After undergoing surgery in late June to repair a torn left labrum in his left shoulder that required nine anchors to be inserted to keep everything in place, Zack Cozart is healthy and looking for a bounce-back season with the Angels.

The Angels announced their Minor League coaching staffs on Saturday, including former Major League catcher Lou Marson being named the new manager of Triple-A Salt Lake and former big leaguer David Newhan as the new skipper at Double-A Birmingham.

The Angels added a veteran lefty reliever, as Dan Jennings officially signed a Minor League deal on Saturday and joined the club for workouts at the club's Spring Training complex. Jennings will earn $1 million, plus incentives, if he makes the club.

Angels first baseman Albert Pujols met with the media for the first time this spring on Sunday and said he's fully healthy after undergoing arthroscopic surgery on his left knee in late August.

Mike Trout and owner Arte Moreno met separately with the media on Monday, but neither would confirm that extension talks have begun between the Angels and Trout's agent, Craig Landis.

The Angels have a new closer in Cody Allen and there isn't any manager in baseball who knows him better than Indians skipper Terry Francona.

VOLUME 279 (2004) PAGES 33438–33446For Fig. 1B, the second, third, and fifth panels were mistakenly duplicated during article preparation as no yeast colonies were observed in these conditions. The corrected images are presented in the revised Fig. 1B. This correction does not affect the results or conclusions of the work. The authors apologize for the error.jbc;295/50/17382/F1F1F1Figure 1B.

VOLUME 289 (2014) PAGES 6604–6618In Fig. 4G, in the foxi1 panel, the images in Fig. 4G, i and l, corresponding to “smad1 MO” and “smad5 MO + samd1/9 mRNA” samples, respectively, were inadvertently reused during figure preparation. This error has now been corrected using images pertaining to each treatment and sample. This correction does not affect the results or conclusions of the work.jbc;295/52/18650/F4F1F4Figure 4G.

Political Opposition and Policy Alternatives in Zambia 31 October 2017 — 10:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 19 October 2017 Chatham House, London

In Zambia’s 2016 national election, the Patriotic Front (PF) was re-elected by a narrow margin. The PF’s Edgar Lungu secured 50.35 per cent of the vote according to the Electoral Commission of Zambia, narrowly avoiding a second round, while his main rival, Hakainde Hichilema, won 47.67 per cent. The UPND, led by Mr Hichilema, alleges electoral fraud and has challenged the result in the courts and through direct protests. Mr Hichilema was imprisoned for 100 days.

At this meeting, Hakainde Hichilema will discuss his UPND priorities, how to strengthen opposition parties and their role in Zambia’s democratic future.

Read transcript

POSTPONED: Zimbabwe Futures 2025: Financial Sector Expansion and Policy Priorities 15 November 2017 — 9:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2017 Harare, Zimbabwe 

This roundtable will draw on current best practice and senior level expertise to identify policy options for financial stability and sector growth. A depoliticized analysis of the development agenda will highlight requisite conditions and prospective policies for a business-driven roadmap to the economic recovery of Zimbabwe, with a specific focus on the financial sector.

Participants will discuss macro-economic policy and stability, retail banking products and services, fintech, mobilizing domestic finance for national infrastructure and balancing consumer price index and inflation.

This event is being held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club.

PLEASE NOTE, THIS EVENT HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Business Development in Madagascar: How to Enable Entrepreneurialism 15 November 2017 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 November 2017 Chatham House, London

How Influential Is China in Zimbabwe? Expert comment sysadmin 20 November 2017

A trip to Beijing by Zimbabwe’s military chief was a ‘normal military exchange’, China’s foreign ministry said after the army seized power in Harare. Alex Vines examines the extent of China’s influence in Zimbabwe.

The news that General Constantino Chiwenga had visited China only a few days before the military takeover in Zimbabwe was a coincidence that did not go unnoticed. There was also speculation after China said it was closely watching developments, but stopped short of condemning President Robert Mugabe’s apparent removal from power.

China is Zimbabwe’s fourth-largest trading partner and its largest source of investment - with stakes worth many billions of pounds in everything from agriculture to construction. Zimbabwe is the dependent partner - with China providing the largest market for its exports and much needed support to its fragile economy.

China’s relations with Zimbabwe are deep, starting during the Rhodesian Bush War. Robert Mugabe failed in 1979 to get Soviet backing, so turned to China, which provided his guerrilla fighters with weapons and training. Both countries formally established diplomatic relations at Zimbabwean independence in 1980 and Mugabe visited Beijing as prime minister the following year. He has been a regular visitor since.

For years, Zimbabwe’s officials have tried to play off China against the West, advocating the country’s ‘Look East’ strategy, particularly following the introduction of EU sanctions in 2002. Indeed, a decade ago, Mugabe told a packed rally at the Chinese-built national sports stadium in Harare: ‘We have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where the sun sets.’

China’s military engagement also deepened during Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ era. Significant purchases were made, including Hongdu JL-8 jet aircraft, JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, vehicles, radar and weapons. However, following a controversy about a shipment of arms in 2008, Beijing decided to list Zimbabwe for ‘limited level’ military trading.

Despite Zimbabwe’s efforts, the ‘Look East’ strategy did not bring the investment flood hoped for and a decade later, in August 2015, Mugabe openly asked for Western re-engagement in his ‘state of the nation’ address.

Now, the reality is that increasingly Chinese and Western interests - particularly those of the UK - have become aligned. Not far from each other in the outer suburbs of Harare, two of the biggest embassies in Zimbabwe are the British and the Chinese. As other embassies scaled down or closed, Beijing’s expanded. Whereas British diplomats were well connected with business, civil society and opposition figures, the Chinese invested in ‘technical support’ of the party of government Zanu-PF, including state security and the presidency. When it came to Zanu-PF politics and factionalism, Chinese diplomats were well connected and insightful and, like their Western colleagues, concerned about stability, a better investment climate and adherence to the rule of law.

President Xi Jinping visited Zimbabwe in 2015 and President Mugabe visited Beijing in January 2017. In public, the Chinese leader said his country is willing to encourage capable companies to invest in Zimbabwe. But in private, the message was that there would be no more loans until Zimbabwe stabilized its economy.

In 2016 trade between the two countries amounted to $1.1 billion, with China the biggest buyer of Zimbabwean tobacco and also importing cotton and various minerals. In return Zimbabwe imported electronics, clothing and other finished products. Chinese state construction firms have also been active, building infrastructure including Zimbabwe’s $100 million National Defence College. And last year China agreed to finance a new 650-seat parliament in Harare.

But Chinese diplomats and many businesses are waiting for better days in Zimbabwe. Some companies have found the investment climate challenging - being burned on diamonds, for example - and have looked for alternative markets. A couple of weeks ago I was in China, attending a meeting on China-Africa relations and Zimbabwe was not mentioned once. Unlike Ethiopia, Sudan, or Angola that are strategic partners, or big markets like Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, Zimbabwe is far from being Beijing’s new priority.

So, Beijing’s interest is in a better investment climate in Zimbabwe. A clear transitional arrangement resulting in elections for a legitimate government in Harare is as much in Beijing’s interest as London’s.

The ‘Look East’ and the ‘Re-engagement with the West’ strategies have not brought about the confidence and investment that Zimbabwe needs. What Zimbabwe requires is stable and accountable government - then investors from Asia, America and Europe will seriously consider that Zimbabwe has an investment future. This was the message that Mugabe received in Beijing in January. And the one which Zimbabwe’s military chief also was given last week.

This article was originally published by BBC News.

Mugabe’s Fall Is a Wake-Up Call for Africa’s Leaders Expert comment sysadmin 27 November 2017

The continent’s long-standing leaders will come under increasing pressure to demonstrate their societal value. Some will become more oppressive; others may conclude that their time has expired.

The end of the Mugabe presidency in Zimbabwe – with the swearing in of Emmerson Mnangagwa in Harare on Friday – is being watched closely across Africa, and especially by its long-standing leaders.

Currently, 30 per cent of African countries are ruled by long-standing rulers, defined as heads of state that have ruled for more than 10 years. Africa is not unique in this respect (Central Asia also has its share of ageing leaders), but Africa has a long tradition, and about a fifth of all African heads of state since independence can be classified as long-standing.

A recent study, African Futures: Horizon 2025, by the European Union Institute of Security Studies (and which this writer contributed to), shows that long-standing rulers in Africa are reducing in number. President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola stepped down voluntarily in September after almost 38 years in office, and Yahya Jammeh of Gambia was forced out after 23 years in office in early 2017. Robert Mugabe was forced out as leader earlier this week after 37 years.

This still leaves a cluster of other ageing leaders: Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea (38 years); Paul Biya of Cameroon (35 years); Yoweri Museveni of Uganda (31 years); Omar al-Bashir of Sudan (28 years); and eight others.

Many of them are coming under increased internal pressure. Demonstrations against Togo’s Faure Gnassingbé in Lome over the summer resulted in him agreeing that any future president could stand for only two terms. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Joseph Kabila is also under increased pressure to agree to elections, after 16 years in power.

Within all of this, there is a pattern of leaders in west and southern Africa adopting the principle of only serving two terms.

De-facto monarchies

Long-standing rulers still thrive in central Africa and its Great Lakes region. Presidents here have successfully changed constitutions to remain in office. They include Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. Zimbabwe will be a warning to them that they should not assume that they will be able to behave as de-facto monarchies, leaving office only after dying of natural causes and handing power over to their family.

Robert Mugabe’s intention to hand power to his wife, Grace, spectacularly backfired. As a couple of Zimbabwe military officials dryly commented: ‘Leadership is not sexually transmitted.’ Former president Hosni Mubarak in Egypt also miscalculated by trying to groom his son, although Ali Bongo Ondimba succeeded his father as president of Gabon after his father died. Equatorial Guinea is still heading for a crisis as President Obiang is grooming his deeply unpopular playboy son, Teodorin, to succeed him.

What Zimbabwe reminds us is that, with the exception of central Africa, there will be more long-standing leaders in Africa disappearing over the coming decade. This is due partly to pressure and partly to their ageing: 13 current long-standing rulers are aged between 65 and 84 years old. This means there will be more transitions taking place such as the one that occurred in Zimbabwe on Friday or the smooth one in Angola in September, when president dos Santos stepped down and handed power to João Lourenço.

This is good news for Africa, which has the most youthful and fastest-growing population in the world. It is the second-largest and second-most populated continent. More than 40 per cent of Africans are under 15, and 20 per cent are between 15 and 24. By 2050, one third of the world’s youth population will live in Africa, up from one fifth in 2012. This means a dramatic disconnect is developing between long-standing leaders and their population.

Generational politics was visible over the past week in Zimbabwe and in the end the older generation prevailed through military intervention. This is transitional politics, and there is likely to be more of it.

Increasing pressure

Other long-serving leaders like Museveni have watched closely. Museveni has already responded to shore up support of his military by giving them a significant pay rise. There is likely to be more investment in the military by Africa’s long-standing leaders in the coming months.

Change in Africa comes in fits and starts. The fall of Mugabe is a reminder that Africa is dynamic and change is occurring all the time. Africa’s long-standing leaders will come under increasing pressure to demonstrate their societal value. Some will become more oppressive; others may conclude that their time has expired and that they should welcome a transition.

This is the key lesson of Angola – where president dos Santos willingly retired after 37 years in power. Mugabe dreamed of dying in office and being succeeded by his wife – and was forced out by the military. I predict both models will be repeated in Africa in coming years.

This article was originally published in the Irish Times.

Tsvangirai Leaves an Important Political Legacy in Southern Africa Expert comment sysadmin 21 February 2018

The story of Zimbabwe’s ‘people’s champion’ offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

The death of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai is a loss for Zimbabwe. In nearly three decades of speaking truth to power, Tsvangirai helped to change his nation and the region.

Southern Africa’s new politics

His death marks a period of transition for regional governments and opposition parties alike. The Zuma era has ended in South Africa while Mozambique, Namibia and Angola have also seen political transitions, pushing modernization agendas to appeal to young citizenries that increasingly see politics in separate terms from the liberationist struggles of the previous generation.

Regional opposition movements also face winds of change: the longstanding opposition leader in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Etienne Tshekedi, passed away in 2017, and Mozambique’s Afonso Dhlakama and Kenya’s Raila Odinga are both aging. These movements similarly need to appeal to a younger audience or risk losing relevance.

From trade unionist to opposition leader

Tsvangirai’s career is an eloquent illustration of these challenges. Born in Buhera in rural eastern Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai worked in textiles and mining before politics – diverse experience which gave him crucial exposure to the lives of ordinary people across the country. In his early years, he also worked for ZANU-PF, before leaving to forge his own political path. He became increasingly active in mining politics, rising to the executive of the National Mineworker’s Union and, in 1989, to secretary-general of the powerful Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

In the late 1990’s, Zimbabwe was riven by questions over land, war veterans, the Congo conflict, a shrinking economy and growing doubts about ZANU-PF itself. Opposition leaders of the time could not answer them; those such as Edgar Tekere and Margaret Dongo struggled to win support beyond their local constituencies, and liberation leader Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU had been merged with ZANU-PF in the 1987 Unity Accord.

But in 2000, Zimbabwe’s ‘perfect storm’ of a divisive constitutional referendum, land redistribution and a June election made Tsvangirai and the newly minted MDC, formed in 1999, a national rival to ZANU-PF. Through subsequent national elections in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013, Zimbabwe remained polarized between competing visions of Zimbabwe future: ZANU-PF’s powerful black liberationist politics of identity and the opposition’s equally compelling liberal democracy agenda.

Tsvangirai’s achievement was to provide a credible alternative to liberation icon Robert Mugabe. Tsvangirai also resuscitated Zimbabwe’s tradition of urban nationalism, and was a successor to Benjamin Burombo and other mid-century Zimbabwean urban leaders. Tsvangirai would in turn be a touchstone for contemporary urban activists Evans Mawarire, Linda Masarira and others.

From opposition to coalition

The political struggle for Zimbabwe became global, with Mugabe and Tsvangirai both winning support from rival international power blocs. In March 2007, pictures of a beaten and bloodied Tsvangirai helped to galvanize support for the MDC in the 2008 elections. But the disputed result and violent subsequent run-off between Tsvangirai and Mugabe led the regional community to push both men into a coalition government, with Tsvangirai as prime minister.

Despite continuous ructions, the Government of National Unity (GNU) held, and stabilized Zimbabwe’s collapsed economy, until 2013. Although often politically out-manoeuvred by Mugabe, Tsvangirai deserves credit for getting the opposition a share of political power and for holding his nerve against many who wanted to collapse the GNU.

Tsvangirai was no saint; his complicated love life, and tacit approval of violent attacks on party dissenters, do him no credit. More importantly, the MDC neglected its grassroots supporters during the GNU, and paid the price in its comprehensive 2013 electoral defeat. But although diminished, Tsvangirai remained Zimbabwe’s most popular opposition politician, and the MDC’s new leaders will have quite a task ahead of them, even if they have been planning since his courageous 2016 public admission of colon cancer.

The MDC after Tsvangirai

Nelson Chamisa, one of the three MDC vice presidents, has now been appointed as acting president by the party’s national committee. Chamisa inherits a fractured and fractious party, and one which has also fallen out with the Tsvangirai family. The other two vice presidents, Thokozani Khupe and Elias Mudzuri, have also set their sights on party leadership.

At 40, Chamisa, an orator with grassroots appeal, has a huge task. With general elections due by July, he has to unite the party, counter Zimbabwe’s rising ethno-politics, prove himself as leader of a broader opposition coalition and take on a resurgent President Emmerson Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF.

Electorally, the opposition’s strongest card has always been the urban vote and the economy. But Mnangagwa has fast forwarded a comprehensive economic reform and internationalist agenda. This, and Mugabe’s exit, have forced Chamisa, Joice Mujuru and other opposition leaders to play catch-up. Zimbabwe’s elections, the first since 2000 without Mugabe and Tsvangirai as contenders, will be of global interest as the country navigates the new political dynamics.

The people’s champion

Morgan Tsvangirai’s resilience earned him respect from friends and foes alike, with Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga visiting him at home a few weeks ago. A former nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, Tsvangirai, popularly known by his totem of ‘Save’ and also called mudhara [the old man] deserves national hero status. He will certainly be remembered as the ‘people’s champion’, and a pioneer in bridging the generational and ideological fissures that have shaped Southern Africa’s politics.

With their leader now gone, the turbulent MDC will undoubtedly be hoping for a ‘remembrance vote’ in his memory to carry them through the elections. But beyond that, his story offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

Angola Forum 2018: 30th Anniversary of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale 23 March 2018 — 10:00AM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 March 2018 Chatham House, London

Reflections on Southern Africa’s Turning Point

23 March 2018 marks the 30th anniversary of the final assault of what became known as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

The confrontation between the Angolan army, supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union, and the armed opposition UNITA, supported by the South African Defence Force, is the largest land battle to have taken place in Africa since World War Two.

The battle was a watershed in Angolan and southern African history, but its significance continues to be contested. Today, although the battlefield has a monument and museum, it remains one of the most landmine-contaminated parts of Angola and this hinders development plans for international tourism.

This event brings together veterans and experts to contribute towards developing a deeper understanding of the battle. Discussions will further focus on the significance of the wider events around the battle, its regional implications, as well as the legacy of the battlefield.

Zimbabwe Ahead of the Elections: Political and Economic Challenges 8 May 2018 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 May 2018 Chatham House, London

The upcoming elections in Zimbabwe will be the first since 2000 in which former president Robert Mugabe and long-time opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai are not on the ballot paper. A key electoral issue for many voters will be the economy: recent years have been marked by high unemployment rates, chronic cash shortages and mounting public debt. Although this has traditionally been a strong campaigning issue for the opposition, President Emmerson Mnangagwa has fast-tracked comprehensive economic reforms.

At this event, Nelson Chamisa, MDC Alliance presidential candidate, will discuss his efforts to build a united opposition coalition with a strong message, the steps needed to ensure a free and fair election can take place, and the role that international partners can play in Zimbabwe’s democratic process.

Afonso Dhlakama’s Death Changes the Calculation for Peace Prospects in Mozambique Expert comment sysadmin 4 May 2018

If politicians continue to act in good faith, the death of the opposition leader may be a significant opportunity to finally draw a line under Mozambique’s long war.

The unexpected death of opposition and ex-rebel leader Afonso Dhlakama on 3 May is a game changer for Mozambique’s politics and an almost-completed peace process. The 65-year old Dhlakama, who died of a heart attack, had led Renamo for 38 years and had totally dominated his party. Dhlakama regularly boasted that he was Mozambique’s ‘father of democracy’, despite not allowing competition within his own party, and he leaves a legacy of more than 30 years of struggle, through both armed action and peaceful politics.

A long war

Originally Renamo had been a tool for the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa to challenge the socialist Frelimo political party that took power in Mozambique in 1975. But under Dhlakama’s command, by the late 1980s Renamo had become increasingly independent and rooted in Mozambique. After Renamo’s long war with Frelimo ground to a hurting stalemate, a transition led to Mozambique’s first multiparty elections in 1994, and the creation of a new joint army. A ‘pay and scatter’ programme successfully dispersed and reintegrated many thousands of ex-combatants.

But early post-election gains did not translate to lasting peace. Disarmament was a time-limited, technical process, and devoted declining resources and attention to clusters of ex-combatants that failed to disperse. In addition, Dhlakama was allowed to maintain an armed militia under the guise of a presidential guard.

Mounting economic inequality, notably in opposition strongholds such as central Mozambique, saw Renamo made political gains and Dhlakama nearly won the 1999 presidential elections. (Some believe he did.) The result focused Frelimo’s attention on the threat that Renamo posed and, ultimately, a strategy of pursuing total Frelimo domination across the country, culminating in a crushing Frelimo victory at the 2009 elections.

This humiliated and marginalized former Renamo rebels, resulting in Dhlakama ordering their return to targeted armed violence in 2013. Frelimo’s new leader, President Filipe Nyusi, took power in 2015 and sought direct dialogue with Dhlakama. Five rounds of internationally mediated peace talks took place from July to December. Finally, in late December 2016, Dhlakama announced a unilateral truce, which was extended twice and subsequently made indefinite.

New peace talks also started and, in August 2017 and February 2018, President Nyusi and Dhlakama showed the courage to meet in person, near Renamo’s base in central Mozambique, to build up mutual trust and discuss the details of the emerging peace deal – including the demobilization or integration into government security forces for Renamo’s now mostly middle-aged gunmen.

Dhlakama the ‘Big Man’

Dhlakama’s sudden death has fundamentally changed the negotiation dynamics. He never allowed for any serious succession planning, and ensured all key decisions were his and his alone. Renamo had already decided that he would be its presidential candidate for the 2019 national elections.

His party is significantly weakened by his death and unlikely able to fully recover – but needs to try and reach consensus quickly on a successor, as it will also compete in municipal elections in October and was expecting significant gains. There will be a number of contenders to succeed him including from the parliamentary wing, led by his niece Ivone Soares, its secretary general, Manuel Bissopo, and a few others.

But Renamo’s key leverage for now remains some 1,000 middle-aged gunmen in central Mozambique who have been stoically loyal to Dhlakama since the 1980s and who have little respect for the younger generation of professional politicians based in Maputo. Some may be bought off by government offers, others integrated into localised organized crime groups and others into internal Renamo sectarianism. The risk of fragmentation is real.

Renamo’s weakness could also embolden Frelimo hardliners to seek a return to unilateral domination of Mozambique’s political landscape, and to undermine the peace process. That would be a serious tactical mistake by Frelimo, as a lasting deal is close and the death of Dhlakama could actually assist in making this settlement lasting. Dhlakama was quixotic and prone to changing his mind, often influenced by the last person he spoke to – his death potentially introduces greater predictability in negotiations and in any post-deal implementation.

President Nyusi is clearly aware of this as he hailed on state television TVM that Dhlakama was ‘a citizen who has always worked for Mozambique’ and said he was distraught at the news of his death. He stated, ‘I hope that we as Mozambicans can continue to do everything so things do not go down.’ He also addressed Renamo’s support base by saying that ‘[Dhlakama] did everything so that there would be peace. The last time he spoke to me, he said he was not going to miss out anything in peace negotiations.’

Renamo’s gunmen are fatigued and want to retire with dignity but are vulnerable to manipulation and political miscalculation by Mozambican’s positioning politicians. International partners and investors can engage, by emphasizing that sustainable peace is the only pathway to poverty reduction and inclusive economic development.

This includes assisting development and reconciliation projects in areas impacted by the renewed conflict since 2013. Long-term investment for development in Renamo’s key constituencies could help avoid fragmentation at a critical time – faith groups and NGOs may also have a key role to play.

If Mozambique’s politicians continue to act in good faith, the death of Dhlakama may constitute a significant opportunity to finally draw a line under Mozambique’s long war.

Higher Education in South Africa: Demands for Inclusion and the Challenges of Reform 17 October 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London

Public Service, Accountability and Delivery in Malawi 17 October 2018 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 October 2018 Chatham House, London

Political Reform in Angola: Challenges and Priorities for Elected Officials 31 October 2018 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 October 2018 Chatham House, London

Angola’s reformulated National Assembly has passed a series of legislative reforms since elections in August 2017, in which the ruling MPLA won a majority of 150 seats to the 51 held by the UNITA leading opposition party.

Many of the changes have targeted the revitalization of an underperforming economy and improved governance: in June 2018 parliament approved a new private investment law aimed at diversifying Angola’s fiscal base beyond oil revenues while new legislation in May mandated the return of illicitly exported capital of over $100,000.

As the appetite for measurable progress across all sectors of society remains high, and with newly constituted municipal elections scheduled for 2020, inclusive and accountable political debate will remain critical to Angola’s future.

At the event, a cross-party delegation discuss the role of the National Assembly in affecting political change and the importance of maintaining open dialogue among opposing voices to address the challenges facing Angola.

Water, Energy and Development in Angola: From Ambition to Actuality 13 December 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 November 2018 Chatham House, London

South Africa After the Elections: Balancing Domestic and International Policy Priorities 16 May 2019 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 May 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government that emerges from the 8 May election in South Africa faces immediate domestic and international foreign policy demands. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to stimulate job growth, accelerating anti-corruption and good governance efforts are at the forefront of the new government’s agenda.

International ambitions will be upgraded such as UN security council reform, maximizing South Africa’s G20, BRICS and IBSA membership and preparing for South Africa’s chairmanship of the African Union (AU) in 2020.

At this meeting, the speakers – Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of SAIIA and author with Nobantu Mbeki of A Manifesto for Social Change: How to Save South Africa, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, chief executive of SAIIA and currently co-editing a volume on A South African Foreign Policy for the 2020s which will be published in 2019 – will reflect on the election and discuss the new government’s domestic and international policy agenda. The meeting will be chaired by Ann Grant, former British High Commissioner to South Africa (2000-05) with past experience working for Oxfam, Standard Chartered Bank and Tullow Oil.

Mine Action in Angola: Clearing the Legacies of Conflict to Harness the Potential of Peace Other resource sysadmin 14 June 2019

This publication draws on and updates the briefing note published following a meeting of the All- Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Angola on 26 April 2017. It also incorporates insights from a Chatham House Africa Programme conference session on the legacies of the Angolan Civil War, held on 23 March 2018; and draws on the Africa Programme’s research into conservation-driven development models in Southern Africa.

Almost two decades after the end of its civil war, Angola remains one of the most heavily landmine-contaminated countries in the world. The Angolan government has committed to clearing its landmines by 2025, and there is constructive collaboration between the government and mine clearing agencies in this endeavour, but the target will be achievable only if a decline in funding from international donors is reversed. International funding for mine clearance in Angola fell by more than 80 per cent between 2005 and 2017, and this sharp drop in external support has compounded the impact on domestic funding for national clearance efforts as a result of the downturn in prices for Angola’s main export commodities.

The national mine action agency, the Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária (CNIDAH), is supported by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the HALO Trust. By 2017, 15 years after the end of the civil war, these organizations had collectively helped clear 56 per cent of known landmine-contaminated land. State-led demining has focused principally on clearing areas designated for infrastructure projects. Now, it is critical that humanitarian demining in largely agricultural and conservation areas is prioritized to bring to an end the daily threat to Angola’s rural poor – as well as to the country’s livestock and wildlife – of injury or death as a result of landmine accidents.

Angola has some of the world’s most important remaining wilderness, including the tributary system for the unique Okavango Delta, and the country has the potential to host one of the most diverse wildlife populations on the continent. However, the presence of landmines and other remnants of the civil war render large areas of the country unsafe both for wildlife and for the local people, whose ability to derive a sustainable livelihood from their natural environment is fundamental to its protection.

Wildlife and tourism provide important economic opportunities for diversification beyond an oil-dominated economy. Critically, Angola’s economic diversification and development objectives can only be achieved if the landmines that prohibit access to land for agriculture, mining, tourism and wildlife are cleared.

There are economic opportunities for released land in the most heavily mined provinces of Cuando Cubango and Moxico. Already, some new funding for mine action in Angola, if upscaled or matched by international donors, could be transformative for its people, and for the conservation of the region’s vital biodiversity.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Policy Priorities for Industrialization, Agri-Business and Tourism 6 June 2019 — 9:30AM TO 1:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

Can Liberation Movements Really Rid Southern Africa of Corruption? Expert comment sysadmin 16 December 2019

Southern Africa’s national liberation movements have survived ‘end of decade’ elections across the region. Combating corruption has been at the heart of many of the campaigns, but the question is can they succeed?

Swapo’s victory in Namibia two weeks ago was the last in a series of recent ‘end of decade’ elections that have returned dominant parties to power across Southern Africa. However, the “enduring appeal of liberation” is wearing thin.

Experiences across the region show that if governments are to deliver on their electoral promises, they must empower institutions, actively promote a culture of accountability and transparency within their party ranks and pursue economic reforms that untangle the web of party-state-business alliances. Such actions are critical for the survival of national liberation movements as the dominant force in the politics of Southern Africa – but will be difficult to implement.

Avoid political factionalism

South Africa, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe all saw new presidents take over just before elections. All used the rhetoric of anti-corruption to distance themselves from the tainted image of their predecessors. But acting on this requires a shift in mind-set in parties that have always preferred to deal with their problems behind closed doors. High profile adversaries from past regimes make tempting targets but could also drive party divisions.

In Angola, the transition of power was safeguarded by an agreement that former president José Eduardo dos Santos would be immune from prosecution. But this week his son faced corruption charges before the country’s supreme court, a high-profile example of a wave of anti-corruption cases across Southern Africa, driven by dominant parties wary of their future.

The allegations against José Filemino De Sousa Dos Santos, nickname ‘Zenu’, include a $500-million fraud involving the country’s central bank. Pressure is also mounting on Zenu’s sister Isabel — once prominent in Angola, she is now absent from public life.

Other leaders have had to tread more carefully. Immunity was a luxury Cyril Ramaphosa was neither willing nor politically able to grant Jacob Zuma in South Africa. Reliant on a few close allies at the top of the party, Ramaphosa lacks foot soldiers at the grassroots level, and his campaign against corruption within the ANC has faced persistent opposition.

Rebuilding institutions and empowering authorities takes time, and with few high-profile cases to point to, people are getting restless. This is also the case in Zimbabwe, where a worsening economic situation has left policy reformers politically isolated.

Party, state, and business

Long term incumbency has blurred the distinction between the party and the state. Liberation movements have created vast party-linked business empires. Political allegiance grants access to economic resources through appointments to lucrative positions in state-owned enterprises, preferential bids for tenders and licenses, and direct access to decision makers.

In Angola, this was fuelled by oil revenues. In South Africa, state capture flourished in an environment where the ANC and its constituent elements had significant power on the panels that chose leaders for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In Namibia, an Icelandic fishing company paid backhanders to officials for fishing rights in what has become known as the ‘Fishrot’ scandal. Zanu-PF officials’ access to preferential foreign exchange rates present them with lucrative opportunities in Zimbabwe.

Ending this bureaucratic rent seeking goes beyond appointing ‘clean’ officials, which has been central to the anti-corruption campaigns in Angola and South Africa. Governments must also allow scrutiny of the state and empower those institutions designed for that role, such as the National Prosecuting Authority and the Public Protector in South Africa. Zimbabwe’s auditor general has published an in-depth report of the state of corruption in the country’s SOEs.

Companies must also be held to account for their role in aiding, and at worst directly benefitting, from state graft. International businesses have actively sought to benefit from corruption. They are now starting to face the consequences. A former Credit Suisse banker has pleaded guilty in the US over handling alleged kickbacks in Mozambique’s $2-billion “tuna bond” scandal. Global banks and consultancies continue to feel the squeeze for their complicity in state capture in South Africa.

Competition and pluralism

National liberation movements may only have a limited window within which to act. Across the region civil society campaigns and investigative journalists have shed light on some of the worst abuses of power. Anti-corruption campaigns are starting to bite. The state will continue to play a central role in Southern African economies, an important arbiter of economic transformation able to balance the region’s highly unequal and resource-dependent economies.

But opposition, civil society and the media are also critical for the progression towards democratic competition and pluralism in Southern Africa. Parliaments remain vital for holding rulers to account. Long used to unchallenged dominance, liberation movements have significant adjustments to make to rise to the challenge of a new era.

This article was originally published in the Mail and Guardian.

Angola's Business Promise: Evaluating the Progress of Privatization and Other Economic Reforms 21 January 2020 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Minister Nunes Júnior will discuss the progress of the Angolan government’s economic stabilization plans and business reform agenda including the privatization of some state-owned enterprises. These reforms could expand Angola’s exports beyond oil and stimulate new industries and more inclusive economic growth.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

POSTPONED: Pursuing Economic Reform and Growth in South Africa: the view from the African National Congress 18 March 2020 — 10:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 March 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government of South Africa is pursuing a programme of reform to revitalize the economy, strengthen institutions and combat corruption. The State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 13 February and the budget speech of 26 February represent the most significant articulation of the government’s economic strategy. Central to this is the government’s plans for the energy sector, which is fundamental for reviving the economy, and the reform of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). But questions remain about possible divergence of the approach taken by government ministers from the policy position of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and what this might mean for the sustainability and progress of reform.

At this event, Paul Mashatile, Treasurer General of the ANC, will discuss the party’s assessment of reform efforts to date and priorities for delivering on inclusive growth.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

COVID-19 in South Africa: Leadership, Resilience and Inequality Expert comment sysadmin 7 May 2020

In a world looking for leadership, South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa has been remarkable. One year after he carried the time-worn ANC through a national election, South Africans are crying out for more.

In the COVID-19 crisis so far, Cyril Ramaphosa has been widely praised for displaying the decisive leadership so many hoped for when they cast their ballot for him in May 2019. Buttressed by others such as health minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, and on a simple objective to prevent transmission, South Africa has been a lesson to the world. Act fast. Act hard.

Former president Thabo Mbeki’s disastrous response to the HIV crisis cast a long shadow over his legacy, and Ramaphosa has taken note. South Africa has had one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. No exercise. No cigarettes. No alcohol.

The lockdown was imposed when the country had only around 1,000 recorded cases and just two deaths. As a result, transmission from returning travellers has not yet led to an exponential infection rate within the community. The government’s swift reaction has bought much needed time with the peak now seemingly delayed to September or October.

Continental and national leadership

Ramaphosa has also emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses. As current chair of the African Union (AU) he leads the continental engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO), and the various international finance institutions, while South African officials are working with the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on a push for African debt restructuring.

He has also been active in trouble shooting to unlock external assistance to the continent, including from China and Russia. Appointing special envoys is typical of his boardroom-honed leadership style.

International and regional partnerships are vital for resilience and the arrival of 217 Cuban doctors to South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the liberationist solidarity of the Cold War era. And regional economies remain dependent on South Africa to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Following the 2008 financial crisis, it was South Africa’s regional trading relationships that remained robust, while trade with its main global partners in China and the US dropped.

Despite the plaudits, Ramaphosa remains vulnerable to challenge at home, notably around his failure to stimulate South Africa’s moribund economy. On the eve of lockdown, Moody’s joined its peers Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in giving South Africa a below investment grade credit rating. The move was a long time coming. Long mooted economic reforms were slow to materialise, and South Africa had fallen into recession.

Ramaphosa depends on a small core of close advisors and allies, initially united in apparent opposition to the kleptocratic rule of President Jacob Zuma and the deep patronage networks he created within both the party and the state. But this allegiance is being tested by economic reality. Support within the party was already drifting prior to the crisis.

Disagreements are not just technocratic – there are big ideological questions in play around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. Energy minister and former union stalwart Gwede Mantashe is wary of job losses, and minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan protective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before coronavirus hit, Ramaphosa seemed content to allow these policy disputes to play themselves out with little decisive intervention.

Slow progress on reform, against worsening economic performance, left Ramaphosa and his allies exposed. In January the president missed the UK’s African Investment Summit in order to assert control over a party meeting at which it was expected his detractors would seek to remove Gordhan.

COVID-19 has sharpened thinking

As the independently assertive - and eminently quotable - pro-market reformist finance minister Tito Mboweni stated, ‘you can’t eat ideology’. Accelerated reform and restructuring is required if the government turns to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance.

For the first time, Gordhan has been forced to deny a bailout to beleaguered state airline South African Airways (SAA), and the government’s lockdown bailout of R500 billion has been applauded by business. Much like the fiscal stimulus and recovery plan of 2018, it relies on smart spending, targeting sectors with high multiplier effects. It also includes significant reserve bank loans.

But it has been criticised for not doing enough to help the most vulnerable. There is considerable fear of what could happen when the virus takes hold in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements where social distancing is almost impossible, basic toilet facilities are shared, and HIV and TB rates high.

There are mounting concerns of the humanitarian cost of a prolonged lockdown, and the government has been faster than others in implementing a tiered lockdown system, trying to get people back to work and keep the economy afloat.

South Africa has been criticized by the UN for the use of lethal force by security forces in enforcing lockdown and, in a society plagued by corruption, there are fears legislation to stop the spread of false information could be used to restrict legitimate reporting on the virus response or other issues.

COVID-19 shines a spotlight on societies’ fault-lines worldwide. South Africa is often touted as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world but, in a globalized economy, these divisions are international as much as they are local.

Resilience comes from within, but also depends on regional and global trading and financial systems. South Africans and international partners have long recognised Ramaphosa’s leadership qualities as an impressive voice for the global south.

But he must also be an advocate for South Africa’s poor. This crisis could accelerate implementation of his landmark pro-poor National Health Insurance and Universal Health Care programmes. Or the hit of COVID-19 on top of South Africa’s existing economic woes could see them derailed entirely. Ramaphosa must push through economic reforms at the same time as managing COVID-19 and rebuilding trust in his government.

Mozambique’s Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement: One Year On 6 August 2020 — 2:30PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2020 Online

August 6, 2020 marks one year since the Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement was signed in Maputo. The agreement, signed by the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade, and witnessed by regional and international political and religious leaders, ended the return to conflict that started in 2013.

It also paved the way for Mozambique’s national elections in October 2019. Since the agreement, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won a landslide victory in the elections, weakening RENAMO, and a splinter group has conducted targeted armed violence in Manica and Sofala provinces. Yet, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process has made progress.

At this event, senior figures reflect on the peace agreement and the key factors of its success. The event also draws upon insights from the authors of recent publications on the latest peace agreement in the context of longer term trends of democratization and peace-building in Mozambique.

A Chatham House Africa Programme research paper published in August 2019, Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky?, examined how the deal was achieved. The Portuguese version includes the full text of the peace accord. Read the research paper in Portuguese or English here.

Zimbabwe’s Economic Governance and Regional Integration 17 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2020 Online

Panellists discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration in the context of the shocks caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

At this virtual event, panellists and participants will discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration.

The government of Zimbabwe has emphasized its commitment to economic reform and its ambition to achieve upper-middle-income status by 2030, but there are considerable challenges to overcome.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing economic fragility. Improving the business climate to attract international private-sector investment will be contingent on clear, consistent and coherent policy and implementation, including targeting abuse and corruption.

Zimbabwe has, in recent years, successfully strengthened its regional trade integration, although some trade frictions remain. This is an important factor not only for catalysing economic growth in Zimbabwe, but for supporting regional prosperity and post-COVID recovery.

This webinar is the second in a series of events held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic reform and recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Zambia’s political and economic reform and recovery 5 November 2021 — 11:30AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 November 2021 Chatham House and Online

At this event, HE Hakainde Hichilema, president of the Republic of Zambia, discusses his vision for Zambia’s development and long-term political and economic reform and recovery.

Zambia’s new administration, following the general elections of August 2021, faces a daunting challenge of reversing economic contraction, lowering income-eroding inflation, and addressing the unsustainable national debt.

The country has been one of the few to seek debt restructuring under the G20’s new Common Framework for Debt Treatments, and its immediate priorities include a prospective agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Young Zambians are eager for jobs and improved living standards. But the government’s ambition to create more jobs and achieve middle-income status will depend on both attracting new investment into its copper sector and pursuing a programme of economic diversification supporting growth beyond the mining industry.

Addressing these economic concerns will also need to be supported by a programme of political reform and rehabilitation of citizens’ trust in the state.

Angola forum 2022: Prospects for Angola's social and economic future 15 December 2022 — 1:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 November 2022 Online

At this online Angola forum, experts will discuss Angola’s social and economic future, and what to expect from 2023.

At this virtual Angola Forum, speakers will discuss Angola’s social and economic future and what to expect from 2023.

Angola experienced positive economic momentum in 2022 allowing it to exit its six-year recession, with the economy taking centre stage in the August national multiparty elections. Increased oil prices and high levels of production have driven Angola’s economic growth and improved macroeconomic conditions, as well as helping the country to reduce its public debt to 56.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (down from 79.7 per cent in 2021).

However, a global economic downturn in 2023, with increased inflation, means Angola’s re-elected MPLA government will need to focus on job creation, greater economic inclusivity and diversifying away from an oil-led economy. It will also require Angola to navigate its international partnerships more effectively in this era of heightened geopolitical rivalries.  

At this online Angola forum, experts will discuss Angola’s social and economic future and what to expect from 2023. Speakers will reflect on the social and economic trends seen in 2021-22 and explore election trends, human rights and international relations.

This Angola Forum is supported by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.