In the early hours of Sunday June 12, 2016, a madman perpetrated the mass murder of 49 people in a nightclub considered a safe space for Orlando’s LGBT community. 

Politicians quickly went into gear to exploit this tragedy to push their own agendas. Glaringly silent on the civil rights of LGBT communities, Donald Trump and Ted Cruz repeated their calls to ban, deport, and more aggressively prosecute Muslims in the wake of this attack. As if Muslims in America are not already selectively targeted in counterterrorism enforcement, stopped for extra security by the TSA at airports, and targeted for entrapment in terrorism cases manufactured by the FBI. 

Other politicians reiterated calls for Muslim communities to fight extremism purportedly infecting their communities, all while ignoring the fact that domestic terrorism carried out by non-Muslim perpetrators since 9/11 has had a higher impact than the jihadist threat. Asking Muslim American communities to counter violent extremism is a red herring and a nonstarter. 

In 2011, the White House initiated a countering violent extremism (CVE) program as a new form of soft counterterrorism. Under the rubric of community partnerships, Muslim communities are invited to work with law enforcement to prevent Muslims from joining foreign terrorist groups such as ISIS. Federal grants and rubbing elbows with high level federal officials are among the fringe benefits for cooperation, or cooptation as some critics argue, with the CVE program. 

Putting aside the un-American imposition of collective responsibility on Muslims, it is a red herring to call on Muslims to counter violent extremism. An individual cannot prevent a criminal act about which s/he has no knowledge. Past cases show that Muslim leaders, or the perpetrators’ family members for that matter, do not have knowledge of planned terrorist acts. 

Hence, Muslims and non-Muslims alike are in the same state of uncertainty and insecurity about the circumstances surrounding the next terrorist act on American soil. 

CVE is also a nonstarter for a community under siege by the government and private acts of discrimination. CVE programs expect community leaders and parents to engage young people on timely religious, political, and social matters. While this is generally a good practice for all communities, it should not be conducted through a security paradigm. Nor can it occur without a safe space for honest dialogue.

After fifteen years of aggressive surveillance and investigations, there are few safe spaces left in Muslim communities. Thanks in large part to mass FBI surveillance, mosques have become intellectual deserts where no one dares engage in discussions on sensitive political or religious topics. Fears that informants and undercover agents may secretly report on anyone who even criticizes American foreign policy have stripped mosques from their role as a community center where ideas can be freely debated. Government deportations of imams with critical views have turned Friday sermons into sterile monologues about mundane topics. And government efforts to promote “moderate” Muslims impose an assimilationist, anti-intellectual, and tokenized Muslim identity. 

For these reasons, debates about religion, politics, and society among young people are taking place online outside the purview of mosques, imams, and parents. 

Meanwhile, Muslim youth are reminded in their daily lives that they are suspect and their religion is violent. Students are subjected to bullying at school. Mosques are vandalized in conjunction with racist messages.  Workers face harassment at work. Muslim women wearing headscarves are assaulted in public spaces. Whether fear or bigotry drives the prejudice, government action and politicians’ rhetoric legitimize discrimination as an act of patriotism.

Defending against these civil rights assaults is consuming Muslim Americans’ community resources and attention. Worried about their physical safety, their means of livelihood, and the well-being of their children in schools; many Muslim Americans experience the post-9/11 era as doubly victimized by terrorism. Their civil rights are violated by private actors and their civil liberties are violated by government actors—all in retribution for a criminal act about which they had no prior knowledge, and which they had no power to prevent by a criminal with whom they had no relationship.

To be sure, we should not sit back and allow another mass shooting to occur without a national conversation about the causes of such violence. But wasting time debating ineffective and racialized CVE programs is not constructive. Our efforts are better spent addressing gun violence, the rise of homophobic violence, and failed American foreign policy in the Middle East.

We all have a responsibility to do what we can to prevent more madmen from engaging in senseless violence that violates our safe spaces.

This article was originally published in the Huffington Post.

       

Los Angeles has long been a city associated with the common ills of urban excess: sprawl, homelessness, and congestion. More charitable descriptions paint it as West Coast paradise, boasting sunshine and celebrities in equal measure.

A three-day visit to downtown Los Angeles exposed the nuances behind these stereotypes. Hosted by the Los Angeles Downtown Center Business Improvement District, which is focused on strengthening downtown as an innovation district, our visit began as a real estate tour but quickly revealed regeneration and innovation activity that confounded our expectations. 

Downtown LA (DTLA)’s innovation district focuses not just on tech firms but also on historic LA industry strengths like fashion, design, and real estate. LA may have sat in the shadow of the Silicon Valley tech boom, but it appears to be revitalizing in time for the convergence economy, in which tech is no longer a separate sector but ingrained in all forms of economic and creative activity.

And at a time where firms are revaluing proximity, vibrancy, and authenticity, DTLA could not be in a better place. While a number of U.S. cities subjected their downtowns to a range of urban renewal initiatives, the urban fabric of DTLA is largely intact. Vibrant areas like South Broadway feature boutique hotels, a dozen theatres, and clothing stores and bars that exist in historic infrastructure like reclaimed theatres. There is an urban feel that is authentically LA.

The initial renaissance of DTLA began in the late 1990s, after the residential units within its 65 blocks had dwindled to just 10,000.

Along with transportation improvements, permissive planning policies such as adaptive reuse—which allowed commercial buildings to be converted into residential use—were instrumental in increasing DTLA’s residential population. Since 1999, the residential population and housing units have tripled. With new bars and restaurants springing up on every corner, it is no surprise that three-quarters of DTLA’s current residents are aged between 23 and 44.

Building on this residential surge, an increasing number of businesses are now setting up or relocating downtown.

DTLA office space has not always been an easy sell. Employers balk at the prospect of subjecting their workforce to the punishing commute. And Bunker Hill and the adjacent Financial District, the epicenter of the central business district, offers little more than unpopulated plazas and cubicled office space.

DTLA has worked to serve its newfound residential population and attract more workers and companies by retrofitting buildings to modern aesthetic standards. The exposed brickwork and ceiling equipment of many DTLA offices like those of Nationbuilder, an online platform used for political and civic campaigns, is not just a statement of style but a conscious decision to make downtown office buildings feel hospitable to creative firms. The BLOC, a 1.9 million square foot retail development, is essentially a mall that has been turned inside out, with the roof removed to reveal an open air plaza, unrecognizable from the fortress-style building that once sat in the same spot.

While downtown’s office blocks are a fantastic asset in attracting innovation activity, the area also boasts a vast amount of warehouse space. These larger footprints, most often used for textile or food production, are attracting a range of activities that require space or, in the case of Tesla’s Hyperloop, secrecy. Such industrial firms are interspersed with new art galleries and a historic knitting mill, proof of the area’s artistic heritage.

The individuals leading the drive for a DTLA innovation district, such as Nick Griffin, director of Economic Development for the Downtown Center Business Improvement District, are realistic about challenges, such as the lack of quality public space, and proactive in leveraging existing assets, such as the large supply of creative office space.

These efforts and LA’s distinctive industry strengths are combatting one of the biggest challenges to attracting businesses downtown: the strength of competing areas like Silicon Beach, which includes Santa Monica and Playa del Rey and offers an established tech ecosystem alongside an attractive location.

Another challenge? Like many U.S. cities, LA bears the scars of suburban sprawl and a legacy of under investment in public transportation. Congestion is a constant complaint.

But here too LA is making progress.

In November, Angelinos will vote on an extension of Measure R—a 2008 ballot initiative raising the sales tax to fund core transportation projects—to provide sustainable funding for transportation infrastructure and improve access to the city center through the metro system.

Other ambitious projects, such as the Regional Connector, a light rail subway through the middle of downtown, will have a profound effect on the area's connectivity. This project is not just about getting people to and from downtown—it will also have a transformative effect on public space. The city is working with Project for Public Spaces to redesign one of the Connector’s hubs, Pershing Square, with the aim of providing a public space where employees and residents can convene and collaborate.

Connectivity will play a vital role in the continuing success of DTLA’s resurgence. But the DTLA innovation district’s main opportunity lies in better serving and connecting the people who make it work. With hometown authenticity and civic commitment, DTLA is on its way to creating a city center that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Photo Credit: Hunter Kerhart

       

INTRODUCTION

The Obama administration needs to focus on executing its existing financial rescue plans, keep the TARP focused on the banking sector, and create a contingency plan should the banking system destabilize again.

Crystal balls are dangerous, especially when it comes to economic predictions, which is why it is important for the administration to chart a path forward. Public policy must remain focused on the very real possibility that the apparent easing in the economy’s decline may be followed by little or no growth for several quarters and there could possibly be another negative turn. One of the risks is that the United States is very connected to the rest of the world, most of which is in severe recession. The global economy could be a significant drag on U.S. growth.

Cautious optimism should be the order of the day. We fear that the recent reactions of the financial markets and of some analysts carry too much of the optimism without recognizing enough of the uncertainty. There remains a lot of uncertainty and policymakers should not rest on their laurels or turn to other policies, even if they look more exciting. It is vital to follow through on the current financial rescue plans and to have well-conceived contingency plans in case there is another dip down.

We propose three recommendations for the financial rescue plans:

• Focus on execution of existing programs. The Administration has created programs to deal with each of the key elements necessary to solve the financial crisis. All of them have significant steps remaining and some of them have not even started yet, such as the programs to deal with toxic assets. As has been demonstrated multiple times now since October 2008, these are complex programs that require a great deal of attention. It is time to execute rather than to create still more efforts.
• Resist the temptation to allocate money from the TARP to other uses—it is essential to maintain a reserve of Congressionally-authorized funds in case they are needed for the banks. It would be difficult to overemphasize the remaining uncertainties about bank solvency as they navigate what will remain a rough year or more. The banks could easily need another $300 billion of equity capital and might need still more. It is essential that the administration have the ammunition readily available.
• Third, make sure there is a contingency plan to deal with a major setback for the banking system. The plan needs broad support within the administration and among regulators and, ideally, from key congressional leaders. We probably won’t need it, but there is too high a chance that we will require it for us to remain without one. The country cannot afford even the appearance of the ad hoc and changing nature of the responses that were evident last fall.

We also give the administration a thumbs-up for their bank recapitalization as well as the TALF program, while they are much more skeptical of the Treasury’s approaches to toxic assets. The authors also believe it is time to focus on the truly mind-blowing budget deficits given the danger that markets will not be able to absorb the amount of government borrowing needed without triggering a rise in U.S. interest rates and perhaps an unstable decline in the value of the dollar, nor do they believe there should be a another fiscal stimulus except under extreme circumstances.

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I’ve written here before about my research with Betsey Stevenson showing that economic development is associated with rising life satisfaction. Some people find this result surprising, but it’s the cleanest interpretation of the available data. Yet over the past few days, I’ve received calls from several journalists asking whether Richard Easterlin had somehow debunked these findings. He tried. But he failed.

Rather than challenge our careful statistical tests, he’s simply offered a new mishmash of statistics that appear to make things murkier.

For those of you new to the debate, the story begins with a series of papers that Richard Easterlin wrote between 1973 and 2005, claiming that economic growth is unrelated to life satisfaction. In fact, these papers simply show he failed to definitively establish such a relationship. In our 2008 Brookings Paper, Betsey and I systematically examined all of the available happiness data, finding that the relationship was there all along: rising GDP yields rising life satisfaction. More recent data reinforces our findings. Subsequently, Easterlin responded in of papers circulated in early 2009. That’s the research journalists are now asking me about. But in a paper released several weeks ago, Betsey, Dan Sacks and I assessed Easterlin’s latest claims, and found little evidence for them.

Let’s examine Easterlin’s three main claims.

1. GDP and life satisfaction rise together in the short-run, but not the long-run. False. Here’s an illustrative graph. We take the main international dataset — the World Values Survey — and in order to focus only on the long-run, compare the change in life satisfaction for each country from the first time it was surveyed until the last, the corresponding growth in GDP per capita. Typically, this is a difference taken over 18 years (although it ranges from 8 to 26 years). The graph shows that long-run rises in GDP are positively associated with growth in life satisfaction.

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This graph includes the latest data, and Dan generated it just for this blog post. In fact, Easterlin was responding to our earlier work, which showed each of the comparisons one could make between various waves of this survey: Wave 1 was taken in the early ‘80s; Wave 2 in the early ‘90s; Wave 3 in the mid-late ‘90s; Wave 4 mostly in the early 2000s. And in each of these comparisons, you see a positive association — sometimes statistically significant, sometimes not.

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What should we conclude from this second graph? Given the typically-significant positive slopes, you might conclude that rising GDP is associated with rising life satisfaction. It’s also reasonable to say that these data are too noisy to be entirely convincing. But the one thing you can’t conclude is that these data yield robust proof that long-run economic growth won’t yield rising life satisfaction. Yet that’s what Easterlin claims.

2. The income-happiness link that we document is no longer apparent when one omits the transition economies. Also false. One simple way to see this is to note that in the first graph the transition countries are shown in gray. Even when you look only at the other countries, it’s hard to be convinced that economic growth and life satisfaction are unrelated. To see the formal regressions showing this, read Table 3 of our response. (Aside: Why eliminate these countries from the sample?)

Or we could just look to another data source which omits the transition economies. For instance, the graph below shows the relationship between life satisfaction and GDP for the big nine European nations that were the members of the EU when the Eurobarometer survey started. Over the period 1973-2007, economic growth yielded higher satisfaction in eight of these nine countries. And while we’re puzzled by the ninth — the increasingly unhappy Belgians — we’re not going to drop them from the data! And if you think Belgium is puzzling, too, then we’ve done our job.

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3. Surveys show that financial satisfaction in Latin American countries has declined as their economies have grown. Perhaps true. But how are surveys of financial satisfaction relevant to a debate about life satisfaction? And why focus on Latin America, rather than the whole world? In fact, when you turn to the question we are actually debating — life satisfaction —these same surveys suggest that those Latin American countries which have had the strongest growth have seen the largest rise in life satisfaction. This finding isn’t statistically significant, but that’s simply because there’s not a lot of data on life satisfaction in Latin America! (Given how sparse these data are, we didn’t report them in our paper.)

What’s going on here?

Now it’s reasonable to ask how it is that others arrived at a different conclusion. Easterlin’s Paradox is a non-finding. His paradox simply describes the failure of some researchers (not us!) to isolate a clear relationship between GDP and life satisfaction.

But you should never confuse absence of evidence with evidence of absence. Easterlin’s mistake is to conclude that when a correlation is statistically insignificant, it must be zero. But if you put together a dataset with only a few countries in it — or in Easterlin’s analysis, take a dataset with lots of countries, but throw away a bunch of it, and discard inconvenient observations — then you’ll typically find statistically insignificant results. This is even more problematic when you employ statistical techniques that don’t extract all of the information from your data. Think about it this way: if you flip a coin three times, and it comes up heads all three times, you still don’t have much reason to think that the coin is biased. But it would be silly to say, “there’s no compelling evidence that the coin is biased, so it must be fair.” Yet that’s Easterlin’s logic.

There’s a deeper problem, too. The results I’ve shown you are all based on analyzing data only from comparable surveys. And when you do this, you find rising incomes associated with rising satisfaction. Instead, Easterlin and co-authors lump together data from very different surveys, asking very different questions. It’s not even clear how one should make comparisons between a survey (in the US) asking about happiness, a survey (in Japan) asking about “circumstances at home,” surveys of life satisfaction in Europe based on a four-point scale, and global surveys based on a ten-point scale. Easterlin’s non-result appears only when comparing non-comparable data.

If you want to advocate against economic growth — and to argue that it won’t help even in the world’s poorest nations — then you should surely base such radical conclusions on findings rather than non-findings, and on the basis of robust evidence.

A final thought

Why not look at the levels of economic development and satisfaction? The following graph does this, displaying amazing new data coming from the Gallup World Poll. There’s no longer any doubt that people in richer countries report being more satisfied with their lives.

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Is this relevant? Easterlin argues it isn’t — that he’s only concerned with changes in GDP. But the two are inextricably linked. If rich countries are happier countries, this begs the question: How did they get that way? We think it’s because as their economies developed, their people got more satisfied. While we don’t have centuries’ worth of well-being data to test our conjecture, it’s hard to think of a compelling alternative.

      

Justin Wolfers’ column titled “Debunking the Easterlin Paradox, Again” dismisses Richard Easterlin’s work as just plain wrong. I argue here, as I have elsewhere, that where you come out on the Easterlin paradox depends on the happiness question (and therefore the definition of happiness) that you use, as well as the sample of countries and the period of time.

Richard Easterlin finds no clear country-by-country relationship between average per capita GDP and life satisfaction (among wealthy countries), despite a clear relationship between income and happiness at the individual level within countries. Easterlin also found – and continues to find, based on methods different from Wolfers’ – an absence of a relationship between life satisfaction and long-term changes in GDP per capita.

Different well-being questions measure different dimensions of “happiness”, and, in turn, they correlate differently with income (something they themselves show at the end of their last paper, and admit that the relationship between income and well-being is complex). The best possible life question – which Justin Wolfers and Betsey Stevenson primarily use in the first work, and also in the second – asks respondents to compare their life today to the best possible life they can imagine for themselves. This introduces a relative component, and, not surprisingly, the question correlates most closely with income of all of the available subjective well-being questions. Life satisfaction, which they use in the second work, also correlates with income more than open-ended happiness, life purpose or affect questions, but not as closely as the best possible life question.

Wolfers and Stevenson used the most recent and extensive sample of countries available from the Gallup World Poll, and, as the measure of “happiness”, the best possible life question therein, and challenged the Easterlin paradox. In more recent work, with Stevenson and Dan Sacks (2010), referenced in this blog, the authors look at the relationship between life satisfaction and economic growth, based on the World Values survey and GDP levels and the best possible life question, based on the Gallup World Poll. They isolate a clear relationship between life satisfaction and GDP levels, and their statistical analysis is spot on.

Recent studies by Kahneman and Deaton (2010), and Diener and colleagues (2010), for example, find that happiness in a life evaluation sense (as measured by the best possible life question) correlates much more closely with income than does happiness in a life experience sense (as measured by affect or more open ended happiness questions). This holds within the United States (Kahneman and Deaton) and across countries (Diener et al.).

My own work on Latin America, with Soumya Chattopadhyay and Mario Picon, tested various questions against each other and finds a similar difference in correlation, with affect and life purpose questions having the least correlation with income and the best possible life question the most. My work on happiness in Afghanistan found that Afghans were happier than the world average (on par with Latin Americans) as measured by an open ended happiness question, and 20 percent more likely to smile in a day than Cubans. Yet they scored much lower than the world average on the best possible life question. This is not a surprise. While naturally cheerful and able to make the best of their lot, the Afghans also know that the best possible life is outside Afghanistan.

Thus the conclusions that one draws on whether there is an Easterlin paradox or not in part rest on the definition of happiness, and therefore the question that is used as the basis of analysis. Wolfers and co-authors find a clear relationship between GDP levels and life satisfaction and best possible life – clearly important dimensions of well-being. Yet in the same paper they find much less clear relationships when they use happiness, affect and life purpose questions.  

There is also the question of the sample of countries, and whether one is examining cross section or time series data. The most recent debate with Easterlin is about the trends over time rather than cross-sectional patterns. Dropping the transition economies, as Easterlin does, may be a mistake, as Wolfers contends. But it is also important to recognize the extent to which including a large sample of countries that experienced unprecedented economic collapse and associated drops in happiness alters the slope in the cross-country income-happiness relationship (making it steeper). Wolfers also criticizes Easterlin for relying on financial satisfaction data for his Latin American time series sample (because there is not enough life satisfaction data); financial satisfaction correlates closely, but not perfectly, with life satisfaction. Easterlin’s technique allows for the inclusion of a much larger sample of middle income developing countries, a sample of countries that one can imagine is very important to the growth and happiness debate. Wolfers and co-authors use far fewer Latin American countries because comparable life satisfaction data is limited. Either approach is plausible and, as with all work with limited data, is not perfect. But I would not go as far as calling one or the other “plain wrong”.

Finally, there is the simpler question of giving credit where credit is due. We would not be having this debate, nor would we have a host of analysis on well-being beyond what is measured by income, had Easterlin not triggered our thinking on this with his original study of happiness and income over three decades ago (and his patient and thoughtful mentoring of many economists since then). In the big picture of things, Easterlin had the idea.

      

Access to information and communication technology through cell phones, the internet, and electronic media has increased exponentially around the world. While a few decades ago cell phones were a luxury good in wealthy countries, our data show that today over half of respondents in Sub-Saharan Africa and about 80 percent of those in Latin America and Southeast Asia have access to cell phones. In addition to making phone calls and text messaging, cell phones are used for activities such as accessing the internet and social network sites. Meanwhile, the launch of mobile banking gives access to these technologies an entirely new dimension, providing access to financial services in addition to information and communication technology. It is estimated that in Kenya, where the mobile banking “revolution” originated, there are some 18 million mobile money users (roughly 75 percent of all adults). Given the expanding role of information technology in today’s global economy, in this paper we explore whether this new access also enhances well-being.

Neither of the authors is an expert on information technology. The real and potential effect of information technology on productivity, development, and other economic outcomes has been studied extensively by those who are. Building on past research on the economics of well-being and on the application of the well-being metrics to this particular question, we hope to contribute an understanding of how the changes brought about by information and communication technology affect well-being in general, including its non-income dimensions.

Our study has two related objectives. The first is to understand the effects of the worldwide increase in communications capacity and access to information technology on human well-being. The second is to contribute to our more general understanding of the relationship between well-being and capabilities and agency. Cell phones and information technology are giving people around the world – and particularly the poor – new capabilities for making financial transactions and accessing other services which were previously unavailable to them. We explore the extent to which the agency effect of having access to these capabilities manifests itself through both hedonic and evaluative aspects of well-being.

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Paris and Rome may be famous for romance, but it’s Filipinos who get the most love. That, at least, is a conclusion that can be drawn from a global love survey conducted by the Gallup Organization.

In our latest column for Bloomberg View, we mine the unique Gallup data for insights into the nature of love and its relationship to nationality, age, money and economic development. The survey, conducted in 136 countries, posed the question: “Did you experience love for a lot of the day yesterday?”

In honor of Valentine’s Day, we thought readers might be interested in seeing the full ranking. So here goes. The first number after each country name is the percentage of respondents who said they had experienced love the previous day. The second (in parentheses) is the sample size for the country.

1. Philippines 93% (2193)
2. Rwanda 92% (1495)
3. Puerto Rico 90% (495)
4. Hungary 89% (1002)
5. Cyprus 88% (988)
6. Trinidad and Tobago 88% (506)
7. Paraguay 87% (1986)
8. Lebanon 86% (970)
9. Costa Rica 85% (1985)
10. Cambodia 85% (1961)
11. Nigeria 84% (1965)
12. Guyana 83% (486)
13. Spain 83% (998)
14. Mexico 82% (989)
15. Tanzania 82% (1941)
16. Ecuador 82% (2126)
17. Jamaica 82% (534)
18. Venezuela 82% (997)
19. Cuba 82% (978)
20. Brazil 82% (1038)
21. Laos 81% (1947)
22. Argentina 81% (1985)
23. Belgium 81% (1015)
24. Canada 81% (1006)
25. Greece 81% (996)
26. U.S. 81% (1224)
27. Denmark 80% (1003)
28. Portugal 80% (995)
29. Netherlands 80% (993)
30. Vietnam 79% (1901)
31. New Zealand 79% (1775)
32. Italy 79% (1000)
33. Colombia 79% (1994)
34. Madagascar 78% (998)
35. Uruguay 78% (1969)
36. Turkey 78% (985)
37. Dominican Republic 78% (1976)
38. United Arab Emirates 77% (961)
39. Saudi Arabia 77% (978)
40. Chile 76% (1982)
41. Malawi 76% (1997)
42. Ghana 76% (1986)
43. South Africa 76% (1968)
44. Australia 76% (1199)
45. Panama 75% (1995)
46. Zambia 74% (1971)
47. Kenya 74% (1965)
48. Namibia 74% (996)
49. Nicaragua 74% (1988)
50. Germany 74% (1214)
51. Ireland 74% (992)
52. Sweden 74% (993)
53. U.K. 74% (1200)
54. Switzerland 74% (986)
55. Montenegro 74% (800)
56. Austria 73% (984)
57. France 73% (1217)
58. Kuwait 73% (934)
59. Finland 73% (993)
60. El Salvador 73% (2000)
61. Pakistan 73% (2253)
62. Zimbabwe 72% (1989)
63. Honduras 72% (1947)
64. Peru 72% (1982)
65. Egypt 72% (1024)
66. Serbia 72% (1474)
67. Bosnia and Herzegovina 72% (1896)
68. Sierra Leone 71% (1986)
69. India 71% (3140)
70. Taiwan 71% (984)
71. Bangladesh 70% (2200)
72. Belize 70% (464)
73. Croatia 69% (958)
74. Macedonia 69% (1000)
75. Mozambique 69% (996)
76. Bolivia 69% (1948)
77. Liberia 68% (988)
78. Iran 68% (963)
79. China 68% (7206)
80. Slovenia 68% (1000)
81. Haiti 68% (471)
82. Norway 67% (992)
83. Sri Lanka 67% (1974)
84. Poland 67% (939)
85. Guatemala 67% (1988)
86. Uganda 66% (1961)
87. Sudan 66% (971)
88. Israel 66% (957)
89. Kosovo 65% (983)
90. Thailand 65% (2377)
91. Jordan 65% (998)
92. Albania 64% (855)
93. Guinea 62% (952)
94. Botswana 62% (999)
95. Angola 62% (957)
96. Burkina Faso 62% (1876)
97. Malaysia 61% (2115)
98. Mali 61% (984)
99. Niger 61% (1925)
100. Palestinian Territories 61% (991)
101. Romania 61% (937)
102. Senegal 61% (1805)
103. Indonesia 61% (2013)
104. Afghanistan 60% (1128)
105. Hong Kong 60% (789)
106. Cameroon 59% (1967)
107. Japan 59% (1138)
108. Nepal 59% (1965)
109. Bulgaria 59% (927)
110. Slovakia 58% (991)
111. Singapore 58% (3002)
112. Czech Republic 58% (992)
113. Mauritania 57% (1960)
114. Benin 56% (974)
115. South Korea 56% (2056)
116. Myanmar 55% (1047)
117. Latvia 54% (1942)
118. Togo 54% (988)
119. Estonia 53% (1800)
120. Lithuania 50% (1863)
121. Russia 50% (4667)
122. Chad 49% (1915)
123. Yemen 48% (959)
124. Ukraine 48% (1930)
125. Ethiopia 48% (1913)
126. Azerbaijan 47% (1824)
127. Tajikistan 47% (1847)
128. Moldova 46% (1937)
129. Kazakhstan 45% (1871)
130. Morocco 43% (1011)
131. Belarus 43% (1992)
132. Georgia 43% (1904)
133. Kyrgyzstan 34% (1969)
134. Mongolia 32% (928)
135. Uzbekistan 32% (962)
136. Armenia 29% (1954)

Note: This content was first published on Bloomberg View on February 13, 2013.

      

One of global society’s foremost structural changes underway is its rapid aggregate shift from farmbased to city-based economies. More than half of humanity now lives in urban areas, and more than two-thirds of the world’s economies have a majority of their population living in urban settings. Much of the gradual movement from rural to urban areas is driven by long-term forces of economic progress. But one corresponding downside is that city-based societies become increasingly disconnected—certainly physically, and likely psychologically—from the practicalities of rural livelihoods, especially agriculture, the crucial economic sector that provides food to fuel humanity.

The nature of agriculture is especially important when considering the tantalizingly imminent prospect of eliminating extreme poverty within a generation. The majority of the world’s extremely poor people still live in rural areas, where farming is likely to play a central role in boosting average incomes. Agriculture is similarly important when considering environmental challenges like protecting biodiversity and tackling climate change. For example, agriculture and shifts in land use are responsible for roughly a quarter of greenhouse gas emissions.

As a single word, the concept of “agriculture” encompasses a remarkably diverse set of circumstances. It can be defined very simply, as at dictionary.com, as “the science or occupation of cultivating land and rearing crops and livestock.” But underneath that definition lies a vast array of landscape ecologies and climates in which different types of plant and animal species can grow. Focusing solely on crop species, each plant grows within a particular set of respective conditions. Some plants provide food—such as grains, fruits, or vegetables—that people or livestock can consume directly for metabolic energy. Other plants provide stimulants or medication that humans consume—such as coffee or Artemisia—but have no caloric value. Still others provide physical materials—like cotton or rubber—that provide valuable inputs to physical manufacturing.

One of the primary reasons why agriculture’s diversity is so important to understand is that it defines the possibilities, and limits, for the diffusion of relevant technologies. Some crops, like wheat, grow only in temperate areas, so relevant advances in breeding or plant productivity might be relatively easy to diffuse across similar agro-ecological environments but will not naturally transfer to tropical environments, where most of the world’s poor reside. Conversely, for example, rice originates in lowland tropical areas and it has historically been relatively easy to adopt farming technologies from one rice-growing region to another. But, again, its diffusion is limited by geography and climate. Meanwhile maize can grow in both temperate and tropical areas, but its unique germinating properties render it difficult to transfer seed technologies across geographies.

Given the centrality of agriculture in many crucial global challenges, including the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals recently established for 2030, it is worth unpacking the topic empirically to describe what the term actually means today. This short paper does so with a focus on developing country crops, answering five basic questions: 

1. What types of crops does each country grow? 

2. Which cereals are most prominent in each country? 

3. Which non-cereal crops are most prominent in each country? 

4. How common are “cash crops” in each country? 

5. How has area harvested been changing recently? 

Readers should note that the following assessments of crop prominence are measured by area harvested, and therefore do not capture each crop’s underlying level of productivity or overarching importance within an economy. For example, a local cereal crop might be worth only $200 per ton of output in a country, but average yields might vary across a spectrum from around 1 to 6 tons per hectare (or even higher). Meanwhile, an export-oriented cash crop like coffee might be worth $2,000 per ton, with potential yields ranging from roughly half a ton to 3 or more tons per hectare. Thus the extent of area harvested forms only one of many variables required for a thorough understanding of local agricultural systems. 

The underlying analysis for this paper was originally conducted for a related book chapter on “Agriculture’s role in ending extreme poverty” (McArthur, 2015). That chapter addresses similar questions for a subset of 61 countries still estimated to be struggling with extreme poverty challenges as of 2011. Here we present data for a broader set of 140 developing countries. All tables are also available online for download.

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• WB income class
• WBcodescountrycode

      

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Thailand has been under military rule since May 2014, when General Prayuth Chan-Ocha and the Royal Thai Army seized power after deposing democratically elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Current Prime Minister Prayuth has systematically postponed elections on the grounds of prioritizing order and drafting a new constitution to restore democracy. Since the coup, Thai authorities have used the murky lèse-majesté law to curtail opposition to the monarchy, while the country’s economy has languished.

On February 24, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted an event to explore the root causes of Thailand’s political crisis, the implications of an upcoming royal succession, and the possibilities for the road ahead. The event was moderated by Senior Fellow Richard Bush.  Panelists included Duncan McCargo, professor of political science at the University of Leeds, Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Don Pathan, an independent security analyst based in Thailand.

 

 Please follow the conversation on Twitter at #ThaiPolitics

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• Kingdom at a crossroads: Thailand’s uncertain political trajectory

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• Transcript (.pdf)

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Not the least worrying feature of these chaotic times is that the members of my transatlantic analyst tribe—whether American or European—have stopped being smug or snarky about goings-on on the other side of the Atlantic. For two decades, the mutual sniping was my personal bellwether for the rude (literally) health of the relationship.

No more. Now my American neocon buddies are lining up to sign scorching open letters against the GOP frontrunner, begging the Brits not to brexit, and lambasting Obama because he’s not doing more to help German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Heck, they would even let him take in Syrian (Muslim Syrian, if necessary!) refugees if it helps her. 

My fellow Europeans have been shocked into appalled politeness by the recognition that The Donald has genuine competition in the U.K.’s Boris Johnson, France’s Marine le Pen, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders, Slovakia’s Robert Fico, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or Russia’s Vladimir Putin. They recognize that the roar of Trump’s supporters is echoed on streets and social media websites across their own continent—including in my country, Germany, which is reeling after taking in more than a million refugees last year.

Adding to the general weirdness, parliamentarians of Germany’s Die Linke (successor to East Germany’s Communist party) have been casting longing glances at the Bernie Sanders phenomenon. "Who would have thought a democratic Socialist could get this far in America?" tweeted Stefan Liebich. His fellow Member of Parliament Wolfgang Gehrcke, a co-founder of the West German Communist Party DKP in 1968, wistfully confessed his regret on German national radio recently at never having visited the United States. The Linke has been getting precious little traction out of the turmoil at home, despite their chief whip Sahra Wagenknecht, who rocks a red suit and is herself no slouch at inflammatory rhetoric.

Like [political elites], we [analysts] mostly ignored or took for granted that the essential domestic underpinnings of foreign policy were hardwired into our constitutional orders: political pluralism, economic opportunity, inclusion.

One would have to be made of stone not to be entertained by all this. Rather less funny is the fact that we, the analysts, have been as badly surprised by these developments as the politicians. We are indeed guilty of much of the same complacency that political elites are currently being punished for on both sides of the Atlantic. Like them, we mostly ignored or took for granted that the essential domestic underpinnings of foreign policy were hardwired into our constitutional orders: political pluralism, economic opportunity, inclusion. In other words, a functioning representative democracy and a healthy social contract. 

That was a colossal oversight. George Packer’s "The Unwinding" is a riveting depiction of the unraveling of America. Amanda Taub, Thomas Frank, and Thomas Edsall have written compelling recent pieces about the fraying economic and social conditions which offer a potent explanation for the current dark mood of much of the American electorate. Yet "Europe" could be substituted for "America" in many of these studies with equal plausibility. 

A thread which runs through all these analyses is the enormous fear and anger directed at international trade—a feeling stoked masterfully by Trump, but likewise by his European counterparts. Another common element is the increasing inability of representative democracy and its politicians to deal with these problems—whether because they are being deliberately undermined (e.g. by Russia), or are simply overwhelmed by it all. 

“Europe“ could be substituted for “America“ in many of these studies with equal plausibility.

The implications for foreign and security policy are already on view. Western governments find themselves increasingly on the defensive at home as they try to grapple with fierce divisions in Europe and in the transatlantic alliance on how to handle war and human misery in the Middle East, to prevent Europe’s eastern neighborhood from succumbing to failure, to save a faltering transatlantic trade agreement, and to support and protect the liberal global order. Even Chancellor Merkel, who has been pushing hard for an EU-Turkey deal to manage the flow of refugees to Europe, is finding herself besieged at home by an insurgent challenger in form of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD).

So, as you watch the primaries in Washington, D.C. and Wyoming (March 12) and Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, and North Carolina (March 15), you may also want to give some attention to three regional elections in my country. Three of Germany’s sixteen states or Länder—Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt—go to the polls, on what Germany’s media are already calling Super Sunday. The AfD, which was only founded in 2013 (when it narrowly missed the 5 percent threshold to get into the federal legislature), is already present in five states. It is expected to rake in double-digit percentages in all three upcoming votes.

One thing’s for sure already: There will be little to be smug about.

       

       

       

Editor's Note : In this piece from South Asia Hand, Teresita Schaffer and her husband, Howard Schaffer, reflect on how India and Pakistan sometimes find it difficult to shift gears to solve problems, even when they would greatly benefit from doing so. The authors develop this theme more fully in their forthcoming book, "India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy." The book will be published by Brookings Institution Press this spring.

A deadly avalanche that killed ten Indian soldiers earlier this month on the disputed 20,000 foot high Siachen glacier in Kashmir received extensive coverage in the Indian and Pakistani media. The avalanche prompted some commentators in both countries to call for an early settlement of what seemed to them and to many others (including ourselves) a senseless dispute.

Their voices were largely drowned out in India by an outpouring of patriotic fervor that cast the dead soldiers as “Bravehearts” who had died for their country. The Indian Defense Minister publicly dismissed pleas that both sides pull back from the 47-mile long glacier where they have confronted one another since 1984. Possibilities for a settlement seem remote.

Siachen is one of several disputes between India and Pakistan that range in importance from the future status of Kashmir to the precise location of a small stretch of their international boundary near the Indian Ocean. The Siachen dispute arose because the Line of Control drawn between the contending armies in Kashmir terminates in the high Himalayas. India and Pakistan have different versions of where it should go from there as it makes its way toward the Chinese border. This made the glacier a no-man’s land.

Anticipating a Pakistani move in 1984 to seize Siachen, the Indian army struck first. Since then it has controlled most of the glacier, including the main range. Pakistan also deploys troops in the area. Published figures say that the two countries together maintain about 150 outposts. Published figures would put the numbers of troops somewhere around 1000-2000 for each side. These are small numbers for both armies, but there is a long and complicated logistical and support chain that goes with them. India’s formal reports to parliament put the numbers of soldiers killed from 1984 to date at just under 900; Pakistani losses are variously estimated at 1000-3000.

Some fighting took place in the earlier years, but a ceasefire was worked out in 2003 and remains in place. The real enemy is nature, in this high altitude freezing desert. There have been no deaths by enemy fire in recent years. At the post most recently struck by an avalanche, the oxygen is so thin that it cannot support fire for cooking. Over time, both sides learned to deal more effectively with the bitter cold and piercing winds. The mudslides and avalanches that have kept up a steady stream of death have been triggered both by climate change and by human activity that unsettled the packed snow on the glacier itself. The recent disaster was by no means the most deadly: in April 2012, 140 Pakistani soldiers were buried by another avalanche.

Sporadic efforts to resolve the dispute have included the idea of converting Siachen into an “international peace park.” Less idealistic approaches have focused on the demilitarization of the glacier, but only after both sides had reached an agreement delineating the areas they had occupied before withdrawing and pledging not to try to take them back. These efforts won some support within the government headed by Indian National Congress party leader Manmohan Singh in the 2000s. But they were stoutly opposed by the Indian Army, one of the few security issues on which the normally apolitical uniformed military has taken a public stand.

This was particularly evident in 2006, when India and Pakistan seemed to be coming close to an agreement on the issue. In a telegram later released by Wikileaks, the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi reported in May of that year that “Army Chief J.J. Singh appears on the front page of the Indian Express seemingly fortnightly to tell readers the Army cannot support a withdrawal from Siachen.” The embassy went on to note that “given India’s high degree of civilian control over the armed forces, it is improbable that Gen. Singh could repeatedly make such statements without Ministry of Defense civilians giving it at least tacit approval.” It concluded that “[w]hether or not this is the case, a Siachen deal is improbable while his – and the Army’s – opposition continues to circulate publicly.” After the most recent tragedy, LtGen D. S. Hooda, who heads the Northern Command of the Indian army, has maintained this position. He was quoted in a Kashmiri paper as saying that despite these tragic casualties, India must remain in its present positions. He specifically ruled out the mutual demilitarization suggested by Pakistan.

The Indian public has had ample opportunity to read about the terrible human cost of Siachen, but civilian public opinion is unlikely to force the issue. For Indians, the avalanche tragedy was heightened by the apparently miraculous survival of one of the soldiers, who was reportedly buried under twenty-five feet of snow for six days before being rescued. Medically evacuated to New Delhi, he was visited in the hospital by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and became an instant, highly publicized hero. His death a couple of days later made him a national martyr.

Siachen has been one of the issues discussed between India and Pakistan in the on-again, off-again dialogue they initiated in the late ‘90s. Plans to recommence these wide-ranging discussions in January were postponed following the attack on an Indian air base by Kashmiri dissidents whom the Indians were convinced had been directed from within Pakistan.

Progress on Siachen is unlikely when and if these talks actually begin. Although the Modi government was willing to exchange with Bangladesh a small number of enclaves along their border, abandoning territory in Kashmir would strike a much different nerve both in the ruling BJP, the army, and the country at large. (It would be easier for the Pakistanis to accept since their military, which calls the shots on these issues, could argue that Pakistan had got the better deal by forcing the Indians off the main glacier range.)

So the issue is likely to continue to perplex outsiders like ourselves. Retired Indian Army friends have told us how important Siachen is for Indian security. But we find it difficult to accept the assertion that Siachen is a potential invasion route. The difficulty both Pakistan and India have had sustaining small forces in that terrain would be magnified many-fold if one attempted a major military operation. By the same token, we wonder how important Siachen would be in India’s strategy against China. It has long struck us as a great waste of men and material which, were the two sides to act rationally, could be satisfactory resolved. Worse, the deaths suffered by both sides are only likely to increase as climate change increases the risk of avalanches and mudslides.

But Indians and Pakistanis are not the only people in the world who don’t always act rationally on emotionally-charged issues.

      

Editors’ Note: In Southeast Asia, democratization went hand in hand with Islamization, writes Shadi Hamid. So where many assume that democracy can’t exist with Islamism, it is more likely the opposite. The Aspen Institute originally published this post.

In both theory and practice, Islam has proven to be resistant to secularization, even (or particularly) in countries like Turkey and Tunisia where attempts to privatize Islam have been most vigorous. If Islam is exceptional in its relationship to politics — as I argue it is in my new book Islamic Exceptionalism — then what exactly does that mean in practice?

As Western small-l or “classical” liberals, we don’t have to like or approve of Islam’s prominent place in politics, but we do have to accept life as it is actually lived and religion as it is actually practiced in the Middle East and beyond. What form, though, should that “acceptance” take?

If Islam is exceptional in its relationship to politics ... then what exactly does that mean in practice?

First, where the two are in tension, it means prioritizing democracy over liberalism. In other words, there’s no real way to force people to be liberal or secular if that’s not who they are or what they want to be. To do so would suggest a patronizing and paternalistic approach to the Middle East — one that President Barack Obama and other senior U.S. officials, and not just those on the right, have repeatedly expressed. If our own liberalism as Americans is context-bound (we grew up in a liberal democratic society), then of course Egyptians, Jordanians or Pakistanis will similarly be products of their own contexts.

One should be suspicious of “models” of any kind, since models, such as Turkey’s, tend to disappoint. That said, there are good examples outside of the Middle East that deserve a closer look. Indonesia and to a lesser extent Malaysia are often held up as models of democracy, pluralism, and tolerance. Yet, perhaps paradoxically, these two countries feature significantly more shariah ordinances than, say, Egypt, Tunisia or Morocco.

In one article, the Indonesia scholar Robin Bush documents some of the shariah by-laws implemented in the country’s more conservative regions. They include requiring civil servants and students to wear “Muslim clothing,” requiring women to wear the headscarf to receive local government services, and requiring demonstrations of Quranic reading ability to be admitted to university or to receive a marriage license. But there’s a catch. According to a study by the Jakarta-based Wahid Institute, most of these regulations have come from officials of ostensibly secular parties like Golkar. How is this possible? The implementation of shariah is part of a mainstream discourse that cuts across ideological and party lines. That suggests that Islamism is not necessarily about Islamists but is about a broader population that is open to Islam playing a central role in law and governance.

Islamists need secularists and secularists need Islamists. But in Indonesia and Malaysia, there was a stronger “middle.”

In sum, it wasn’t that religion was less of a “problem” in Indonesia and Malaysia; it’s that the solutions were more readily available. Islam might have still been exceptional, but the political system was more interested in accommodating this reality than in suppressing it. There wasn’t an entrenched secular elite in the same way there was in many Arab countries. Meanwhile, Islamist parties were not as strong, so polarization wasn’t as deep and destabilizing. Islamism wasn’t the province of one party, but of most. In a sense, Islamists need secularists and secularists need Islamists. But in Indonesia and Malaysia, there was a stronger “middle,” and that middle had settled around a relatively uncontroversial conservative consensus.

In Southeast Asia, then, democratization went hand in hand with Islamization. To put it more simply, where many assume that democracy can’t exist with Islamism, it is more likely the opposite. What distinguishes Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as their electorates, isn’t some readiness to embrace the gradual privatization of religion. The difference is that their brand of Islamic politics garners much less attention in the West, in part because they aren’t seen as strategically vital and, perhaps more importantly, because the passage of Islamic legislation is simply less controversial domestically. There has been a coming to terms with Islam’s role in public life, where in much of the Middle East, there hasn’t — at least not yet.

       

The much-awaited rulings of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague—in response to the Philippines’ 2013 submission over the maritime entitlements and status of features encompassed in China’s expansive South China Sea claims—were released this morning. Taken together, the rulings were clear, crisp, comprehensive, and nothing short of a categorical rejection of Chinese claims.

Among other things, the court ruled China’s nine-dash line claim to the South China Sea invalid because of Beijing’s earlier ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In a move that surprised many observers, the court also ventured a ruling on the status of every feature in the Spratly Islands, clarifying that none of them were islands and hence do not generate an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Significantly, it ruled that Mischief Reef, which China has occupied since 1995, and Second Thomas Shoal, where China has blockaded Philippine marines garrisoned on an old vessel that was deliberately run aground there, to be within the EEZ of the Philippines.

In the neighborhood

Now that the rulings have been made, what are the implications and way forward for concerned states?

For the Philippines, the legal victory presents a paradoxical challenge for the new government. Prior to the ruling, newly-elected President Rodrigo Duterte indicated on several occasions that he was prepared to depart from his predecessor’s more hardline position on the South China Sea to engage Beijing in dialogue and possibly even joint development. He even hinted that he would tone down Manila’s claim in exchange for infrastructure investment. Given that the ruling decisively turns things in Manila’s favor, it remains to be seen whether the populist Duterte administration would be able to sell the idea of joint development of what are effectively Philippine resources without risking a popular backlash. This will be difficult but not necessarily impossible, given that the Philippines would likely still require logistical and infrastructural support of some form or other for such development projects. 

Since the submission of the Philippine case in 2013, China has taken the position of “no recognition, no participation, no acceptance, and no execution,” as described by Chinese professor Shen Dingli. Beijing continues to adhere to this position, and is likely to dig in its heels given the comprehensive nature of the court’s rejection of China’s claims. This, in turn, will feed the conspiracy theories swirling around Beijing that the court is nothing but a conspiracy against China. 

[T]he rulings are likely to occasion intense internal discussions and debates within the Chinese leadership as to how best to proceed.

Not surprisingly, in defiance of the ruling, China continues to insist on straight baselines and EEZs in the Spratlys. Away from the glare of the media however, the rulings are likely to occasion intense internal discussions and debates within the Chinese leadership as to how best to proceed. Many analysts have the not-unfounded concern that hawkish perspectives will prevail in this debate, at least in the short term—fed by the deep sensibilities to issues of security and sovereignty, and a (misplaced) sense of injustice. This would doubtless put regional stability at risk. Instead, China should do its part to bring the Code of Conduct it has been discussing with ASEAN to a conclusion as a demonstration of its commitment to regional order and stability, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Beijing should also continue to engage concerned states in dialogue, but these dialogues cannot be conducted on the premise of Chinese “unalienable ownership” of and “legitimate entitlements” in the South China Sea. 

ASEAN will be hosting several ministerial meetings later this month, and the ruling will doubtless be raised in some form or other, certainly in closed-door discussions. For ASEAN, the key question is whether the organization can and will cobble together a coherent, consensus position in response to the ruling, and how substantive the response will be (they should at least make mention of the importance of international law to which all ASEAN states subscribe). For now though, it is too early to tell. 

U.S. policy

As an Asia-Pacific country, the United States has set great stock in the principle of freedom of navigation, and has articulated this as a national interest with regards to the South China Sea. There are however, three challenges for the United States as it proceeds to refine its policy in the region:

1. First, going by the attention it has commanded in Washington, it appears that the South China Sea issue has already become the definitive point of reference of America’s Southeast Asia policy. Southeast Asian states, on the other hand, have expressed their desire precisely that the South China Sea issue should not overshadow or dominate the regional agenda. Hence, even as the United States continues to be present and engaged on South China Sea issues in the region, equal attention, if not more, should be afforded to broaden the scope of their engagement. 
2. Second, in pushing back Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, the United States must be careful not to inadvertently contribute to the militarization of the region. There is talk about the deployment of a second carrier group to the region, and the U.S.S. John C. Stennis and U.S.S. Ronald Reagan are already patrolling the Philippine Sea. On the one hand, this is presumed to enhance the deterrent effect of the American presence in the region. Yet on the other hand, Washington should be mindful of the fact that China’s South China Sea claim is also informed by a deep sense of vulnerability, especially to the military activities that the United States conducts in its vicinity. 
3. Finally, in its desire to reassure the region, the United States has sought to strengthen its relations with regional partners and allies. This is necessary, and it is welcomed. At the same time however, Washington should also ensure that this strengthening and deepening of relations is undergirded by an alignment of interests and shared outlooks. This cannot, and should not, be assumed. 

       

The EU and Turkey have reached agreement on the broad outlines of a coordinated strategy to respond to the migration crisis. According to the plan, discussed at an emergency summit on Monday in Brussels, all migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands would be returned. For every migrant Turkey readmits, the EU would resettle one registered refugee from a U.N.-administered camp, effectively establishing a single legal migration pathway.

The deal, which has not been finalized, includes a pledge to speed up disbursement of a 3-billion-euro fund ($3.3 billion) aimed to help Turkey shelter the roughly 2.5 million Syrian refugees currently on its soil, and to decide on additional support. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has requested that Europe double its funding to 6 billion euro ($6.6 billion) over three years. He also called on European leaders to speed up the timetable on lifting visa requirements for Turkish citizens and to kick-start stalled accession talks.

Rough road ahead

Establishing a framework is an important step forward in the effort to forge a common approach to the mounting crisis. German Chancellor Angela Merkel—facing discontent at home over her open door policy—welcomed the tentative deal as a potential breakthrough. So did Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron.

However, key details remain unresolved: First, it is not clear that all EU countries would agree to take part in such a relocation scheme, given strong opposition to compulsory migrant quotas. On Monday night, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán vowed to veto any commitment to resettle asylum seekers. 

[K]ey details remain unresolved.

Second, Ankara’s demands regarding EU membership and visa waivers are likely to be contested. Turkey’s bid for accession has long been controversial, and will only be made more so by the court-ordered seizure of the opposition newspaper Zaman late last week. Visa-free access for Turkish citizens is likewise contentious. Already, leaders of Germany’s conservative Christian Social Union party have vowed “massive resistance” to any such measure.

Third, human rights groups have called into question the plan’s legality. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees raised concerns about its legitimacy under EU and international law, expressing unease over the blanket return of foreigners from one country to another. Amnesty International called the proposal a “death blow” to refugee rights. While Europe believes the legal questions can be resolved by declaring Turkey a “safe third country,” Amnesty has cast doubt on the concept. 

And so?

Talks will continue ahead of the EU migration summit, which will take place on March 17 and 18. Meanwhile, NATO will begin carrying out operations in the territorial waters of Greece and Turkey to locate migrant boats. According to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, those efforts will focus on “collecting information and conducting monitoring” in an endeavor to stop the smuggling.

In recent weeks, as many as 2,000 migrants each day have been arriving on Greece’s shores. They join more than 35,000 migrants already stranded there, unable to travel north due to border closures along the Western Balkans route. Those closures cast in doubt the future of the continent’s open border regime—and with it, the unity of Europe.

      

Publish What You Fund’s 2016 Aid Transparency Index is out. And as a result, today we can assess whether major donors met the commitments they made five years ago at Busan to make aid transparent by the end of 2015. The index is also a window into the state of foreign aid transparency and how the U.S.—the world’s largest bilateral donor—stacks up.

The global picture

On the positive side, the index found that ten donors of varied types and sizes, accounting for 25 percent of total aid, have met the commitment to aid transparency. And more than half of the 46 organizations included in the 2016 index now publish data to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) registry at least quarterly.

At the same time, the index’s assessments show more than half of the organizations still fall into the lowest three categories, scoring below 60 percent in terms of the transparency of their information.

The U.S. picture

Continuing its leadership on transparency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation comes in second overall in the index, meeting its Busan commitment and once again demonstrating that the institutional commitment to publishing and using its data continues.

Otherwise, at first glance, U.S. progress seems disappointing. The five other U.S. donors included in the 2016 index are all in the “fair” category. Seen through a five-year lens, however, these same five U.S. donors were either in the “poor” or “very poor” categories in the 2011 index. So, all agencies have moved up, and three of them—U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief—are on the cusp of “good.”

In the two biggest U.S. agencies that administer foreign assistance, USAID and the State Department, the commitment is being institutionalized and implemented through more systematic efforts to revamp their outdated information systems. Both have reviewed the gaps in their data reporting systems and developed a path forward. USAID’s Cost Management Plan identifies specific steps to be taken and is well under way. The State Department Foreign Assistance Data Review (FADR) involves further reviews that need to be executed promptly in order to lead to action. Both are signs of a heightened commitment to data transparency and both require continued agency leadership and staff implementation.

The Department of Defense, which slid backwards in the last three assessments (and began at the "very poor" category in 2011), has for the first time moved into the "fair" category.  It is still the lowest performing U.S. agency in the index, but it is now publishing 12 new IATI fields. It is moving in the right direction, but significant work remains to be done.

The third U.S. National Action Plan (NAP) announced last fall—the strongest issued by the U.S. to date—calls for improvements to quality and comprehensiveness of U.S. data and commits the U.S. to doing more to raise awareness, accessibility, and demand for foreign assistance data. This gives all U.S. agencies the imperative to do much more to make their aid information transparent and usable.  

Going forward—what should the U.S. being focusing on?

The overall challenge has been laid out in the third NAP:

• Almost all of the U.S. agencies need to improve the breadth and depth of the information they are publishing to meet IATI standards. Far too often, basic information—such as titles—are either not published or are not useful.
• The Millennium Challenge Corporation should continue its leadership role, especially on data use. All agencies should be promoting the use of data among their own staff and by external stakeholders, especially at country level. Feedback will go a long way toward helping them improve the quality of the data they are publishing and thereby help them meet the IATI standards.
• USAID must finish the work on its Cost Management Plan, including putting IATI in the planned Development Information Solution. Additionally, more progress needs to be made on the follow-up to the Aid Transparency Country Pilot Assessment to meet the needs of partners.   
• The State Department needs to follow through on including IATI in the new integrated solution mapped out in its data review.

The leadership of all foreign affairs agencies needs to work harder to make the business case for compiling, publishing, and using data on foreign aid programs. Open data, particularly when it is comparable, timely, accessible, and comprehensive, is an extremely valuable management asset.  Agency leadership should be its champion. So far, we have not seen enough.

U.S. progress on aid transparency was slow to start. It is still not where it needs to be. But with a modest but concerted push, three additional agencies will be in the “good” category and that is a story we can start to be proud of.   

We look forward to continued progress and to the day when all U.S. foreign aid meets transparency standards—a day I believe will be an important one for the cause of greater development, better governance, democratic participation, and reduced poverty worldwide.

       

Once upon a time, long ago, the development industry was fixated on measuring aid from richer to poorer countries. They called it ODA, standing for Official Development Assistance. For decades this aid has been codified, reported, and tracked, mostly by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (DAC/OECD), a club of advanced economies. In advance of the Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank, the DAC announced that ODA has risen by 6.9% over 2014 levels to 132 billion dollars, a record amount. Importantly, ODA increased even after stripping out funds spent on refugees.

The United Nations has established targets for ODA—like the famous 0.7 percent of national income—which have taken on legendary status as benchmarks of national generosity. Only six out of 28 DAC countries met this target last year: Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

Some institutions and lobby groups remain fixated on ODA, but many development actors now reject it as flawed. A major theme of the Spring Meetings is how to move beyond ODA and expand other forms of financing for development. ODA is, among other things, symptomatic of a charity perspective, rather than investment; inappropriate for South-South cooperation; and unable to capture the big new landscape of public-private links. What’s more, it is riddled with self-serving quirks like scoring numerous flows—the cost of university places in donor countries, and administrative costs of aid agencies—that never reach developing countries.

Perhaps the most telling weakness of ODA is that emerging powers like China and India see little merit (and arguably, some residual stigma) in this concept and, therefore, will not report on that basis to a club to which they do not belong. As their share of the world economy and their interactions with other “developing” countries continue to grow, this means ODA will inevitably start to represent an ever smaller share of official financing for development.

TOSSD to the rescue?

TOSSD stands for Total Official Support for Sustainable Development. The idea, still being fleshed out, is to have a universally accepted measure of the full array of public financial support for sustainable development. TOSSD should differ from ODA in at least three ways:

• First, it should take a developing country perspective rather than a donor country perspective. So it should cover the value of all funding for development that is officially supported, from pure grants to near-market loans and equity investments, as well as guarantees and insurance.
• Second, it should measure cross-border flows from all countries, not just the rich members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee.
• Third, it should include contributions to global public goods needed to support development, like U.N. peacekeeping and pandemic surveillance.

There are many complications behind any international attempt to define and track such a huge range of activities. Some are technical, but can probably be resolved with enough goodwill and professionalism. So, for example, we can debate how to establish whether and how official support to private investors changes their behaviour, delivering “additional” development results compared to a situation without that support. In the end, sensible solutions and workarounds will be found.

More difficult are a couple of politically sensitive challenges, which at the same time underlie the value of reaching consensus on a new measure. How far, for example, should the new measure recognise indirect spending on global public goods? Take for example public research on an AIDS vaccine that could lead to prevention of millions of deaths in developing countries. Right now, this would not count as ODA because the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries is not its main objective.

We tend to think that consideration of globe-spanning benefits like these, which do not fit the simple mould of money crossing borders, is an essential feature of a new measure of development finance. However, it will need to be bounded sensibly, not least because of underlying suspicions that the countries that are today most likely to deploy such tools, and claim them as a large part of their distinctive contribution, are among the “old rich”—though that could change quickly. We suggest that spending on a defined list of global public goods should be included, perhaps those that support Agenda 2030, such as U.N. peacekeeping or a global research consortium like GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance.

A second potentially divisive issue, already alluded to, is how to value non-monetary flows, like technical assistance, and in a fair way across countries. We think it would be a powerful positive signal for international cooperation if even modest contributions by low- and middle-income countries are recognised, celebrated, and valued according to the contribution being made, not the cost of providing the assistance. The assistance provided by professionals from developing countries (think Cuban doctors) should be measured at the same prices as assistance provided by professionals from rich countries. Some form of purchasing power parity equivalence would need to be defined and used.

Who should collect all this information and ensure it is more or less consistent?

This is a hugely contentious question. Neither of the most obvious answers, the well-organised but globally unloved OECD and the legitimate but under-resourced U.N. secretariat, are likely to be acceptable without some changes. A preferred candidate has to have a sufficiently broad group of countries prepared to self-report on even a loose set of definitions in order to get momentum. At a minimum all the major economies of the world, for example members of the G-20, should be willing to participate. It should also have the technical capacity to help countries provide information in a consistent way.

The International Monetary Fund or World Bank could be candidates—most countries already report to them on a range of data, including financial flows. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, with its membership of many development actors and technical support, could be another. Or a new group could be created in much the same way as the International Aid Transparency Initiative. This could even be a revamped Development Assistance Committee that operates with broader support in much the same way as the OECD’s tax work has many non-OECD members participating. What is important is that the guiding principle be to measure official cross-border financial resources that support the new universally-agreed Sustainable Development Goals, and to start now and learn by doing.  Such initiatives are too easily killed by subjecting them to endless external criticism that a perfect solution has not been found.

Finally, what’s in name?

TOSSD may be one of the least attractive acronyms on offer today. Without disrespect to its OECD authors, it will anyway have to change to something that works for all the major stakeholders, and is not visibly invented in Paris and that also encourages players who are not strictly speaking “official,” like foundations, to sign up. We tend to favor a plainer, simpler wrapper like International Development Contributions (IDC), or Defined Development Contributions (DDC). 

       

       

       

The loss of the Afghan provincial capital Kunduz was a psychological shock to the Afghan people, a strategic and tactical defeat for both Afghanistan and the United States, and a tragedy for those at the Doctors Without Borders hospital there. Yet the shock may prompt essential changes. It is important to examine both Afghan and U.S. responsibility for the disaster, what is happening now and what needs to be done. President Obama’s decision Thursday to maintain existing U.S. force levels into next year was absolutely correct to achieve the goal he stated of “sustainable Afghan capacity and self-sufficiency.”

Kunduz, which has since been recaptured by Afghan forces, was more than just the first provincial capital to be taken by the Taliban; its fall was highly symbolic because it was the site of the Taliban’s last stand in 2001. The poor initial performance of Afghan security forces and the tragic bombing of a nongovernmental organization hospital in the midst of a chaotic response to the attack sparked national disappointment in Afghanistan and international concern. All this came on the back of a dismal year in which many more Afghan civilians died than did so while international forces fought the Taliban, and the national unity government, which came into office on a wave of hope a year ago, stalled on filling essential positions and reforming governance.

The United States and its allies share responsibility for the military losses. We built security forces that depend on air power and need continued intelligence and advisory support. But instead of ensuring that these capabilities are available, we have severely limited air support, transferred key intelligence enablers to Iraq and created a patchwork system that left key areas, including Kunduz, without effective advisers. Our withdrawals from these vital functions based on politically driven timetables ignored reality on the ground, including Taliban capabilities and the embrace of the Islamic State by some militants.

But Afghans need to understand that U.S. support is not, and should not, be a blank check. Both the government and the opposition need to work to improve their military, political and governance performance, and come together instead of pulling the country apart.

The Kunduz setback does not mean the war is lost. Elite Afghan commandos delivered by recapturing critical areas. Whereas Mosul in Iraq remains in enemy hands a year after it fell, Kunduz has returned to government control. President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah appear to be heeding the call to action. During our recent 10-day visit to Afghanistan, each told us that they have agreed to an accelerated appointment process. Five new governors have been named, including three to critical provinces; further appointments and the long-delayed replacement of numerous senior officers is promised and must happen quickly. Appointments must involve effective individuals and cannot be merely political payoffs. Ghani has created a commission to investigate Kunduz, with a mandate to recommend action, that is led by opposition voices, including a former head of intelligence, though it sadly lacks female members.

If government performance takes off, public confidence could begin to be restored. More remains to be done. Afghan power brokers, intent on advancing personal agendas, seek to replace the government. They need to be pressed to stand down. The effort to reduce predatory governance in the provinces and Kabul cannot be shoved aside. Ghani and Abdullah must work effectively together despite the rapacious desires of their supporters and opponents. Broader consultation with the Afghan people is needed.

The United States needs to continue to step up to its own responsibilities, as well. Ground combat troops are not needed, but advisers and air power must be kept in place and not reduced on some blind, years-old timetable. Air power must be available to preempt attacks and not confined, as it is now, to desperate defense after attacks have begun. Afghan and foreign officials we spoke to foresee a crescendo of Taliban attacks as international forces withdraw. An even bigger Taliban offensive next year is likely to stretch battered Afghan forces further. We have not ended a war, only left it to the Afghans too soon.

The United States should maintain its current forces and funding levels, which are less than 10 percent of expenditures a few years ago, and focus on effectively advising Afghan forces. A reduction of the U.S. effort to a “pure” counterterrorism effort, still foreshadowed by the president’s hope of getting to about half the current force level sometime next year, would be disturbingly similar to what President George W. Bush tried a decade ago. Such a premature drawdown would abandon Afghan forces before they are ready, increasing the risk that a renewed terrorist haven will emerge.

Asking our allies to do jobs they are not equipped to do raises the risk of more reversals such as Kunduz and tragedies like the hospital bombing. Obama’s decision to maintain forces properly avoids preempting his successor’s choices about a difficult and evolving situation. That focus, and not a predetermined timetable, should continue to guide decisions throughout the remainder of this administration. The president’s public determination to maintain our current training and advising effort until Afghan forces do not need such help will provide a needed boost to both Afghans and our NATO allies — some of whom have been ahead of us in urging that we stay. And it is the right thing to do for our national interests.

This piece was originally published by The Washington Post.

       

The gruesome theatrics of the Islamic State (IS) captivate the world’s attention, instilling fear in the public from Los Angeles to Paris to Beirut. Yet while arrests are made in Europe and airstrikes continue in Raqqa, Americans ignore developments on another worn-out battlefield: Afghanistan.

Afghanistan faces numerous crises in 2016 that could rock the country and threaten U.S. security investments. The United States still has 10,000 troops stationed in the country. It must take decisive action not to supply vast numbers of troops or massively increase spending, but instead abandon inadequate policies before something catastrophic occurs. These must be more than incremental policy changes that merely stave off disaster for the interim, as this would compound the seriousness of each crisis. After traveling to Afghanistan in October 2015, we have identified key security risks and steps the United States can take to forestall disaster.

In 2015, Taliban violence resulted in more Afghan civilian, police, and military casualties than in any year since U.S. and NATO forces began fighting in Afghanistan. More fighters, better weapons, and new tactics made the 2015 Taliban offensive their most effective yet, with a recent attack in Parwan province that killed six U.S. soldiers serving as a terrible reminder of this grim reality. Next year, the Taliban will aim to take provincial cities, pounce on Kandahar, and spread fear through spectacular attacks. A major Taliban offensive following this year’s fierce assault is almost certain. Indeed, as a recent Department of Defense report describes, the security situation in Afghanistan has grown more precarious over the last year.

The Afghan army has done its best to counter the Taliban assault. Afghan forces retook Kunduz and pushed back serious Taliban offensives in other cities, including Ghazni. While attrition is high due to soldiers overstaying leaves, desertion, and Taliban threats to soldiers’ families, recruitment of new forces has exceeded losses. Yet, strong ground forces cannot compensate for inadequate air support, modern intelligence capabilities, well-functioning logistics (to maintain vehicles and keep essential supplies available), and higher-order assistance for Afghanistan’s still-nascent security institutions. The United States must help fill these critical gaps while maintaining its promises to complete these critical, but unfinished, programs. The United States must also amend the very restrictive rules of engagement that currently limit air support capabilities, and restore intelligence assets that have been withdrawn. Stronger battlefield intelligence capabilities are essential, as we learned after the tragic bombing of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Kunduz. More effective air attacks and improved intelligence could seriously disrupt Taliban operations in Afghanistan.

But the Taliban is no longer the only threat to stability in Afghanistan. The influence of the Islamic State is growing, as it recruits more extremist Taliban members and brings in fighters from non-Afghan communities, including Uzbeks and Pakistanis. These IS-inspired groups challenge the new Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who seeks to cement his leadership after the years-long deception over the death of his predecessor, Mullah Omar. The Taliban fragmentation and competition from IS, especially prominent in the provinces of Zabul and Nangarhar, have led to increased violence, including the recent beheadings of minority Hazaras. The renewed violence reduces already slim hopes for a negotiated peace in Afghanistan.

The United States and NATO must intensify actions against IS in Afghanistan. Like al Qaeda, the group must be a priority target for air and counter terrorist missions. Now is the time to destroy it. At a minimum, coalition forces must restrain the growth of this hostile force before it becomes a significantly larger threat.

Afghanistan is undertaking a unique experiment in elected government. Nearly 70 percent of the electorate voted in 2014, despite threats from the Taliban to kill or mutilate anyone who did so. However, the results were clouded by accusations of widespread fraud. After an extended political impasse, the United States brokered a peaceful settlement and a power-sharing agreement between the two contenders in the run off. The National Unity Government (NUG) was formed with Ashraf Ghani serving as president and his chief rival, Abdullah Abdullah, as chief executive officer.

Military solutions alone cannot solve all of the country’s woes, as the electorate’s participation and the elected officials’ ability to govern are as critical to a stable state as a strong security apparatus. Now, at a time when insurgent attacks need a strong response and the government needs to stop its internal wrangling and start delivering services to civilians, the NUG finds itself politically distracted. Ex-president Hamid Karzai and mujahedeen leaders continue to undermine the government in an attempt to spur its collapse. These attempts are little more than a naked power grab that, if successful, would usher in months of political paralysis while the victors squabble over the spoils of power. This would be disastrous, at a time when insurgent attacks need a strong response and the government needs to start delivering services. The United States and other coalition nations must voice strong opposition to all efforts to change the constitution through a Loya Jirga or the scheduling of early elections. Without first reforming the electoral system, another massively fraudulent election will surely follow. Quiet opposition will be taken as willingness to see the NUG undone.

Despite some positive developments, the Afghan government is losing popular support. More and more Afghans believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction. Thousands of Afghans are fleeing the country, and along with them goes the potential for economic growth. Crime and insecurity in the cities contribute to this brain and asset drain. Stakeholders in Afghanistan must demand governance improvements from the NUG – including opposition to vicious ethnic discrimination and power abuse, which the Taliban exploited in Kunduz – that the Afghan people crave. The government should focus on increasing effective anti-criminal and anti-corruption policing in the major cities, such as Kabul, Herat, and Jalalabad. This would require significant government action against some major power brokers. Additionally, a concerted foreign advisory effort with the police is needed to improve civilian security. These actions require vigorous U.S. and international backing.

Doubts are growing about the United States’ and NATO’s commitment to long-term support for Afghanistan. While President Barack Obama’s decision to retain major security hubs in Afghanistan was a step in the right direction, this progress was undercut by the planned force reductions at the end of 2016. In a worsening security environment, Afghans fear being abandoned by their international partners. To rebuild confidence, a U.S.-led NATO review of conditions on the ground and a demonstrated willingness to fill major gaps, such as air support, would counteract this sense of abandonment.

Not all is gloom. Unlike Karzai, who blamed the United States for most of Afghanistan’s problems and refused to move against massive corruption, Ghani remains committed to reform. There is progress in revenue collection, enforcement action against fraud in Kabul Bank, and some members of the new cabinet are making progress in less visible but important reforms like speeding business licensing and settling land titles. Unlike in Syria and Iraq, militias do not yet dominate either politics or the battlefield. Actions are still available to minimize the looming crises. But planning and decisions are needed now, not after the crises explode.

This piece was originally published by Foreign Policy. 

       

Editor’s Note: The following chapter is part of the report, "After the Drug Wars," published in February 2016 by the London School of Economics and Political Science's Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy.

Even as the administration of Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto has scored important reform successes in the economic sphere, its security and law enforcement policy toward organized crime remains incomplete and ill-defined. Despite the early commitments of his administration to focus on reducing drug violence, combating corruption, and redesigning counternarcotics policies, little significant progress has been achieved. Major human rights violations related to the drug violence, whether perpetrated by organized crime groups or military and police forces, persist – such as at Iguala, Guerrero, where 43 students were abducted by a cabal of local government officials, police forces and organized crime groups. This has also been seen in Tatlaya and Tanhuato, Michoacán, where military forces have likely been engaged in extrajudicial killings of tens of people. Meanwhile, although drug violence has abated in the north of the country, such as in Ciudad Juárez, Monterrey and Tijuana, government policies have played only a minor role. Much of the violence reduction is the result of the vulnerable and unsatisfactory narcopeace – the victory of the Sinaloa or Gulf Cartels. 

The July 2015 spectacular escape of the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and the world’s most notorious drug trafficker – Joaquín Guzmán Loera, known as El Chapo – from a Mexican high-security prison was a massive embarrassment for the Peña Nieto government. Yet it serves as another reminder of the deep structural deficiencies of Mexico’s law enforcement and rule-of law system which persists more than a decade after Mexico declared its war on the drug cartels.

The Peña Nieto administration often pointed to the February 2014 capture of El Chapo as the symbol of its effectiveness in fighting drug cartels and violent criminal groups in Mexico. The Peña Nieto administration’s highlighting of Chapo’s capture was both ironic and revealing: ironic, because the new government came into office criticizing the anti-crime policy of the previous administration of Felipe Calderón of killing or capturing top capos to decapitate their cartels; and revealing, because despite the limitations and outright counterproductive effects of this high-value-targeting policy and despite promises of a very different strategy, the Peña Nieto administration fell back into relying on the pre-existing approach. In fact, such high-value-targeting has been at the core of Pena Nieto’s anti-crime policy. Moreover, Chapo’s escape from Mexico’s most secure prison through a sophisticated tunnel (a method he had also pioneered for smuggling drugs and previously used for escapes) showed the laxity and perhaps complicity at the prison, and again spotlighted the continuing inadequate state of Mexico’s corrections system.

Read the full chapter here.

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The past year has been one of intense engagement in U.S -India relations with several high-level visits exchanged and working-level dialogues held between the two countries. Most recently, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met at the Paris climate change summit and Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar will visit the United States to discuss the bilateral defense relationship.

On December 11, The India Project at Brookings hosted a conversation with U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma to reflect on developments in U.S.-India relations in 2015. He also discussed the recent high-level engagements on defense policy and climate change, as well as the road ahead for the bilateral relationship. Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project and fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings moderated the discussion. Bruce Jones, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings provided introductory remarks.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #USIndia

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• U.S.–India relations: A conversation with U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma

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• U.S.–India relations: A conversation with U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma

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The U.S. military will carry out a major modernization of its strategic nuclear forces in the 2020s.

It will cover all three legs of the strategic triad.

Much of the planned program makes sense. The long-range standoff (LRSO) — a new nuclear-armed cruise missile to outfit strategic bombers — does not.

The primary reason for the modernization program is that many US strategic weapons systems are aging out, and American policy is that, as long as there are nuclear weapons, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and robust nuclear deterrent.

The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines will begin to hit the end of their service life in the late 2020s, and the Navy will need new submarines. Submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) make up the most survivable leg of the triad, and they carry the bulk of deployed US strategic warheads.

The service life of the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) runs out in 2030. The Air Force seeks a replacement ICBM. At a minimum, keeping an ICBM leg of the triad would require another life extension program for existing Minuteman III missiles.

As for the air-breathing leg of the triad, the Air Force wants to procure 80 to 100 B-21 bombers. Plans are shrouded in secrecy but reportedly will incorporate stealth features and advanced electronic warfare capabilities to allow the aircraft to penetrate contested air space. The Air Force is also modernizing the B61 nuclear gravity bomb for use on strategic bombers.

One can and should question the Pentagon’s desired numbers for these programs. That is especially the case given the projected costs of strategic modernization, which Pentagon officials openly admit they do not know how to fund.

It is not clear why the United States will need to replace 400 deployed ICBMs on a one-for-one basis, particularly as the Air Force several years ago was prepared to go down to 300. A force of 200-300 ICBMs would suffice and result in significant cost savings. Likewise, one can challenge the requirement for 12 new ballistic missile submarines, as opposed to nine or 10.

The biggest question, however, arises over the LRSO, with a projected cost of $20 billion to $30 billion. The Air Force originally developed nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in the 1970s because the B-52 — then the mainstay of the strategic bomber fleet — presented a big target for adversary radars. That would make it hard for the aircraft to penetrate air defenses. A B-52 armed with ALCMs could remain outside of radar range and release its cruise missiles.

The B-2, with its stealth features, was designed to restore a penetrating capability. The Air Force plans to use stealth and electronic warfare capabilities to give the B-21 a penetrating capability as well. If these bombers can defeat and penetrate air defenses, that makes the LRSO redundant. (Moreover, unlike in the 1970s, the Air Force today has very capable long-range conventionally armed cruise missiles that provide a standoff capability for bombers.)

If, on the other hand, the stealth of the B-21 will be compromised in the not-too-distant future, then one has to question the wisdom of spending $60 billion to $80 billion — and perhaps more — to procure the B-21. If we believe the B-21 would soon encounter problems penetrating air defenses, scrap that program. Buy instead modified Boeing 767s, a variant of which will serve as the Air Force’s new aerial tanker, and arm them with the LRSO.

The Air Force’s evident attachment to the B-21 suggests, however, that it believes that the aircraft will be able to defeat adversary air defenses for some time to come. That means that the LRSO would add little capability to the US strategic force mix.

If one were to argue for the redundant capability provided by the LRSO, the number of new ALCMs that the Pentagon proposes to purchase — 1,000 to 1,100 — is difficult to understand. Even allowing for extra cruise missiles for test purposes, the number seems excessively high.

In its 2010 annual report to Congress on implementation of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (SORT), the State Department advised that, as of Dec. 31, 2009, the United States had 1,968 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. That figure captured the actual number of nuclear warheads atop SLBMs and ICBMs plus the number of nuclear bombs and ALCMs at air bases for use by bombers.

On June 1, 2011, a State Department fact sheet showed the number of deployed US strategic warheads as 1,800 as of Feb. 5, 2011, when the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) went into force. A Dec. 1, 2011, fact sheet provided a more detailed breakdown of US strategic forces. It stated that, as of Sept. 1, 2011, the United States had 1,790 deployed strategic warheads and 125 deployed strategic bombers. Like SORT, New START counts each warhead on a deployed ballistic missile as a deployed warhead. But New START counts bomber weapons differently from SORT. New START attributes each deployed bomber as one warhead, regardless of the number that it can carry or the number of weapons that may be at bomber bases.

The 125 deployed bombers on Sept. 1, 2011, would have counted as 125 under New START’s deployed strategic warhead total. Reducing 1,790 by 125 yields 1,665 — the number of deployed warheads then on US SLBMs and ICBMs.

Comparing the SORT and New START numbers is a bit of an apples-and-oranges comparison, but it gives some idea of the number of bomber weapons at US strategic bomber bases. Unless there was a dramatic increase in the number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs between the end of 2009 and September 2011 — and there is no reason to think that there was — comparing SORT’s 1,968 figure (end of 2009) to the 1,665 deployed warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs (under New START counting rules in September 2011) suggests some 300 nuclear bombs and ALCMs were at bomber bases. The B-2s would have been armed with bombs, which indicates a maximum of 200-250 ALCMs. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) also estimates that there are about 300 nuclear weapons at strategic bomber bases, of which 200 are nuclear-armed ALCMs. FAS believes an additional 375 ALCM airframes are held in reserve.

This comparison raises the question: Why would 1,000-1,100 ALCM airframes be needed to support a couple of hundred deployed ALCMs?

The United States should sensibly modernize its strategic deterrent, particularly in a time of tight defense budgets. The case for the LRSO is demonstrably weak, especially for the planned size of the program. The LRSO should be shelved.

This piece was originally published in Defense News.

      

When Iran and the P5+1 signed a deal over Tehran’s nuclear program last July, members of Congress, Middle East analysts, and Arab Gulf governments all warned that the agreement would prompt Iran’s rivals in the region to race for the bomb.

In a report that Bob Einhorn and I released this week, we assessed this risk of a so-called proliferation cascade. We look at four states in particular—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey—and Bob briefly explores each case in another blog post out today. In the paper, we argue that although the likelihood of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East is fairly low, and certainly lower than a number of critics of the Iran deal would have you believe, it is not zero. Given that, here are eight steps that leaders in Washington should take to head off that possibility:

1. Ensure that the JCPOA is rigorously monitored, strictly enforced, and faithfully implemented;
2. Strengthen U.S. intelligence collection on Iranian proliferation-related activities and intelligence-sharing on those activities with key partners;
3. Deter a future Iranian decision to produce nuclear weapons;
4. Seek to incorporate key monitoring and verification provisions of the JCPOA into routine IAEA safeguards as applied elsewhere in the Middle East and in the global nonproliferation regime;
5. Pursue U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with Middle East governments on terms that are realistic and serve U.S. nonproliferation interests;
6. Promote regional arrangements that restrain fuel cycle developments and build confidence in the peaceful use of regional nuclear programs;
7. Strengthen security assurances to U.S. partners in the Middle East; and
8. Promote a stable regional security environment.

Taken together, these steps deal with three core challenges the United States faces in shoring up the nonproliferation regime in the region.

The first is that the central test of nonproliferation in the Middle East will come from how the JCPOA is believed to be meeting its core objective of preventing Iranian nuclear weapons development and Iranian establishment of regional hegemony. It cannot be stressed enough that the decision to pursue nuclear weapons by any state, including those in the region, starts with a sense of vulnerability to core security threats and an inability to address those threats through any other means. The history of nuclear proliferation is one of tit-for-tat armament in the face of overriding security imperatives. Both finished and aborted nuclear programs bear the hallmarks of a security dilemma impelling states to make the political, economic, and security investments into nuclear weapons.

This is no less true for countries across the region than for Iran. To the extent that the overall security environment can be stabilized, there will be less impetus for any Middle Eastern state to develop nuclear weapons. The United States should focus on:

• Fully implementing and enforcing all sides of the JCPOA (nuclear restrictions, transparency, and sanctions relief);
• Creating a strong sense of deterrence toward Iran, manifest most clearly in the passage of a standing Authorization to Use Military Force if Iran is determined to be breaking out toward acquisition of a nuclear weapon;
• Providing security assurances and backing them up with the mechanisms to make them actionable like joint exercises, logistical planning, and cooperation with a range of regional and extra-regional actors; and,
• Working to promote a more stable regional environment by seeking the resolution of simmering conflicts.

But, these latter two factors also point to another resonant theme in our research: the need for the United States to be a player. After decades of involvement in the region, the United States has yet to settle upon the right balance between involvement and remove. Yet, establishing this equilibrium is essential. States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

In part for this reason, the United States should not only pursue deeper security relationships, but also civil nuclear cooperation with interested states throughout the region. Such a relationship both ensures a closer link between the United States and its partners and discourages the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology by disincentivizing countries from “going it alone.” In the Middle East, the United States would need to find a formulation that offers some flexibility (such as by building in language that would permit the United States to terminate any nuclear cooperation arrangements in the face of sensitive fuel cycle development by the other side).

The United States should also share intelligence more closely with its partners in the region. This is helpful in the short term, of course, but also helps the United States understand the mindset of and intelligence picture of its regional partners in a broader sense. It also helps leaders in Washington address concerns brought about by unfounded rumors or speculation as to Iran’s intentions or capabilities.

Changing how we do business

Even more important than how the JCPOA was negotiated will be how we transition from its restrictions and transparency mechanisms into a new world in 15 to 20 years. 

The United States seek to incorporate elements of the JCPOA into normal international monitoring practices and should negotiate new arrangements to help govern the future development of nuclear technology in the region. 

To achieve the former, the IAEA will need to make some changes to how it does business. For example, the IAEA determines how best to implement its monitoring mission, contingent on acceptance by the country being inspected. The United States and its partners should work with the IAEA (and other countries with significant nuclear activities) to make some parts of the JCPOA standard operating practice, such as online monitoring of enrichment levels. Other elements of the JCPOA may require agreements at the IAEA and beyond for how nuclear-related activities, including those that could have value for nuclear weaponization, are handled. It might be hard to get agreement, not least because there is clear language in the JCPOA that states that it will not be seen as a precedent for future nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, it should still be the ambition of the United States to make such steps part of the norm. 

A far more difficult lift would be organizing a regional approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. This is not the same as creating a multilateral fuel cycle, though some elements that approach would be helpful. Rather, the United States should find ways to craft regional agreements or, failing that, moratoria on aspects of the fuel cycle that others in the region would find threatening. It would be easier to negotiate constraints some aspects than others. For example, spent fuel reprocessing is rare in the Middle East, with only Israel having been known to do it to a significant degree. It may therefore be an attractive first place to begin. Enrichment would be altogether more difficult, but it may be possible to convince states in the region to forego the expansion of their enrichment programs beyond their status quo. For Iran, it would continue to possess uranium enrichment but with constraints that limit the utility of this program for weapons production; its incentive would be to avoid creating the rationale for regional competition. For other countries in the region, it would involve holding off on enrichment, but also on the financial and political investment enrichment would involve—as well refraining from creating a security dilemma for Iran that could produce miscalculation in the future.

While some of these recommendations are more challenging (and may prove impossible), others are potentially easier. By taking a multifaceted approach, the United States increases the chances that no further weapons of mass destruction proliferate in the Middle East down the road. 

Editors’ Note: Richard Nephew and Bob Einhorn spoke about their new report at a recent Brookings event. You can see the video from the event here.

      

       

The GOP presidential candidate said he would ban immigrants from sending money home to Mexico.

Donald Trump’s proposal to force Mexico to pay for a Wall guarding against the flux of immigrants into the U.S. made news this week, and rightfully so. Trump’s idea would be to curtail the ability of banks, credit unions, and wire transmission companies to send money abroad — a sharp departure from policy and law whose bipartisan aim has been to bring remittances to all countries into the financial mainstream and out from the shadowy illegal word of people moving cash in suitcases.

Encouraging remittances to go through the financial system benefits everyone: it enhances the ability to combat terrorist finance and money-laundering, it reduces crime in both the U.S. and abroad, it increases economic growth in the U.S. and overseas, and it provides for greater competition and market incentives to allow people to keep more of their hard-earned money to use as they see fit. Moving in the opposite direction would be a major mistake.

This is a big issue that affects a lot more people than one might think – more than just sending money to Mexico. In America today, more than 40 million people were born in other countries, a record number. This translates into just more than 1 in 8 Americans, a sharp increase from 1970 when fewer than 1 in 25 Americans were foreign born. Thus, it is not surprising that many people perceive America to have more foreign-born people than any time in their lifetime. However, that is not the case for the lifetime of America. Between the Civil War and the 1920s, America had as high — or higher — share of foreign born as we do today.

Remittances are not a new phenomenon. Most American families likely sent remittances at some point whenever their family first immigrated. My great-grand father sent money back to what is today the Czech Republic so that his wife and their children (including my grandmother) could come and join him and escape what became the Second World War. Today, remittance flows go toward the new generation of American immigrants and the children of those immigrants. More than $120 billion was sent abroad in 2012 according to the Pew Center and while it is true that Mexico received the largest amount at just under $23 billion, the rest of the top 5 countries may surprise you: China ($13 billion), India ($12 billion), Philippines ($10.5 billion), and Nigeria ($6 billion). And old habits remain as Germany ($2.5 billion) and France ($2 billion) are still among the top 15 countries that receive remittances from the United States.

This money comes in lots of small chunks, which can make sending it expensive. The typical new migrant worker sends money home around 14 times a year, which corresponds to once a month plus Mother’s Day and Christmas. These are usually small sums (less than $300) and represent an extraordinary level of savings given the worker’s income. The money goes through both the formal banking system including banks, credit unions, and wire transmitters who eventually use banks like Western Union and MoneyGram. Some goes through informal means, including “viajeros” who are people that literally carry cash in suitcases on planes that are often breaking the law and outside of the standard anti-money laundering and terrorist finance enforcement system. Why would anyone want to encourage that?

The idea of using this flow of funds to try to implement other policy objectives, such as border control, would be a sharp departure from current practice. The Patriot Act and subsequent federal law governing remittances in financial laws like the Dodd-Frank Act were never intended to be used to threaten to cut off the flow of migrant worker remittances. These laws were intended to track and crack down on the flow of money laundering or support for illegal and terrorist organizations while at the same time providing consumer protections to workers who are sending hard-earned cash back home to their parents, grandparents, and children. In fact, the bipartisan goal of policy concerning remittances has been to encourage the flow of money to come into the official system and to discourage the flow of funds through the underground network.

In 2004, then Federal Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke made clear that, “The Federal Reserve is attempting to support banks’ efforts to better serve immigrant populations, with remittances and other money transfers being a key area of interest.” House Financial Services Chairman Mike Oxley (R-OH) told President Bush’s then-Treasury Secretary John Snow, “Remittances between established and emerging economies foster growth in both types of economies simultaneously. I will be interested in hearing your views on how unnecessary costs can be eliminated in this area.” When Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD) introduced legislation that became the basis for today’s law that covers remittances, he had the simple goal to “increase transparency, competition and efficiency in the remittance market, while helping to bring more Americans into the financial mainstream.”

The longstanding bipartisan support for bringing remittances into the financial mainstream is based on the fact that most immigrants, regardless of whether they are U.S. citizens, legal residents, or undocumented, send remittances. A system that tried to assert proof of citizenship or legal status upon wiring money overseas would be burdensome, costly, and ineffective at best and if effective, it would simply drive more money into illegal transmission schemes while increasing crime here in the U.S. and abroad. Imagine if an entire community knew that someone would be walking through their immigrant neighborhood with a suitcase full of tens of thousands of dollars in cash.

Thought of another way, if I went to the bank to send money to my mother who lives in France part of the year, how would I prove that I’m a citizen? My driver’s license alone is not proof of legal status. Would I need to bring my passport? What if, like the majority of Americans, (62% according to the State Department) I don’t have a valid passport? Would I have to bring my birth certificate to the local Western Union? I guess the one positive thing from such a system is that it would help stop the email scams asking for money from a Nigerian Prince….

Aaron Klein is a fellow at the Brookings Institution and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury Department from 2009 to 2012. He also serves as an unpaid member of the Clinton campaign’s Infrastructure Finance Working Group; he has not served as an advisor on any banking or finance issues.

Editor’s note: This piece originally appeared on Fortune.

      

Like many Brits, I’m reeling. Everyone knew that the "Brexit" referendum was going to be close. But deep down I think many of us assumed that the vote would be to remain in the European Union. David Cameron had no realistic choice but to announce that he will step down.

Mr. Cameron’s fall can be traced back to a promise he made in the 2010 election to cap the annual flow of migrants into the U.K. at less than 100,000, "no ifs, no buts."Membership in the EU means free movement of labor, so this was an impossible goal to reach through direct policy. I served in the coalition government that emerged from the 2010 election, and this uncomfortable fact was clear from the outset. I don’t share the contents of briefings and meetings from my time in government (I think it makes good government harder if everyone is taking notes for memoirs), but my counterpart in the government, Mr. Cameron’s head of strategy, Steve Hilton, went public in the Daily Mail just before this week’s vote.

Steve recalled senior civil servants telling us bluntly that the pledged target could not be reached. He rightly fulminated about the fact that this meant we were turning away much more skilled and desirable potential immigrants from non-EU countries in a bid to bring down the overall number. What he didn’t say is that the target, based on an arbitrary figure, was a foolish pledge in the first place.

Mr. Cameron was unable to deliver on his campaign pledge, and immigration to the U.K. has been running at about three times that level. This fueled anger at the establishment for again breaking a promise, as well as anger at the EU. In an attempt to contain his anti-European right wing, Mr. Cameron made another rash promise: to hold a referendum.

The rest, as they say, is history. And now, so is he.

Immigration played a role in the Brexit campaign, though it seems that voters may not have made a clear distinction between EU and non-EU inward movement. Still, Thursday’s vote was, at heart, a plebiscite on what it means to British. Our national identity has always been of a quieter kind than, say the American one. Attempts by politicians to institute the equivalent of a Flag Day or July Fourth, to teach citizenship in schools, or to animate a “British Dream” have generally been laughed out of court. Being British is an understated national identity. Indeed, understatement is a key part of that identity.

Many Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish feel a much stronger affinity to their home nation within the U.K. than they do to Great Britain. Many Londoners look at the rest of England and wonder how they are in the same political community. These splits were obvious Thursday.

Identity politics has tended in recent years to be of the progressive kind, advancing the cause of ethnic minorities, lesbians and gays, and so on. In both the U.K. and the U.S. a strongly reactionary form of identity politics is gaining strength, in part as a reaction to the cosmopolitan, liberal, and multicultural forms that have been dominant. This is identity politics of a negative kind, defined not by what you are for but what you are against. A narrow majority of my fellow Brits just decided that at the very least, being British means not being European. It was a defensive, narrow, backward-looking attempt to reclaim something that many felt had been lost. But the real losses are yet to come.

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Editor's Note: This piece originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal's Washington Wire.