Chatham House’s annual London Conference looks at the big issues that confront the world at this key moment in history, and at how to design the new systems and institutions that will shape the international landscape of the future.

Speaker highlights     

• Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil (1995-03)
• Kevin Rudd, President, Asia Society Policy Institute; Prime Minister of Australia (2013; 2007-10)
• Yannis Stournaras, Governor, Bank of Greece; Minister of Finance, Greece (2012-14)     
• Børge Brende, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway      
• Sergey Karaganov, Foreign policy adviser to the Presidential Administration, Russia (2001-13)     
• Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General, NATO (2009-14); Prime Minister of Denmark (2001-09)     
• Dr Barham Ahmed Salih, Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan (2009-12); Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq (2006-09) 

This year's London Conference takes places ahead of the G7 summit in Germany.  The themes – demographic changes, urbanization, technological disruptions and resource constraints – are woven throughout the sessions. The aim is not only to discuss the major challenges that these issues present, but also ‘how’ and ‘by whom’ they should be addressed.

Panel discussions will include   

• The Changing Geopolitical Context: Reassessing Priorities and Approaches - In conversation with Kevin Rudd and Fernando Henrique Cardoso     
• What are the implications of the United States substantially retreating from its global leadership role?      
• How are new patterns and habits of digital connectivity changing relations between governments and their populations?     
• Can countries count on technological advances to deliver new routes to economic growth and social inclusion?     
• Is it more important to build national, regional or sectoral successes than to expect answers at the level of global governance?

Click here for full list of speakers >

Click here for full conference agenda >

 

Given the international context, it is in Britain’s best interests to treat Europe as the ‘inner circle’ of its foreign, security and international economic policy, argues Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, in a new paper.

The British government’s approach since 2010 of seeking to enhance the UK's relations with the world’s emerging powers while balancing these with relationships with the United States and Europe has had only limited success. With constrained resources, and in the face of intense global economic competition, mounting security challenges and decaying international institutions, trying to commit the UK equally on all three fronts will not succeed in the future.

Britain, Europe and the World: Rethinking the UK’s Circles of Influence calls for a different mindset and strategy towards the UK’s place in the world – one in which Britain is surrounded by three concentric circles of influence:

• The first or ‘inner circle’ is the EU, the region with which the UK’s relationships need to be strongest and most active.
• The ‘second circle’ consists of the protective and enabling set of economic and security relationships with the US.
• Finally, an ‘outer circle’ comprises the UK’s other key bilateral and institutional relationships.

Should the UK vote to remain in the EU, policy-makers should commit to placing the EU at the centre of Britain's foreign policy, using the country’s economic weight, diplomatic skills and networks to play a leading role in leveraging more effective EU-wide policies.
 
Should the country vote to leave, the UK and the EU would enter an extended period of dislocation before arriving at a new, mutually diminished settlement. British policy-makers would be forced to deal and negotiate with the EU on critical policy issues from the outside. It is hard to see, argues Dr Niblett, how that could lead to EU policies or an international context more in line with British interests.                          

Despite its structural flaws and competing national interests, the EU offers the best prospects for managing the rapidly changing global context, for three main reasons:

First, it allows the UK to leverage the EU’s global economic weight to enhance the UK’s economic interests internationally, including securing beneficial trade agreements and contributing to EU and global standard-setting and rule-writing. Conversely, leaving would require the UK to renegotiate over 100 trade agreements, and would disadvantage UK interests in EU markets, including making EU governments less likely to liberalize services.                          

Second, it gives the UK a say in designing new EU initiatives to strengthen both British and European security in the face of diverse threats, whether managing the flow of refugees and other emigrants; combatting terrorism; or managing a more assertive Russia and the fallout from a disintegrating Middle East.                          

Third, cooperating with other EU members offers a way of maximizing opportunities to find joint solutions to shared problems, whether in terms of responding to climate change; managing growing cyber insecurity; reversing the decay of governance in failing states; or combating the rise of dangerous non-state actors.

Dr Robin Niblett said:

‘Britain is likely to be richer, safer and more influential in the coming decades if it treats Europe as the ‘inner circle’ of its foreign policy. For a mid-sized country like the UK, being a major player in a strong regional institution can offer a critical lever for international influence. In the UK’s case, this means choosing to be a leading player in the world’s principal civilian power, the European Union.’

                          

European leaders need to implement common European solutions to the refugee crisis. Only joint solutions can credibly and effectively reduce the growing human suffering and social and political turmoil.

The refugee crisis poses a serious challenge, both to the welfare of refugees and to European societies. In 2015, more than 1.5 million migrants crossed into the European Union. From Italy to Poland, and from Greece to Germany, countries face immense challenges in responding to requests for humanitarian aid, asylum, and integration. The associated integration challenges in housing, language, work and welfare are already formidable. Failing to manage them properly poses serious threats to social cohesion and political stability.

European countries have had sufficient time to analyse and assess the long-standing challenges which created the current crisis. Now it is time to act – not individually and at the expense of others, but jointly and in a spirit of European solidarity. This is why Vision Europe – a partnership between seven leading think tanks and foundations in Europe – will in 2016 focus its efforts on providing practical solutions to the current refugee crisis, and its root causes. We, the seven signatories, writing in an individual capacity, see an urgent need for a common European approach, to compliment local and national efforts.

At present, there is no consensus among member states on how to respond to the crisis, neither on the objectives to be achieved or the methods to be used.  But disagreements on substance must be overcome now. Building on current discussions, we propose a comprehensive agenda at the EU level, with five major dimensions.

First, it is important to control the EU’s external borders so that only refugees fleeing war and persecution, who have a legitimate right to seek asylum, can enter and potentially remain in the EU. The porous nature of the EU’s external borders has meant an unacceptable loss of control in the eyes of many EU citizens and has raised false hopes for irregular migrants trying to enter the Union. The control of the borders of the Schengen Area should be a collective effort of the EU and all Member States, coordinated by European Institutions with professional staff and with financial support provided to Member States at the EU’s periphery. Regaining control of the EU’s external borders is essential to preserve open internal borders.

Second, beyond implementing the already agreed upon relocation of 160,000 refugees from Greece and Italy, the EU should develop a system which distributes a much larger number of refugees across the Union, directly from the hotspots in the EU and the neighbouring counties such as Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon. Member States not willing to host refugees themselves could choose to make a primarily financial contribution to the system. A Migration Solidarity Fund should be created to manage this compensatory system. Turkey’s efforts to reduce the crossings in the Aegean Sea should be matched by a willingness among EU Member States to take in refugees in an orderly manner. The Conclusions from the European Council seem to move in the right direction in this regard.

The third measure should be to improve, standardize and speed up the processes to determine asylum applications. The sooner refugees know whether they can stay, the more energy can be invested in their integration into host countries’ societies and in family reunions. The sooner a decision is taken, the fairer and more feasible it is to send back those whose requests are refused in full respect of international law and human rights. And EU members cannot afford to have vastly different standards in granting asylum status.  Under international law, there can be no limit set on the number of those eligible to request asylum.

As a fourth measure, we recommend expanding efforts at the EU level to improve the living conditions of refugees staying in countries close to their countries of origin. Many refugees want to return to their homes as soon as the situation becomes safe again. They should not be driven to start the hazardous journey to the European Union only because of unbearable conditions in the countries where they are currently sheltering.

Last but not least, the EU and its Member States should work vigorously towards ending the violent conflicts that are the principal causes of the crisis. Europe must invest heavily in the Syria peace process, in particular. The EU must also raise the ambition and resources of its Neighbourhood Policy, with a focus on helping to stabilise the region and on improving the living conditions and economic opportunities in the Southern neighbourhood.

But action is also required at the national level, especially in the EU countries where significant numbers of refugees have received or are expected to receive asylum. The distribution of refugees across municipalities and regions should be fair and should come with adequate support and resources from the national level, emphasising education and language training. The recognition of professional competences and support to enter the labour market should be available at a very early stage. Within our societies, we need a dialogue between refugees and the host society. It should be made clear that respect for human rights, democratic values and cultural norms is indispensable for a prolonged stay in the respective European host country.

Coming from seven European countries, with different national policies and approaches to the refugee crisis, the foundations and think tanks of Vision Europe are working together to advance new ideas, to frame an informed debate and to emphasize the benefits of common European solutions to Europe-wide problems. Europe is strong enough to manage the migration challenges, but only if political leaders act now, act responsibly and use the resources at their disposal, including support for civil society working in this area. We must not leave the public space to populists and nationalists offering false promises. Only a European solution will be workable and sustainable.

 

Aart de Geus
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Germany

Artur Santos Silva
President, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Portugal

Guntram Wolff
Director, Bruegel, Belgium

Mikko Kosonen
President, Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, Finland

Piero Gastaldo
Secretary General, Compagnia di San Paolo, Italy

Robin Niblett
Director, Chatham House, United Kingdom

Yves Bertoncini
Director, Jacques Delors Institute, France

Chatham House has been named Prospect magazine’s Think-Tank of the Year at a ceremony in the Houses of Parliament. The institute was also the winner in the UK categories for International Affairs and Energy and Environment. The quality, credibility and impact of Chatham House’s research was acknowledged for helping to create better understanding of key global phenomena at this critical time in world affairs. The judges commented that the institute’s work is ‘reliably excellent’ and a ‘gold standard of knowledge and professionalism’.  

Specifically, the US and the Americas and Asia programmes’ joint report Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US-China Narrative, by Xenia Wickett, John Nilsson-Wright and Tim Summers, was singled out for being an important resource to help explain the developing geopolitical relationship between the United States and China.

The Energy, Environment and Resources department’s livestock project was a major factor in their award in the Energy & Environment UK category, including the report Changing Climate, Changing Diets: Pathways to Lower Meat Consumption by Laura Wellesley, Antony Froggatt and Catherine Happer, which developed recommendations for how dietary change can be effected in different national and cultural contexts.

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House said ‘The integrity and authority of Chatham House’s research is needed more than ever and I am extremely proud of our staff and their work particularly during this difficult and challenging year in world affairs’.

His Royal Highness met with young fellows from the Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs and discussed the important role that the next generation of leaders must play in bringing about positive change in their communities. 

The Academy was formally launched by Her Majesty The Queen at Chatham House in 2014.

Prince Harry also contributed to the first scenario exercise held in the institute’s new simulation centre, which explored how to respond to a humanitarian emergency that required landmine clearance, drawing on the prince’s work in the field of landmine eradication.

The opening of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Floor marks a significant moment in the modern history of the institute and is a core component of the Chatham House Second Century Initiative, which aims to strengthen the institute’s capacity to innovate and meet the growing demand for its research in the lead-up to its centenary in 2020.

The extension includes a series of new facilities, including the Asfari Centre for Academy Fellows, the simulation centre, new meeting spaces and a media studio, which will ensure that Chatham House can continue to contribute to building a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world over the coming decades.

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For the past few months, users have been sharing their thoughts on our website on the future of democracy and the role of technology in it. Many have shared concerns about the effects of technological change:  

• Social media may be undermining the historic role of politicians to speak on behalf of their constituencies.
• Twitter favours brief writing and hence brief thinking, which may be leading to a deterioriation in democratic debates.
• The risk that the so-called 'echo chamber effect' undermines balanced and reasoned public debate.

But there have also been lots of ideas about how technology can help European democracies become more responsive and dynamic such as:

• The use of technology to better inform citizens and include civil society in decision-making.
• Sybil-proof identity verification for social network accounts operated by local municipalities.
• The development of non-profit personal data cooperatives as a response to the domination of Big Tech.

Now we want users help in shaping the final report. What do you think should be included?

We are opening up the report writing process and inviting you to take part and feed in your views. Work with us on a collaborative draft in Google Docs – comment, edit and get an insight into the black box of think tank research.

We’ll also be incorporating the most interesting submissions from the previous phase. If you'd like to make a submission, you can still do so here.

How To Join

To access the documents, you will need a Gmail account and to be registered as a user on demtech.chathamhouse.org. Each research question has its own working document, accessed via the Research Questions page.

The process is open to everyone. We look forward to working with you!

Join the project now

2014 is a pivotal year for NATO. Prompted by transatlantic defence austerity, Russian activities in Ukraine, and the conclusion of NATO’s major operations in Afghanistan, allies are raising important questions about NATO’s future in the run-up to the summit in September. 

At this event, representatives from two of the closest partners in the alliance will explore challenges and potential strategies for NATO.

The speaker will outline the importance of economic cooperation in the transatlantic relationship and consider recent developments in the global economy.

The international community is in urgent need of successful, cooperative strategies for both preventing mass atrocities before they begin and stopping those in progress. As recent crises have highlighted, effective international cooperation to save lives and preserve peace and security remains largely aspirational. Participants will discuss current thinking on mass atrocity prevention and intervention, and identify how transatlantic cooperation in this space could be more effective.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Early last month NATO launched a new maritime security mission, ostensibly to prevent people smuggling across the Aegean Sea. This mission, however, was not originally a reaction to the humanitarian catastrophe at sea. Instead, it was a response to growing Russian assertiveness.

A maritime patrol unit was first discussed in the North Atlantic Council in December 2015, when the Alliance agreed to provide a ‘tailored package of assurances’ to Ankara in a period of heightened tensions after Turkey shot down a Russian jet. The package included measures such as early reconnaissance planes (AWACS), air policing, naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, provisions for Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPA) and Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR), and port visits. None of the discussion at the time linked it with protecting refugees. Now framing this decision in that light creates a new mission for NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM), a mission that it has never conducted before.

Neither NATO’s founding documents or the most recent 2010 Strategic Concept provide for this type of mission, and NATO units are not trained to carry out an actual rescue mission. Protecting strategic assets and goods, such as oil tankers, escorting naval vessels providing food into conflict zones, deterring piracy and monitoring the Mediterranean for terrorist activity have been the main priorities for MARCOM in the post-Cold War period. These activities and maritime exercises were aimed at defence against non-state actors.

The positioning of NATO’s maritime fleet in the Aegean Sea to save refugees, however, has the potential to be used as a deterrent against Russia’s Anti Access/Anti-Denial capacity in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia, meanwhile, has increased its naval presence at the Tartus naval base in Syria, which it has used to support its air campaigns in Syria. This level of reciprocated military build-up is hard to sustain in the long-run.   

NATO−Russia tensions

Over the past few years, Russia’s assertive policies – its multiple military operations, the continuing modernization of its army and ‘simulated attacks’ such as the one in 2013 that tested Sweden’s air defence response mechanisms − have increasingly worried the Alliance and its partners. Clashing interests over Syria’s future and Russia’s attacks against the Western-supported rebel groups have also served to increase tensions between NATO member states and Russia. Recent analysis logged 60 dangerous incidents in the Euro-Atlantic area between Russia and NATO counties in the period between March 2014 and March 2015. NATO’s preparedness has been severely tested by these incidents, and has led the alliance to strengthen its presence on Europe’s southern flank.

Such increased tensions could create a situation whereby accidents and miscalculations lead to escalation. NATO forces and Russia are already engaged in further force posturing − the decision to accelerate Montenegro’s accession to NATO and the increased conduct of wartime exercises, such as NATO’s search for submarines in open waters (Dynamic Manta 2016), reconnaissance operations (Cold Operation 16) or Russia’s simulated exercises, for instance – which could undermine global stability. Three weeks after the Russian jet was shot down, a Russian patrol ship fired warning shots at a Turkish vessel to attract attention and avoid a collision. This event did not escalate but given the heightened tensions, similar events may spiral out of control.  

The tentative cease-fire in Syria is a confidence building measure that could normalize and rebuild relations. But further steps should be taken to establish political dialogue, open up the channels for potential meetings at the NATO−Russia Council, and increase transparency and risk mitigation in exercises and activities. The longer both sides wait, the more likely a confrontation will be.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

The US−UK ‘Special Relationship’ is in decline, and a British decision to leave the EU would hasten its demise. As Great Britain increasingly becomes just one of America’s many strategic relationships, Brexit would speed the transfer of US attention and energy from the UK to the continent. This, however, does not need to be inevitable. The necessary ingredient to reverse this decline is stronger British leadership internationally.

The US government has made it abundantly clear that its preference is to see the UK remain in the European Union. In January 2013, when David Cameron had not yet committed to a referendum, Phil Gordon, the US assistant secretary of state for European affairs bluntly stated that it is in the American interest for the US ‘to see a strong British voice in that European Union.’ The fact that a senior US official would go so far – to be seen to intervene so early in a divisive domestic political issue – spoke volumes about how important this is to America. This week, President Obama will visit the UK to send an equally firm, if polite, message to the British public.

Why does the US want the UK to remain in Europe?

From the US perspective, there are three principal elements that the UK brings to the table in the bilateral relationship. The first stems from Britain’s capabilities, particularly in the military and intelligence arenas. US−UK intelligence sharing, the closest for both countries, has a long history dating back to the Second World War. For good or ill the UK has been among America’s leading allies in every major conflict the US has been involved in for the last quarter of a century – in the Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo, Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the interventions in Libya as well as current operations against ISIS in Iraq and, belatedly, Syria.

The second relates to the political value of having a reliable partner in international engagements – and thereby avoiding the perception of acting unilaterally. Shared history and values, and thus often perspectives (as well as capabilities) have ensured that the UK has long been the first port of call for the US when seeking to solve international problems or build coalitions. At the same time, Britain’s historical global reach and diplomatic experience around the world (not least in areas of current concern such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel and Palestine, and Iraq) have provided American policy-makers with valuable input on foreign policy issues that has contributed to their own internal decision making.

The third area of added value for the US is Britain’s place in the EU. While British and US policy preferences may at times diverge, as they have recently on the Israel−Palestine issue, for example, their common outlooks and interests mean that Britain is the closest thing that the United States has to having a voice in the EU. At the same time, the US also sees the UK as the country most likely to support an open trade and investment agenda and a more proactive approach to dealing with the challenges in Europe’s neighbourhood, policies that leaders in both countries agree are necessary to make the EU a more effective actor and better partner to the US on the international scene.

The transition from US−UK ties to US−European ties

In recent years, however, the US has begun to diversify its relationships within Europe, in part as the UK has become unable or unwilling to step up and fulfil these three elements of paramount importance to the US.

Defence and intelligence

With regards to defence capabilities, it is no longer the UK that the United States inevitably looks to first. In Libya, the operation that started with the defence of Benghazi from Gaddafi’s forces in March 2012 (that eventually came to remove Gaddafi himself) was jointly led by the French and the British, although then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy appeared to be the driving force. More recently, it was the French with whom the US partnered in responding to the terrorist activities in Mali and who were first to support the US in action in Syria (following a UK parliamentary vote to stay out in August 2013 and a belated vote to act in December 2015). But in recent years others have worked more closely with the United States militarily as well, including in particular Poland and Denmark (although with the new government in Poland, the relationship might wither again).

This trend towards more diversified military engagement with other European states looks set to continue in the near term. Despite taking a tough position in the 2014 NATO Summit to reinforce the NATO commitment of two per cent of GDP spending on defence, the Cameron government came very close to falling below this line in 2015 (after five years of real defence cuts). The eventual decision to commit to meet this target, along with the newly released Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), have somewhat reassured American policy-makers of the UK’s continued ambition and capabilities. But there remains a lack of US confidence that this is only a temporary uptick in UK attention on defence. Meanwhile, America will continue to expand its horizons.

The story on intelligence sharing is slightly different, but here too obstacles have arisen in the close US-UK exchange of information. Since the end of the Second World War, the US and UK have been part of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance – with Australia, New Zealand and Canada – that allows the close sharing of intelligence. And arguably, within the Five Eyes, the links between the US and UK are the closest of all. However, more recently, tensions have emerged. Over the past five or so years, the British judicial system in particular has pushed back on US confidentiality rules in ways that make the US intelligence services nervous of continuing to share information; given the current close relationship, this could be more of an obstacle than it is for other countries sharing intel with the US.

At the same time, with the ISIS-inspired resurgence in the terrorist threat in both Europe and the US, it is becoming increasingly clear that the close intelligence sharing between the US and UK must take place much more widely. The current systems – through NATO or INTERPOL – have proven too slow and ineffective, as the recent attacks in Paris and Brussels have made clear. Sharing among the US and UK, or even among the Five Eyes, is insufficient – increasingly the relationships will have to be broadened.

Partnership

The US is also looking elsewhere for partnership in its international engagements, including on some of the issues that are at the top of the inbox for the American president.

On responding to Russian actions in Ukraine, it is clear that German Chancellor Angela Merkel is in the lead, both in corralling Europeans to maintain the sanctions but also in negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This was highlighted in the creation of the Normandy format in the summer of 2014, a group encompassing Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine (but not the UK or the US), to resolve the situation in the east of Ukraine. On another issue of significant import to the United States, European economic prosperity and stability, Merkel is again the leading actor in Europe.

In the case of targeted bombing in Syria, it was not the British that were first to join the United States in the offensive against ISIS, but instead the French. President Francois Hollande also proved far more proactive after Syrian President Assad crossed the chemical weapons ‘redline’ in 2013, although in the end France was left hanging when President Obama decided to step back from military action after the failure of the British parliamentary vote to authorize UK involvement.

Finally, on at least one issue of great import to the US – China – the UK appears to be diverging meaningfully. The most recent case – the UK decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in March 2015 – is perhaps the starkest example of such differing policy positions that have caused significant frustration in the US.

Influence in the European Union

With regards to Europe, even before the referendum was formally announced, it was increasingly clear that the UK was less inclined to engage proactively in the EU. A number of factors have ensured that, particularly since 2010, the UK has become less influential there.

British influence has been diminished through actions by the Cameron government that have, perhaps unnecessarily, antagonized many across the Channel. Many European conservatives became frustrated early in Cameron’s tenure when he decided to take the Conservative Party out of the principal conservative group in the European parliament, the European People’s Party. This sentiment only worsened in recent years as, albeit for perhaps understandable domestic political reasons, Cameron conducted an adversarial negotiation with his European partners in an effort to secure reforms to the EU and changes in Britain’s terms of membership.

The UK also no longer sends its best and brightest to EU institutions. Many of the leading British officials who once occupied high offices there have left and been replaced by other continental Europeans. This deprives Britain of an important source of influence within the EU.

It is clear that if the US wants influence in the EU, it needs more partners there than just the UK. Britain is still important, and would be a strong driver to make the institution more efficient, but as its influence declines it is no longer sufficient. A Leave vote would immediately dispose of that influence entirely.

The UK is ‘one among many’ for the US

What is clear is that increasingly the UK is not ‘first among equals’ in Europe but ‘one among many’ for the United States. America is diversifying its relationships. More and more the US can find other allies and friends to fulfil the needs in which the UK no longer has interest.

If the UK leaves the European Union, the pace of this trend will only quicken. In addition to needing to find alternative partners to address these policy gaps, the UK will likely no longer have the time to devote to the United States that it does today. If Brexit takes place, Whitehall will find itself inundated with issues which had previously been managed by the EU, from trade deals with third parties to negotiating constant market access adjustments with the EU. Thus, very quickly, British resources are likely to be pulled from the US portfolio, and issues of common concern will get drowned out by other agendas. At least for a while, the US will likely get short shrift.

America’s response then can only be to hasten its search for other partners both in Europe and beyond. And there lies an inevitable negative spiral for the Special Relationship.

Can anything be done to save the Special Relationship?

There is no question that the US and UK will continue to have a strong and positive relationship, but it is clear that, without action, either in or out of Europe, its ‘specialness’ will decline. As the arguments above lay out, the only question is how fast this demise takes place. But there is something that could not only halt, but also reverse this trend.

As President Obama made starkly clear in his interviews with Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic, what he wants most from partners and allies is for them to step up – to show more leadership (a sentiment that the Republican candidates for president would push even further). With the perceived failure of interventions over the last 15 years – from Afghanistan to Iraq to Libya –many politicians and publics have become wary of foreign military intervention. This is true in Europe and the US; but Americans have often felt that they have been left holding both the bag and the blame.  

It should be noted that more leadership does not necessarily mean more military engagement. Or even, necessarily, more spending on foreign policy tools (whether diplomatic, military or development). But it does mean a willingness to step up and take responsibility for trying to guide international events and for promoting common interests.

In the UK’s SDSR released towards the end of 2015, the government stated its intention to remain fully engaged globally; however, its actions belie this. Where Asia is concerned – an issue that is front and centre for the US – the UK joins other European powers in arguing that its lack of resources in the region makes it unable to contribute meaningfully to maintaining stability. Even closer to home, in the Middle East, the UK has been wary of leading.

It is understandable why the UK is hesitant to take such a leadership role, even as part of a coalition, in some of the larger strategic challenges the world faces. There are few benefits. Merely finding the human capital to coordinate an international response is difficult. The complexity of these problems ensures they rarely work out as hoped, and more often lead to international contempt rather than approbation. Thus it is no great surprise that the UK, along with much of the rest of the world, resists the temptation to be out in front. But there are opportunities – two issues that the US would likely welcome greater British leadership on would be building support in Europe for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and taking a more active role in maintaining stability in Asia. Further, having a stronger European partner on issues in the Middle East (from Yemen to Syria) – Europe’s near abroad – is something that many American policy-makers have suggested. 

But the UK would not have to stand alone. With a little leadership from the UK, the US would provide support, as would many others currently loath to take the lead but with very strong interests in the outcomes. But someone has to start; as Obama made clear, there needs to be less ‘free riding’.

If the UK wants to reverse the decline of the Special Relationship, it will need to show more leadership internationally. This should not be as hard as it might seem. Not only does it conform to the government’s own strategy (as laid out in the SDSR) but public concern over further interventions is weaker than one might imagine. Such a leadership role would once again show to the United States the value of the Special Relationship.

This article has also been published by Real Clear World.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Summary

• The United States’ transatlantic allies need to appreciate how its global leadership is changing and what this means for their interests, and respond accordingly. Notions of US decline have been overstated, but the country is not going to play the same international role in the future that it has previously.
• As the United States’ international engagement changes, Canada and Europe should increase coordination with it to prevent power vacuums from emerging. The transatlantic allies should work together to build greater links at all stages of the policy process, from perceptions of threat, prioritization, analysis, threat definition and policy formation to implementation and action.  
• As the United States’ capabilities adapt to its changed circumstances and role, so too must those of its allies. This adjustment must go far beyond military aspects to enhancing diplomatic, energy, economic, intelligence and other resources.
• In addition to the challenges around differing interests, priorities and capabilities inherent in any alliance, Europe appears to have lost its confidence. In part this is due to its growing disengagement and introspection. But Europe retains huge potential for influence if it uses its resources effectively. There is much that European states can do, individually and together, to take more control over advancing their strategic interests. Equally, by working together they can do much to nudge the United States in helpful directions to support the mutual interests of all parties.
• The conversation on reforming global institutions such as the IMF must move beyond the need for change per se towards articulating the actual shape of such changes. Europe and Canada will likely need to push the United States into accepting reform of these institutions to better reflect today’s reality and tomorrow’s challenges. Global institutions need more diversified leaderships if they are to ensure their long-term legitimacy and influence. This will be difficult to push through politically in the United States, but by working with new regional and global powers to propose reforms, Europe and Canada can help find an acceptable solution.
• The use of ad hoc coalitions does not necessarily damage the efficacy of broader consensus institutions such as NATO. In fact, flexible coalitions may often be desirable when solutions to new challenges need to be developed and agreed quickly.
• Canada and Europe should consider partnering with other actors besides the United States where necessary. This may be expedient for meeting individual objectives, and would have the secondary benefit of demonstrating to emerging powers that the West does not exclude cooperation with others out of an arbitrary loyalty to the United States.
• Europe needs to appreciate the potentially dire consequences of failing to adapt to changing US leadership and an increasingly complex world. There is a real chance that the European project could unravel in the next few years due to external and internal pressures. While many European policy-makers display an understanding of these challenges in private, in public there is little appetite for taking the decisions necessary to bring long-term stability to the continent. 

A British exit from the EU would add to growing strains on the United States’ relations with Britain and the rest of Europe, but by itself would not lead to a breakdown in transatlantic relations due to the scale of shared ideas and interests, institutional links, international pressures and commitments by individual leaders. It would, however, add to pressures on the US that could change the direction of the transatlantic relationship. From the perspective of Washington, Britain risks becoming an awkward inbetweener, beholden more than ever before to a wider transatlantic relationship where the US and EU are navigating the challenges of an emerging multipolar world. The article outlines developments in the UK, EU, Europe and the US in order to explain what Brexit could mean for the United States’ approaches to transatlantic relations. By doing so the article moves beyond a narrow view of Brexit and transatlantic relations that focuses on the future of UK–US relations. In the conclusion we map out several ways in which US views of the transatlantic relationship could be changed.

With Britain’s decision to leave the EU, the clouds of uncertainty hanging over the proposed US-EU free trade deal (known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or TTIP) have become darker. The negotiations were formally launched three years ago and have stalled because of transatlantic differences (for instance over issues of investor protections and public procurement) as well as growing public opposition. For now, both the US and the EU negotiators are determined to weather the storm and continue talks when they meet in Brussels from 11-15 July.

The result of the UK’s EU referendum will blow a strong wind into the face of TTIP negotiators on three fronts. First, the Brexit vote will delay the TTIP talks as EU officials will focus their attention and political capital on the future UK-EU relationship. Once the UK government triggers Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, both sides have two years to sort out the separation proceedings. Only after it has become clear what Britain’s relationship with the EU will look like will the European side stop navel-gazing. The TTIP negotiations will likely continue in the meantime, but will be put on the back-burner.

Second, any progress on TTIP will require clarity on what both sides are bringing to the negotiating table. But until the final nature of the UK-EU relationship is known, it will be difficult for the American side to assess exactly how valuable the access to the remaining EU market is. This raises the question of whether American negotiators will put forth their best offers if they don’t know what benefits they will obtain for making concessions.

Third, with Britain’s vote to leave the EU, TTIP has just lost one of its greatest cheerleaders. French and German officials are increasingly expressing concerns about TTIP. Within three days of the Brexit vote, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls dismissed the possibility of a US-EU trade deal, stating TTIP was against ‘EU interests’. In addition, 59 per cent of Germans oppose TTIP – up from 51 per cent – according to the most recent Eurobarometer survey. Britain’s voice for further trade liberalization will be sorely missed by American negotiators eager to strike a deal.

Despite the dark Brexit clouds on the TTIP horizon, there might be a silver lining. Britain’s decision to leave the EU could bring some benefits to the US-EU trade talks in two ways. First, financial services regulation might no longer be a sticking point in the TTIP negotiations. Given London’s role as a financial centre, the UK had insisted on including a financial services chapter in the trade deal. The US, however, has resisted this. The removal of this friction could help move the TTIP negotiations along.

Second, European trade negotiators will no longer have to address British fears that TTIP could put the National Health Service (NHS) at risk. Much of the TTIP-debate in Great Britain has focused on how this deal might impact the NHS. Opponents of TTIP have argued that including healthcare in the agreement could lead to privatization and ultimately the death of the NHS. EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström spent resources and energy in correcting these misconceptions. UK withdrawal from the EU means that she can now focus on fighting other myths surrounding TTIP, which could potentially help advance the trade deal.

For now and the immediate future, Britain will remain a member of the EU and the European Commission will continue to negotiate trade deals on behalf of all 28 member states. Both the US and EU negotiators are committed to advancing the trade deal despite Brexit. The British decision to leave the EU has not weakened the case for TTIP. Speaking on the outcome of the EU referendum, United States Trade Representative Michael Froman said ‘the economic and strategic rationale for TTIP remains strong’. And his counterpart Cecilia Malmström went even further, saying that the British decision to leave the EU creates more of an impetus for TTIP to be finished this year.

Though this timeline is unlikely to be met, TTIP is likely to survive the British decision to leave the EU. However, Brexit is a serious blow that will probably push back the conclusion of TTIP by at least two years. Any deal will need to take into account the future nature of the UK-EU trade deal, which may not be known before 2018. Meanwhile, elections in Germany and France (two countries with strong public opposition to TTIP) will take place in 2017. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US presidential election adds yet another layer of uncertainty as the trade policy of the next administration remains unknown. When US and EU trade negotiators meet again this week, they should not be too worried about the Brexit storm but rather the changing climate for TTIP in France, Germany and the US.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Economic populism is on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have made protectionist arguments and appealed to voters who feel left behind by globalization. In Europe, left-wing groups like Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain as well as far-right groups like France’s Front National, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the UK Independence Party are capitalizing on the anti-globalization mood.

Manifestations of the current anti-trade and anti-globalization movements include opposition to trade initiatives like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as well as populist calls for an end to the austerity measures and economic reforms that were introduced in the wake of the euro crisis. There have been questions regarding whether capitalism can respond to the rise in inequality seen in many Western states. Many populists also share a distrust of those they perceive as elite policy-makers and a desire to reclaim national sovereignty from international institutions. Thus, the rise of populism could have far-reaching consequences for trade and economic policy-making and the existing trade and broader economic architectures.

The US and the Americas Programme at Chatham House and the German Marshall Fund of the United States in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung will convene an expert roundtable to provide insight and analysis geared towards examining key drivers behind the rise of economic populism, its implications for the international economic system, and possible ways to mitigate the effects of populism in the economic arena.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

The Chatham House Rule

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

Diane Coyle will join us for a discussion on the impact that new technologies will have on transatlantic economic transformations in the future.

Economic growth rates in the US and Europe have been decelerating over the last decades, and the growth that has materialised has not been equally shared by all.

While technological advancements have contributed to widening inequality of income and wealth, at the same time, technological change is a driving force in improving living standards.

Looking ahead, what role will new technologies play in economic transformations and disruptions?

How can leaders in government and business on both sides of the Atlantic best harvest the potential and respond to the challenges of technological change and its impact on the economy?

This event is part of the US and Americas Programme ongoing series on Transatlantic Perspectives on Common Economic Challenges.

This series examines some of the principal global challenges that we face today and potentially differing perspectives from across Europe and the US.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Megan Greene will join us for a discussion on the prospect of future economic and political uncertainty on both sides of the Atlantic.

The first year of Donald Trump’s presidency and the ongoing saga of Brexit negotiations underscore the amount of uncertainty about the economic future on both sides of the Atlantic.

Despite that, business and consumer confidence in the US and continental Europe have soared. Are we still stuck in secular stagnation, or are we breaking out of the low growth, low inflation, low rate environment we’ve been in for years?

What opportunities and risks are posed by this year’s elections in France and Germany, the upcoming elections in Italy, and the mid-term elections in the US?

This event is part of the US and Americas Programme ongoing series on Transatlantic Perspectives on Common Economic Challenges. This series examines some of the principal global challenges that we face today and potentially differing perspectives from across Europe and the US.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

As coronavirus spreads across the globe, states grapple to find the ideal strategy for coping with the global pandemic. And, in China, Singapore, South Korea, the US, the UK, and Europe, divergent policies are a product of state capacity and legal authority, but they also reveal competing views about the optimal role of centralized state authority, federalism, and the private sector.

Although it is too soon to know the longer-term effects, the apparent capacity of centralized state authority in China, South Korea and Singapore to respond effectively and rapidly is making headlines. In the United States, the opposite has been true. 

America’s response is being shaped by its federal structure, a dynamic private sector, and a culture of civic engagement. In the three weeks since the first US case of coronavirus was confirmed, state leaders, public health institutions, corporations, universities and churches have been at the vanguard of the nation’s effort to mitigate its spread.

Images of safety workers in hazmat suits disinfecting offices of multinational corporations and university campuses populate American Facebook pages. The contrast to the White House effort to manage the message, downplay, then rapidly escalate its estimation of the crisis is stark.

Bewildering response

For European onlookers, the absence of a clear and focused response from the White House is bewildering. By the time President Donald Trump declared a national emergency, several state emergencies had already been called, universities had shifted to online learning, and churches had begun to close.

By contrast, in Italy, France, Spain and Germany, the state has led national efforts to shutter borders and schools. In the UK, schools are largely remaining open as Prime Minister Boris Johnson has declared a strategy defined by herd immunity, which hinges on exposing resilient populations to the virus.

But America has never shared Europe’s conviction that the state must lead. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the leading national public health institute and a US federal agency, has attempted to set a benchmark for assessing the crisis and advising the nation. But in this instance, its response has been slowed due to faults in the initial tests it attempted to rollout. The Federal Reserve has moved early to cut interest rates and cut them again even further this week.

But states were the real first movers in America’s response and have been using their authority to declare a state of emergency independent of the declaration of a national emergency. This has allowed states to mobilize critical resources, and to pressure cities into action. After several days delay and intense public pressure, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo forced New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio to close the city’s schools.

Declarations of state emergencies by individual states have given corporations, universities and churches the freedom and legitimacy to move rapidly, and ahead of the federal government, to halt the spread in their communities.

Washington state was the first to declare a state of emergency. Amazon, one of the state’s leading employers, quickly announced a halt to all international travel and, alongside Microsoft, donated $1million to a rapid-response Seattle-based emergency funds. States have nudged their corporations to be first movers in the sector’s coronavirus response. But corporations have willingly taken up the challenge, often getting ahead of state as well as federal action.

Google moved rapidly to announce a move allowing employees to work from home after California declared a state of emergency. Facebook soon followed with an even more stringent policy, insisting employees work from home. Both companies have also met with World Health Organization (WHO) officials to talk about responses, and provided early funding for WHO’s Solidarity Response Fund set up in partnership with the UN Foundation and the Swiss Philanthropy Foundation.

America’s leading research universities, uniquely positioned with in-house public health and legal expertise, have also been driving preventive efforts. Just days after Washington declared a state of emergency, the University of Washington became the first to announce an end to classroom teaching and move courses online. A similar pattern followed at Stanford, Harvard, Princeton and Columbia - each also following the declaration of a state of emergency.

In addition, the decision by the Church of the Latter Day Saints to cancel its services worldwide followed Utah’s declaration of a state of emergency.

The gaping hole in the US response has been the national government. President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency came late, and his decision to ban travel from Europe but - at least initially - exclude the UK, created uncertainty and concern that the White House response is as much driven by politics as evidence.

This may soon change, as the House of Representatives has passed a COVID-19 response bill that the Senate will consider. These moves are vital to supporting state and private efforts to mobilize an effective response to a national and global crisis.

Need for public oversight

In the absence of greater coordination and leadership from the centre, the US response will pale in comparison to China’s dramatic moves to halt the spread. The chaos across America’s airports shows the need for public oversight. As New York State Governor Cuomo pleaded for federal government support to build new hospitals, he said: ‘I can’t do it. You can’t leave it to the states.'

When it comes to global pandemics, we may be discovering that authoritarian states can have a short-term advantage, but already Iran’s response demonstrates that this is not universally the case. Over time, the record across authoritarian states as they tackle the coronavirus will become more apparent, and it is likely to be mixed.

Open societies remain essential. Prevention requires innovation, creativity, open sharing of information, and the ability to inspire and mobilize international cooperation. The state is certainly necessary, but it is not sufficient alone.

In the past few weeks, European Union member states have implemented measures such as social distancing, school and border closures and the cancellation of major cultural and sporting events in an effort to curb the spread of COVID-19. Such measures are expected to have significant economic and political consequences, threatening near or total collapse of certain sectors. Moreover, the management of the health and economic crises within the EU architecture has exposed tensions and impasses in the extent to which the EU is willing to collaborate to mitigate pressures on fellow member states.

The panellists will examine the European Union's response to a series of cascading crises and the likely impact of the pandemic on individual member states. Can the EU prevent an economic hit from developing into a financial crisis? Are the steps taken by the European Central Bank to protect the euro enough? And are member states expected to manage the crisis as best they can or will there be a united effort to mitigate some of the damage caused?  

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

 

With the IMF forecasting a 6.1% fall in advanced economy GDP in 2020 and world trade expected to contract by 11%, there is intense focus on the question of how and when to re-open economies currently in lockdown.

But no ‘opening up’ plan has a chance of succeeding unless it commands the confidence of all the main actors in the economy – employees, consumers, firms, investors and local authorities.

Without public confidence, these groups may follow official guidance only sporadically; consumers will preserve cash rather than spend it on goods and services; employees will delay returning to work wherever possible; businesses will face worsening bottlenecks as some parts of the economy open up while key suppliers remain closed; and firms will continue to delay many discretionary investment and hiring decisions.

Achieving public confidence

Taken together, these behaviours would substantially reduce the chances of a strong economic bounce-back even in the absence of a widespread second wave of infections. Five key steps are needed to achieve a high degree of public confidence in any reopening plan.

First, enough progress must be made in suppressing the virus and in building public health capacity so the public can be confident any new outbreak will be contained without reverting to another full-scale lockdown. Moreover, the general public needs to feel that the treatment capacity of the health system is at a level where the risk to life if someone does fall ill with the virus is at an acceptably low level.

Achieving this requires the government to demonstrate the necessary capabilities - testing, contact tracing, quarantine facilities, supplies of face masks and other forms of PPE (personal protective equipment) - are actually in place and can be sustained, rather than relying on future commitments. It also needs to be clear on the role to be played going forward by handwashing and other personal hygiene measures.

Second, the authorities need to set out clear priorities on which parts of the economy are to open first and why. This needs to take account of both supply side and demand side factors, such as the importance of a particular sector to delivering essential supplies, a sector’s ability to put in place effective protocols to protect its employees and customers, and its importance to the functioning of other parts of the economy. There is little point in opening a car assembly plant unless its SME suppliers are able to deliver the required parts.

Detailed planning of the phasing of specific relaxation measures is essential, as is close cooperation between business and the authorities. The government also needs to establish a centralised coordination function capable of dealing quickly with any unexpected supply chain glitches. And it must pay close attention to feedback from health experts on how the process of re-opening the economy sector-by-sector is affecting the rate of infection.  

Third, the government needs to state how the current financial and economic support measures for the economy will evolve as the re-opening process continues. It is critical to avoid removing support measures too soon, and some key measures may have to continue to operate even as firms restart their operations. It is important to show how - over time - the measures will evolve from a ‘life support’ system for businesses and individuals into a more conventional economic stimulus.

This transition strategy could initially be signalled through broad principles, but the government needs to follow through quickly by detailing specific measures. The transition strategy must target sectors where most damage has been done, including the SME sector in general and specific areas such as transport, leisure and retail. It needs to factor in the hard truth that some businesses will be no longer be viable after the crisis and set out how the government is going to support employees and entrepreneurs who suffer as a result.

The government must also explain how it intends to learn the lessons and capture the upsides from the crisis by building a more resilient economy over the longer term. Most importantly, it has to demonstrate continued commitment to tackling climate change – which is at least as big a threat to mankind’s future as pandemics.

Fourth, the authorities should explain how they plan to manage controls on movement of people across borders to minimise the risk of new infection outbreaks, but also to help sustain the opening-up measures. This needs to take account of the fact that different countries are at different stages in the progress of the pandemic and may have different strategies and trade-offs on the risks they are willing to take as they open up.

As a minimum, an effective border plan requires close cooperation with near neighbours as these are likely to be the most important economic counterparts for many countries. But ideally each country’s plan should be part of a wider global opening-up strategy coordinated by the G20. In the absence of a reliable antibody test, border control measures will have to rely on a combination of imperfect testing, quarantine, and new, shared data requirements for incoming and departing passengers.  

Fifth, the authorities must communicate the steps effectively to the public, in a manner that shows not only that this is a well thought-through plan, but also does not hide the extent of the uncertainties, or the likelihood that rapid modifications may be needed as the plan is implemented. In designing the communications, the authorities should develop specific measures to enable the public to track progress.

Such measures are vital to sustaining business, consumer and employee confidence. While some smaller advanced economies appear close to completing these steps, for many others there is still a long way to go. Waiting until they are achieved means higher economic costs in the short-term. But, in the long-term, they will deliver real net benefits.

Authorities are more likely to sustain these measures because key economic actors will actually follow the guidance given. Also, by instilling confidence, the plan will bring forward the consumer and business decision-making crucial to a strong recovery. In contrast, moving ahead without proper preparation risks turning an already severe economic recession into something much worse.

On 10 January 2020, Chinese scientists released the sequence of the COVID-19 genome on the internet. This provided the starting gun for scientists around the world to start developing vaccines or therapies. With at least 80 different vaccines in development, many governments are pinning their hopes on a quick solution. However, there are many hurdles to overcome. 

Vaccine development

Firstly, vaccine development is normally a very long process to ensure vaccines are safe and effective before they are used. 

Safety is not a given: a recent dengue vaccine caused heightened disease in vaccinated children when they later were exposed to dengue, while Respiratory Syncytial Virus vaccine caused the same problem. Nor is effectiveness a given. Candidate vaccines that use novel techniques where minute fragments of the viruses’ genetic code are either injected directly into humans or incorporated into a vaccine (as is being pursued, or could be pursued for COVID-19) have higher risks of failure simply because they haven’t worked before. For some vaccines, we know what levels of immunity post-vaccination are likely to be protective. This is not the case for coronavirus. 

Clinical trials will have to be done for efficacy. This is not optional – regulators will need to know extensive testing has taken place before licencing any vaccine. Even if animal tests are done in parallel with early human tests, the remainder of the process is still lengthy. 

There is also great interest in the use of passive immunization, whereby antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 (collected from people who have recovered from infection or laboratory-created) are given to people who are currently ill. Antivirals may prove to be a quicker route than vaccine development, as the testing requirements would be shorter, manufacturing may be easier and only ill people would need to be treated, as opposed to all at-risk individuals being vaccinated.

Vaccine manufacturing

Developers, especially small biotechs, will have to make partnerships with large vaccine manufacturers in order to bring products to market. One notorious bottleneck in vaccine development is getting from proof-of-principle to commercial development: about 95 per cent of vaccines fail at this step. Another bottleneck is at the end of production. The final stages of vaccine production involve detailed testing to ensure that the vaccine meets the necessary criteria and there are always constraints on access to the technologies necessary to finalize the product. Only large vaccine manufacturers have these capacities. There is a graveyard of failed vaccine candidates that have not managed to pass through this development and manufacturing process.

Another consideration is adverse or unintended consequences. Highly specialized scientists may have to defer their work on other new vaccines to work on COVID-19 products and production of existing products may have to be set aside, raising the possibility of shortages of other essential vaccines. 

Cost is another challenge. Vaccines for industrialized markets can be very lucrative for pharmaceutical companies, but many countries have price caps on vaccines. Important lessons have been learned from the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic when industrialized countries took all the vaccines first. Supplies were made available to lower-income countries at a lower price but this was much later in the evolution of the pandemic. For the recent Ebola outbreaks, vaccines were made available at low or no cost. 

Geopolitics may also play a role. Should countries that manufacture a vaccine share it widely with other countries or prioritize their own populations first? It has been reported that President Trump attempted to purchase CureVac, a German company with a candidate vaccine.  There are certainly precedents for countries prioritizing their own populations. With H1N1 flu in 2009, the Australian Government required a vaccine company to meet the needs of the Australian population first. 

Vaccine distribution

Global leadership and a coordinated and coherent response will be needed to ensure that any vaccine is distributed equitably. There have been recent calls for a G20 on health, but existing global bodies such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and GAVI are working on vaccines and worldwide access to them. Any new bodies should seek to boost funding for these entities so they can ensure products reach the most disadvantaged. 

While countries that cannot afford vaccines may be priced out of markets, access for poor, vulnerable or marginalized peoples, whether in developed or developing countries, is of concern. Developing countries are at particular risk from the impacts of COVID-19. People living in conflict-affected and fragile states – whether they are refugees or asylum seekers, internally displaced or stateless, or in detention facilities – are at especially high risk of devastating impacts. 

Mature economies will also face challenges. Equitable access to COVID-19 vaccine will be challenging where inequalities and unequal access to essential services have been compromised within some political systems. 

The need for global leadership 

There is an urgent need for international coordination on COVID-19 vaccines. While the WHO provides technical support and UNICEF acts as a procurement agency, responding to coronavirus needs clarity of global leadership that arches over national interests and is capable of mobilizing resources at a time when economies are facing painful recessions. We see vaccines as a salvation but remain ill-equipped to accelerate their development.

While everyone hopes for rapid availability of safe, effective and affordable vaccines that will be produced in sufficient quantities to meet everyone’s needs, realistically, we face huge hurdles. 

As a body with a relatively small operating budget and no formal mechanisms, or authority, to sanction member states that fail to comply with its guidance, the World Health Organization has been limited in its ability to coordinate a global response to the COVID-19 outbreak. At the same time, the organization is reliant on an international order that the current coronavirus crisis is, arguably, disrupting: as containment measures become more important in stemming the spread of the virus, the temptation to implement protectionist policies is increasing among nations. For example, the UK did not participate in an EU scheme to buy PPE and Germany has accused the US of ‘piracy’ after it reportedly diverted a shipment of masks intended for Berlin. Elsewhere, despite rhetorical commitments from the G7 and G20, a detailed plan for a comprehensive international response has not been forthcoming. 

The panel will discuss issues of coordination and cooperation in the international response to COVID-19. Have global trends prior to the outbreak contributed to the slow and disjointed international response? How has the pandemic exposed fissures in the extent to which nations are willing to cooperate? And what is the capacity of international organizations such as the WHO to coordinate a concerted transnational response and what could the implications be for the future of globalization and the international liberal order?

This event is open to Chatham House Members. Not a member? Find out more.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a profound impact on the cybersecurity landscape - both amplifying already-existing cyber threats and creating new vulnerabilities for state and non-state actors. The crisis has highlighted the importance of protecting key national and international infrastructures, with the World Health Organization, US Department of Health and Human Services and hospitals across Europe suffering cyber-attacks, undermining their ability to tackle the coronavirus outbreak. Changing patterns of work resulting from widespread lockdowns are also creating new vulnerabilities for organizations with many employees now working from home and using personal devices to work remotely.

In light of these developments, the panellists will discuss the evolving cyber threats resulting from the pandemic. How are they impacting ongoing conversations around cybersecurity? How can governments, private sector and civil society organizations work together to effectively mitigate and respond to them? And what could the implications of such cooperation be beyond the crisis? 

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.