusion that it has been as ready for democracy as any place in East Asia, and that its instability in recent years is due more to the absence of democracy than because it is unready.

The long-standing premise of U.S. policy is that Hong Kong people are ready for democracy. Since the protest movement began, the U.S. government has reiterated its support for the rule of law, Hong Kong’s autonomy, respect for the political freedoms of Hong Kong people, and a universal-suffrage election that would provide the people of Hong Kong “a genuine choice of candidates that are representative of the peoples and the voters’ will.” Washington has also called for restraint on all sides.

Finally, the strategic question for East Asia is what the rise of China means for its neighbors. That question will be answered in part by China’s power relative to the United States and others. But it will also be answered by what happens between China and its neighbors in a series of specific encounters. Through those interactions, China will define what kind of great power it will become. North Korea, the East and South China Seas, and Taiwan are the most obvious of these specific encounters. But Hong Kong is as well. If the struggle there for a more democratic system ends well, it will tell us something positive about China’s future trajectory. If it ends badly, it will say something very different.

Looking forward, several options exist for resolving the crisis and only one of them is good.

One option is a harsh crackdown by China. Article 18 of the Basic Law gives Beijing the authority to declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong if “turmoil” there “endangers national unity or security and is beyond the control” of the Hong Kong government. In that case, Chinese national laws would be applied to Hong Kong and could be enforced in the same way they are in China. We would then see crowd control, Chinese style. I believe this scenario is unlikely as long as Beijing has some confidence that the protest movement will become increasingly isolated and ultimately collapse.

A second option is that the occupation ends but the unrepresentative electoral system that has been used up until now continues. That would happen because two-thirds of the Legislative Council is required to enact the one-person-one-vote proposal of the Chinese and Hong Kong governments for electing the chief executive. Getting two-thirds requires the votes of a few democratic members. If all moderate democrats oppose the package for whatever reason, then the next CE will be elected by the 1,200-person election committee, not by Hong Kong voters. Protests are liable to resume. There is a danger that in response, Beijing will move quietly to restrict press freedom, the rule of law, and the scope for civil society beyond what it has already done.

The third scenario is for a late compromise within the parameters of Beijing’s August 31^st decision. The goal here would be to create a process within the nominating committee that would make it possible for a leader of the democratic camp to be nominated for the chief executive election, creating a truly competitive election. That requires two things. First, the nominating committee must be more representative of Hong Kong society. Second, the nominating committee, before it picks the two or three election nominees, should be able to review a greater number of potential nominees. Done properly, that could yield the nomination of a democratic politician whom Beijing does not mistrust but whose platform would reflect the aspirations of democratic voters. Prominent individuals in Hong Kong have discussed this approach in print, and Hong Kong senior officials have hinted a willingness to consider it. For such a scenario to occur, Beijing would have to be willing to show more flexibility than demonstrated so far; the Hong Kong government should be forthcoming about what it has in mind; and some leaders of the democratic camp must be willing to engage both Beijing and the Hong Kong government. In the climate of mutual mistrust that has deepened since August 31^st, that is a tall order. But at this point it appears to be the best way out of a bad situation.