War on Ukraine: The state of the global response 17 October 2022 — 6:30PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

Implications of the war for the future of multilateralism.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has tested the capacity for a unified global response to grave violations of the UN Charter. The world is in unchartered territory as a nuclear member of the United Nations Security Council attacks a non-nuclear country. 

Multilateral institutions that were born out of an effort to prevent war are struggling to prove their relevance in the face of growing existential threats to humanity. The war is exacerbating divisions within the global community, disrupting food and energy supplies worldwide and contributing to a profound crisis of multilateralism.

The longer these divisions last, the longer the war in the middle of Europe and the harder it will be to respond to the interconnected global crises that threaten everyone.

This discussion offers a unique insight into the macro-geopolitical questions in relation to the war in Ukraine with members of the Elders and other experts:

The panel considers:

• How can a more united global response to Russian aggression be built?

• What stands in the way of an effective multilateral response based on international norms?

• In what ways are divisions between UN member states influencing the trajectory of the war or prospects for peace?

• How is the conflict changing geopolitics and the ability of the multilateral system to address global challenges?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. This event is organised in partnership between Chatham House and The Elders, the group of independent global leaders founded by Nelson Mandela who work for peace, justice and human rights.

Read the transcript.

Black perspectives on international relations 27 October 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can black perspectives help the world tackle global challenges and expand our understanding of international relations?

As social boundaries change, the viewpoints of black academics, thought leaders and policymakers have grown in both influence and strength worldwide, challenging western and institutional norms. 

However, many institutions and organizations, long established with the exclusion of black voices, have to adapt if there is to be greater inclusion and diversity of thought when tackling major global issues.

Growing reflection on the legacy of colonialism and the importance of the power of diversity may be needed for today’s problems.

The search for global racial equality has seen a growing commitment to ensuring the black experience is at the heart of geopolitical discussions.

This panel discussion looks at what changes are occurring now and how is the conversation shifting. It also examines the challenges posed by the increasing politicization of race and culture issues in the current political environment.

Key questions discussed by the panel include:

• What is the importance of black voices in international relations and where are the main challenges to greater incorporation?

• What are some of the leading perspectives, approaches and beliefs within Africa and across the black diaspora regarding international relations?

• To what extent are governments, businesses and leading global institutions making efforts to include more black voices in decision-making?

• How are black academics changing wider geopolitical conversations and to what extent can deeper conversations lead to change?

• Will an ‘African Century’ bring black perspectives on international relations to the fore of the geopolitical agenda?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

War on Ukraine: The energy crisis and Europe’s impending long winter 2 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Online

Can Europe remain unified over the long winter?

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global community has been responding to significant price shocks, especially energy. As Europe heads into a particularly difficult winter, policymakers are grappling with the costs, both political and economic, required to make sure Russian energy blackmail does not succeed.

Retaining a unified front against Russia and providing continued support to the Ukrainian government will be great challenges. As the cold begins to bite, war fatigue may accelerate among the populations of Europe. Providing their people with adequate heat will not come cheaply for governments across the continent at a time of economic uncertainty.

At this critical moment of Russia’s invasion, experts discuss:

• Have European preparations been sufficient to stave off an energy crisis this winter?
• What will be Russia’s reaction during and after the winter period, particularly if Europe avoids energy market failures?
• How will this ‘energy crisis’ ensure future dependencies on single state actors of goods and services do not occur in the future?

Read the transcript. 

Expanding and enhancing the global cyber workforce 17 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can we address the cybersecurity workforce shortage and skills gap?

Accelerated digital transformation and heightened geopolitical tensions on the international stage have increased the need for effective cybersecurity practices and policies as well as a skilled workforce. Despite this, the demand for cybersecurity professionals continues to outpace the supply for societies and businesses globally, resulting in a cybersecurity workforce gap.

To ensure that digital transformation is available, safe and beneficial to all, significant efforts are needed to encourage cyber workforce capacity-building and knowledge-sharing at both national and international levels.

This discussion, supported by (ISC)² and the UK Cyber Security Council, will explore how to effectively address the twin challenges of the global cyber workforce shortage and skills gap.

• What are the implications of the global cyber workforce and skills gaps for businesses and societies?

• What shape do these gaps take within society? Where are they most prevalent and how do they vary?

• What is the role of education and private-public partnerships in effectively addressing these gaps?

• How does the UK National Cyber Strategy seek to address these challenges? What are the key lessons from this strategy?

• What other efforts are being made internationally to bridge this gap? What opportunities are there for knowledge-sharing and capacity-building?

• What is the role of diversity, equity and inclusion in tackling these gaps?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. If you are not a member of Chatham House but would still like to attend the event please email Eleanor Macmillan-Fox to enquire about registration.

Read the transcript. 

Members' drinks and exhibition 27 October 2022 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 October 2022 Chatham House

A showcase of a selection of the Black Cultural Archives photo exhibition of up-and-coming Black British leaders.

Chatham House is pleased to showcase a selection of the Black Cultural Archives photo exhibition of up-and-coming Black British leaders. These portraits illuminate the talent and pipeline of ‘next gen’ leaders in the Black British community – some of whom will be in attendance at the reception. The chair of the Black British Cultural Archives, Dr Yvonne Thompson, will make short remarks at around 18:20 BST.

We hope you will join your fellow members and Chatham House staff for a chance to connect and celebrate.

You are welcome to attend the event Black perspectives on International Relations preceding the reception.

Please note as space is limited, this event is operating a ballot for registrations. Your place will be confirmed by Tuesday 25 October if you are successful.

The future of global trade: Beyond ‘peak globalization’? 23 November 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2022 Online

Is globalization in retreat?

The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine have highlighted how vulnerable international trade is. But, even before these recent shocks, rising protectionism in major economies around the world and concerns about the environment have weighed heavily on trade.

According to some key measures, the globalization trend appears to have slowed. But is ‘peak globalization’ a reality or a myth? What are the major phases of globaliszation and what might come next? The answer differs between trade in goods, services, capital, technology, data and people. And whether the future is a more integrated or fragmented world economy also depends on politics and the stability of the international order.

Key questions to be tackled at this event includes:

• How do recent shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine, change globalization? 

• What are the key indicators for the global integration of major economies?

• Will there be a split between a US and China-dominated ’trading sphere of influence’?

• Could trade in services offer ‘globalization’ a new phase of rapid growth?

• What impact will technology continue to have on global trade and the future of globalization?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

The discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. The Global Trade Policy Forum is supported by founding partner AIG, associate partner Boston Consulting Group and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo PLC and UPS.

Read the transcript. 

What’s next in UK monetary policy? 4 November 2022 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

A panel of leading experts discuss the future direction of UK monetary policy.

The UK’s so-called ‘mini-budget’ on 23 September led to a severe market reaction and a wave of criticism at home and abroad that ultimately forced the sacking of UK chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng and contributed to the downfall of Liz Truss’s government.

The new chancellor Jeremy Hunt is due to deliver what will essentially be an entirely new budget in mid-November, with a full assessment from the Office of Budget Responsibility. This will follow the meeting of the Bank of England’s interest rate setting Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) on Thursday 3 November.

Given rising inflationary pressures worldwide, it seems highly likely that the MPC will increase interest rates once again, but by how much and how far there will have to be an additional premium linked to the government’s fiscal strategy is far from clear.

Chatham House’s Global Economy and Finance programme is pleased to partner with Fathom Consulting to host a special session of Fathom’s Monetary Policy Forum.

A presentation of Fathom’s latest economic outlook, fully updated to take account of the previous day’s MPC decision, will be followed by a discussion among four of the MPC’s original former external members. Key questions will include:

• How far has the government been able to restore its fiscal credibility?
• Did the MPC make the right decision on 3 November?
• What is the likely pace and extent of monetary tightening in the UK going forward?
• What will be the long-term consequences for the UK economy of the past month’s policy experiment?
• What are the international implications?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. 

This event is in partnership with Fathom Consulting.

The road to COP27: In conversation with US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry 27 October 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

What will progress on climate change look like at COP27?

With global attention zeroing in on COP27, policymakers and world leaders will meet in Egypt to take the next step in the fight against the climate crisis. The planet is on course to warm well beyond 1.5°C and climate hazards are increasing our exposure to climate risk. Violent and unpredictable weather events increasingly leave devastation among communities, particularly in vulnerable countries.

At the same time, the ripple effects of the conflict in Ukraine will have wide-ranging economic, social and geopolitical consequences for years to come. Whilst some finance is being made available, more is needed to properly address the damage caused by climate change and fund the transition to net zero worldwide. These challenges have become more acute as the world grapples with a growing energy crisis, the war in Ukraine and a troubling economic outlook.

Joined by US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, the following questions are considered:

• Is ‘1.5 degrees’ still on track?

• How can countries better collaborate to move to net zero faster?

• How can we achieve progress on adaptation, climate finance, and loss and damage?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

Thinking out loud: Is disinformation here to stay? 10 November 2022 — 6:00PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 25 October 2022 Chatham House

This event is postponed.

Have you ever wondered how Chatham House researchers approach the big deals that become research? Do you enjoy meeting other Chatham House members and engaging with questions that open your mind? ‘Thinking Out Loud’ invites a small group of members to a live, unscripted discussion with a Chatham House researcher. This in-person event is a way for researchers and members to think out loud to help shape ideas for future research.

Kate Jones, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme at Chatham House will pose some key questions facing how speech is governed in an online world:

• How has big tech influenced the way we think about speech and its limitations?

• Can disinformation be eliminated or even greatly reduced?

• Where should the responsibilities fall between government and business when it comes to speech regulation?

• What might the information landscape look like in 10 years’ time? Should that affect how we tackle disinformation today?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Weathering the storm: The UK’s role in the world today 29 November 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 November 2022 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with David Miliband, examining the risks and opportunities for the UK in a critical year ahead. 

With a new government in the midst of a global order in flux, the UK’s position in the world needs re-examining.

Just 20 months since the UK’s Integrated Review on international policy and security, Britain’s global blueprint is being reviewed and updated in light of major global developments.

Today, Brexit and the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine require adjustments to the UK’s strategic thinking and positioning in the world.

As the economic and political turmoil of previous weeks begins to abate, this is an important moment to once again determine Britain’s role in Europe and beyond. 
 
Realigning British foreign policy in a rapidly shifting international order will be a major challenge for the new administration.  

International Rescue Committee’s CEO and President, and former UK Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, examines the risks and opportunities for a critical year ahead. 
 
Key questions include:

• What are the crucial decisions the UK needs to make in the coming 12 months?
• What should the UK’s priorities be for its role in the world? How should it project itself amidst geopolitical fracturing?
• How can Britain best respond to humanitarian crises around the world?
• Does the UK have the strategic and economic clout to keep up with its foreign policy and development commitments?

As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

Members' Christmas drinks 6 December 2022 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 November 2022 Chatham House

Join us at 10 St James’s Square for a chance to raise a glass with fellow Chatham House members and staff.

This evening is a special opportunity to meet fellow Chatham House members and staff around the Christmas tree.

Please note this reception is open to members of Chatham House only. Regrettably, we are unable to register non-member guests.

Members event (open ticket) 1 February 2023 — 9:00PM TO 10:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: How it changed the world 21 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Chatham House experts examine how the world has changed since 24 February 2022.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted serious soul-searching about European security, what it means to be European and the futures of the two principal protagonists. However, practical questions have developed throughout the war in surprising ways.

Chatham House is producing a multi-author feature reflecting on seven things Russia’s war has changed in the world. The article assesses the impact of the war one year on, the long-term changes this has catalyzed and unpacks why these changes are significant for the future of international affairs.

This event examines key themes with the research directors who authored the piece. Alliances, national resiliency for both Ukraine and Russia and sanctions are examined including the following questions:

• How did the war change Ukraine?

• What alliances have been forged over the past year? 

• How long can ‘fortress Russia’ weather the storm and what has it revealed about Russia’s integration into the international system? 

• What have countries done to mitigate the impact on supply chains and markets? Who, for example, has been most affected by the grain crisis?

• What have we learnt about Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky that we didn’t know before 24 February 2022?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Linked article: ‘Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world’, read the featured piece here.

Read the transcript. 

From Iraq to Ukraine: What did governments learn? 20 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

What were the main lessons for today’s conflicts from the way in which the war in Iraq played out?

This March marks the 20th anniversary of the US and UK-led invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein. Based primarily on unfounded fears Iraq’s WMD (weapons of mass destruction) capability was buidling up in the absence of UN inspection and constraints on the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, the decision to go to war has reverberated throughout the Middle East, the intelligence communities, and Western political decision-making ever since.

In the 2002–03 period when UN inspectors were allowed back into Iraq, Hans Blix, chairman of UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, were at the centre of a storm in which they were put under huge pressure to agree with the US/UK narrative on the ‘missing’ WMD.

Their problem was that the evidence they were uncovering did not support the claims, but the war went ahead – and Saddam was overthrown – despite these UN findings.

Much has changed since 2003. As the geopolitical landscape has shifted, so have geopolitics and capabilities. Today’s Russia’s war against Ukraine which includes WMD threats, cyberattacks, and an assertive disinformation campaign has opened up new ways of thinking about communicating information from open source and government intelligence analysis.

This panel explores the experiences of people involved with decision-making at the UN and in the UK in 2003 and how things have changed today.

• What were the lessons from the way in which the war in Iraq played out?
• How has that influenced the way in which NATO has responded to Russia’s wars against Ukraine?
• How should information be communicated within governments and to the public?
• How to deal with disinformation campaigns in the days of open source information and social media?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

In conversation with Ehud Barak 27 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

The former prime minister of Israel discusses his country’s political outlook and foreign policy priorities.

On the eve of its 75th independence anniversary, Israel is at a critical crossroads. Weeks of long, intense protests surrounding judicial reforms pursued by the current government have widened the debate over the role played by the, so far independent, judiciary, notably the Supreme Court.

Supporters on both sides of the argument are fighting over different visions of Israel – a true liberal-democracy, or a much-reduced version of a democratic system. Whichever side of the argument people fall, the debate symbolizes tension in Israel’s society and decline in trust of its political and constitutional institutions.

Abroad, the situation remains intricate. Israel-Iran relations remain on a knife edge while the Abraham Accords normalized relations with parts of the Gulf. Then there are the continual issues surrounding relations with the Palestinians and their right to self-determination and statehood.

Old international challenges are now rubbing up against the new. Israel is part of a changing power dynamic in the Middle East, the result of a much-reduced US footprint. Furthermore, it must now contend with the other global superpower in China and continue to work on its response to the war in Ukraine.

Amid its domestic struggle to maintain its democratic character, fast-moving regional and international developments are in need of addressing. Friends and allies are deeply concerned with the country’s constitutional crisis, potentially re-evaluating their relations with the Jewish state.

Former prime minister of Israel Ehud Barak lays out his views on the complexities of domestic and international challenges facing Israel today.

Questions covered include:

• What are the main root causes of the current constitutional crisis, and how could it be best resolved?
• Could the current situation lead to a breakdown of the political system, even widespread violence?
• How could the current circumstances in Israel and Palestine affect relations between the two and any prospect for peace negotiations?
• How will US-Israel relations stand up against China’s influence in the region?
• What is Israel’s interpretation of the war in Ukraine and how is the country affected?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Turkey at a crossroads 4 May 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

What is at stake in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections?

Turkey is heading towards a fateful presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023. These elections are taking place against the background of a deepening economic downturn and a devastating earthquake. The elections will bear a major impact on the future of Turkish democracy, economy and foreign policy. At stake is the nature of Turkey’s political system, its geopolitical identity and the health of its democracy.

To unpack the significance and implications of this election, this event aims to address the following questions:

• What kind of political visions do the main presidential candidates offer for the country?
• How do they differ on the main domestic and foreign policy issues?
• How do the presidential candidates feature in public surveys?
• What does this election mean for Turkey’s foreign policy?
• What is the likely impact of the election on Turkey’s place in the transatlantic alliance and its relations with Europe?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

The role of think tanks amid political uncertainty 9 May 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

Think tank leaders discuss how persistent and new forms of political uncertainty impact on their work and what can they do to counter it.  

Think tanks play a crucial role in supporting better public policy to address the most pressing global and local challenges. However, the recent rise in political turbulence poses a significant challenge to this work. Not only must the work of think tanks help counter political uncertainty but that uncertainty often threatens their ability to work effectively, and in some cases, their survival.

Polarized elections, regional instability, the rise of populism, shrinking civic space, eroding democracies, weakened institutions and public distrust are just some of the tricky contexts and issues raised by think tank leaders in the latest think tank state of the sector report. 

This event is being held in collaboration with On Think Tanks ahead of the On Think Tanks Conference.

Join us for a thought-provoking discussion at Chatham House on the major sources and consequences of political uncertainty in the world today and the critical role of think tanks in responding to and countering it. 

Key questions to be addressed during this discussion include:

• How does political uncertainty look like today?
• What can think tanks do to operate within uncertain contexts? 
• What are their roles: should they build the middle ground, support political parties, rally behind social demands?  
• Will think tanks be able to maintain their reliability and credibility in an increasingly polarized political environment?
• What can think tanks do to contribute to greater political stability?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

A drinks reception will immediately follow this event.

I’m often asked if I miss working in the House of Commons. Of course I do; it’s one of the most amazing places in the world and remains the cockpit of our nation.There are obviously days I miss it more than others, usually around the big national moments. Whatever your view of Kim Leadbeater’s private member’s bill—the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill—its second reading this month will be one of those big moments.Kim is a friend of mine, and we spoke before she decided to put her bill forward after it topped the private members’ ballot at the start of the new parliament. My advice was to proceed with great care, to remember that this will take over your career in many ways, and to read the report produced earlier this year by the Health and Social Care Committee, which I chaired, on the subject of assisted dying/assisted...

Russia and 9/11: Roads not taken Expert comment NCapeling 9 September 2021

Many Russia watchers recall the fleeting moment 20 years ago when the country could have moved away from a path of confrontation with the US.

On 12 September 2001, Russian president Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to call George W. Bush to express his condolences – and to offer him support.

Just the previous year, Putin had said Russia joining NATO was a possibility and it suited Russia to draw parallels between the terrorist attacks on the US and its own ‘anti-terrorist’ campaign in Chechnya at the time.

Even though much of the Russian commentary about 9/11 professed empathy rather than sympathy, in their eyes the US was both a victim – as Russia likes to see itself – and ‘had it coming’ while Russia was blameless.

At that time, many in the West were still tempted by the idea Putin’s Russia might develop in a liberal direction, and Putin himself wanted to be seen as constructive especially after Chechnya. He may also have also assumed that, if Russia joined the international alliance, it would be as a co-leader with the US.

An offer which was never stated

Whether he was sincere in his condolences or not, Putin was of course not offering something for nothing – but then few countries ever do. Although less than one-tenth into his time in control of Russia (so far), Putin was still feeling his way but was not a naive president having already been through the controversial sinking of the Kursk submarine.

His first move was to facilitate access to bases in Central Asia for the US campaign in Afghanistan – vital initially but less so later. Apparently, this offer was against the wishes of many of his senior military commanders – although the extent to which it was in his gift to grant such access is questionable.

The quid pro quo, unstated and only dawning on Washington much later, was for the US to keep out of what Russia saw – and still sees – as its backyard. Putin probably misjudged that the US would have neither the inclination nor the capacity to be in that region for anything other than supply chain purposes. And he hoped America now needed Russia after the humiliations of the 1990s.

Common interests could once have been the basis of a partnership with Russia; but to Moscow that meant a partnership of equals which recognized the Kremlin’s self-declared right to conduct out-of-area operations. But the US took a different view and, with nothing written down and no memorandum ever signed, the ensuing disappointment for Russia was gradual but inexorable.

A purely practical reason for declining the ‘offer’ was that, despite its own illusions, Russia had little to bring to the table which was useful and could be offered on acceptable terms. Subsequent initiatives – from specific joint terrorism initiatives to a ‘grand reset’ – could not narrow differences to the point where the character of the relationship changed.

The Northern Distribution Network for supplying US forces in Afghanistan – Russia’s most practical contribution to the notional common cause – took almost a decade to be established and was plagued by problems which often come with a dependence on Russian goodwill.

The Kremlin also had the pleasure of watching US hubris lead to failure in Iraq. And, although knowing the US intervention in Afghanistan would never end well, even Russia could not have foreseen the scale of the defeat and humiliation of chaotic withdrawal.

US achievements with Russia’s neighbours

When it comes to Russia’s post 9/11 ‘offer’ and subsequent expectations, many of the other newly independent countries might never have achieved what they have over the past 20 years if the US had agreed – tacitly or otherwise – to sit back and accept Moscow’s droit de regard over them.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, these states were Russia’s ‘kith and kin’ but it underestimated US willingness to support smaller states over a ‘great power’ – especially as George H.W. Bush pleaded to those states not to go too far too fast. Albeit uneven, most have benefitted from US support for their own independence as well as practical assistance to strengthen their institutions and diversify external relationships.

The three Baltic states consolidated their democracies while their economies, which severed many ties with Russia early, are flourishing and prosperous in contrast to those still in the Russian orbit. They are not only members of NATO and the European Union (EU) but have on occasion been moral leaders as in the case of Lithuania facing down both Belarus and China.

Ukraine has undergone two revolutions in attempting to follow the paths of the Baltic states that continues today. After many false starts Moldova has undergone a similar change recently but at the ballot box not on the streets, to give itself another shot at the prize of true democracy and international acceptance.

Georgia conducted the most radical governance reforms seen in the region after its own revolution although it has taken a few steps backwards of late. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have strengthened their independence since then and adjusted their modus vivendi with Russia to their advantage. Putin would hardly be able to give the same assurances about use of bases there today – and indeed reportedly brushed off a request by Biden to use them in the current withdrawal.

Only a minority of formerly Soviet republics have made no progress whatsoever at the governmental level – Belarus and Turkmenistan for sure, perhaps Azerbaijan and Tajikistan too depending on the criteria.

The roads not taken

America’s failure was not so much rejecting Russia’s offer of partnership but failing to pay sufficient attention to it because Russia was still regarded as weak despite being relatively strong in its immediate neighbourhood.

The question of whether it was worth alienating Russia is a moral one. Refusing to sign the Paris Charter – which recognizes the right of independent states to form their own alliances – would have been a further betrayal of people who have long been subjected to their future being decided by stronger powers around them. But Russia may have chosen a path of confrontation anyway as, for the Kremlin, suzerainty over its former republics is considered an entitlement which comes with being a great power.

Although impossible to conclusively prove, all previous frameworks of Russian assumptions and habits of Russian behaviour indicate Moscow would have pocketed the deal and simply moved on anyway. It certainly seems likely that Russia’s other outrages and offenses over the years – from the murders of Litvinenko and Skripal in the UK to the manipulation of information and elections – would still have occurred even if a shabby deal had been made over the heads of the new states on Russia’s borders.

The atrocity of 9/11 was really an opportunity for Russia, a genuine potential turning point and a chance to create a new relationship with the outside world – but its expectations were unrealistic. Russia blew it with demands at the time that could not be met – and rightly were not met. The US rarely receives credit for withstanding Russian blandishments at a moment when its own aura of strength had been so cruelly and effectively punctured by the most brazen of attacks.

Q&A: Maria Kolesnikova The World Today rescobales.drupal 29 September 2021

The jailed Belarusian opposition activist says: ‘It’s worth it’

Earlier this month, the Belarusian opposition activists, Maria Kolesnikova and Maxim Znak, were sentenced to long prison terms on charges of conspiring to seize power and crimes against national security. Both Kolesnikova, a prominent musician, and Znak, a lawyer, are supporters of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who ran against President Alexander Lukashenka in last year’s election and is now in exile in Lithuania. European Union countries have called for all political detainees, including Kolesnikova, to be released, but so far these calls have fallen on deaf ears. Alistair Burnett interviewed Maria Kolesnikova.

What is your response to the verdict and the 11-year sentence handed down to you?

My conscience is clear. We didn’t break the law. We followed the law at all the stages of the electoral campaign.

After the verdict, we applauded when the judges left the courtroom. They fulfilled their despicable role in this historical process – now this decision is on their conscience.

It is impossible to take the court and the verdict in any way seriously. This is not a verdict on Maxim and me but on the authorities themselves, on the system itself.

It is evidence not only of a legal default, but of a system-wide default. I feel sorry for those who did not understand what happened and did not learn history’s lessons.

Your trial was held behind closed doors and you were charged with conspiring to seize power and crimes against national security. What can you tell us about the prosecution’s case against you?

If there had been any evidence against us, the trial would have been open.

The very existence of accusations like this denies people the potential to participate in election campaigning and in political activity generally. It also prohibits public criticism of the authorities.

Such a judgment and verdict is a Pandora’s box with far-reaching negative consequences.

After the crackdown over last year’s protests and now your sentencing, what is the state of the opposition within Belarus?

I am in prison, so it is hard for me to judge objectively people’s attempts to fight for their freedom and basic human rights. According to what I see on TV, as well as the mood of those few people I have had a chance to talk to, I can say that the authorities are scared by the people’s activism.

They understand that though they can put down protests, they can’t change people’s mindsets. I see the fear in their eyes. I also believe that even those outside of Belarus can do a lot, and it’s important to continue opposition activity both inside and outside the country.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has been visiting European countries and the United States to maintain their support. Has international pressure, including from human rights groups, had any effect on the Lukashenka government?

I will use this opportunity to say hi to Sviatlana: ‘You are amazing. Keep it up.’

I’m sure Lukashenka is scared. He turned from a person who meets presidents to talk about Ukraine into an outcast no one wants to shake hands with.

It is traumatic for him, but the fear will pass. He will get used to it.

That is why it’s important to think about the next step, to understand what American and European partners are ready to offer Lukashenka in return for him to change course. If they aren’t ready to offer him anything – it’s important to know how long they are ready to maintain the pressure.

It concerns Russia as well. Maybe they simply don’t understand that Lukashenka and his government are in a bad way.

To what extent do you believe the futures of the Lukashenka and Russian President Vladimir Putin are now intertwined?

Lukashenka is a famous manipulator. Almost 30 years in power has made his self-preservation instincts automatic. It’s a tactical choice. There’s nothing behind it besides the willingness to stay in power till he dies.

But a trapped person is a dangerous and unreliable partner. It won’t remain like this for a long time. His partners will sooner or later face unpleasant surprises.

What can the international community do?

Hundreds of political prisoners, thousands in exile, tens of thousands arrested, fined, subjected to violence, and the media and businesses are being destroyed. The authorities are at war with their own people and leading the country into an abyss.

The support of the international community is very important for Belarusians. We need to look for an opportunity to start a dialogue, both within the country and with international partners.

Why did last year’s protests last as long as they did? Was it the relative youth of the protesters; the use of social media; the prominence of women; and did COVID restrictions play any part?

For me, the protests aren’t the main thing. The transformation of Belarusian society is the most important thing.

Most Belarusians decided what they want to see in their county: Belarus as a free, democratic, sovereign country. And the current authorities aren’t able to provide that.

Regarding new technology, of course, it gives more opportunities for people to organize, however, social media users are still the minority in Belarus. Everything happened on a deeper level after being built up over time through people’s real-life experience.

Throughout the campaign, I have been surprised by the fact that most of the activists are middle-aged people from different professions. There were plenty of women who expressed their objection first.

Through the situation with COVID, we gained a new experience of solidarity and mutual assistance, so when the government turned against the people, we realized then how many we were.

Looking back now at the protests, would you do anything differently and have you learned lessons for the future?

We definitely have more appreciation for what we already have. We appreciate our amazing journalists, our civil society, and private businesses. And, of course, our upcoming victory.

What could we have done differently? We could have been more consistent in terms of our willingness to resolve the crisis quickly and painlessly for the country. We were calling for dialogue in August, and then we had this unfortunate period of ultimatums that damaged both sides.

The situation is different now, and everything is more complicated. The moment has gone, and I don’t think that negotiation or national dialogue in the form we expected a year ago is possible anymore.

We had to make very hard choices many times, but the most important thing is that we never deviated from our principles and values - the fairness of the law, kindness, respect and love. I believe it is the only right way.

How can you now achieve your goal of removing President Lukashenka from power?

To be a politician in Belarus nowadays means to be in prison. In this way, I can contribute to the common endeavor. It’s not our objective, though.

Our objective is a country free of current and future forms of authoritarianism.

How to free the country? On the one hand, we all have to maintain our effort, cohesion and solidarity. We should try not to lose that. On the other hand, we should focus on limiting the political space for the government. We should show that the system will have to deal with us, the Belarusians.

Thirdly, we have to think about the future of Belarus. We have to dream about it, believe in it and stay active. Everything is up to us.

You were a musician before becoming active in politics. Has music shaped your approach to political activism and have you had the chance to continue playing in detention?

The artistic path shapes the personality. Of course, teamwork, looking for unusual solutions, and the ability to stay concentrated and work for a long time in critical situations, as well as performing in public, is what I’ve been learning my whole life as a musician.

Management of contemporary art projects and partnerships with businesses, like with Viktar Babaryka, the former presidential candidate, for example, gave me even more experience.

I miss music a lot, but in Belarusian prisons, even books aren’t really allowed. I don’t have an opportunity to play.

Do you have any regrets about your decision to become involved in opposition politics?

I consider my decision to participate in the campaign the most important and responsible one of my life. I knew it would be hard, but the future of the nation is at stake. So it’s worth it. My love for Belarus and Belarusian people didn’t allow me to stay aloof.

Director’s breakfast briefing: Shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11 14 October 2021 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2021 Chatham House

Former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

Former MI6 chief Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

The dramatic events surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates a profound shift in European security priorities since the beginning of the ‘war on terror’. Against the backdrop of the 20th anniversary of 9/11, former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses recent shifts in European foreign policy.

How has the focus on counterterrorism changed over the last two decades particularly in light of new and evolving strategic challenges? Why were many long-term objectives in Afghanistan left unachieved? Has the threat of terrorism changed across Europe? How has cooperation between security and intelligence services across the world changed particularly across the Atlantic? And, 20 years on, is the ‘war on terror’ really over?

This event is only open to Chatham House Partners and Major Corporate Members as well as selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you would like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford at RSVP@chathamhouse.org.

Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum Expert comment Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2021

With a focus on evacuations from Afghanistan, the situation in Europe is often forgotten as thousands of asylum seekers continue to wait for their cases to be settled.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, European leaders shared messages to welcome those evacuated, but the reality of European responses to displacement in Afghanistan paints a more contentious picture. 

As of July 2021, 33,325 cases of Afghan asylum applicants were pending in Germany, in France 18,410 people were waiting on a decision, while in Greece the numbers were 13,660. 

Arguably, such numbers are manageable given European states’ size and their functioning asylum systems but, while 56 per cent of Afghans in Europe receive protection status, a large proportion is still in limbo in differing European countries’ asylum systems. 

Europe hosts fewer than ten per cent of the three million UN-registered displaced Afghans globally, as neighbouring countries carry the burden of Afghanistan’s forced displacement: Iran hosts almost one million Afghan refugees and Pakistan 1.5 million, and these numbers double when adding undocumented or Afghan passport holders.
 
But despite these manageable numbers, national authorities in Europe often leave people waiting for months or even years to receive an asylum decision. Deportations to Afghanistan were halted only after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and even then there was resistance to this from certain European countries, while Austria suggested setting up ‘deportation centres’ in countries neighbouring Afghanistan. 

Europe remains a fortress

The European Commission’s Draft Action Plan responding to the events in Afghanistan confirmed the willingness of the European Union (EU) to continue returns to non-European ‘third countries’. So Europe remains a fortress, despite pledging support for ‘the safe and orderly departure of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to leave the country’. 

The wall by Greece at its border with Turkey and Poland’s treatment of Afghan asylum seekers trapped at its border with Belarus illustrate this hardline stance. The president of the European Council Charles Michel and EU Home Affairs Chief Ylva Johansson both confirm the priority is to secure European borders. 

This is further backed up by the European Council’s latest set of Conclusions on Afghanistan which focuses on security and ‘preventing illegal migration’ while avoiding reference to any domestic asylum efforts or the establishment of protection pathways for Afghans. 

This disconnect is not new. At the national level, reports of illegal pushbacks on European land and sea borders alarmingly intensified in 2020 as authorities intercepted and sent migrants back to neighbouring countries without assessing asylum claims. 

At the EU level, development aid to countries such as Afghanistan has long been conditional on their governments’ adherence to the bloc’s migration objectives of preventing asylum seekers from reaching European borders and facilitating the repatriation of those refused asylum in Europe. 

But this latest displacement crisis from Afghanistan exposes clear inconsistencies in European approaches to asylum and humanitarianism. Migration remains a divisive issue in European politics, but European governments must act promptly to support Afghans already residing in their territories alongside establishing robust international commitments.

Time for concrete action

European countries should firstly improve the treatment of those Afghans currently in limbo within their respective asylum systems by expediting pending Afghan asylum applications and family reunification cases, re-examining rejected asylum applications, and facilitating integration.

Secondly, national authorities should not return asylum seekers to Afghanistan or any third countries deemed ‘safe’. For Europe to coordinate evacuations from Afghanistan while simultaneously deporting asylum seekers undermines the international refugee regime and threaten Europe’s global credibility. 

How do Eurasian kleptocracies earn and use their money? 9 November 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 October 2021 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the presence of corrupt funds from Eurasia in Western democracies, what they are used for, and how they can be constrained.

The Pandora Papers once again shone the spotlight on the UK being home to corrupt funds from kleptocracies, where the ruling elite abuse their political power for private gain.

In recent years much focus has been placed on this term, and the possible effects such money could have on Western democracies.

• How do such states create this wealth in the first place?
• How do these funds make their way to the UK?
• Is the term kleptocracy appropriate for the majority of countries in Eurasia?
• What evidence is there that such funds are ‘weaponized’ to achieve foreign policy goals?

This event discusses the term, how it can be applied, and the differences between how ’grey’ funds are used by various countries. It also highlights how the UK and the wider international community can counteract these flows, both from a legal point of view, and via other methods.

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Limited expectations as Scholz heads to Kyiv and Moscow Expert comment NCapeling 14 February 2022

After heavy criticism for an initially timid response, the approach of Germany’s new government to the Ukraine crisis is improving as its position on Russia evolves.

Olaf Scholz is a famously quiet and cautious communicator and, as concerns mounted in Washington and London about the possibility of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the new German chancellor remained silent.

This time his silence reflected the fact that his government was unprepared for its first major foreign policy test, with marked divisions between the SPD and the Greens on how to manage a rapidly deteriorating relationship with Russia.

When he did speak, Scholz caused dismay in several NATO capitals by defending the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline. He called it ‘a purely private economic project’ even though the company building the pipeline is a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned Gazprom.

The absence of crisis management from Berlin was a stark reminder of the gap left by Angela Merkel. Her knowledge of Russia and Ukraine, and her personal experience of dealing with Vladimir Putin, were key assets in 2014 in developing a unified western response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of south-eastern Ukraine.

Germany has coordinated with its allies

Scholz has prepared the ground carefully for his visits to Kyiv and Moscow, extensively coordinating with NATO allies, such as France and Poland – as part of the Weimar Triangle – and the three Baltic states. His inaugural visit to Washington helped align positions on US-EU efforts to develop an economic deterrent against further Russian intervention in Ukraine.

Scholz has also repeated Merkel’s language from 2014 to signal to Moscow that Germany and its partners are ‘united and determined’ to stand their ground. And he has spoken of Germany’s continuing double strategy of ‘clear announcements’ to Moscow of the price it would pay for further aggression accompanied by a readiness to use all possible channels of dialogue to preserve peace.

The continuation of Germany’s established policy will not surprise Moscow. But under the surface Germany’s discourse on Russia is evolving as the political class internalizes the fact that the current Russian leadership is openly threatening to use military force to impose its will on Ukraine and re-configure Europe’s security arrangements.

Despite deep concerns about Germany’s dependence on Russian gas – more than half of the gas it consumes comes from Russia – there is broad acceptance that Nord Stream 2 cannot go ahead if Russia invades Ukraine. But typically, Scholz has not yet said as much publicly, limiting himself to stating ‘all options are on the table.’

Robert Habeck, Germany’s vice-chancellor as well as economic affairs and climate action minister, says the ‘geopolitical situation’ requires Germany to diversify its gas supplies and infrastructure for importing gas. For years, a strong pro-Russian gas lobby has dominated the thinking of the Economics Ministry and one consequence is the complete absence of facilities to import liquefied natural gas.

The German debate on Russia is shifting

A public debate has also started about weapons deliveries to Ukraine, even though this runs counter to deeply embedded pacifist tendencies in German society. Some MPs, former diplomats, and experts have begun to make the case for Germany to supply weapons to Ukraine so it can exercise its right to self-defence and deter military attack.

Christoph Heusgen, a former long-standing foreign policy adviser in the Federal Chancellery, says Berlin’s decision not to deliver arms to Ukraine to avoid endangering the Minsk peace process requires revision now Moscow has abandoned the path of negotiation.

Despite its mantra that there is no alternative to the Minsk Agreements, Berlin now admits these currently offer no prospect of resolving the war in Donbas because Russia is not prepared to implement them properly.

Other taboos are also being broken inside Germany. Heavyweight left-of-centre Die Zeit published the first results of its investigation into the SPD’s links with Russia and their place in Russia’s channels of influence in Germany. And even the SPD’s Sigmar Gabriel, an outspoken champion of Nord Stream 2 during his time as a government minister, has raised the question of Germany terminating energy imports from Russia if there is a drastic deterioration of the security situation.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.

Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees Expert comment NCapeling 30 March 2022

As European governments provide swift protection assurances to those fleeing Ukraine, non-European asylum-seekers continue to face violence at the EU’s borders.

One month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) already faces its largest refugee crisis since World War Two, with more than ten million people having fled their homes – 6.5 million displaced within Ukraine and 3.9 million escaping to neighbouring countries.

Acting quickly and decisively, European governments have opened borders and European citizens have opened their homes in an unprecedented showing of solidarity towards refugees. But, with all eyes on Ukraine, the Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey while Spanish police forcefully repel those who dare to jump the fence in Melilla.

The painful contrast exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees. With Europe’s grim history of restrictive asylum policies, it is wishful thinking that the warm welcome to Ukrainians will extend to all asylum-seekers. The EU solidarity to displaced Ukrainians illustrates the deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection.

However, the hope is this turning point in European history can at least set an important precedent for treating refugees more humanely. Undoubtedly, EU solidarity towards people fleeing the horrors of Putin’s war is critically important and the initial response is positive in its efforts to meet immense humanitarian needs.

Solidarity with Ukrainians

The EU activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is a significant step towards a more humane protection regime and fairer responsibility-sharing among member states. Without the need for the examination of individual applications, those fleeing Ukraine can access harmonized rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and access to the labour market and education.

The TPD is also a move away from the strict ‘Dublin’ rules which put the pressure of hosting refugees onto the countries of ‘first arrival’. Ironically, the fiercest opponents of intra-EU solidarity, such as Poland and Hungary, are the ones benefiting from this change now but, in the case of Ukraine, geographical proximity and shared histories must be considered when analysing Europe’s response.

Eastern European and Baltic countries share a post-Soviet history and fear of Russian aggression, and Ukrainians already enjoyed 90 days of visa-free travel in the EU – with a large diaspora, many have established networks across Europe. But even considering these distinctive connections with Ukrainian displacement, the initial response still shows that European countries have both the political will and the capacity to host refugees.

Unlike the usual – often media-fuelled – narratives of refugee ‘invasions’ into Europe, the waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards.

The EU has used agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya to prevent arrivals and outsource asylum responsibilities, while border violence, detention, and lengthy asylum procedures await the few asylum seekers who manage to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

These ‘fortress Europe’ legacies have even undercut the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with reports of incidents of discrimination towards people of colour at the EU borders being condemned by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), the media facing allegations of racist reporting, and comments from Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov providing a stark reminder of the islamophobia, racism, and history of colonization which still pervades European asylum policies.

Foreign policy also influences how EU leaders treat the right to asylum, as the geopolitics of Europe’s efforts to create a united front against Russian aggression is an undercurrent to the prompt European response to Ukrainians. But only a few months ago, non-European asylum-seekers trapped in freezing forests at the Poland-Belarus border were used as political pawns by Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka and then dehumanised as a ‘hybrid attack’ by EU leaders.

A turning point for asylum in Europe?

Despite entrenched discriminatory precedents, it is worth looking ahead at this moment of reckoning. Although policy changes remain far off, the unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system.

War on Ukraine: Exploring the humanitarian response to the conflict 12 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

This event explores the implications of the humanitarian realities from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the largest ground campaign in Europe since World War Two.

Reports from humanitarian organizations working in Ukraine are dire and reveal that a humanitarian disaster on an epic scale is unfolding.

The United Nations (UN) and other organizations estimate 12 million of Ukraine’s population are in need of assistance, 4.1 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and 6.4 million have become internally displaced.

Gillian Triggs, the assistant secretary-general and assistant high commissioner for protection at the UNHCR, joins other experts to discuss the humanitarian situation in Ukraine.

The panel considers:

• What are the greatest needs in Ukraine now?
• How can aid agencies meet those needs?
• What are the short and long-term implications of the crisis for Ukraine and Europe?
• How do international organizations work with local NGOs to provide food, medical aid and shelter?

This event is part of a regular series of events offering insight and analysis from experts and policymakers on how the war is affecting Ukraine, the region and the world.

This event is part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on the future of conflict.

Read the transcript

War in Ukraine: Can the EU survive without Russian oil and gas? Audio NCapeling 5 May 2022

The fourth episode of our podcast mini-series examines how reliant the European Union (EU) is on Russian energy.

What would an all-out ban on Russian oil look like? Which countries would be most affected? Does this offer an opportunity for renewable energy?

Clips used: Bloomberg News

This episode was produced by Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.

Interview: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

Belarus’s exiled democratic opposition leader tells Roxanne Escobales about her unexpected political career and President Lukashenka’s wavering support for Putin

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is the face of the Belarusian democratic movement. In 2020, she stood as a presidential candidate against Aliaksandr Lukashenka after her husband, an anti-corruption campaigner and the main opposition candidate, was arrested on the campaign trail and imprisoned. Lukashenka, autocratic ruler of Belarus for more than 30 years, was re-elected. Since then, Sviatlana has lived in exile in Lithuania meeting with western leaders and calling for regime change in her native land. Her husband Sergey remains in prison serving an 18-year sentence.

You have said in the past that there will be no free Belarus without a free Ukraine. How is the fate of the two countries connected?

The Kremlin wants to drag our countries into the past, and we are looking into a future which we want to choose for ourselves. The Kremlin doesn’t recognize Ukraine or Belarus as independent countries – it sees them as part of Russia. While the current regime is in our country, there will be a constant threat of aggression from Russia. But we are absolutely independent countries with our own languages, cultures and so on.

The fate of Belarus depends a lot on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it is evident. When Ukraine wins – and they definitely will win – it will mean the Kremlin is weak and that Lukashenka is weak. Every day we create multiple points of pressure on the regime from within the country, from outside the country. For countries like Ukraine and Belarus the support of strong democracies is very important.

It is very important for European society to understand that it is not just a war between Russia and Ukraine. It is a war between democratic values and dictatorship on the territory of Ukraine. It is very important for democracy to have a strong voice at the moment.

Recently Lukashenka said the war was taking too long. Do you think he understood what he was getting into when he supported Vladimir Putin by allowing his illegal invasion to be launched from Belarus?

The support between the Kremlin and Lukashenka has always been situational – it is not a real friendship. Lukashenka got huge political and economic support in 2020 after the protests, and now he owes a debt to the Kremlin and had to show his loyalty.

And we see how his rhetoric is changing because the situation in Ukraine is changing. At the beginning Lukashenka always said that, ‘Me and Putin will take Ukraine in three days’, and when this blitzkrieg failed, now he wants to get out of the situation. Now he wants to say, ‘Look, we are for peace. We didn’t have any intention to invade Ukraine.’ He wants to act like he is a peacemaker.

He only cares about his own interest, not his country or its people. He just wants to keep his power.

You have been living in exile in Lithuania for two years, and a lot has happened in that time. What is the state of the Belarusian democratic movement now?

We have been a grassroots movement since the first day. There is no leader who says you have to do this or that. My role is to work on the political level. My task is to go to the European Union, to the United States, and ask for packages to assist civil society. With this technical assistance from our democratic partners, we have managed to build structures in exile, and people in Belarus have managed to build structures inside the country.

Another task of mine is to inspire people, and to explain to the international community what is going on and to show them that Belarus is not just Lukashenka’s regime – it is people who want change.

I communicate with Belarusian people almost every day, especially those who are in the country. We have to keep close ties. It is important to understand how dangerous it is in Belarus to communicate on different channels like Telegram or even to subscribe to some media sources. But people do this. They understand the threats and the consequences, but their energy is still so alive.

We have to keep this energy strong and to give this assurance to people that in case something happens to them, or their families, they will get help from outside. This is how it works.

This struggle has come at a very personal cost to you and your husband, Sergey, who is in prison for his political activities. How is he doing?

I communicate with my husband through his lawyer, who visits him once a week. It has to be short messages because there is no privacy. Our children can send him letters and they receive letters back from him.

There are thousands of people like Sergey, and we have to take care of all of them. The treatment of political prisoners is much worse than criminals because they are like Lukashenka’s personal enemies. That is why it is so important to support human rights organizations who provide lawyers to political prisoners. It is important to fund support for them and for families of political prisoners.

You were a teacher when you took over your husband’s presidential campaign. If you could go back in time, what advice would you give yourself?

I would wish I could have had more confidence. I didn’t have any political experience – I was an ordinary woman and wife, the same as millions of other Belarusians. At the beginning, I didn’t feel confident because I didn’t know about politics. I didn’t know how to communicate with the political leaders of different countries. I was scared.

What motivated you to step into your husband’s shoes?

It was an accidental choice. It was terrible for my husband. But I saw millions of people on the streets, and when you see people standing shoulder to shoulder it inspires you. Every day thousands of people call me who want to help, and I understand that we are not alone. This motivates me.

Also, the fact that thousands of children want to see their mothers and fathers who are in jail gives me strength. When sometimes you think you can’t do this any more because it is so difficult, you think about those who haven’t seen their children for two years. It is awful.

So, every day, you find something that gives you a small energy and it doesn’t let you give up.

Central and Eastern Europe become hawkish on China Expert comment LJefferson 16 September 2022

The recent withdrawal of the Baltic countries from the ‘17+1’ format displays changing perceptions of China due to its ambiguity towards the war in Ukraine.

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine only confirmed Central and Eastern Europe’s views of Russia, it is also affecting their relations with China. Although the relationship was already complicated due to unfulfilled Chinese economic promises to CEE countries and growing indications of efforts to influence their domestic politics, China’s support for Russia is pushing Central and Eastern Europeans even further away.

This shift was highlighted, and formalized, recently by several countries in the region leaving the ‘17+1’ format, through which China cooperates with a group of countries from the region. The shifting attitudes towards China will also influence the relationship between the European Union as a whole and China.

A Trojan Horse that never was

When the format was launched in 2012 between 16 CEE countries at the time and China, the countries jumping on board expected a wave of Chinese investment and an opportunity to diversify mostly west-bound trade.

These hopes never fully materialized as Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in CEE has been generally lower compared to the rest of Europe and China never became an important export destination for any of the countries. The growing disillusionment and concern about Chinese security threats has led to some of the countries speaking up about the perceived perils of closer cooperation.

The first to withdraw from what had become ‘17+1’ by 2021 was Lithuania, which also took an interest in strengthening ties with Taiwan and allowed it to open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. This triggered a breakdown in the bilateral relations with China. As a retaliatory response, China blocked Lithuanian imports and imports from other EU states containing inputs from Lithuania, leading the EU to launch an official dispute at the WTO.

War in Ukraine

Since the invasion started, CEE countries have been dealing with large numbers of Ukrainian refugees, organizing shipments of military equipment to Ukraine, and at the same time worrying whether they could be next on Russia’s list.

However, the concerns and security environment that these countries face seems to be almost entirely disregarded by China. On the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, Xi and Putin signed the joint communiqué in which China backed Moscow’s demands to reverse NATO borders to the pre-1997 situation, completely disregarding CEE’s security interests.

China’s implicit support for Russia after the invasion has sowed deep mistrust of its respect for the sovereignty of other nations. The Chinese diplomatic apparatus clearly noticed this changing mood among CEE governments and sent a special envoy to eight capitals in April-May tasked with ‘eliminating misunderstandings regarding Russia-Ukraine conflict’.

However, the trip was not particularly successful. The delegation failed to secure high-level meetings, with the most prominent case being the Polish minister of foreign affairs declining to meet Huo Yuzhen, the Chinese Special Councilor for CEEC cooperation. Given that Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, was the only head of an EU state who attended the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony just before the Russian invasion in February, the change in attitudes is clear.

Following the envoy’s visit to the Czech Republic, the Czech parliament’s foreign affairs committee unanimously approved a resolution calling for the country to quit the ‘16+1’ format and the government is expected to act upon it in the near future. Meanwhile, Latvia and Estonia recently jointly announced that they would no longer be participating in the cooperation framework, turning it into ‘14+1’.

Why the UK must deliver on Nordic-Baltic security Expert comment NCapeling 16 December 2022

Hard choices are needed but it is crucial the UK provides security and leadership to its European partners given the wider context of the war in Ukraine.

The UK’s role in Nordic-Baltic security has been growing over the past decade. The region is key to core British strategic interest and engagement, and UK threat assessment closely aligns with long-held regional perspectives – the 2021 Integrated Review defines Russia as ‘the most acute threat to our security’.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK’s strong stance towards Moscow and the concrete steps taken to assist Ukraine and strengthen defence and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank have been widely appreciated in the Nordic-Baltic region.

The UK is seen as a reliable partner but, for it to continue to deliver in the region, difficult choices must be made with regards to UK defence spending and military capabilities, and London’s more global ambitions.

The UK is a major contributor to NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank, serving as a framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battlegroup in Estonia, and contributing to another battlegroup in Poland.

UK remains crucial to regional security

Coupled with its contribution to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission and maritime forces in the area, the UK is a crucial security partner both in the region and in a broader arch across Europe.

Over the past decade and a half, the UK has been developing a dense network of bilateral and minilateral relations in the region which are major assets in the current security environment.

It leads the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) which is a military cooperation format highly valued for its flexibility in responding to the needs of the participating nations – including non-NATO Sweden and Finland – and is increasingly focused on the North Atlantic, High North and wider Baltic areas. The UK has also seen increased bilateral defence cooperation with Norway, Denmark, Estonia, and other regional allies and partners.

There are reasonable expectations that Germany or France may at some point assume a greater role in this part of Europe, building on France’s participation in the EFP in Estonia, and Germany’s lead of the EFP in Lithuania.

However, while Paris remains more focused on NATO’s southern (and south-eastern) flank and building the European Union’s defence role, Berlin often underperforms as a leading or an organizing power of collaborative efforts across Europe.

Both also have a credibility problem in the Nordic-Baltic region due to their past policies towards Russia that occasionally reappear when discussing military support to Ukraine or how to treat Russia in the post-war European security order.

By contrast, the UK offers military capability, strong political will, a long-standing tradition of engagement in the Nordic-Baltic area, and fast decision-making.

The latter is exemplified by the bilateral security guarantees provided to Sweden and Finland during their accession to NATO, and the surge of assets sent to the region in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine such as an additional battlegroup and Chinook helicopters to Estonia, as well as forward-deployed elements of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to Latvia and Lithuania as part of the JEF.

Such pragmatic and resolute engagement help substantiate the UK’s post-Brexit claim that although it left the EU, it did not leave Europe. London also understands and facilitates the pivotal role that the US plays in European security – a shared perspective with the Nordic-Baltic partners.

Only the US – which has just recently decided to step up its military presence in the Baltics – has a greater appeal than the UK as a major ally. But Washington’s truly global responsibilities make it more difficult for it to play a regional leadership role.

With the context of the war in Ukraine, the centre of gravity of European security is moving east. The Nordic-Baltic region is likely to feature more prominently in the upcoming refresh of the UK’s Integrated Review, as the war in Ukraine and NATO’s new forward defence approach will focus UK attention and military capabilities on Europe for the foreseeable future.

But the UK still has limited resources and, despite the worsening security environment, there is currently no commitment by the Rishi Sunak government to increase defence spending beyond two per cent of GDP, as set out in the recently-published Autumn Statement.

This difficult fiscal reality contrasts UK ambition to also increase its footprint and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region highlighted by Rishi Sunak in his first foreign policy speech. London is already confronted with increasing expectations from its Nordic and Baltic partners, which are rattled by Russia’s aggression and seek more engagement and commitments from larger and more resourceful allies, and are insisting on prompt implementation of NATO’s new defence and deterrence plans.

This all comes on top of the resources that further assistance to Ukraine will require in the coming months and years. Balancing competing priorities and demands from partners is routine for a major power with global ambition but, in the current context, if the UK government fails to prioritize and increase resources, over-extension is in sight for its armed forces.

The war in Ukraine confirms that, beyond the rhetoric around the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, the Euro-Atlantic is – and will remain – the priority theatre of engagement for the UK. To keep delivering in the Nordic-Baltic region and remain a reliable partner, UK ambitions should be set clearly, and expectations managed with regional partners.

A good example is the recent UK-Estonia joint statement and defence roadmap, which is an attempt to reconcile London’s vision of modern deterrence with Tallinn’s preference for ‘more boots on the ground’.

The joint statement also clarifies initial misunderstandings regarding the upcoming withdrawal of the second UK battlegroup deployed to Estonia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – support Tallinn expected to continue ‘as long as necessary’ but London saw as temporary. It offsets the poor political ‘optics’ of the withdrawal while providing solid ground for deepening the common agenda in the near future.

By the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, progress on implementing the roadmap will be a crucial measure of success for the bilateral relationship, and for the UK’s broader regional role. It should serve as an opportunity for the UK to reflect on its force development priorities and balance, with Baltic partners arguing in favour of the UK rebuilding some mass in its armed forces and providing more resources to the land component.

Much to gain for the UK

The UK gains many benefits from deepening and widening its engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, and not only by showcasing its regional leadership at a time of dire need or having more weight in Europe and across the Atlantic in strategic debates about future security architecture.

Review: Rediscovering Milan Kundera’s European tragedy The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

The Czech writer’s 40-year-old essay on the roots of Russia’s empire-building, ‘A Kidnapped West’, reads all too presciently, writes Stefan Auer.

A Kidnapped West: The Tragedy of Central Europe
Milan Kundera, Faber, £10

‘In November 1956, the director of the Hungarian News Agency, shortly before his office was flattened by artillery fire, sent a telex to the entire world with a desperate message announcing that the Russian attack against Budapest had begun. The dispatch ended with these words: “We are going to die for Hungary and for Europe.”’ Thus, Milan Kundera began his 1983 essay for the French journal Le Débat, reflecting on the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.

A seminal essay

The Czech author might well have written a near-identical passage about the fraught hours immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In the event, Russian tanks failed to occupy Kyiv, unlike Budapest in 1956. Nevertheless, Faber has chosen this moment, 40 years later, to republish Kundera’s seminal essay on Europe and Russian aggression in its original translation for the New York Review of Books by Edmund White. How salient are its observations today?

The essay’s original French title, ‘Un Occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale’ (The Kidnapped West, or the Tragedy of Central Europe), described the fate of Hungary, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and, to an extent, Poland in 1980-81 at the hands of the Soviet Union. Owing to the Cold War division of Europe, the countries of Central Europe were denied their true destiny, Kundera thought, to be an integral part of the liberal, democratic West. Kundera himself fled Czechoslovakia for France in 1975.

The author of The Unbearable Lightness of Being might no longer be as well-known as he was at the height of his fame in the 1980s, but his novels and essays still deserve attention. So, it is pleasing to see Kundera’s masterpiece republished, even as it is awful to witness the enduring relevance of the questions it raises.

What did the Hungarian journalist mean when he declared his willingness to die for Europe, Kundera asked? That ‘Russians, in attacking Hungary, were attacking Europe itself. He was ready to die so that Hungary might remain Hungary and European’. The journalist did indeed die in the uprising.

It is a line that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his supporters abroad have echoed time and again: that Ukrainian soldiers are not just dying for their country, they are dying for Europe at large.

The ‘tragedy’ in Kundera’s essay was that the West didn’t care. ‘Europe hasn’t noticed the disappearance of its cultural home,’ Kundera wrote, ‘because Europe no longer perceives its unity as a cultural unity.’

In other words, as the cultural sphere in Central Europe continued to defy the political restrictions imposed by the Soviet empire, it embodied the western values of freedom and democracy more than the West itself did. The extent to which this analysis remains relevant today will prove decisive for Europe’s future.

As timely as ever

Kundera’s essay is as timely as ever but in ways that both vindicate and challenge his key arguments. His suspicion of Russia has been validated. His frustration about the indifference of the West less so. But the true tragedy of Ukraine would be if the West has not changed sufficiently. So far, the West appears to be doing enough to enable Ukraine to defend itself, but not enough to defeat the aggressor.

Faber has made an excellent decision in combining The Tragedy of Central Europe with a lesser-known text by Kundera: his 1967 speech to the Czech Writers’ Congress given the year before the ill-fated Prague Spring. In it, Kundera addressed what was to become a lifelong preoccupation: the fate of small nations. ‘For Czechs’, Kundera wrote, ‘nothing has ever constituted an indisputable possession – neither their language nor their belonging to Europe.’

Rather than reflecting the size of its territory or population, a small nation ‘is one whose very existence can be put in question at any moment; a small nation can disappear, and it knows it.’ In this way Ukraine, Europe’s largest country, apart from Russia, is fighting to avoid the fate of Kundera’s ‘small nation’.

Historically, the ‘small’ nations of Central Europe were threatened by both Germany and Russia. But after the Second World War, the threat was from the Soviet Union, which for Kundera was indistinguishable from Russia (tacitly including Ukraine). In its expansiveness, Russia was the opposite of Central Europe. While the latter was based on the principle of ‘the greatest variety within the smallest space’, the former represented ‘the smallest variety within the greatest space’.

In this sense, authoritarian communism was the fulfilment of Russian history, Kundera argued, writing that ‘Russian communism vigorously reawakened Russia’s old anti-western obsessions and turned it brutally against Europe’. Vladimir Putin’s Russia appears to build on these same pernicious impulses.

Kundera was widely criticized for observations in his essay that smack of civilizational racism (including by me) describing Russians as fundamentally different from us: ‘Russia knows another (greater) dimension of disaster, another image of space (a space so immense that entire nations are swallowed up in it), another sense of time (slow and patient), another way of laughing, living, and dying’.

Independent Thinking: Sweden, Finland, and NATO Audio NCapeling 31 March 2023

Episode 21 of our weekly podcast examines the latest developments relating to Sweden and Finland’s proposed accession to NATO.

The Hungarian parliament has finally ratified Finland’s membership to the NATO alliance, two weeks after President Erdogan in Turkey gave his seal of approval following a meeting with the Finnish president.

Sweden however remains trapped in limbo, with both Turkey and Hungary delaying Stockholm’s membership and Erdogan in particular asking for more concessions.

The panel discusses why Turkey and Hungary took issue with Sweden and Finland, what the strategic situation in the Baltic looks like now with only Finland joining NATO, and the challenges facing Sweden amid its fraught ties with President Erdogan.

We also look ahead to Turkey’s presidential election in May as recent opinion polls point to a neck-and-neck race, with some polls even showing President Erdogan falling behind the opposition. The panel examines what the sentiment is like in Turkey ahead of the election, and how the world would respond if there was a change in power in Ankara for the first time in 20 years.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week is Henri Vanhanen, research fellow with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and Galip Dalay, associate fellow with our Middle East and North Africa programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Virtual breakfast: The state of the EU in 2023 3 May 2023 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 5 April 2023 Online

In this breakfast discussion, we will explore the current state of play in the EU with one the most prominent experts on European politics.

While the European Union has come together in its response to the invasion of Ukraine, significant divisions remain on other issues. East-West tensions remain high and troublesome German-French relations are hampering the bloc’s traditional engine of integration.
 
Furthermore, the EU is pushing through legislation at breakneck speed, including in its attempts to kickstart green industrial policy with its responses to the American Inflation Reduction Act. At the same time, the main players within the EU continue to disagree on what the bloc’s fiscal rules should look like.

• What are the implications of the recent wave of protests in France against President Macron’s pension reforms?
• What is the outlook of EU-UK relations following the successful completion of the Windsor Framework?
• Where are the fiscal rules likely to land and when will they be back in place?
• Are we seeing the emergence of a new Central and Eastern European power bloc within the EU?

In short, despite having avoided an energy crisis over the winter, the EU continues to face significant challenges. In this breakfast event, we will explore the current state of play in the EU with one of the most prominent experts on European politics.