Robert W. Mahley
Jan 1, 1999; 40:1-16
Reviews

Chatham House Prize: Malawi Judges Win for Election Work News Release NCapeling 23 October 2020

Malawi’s constitutional court judges have won the 2020 Chatham House Prize in recognition of their 'courage and independence in the defence of democracy'.

The UK's new Online Safety Bill 10 February 2021 — 3:00PM TO 3:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2021 Online

Discussing the new proposals which include the establishment of a new ‘duty of care’ on companies to ensure they have robust systems in place to keep their users safe.

Governments, regulators and tech companies are currently grappling with the challenge of how to promote an open and vibrant internet at the same time as tackling harmful activity online, including the spread of hateful content, terrorist propaganda, and the conduct of cyberbullying, child sexual exploitation and abuse.

The UK government’s Online Harms proposals include the establishment of a new ‘duty of care’ on companies to ensure they have robust systems in place to keep their users safe. Compliance with this new duty will be overseen by an independent regulator.

On 15 December 2020, DCMS and the Home Office published the full UK government response, setting out the intended policy positions for the regulatory framework, and confirming Ofcom as the regulator.

With the legislation likely to be introduced early this year, the panel will discuss questions including:

• How to strike the balance between freedom of expression and protecting adults from harmful material?

• How to ensure the legislation’s approach to harm is sufficiently future-proofed so new trends and harms are covered as they emerge?

• What additional responsibilities will tech companies have under the new regulation?

• Will the regulator have sufficient powers to tackle the wide range of harms in question?

This event is invite-only for participants, but you can watch the livestream of the discussion on this page at 15.00 GMT on Wednesday 10 February.

Imagine a World Without Fake News Explainer Video NCapeling 25 February 2021

Harriet Moynihan and Mathieu Boulegue explain how we can avoid drowning in an ocean of fake news and information manipulation.

The flow of fake news is vast and unlikely to go away. What’s more, imagining a world where fake news is eradicated completely has implications for freedom of expression.

But what if, instead of wishing fake news away, we can adapt and become immune to it? 

Chatham House is built on big ideas. Help us imagine a better world.

Our researchers develop positive solutions to global challenges, working with governments, charities, businesses and society to build a better future.

SNF CoLab is our project supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) to share our ideas in experimental, collaborative ways – and to learn about designing a better future, overcoming challenges such as fake news, COVID-19, food security, and conflict.

Facebook's power under scrutiny as Trump ban upheld Expert comment NCapeling 6 May 2021

Keeping Donald Trump’s Facebook ban in place shows the vast power social media platforms hold, raising questions of whether that power is appropriately used.

Kate Jones

From a human rights perspective, the Oversight Board’s decision is a strong one, and not at all surprising. The board decided Facebook was right to suspend the former president’s access to post content on Facebook and Instagram, but not indefinitely.

It found Donald Trump’s posts violated Facebook’s community standards because they amounted to praise or support of people engaged in violence and that, applying a human rights assessment, Facebook’s suspension of Trump was a necessary and proportionate restriction of his right to freedom of expression.

However the board also found Trump’s indefinite suspension was neither in conformity with a clear Facebook procedure nor consistent with its commitment to respect human rights. Its decision requires Facebook to make a new decision on the future of Donald Trump’s account, grounded in its rules.

While opinions on this result will differ, the increased call for clear and accessible rules and respect for human rights in their implementation that the Oversight Board brings to Facebook’s operations is welcome.

But the Oversight Board’s powers are limited to content moderation – Facebook declined to answer the board’s questions about amplification of Trump’s posts through the platform’s design decisions and algorithms. This limitation on the board’s role should be lifted. It is in content amplification, not just content moderation, that Facebook should face scrutiny and accountability for the sake of the human rights of its users.

Fundamentally, human rights is not a veneer which can mask or legitimize underlying power dynamics or public policy – those still fall to be assessed for themselves.

The Trump/Facebook saga does highlight the vast power Facebook and other major social media platforms have over political discussion and persuasion. Through granting or denying, or through amplifying or quietening the voices of political figures, Facebook has the power to shape politics, electorates, and democratic processes. Improving content moderation through the Oversight Board, although important, does little to constrain that power.

Facebook itself, unlike a government, has no accountability to the general public, and the Oversight Board must not distract us from the need for a full conversation about the extent to which Facebook’s power is appropriately held and properly wielded.

Emily Taylor

This decision marks a coming of age for Facebook’s content moderation process. For years, decisions to take down content or ban users have been opaque, conducted by a human workforce that Facebook and other platforms have been hesitant to acknowledge. The platforms have also been worried that being seen to exercise an editorial function might put at risk the legal protections which prevent the platforms being held responsible for user-generated content.

When the Oversight Board was first posited, observers questioned whether a body funded by Facebook could properly exercise a legitimate appeals function. Now there is a reasoned decision which partly supports the decision to de-platform a serving president, but also takes issue with the indefinite nature of the ban.

Facebook specifically asked the Oversight Board to consider specific challenges involved when the person involved is a political leader. The board concluded that Trump’s ‘status as head of state with a high position of trust not only imbued his words with greater force and credibility but also created risks that his followers would understand they could act with impunity’. The storming of the US Capitol and role President Trump played in stirring up the violence underlined that political leaders’ words can motivate others to take harmful actions.

Just as the events of January 6 remain shocking, it remains shocking that private platforms have exercised the power to curb the speech of a US president. It also remains shocking that the platforms sat back and took no action over the previous four years, but waited until the final days of the transition.

The board’s decision is an evolution in private-sector content moderation, with a diverse board giving a reasoned opinion on a Facebook decision. But to fully comply with the principles of open justice, board decisions should include more detail on the individuals who have made the decision – at present, it appears all members of the board review the decision but it is not clear which individuals were involved in its drafting, or that they were clear from conflicts. If the process is to gain respect as a truly independent oversight on the platform’s decisions, greater transparency over the identity of decision-makers will be needed.

Mark Zuckerberg expressed concern about Facebook becoming an arbiter of truth or free speech and, overall, the difficulty of having private companies managing the application of fundamental rights on their platforms has not been solved. Just because companies have the financial resources to do it, does not mean they necessarily should.

Yet no other international governance or arbitration system has emerged to handle the complexities of platform power over speech. In the context of that vacuum, the Oversight Board’s decision is a welcome step.

Monitoring of trade deals needs a risk-based approach Expert comment NCapeling 24 May 2021

On human rights issues, trading partners must do more than trust to luck.

The recent row within the UK government about the treatment of agricultural products in a proposed new trade deal with Australia provides a reminder that changes to trading arrangements can have social and environmental costs, as well as benefits.

Although the UK government clearly feels political pressure to demonstrate its ‘Global Britain’ credentials with some speedily concluded new deals, rushing ahead without a full understanding of the social, environmental, and human rights implications risks storing up problems for later. In the meantime, calls for better evaluation and monitoring of trade agreements against sustainability-related commitments and goals – ideally with statutory backing – will only get stronger.

EU experiences with these kinds of processes are instructive. For more than 20 years the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission (DG Trade) has been commissioning sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) from independent consultants in support of trade negotiations, and since 2012 these assessments have explicitly encompassed human rights impacts as a core part of the analysis.

These processes have since been augmented with a programme of periodic ‘ex post’ evaluations of trade agreements to ‘analyse the observed economic, social, human rights, and environmental impacts’ of live trade deals and to make recommendations about any mitigation action which may be needed.

For credibility and objectivity, the Commission outsources much of its sustainability assessment and ex post evaluation activities to independent consultants, who are encouraged to innovate and tailor their approaches subject to broad methodological parameters laid down by the Commission. Over time, experiences with specific assessment and monitoring assignments have enabled external SIA practitioners – and the Commission itself – to progressively strengthen these processes and underlying methodologies.

Yet despite the improvements there remains legitimate questions about whether the human rights aspects of these SIA processes – and subsequent evaluations – are having real policy impact. The difficulty of predicting human rights impacts of trade agreements in advance – as the COVID-19 crisis amply demonstrates – suggests a need for realism about the extent to which a ‘one off’ process, often carried out at a time when there is only ‘agreement in principle’ as to future trading terms, can produce a robust roadmap for heading off future human rights-related risks.

Human rights impact assessments have a potentially valuable role to play in laying down the substantive and structural foundations for future human rights monitoring as part of a broader, iterative, human rights risk management strategy. But the fragmented manner in which many trade agreements approach human rights issues, and the fact that outcomes are the product of negotiation rather than necessarily design, make it difficult to turn this vision into reality.

Controversies surrounding the SIA process for the EU-Mercosur agreement illustrate why striving for more coherence in the identification and subsequent management of human rights-related risks is important. In June 2019, the Commission decided to wrap up negotiations with the South America Mercosur bloc, even though the SIA process for the proposed agreement was still incomplete and the interim and final SIA reports yet to be delivered. Frustrated NGOs made their feelings clear in the form of a formal complaint – and a slap on the wrist from the EU Ombudsman duly followed.

However, when it eventually appeared in December 2020, the final SIA report for the EU-Mercosur deal did include a number of interesting recommendations for responding to specific areas of human rights-related risk identified through the pre-signing assessment process – such as flanking measures designed to address issues pertaining to health, equality, and protection of indigenous peoples, and stressing the need for ‘continuous monitoring’.

Hopefully these recommendations will be proactively followed up, but there are reasons not to be overly optimistic about that. To the extent that these recommendations might have required, or benefitted from, some tweaks to the terms of the trade agreement itself, it was clearly too late. And while there may be opportunities for EU institutions to follow up the recommendations through unilateral ex post evaluation processes, current legal, policy, and institutional arrangements provide few guarantees this will take place.

The credibility of the EU SIA programme has clearly taken a knock because of the problems with the EU-Mercosur process, and stakeholders could be forgiven for questioning whether expending time and effort on engaging in these processes is actually worthwhile. As a first step towards rectifying this, the Commission should be transparent about how it plans to respond to the EU-Mercosur SIA recommendations regarding flanking measures and follow up – ideally consulting with stakeholders about the various human rights monitoring options available.

Looking further ahead, the Commission should be urging SIA practitioners to deal more expansively with the options for follow up human rights monitoring in future SIA reports, setting out recommendations not just on the need for ongoing monitoring of human rights-related issues but on the detail of how this might be done, and how progress towards human rights-related goals could be tracked. And creativity should be encouraged because, as detailed in a newly-published Chatham House research paper, there may be more opportunities for human rights monitoring than first appear.

The SIA process could also provide a forum for exploring complementary measures needed to make future monitoring efforts as effective as possible – jointly and unilaterally; politically, structurally, and resources-wise; both within the framework of the trading relationship and extraneously. The credibility of the process – and hence stakeholder trust – would be further enhanced by commitments from the Commission to be more transparent in future about how different human rights monitoring recommendations laid out in SIAs have been taken into account in subsequent negotiations, in the supervisory arrangements developed for specific trading relationships, and in the implementation of EU trade policy more generally.

Why the next generation is key to protecting human rights Expert comment LToremark 23 June 2021

Strengthening youth participation in public affairs is essential to building inclusive and democratic societies that respect human rights.

Young people have always been drivers of social and economic reform, and today’s global youth population is more numerous and interconnected than ever before. While they have been at the forefront of civic rights movements in recent years, young people are largely excluded from discussions around human rights norms and how to monitor their protection and defence.

Young people are consistently underrepresented in intergovernmental mechanisms and national dialogues, which not only squanders their potential to contribute to effective solutions but also risks disengagement and disillusionment with multilateralism more broadly, at a time when many are already warning of the fraying of the international liberal order. Although there are actors and initiatives working to lift barriers to youth participation in governance – such as the UN Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth, Jayathma Wickramanayake, or the UN 2016 Not Too Young To Run campaign – these efforts tend to fall short in effecting real change and rarely translate into institutionalized procedures.

While ‘the youth’ is a heterogenous group, comprising different ages, ethnicities, national identities and interests, their participation in realizing human rights is essential to addressing the current challenges and possibilities of human rights for future generations. This will help foster more effective solutions to rights-related challenges, re-build trust in the international human rights framework among younger demographics and broaden and deepen commitments to human rights across generations.

Human rights policies and the online environment

Young people tend to be more technologically literate than their predecessors and also represent the majority of internet users and social media consumers in many countries. They can therefore play a key role in innovating and imagining rights-based solutions to emerging problems for the human rights framework, such as illegitimate collection of data by governments and companies, microtargeting by online platforms, and the sharing of harmful content online. In many cases, international human rights practices have failed to keep pace with these changes and the challenges they bring.

Younger demographics may also approach these novel human rights issues from different starting points. For example, a UK study found that 30 per cent of 18-24 year-olds were ‘unconcerned’ about data privacy compared with only 12 per cent of those aged 55-64, and it has been shown that younger people tend to be more discerning of fake news compared to older generations. There may be a need for human rights institutions and practitioners to acknowledge and bridge these gaps in perspective and understanding to ensure long-term support for proposed solutions.

International cooperation for human rights protection

It has been suggested that young people have reaped the benefits of previous human rights-based policy reforms and have a strong sense of what rights they are entitled to and why these need to be protected through an international framework. Young people are also generally more supportive of multilateralism compared to their older counterparts, as demonstrated by a 2020 survey by Pew Research Center on global attitudes, which showed that 72 per cent of respondents aged 18-29 stated they have a favourable view of the UN, compared with 58 per cent of respondents aged 50 and older.

At a recent Chatham House workshop, young participants from countries as diverse as Lebanon, Kenya and the United States expressed concern that growing hostility towards globalization threatens to undo progress in human rights standards and multilateralism more broadly, progress that they have seen and benefitted from. The rise of nationalist and populist parties has also seen countries shift their attention inwards, as evidenced by former president Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement on climate change, and threats by Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro, to follow suit.

Engaging more actively with younger individuals on global human rights reform will help ensure the long-term relevance of multilateral cooperation as well as domestic buy-in of human rights commitments.

Awareness of the interconnectivity of global problems

Young people’s proficiency on online platforms has enabled greater coordination and knowledge sharing without geographical constraints, allowing young activists – like Greta Thunberg – to inspire global movements and foster online discussions about intersectional solutions to modern-day challenges.

This intersectional and transnational lens will be a vital component of building solutions to politically or historically complex issues and can be leveraged to foster better understanding of competing human rights claims relating to issues such as land re-distribution in South Africa or limitations on freedom of movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. These democratic forums and platforms will ultimately help build a global community committed to and engaged with human rights.

Capturing the next generation’s potential

With these concerns and areas of potential in mind, how can human rights institutions and mechanisms create more meaningful avenues for youth input? 

Recent Chatham House research has suggested that multilateral institutions’ efforts to engage youth has often taken the form of ‘superficial listening’, for example inviting a high-profile youth actor to a one-off event or appointing youth delegates who are not able to participate in formal discussions or mainstream governance forums. While encouraging youth participation in meetings focused on human rights can lead to positive change, tokenism can discourage future engagement and dilute the effectiveness of the forums in question.

Capitalizing on the potential of the next generation can be achieved through integrating youth councils and advisers into national and international human rights policy processes, as well as human rights institutions. A few replicable models are already operational, such as the Y7 and the Y20 delegations – the official youth engagement groups for the G7 and G20 – that advance evidence-based proposals to world leaders ahead of the G7 and G20 summits.

At the domestic level, grassroots youth-led movements can help bridge the gap between local constituencies and international policymakers, with youth activists on the ground helping to implement human rights standards and fighting against the spread of misinformation. Strong local networks and civic spaces are essential for pushing back against human rights abuses, and youth activists should be mobilized to connect the efforts of domestic and international bodies to the real issues on the ground; for example, canvassing grassroots youth networks on domestic and traditional customs before implementing development agendas around women’s rights.

As well as providing insertion points for youth policy actors, human rights institutions must communicate their goals more effectively to younger generations and promote intergenerational and inclusive dialogue, for example by holding virtual consultations that  give access to individuals from different backgrounds. Similarly, they should ask young people about their priorities for human rights reform using regular and accessible surveys or by sharing information on online platforms regularly used by this demographic. This will ensure lasting buy-in from the next generation, essential for the relevance and sustainability of the human rights framework in the years to come.

This piece draws upon insights gathered at a workshop hosted by Chatham House in March 2021, which brought together the Institute’s networks of next generation groups including representatives of the QEII Academy Ambassadors, the Panel of Young Advisers, and the Common Futures Conversations community, as well as young members from the South African Institute of International Affairs.

Undercurrents: The Oversight Board's Trump decision, and Merkel's legacy Audio bhorton.drupal 25 June 2021

Was Facebook right to suspend Trump? And how will Merkel be remembered?

In the wake of the storming of Capitol Hill on 6 January 2021, social media platforms took steps to remove former President Donald Trump from their websites for infringing community standards. This step was welcomed by many, but also raised serious questions about the power of social media companies to limit free speech and censor elected officials. The suspension of President Trump from Facebook was referred to the Oversight Board, an independent body of experts set up to scrutinise the platform’s content moderation decisions.  

In this episode, Ben speaks to Thomas Hughes and Kate Jones about the outcome of the Oversight Board’s inquiry into the Trump suspension, and the wider implications for content moderation on social media.  

Then Lara is joined by Hans Kundnani to assess the political outlook in Germany and reflect on the legacy of outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel.  

New UK bill can fight fresh wave of online racist abuse Expert comment NCapeling 21 July 2021

The Euros final and Grand Prix put online abuse once more in the spotlight. The UK’s Online Safety Bill provides a strong framework for tackling the problem.

The ugly online abuse targeted at members of the England football team following the Euros final, and then at Lewis Hamilton after the British Grand Prix, was not only hateful to the individuals concerned, but divisive for the UK more broadly.

More needs to be done to regulate online platforms to avoid the spread of such abuse at scale. Online platforms are making increasing efforts to ‘self-regulate’ in order to tackle online abuse. Over the past year, Facebook and Twitter have strengthened their policies on hateful speech and conduct, such as Facebook’s policy banning Holocaust denial. Both have become more vigilant at deplatforming those who violate their terms of service, such as Donald Trump, and at removing online abuse using a combination of machines and humans.

Twitter announced in the 24 hours following the Euros final that it had removed more than 1,000 tweets, and permanently suspended several accounts, for violating its rules. But inevitably not all abusive posts are picked up given the scale of the issue and, once the post has been seen, arguably the damage is done.

Platforms have also partnered with NGOs on initiatives to counter hate speech and have launched initiatives to tackle the rise in coordinated inauthentic behaviour and information operations that seek to sow distrust and division. But while these efforts are all laudable, they are not enough.

The root of the problem is not the content but a business model in which platforms’ revenue from advertising is directly linked to engagement. This encourages the use of ‘recommender’ algorithms which amplify divisive content by microtargeting users based on previous behaviour, as seen not just with racist abuse but also other toxic content such as anti-vaccination campaigns. Abusers can also remain anonymous, giving them protection from consequences.

Creating a legal duty of care

The UK government’s Online Safety Bill, published in May 2021, aims to tackle harmful content online by placing a duty of care on online platforms to keep users safe and imposing obligations tailored to the size, functionality, and features of the service.

Social media companies will be expected to comply with their duties by carrying out risk assessments for specified categories of harm, guided by codes of practice published by the independent regulator, OFCOM. The bill gives OFCOM the power to fine platforms up to £18 million or ten per cent of global turnover, whichever is higher, for failure to comply.

Following the Euros final, the UK government spoke of referring some racist messages and conduct online to the police. But only a small proportion of it can be prosecuted given the scale of the abuse and the fact only a minority constitutes criminal activity. The majority is ‘lawful but harmful’ content – toxic and dangerous but not technically falling foul of any law.

When addressing ‘lawful but harmful’ material, it is crucial that regulation negotiates the tension between tackling the abuse and preserving freedom of expression. The scale at which such expression can spread online is key here – freedom of speech should not automatically mean freedom of reach. But it is equally important that regulation does not have a chilling effect on free speech, as with the creeping digital authoritarianism in much of the world.

The Online Safety Bill’s co-regulatory approach aims to address these tensions by requiring platforms within the scope of the bill to specify in their terms and conditions how they deal with content on their services that is legal but harmful to adults, and by giving the regulator powers to police how platforms enforce them. Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter may already have strong policies on hate speech – now there will be a regulator to hold them to account.

Devil is in the detail

How successful OFCOM is in doing so will depend on the precise powers bestowed on it in the bill, and how OFCOM chooses to use them. It’s still early days - the bill will be scrutinized this autumn by a committee of MPs before being introduced to parliament. This committee stage will provide an opportunity for consideration of how the bill may need to evolve to get to grips with online abuse.

These latest two divisive and toxic episodes in UK sport are only likely to increase pressure from the public, parliament, and politicians for the bill to reserve robust powers for OFCOM in this area. If companies do not improve at dealing with online abuse, then OFCOM should have the power to force platforms to take more robust action, including by conducting an audit of platforms’ algorithms, enabling it to establish the extent to which their ‘recommender’ settings play a part in spreading hateful content.

Currently, the bill’s definition of harm is confined to harm to individuals, and the government has stated it does not intend this bill to tackle harm to society more broadly. But if racist abuse of individuals provokes racist attacks more widely, as has happened, the regulator should be able to take that wider context into account in its investigation and response.

Responses to the draft bill so far indicate challenges ahead. Some argue the bill does not go far enough to tackle online abuse, especially on the issue of users’ anonymity, while others fear the bill goes too far in stifling freedom of expression, labelling it a recipe for censorship.

Parliamentary scrutiny will need to take into account issues of identity, trust, and authenticity in social networks. While some call for a ban on the cloak of anonymity behind which racist abusers can hide online, anonymity does have benefits for those in vulnerable groups trying to expose hate.

An alternative approach gaining attention is each citizen being designated a secure digital identity, which would both provide users with greater control over what they can see online and enable social media platforms to verify specific accounts. Instituted with appropriate privacy and security safeguards, a secure digital ID would have benefits beyond social media, particularly in an online COVID-19 era.

The online public square is global so countries other than the UK and international organizations must also take measures. It is encouraging to see synergies between the UK’s Online Safety Bill and the EU’s Digital Services Act, published in draft form in December 2020, which also adopts a risk-based, co-regulatory approach to tackling harmful online content. And the UK is using its G7 presidency to work with allies to forge a more coherent response to internet regulation at the international level, at least among democratic states.

Addressing the scourge of online hate speech is challenging so the UK’s Online Safety Bill will not satisfy everyone. But it can give the public, parliament, and politicians a structure to debate these crucial issues and, ultimately, achieve more effective ways of tackling them.

The trickle-up effect of rights-based climate litigation Expert comment NCapeling 16 November 2021

With governments failing in their pledges and companies accused of ‘green-washing’, human rights-based litigation is increasingly important for accountability.

Tuvalu’s foreign minister addressing COP26 while standing knee-deep in seawater was a stark illustration of how the climate emergency directly and imminently threatens the most basic human rights protected under international law – including to the right to life, self-determination and cultural rights.

Human rights are now a fundamental component of more than 90 per cent of the climate litigation currently taking place outside the US, highlighting the international reach of human rights law and how its emphasis on protecting the most vulnerable helps diverse communities find common arguments for shared goals.

Cases are set to continue and to evolve but three types of claim are emerging, each of which is examined in a new Chatham House briefing paper.

1. Enforcing commitments

One category of cases seeks to hold states accountable for pledges they have made on climate change, such as emission reduction targets made under the framework of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Drawing on human rights obligations, governments can be charged with not taking sufficient steps to implement these pledges.

The case of Leghari v Pakistan (2015) concerned the government’s failure to carry out the National Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014-2030). The Lahore High Court held that several of the human rights enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution cover climate change and ‘provide the necessary judicial toolkit to address the government’s response to climate change’.

The court ordered the government to carry out measures such as publishing an adaptation action plan realizable within a few months of the order and establishing a Climate Change Commission to monitor progress.

2. Positive duties to mitigate risks

Many rights-based climate cases are being brought to clarify the scope of states’ positive duties under human rights law to take meaningful steps to protect their citizens against foreseeable risks to life and other rights.

This ‘trickle-up’ effect of human rights was prominent in the case of State of the Netherlands vs the Urgenda Foundation (2019) where the Dutch Supreme Court held that reducing emissions with the highest possible level of ambition amounts to a ‘due diligence standard’ for states to comply with their positive duties to adopt adequate measures to address climate change. Human rights law was also used by the court to fill in the content of the due diligence standards.

There is also a growing trend for rights-based actions to be brought against corporations, such as a recent case which drew on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to define the parameters of Shell’s duty of care and due diligence obligations in relation to carbon emissions under Dutch law. The court ordered Shell to reduce emissions by a net rate of 45 per cent by the end of 2030 – relative to 2019 figures – through its group corporate policy.

3. Avoiding harm in climate action

The global human rights regime is also increasingly invoked in litigation concerning states’ negative obligations to ensure that their climate mitigation and adaptation activities do not themselves contribute to human rights violations (including discrimination) and that states prioritize adaptation measures for those most at risk in a just and equitable way.

As Chatham House’s paper makes clear, this kind of litigation ‘puts pressure on governments to expand their approach to tackling climate change beyond purely a regulatory one to a more holistic strategy’.

Closing the climate justice gap

Climate and environmental litigation grounded in human rights is set to continue given the overwhelming scientific evidence of risks associated with human-induced climate change and the limited confidence in pledges made by states and corporations alike – including those made recently at COP26.

A growing collaboration between civil society organizations and vulnerable communities in relation to both the protection of nature and the enjoyment of their land and cultural rights was evident at COP26, and this alliance will add further momentum to the trend for rights-based climate litigation based on the rights of indigenous and other vulnerable communities, especially on issues such as deforestation.

But more challenges are coming. International human rights law recognizes a duty of international cooperation but there remain significant hurdles for climate-vulnerable communities in developing countries to compel action by richer nations despite the vast debts of ‘carbon colonialism.’

One big issue is the problem of extraterritoriality, as the extent to which states owe obligations to individuals outside their territory is contested. Courts in both Germany and the Netherlands have rejected claimants from developing countries in domestic class actions on this basis. But a recent decision of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on a complaint brought by Greta Thunberg and other youth activists against five countries opens the door for further litigation.

One of a number of cases being brought by youth claimants across the world, the committee concluded that a state’s human rights duties can – in some instances – extend to children in other countries. This includes any activities on the territory that host states have the power to prevent from causing ‘transboundary harm’ – such as emissions from the territory – where these activities ‘significantly’ impact the enjoyment of human rights of persons outside the territory.

To date, high-profile rights-based cases have argued for policy change and stronger targets underpinned by binding legislation responsive to the science. Claims are set to become more complex and contested. Building on scientific developments in climate attribution, rights-based litigation is now tackling other difficult questions such as apportioning responsibility and remedial action.

These cases examine both historically high emitters and the public and private actors who either continue specific activities or refrains from action in the face of the overwhelming science linking human activities such as extraction and burning of fossil fuels to deforestation and climatic consequences.

Courts are also likely to explore the duties that states and corporations owe to deliver a ‘just transition’ away from carbon-intensive industries, given the benefits of growth and climate action are already unevenly distributed.

A holistic human-rights based approach

Several states together with civil society are leading the charge for global recognition of the right to a healthy, clean, and sustainable environment in the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, and multi-stakeholder processes are defining what effective corporate due diligence looks like.

In addition, UN-appointed special rapporteurs are delivering practical guidance on how to devise solutions which are fair, non-discriminatory, participatory, and climate-resilient without exacerbating inequality – including difficult issues of planned relocation – and UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies are unpacking the duty of international cooperation to act in good faith to address loss and damage.

Recently the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recommended the Marshall Islands, in order to meet its duty to its citizens, should actively seek international cooperation and assistance – including climate change financing – from other countries but in particular the US, whose ‘extraterritorial nuclear testing activities have exacerbated the adverse effects of climate change and natural disasters’ in the islands.

Transatlantic Tech Talks: Cooperation or sovereignty? Audio bhorton.drupal 15 December 2021

A new mini-series from Undercurrents explores international cooperation on regulating the tech sector.

Transatlantic Tech Talks is a three part mini-series on the Undercurrents podcast feed, produced with the support of Microsoft, which explores the state of international cooperation on digital governance between the United States, the UK and Europe.

As technological innovation accelerates, and new digital tools and business models arise, governments are working to develop a framework of regulations to safeguard the rights and interests of their citizens. Not all stakeholders agree, however, on the best way to achieve this. While some advocate a ‘digital cooperation’ approach based on transparency and data-sharing, others are more concerned with maintaining ‘digital sovereignty’.

In the first episode of this series, Ben is joined by Casper Klynge, Harriet Moynihan and Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, who set out the broad context for these debates. They assess where the major government, private sector and civil society actors stand on the question of digital governance, and how they are approaching the international negotiations.

Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications Expert comment NCapeling 24 February 2022

Russia is violating international law in Ukraine using baseless allegations, and states’ responses should be guided accordingly.

Russia has begun a large-scale military attack on Ukraine, having first declared it recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as separate states. It scarcely needs saying Russia is violating international law – violating the prohibition in the United Nations (UN) Charter on the use of force, violating the obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, and violating the prohibition on intervention.

But Russia is using the language of the law to defend its actions. In all the recent verbiage of President Vladimir Putin, some attempts at legal arguments can be elicited – but they do not stand up to scrutiny.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force with the only two Charter exceptions to this prohibition being self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council. In his speech on 23 February, Putin points to two grounds on which Russia relies on self-defence – defence in aid of the two breakaway republics and self-defence in the light of threats against Russia itself.

Donetsk, Luhansk, and collective self-defence

Putin said ‘the people’s republics of Donbass turned to Russia with a request for help’ and went on to seek to justify his military action under Article 51 of the Charter. But it is only in respect of states that the right of collective self-defence exists – humanitarian intervention on behalf of individuals in a state has not gained a place in international law. And it is only Russia which has recognized the statehood of the two regions.

Putin repeated on 23 February his earlier allegation that the people of the two breakaway republics are being repressed by the Ukraine government, and even that genocide is being committed against them. This baseless allegation is relevant not only to the claim of self-defence on behalf of these regions but also to Russia’s ‘recognition’ of them as separate states.

International law does not give the inhabitants of a part of a state the right to secede from that state. The aspect of self-determination which allows for independence of a ‘people’ applies to peoples in colonies and other overseas territories under the occupation of another state. The other aspect of self-determination is ‘internal’ and comprises the right to freely choose political status and pursue economic, social, and cultural development within the state – as the Minsk accords sought to provide for Donetsk and Luhansk.

There is a somewhat controversial theory in international law that would give a right of secession from a state if the people in question were subject to extreme abuse of human rights and systematic oppression. This is the theory of remedial secession, which some countries, such as Switzerland, used in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in relation to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia – an independence still not recognized by Russia.

But the theory has no support from the international courts and, even if it did, Russia itself has stated previously that a right of remedial secession is ‘limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question’ (see Russia’s submissions to the ICJ in the Kosovo case, para 88).

The facts do not substantiate Russia’s claims anyway. The law is as stated on behalf of the UN Secretary-General on 21 February – that Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions is a ‘violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ There are no ‘states’ which can request the use of military force.

Is Ukraine a threat against Russia?

Putin refers to the ‘further expansion of the infrastructure of the North Atlantic Alliance, the military development of the territories of Ukraine’ as creating an ‘anti-Russia’ comprising a ‘real threat not just to our interests, but to the very existence of our state, its sovereignty’.

Article 51 allows for self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This has been interpreted by many states to include defence against the threat of an imminent attack – for example, there is no requirement to wait until a nuclear strike has begun. But under no interpretation of ‘imminence’ can the situation in Ukraine constitute a threat to Russia. There have been no threats of force against Russia from Ukraine nor from NATO member states. There is nothing to support a legal justification for Russia’s military attack against Ukraine.

The myth of Ukraine never having had ‘real statehood’ also does not give any legal justification for Russian aggression. The UN is based on the ‘principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter). Ukraine retained its membership in the UN at the dissolution of the USSR, having been one of the founding members of the UN as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

What are the legal consequences of Russia’s actions?

Within the UN, it is the Security Council which has the mandate to uphold international peace and security, and act when there is a threat to the peace. But there will be no help from there with Russia’s status as a permanent member holding a veto.

The UN General Assembly may act instead. Since 2014 it has adopted a series of resolutions (the latest on 9 December 2021) requiring Russia to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Crimea. But the General Assembly does not have the powers of the Security Council, and cannot mandate peacekeepers or the use of force.

In due course there may be the need for a UN Human Rights Commission of Inquiry to be launched if there are breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law, and human rights cases may be brought against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. But international institutions do not have the necessary powers to stop what is going on right now.

International law gives the right to Ukraine, being attacked, to call for support from other states. And as well as imposing sanctions, states may wish to consider cyber countermeasures. Some of the recent cyber activity against Ukraine has been attributed by the US, UK, and Australia to the Russian Main Intelligence Unit (GRU).

Sanctions must not prevent humanitarian work in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 30 May 2022

Restrictions on supply of certain items and financial sanctions can impede vital relief unless adequate safeguards are put in place such as exceptions or general licences.

Sanctions play a major role in the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United Nations (UN) has not imposed sanctions, but an important number of states have done so. They have imposed a wide array of restrictions and the number of targeted – or ‘designated’ – persons is unprecedented.

The public has been captivated by the freezing of oligarchs’ assets. There is ongoing discussion about seizing them to provide compensation for war damage. Debate continues about how far to ban oil and gas imports.

One aspect of the sanctions has received far less attention, even though it can exacerbate the effect of the conflict on civilians. Some of the trade restrictions and financial sanctions pose immediate and concrete challenges to the capacity of humanitarian organizations to work in Ukraine and in neighbouring states.

Trade sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) and UK prohibit the export or supply of certain goods and technology in the transport, telecommunications, energy, and oil or mineral exploration sectors to non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk or Luhansk oblasts, or for use there.

Restricted items include technical equipment which is necessary for humanitarian operations, such as water pumps and refrigerating equipment, but also far more mundane items such as vehicles for transport of persons and goods, and office equipment that are necessary for humanitarian organizations trying to work in the region.

Designations can reduce options for support

Financial sanctions also raise problems. Some are immediately apparent. Significantly for humanitarian operations, the two de facto republics of Donetsk and Luhansk are designated by the EU, the UK, and the US. Consequently, it is prohibited to make funds or assets available to them directly or indirectly.

This prohibition covers the payment of any taxes, licences, and other fees to these authorities, as well as the provision of assets to ministries under their control in the course of humanitarian operations, such as ministries of health and education.

Designations of other entities may also be relevant, such as Russian ‘state enterprises’ which operate in these areas and are the sole providers of commodities necessary for humanitarian response, such as heating fuel.

These are the designations which most obviously impact humanitarian response. However, more than 1,000 persons and entities have been designated and humanitarian organizations must avoid purchasing goods and services from them.

Risk-averse commercial partners

Commercial actors – such as banks, insurers, freight companies and commodity providers – whose services are required by humanitarian organizations must also comply with the sanctions. Experience shows that the due diligence measures adopted by humanitarian organizations do not always allay concerns of risk-averse sectors such as banks.

Fears of violating the sanctions, coupled with the fact humanitarian organizations are rarely profitable clients, have led them to severely restrict the services they provide.

This is not the first occasion the problem has arisen. What is different in relation to Ukraine is the number of designated persons and the ‘sanctions packages’ adopted in quick succession. As compliance officers struggle to keep abreast, their institutions become even more risk-averse.

For UK banks, the situation is exacerbated by the adoption of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. This amends existing rules by removing the requirement for the UK Treasury to prove knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect that a transaction violated sanctions, imposing strict liability for sanctions violations.

Time for the UK to follow others

The EU, the US, Switzerland, and other states which have imposed sanctions have sought to mitigate their adverse effects by including safeguards for humanitarian action. Although the UK has largely replicated the measures adopted by the EU in terms of restrictions and designations, it lags behind in including such safeguards.

The UK trade restrictions and financial sanctions do not include exceptions for humanitarian action. While several general licences have been issued, none relate to humanitarian operations.

Instead, the UK measures foresee only the possibility of applying for specific licences – from the Treasury in the case of financial sanctions and the Department of International Trade for trade restrictions. But obtaining specific licences is a time-consuming process which is simply not appropriate for emergency response.

If the UK is to show it is serious about responding to the immense needs caused by the invasion it must introduce appropriate safeguards in its sanctions – either in the form of exceptions or general licences.

What matters is they cover all key humanitarian organizations responding to the Ukraine crisis that are subject to UK sanctions – either because they are UK persons or because their funding agreements with the UK government require them to comply with UK measures.

These include UN agencies, funds and programmes, components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) responding to the crisis in Ukraine and neighbouring states. The provision must also clearly extend to commercial entities which provide necessary services for humanitarian operations.

Given the UK recently adopted an exception along similar lines in relation to the Afghanistan sanctions, there is a valuable precedent for Ukraine.

What is happening in Sri Lanka? Explainer Video aboudiaf.drupal 15 July 2022

Chanu Peiris reflects on the unfolding political and economic crisis in Sri Lanka and its impact on human rights.

What is happening in Sri Lanka?

Sri Lanka has been a leader in South Asia on many human development indicators including health and education. Until recently, it was considered an upper middle-income country. Its GDP, when adjusted for purchasing power, was on par with South Africa’s.  

But the country is now experiencing economic collapse. The crisis has its roots in economic mismanagement by multiple governments. This was made worse by global market disruptions and by internal security emergencies including the 2019 Easter bombings.  

What rights are being impacted?   

The current situation is impacting the full range of human rights for people in Sri Lanka. According to the World Food Programme, over a third of people are now facing moderate to severe hunger.

Shortages of other essentials including cooking gas, fuel and lifesaving medicines are disrupting the normal functioning of society and causing loss of life, enormous hardship, mental distress and social unrest.

There are serious concerns about the long-term impacts to the more vulnerable members of Sri Lanka society – including children, whose development due to lack of proper nutrition and disruptions to schools will be affected.  

The global human rights community has called attention to rights violations by the government, which has been seen to be slow to take the necessary steps to rectify the economic situation. It has also used lethal force and social media blackouts in response to protests. 

What are the broader human rights implications? 

The country is seeing the most widespread and diverse mass demonstrations in its history. So far they have led to the resignation of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and the cabinet. They have also resulted in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa leaving the country. 

The scale of the protests signals an important shift in the social contract. The crisis has united people who were previously divided and there are demands for the abolition of the executive presidency.   

It is also significant that people are calling for more than the economic issues to be addressed. They are focusing on the need for systemic changes, including accountability and transparency within a government which has long resisted both.

In other words, what we are seeing is a clear assertion from the streets of the indivisibility of human rights – that access to food, water, and electricity rely on the safeguarding of civil and political rights and proper accountability.

They are making a powerful argument in favour of human rights-sensitive governance – something that has been in short supply around the world. 

What are the priorities for the new UK prime minister? Expert comment GBhardwaj 2 September 2022

Experts from across Chatham House examine the range of domestic and foreign policy issues facing Rishi Sunak as he prepares to lead the UK government.

Experts from across Chatham House’s research programmes give their insights on a range of issues facing Rishi Sunak as he becomes UK prime minister, covering energy prices, the climate change agenda, war in Ukraine, China and the Indo-Pacific, Africa, the US, global health, international law and security, science and technology, trade, and the global economic crisis.

Rising energy prices

Antony Froggatt, Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director, Environment and Society Programme, Chatham House

The social and economic impact of high energy prices this winter may be greater than that of COVID-19. However, in contrast to the pandemic, there has been ample warning of the expected scale of this crisis.

The European Union (EU) gets much more of its energy from Russia than the UK does, but all are part of a largely informal European price zone which is why UK consumers are now facing, what would have been to many, unimaginable bills despite no longer importing energy from Russia.   

The cost of energy will continue to be a major concern for households and businesses and, given the cost of interventions, will significantly affect government finance.

The current policy of capping the unit price for six months increases affordability but will only offer some relief for this winter. The new government urgently needs to look at what happens to bills in the spring and next winter which, from a gas supply perspective, may be even worse than this one.

The EU has reacted with much greater purpose, proposing new legislative packages to diversify supply, accelerate the deployment of renewable energy, make adjustments to markets, and put in place energy saving measures. While these are unlikely to be enough they will make a difference and can become a benchmark for UK policy.

The role that government plays in assisting public and private sectors to save energy will be important. This is where past administrations have wasted the last eight months, where public information campaigns and small technology changes, such as refurbishing and resetting boilers and larger energy consuming products or insulating homes, would have made a difference.

Action needs to be taken across all levels, including co-ordination with the devolved administrations and local government.

Support for new supply needs to be immediately given to new low-carbon technologies which can deliver both cheaply and rapidly, primarily onshore wind and solar, which also help to decarbonize the sector.

The UK will need to maintain, and more likely increase, its relationship with the EU on energy as it continues to trade gas and electricity which is likely to require the resolution of tricky issues such as the Northern Ireland Protocol.

However, the discussions at the European Political Community in early October on greater co-operation on North Sea grids, creating an important opportunity for the accelerated deployment of offshore wind, needs to be taken forward.

Other supply options and market restructuring will be needed and they all must balance affordability, security of supply, and environmental considerations.

The agenda on climate change

Professor Tim Benton, Director, Environment and Society Programme, Chatham House

The record temperatures this summer show how the changing climate is impacting the daily lives of UK citizens. Climate change remains the most important challenge of this century and one that the prime minister will rapidly need to get a grip of ahead of COP27.

Hosting COP26 in 2021, along with Italy, was seen as an important post-Brexit opportunity for the UK in the climate space and ensured the development of many new multilateral sectorial initiatives, such as on climate finance, the Global Methane Pledge and on electric vehicles, while further supporting other emerging initiatives, such as on loss and damage. It will be important for the new prime minister, and the UK’s credibility, to continue to deliver on these.

Concrete things that are needed are a fast roll-out of renewable energy rather than fast-tracking more fossil fuel production, driving ahead the net-zero agenda particularly around land use and food and considering how to restructure markets to better deliver the long-term goals.

Grasping the need to address the demand-side of consumption growth, and not just supply, is key. The UK has prided itself on being a global leader on the climate over the last 15 years but let’s hope that is now not in peril.

Russia and the war in Ukraine

James Nixey, Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Supporting Ukraine and confronting Russia are indisputable foreign policy priorities so it is highly likely the new prime minister will look to continue on this path and go with both popular and expert consensus in assisting Ukraine generously and standing up to Russia.

The other question, though, is to what extent the UK’s position can continue to make a difference to the outcome of the war.

Bringing the waverers of western Europe more firmly on board is surely beyond any UK prime minister’s ability considering the UK’s post-Brexit behaviour where the UK still has its own questions to answer including over the failure to tackle the problems of Russian influence at home.

That said, Brexit may not always be relevant to shared hard security challenges. Other countries do see the difference training, money and weapons are making and, if these continue to bring success, it is possible even the waverers can be guilted into providing more aid and economic support.

However, supporting Ukraine is one thing. Truly understanding Russia and devising a coherent Russia strategy is another. What needs to be learned is that Russia, in its present incarnation, cannot be reasoned with whatever the state of the war.

Therefore, given the threat Russia poses to the UK and other democracies, Britain now needs to consider how it can assist with engendering change in Russia. This should not be confused with engineering ‘regime change’ as the Kremlin accuses the UK of doing already.

But it does suggest a more proactive, less defensive Russia policy is required, rather than waiting for the Russian people to instigate change from within. That will take a degree of leadership and political will rarely seen in UK politics.

China and the Indo-Pacific tilt

Ben Bland, Director, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House

Both candidates in the last Conservative leadership contest argued during their campaigns that China was the biggest long-term threat to the UK’s national security. They both promised to call out China’s violations of human rights and international law and extend curbs on China’s access to sensitive technology.

However, to successfully respond to the scale of the challenge, the next prime minister will need to do much more than say what they do not want from Beijing. There needs to be a convincing, positive vision for how the UK can navigate a world where the centre of global economic and geopolitical gravity is moving eastwards.

The Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’ which Liz Truss oversaw as UK foreign secretary was a good start. But tilting isn’t a strategy. So what comes next?

At a time when its in-tray is full of problems closer to home, the UK government needs to sustain enhanced levels of engagement in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia, while investing at home in the UK’s Asia literacy.

That should include more support for research and education about China as well as the rest of this dynamic region. Labelling China a threat does not make it go away. The UK needs to learn how to live in a world where Chinese power and influence will continue to grow from Asia to Latin America and across the UN and other multilateral organizations.

Investing in the UK’s knowledge of, and relationships in, Asia will also support British businesses as they look for new opportunities in fast-growing but challenging emerging markets such as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

The UK’s Middle East policy

Dr Lina Khatib, Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House

The UK government must restore a distinct cabinet position for the Middle East and North Africa and reorient to give Iran’s regional role greater focus.

The Middle East portfolio remains hefty and complex and requires diplomatic engagement to match. No sooner had the UK merged the ministerial Middle East portfolio into the broader one of minister of state for Asia and the Middle East than the war on Ukraine began, directing Western attention to Gulf Arab countries as one potential energy source to offset the loss of Russian oil and gas. Yet Gulf Arab countries are hesitating to fully heed Western calls to increase energy production. 

One key cause is Gulf Arab perceptions that the UK and other Western countries have overlooked their concerns of the threats that Iran poses to their security and political clout.

Despite the UK’s characterization of Iraq as ‘post-conflict’, and of the situation in Syria as a ‘crisis’, recent clashes in Baghdad’s Green Zone and American and Israeli bombing of Iran-linked targets in Syria, as well as recurring attacks by Iran-backed groups on targets in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, underline Iran’s role in ongoing instability in the Middle East, which threatens the interests of the UK and its allies in the region.

Although the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office resources have been recently redistributed to further support response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the UK can, and must, use existing resources earmarked for the Middle East to engage more effectively.

The two are not wholly distinct: Russia is using Iranian drones to attack Ukraine and Iranian military personnel are active on the ground in Ukraine in aid of the Russian military. Iran and Russia’s ongoing military intervention in Syria paved the way for their cooperation in the invasion of Ukraine.

The UK must restore diplomatic cabinet distribution to give the Middle East the attention it requires, but also revising its approach, putting Iran’s regional and international interventions high on the agenda and in parallel to efforts on the Iran nuclear deal.

The UK sees GCC countries as a potential alternative source of energy to Russian oil and gas specifically and as important trade partners more broadly. UK foreign policy must not compartmentalize its approach to the Middle East.

Diplomatic engagement on Iran’s regional role is a key factor in strengthening trust between the UK and its Middle Eastern allies, including in the GCC, which in turn supports the UK’s economic and security priorities. This means UK policy must approach Iran not just more comprehensively, and coherently, but also as a component of the broader strategy of dealing with the geopolitical and economic threats presented by Russia. 

Africa and the UK

Alex Vines, Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Senior UK politicians often claim that Africa is a priority but UK prime ministers and foreign secretaries rarely visit the continent. Boris Johnson attending the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit in Kigali in August was his first as prime minister where he was accompanied by Liz Truss who was then his foreign secretary.

Despite saying she was an Africa enthusiast as secretary of state for international trade and president of the Board of Trade, Truss had never visited the continent. Her focus was consistently on other parts of the world except for defending the UK’s contested partnership with Rwanda to repatriate to Kigali informal migrants to the UK.

Viewing global politics through the lens of great power rivalry has cast African states as second tier players, disrespecting their agency and prided sovereignty and ignoring the preference of many states to remain non-aligned on issues pertaining to great power competition.

This is a mistake as 25 per cent of the UNGA is comprised of African member states and, of them, 21 are Commonwealth members with Gabon and Togo recently joining. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and intensifying competition with China is a reminder that in this era of sharper geopolitics, Africa increasingly matters for UK’s foreign policy objectives.

The new prime minister will need to review the 2021 Integrated Review, which downplayed much of Africa for UK strategy and advocated a pivot focus to East Africa. The war in Ukraine, coupled with democratic reversals in East Africa and worsening stability in West Africa requires a UK priority rethink. With limited resources to support an expanded UK footprint, sharper focus and defined ambition is important.

Continuity is important too. Since 1989, there have been 21 ministers for Africa, an average tenure of just over 18 months. This is not the time to change the UK’s minister responsible for Africa but it is the moment to make once again that post focused just on sub-Saharan Africa rather than also covering the Caribbean and Latin America too.

The UK-US relationship

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House

As the US approaches its midterm elections, the new prime minister should think carefully about the UK’s response to potential disruption or challenges to the legitimacy of electoral results.

The US faces a period of unpredictable politics with the possibility of significant disruption, upheaval, and the potential for violence. The UK should be careful to differentiate between being independent with respect to partisan politics, which is essential, from being neutral with respect to democracy and especially the integrity of elections.

It would be a mistake for the UK prime minister or the next foreign secretary to be neutral on the question of free and fair elections and the importance of democracy in the US. Boris Johnson’s administration, especially his foreign secretary, was poorly equipped to respond to questions about the outcome of the 2020 presidential elections and prevaricated more than once. 

On foreign policy, a shared interest in supporting Ukraine and strengthening NATO is the current anchor for this partnership, but its historical foundation is both deeper and wider.

The new UK prime minister should demonstrate to the US, and to the world, that Britain is serious about its existing international commitments, especially in the Euro-Atlantic and through NATO, but also with respect to Northern Ireland and Europe.

The UK should deepen its participation in the new European Political Community and seize any opportunity to strengthen mechanisms for security cooperation with Europe. It should aim to restore Britain’s reputation as a nation committed to international, regional and domestic multilateral and legal frameworks.

These measures strengthen Britain’s attractiveness to the US and so lend it greater influence in this essential partnership. Any move to undermine the Northern Ireland protocol should be carefully measured against its wider impacts, not only with Europe, but also with the US.

Continuing Boris Johnson’s policy of restraint, rather than demanding a US-UK trade deal, is wise given the persistence of anti-trade sentiment in the US Congress and the looming US midterm elections.

The prime minister should also do what they can to lend support and work effectively and pragmatically with this US administration. What comes next could be disruptive so now is the time to leverage US power and lock the US into durable commitments that enhance international stability and prosperity.

US president Joe Biden is determined and pragmatic. He will choose the partners that best enable him to deliver his foreign policy priorities. The UK will be both more attractive, and less supplicant, to the US if it has a strong relationship with Europe.

Global health priorities

Robert Yates, Director, Global Health Programme and Executive Director, Centre for Universal Health, Chatham House and Emma Ross, Senior Research Fellow, Global Health Programme. 

Global health has been one of the areas where the UK has historically been seen as punching above its weight due to the magnitude of its financing for global health programmes and its reputation as a leader in global health initiatives.

However, the UK’s standing has taken a significant hit since the start of the pandemic with it demonstrating a lack of solidarity in combatting COVID-19 when it hoarded vaccines and failed to lead the G7 in raising adequate funding for the COVAX facility and blocked attempts to share vaccine technologies with developing countries.

Slashing the international aid budget and deprioritizing global health within its aid strategy has further tarnished the UK’s reputation as a global health leader.

Rebuilding the UK’s hard-earned status as a leading force in global health by at least restoring the level of official development assistance (ODA) for health, if not enhancing it, should be one of the new prime minister’s top priorities.

This should include support for major initiatives such as the Financial Intermediary Fund for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response (FIF), the Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence in Berlin and the vaccine technology transfer hub in Africa.

There is a risk that the ongoing pandemic treaty negotiations will result in a weak instrument of little value. The UK prime minister should prioritize the successful outcome of the negotiations by championing provisions that ensure the treaty makes a meaningful difference in enhancing global health security.

There is a need for workable mechanisms to ensure countries cooperate next time in preventing, preparing for and responding to a pandemic and supporting countries that need extra resources while, another related priority, should be to engage in efforts to reform the International Health Regulations in a way that strengthens global health security.

Championing international law

Rashmin Sagoo, Director, International Law Programme, Chatham House

Compliance with international law is in the best interests of the UK, and the new UK government needs to recognize this.  

The UK wants Russia to comply with the UN Charter and stop its aggressive war against Ukraine. It wants China to recognize the rights of its Uighur citizens, for women to be protected from violence in armed conflict, for compliance with nuclear non-proliferation treaties and  negotiate lucrative international trade agreements. 

These are all excellent aims and they should continue to be pursued. But exhortations to the rest of the world to support the international rules-based order ring hollow if they come from a government which itself does not itself adhere to those rules. 

How the UK conducts itself domestically is a mirror of how it conducts itself internationally. What elected UK officials say and do here matters elsewhere. How we treat the rule of law in this country impacts how others treat it – and us.  

The new prime minister has an opportunity to lead by example by ending the slow but dangerous habitualization of the British public becoming numb to government ‘intentions’ to break international law whether or not such threats are ultimately carried out.

There should also be a full public and parliamentary scrutiny of constitutionally significant proposals, such as the Northern Ireland Protocol bill and reform of the Human Rights Act, rather than fast-track them past a public distracted by the cost-of-living crisis. 

International law is founded upon principles of mutual trust, cooperation, good faith and reciprocity. To be a credible global leader, the UK must put the rule of law, including international law, at the heart of both its foreign and domestic policy. They cannot be disaggregated.   

Strengthening international security

Dr Patricia Lewis, Director, International Security Programme, Chatham House

Security and defence will be high on the agenda for the new UK prime minister. Russia’s war in Ukraine and the potential for sudden, wider escalation remains a serious concern.

Threats of nuclear weapons use, possible false flag ‘dirty bomb’ threats, the continuing attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant threats and veiled references to chemical or biological attacks has demonstrated the willingness of Russia to take enormous risks in regard to threatening Europe as a whole in order to achieve its aims.

If Ukraine’s counter-offensive continues to make gains, then NATO countries will likely be threatened again in this manner. These are not just threats to Ukraine but to NATO states. And, most likely, given the significant role it has played in supporting Ukraine militarily, aimed primarily at the UK.

In the longer term, the UK prime minister needs to review the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The review came following the decision to increase defence spending and the UK secretary of defence Ben Wallace – continuing in place –has been clear that he has no need to increase his budget further although that may change as the impact of inflation becomes clearer across the board.

The Integrated Review is all about serious investment in the science and technology needed for security and defence in the future. Without such investment the UK will not be able to contribute to international security even in the limited way it can now and certainly not in an ambitious way in decades hence.

There are many long-term security threats that the UK will need to grapple with in addition to Russia’s aggression in Europe, not least of which are China’s rising military capabilities and global ambitions.

In the Arctic and Antarctic, China along with several other major economies, has serious ambitions for exploiting natural resources in terms of minerals, energy, particularly as climate change drives fish stock to the polar seas.

The newly-established AUKUS arrangement which plans to produce a nuclear-powered submarine capability for Australia also provides a mechanism for joint investment by Australia, the UK and the US in science and technologies such as in artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum technology. There are discussions about extending this arrangement to other countries such as Japan and could also include the space sector.    

Meanwhile, at home, in the short-term, there will be increasing calls to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. The prime minister will need to be ahead of that game so that Ukraine is supported and European security is enhanced rather than further stressed.

This will require a new approach to international security – a need that was further highlighted at the end of August in New York with yet another collapse of agreement in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a result of Russia’s veto.

The UK has long played an important diplomatic role in finding creative solutions for international security and the new prime minister would be well advised to lever that reputation.

Supporting science and technology

Marjorie Buchser, Executive Director, Digital Society Initiative, Chatham House, David Lawrence, Research Fellow, UK in the World Initiative Chatham House and Alex Krasodomski, Head of Innovation Partnerships, Chatham House

In science and technology, the UK currently finds itself in a balancing act between the US and the EU: ideologically attached to the light-touch approach of the US while dependent on the EU as an export market and for supply chains.

While Brexit in theory gives Britain more regulatory freedom, UK companies have often ended up abiding by EU regulations they are unable to shape. The new prime minister should explore forms of regulatory cooperation with the EU that prioritize market access while offering incentives to attract scientists and boost technical innovation.

Beyond transatlantic and European partnerships, it is essential for the UK to foster coalitions with a broader group of like-minded democracies which will be crucial to addressing global technology concerns and countering China’s digital model expansion.

Entrenching the UK as a science and technology ‘superpower’ will require a collaborative approach and involve identifying critical areas where the UK can drive international efforts. For example, the UK should build on its recent successes in the sensitive issues of data flows and digital technical standards as well as encourage investment in open-source security and infrastructure.

Finally, it is essential to unblock the skills and talent pipeline. It is difficult and expensive for high-skilled workers to move to the UK and a key source of labour supply has been lost since leaving the EU. The UK should consider introducing a Commonwealth visa scheme and radically reduce the cost for science and technology companies to offer those visas.

Strengthening infrastructure and housing, particularly in areas that need levelling up, will allow talent to move to areas with the most productive opportunities. 

Trade, climate and green supply chains

Bernice Lee, Research Director, Futures; Hoffmann Distinguished Fellow for Sustainability; Chair, Sustainability Accelerator Advisory Board 

The new prime minister will soon find the answers to the UK’s supply security challenges and soaring energy and food prices as well as future growth lie not at home but are global problems.

At a time of crisis, solutions can only come from countries working together. The UK is a perfectly sized state with plenty of heft but it is not so large as to be able to afford to ignore the needs of others.

It should lead the convening of a growing ‘coalition of the willing’ on trade, climate and green supply chains which could include Australia and Canada as well as developing nations with large extractive sectors in Africa and Asia that are pro-trade, pro-climate, pro-development and pro-growth.

Even though working together on trade and green supply chains can reduce unwanted dependencies, support climate action and help businesses unlock the $26 trillion in market opportunities, many governments have yet to take bold steps due to a fear of disguised protectionism.

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is fuelling bitter divides on competitiveness and development concerns.

Trade retaliation is likely and most probably will happen in parallel with legal processes at the WTO. These dynamics mean trade will be underused as an instrument but will create challenging dynamics for COP27. 

Although the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade, and Sustainability (ACCTS) was launched in 2019, the UK could fill a leadership gap since no major economies have positioned themselves as leaders at the intersection of trade, climate, and green supply chains.

British International Investment, the UK’s development institution, should support the establishment and scaling of low-carbon, resource-efficient, sustainable and deforestation-free supply chains which could help fuel the next generation of growth in the UK and beyond.

Improve regulation, give priority to trade relations with the EU, and maintain transparency

Creon Butler, Research Director, Trade, Investment and New Governance Models, and Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme

The UK’s new prime minister comes into office with the country facing the most serious set of economic challenges since 2008-09.

But, in contrast to the global financial crisis, the causes of today’s crisis are more multifaceted and to a degree more UK-specific: the Brexit trade shock; increased public spending pressures linked to the backlog in the NHS and potentially serious long-term effects of ‘long COVID’ and disrupted schooling; the unprecedented shock to energy prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine linked in part to the UK’s lack of gas storage capacity; and the shock to market confidence in the UK’s economic management resulting from the 44-day Liz Truss administration.

While the new prime minister should not delay addressing the UK’s long-term challenges, there are three critical questions which will help determine the success or failure of the government’s approach.

First, should the priority be less regulation or, in the context of the tech revolution and the need to accelerate the transformation of the economy to net zero, smarter regulation?

Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world Feature jon.wallace 17 February 2023

Chatham House experts examine the shifts in geopolitical alliances, security, energy, and supply chains and whether these changes are likely to be long-lasting.

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale re-invasion of Ukraine one year ago was a global shock which ‘marked an abrupt end to 30 years of globalization and all the international co-operation that made that possible’ with serious implications for countries around the world, outlined Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox in her inaugural lecture.

Not only has the war threatened the stability of Europe but it has also impacted food and energy security globally including in the Middle East and Africa, creating shock waves in a world barely recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The UK must not sleepwalk into leaving the ECHR Expert comment NCapeling 17 March 2023

Talk of the UK leaving the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) keeps rearing its head with little thought for the real impact.

Withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has not been firmly ruled out as a potential UK government policy option to allow easier implementation of its controversial new measures to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda. This, in the context of a UK general election looming and tackling the ‘small boats problem’ being one of the five priorities of UK prime minister Rishi Sunak.

In recent months, ECHR withdrawal has come up in relation to the UK’s controversial draft Illegal Migration Bill, the (now shelved) bill of rights, and – perhaps most significantly – the Northern Ireland Protocol deal with implications for the Good Friday Agreement. But leaving the ECHR – and likely the Council of Europe – would be counterproductive for the UK’s global leadership.

UK values and priorities will be undermined

The only other countries in the region outside of the Council of Europe, Russia and Belarus, both had sanctions imposed on them by the UK for their human rights record. Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe in 2022 due to its aggression in Ukraine and, although the UK would be deciding to remove itself from Europe’s oldest and largest intergovernmental human rights body, the optics would not be good.

This is especially true considering the UK’s vocal support for Ukraine in international forums, including its intervention in Ukraine’s case against Russia before the International Court of Justice and, potentially, in a separate case against Russia before the European Court of Human Rights itself.

More significantly and closer to home, the ECHR is a fundamental part of the Good Friday Agreement. It is difficult to argue UK withdrawal would not breach the agreement. As well as risking damage to intercommunal relations, such a breach is likely to significantly harm strategic relations with the US – and President Biden is set to visit Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to mark the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement.

It would also damage relations with the UK’s closest neighbours, Ireland, and the European Union (EU), with whom the prime minister has only recently scored credits for securing the Northern Ireland Protocol deal. If the UK withdraws from the ECHR, the EU would be entitled to terminate important provisions concerning international law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal justice matters under Article 692 of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement, further isolating the UK from allies who share its legal and other values.

Withdrawal would be in the name of sovereignty but with little thought to the practical implications on rights and few perceived gains from doing so. But the idea could easily gain traction by erroneously conflating the Strasbourg court and Council of Europe (of which the UK is a member) with the European Union (which the UK has left).

This means leaving the ECHR could easily be confused as a post-Brexit ‘tidy up’ exercise of taking back control from the EU when the reality is the UK would be withdrawing from a completely different regional body.

It would also be at odds with the UK’s Integrated Review Refresh which, reassuringly, contains references to the UK’s commitment to the rule of law, ‘respect for the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and international law’, and ‘universal human rights that underpins our democracy’. This would make the UK far less able to champion international law and influence states with long records of human rights violations, and run contrary to UK strategic priorities such as tackling aggression from Russia and China, its support for multilateralism, and its global legal leadership.

All this loss would come for little gain. Before going down this path, there must be a clearer understanding about exactly what concerns there are about the ECHR, and whether they stand up to scrutiny. Are they about UK sovereignty, specific issues about the European Court of Human Rights, or about the rights and obligations contained in the Convention?

The latter would raise a far bigger question on the UK’s commitment to other international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention on Rights of the Child, as many ECHR obligations also exist elsewhere in both common law and international law.

The need for cool heads and a long-term view

The significant concerns surrounding proposals in the Illegal Migration bill have been well-documented, including in relation to obligations under the ECHR and UN Refugee Convention.

There are many reasons beyond simply human rights concerns which are preventing migrants being deported to Rwanda, including the fact there are insufficient countries with which the UK has agreements to allow for deportation.

Mammalian circadian clocks are driven by transcription/translation feedback loops composed of positive transcriptional activators (BMAL1 and CLOCK) and negative repressors (CRYPTOCHROMEs (CRYs) and PERIODs (PERs)). CRYs, in complex with PERs, bind to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex and repress E-box–driven transcription of clock-associated genes. There are two individual CRYs, with CRY1 exhibiting higher affinity to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex than CRY2. It is known that this differential binding is regulated by a dynamic serine-rich loop adjacent to the secondary pocket of both CRYs, but the underlying features controlling loop dynamics are not known. Here we report that allosteric regulation of the serine-rich loop is mediated by Arg-293 of CRY1, identified as a rare CRY1 SNP in the Ensembl and 1000 Genomes databases. The p.Arg293His CRY1 variant caused a shortened circadian period in a Cry1−/−Cry2−/− double knockout mouse embryonic fibroblast cell line. Moreover, the variant displayed reduced repressor activity on BMAL1/CLOCK driven transcription, which is explained by reduced affinity to BMAL1/CLOCK in the absence of PER2 compared with CRY1. Molecular dynamics simulations revealed that the p.Arg293His CRY1 variant altered a communication pathway between Arg-293 and the serine loop by reducing its dynamicity. Collectively, this study provides direct evidence that allosterism in CRY1 is critical for the regulation of circadian rhythm.

Zika virus (ZIKV) is a neurotropic flavivirus that causes several diseases including birth defects such as microcephaly. Intrinsic immunity is known to be a frontline defense against viruses through host anti-viral restriction factors. Limited knowledge is available on intrinsic immunity against ZIKV in brains. Amyloid precursor protein (APP) is predominantly expressed in brains and implicated in the pathogenesis of Alzheimer's diseases. We have found that ZIKV interacts with APP, and viral infection increases APP expression via enhancing protein stability. Moreover, we identified the viral peptide, HGSQHSGMIVNDTGHETDENRAKVEITPNSPRAEATLGGFGSLGL, which is capable of en-hancing APP expression. We observed that aging brain tissues with APP had protective effects on ZIKV infection by reducing the availability of the viruses. Also, knockdown of APP expression or blocking ZIKV-APP interactions enhanced ZIKV replication in human neural progenitor/stem cells. Finally, intracranial infection of ZIKV in APP-null neonatal mice resulted in higher mortality and viral yields. Taken together, these findings suggest that APP is a restriction factor that protects against ZIKV by serving as a decoy receptor, and plays a protective role in ZIKV-mediated brain injuries.

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Histone recognition by “reader” modules serves as a fundamental mechanism in epigenetic regulation. Previous studies have shown that Spindlin1 is a reader of histone H3K4me3 as well as “K4me3-R8me2a” and promotes transcription of rDNA or Wnt/TCF4 target genes. Here we show that Spindlin1 also acts as a potent reader of histone H3 “K4me3-K9me3/2” bivalent methylation pattern. Calorimetric titration revealed a binding affinity of 16 nm between Spindlin1 and H3 “K4me3-K9me3” peptide, which is one to three orders of magnitude stronger than most other histone readout events at peptide level. Structural studies revealed concurrent recognition of H3K4me3 and H3K9me3/2 by aromatic pockets 2 and 1 of Spindlin1, respectively. Epigenomic profiling studies showed that Spindlin1 colocalizes with both H3K4me3 and H3K9me3 peaks in a subset of genes enriched in biological processes of transcription and its regulation. Moreover, the distribution of Spindlin1 peaks is primarily associated with H3K4me3 but not H3K9me3, which suggests that Spindlin1 is a downstream effector of H3K4me3 generated in heterochromatic regions. Collectively, our work calls attention to an intriguing function of Spindlin1 as a potent H3 “K4me3-K9me3/2” bivalent mark reader, thereby balancing gene expression and silencing in H3K9me3/2-enriched regions.

The functional mechanisms of multidomain proteins often exploit interdomain interactions, or “cross-talk.” An example is human Pin1, an essential mitotic regulator consisting of a Trp–Trp (WW) domain flexibly tethered to a peptidyl-prolyl isomerase (PPIase) domain, resulting in interdomain interactions important for Pin1 function. Substrate binding to the WW domain alters its transient contacts with the PPIase domain via means that are only partially understood. Accordingly, we have investigated Pin1 interdomain interactions using NMR paramagnetic relaxation enhancement (PRE) and molecular dynamics (MD) simulations. The PREs show that apo-Pin1 samples interdomain contacts beyond the range suggested by previous structural studies. They further show that substrate binding to the WW domain simultaneously alters interdomain separation and the internal conformation of the WW domain. A 4.5-μs all-atom MD simulation of apo-Pin1 suggests that the fluctuations of interdomain distances are correlated with fluctuations of WW domain interresidue contacts involved in substrate binding. Thus, the interdomain/WW domain conformations sampled by apo-Pin1 may already include a range of conformations appropriate for binding Pin1's numerous substrates. The proposed coupling between intra-/interdomain conformational fluctuations is a consequence of the dynamic modular architecture of Pin1. Such modular architecture is common among cell-cycle proteins; thus, the WW–PPIase domain cross-talk mechanisms of Pin1 may be relevant for their mechanisms as well.

Pyruvate kinase muscle isoform 2 (PKM2) is a key glycolytic enzyme and transcriptional coactivator and is critical for tumor metabolism. In cancer cells, native tetrameric PKM2 is phosphorylated or acetylated, which initiates a switch to a dimeric/monomeric form that translocates into the nucleus, causing oncogene transcription. However, it is not known how these post-translational modifications (PTMs) disrupt the oligomeric state of PKM2. We explored this question via crystallographic and biophysical analyses of PKM2 mutants containing residues that mimic phosphorylation and acetylation. We find that the PTMs elicit major structural reorganization of the fructose 1,6-bisphosphate (FBP), an allosteric activator, binding site, impacting the interaction with FBP and causing a disruption in oligomerization. To gain insight into how these modifications might cause unique outcomes in cancer cells, we examined the impact of increasing the intracellular pH (pHi) from ∼7.1 (in normal cells) to ∼7.5 (in cancer cells). Biochemical studies of WT PKM2 (wtPKM2) and the two mimetic variants demonstrated that the activity decreases as the pH is increased from 7.0 to 8.0, and wtPKM2 is optimally active and amenable to FBP-mediated allosteric regulation at pHi 7.5. However, the PTM mimetics exist as a mixture of tetramer and dimer, indicating that physiologically dimeric fraction is important and might be necessary for the modified PKM2 to translocate into the nucleus. Thus, our findings provide insight into how PTMs and pH regulate PKM2 and offer a broader understanding of its intricate allosteric regulation mechanism by phosphorylation or acetylation.

Myosins generate force and motion by precisely coordinating their mechanical and chemical cycles, but the nature and timing of this coordination remains controversial. We utilized a FRET approach to examine the kinetics of structural changes in the force-generating lever arm in myosin V. We directly compared the FRET results with single-molecule mechanical events examined by optical trapping. We introduced a mutation (S217A) in the conserved switch I region of the active site to examine how myosin couples structural changes in the actin- and nucleotide-binding regions with force generation. Specifically, S217A enhanced the maximum rate of lever arm priming (recovery stroke) while slowing ATP hydrolysis, demonstrating that it uncouples these two steps. We determined that the mutation dramatically slows both actin-induced rotation of the lever arm (power stroke) and phosphate release (≥10-fold), whereas our simulations suggest that the maximum rate of both steps is unchanged by the mutation. Time-resolved FRET revealed that the structure of the pre– and post–power stroke conformations and mole fractions of these conformations were not altered by the mutation. Optical trapping results demonstrated that S217A does not dramatically alter unitary displacements or slow the working stroke rate constant, consistent with the mutation disrupting an actin-induced conformational change prior to the power stroke. We propose that communication between the actin- and nucleotide-binding regions of myosin assures a proper actin-binding interface and active site have formed before producing a power stroke. Variability in this coupling is likely crucial for mediating motor-based functions such as muscle contraction and intracellular transport.

RNA-protein interfaces control key replication events during the HIV-1 life cycle. The viral trans-activator of transcription (Tat) protein uses an archetypal arginine-rich motif (ARM) to recruit the host positive transcription elongation factor b (pTEFb) complex onto the viral trans-activation response (TAR) RNA, leading to activation of HIV transcription. Efforts to block this interaction have stimulated production of biologics designed to disrupt this essential RNA-protein interface. Here, we present four co-crystal structures of lab-evolved TAR-binding proteins (TBPs) in complex with HIV-1 TAR. Our results reveal that high-affinity binding requires a distinct sequence and spacing of arginines within a specific β2-β3 hairpin loop that arose during selection. Although loops with as many as five arginines were analyzed, only three arginines could bind simultaneously with major-groove guanines. Amino acids that promote backbone interactions within the β2-β3 loop were also observed to be important for high-affinity interactions. Based on structural and affinity analyses, we designed two cyclic peptide mimics of the TAR-binding β2-β3 loop sequences present in two high-affinity TBPs (KD values of 4.2 ± 0.3 and 3.0 ± 0.3 nm). Our efforts yielded low-molecular weight compounds that bind TAR with low micromolar affinity (KD values ranging from 3.6 to 22 μm). Significantly, one cyclic compound within this series blocked binding of the Tat-ARM peptide to TAR in solution assays, whereas its linear counterpart did not. Overall, this work provides insight into protein-mediated TAR recognition and lays the ground for the development of cyclic peptide inhibitors of a vital HIV-1 RNA-protein interaction.

Erythromycin-resistance methyltransferases are SAM dependent Rossmann fold methyltransferases that convert A2058 of 23S rRNA to m6 2A2058. This modification sterically blocks binding of several classes of antibiotics to 23S rRNA, resulting in a multidrug-resistant phenotype in bacteria expressing the enzyme. ErmC is an erythromycin resistance methyltransferase found in many Gram-positive pathogens, whereas ErmE is found in the soil bacterium that biosynthesizes erythromycin. Whether ErmC and ErmE, which possess only 24% sequence identity, use similar structural elements for rRNA substrate recognition and positioning is not known. To investigate this question, we used structural data from related proteins to guide site-saturation mutagenesis of key residues and characterized selected variants by antibiotic susceptibility testing, single turnover kinetics, and RNA affinity–binding assays. We demonstrate that residues in α4, α5, and the α5-α6 linker are essential for methyltransferase function, including an aromatic residue on α4 that likely forms stacking interactions with the substrate adenosine and basic residues in α5 and the α5-α6 linker that likely mediate conformational rearrangements in the protein and cognate rRNA upon interaction. The functional studies led us to a new structural model for the ErmC or ErmE-rRNA complex.

V. G. Lysov
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 291-304.
Abstract, references and article information

A. I. Aptekarev and M. L. Yattselev
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 251-268.
Abstract, references and article information

A. G. Sergeev, A. Kh. Khachatryan and Kh. A. Khachatryan
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 55-65.
Abstract, references and article information

Visualizing the Data: The Evolution of Trade Tensions in Metals and Minerals Markets 18 January 2018 — 4:30PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 December 2017 Chatham House, London

Over the past decade, producer countries such as South Africa, Zambia, Indonesia, the DRC and, most recently, Tanzania have restricted exports of unprocessed precious metals, copper, nickel, cobalt and other minerals in an attempt to support, or create, downstream processing industries and jobs or increase revenues. These moves have invariably created tensions with trading partners. Research suggests that export restrictions are not the best way to achieve such policy objectives and can instead harm the producer country’s economy and undermine the functioning of international metals and minerals.

Drawing on OECD and Chatham House research on resource trade, the speaker will present analysis and data visualizations exploring the drivers of past export restrictions and their political and economic impacts. They will also consider how the drivers of ‘resource nationalist measures’ are changing, whether and where export restrictions might present strategic and economic risks in the current context, and the extent to which producer and consumer governments and international governance mechanisms are prepared to address them.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Korea's New Energy Policy and Implications for LNG Imports 3 October 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 September 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The new energy policy of Moon Jae-In’s administration aims to swing radically from coal and nuclear towards renewables and LNG for power generation. During the last 12 months the priority given to the expansion of renewable energy has been overwhelming and the support for the expansion of gas not as strong as many observers had expected. The 13th gas supply and demand plan announced in Spring 2018 confirmed the trend. Based on this projection, Professor K. Paik will discuss how this new energy policy will affect Korea’s LNG imports strategy and what are the implications of Korea’s northern policy towards this LNG supply strategy and pipeline gas imports to the Korean Peninsula.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The Impact of Brexit on Energy Transformation in the UK and EU 28 March 2019 — 8:15AM TO 9:45AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The UK’s decision to leave the EU will fundamentally reshape many of the UK’s policies and its relations with countries around the world. For energy and climate, the changes could be significant and will need to be managed carefully to secure ongoing investment, stable energy prices and ambitious climate objectives. The UK’s departure will also affect the balance of political support for climate and energy policies with the EU institutions and potentially impact upon regional initiatives.

This roundtable will discuss:

• The impact on the energy sector of Brexit during the transition period through until December 2020 including the operation of interconnectors and access to the Internal energy market, ongoing engagement in European research collaboration and the replacement of European financial resources.
• The possible opportunities and risks for the UK’s energy sector in 2021 and beyond.
• The implications of Brexit on the EU’s energy and climate policy.

The roundtable will discuss the role of the public and business in shaping the future deal as it will need to be ratified by the parliaments of all member states.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Power Sector Transformation, New Market Dynamics and Geopolitical Implications 7 November 2018 — 8:00AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 6 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The global electricity sector is experiencing profound change due to a confluence of technological innovation, environmental policies and regulatory reform. The effect is most obvious in the EU28, Australia and parts of North America.

However, this is just the beginning and the success of the next phase of electricity sector transformations hinges on enhancing system flexibility to facilitate unhindered low-cost deployment of renewables. It remains to be seen how utilities will seek to navigate this second phase of electricity transformations.

This session starts with a presentation and discussion that focuses on:

• Public and private sector risks of the transformation of the power sector, changes in generation mix and their implications for supply chain, employments and investment patterns.
• The role of government and the regulatory framework in light of changing market structure, new entrants and big data.
• Wider geopolitical issues including the implication for fossil fuel producers and the rise in demand for new materials and changes in land use.
• The possible implications on the power sector on the electrification of heat and transport.

The discussion then moves to the speed of transformation and what this means for existing and new market actors.

Plant-based 'Meat' and Cultured Meat: Revolutionizing the Livestock Sector 10 April 2019 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 March 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Consensus is building across the scientific, environmental and public health communities that a radical shift away from excessive meat-eating patterns is urgently needed to tackle the unsustainability of the livestock sector. Recognizing the scale of the challenge ahead, public policymakers, civil society and innovators have increasingly sought to prompt shifts in consumer food choices – away from the most resource-intensive meat products and towards more sustainable alternatives.

Meat analogues – plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat also known as ‘lab-grown’ meat – mark a departure from traditional meat alternatives. Both are intended to be indistinguishable from – and in the case of cultured meat biologically equivalent to – animal-derived meat and are marketed principally at meat-eaters. Innovation and investment in meat analogues have increased significantly, but the direction and pace of growth in the meat analogue industry will depend upon a multitude of factors, including public acceptance, civil society support and incumbent industry responses.

This event will explore the challenges of scaling up production and generating demand for meat alternatives. It will also look at the ways policymakers in the UK and EU can impact the direction of the industry while examining what factors will influence consumer acceptance of plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat as substitutes for animal-derived meat.

Nuclear, gas and green finance taxonomies in the EU and UK 23 February 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 January 2022 Online

Experts discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives on green taxonomy.

This event will address the controversial additions to the EU green finance taxonomy, including the labelling of some nuclear and gas power sources as “green”. Hear perspectives from the UK, EU and international experts.

The UK has committed to creating a green taxonomy to provide a shared understanding of which economic activities count as sustainable. It should be robust and evidence-based, taking an objective and science-based approach to assessing sustainability.

Technical Screening Criteria (TSCs) for the climate change mitigation, and climate change adaptation objectives within the UK green taxonomy will be based on those in the EU Taxonomy. The Government is currently reviewing these and expects to consult on UK draft TSCs in the first quarter of 2022, ahead of legislating by the end of 2022.

In recent weeks the European Commission has proposed controversial additional TSCs for the EU taxonomy, most notably the inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in power generation, which are currently being discussed by Member States and the European Parliament.

The inclusion of controversial power sources not only risks affecting investment and deployment patterns in the net-zero transition, but may also be a threat to the authority of the taxonomy as a whole

Key questions for the UK now include whether and how to address these issues in its own taxonomy, and how to promote a science-based ‘race to the top’ between jurisdictions that can lead to robust international standards.

This Environment and Society Discussion Series event brings expert voices together to discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives, and is co-organized with E3G.

The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security 13 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

What are the potential impacts on food and energy markets emerging from the situation in Ukraine?

Russia and Ukraine are key players in global energy, food, fertilizer and mineral markets. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, both the threat and reality of resource flows being reduced drove up global prices, and has impacted the day-to-day life of people and businesses around the world.

Developing and nutrition-fragile countries across Africa and the Middle East will be hit the hardest – Somalia, for example, is reliant on Russia and Ukraine for 100 per cent of its wheat imports and is currently experiencing its worst drought in years.

The potential scale of disruption to food and energy markets increases with every week the war continues. This event launches the Environment and Society programme’s latest briefing paper The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security: Cascading risks from rising prices and supply disruptions.

The panel discusses:

• The political, socio-economic and resource pressures already faced by the international community prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• Direct and cascading impacts on the complex and interconnected energy, minerals, food and fertilizer markets, and policy or market responses that may exacerbate these impacts.
• Geopolitical ramifications that will affect the evolution of the conflict, as well as longer-term international cooperation and security.
• Measures that governments can take to build resilience, both to the ongoing impacts of the situation in Ukraine and to future risks of market disruption and geopolitical upheaval.

An Attack on the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Principle in Hong Kong Expert comment sysadmin 11 January 2016

The disappearance of publisher Lee Bo may mark the beginning of the end of Beijing’s commitment to uphold the framework that provides the territory with a high degree of autonomy.

The disappearance of a publisher in Hong Kong, Lee Bo, who owns a well-known bookshop that sells books critical of Chinese leaders, is a landmark event and potentially a historical turning point for Hong Kong. It is not clear if this happened at the behest of the senior Chinese leadership. But if those responsible for the disappearing of Lee are not punished, it will be clear that their acts are condoned by the authorities.

This is deeply worrying as it gravely undermines the ‘one country, two systems’ framework, which provides Hong Kong with high degree of autonomy from Beijing. Under the Sino-British Agreement of 1984 and Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which govern relations between Hong Kong and China, the rights of Hong Kong citizens are meant to be protected within the territory. Mainland Chinese authorities do not have the legal power to arrest or detain an individual in, or remove anyone from, Hong Kong.

The Chinese know the limit of their legal authority in Hong Kong. Hence, Lee was quietly disappeared, rather than openly arrested. But that it happened at all may mark the beginning of the end of Beijing’s commitment to uphold the ‘one country, two systems’ framework – a relationship that requires Beijing to tolerate, if not respect, the judicial integrity and the way of life in Hong Kong.

Do we know for sure that Lee was ‘disappeared’ by China’s security apparatus? Before he disappeared, Lee said in an interview that he knew he had been watched and that his emails were accessed by Chinese agents, and that he would not travel to the mainland as a result. And we know that Lee’s travel documents are all in his home; yet he is now supposedly in China ‘assisting the authorities in an investigation’ into something unspecified. This explanation comes from a fax sent to Lee’s wife, probably intended by the Chinese authorities to put an end to speculation. But why would Chinese authorities work with Lee, a British citizen who carries no travel documents and would thus have broken the law by entering China? The circumstantial evidence is strong enough to show that whether he was taken by Chinese officers or someone else, his removal from Hong Kong to China must have received official endorsement.

Should the rest of the world be concerned about this? Hong Kong is a major financial center that services the world economy, and it can do so largely because it enjoys judicial independence and the high degree of autonomy under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. It is also a shining example of how the rights and scope of development for individuals can be respected in a Chinese community. Should the ‘one country, two systems’ framework be undermined, Hong Kong as we know it will be no more.

Beijing’s quick response in requiring Lee to fax his family may come across as ham-fisted and callous, but it also demonstrates that it had not expected the strong backlash to Lee’s disappearance. A strong and well-articulated international response that brings the matter to Xi’s attention may persuade him that it is in China’s best interest to put a stop to this process of undermining the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. Given Hong Kong’s importance to the global economy, this should be a priority for the international community.

This article was originally published in the Diplomat.

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