The new European Commission, headed by Ursula von der Leyen, assumed office on 1 December, and there are early signs that Africa will begin near the top of their foreign policy priorities. Policy towards Africa under the new EU administration is yet to be fully defined, but its contours are already visible in the selection of commissioners and assignment of portfolios.  

Although rumours of a dedicated commissioner for Africa were unfounded, the appointment of Jutta Urpilainen to the new role of commissioner for international partnerships – replacing the former post of development commissioner – is a strong signal of ongoing change in EU development thinking, away from bilateral aid towards trade and investment, including by the private sector. 

This may have significant consequences for the EU’s relationship with Africa. In her mission letter to Urpilainen in September, von der Leyen listed the first objective as a new ‘comprehensive strategy for Africa’. Urpilainen, Finland’s finance minister before being posted to Ethiopia as special representative on mediation, has also described her appointment as an opportunity to move on from traditional measures of aid delivery. 

Ambition or incoherence? 

However, this ambition may be at odds with other EU priorities and practices, notably managing migration and institutions and instruments for governing EU–Africa relations that remain rooted in a ‘traditional’ model of North–South development cooperation rather than equitable partnership.

Another newly created post will see Margaritis Schinas assume the role of vice-president for promoting the European way of life – formerly ‘protecting our European way of life’ before a backlash saw it changed – a reminder that migration will remain high on the EU’s foreign policy agenda. The new high representative for foreign and security policy and chief EU diplomat, Josep Borrell, has highlighted the need for bilateral partnership with countries of origin and transit, mainly in Africa. 

Negotiations also continue to stall on a replacement to the Cotonou Agreement, the 20-year partnership framework between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states, which now looks certain to be extended for at least 12 months beyond its expiry in February 2020.

Ambiguities in the EU’s negotiating approach have certainly contributed to the delay: having pushed initially for a separate regional pillar for Africa that would be opened to the North African countries (who are not ACP members) and include a loosely defined role for the African Union, this would later be abandoned in favour of a dual-track process on separate new agreements with the AU and ACP respectively.

The EU also continues to pursue controversial economic partnership agreements under the aegis of Cotonou, despite their increasing appearance of incompatibility with the pathbreaking African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – one of the clearest expressions to date of African agency.

The EU has so far attempted to gloss over this incoherence, claiming that EPAs can somehow act as the ‘building blocks’ for Africa-wide economic integration. But tensions are appearing between EU departments and within the commission, with the European External Action Service inclined to prioritize a more strategic continental relationship with the AU, while the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development remains committed to the ACP as the conduit for financial support and aid delivery.

And it is unlikely to get away with such incoherence for much longer. Change is now urgent, as numerous countries in sub-Saharan Africa continue to attract the strategic and commercial interests of the EU’s competitors: from established players such as China and potentially in future the UK, which is intent on remodelling its Africa ties post-Brexit, to emerging actors such as Turkey or Russia, which held its first Africa summit in October. 

The need for delivery

If the EU is serious about its rhetoric on equal partnership, it must therefore move beyond convoluted hybrid proposals. Delivering on the Juncker administration’s proposal to increase funding for external action by 30 per cent for 2021–27 would mark an important first step, particularly as this involves streamlining that would see the European Development Fund – the financial instrument for EU-ACP relations – incorporated into the main EU budget.

The new commission should therefore continue to exert pressure on the European Council and European Parliament to adopt this proposal, as negotiations on this financial framework have been repeatedly subject to delay and may not be resolved before the end of the year. 

Beyond this, proactive support for the AfCFTA and for structural transformation more broadly must be prioritized ahead of vague promises for a continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as held out by Juncker in his final State of the Union address in 2018. 

The significance of internal EU reforms for Africa should also not be discounted. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, for instance, has placed the African sector at a particular disadvantage and has made it harder to compete even in domestic markets, let alone in the distant EU export markets. EU efforts to stimulate inflows of private investments into the African agricultural sector, abolish import tariffs and offer technical support for African producers to satisfy EU health and safety regulations will be of little use if they are undermined by heavy subsidies across Europe.

Ultimately, changes to job titles alone will be insufficient. The new commission’s rhetoric, while ambitious, differs little from that of the previous decade – Africa has heard the promise of a ‘partnership of equals’ and of ‘shared ownership’ since before the advent of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy in 2007. Now is the time for truly bold steps to implement this vision.

As the UK leaves the EU and the formal negotiations on the future relationship begins, this workshop will discuss any immediate changes and review the short and medium term impacts of Brexit on the energy sector. 

The workshop will look to cover:

• The implications for UK business and system operations of the UK leaving the Internal Energy Market.
• Current and future investment trends in the UK energy system.
• The trade of electricity and gas over inter-connectors.
• The need for the development of a new EU-UK operational framework mechanism.
• The UK's EU withdrawal agreement and the operation of the Single Electricity Market (SEM) across Ireland. 
• Options for the UK outside of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the impact on carbon prices.

This workshop is part of a programme funded by the UK Energy Research Centre on Brexit and the UK’s Net Zero Energy Policy being run by the University of Warwick and Chatham House.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Theresa May’s announcement in 2018 on the UK’s ambition to become the G7’s largest investor in Africa by 2022 has been followed by similar stated ambitions at the recent UK-Africa Investment Summit, which saw the attendance of 16 African heads of states. Such ambitions mirror overtures from various international players including a call for a ‘comprehensive strategy for Africa’ by the EU in 2019. While the UK’s recent expansion of its diplomatic networks in Africa and the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement with the Southern African Customs Union and Mozambique appear promising, there are significant challenges to deepening partnerships including visa restrictions and complex business environments.
 
At this event, the panellists will assess the future of trade and investment relations between the UK and Africa. Amid a proliferation of new trading partners including Asia’s emerging economies, Russia and the Gulf states, what are the points of change and continuity in the long-standing relationship between Africa and the UK? And what are the challenges and opportunities facing governments and businesses in Africa and the UK in efforts to build long-lasting economic ties?
 
This event will be followed by a drinks reception.

This event is open to Chatham House Corporate Members and corporate contacts of Chatham House's Africa Programme only.

Not a member? Find out more. For further information on the different types of Chatham House events, visit Our Events Explained.

In the past few weeks, European Union member states have implemented measures such as social distancing, school and border closures and the cancellation of major cultural and sporting events in an effort to curb the spread of COVID-19. Such measures are expected to have significant economic and political consequences, threatening near or total collapse of certain sectors. Moreover, the management of the health and economic crises within the EU architecture has exposed tensions and impasses in the extent to which the EU is willing to collaborate to mitigate pressures on fellow member states.

The panellists will examine the European Union's response to a series of cascading crises and the likely impact of the pandemic on individual member states. Can the EU prevent an economic hit from developing into a financial crisis? Are the steps taken by the European Central Bank to protect the euro enough? And are member states expected to manage the crisis as best they can or will there be a united effort to mitigate some of the damage caused?  

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

In the last 100 years, global economic crises from the Great Depression of the 1930s to the 2008 financial crash have contributed to significant political changes in Europe, often leading to a rise in popularity for extremist parties and politics. As Europe contends with a perceived crisis of democracy - now compounded by the varied responses to the coronavirus outbreak - how should we understand the relationship between externally-driven economic crises, political upheaval and democracy?

The panellists will consider the parallels between the political responses to some of the greatest economic crises Europe has experienced in the last century. Given that economic crises often transcend borders, why does political disruption vary between democracies? What can history tell us about the potential political impact of the unfolding COVID-19-related economic crisis? And will the unprecedented financial interventions by governments across Europe fundamentally change the expectations citizens have of the role government should play in their lives?

This event is based on a recent article in The World Today by Hans Kundnani and Pepijn Bergsen who are both researchers in Chatham House's Europe Programme. 'Crawling from the Wreckage' is the first in a series of articles that look at key themes in European political discourse from the last century. You can read the article here. 

This event is open to Chatham House Members. Not a member? Find out more.

This half-day strategic workshop, organized by Chatham House and E3G, brought together key climate experts, policymakers and influential actors, especially in Europe, for a focused and facilitated discussion on the roles, risks and potentials of negative emissions technologies (NETs). 

An interactive scenario exercise will be conducted, drawing on a climate simulation tool developed by Climate Interactive, to consider the potential roles and risks of different NETs deployments to meet the Paris Agreement targets and to consider the international co-operation required to manage the pathway to net-zero emissions. Participants will explore the political opportunities, discuss different scenarios and risks and identify areas of interventions and collective action.

The meeting is part of a series of events being held at Chatham House as part of London Climate Action Week (LCAW).

As the UK leaves the EU and the formal negotiations on the future relationship begins, this workshop will discuss any immediate changes and review the short and medium term impacts of Brexit on the energy sector. 

The workshop will look to cover:

• The implications for UK business and system operations of the UK leaving the Internal Energy Market.
• Current and future investment trends in the UK energy system.
• The trade of electricity and gas over inter-connectors.
• The need for the development of a new EU-UK operational framework mechanism.
• The UK's EU withdrawal agreement and the operation of the Single Electricity Market (SEM) across Ireland. 
• Options for the UK outside of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the impact on carbon prices.

This workshop is part of a programme funded by the UK Energy Research Centre on Brexit and the UK’s Net Zero Energy Policy being run by the University of Warwick and Chatham House.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The pressure of the coronavirus pandemic is adding to a widely held misconception that trade in food products is bad for the environment due to the associated ‘food miles’ – the carbon footprint of agricultural products transported over long distances.

This concept, developed by large retailers a decade ago, is often invoked as a rationale for restricting trade and choosing locally-produced food over imports. Consuming local food may seem sensible at first glance as it reduces the carbon footprint of goods and generates local employment. 

However, this assumption ignores the emissions produced during the production, processing or storage stages which often dwarf transport emissions. Other avenues to address the climate change impact of trade are more promising.

Demystifying food emissions

In the US, for example, food items travel more than 8,000 km on average before reaching the consumer. Yet transport only accounts for 11 per cent of total emissions with 83 per cent – mostly nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) emissions – occurring at the production stage.

US Department of Agriculture data on energy use in the American food system echoes this finding, showing that processing, packaging, and selling of food represent ten times the energy used to transport food.

In practice, it may be preferable from an environmental perspective to consume lamb, onion or dairy products transported by sea because the lower emissions generated at the production stage offset those resulting from transport. Similarly, growing tomatoes under heated greenhouses in Sweden is often more emissions-intensive than importing open-grown ones from Southern Europe.

Seasonality also matters. British apples placed in storage for ten months leads to twice the level of emissions as that of South American apples sea-freighted to the UK. And the type of transport is also important as, overall, maritime transport generates 25 to 250 times less emissions than trucks, and air freight generates on average five times more emissions than road transport.

Therefore, air-freighted Kenyan beans have a much larger carbon footprint than those produced in the UK, but crossing Europe by truck to import Italian wine might generate more emissions than transatlantic shipments.

Finally, one should take into account the last leg of transport. A consumer driving more than 10 km to purchase 1 kg of fresh produce will generate proportionately more greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than air-freighting 1 kg of produce from Kenya.

Shifting consumption towards local foods may reduce GHG emissions in sectors with relatively low emissions intensities but, when non-carbon dioxide emissions are taken into account, this is more often the exception than the rule.

Under these circumstances, preventing trade is an inefficient and expensive way of reducing GHG emissions. Bureau et al. for example, calculate that a global tariff maintaining the volume of trade at current levels until 2030 may reduce global carbon dioxide emissions by 3.5 per cent. However, this would be roughly seven times less than the full implementation of the Paris Agreement and cost equivalent to the current GDP of Brazil or 1.8 per cent of world GDP.

By preventing an efficient use of resources, such restrictions would also undermine the role of trade in offsetting possible climate-induced production shortfalls in some parts of the world and allowing people to access food when they can’t produce it themselves.

Reducing the climate footprint of trade

This is not to say that nothing should be done to tackle transport emissions. The OECD estimates that international trade-related freight accounted for over 5 per cent of total global fuel emissions with shipping representing roughly half of it, trucks 40 per cent, air 6 per cent and rail 2 per cent. With the projected tripling of freight transport by 2050, emissions from shipping are expected to rise between 50 and 250 per cent.

Furthermore, because of their international nature, these emissions are not covered by the Paris Agreement. Instead the two UN agencies regulating these sectors – the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization – are responsible for reducing these emissions and, so far, significant progress has proven elusive.

Regional or bilateral free trade agreements to further stimulate trade could address this problem by exploiting comparative advantages. Impact assessments of those agreements often point towards increases in GHG emissions due to a boost in trade flows. In the future, such agreements could incorporate – or develop in parallel – initiatives to ensure carbon neutrality by connecting carbon markets among contracting parties or by taxing international maritime and air transport emissions.

Such initiatives could be combined with providing additional preferences in the form of enhanced market access to low-carbon food and healthier food. The EU, as one of the chief proponents of bilateral and regional trade agreements and a leader in promoting a transition to a low-carbon economy could champion such an approach.

This article is part of a series from the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum, designed to promote research and policy recommendations on the future of global trade. It is adapted from the research paper, Delivering Sustainable Food and Land Use Systems: The Role of International Trade, authored by Christophe Bellmann, Bernice Lee and Jonathan Hepburn.