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Undercurrents: Episode 49 - EU Responses to COVID-19, and the Politics of Celebrity




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Undercurrents: Episode 50 - The Coronavirus Communications Crisis, and Justice in Myanmar




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Undercurrents: Episode 51 - Preparing for Pandemics, and Gandhi's Chatham House Speech




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Undercurrents: Episode 52 - Defining Pandemics, and Mikheil Saakashvili's Ukrainian Comeback




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Undercurrents: Episode 53 - Protecting Workers During COVID-19, and Food in Security in West Africa




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Undercurrents: Episode 54 - India's COVID-19 Tracing App, and the Media's Pandemic Response




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Undercurrents: Episode 55 - Benjamin Netanyahu's Trial, and the Identity Politics of Eurovision




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Undercurrents: Episode 56 - Uganda's Children Born of War




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Undercurrents: Episode 57 - Race in Westminster, and COVID-19 Expertise




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Undercurrents: Episode 58 - The Birth of a New America, and Remembering Rosemary Hollis




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Undercurrents: Episode 60 - Protecting Human Rights in Trade Agreements




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Undercurrents: Episode 61 - LGBTQ+ Rights, and China's Post-COVID Global Standing




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Undercurrents: Episode 62 - 100 Years of Chatham House




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Undercurrents: Episode 63 - The Politics of Violent Images




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Design in an Age of Crisis: The Search for Radical Solutions




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Design in an Age of Crisis: Rethinking Work and the Environment




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Design in an Age of Crisis: Rethinking Health and Society




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Thematic review series: Lipid Posttranslational Modifications. Protein palmitoylation by a family of DHHC protein S-acyltransferases

David A. Mitchell
Jun 1, 2006; 47:1118-1127
Thematic Reviews




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Thematic Review Series: Glycerolipids. DGAT enzymes and triacylglycerol biosynthesis

Chi-Liang Eric Yen
Nov 1, 2008; 49:2283-2301
Thematic Reviews




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Thematic review series: The Pathogenesis of Atherosclerosis The oxidation hypothesis of atherogenesis: the role of oxidized phospholipids and HDL

Mohamad Navab
Jun 1, 2004; 45:993-1007
Thematic Reviews




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Fish oils and plasma lipid and lipoprotein metabolism in humans: a critical review

WS Harris
Jun 1, 1989; 30:785-807
Reviews




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Regulation of hepatic secretion of apolipoprotein B-containing lipoproteins: information obtained from cultured liver cells

JL Dixon
Feb 1, 1993; 34:167-179
Reviews




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Thematic review series: Brain Lipids. Cholesterol metabolism in the central nervous system during early development and in the mature animal

John M. Dietschy
Aug 1, 2004; 45:1375-1397
Thematic Reviews




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Thematic review series: The Pathogenesis of Atherosclerosis. Effects of infection and inflammation on lipid and lipoprotein metabolism mechanisms and consequences to the host

Weerapan Khovidhunkit
Jul 1, 2004; 45:1169-1196
Thematic Reviews




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Thematic review series: Adipocyte Biology. The perilipin family of structural lipid droplet proteins: stabilization of lipid droplets and control of lipolysis

Dawn L. Brasaemle
Dec 1, 2007; 48:2547-2559
Thematic Reviews




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Lipid rafts: bringing order to chaos

Linda J. Pike
Apr 1, 2003; 44:655-667
Thematic Reviews




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Quantitation of atherosclerosis in murine models: correlation between lesions in the aortic origin and in the entire aorta, and differences in the extent of lesions between sexes in LDL receptor-deficient and apolipoprotein E-deficient mice

RK Tangirala
Nov 1, 1995; 36:2320-2328
Articles




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Lipoprotein lipase and lipolysis: central roles in lipoprotein metabolism and atherogenesis

IJ Goldberg
Apr 1, 1996; 37:693-707
Reviews




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The amphipathic helix in the exchangeable apolipoproteins: a review of secondary structure and function

JP Segrest
Feb 1, 1992; 33:141-166
Reviews




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Undercurrents: The Oversight Board's Trump decision, and Merkel's legacy

Undercurrents: The Oversight Board's Trump decision, and Merkel's legacy Audio bhorton.drupal 25 June 2021

Was Facebook right to suspend Trump? And how will Merkel be remembered?

In the wake of the storming of Capitol Hill on 6 January 2021, social media platforms took steps to remove former President Donald Trump from their websites for infringing community standards. This step was welcomed by many, but also raised serious questions about the power of social media companies to limit free speech and censor elected officials. The suspension of President Trump from Facebook was referred to the Oversight Board, an independent body of experts set up to scrutinise the platform’s content moderation decisions.  

In this episode, Ben speaks to Thomas Hughes and Kate Jones about the outcome of the Oversight Board’s inquiry into the Trump suspension, and the wider implications for content moderation on social media.  

Then Lara is joined by Hans Kundnani to assess the political outlook in Germany and reflect on the legacy of outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel.  




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Counter-terrorism measures and sanctions: How to avoid negative consequences for humanitarian action?

Counter-terrorism measures and sanctions: How to avoid negative consequences for humanitarian action? 9 September 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 July 2021 Online

Exploring current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

Counter-terrorism measures  address broad forms of support to terrorist acts. Their expansion, internationally and domestically, has given rise to new points of friction with international humanitarian law. Unless the measures include adequate safeguards, they  can impede humanitarian action. Country-specific sanctions imposed for other objectives, such as ending conflicts or protecting civilians, raise similar challenges for humanitarian action. 

These problems are not new, but solutions at international and national level remain elusive. 

At this panel event, which marks the launch of a new Chatham House research paper, panellists explore current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

  • What are the current dynamics and developments at Security Council level?  
  • What are the opportunities now that the UK is developing its independent sanctions strategy? 
  • What challenges do counter-terrorism requirements in funding agreements for humanitarian action  pose? 
  • What is necessary to make progress?




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Protecting universal human rights: Imagine a better world

Protecting universal human rights: Imagine a better world Explainer Video NCapeling 19 November 2021

Short animation examining why protecting and defending human rights ensures an equitable response to humanitarian crises and addresses economic inequality.

Human rights are not policies that can be overturned, they are not granted by governments. They belong to everyone as human beings.

For the most part, states are meeting their commitments to defend and protect universal human rights. But increasingly some governments are beginning to shy away from their obligations, and some are even actively seeking to subvert human rights.

And the regional and international bodies created and charged with defending these rights are being challenged by the rise of new powers and political movements.

Chatham House is built on big ideas. Help us imagine a better world.

Our researchers develop positive solutions to global challenges, working with governments, charities, businesses and society to build a better future.

SNF CoLab is our project supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) to share our ideas in experimental, collaborative ways – and to learn about designing a better future.




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Transatlantic Tech Talks: Cooperation or sovereignty?

Transatlantic Tech Talks: Cooperation or sovereignty? Audio bhorton.drupal 15 December 2021

A new mini-series from Undercurrents explores international cooperation on regulating the tech sector.

Transatlantic Tech Talks is a three part mini-series on the Undercurrents podcast feed, produced with the support of Microsoft, which explores the state of international cooperation on digital governance between the United States, the UK and Europe.

As technological innovation accelerates, and new digital tools and business models arise, governments are working to develop a framework of regulations to safeguard the rights and interests of their citizens. Not all stakeholders agree, however, on the best way to achieve this. While some advocate a ‘digital cooperation’ approach based on transparency and data-sharing, others are more concerned with maintaining ‘digital sovereignty’.

In the first episode of this series, Ben is joined by Casper Klynge, Harriet Moynihan and Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, who set out the broad context for these debates. They assess where the major government, private sector and civil society actors stand on the question of digital governance, and how they are approaching the international negotiations.




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Humanitarian exceptions: A turning point in UN sanctions

Humanitarian exceptions: A turning point in UN sanctions Expert comment LJefferson 20 December 2022

The UN Security Council has adopted a cross-cutting exception for humanitarian action in UN sanctions. What does it cover? What must happen next?

The UN Security Council has removed an obstacle to humanitarian work. On 9 December 2022, it adopted a resolution establishing a cross-cutting exception to existing – and future – UN financial sanctions for funds or assets necessary for humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs. In a coup for multilateralism, the council has been able to act, even when the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused paralysis in other areas.

Whilst sanctions are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for civilian populations, aid agencies have argued for years that they do just this.

Resolution 2664 – introduced by Ireland and the US, co-sponsored by 53 states, and adopted by 14 votes in favour, with India abstaining – is the culmination of a decade of engagement between humanitarian organizations and states to find ways of avoiding the adverse impact of sanctions on the most vulnerable: people relying on humanitarian action for survival.

A reminder of the problem

Whilst sanctions are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for civilian populations, aid agencies have argued for years that they do just this. UN financial sanctions prohibit making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to designated persons or entities. Without adequate safeguards, incidental payments made during humanitarian operations, or relief consignments that are diverted and end up in the hands of such persons or entities can violate this prohibition.

Exceptions in Afghanistan and Haiti sanctions pave the way

Humanitarian actors have been decrying and documenting the impact of sanctions on their operations for years. Ensuring that sanctions did not hinder the COVID-19 response was a turning point in states’ willingness to address the issue.

The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan called for a more radical approach.

Movement at Security Council level was gradual, starting off with demands in the renewals of certain country-specific sanctions that measures taken by member states to give effect to them comply with international law. The return to power of the Taliban called for a more radical approach.

In December 2021, the Council adopted a broad exception to the Afghanistan financial sanctions, covering the provision, payment and processing of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian action and for activities to meet basic human needs. A similar exception was adopted – almost unnoticed – in October 2022 in the newly-established Haiti sanctions.

These developments, coupled with the determination of elected Council member Ireland to find solutions, paved the way for the adoption of SCR 2664.

The scope of the humanitarian exception

SCR 2664 introduces a clear and broad exception that addresses the key challenges financial sanctions pose to humanitarian action. The exception expressly refers to the different ways in which funds or assets are allowed to reach designated persons or entities: by the provision of goods or payment of funds by humanitarian actors themselves; by the processing of funds by financial institutions; and by the provision of goods and services by other commercial actors whose services are necessary for humanitarian action such as insurers and freight companies.

SCR 2664 introduces a clear and broad exception that addresses the key challenges financial sanctions pose to humanitarian action.

The exception is broad in terms of the excluded activities: the provision of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs. The UN Somalia sanctions – the first, and for a decade the only, regime to include an express exception – exclude funds necessary for ‘humanitarian assistance’.

SCR 2615 on Afghanistan added the expression ‘activities to meet basic human needs’.  These go beyond humanitarian assistance, and have been interpreted as including activities necessary to sustain essential social services such as health and education, preserve essential community systems, and promote livelihoods and social cohesion.  These are essentially development programmes.  ‘Activities that support basic needs’ should be understood in a similar manner in SCR 2664.

SCR 2664 is not, however, a ‘blanket’ exception.  It only applies to financial sanctions.  These are not the only type of restriction in UN sanctions that can hinder humanitarian action. For example, organizations that send commodities into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must still go through the notoriously slow procedure of authorization by the sanctions committee.  Similarly, authorizations are still required for import of demining materials that fall within the scope of arms embargoes.

Opportunities for further engagement and additional safeguards

Recognizing that additional challenges remain, SCR 2664 requests the UN Secretary-General to draft a report on unintended adverse humanitarian consequences of all types of restrictions in UN sanctions. He is asked to include recommendations for minimizing and such unintended consequences, including by the adoption of additional cross-cutting exceptions.

Humanitarian organizations have played a pivotal role in advancing the agenda. SCR 2664 is the result of their relentless engagement with the Security Council. It is not the end of the road. Other restrictions raise problems, and the Council has left the door open to finding ways of addressing them.

Humanitarian organizations have played a pivotal role in advancing the agenda. SCR 2664 is the result of their relentless engagement with the Security Council.

Humanitarian actors should seize this opportunity to provide information, identifying the problematic types of restrictions and their consequences on their operations as specifically as possible.

What happens next?

It is UN member states that implement UN sanctions. For SCR 2664 to be truly effective, it is imperative that states give effect to it in domestic law and practice. In doing so, they must not narrow the scope of the exception.

Recent experience in Afghanistan has shown that even in situations when significant safeguards exist, key actors may be unaware of them or unclear as to their precise scope. Financial institutions in particular are fast to de-risk when sanctions are imposed, and remain wary of conducting transactions that they perceive as high-risk even though exceptions permit this.

For SCR 2664 to be truly effective, it is imperative that states give effect to it in domestic law and practice. In doing so, they must not narrow the scope of the exception.

OFAC – the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the US Treasury – has issued extensive guidance on the Afghanistan sanctions in the form of frequently asked questions.  These have played an extremely important role in ensuring full advantage is taken of the exceptions.

States should follow this example, and adopt guidance to raise awareness of the exception in SCR 2664 and to clarify its scope.

A valuable precedent for autonomous sanctions

SCR 2664 only applies to sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council. It does not extend to autonomous sanctions adopted by states or relevant international organizations such as the EU.





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Building better polymerases: Engineering the replication of expanded genetic alphabets [Molecular Biophysics]

DNA polymerases are today used throughout scientific research, biotechnology, and medicine, in part for their ability to interact with unnatural forms of DNA created by synthetic biologists. Here especially, natural DNA polymerases often do not have the “performance specifications” needed for transformative technologies. This creates a need for science-guided rational (or semi-rational) engineering to identify variants that replicate unnatural base pairs (UBPs), unnatural backbones, tags, or other evolutionarily novel features of unnatural DNA. In this review, we provide a brief overview of the chemistry and properties of replicative DNA polymerases and their evolved variants, focusing on the Klenow fragment of Taq DNA polymerase (Klentaq). We describe comparative structural, enzymatic, and molecular dynamics studies of WT and Klentaq variants, complexed with natural or noncanonical substrates. Combining these methods provides insight into how specific amino acid substitutions distant from the active site in a Klentaq DNA polymerase variant (ZP Klentaq) contribute to its ability to replicate UBPs with improved efficiency compared with Klentaq. This approach can therefore serve to guide any future rational engineering of replicative DNA polymerases.




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Flexible Distribution Systems: New Services, Actors and Technologies

Flexible Distribution Systems: New Services, Actors and Technologies 4 September 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 31 July 2018 Chatham House, London

The pace of the energy transition is accelerating. Solar and wind are dramatically falling in cost and displacing fossil fuel generators. Simultaneously, the rapid uptake of electric vehicles and battery storage systems are beginning to send shock-waves through the electricity sector.

As the proportion of distributed energy resources (DERs) connected to the distribution network grows, a significant opportunity is beginning to present itself. What if the concerns of renewable integration and associated costs could be solved by the smart integration of these DERs?

By properly valuing the services DERs can provide, actively managing the distribution system and creating new market places, might a truly renewable electricity system capable of supporting the electrification of heat and transport be possible?

During this roundtable, Andrew Scobie, CEO of Faraday Grid, will provide an overview of the challenges and opportunities faced within the distribution network and explain why the current system is no longer fit for purpose.

This is the inaugural event in the Energy Transitions Roundtable (ETR) series.




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Cities as climate leaders: Progress and ambition

Cities as climate leaders: Progress and ambition 1 December 2021 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 November 2021 Online

This panel discusses the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally.

Cities are critical to tackling the pressing environmental challenges of our time. While they now account for an estimated 75 per cent of global CO2 emissions, cities also offer a unique opportunity for devolved leadership on climate action. At the recent COP26, some significant progress was made in elevating cities’ position on climate action with a flurry of announcements and commitments.

For example, more than 1,000 cities are now committed to the Cities Race to Zero and C40’s Clean Construction Declaration saw multiple cities committing to at least halving emissions from initial construction of buildings by 2030. A raft of financing commitments were also made to improve urban resilience in the face of climate change.

This builds on existing momentum before COP26. Over 50 world cities are now on track to meet Paris Agreement and the Marrakech Partnership is further enabling collaboration between governments and cities within the UNFCCC processes.

Therefore, how we design, build, govern and use our urban places will be a key factor for decarbonization and climate change adaptation.

On the back of COP26, this panel brings together leaders from across urban development sectors to discuss the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally. 




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The Rohingya Crisis: Three Years On

The Rohingya Crisis: Three Years On 17 September 2020 — 1:30PM TO 2:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 September 2020 Online

Speakers examine the current situation of the Rohingya people and assess the threat that COVID-19 poses to the health and human rights of refugees and displaced people.

It has been three years since a military-led crackdown forced more than 740,000 Rohingya to flee across the border into Bangladesh to escape collective punishment and violence in Myanmar.

Most refugees have sought shelter in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district, where access to clean water is limited, sanitation facilities are lacking, and due to overcrowding, social distancing is impossible.

While the number of reported COVID-19 cases has so far been relatively low, testing capacity remains limited and anecdotal reports from humanitarians suggest that COVID-19 has spread extensively through the refugee camps and the Bangladeshi host community.

The speakers also consider the different approaches taken by neighbouring states, regional and international organizations in responding to the crisis.

What can be done to address the needs of refugees in the short term and how can fundamental human rights be restored and protected during the time of COVID-19? What aid provision has been successfully delivered within Rakhine State and in what ways?

Ahead of elections in Myanmar in November, how can the international community persuade the Myanmarese government into positive action? And what would a sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis look like and what are the competing views over how such a solution should be delivered?

This event is held in partnership with The Atlantic Council.




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The 2020 Inner Mongolia Language Protests: Wider Meanings for China and the Region

The 2020 Inner Mongolia Language Protests: Wider Meanings for China and the Region 24 November 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 November 2020 Online

Speakers discuss the historical roots of the language issue, as well as the wider significance of the protests in China.

Please note this is an online event. Please register on Zoom using the link below to secure your registration.

In September thousands of people protested in Inner Mongolia in opposition to a government move to replace Mongolian language with Standard Mandarin in three school subjects – history, politics and Chinese language.

Announced less than a week before the start of the new school year, the policy also requires schools to use new national textbooks in Chinese, instead of regional textbooks. The mass protests and classroom walk-outs reflect ethnic Mongolian’s anxiety that their native language may be eliminated. What has the government’s response to the protests been?




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Rational group algebras of generalized strongly monomial groups: Primitive idempotents and units

Gurmeet K. Bakshi, Jyoti Garg and Gabriela Olteanu
Math. Comp. 93 (), 3027-3058.
Abstract, references and article information





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Algebraic solutions of linear differential equations: An arithmetic approach

Alin Bostan, Xavier Caruso and Julien Roques
Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 61 (), 609-658.
Abstract, references and article information




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Ski resort announces immediate closure as relentless threat brings fewer visitors and increases debts: 'I feel like I'm in mourning'




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Emerging Economies: Where is the Debt Problem?

16 July 2020

David Lubin

Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme
Just two months ago it appeared self-evident that emerging economies faced a devastating inability to service their foreign debt, mostly denominated in dollars. That has turned out to be wrong, for now at least.

2020-07-16-India-Banking

Yes Bank branch of Malcha Marg, in New Delhi, India. Photo by Vipin Kumar/Hindustan Times via Getty Images.

Back in April, nervousness about external debts reached its peak when highly-respected economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff suggested emerging economies with less than a AAA credit rating be offered a moratorium on all their external debt service payments.

Although such a proposal might make sense if emerging economies were actually facing any serious shortage of access to foreign exchange, it is a difficult case to make. What we should worry about is not the external debt of emerging economies, but rather the large increases in government debts denominated in their own currencies.

In the first six months of 2020, borrowers from emerging economies issued more than $400 billion of Eurobonds to international investors, up by one-fifth over the same period in 2019. Most of these bonds were sold by borrowers with relatively high credit ratings, but many of the poorest countries do not fear for their access to international capital markets - largely because the US Federal Reserve increased global supply of dollars to a point where their availability is beyond question.

Much of the panic about emerging economies’ external debt comes from ‘sticker shock’ - the bald fact that developing countries’ external debt rose by $4.1 trillion in the decade to 2018 generates much hand-wringing.

But the increase in gross external debt of developing countries looks a lot scarier than the net increase in debt, which sets off a country’s foreign assets - mostly foreign exchange reserves - against its liabilities. And it is net that counts.

At the end of 2018, foreign exchange reserves covered 70% of the external debt of low and middle income developing countries - much lower than a decade ago, when that coverage was above 100%. But in the 1980s and 1990s – two decades of financial instability largely because of excessive foreign debt – the coverage was 15%. By that measure, we are far from crisis territory.

Complacency about the external debt burden of developing countries is quite wrong. But, if complacency is misplaced, so is panic.

The debt growing most worryingly is the domestic debt of governments. There are large, systemically important emerging economies who will suffer eye-watering increases in public debt this year thanks to a combination of collapsing GDP and the fiscal effort needed to save lives.

In Brazil, public debt is rising from 75% GDP last year to a level that could top 100% in 2020. South African public debt is rising from just over 60% last year to something close to 80% GDP. These are truly unprecedented levels of debt.

So why worry about a government’s domestic debt? These are debts which are denominated in these countries’ own currency. So surely the central bank can just print the currency needed to repay their obligations if more conventional solutions – such as tax increases – will not work.

But it is one thing for the US Federal Reserve to increase supply of dollars on a massive scale, since the world is hungry for them - it is quite another thing if emerging economies do the same with their currencies which almost entirely lack the many attractions of the dollar. That remains the currency of the pre-eminent global superpower whose capital markets offer legal certainty and depth of liquidity. And other highly developed economies have a similar privilege.

And yet printing money – in effect, asking the central bank to finance budget deficits – does seem as though it could become a more attractive option for many emerging countries. Importantly, international fund managers have lost interest in buying bonds issued by emerging economy governments in their local currencies. Just a few years ago, foreign investors owned more than 40% of South Africa’s public debt. That has fallen sharply to 30% and is unlikely to rise.

Monetising budget deficits was once anathema, since it was routinely associated with uncontrolled rates of inflation - bad news not only for firms trying to decide whether to invest but also for the poor, who suffer disproportionately when inflation accelerates.

Right now there are emerging economies – such as Indonesia – whose central banks lend directly to the government, and the sky has not fallen in. The rupiah has been remarkably stable this year. However, there are other examples – Argentina, Turkey – where central bank financing of government deficits has been associated with uncomfortably high inflation rates.

This needs careful watching. The biggest risk is the accumulation of public debt threatening longer-term growth. If firms stop investing because they worry about the risks to the value of their currency as domestic public debt explodes, emerging economies will have a tough time growing their way out of these debts.

It could be this, rather than the external debt of emerging economies, that is the biggest risk to the post-coronavirus economic environment in the developing world.




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US-Cuba Sanctions: Are They Working Yet?

20 August 2020

Dr Christopher Sabatini

Senior Research Fellow for Latin America, US and the Americas Programme
The recent spate of sanctions limiting US travel to Cuba announced by the White House and the news that the Cuban regime has re-opened US dollar stores have sharpened the question: do sanctions work and when? Central to that question is how would they work?

GettyImages-1207671309.jpg

A taxi driver wears a face mask while driving tourists around Havana on 19 March 2020. Photo: Getty Images.

It’s easy to take a look at the array of economic and diplomatic punitive policies that the sanctions-happy Trump administration has slapped on individuals and countries from Argentina to Iran and conclude that they have failed to achieve their objectives. With US oil sanctions on Venezuela, trade sanctions on select Argentine, Brazilian and Canadian exports and the tightening of the US embargo on Cuba, sanctions have become a go-to tool of the current administration.

Have they worked so far? Some have. Some haven’t. All of this leads to a legitimate question: when do they? The most extreme example, the US embargo on Cuba – first imposed by executive order under the Trading with the Enemy Act in 1961 and then codified into law by the Cuba Democracy Act (1992) and Libertad Act (1996) passed by Congress – has failed miserably, but remains an article of faith among its advocates, the bulk of them in southern Florida. The 1992 Democracy Act and 1996 Libertad Act have failed to produce either democracy or liberty in Cuba… yet their potential efficacy persists in the collective imaginations of their supporters. Why?

Conditions on Cuba

Any policy needs to have an explicit goal and with it an implicit or explicit theory of change. Whether it’s advertising that smoking kills on cigarette packages or trade negotiations, these efforts have behind them an explicit idea of the change they seek to foster and the causal relationships to achieve them. These are testable and, in theory, subject to course correction if they are not meeting their intended goals. Has advertising reduced the incidence of smoking?  Are workers better paid and receiving better health benefits and labour protections under the trade agreement several years on?

None of those has applied on the US’s embargo on Cuba. First, the policy goals have changed. In some cases, it has been stated that the limitations on US commerce and travel to the island is to reduce the regime’s international support for autocratic regimes. But Cuba’s to-the-death support of the Nicolas Maduro government in Venezuela has demonstrated this isn’t working. 

Arguably it has had the opposite effect: by impoverishing the state-centered Cuban economy, the embargo has made the regime more dependent on the decreasing oil that Venezuela supplies the island nation. In other cases, the stated goal has been regime change as the titles of the 1992 and 1996 act titles reveal.

The latter even lays out a set of conditions that must be present in Cuba before the Congress can lift the trade and diplomatic isolation the US has imposed on the island unilaterally. Those include the release of political prisoners, the absence of any Castro family members from decision-making, and credible steps toward free and fair elections. 24 years after the passage of the Libertad Act, Cuba is no closer to achieving not just one but any of those goals despite the putative incentive of a full and complete lifting of the embargo.   

The question here is the implicit theory of change for the embargo. Here, embargo supporters have never been clear about this link. First, there is the implied hope that sanctions will impose such costs and suffering on the general population that the masses will rise up and shake off autocratic rule of their overlords.

There are several problems with this. One is that general sanctions that reduce access to foodstuffs and finances – as has been the case in the US embargo on Cuba and sanctions on Venezuela – lowers the incentives for protest. It concentrates the government’s political and economic control over the population rather than weakening it. More, people who are hungry living under a repressive government simply aren’t that likely to rise up; they are often more concerned with the day-to-day struggles of getting by.

Second, there is a naïve notion that either those in power or those around them will see the light of day and decide to step down. Promoters of sanctions often have a cold-eyed reality of the nature of evil of autocratic governments. So why do they believe in some hidden decency among its inner circles? In truth, the purveyors of this view deny the basic and laudable basis for their hatred of autocrats: their bottomless cruelty and disregard for their own people. 

Do sanctions work? 

There is also a growing body of research on the efficacy of sanctions. Comparative research has revealed a number of conclusions, none of which appear to have been considered by current policymakers in the White House or State Department.  

The first of these is that sanctions work when they are implemented broadly by a wide coalition of governments. Most of the sanctions that have succeeded in their intentions have been along those lines including the UN sanctions on Iran to push the country to a nuclear deal.  

The second is that the goals of sanctions should be narrow and clearly defined. Successful cases, as Daniel Drezner who wrote a book on the topic has detailed, have been tied to specific goals. Regime change is not one of those. It is too broad and amorphous – though as I say above also unrealistic in its logic between intended effect and the targeted individual. 

A third element of successful sanctions is keeping them flexible and credible. As detailed in a Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder ‘the target must believe that sanctions will be increased or reduced based on its behaviour.’ 

That’s never been the case with Cuba sanctions under the Democracy or Libertad acts. Instead, sanctions relief is presented as a binary choice: democracy or nothing. There are no provisions for intermediate steps that could potentially incentivize changes of behaviour toward loosening state control and reducing human rights abuses.  

The recent tightening of the US embargo that included restrictions on US travel to Cuba and financial transactions under the Trump White House has been disconnected from any specific policy changes in the island. In this case, human rights conditions that the changes were linked to or intended to punish had not taken a dramatic turn for the worse. They were instead intended to simply ratchet up pressure for an embargo which advocates felt was too leaky and hope for a collapse that would weaken the Maduro regime.

That is precisely the problem for many of the most strident advocates of the US-Cuba embargo: the policy has become the objective, divorced from on-the-ground realities and incentives to move them forward.  There is the legitimate concern that the sanctions hurt the very people that the policy claims to defend. They also serve as a rallying point for the Castro regime and a way to cover up for its own economic failures.  But the most damning indictment of the embargo is that in its almost 50-year history it has failed to achieve its objectives.

If the matter is the efficacy of sanctions, then the US embargo on Cuba does not meet the test. It’s not limited to Cuba. None of the cases of regime change that many of the embargo advocates love to cite, communist Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and South Africa had embargos as tight or isolating as those imposed on Cuba for nearly half a century. There’s a reason for that. It’s basic logic.

A version of this article will also appear in Spanish in the journal Foro Cubano in September.  




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Power for refugees: Electricity

Power for refugees: Electricity Audio bhorton.drupal 16 May 2022

A new podcast special explores an often-overlooked aspect of humanitarian assistance: access to energy.

From Afghanistan to Ukraine to Sudan - the world is grappling with the consequences that emerge when people are forced to flee from their homes. One factor that does not usually make the headlines is that many people displaced by conflict or natural disasters lack access to the energy services that are necessary for forging dignified lives and livelihoods. 

This first episode of a two-part Undercurrents special examines efforts to electrify refugee settlements in Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda, shedding light on what has worked and what has not. Approximately 94% of forcibly displaced people living in these settlements do not have access to electricity to heat or cool hospitals, schools and dwellings, or to light streets.

Since 2015, Chatham House has been researching this issue and convening dialogues to spur action by humanitarians, energy companies and others. Our seminal Heat, Light and Power report provided the first ever comprehensive assessment of access to energy in refugee camps and urban areas with high numbers of refugees.

This two-part podcast is part of the Renewable Energy for Refugees project. Led by Practical Action, the project provides access to affordable and sustainable sources of renewable energy, and improves the health, wellbeing and security of refugees and neighbouring communities.




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Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa

Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Europe’s ‘gas grab’ in Africa is just the latest abuse of its relationship with the continent, says Catherine Fieschi.

When Emmanuel Macron made one of his first visits to Africa as France’s recently elected young president in 2017, his speech at Ouagadougou University in Burkina Faso was designed to set the tone for a new relationship between his country and African countries. 

‘There no longer is a French policy for Africa,’ he said.

This was a signal away from ‘la Françafrique’, with its post-colonial accents and the propping up of regimes friendly to France, to something that was more strategic, equitable and transparent – more partnership and less tutelage. 

And Europe seemed to be following suit. In March 2020 the European Union and Africa decided that they would redefine their relationship. The European Commission unveiled its vision for a ‘comprehensive strategy with Africa’. The roadmap would give Africa significantly more say over the nature and extent of the relationship, more choice and more political agency.

Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another when it comes to Africa

But what, today, is left of these aspirations? Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another. 

Earlier this year, after the long-awaited 6th annual EU-African Union summit in Brussels, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa was frank when he summed up the gap between stated ambitions and the current relationship. The pandemic-weary Global South had reason to be wary. Ramaphosa laid out missed opportunities, disappointment and the low expectations that act as self-fulfilling prophecies. 

Europe’s changing focus in Africa 

From the apparent high point of the Ouagadougou speech, Macron has now turned to the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in Africa for geopolitical purposes. His primary aim is to combat the rise of Islamist militants and terrorism in the Sahel as well as to tackle the growing influence of China and Russia in the region. 

Russian inroads – via the security firm Wagner in Mali, for instance – have given France further cause to use the OIF to counter destabilization activities. Both the United Kingdom and France train African military in the Sahel, but now, with the end of France’s anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane in Mali, the subsequent withdrawal of French troops and the increasingly established presence of the Wagner group, the security situation in the region is expected to deteriorate dramatically and become increasingly impermeable to European interests and forces.

As for development aid, Britain’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy makes no bones about the fact that Asia is now a priority over Africa.

The relationship between Africa and Britain is being transformed as a result, most obviously through the cuts in development aid, with African aid cut by 66 per cent in 2021. But the nature of the relationship, which has become both more conditional and more transactional, has also changed. 

The UK is emphasizing human rights and ‘free societies’, but also pushing for free market principles rather than the kind of state involvement that some African countries often prefer as a road to accelerated and more autonomous development. 

The future of energy exports and COP27

The issue of energy exports points to what will most likely trigger the greatest disappointment in the next few years – climate and climate finance. 

Green energy deals, like the $8.5 billion COP26 package from the EU, United States and UK to South Africa, look far more problematic now in the light of Europe’s African gas-grab. Indeed, Europe is importing as much African gas as it can after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia reduced supplies. Yet African countries are still being told to curb their own use of ‘dirty’ energy. 

As an illustration, Nigeria holds 3 per cent of the world’s gas reserves, but has barely tapped them, while 40 per cent of its output is exported to Europe. In April, Italy closed deals to buy gas from Angola and the Republic of Congo, while Germany did the same with Senegal.
 

At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries pledged an annual $100 billion in climate finance to developing countries for both adaptation and mitigation. But pledges have never really materialized. The aid agency Oxfam estimates that only about a third of the money has been delivered. Climate finance was again the main focus of COP26 – and dismissed by Greta Thunberg as more ‘blah, blah, blah’.

This series of repeated resets, pledges and disappointments tells a story – indeed, several stories. First and foremost, it is one of arrogance and betrayal. That much is obvious. But it is also a story about stories – about how the narratives elaborated by various European countries and leaders never amount to more than a sum of transactions. 

Climate change places Europe, and other rich nations, at a crossroads in its relationship with Africa: the former holds the wealth, but also some of the keys and threats to the transition. COP27, to be held in Egypt in November, will be the next chapter in the story. 




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Diagnostic Radiopharmaceuticals: A Sustainable Path to the Improvement of Patient Care




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Modeling PET Data Acquired During Nonsteady Conditions: What If Brain Conditions Change During the Scan?

Researchers use dynamic PET imaging with target-selective tracer molecules to probe molecular processes. Kinetic models have been developed to describe these processes. The models are typically fitted to the measured PET data with the assumption that the brain is in a steady-state condition for the duration of the scan. The end results are quantitative parameters that characterize the molecular processes. The most common kinetic modeling endpoints are estimates of volume of distribution or the binding potential of a tracer. If the steady state is violated during the scanning period, the standard kinetic models may not apply. To address this issue, time-variant kinetic models have been developed for the characterization of dynamic PET data acquired while significant changes (e.g., short-lived neurotransmitter changes) are occurring in brain processes. These models are intended to extract a transient signal from data. This work in the PET field dates back at least to the 1990s. As interest has grown in imaging nonsteady events, development and refinement of time-variant models has accelerated. These new models, which we classify as belonging to the first, second, or third generation according to their innovation, have used the latest progress in mathematics, image processing, artificial intelligence, and statistics to improve the sensitivity and performance of the earliest practical time-variant models to detect and describe nonsteady phenomena. This review provides a detailed overview of the history of time-variant models in PET. It puts key advancements in the field into historical and scientific context. The sum total of the methods is an ongoing attempt to better understand the nature and implications of neurotransmitter fluctuations and other brief neurochemical phenomena.