NEW YORK (AP): When it comes to the 2025 Grammy Award nominations, Cowboy Carter rules. Its superstar singer, Beyonce, leads the nods with 11, bringing her career total to 99 nominations. That makes her the most nominated artiste in Grammy history...

Thoracic great vessels such as the aorta and subclavian arteries are formed through dynamic remodeling of embryonic pharyngeal arch arteries (PAAs). Previous work has shown that loss of a basic helix-loop-helix transcription factor Hey1 in mice causes abnormal fourth PAA development and lethal great vessel anomalies resembling congenital malformations in humans. However, how Hey1 mediates vascular formation remains unclear. In this study, we revealed that Hey1 in vascular endothelial cells, but not in smooth muscle cells, played essential roles for PAA development and great vessel morphogenesis in mouse embryos. Tek-Cre–mediated Hey1 deletion in endothelial cells affected endothelial tube formation and smooth muscle differentiation in embryonic fourth PAAs and resulted in interruption of the aortic arch and other great vessel malformations. Cell specificity and signal responsiveness of Hey1 expression were controlled through multiple cis-regulatory regions. We found two distal genomic regions that had enhancer activity in endothelial cells and in the pharyngeal epithelium and somites, respectively. The novel endothelial enhancer was conserved across species and was specific to large-caliber arteries. Its transcriptional activity was regulated by Notch signaling in vitro and in vivo, but not by ALK1 signaling and other transcription factors implicated in endothelial cell specificity. The distal endothelial enhancer was not essential for basal Hey1 expression in mouse embryos but may likely serve for Notch-dependent transcriptional control in endothelial cells together with the proximal regulatory region. These findings help in understanding the significance and regulation of endothelial Hey1 as a mediator of multiple signaling pathways in embryonic vascular formation.

Broad-specificity glycoside hydrolases (GHs) contribute to plant biomass hydrolysis by degrading a diverse range of polysaccharides, making them useful catalysts for renewable energy and biocommodity production. Discovery of new GHs with improved kinetic parameters or more tolerant substrate-binding sites could increase the efficiency of renewable bioenergy production even further. GH5 has over 50 subfamilies exhibiting selectivities for reaction with β-(1,4)–linked oligo- and polysaccharides. Among these, subfamily 4 (GH5_4) contains numerous broad-selectivity endoglucanases that hydrolyze cellulose, xyloglucan, and mixed-linkage glucans. We previously surveyed the whole subfamily and found over 100 new broad-specificity endoglucanases, although the structural origins of broad specificity remained unclear. A mechanistic understanding of GH5_4 substrate specificity would help inform the best protein design strategies and the most appropriate industrial application of broad-specificity endoglucanases. Here we report structures of 10 new GH5_4 enzymes from cellulolytic microbes and characterize their substrate selectivity using normalized reducing sugar assays and MS. We found that GH5_4 enzymes have the highest catalytic efficiency for hydrolysis of xyloglucan, glucomannan, and soluble β-glucans, with opportunistic secondary reactions on cellulose, mannan, and xylan. The positions of key aromatic residues determine the overall reaction rate and breadth of substrate tolerance, and they contribute to differences in oligosaccharide cleavage patterns. Our new composite model identifies several critical structural features that confer broad specificity and may be readily engineered into existing industrial enzymes. We demonstrate that GH5_4 endoglucanases can have broad specificity without sacrificing high activity, making them a valuable addition to the biomass deconstruction toolset.

Abnormal changes of neuronal Tau protein, such as phosphorylation and aggregation, are considered hallmarks of cognitive deficits in Alzheimer's disease. Abnormal phosphorylation is thought to precede aggregation and therefore to promote aggregation, but the nature and extent of phosphorylation remain ill-defined. Tau contains ∼85 potential phosphorylation sites, which can be phosphorylated by various kinases because the unfolded structure of Tau makes them accessible. However, methodological limitations (e.g. in MS of phosphopeptides, or antibodies against phosphoepitopes) led to conflicting results regarding the extent of Tau phosphorylation in cells. Here we present results from a new approach based on native MS of intact Tau expressed in eukaryotic cells (Sf9). The extent of phosphorylation is heterogeneous, up to ∼20 phosphates per molecule distributed over 51 sites. The medium phosphorylated fraction Pm showed overall occupancies of ∼8 Pi (± 5) with a bell-shaped distribution; the highly phosphorylated fraction Ph had 14 Pi (± 6). The distribution of sites was highly asymmetric (with 71% of all P-sites in the C-terminal half of Tau). All sites were on Ser or Thr residues, but none were on Tyr. Other known posttranslational modifications were near or below our detection limit (e.g. acetylation, ubiquitination). These findings suggest that normal cellular Tau shows a remarkably high extent of phosphorylation, whereas other modifications are nearly absent. This implies that abnormal phosphorylations at certain sites may not affect the extent of phosphorylation significantly and do not represent hyperphosphorylation. By implication, the pathological aggregation of Tau is not likely a consequence of high phosphorylation.

9 July 2020

20 August 2020

2 September 2020

30 September 2020

Yi-Han Lin
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2030-2046
Research

Ji Eun Kim
Dec 20, 2020; 0:RA120.002159v1-mcp.RA120.002159
Research

Alice Santonastaso
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1687-1696
Research Articles

Chiara Pavanello
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1784-1788
Patient-Oriented and Epidemiological Research

     Lens and tear film lipids are as unique as the systems they reside in. The major lipid of the human lens is dihydrosphingomylein, found in quantity only in the lens. The lens contains a cholesterol to phospholipid molar ratio as high as 10:1, more than anywhere in the body. Lens lipids contribute to maintaining lens clarity, and alterations in lens lipid composition due to age are likely to contribute to cataract. Lens lipid composition reflects adaptations to the unique characteristics of the lens: no turnover of lens lipids or proteins; the lowest amount of oxygen than any other tissue and contains almost no intracellular organelles. The tear film lipid layer (TFLL) is also unique. The TFLL is a thin, 100 nm layer of lipid on the surface of tears covering the cornea that contributes to tear film stability. The major lipids of the TFLL are wax esters and cholesterol esters that are not found in the lens. The hydrocarbon chains associated with the esters are longer than those found anywhere in the body, as long as 32 carbons, and many are branched. Changes in the composition and structure of the 30,000 different moieties of TFLL contribute to the instability of tears. The focus of the current review is how spectroscopy has been used to elucidate the relationships between lipid composition, conformational order and function and the etiology of cataract and dry eye.

Familial LCAT deficiency (FLD) is a rare genetic disorder of HDL metabolism, caused by loss-of-function mutations in the LCAT gene and characterized by a variety of symptoms including corneal opacities and kidney failure. Renal disease represents the leading cause of morbidity and mortality in FLD cases. However, the prognosis is not known and the rate of deterioration of kidney function is variable and unpredictable from patient to patient. In this article, we present data from a follow-up of the large Italian cohort of FLD patients, who have been followed for an average of 12 years. We show that renal failure occurs at the median age of 46 years, with a median time to a second recurrence of 10 years. Additionally, we identify high plasma unesterified cholesterol level as a predicting factor for rapid deterioration of kidney function. In conclusion, this study highlights the severe consequences of FLD, underlines the need of correct early diagnosis and referral of patients to specialized centers, and highlights the urgency for effective treatments to prevent or slow renal disease in patients with LCAT deficiency.

Lipoprotein (a) [Lp(a)] is characterized by an LDL-like composition in terms of lipids and apoB100, and by one copy of a unique glycoprotein, apo(a). The apo(a) structure is mainly based on the repetition of tandem kringle domains with high homology to plasminogen kringles 4 and 5. Among them, kringle IV type 2 (KIV-2) is present in a highly variable number of genetically encoded repeats, whose length is inversely related to Lp(a) plasma concentration and cardiovascular risk. Despite it being the major component of apo(a), the actual function of KIV-2 is still unclear. Here, we describe the first high-resolution crystallographic structure of this domain. It shows a general fold very similar to other KIV domains with high and intermediate affinity for the lysine analog, -aminocaproic acid. Interestingly, KIV-2 presents a lysine binding site (LBS) with a unique shape and charge distribution. KIV-2 affinity for predicted small molecule binders was found to be negligible in surface plasmon resonance experiments; and with the LBS being nonfunctional, we propose to rename it "pseudo-LBS". Further investigation of the protein by computational small-molecule docking allowed us to identify a possible heparin-binding site away from the LBS, which was confirmed by specific reverse charge mutations abolishing heparin binding. This study opens new possibilities to define the pathogenesis of Lp(a)-related diseases and to facilitate the design of specific therapeutic drugs.

The neuronal basis of complex social behavior is still poorly understood. In honeybees, reproductive investment decisions are made at the colony-level. Queens develop from female-destined larvae that receive alloparental care from nurse bees in the form of ad-libitum royal jelly (RJ) secretions. Typically, the number of raised new queens is limited but genetic breeding of "royal jelly bees" (RJBs) for enhanced RJ production over decades has led to a dramatic increase of reproductive investment in queens. Here, we compare RJBs to unselected Italian bees (ITBs) to investigate how their cognitive processing of larval signals in the mushroom bodies (MBs) and antennal lobes (ALs) may contribute to their behavioral differences. A cross-fostering experiment confirms that the RJB syndrome is mainly due to a shift in nurse bee alloparental care behavior. Using olfactory conditioning of the proboscis extension reflex, we show that the RJB nurses spontaneously respond more often to larval odors compared with ITB nurses but their subsequent learning occurs at similar rates. These phenotypic findings are corroborated by our demonstration that the proteome of the brain, particularly of the ALs differs between RJBs and ITBs. Notably, in the ALs of RJB newly emerged bees and nurses compared with ITBs, processes of energy and nutrient metabolism, signal transduction are up-regulated, priming the ALs for receiving and processing the brood signals from the antennae. Moreover, highly abundant major royal jelly proteins and hexamerins in RJBs compared with ITBs during early life when the nervous system still develops suggest crucial new neurobiological roles for these well-characterized proteins. Altogether, our findings reveal that RJBs have evolved a strong olfactory response to larvae, enabled by numerous neurophysiological adaptations that increase the nurse bees' alloparental care behavior.

High-speed analysis of large (prote)omics sample sets at the rate of thousands or millions of samples per day on a single platform has been a challenge since the beginning of proteomics. For many years, ESI-based MS methods have dominated proteomics because of their high sensitivity and great depth in analyzing complex proteomes. However, despite improvements in speed, ESI-based MS methods are fundamentally limited by their sample introduction, which excludes off-line sample preparation/fractionation because of the time required to switch between individual samples/sample fractions, and therefore being dependent on the speed of on-line sample preparation methods such as liquid chromatography. Laser-based ionization methods have the advantage of moving from one sample to the next without these limitations, being mainly restricted by the speed of modern sample stages, i.e. 10 ms or less between samples. This speed matches the data acquisition speed of modern high-performing mass spectrometers whereas the pulse repetition rate of the lasers (>1 kHz) provides a sufficient number of desorption/ionization events for successful ion signal detection from each sample at the above speed of the sample stages. Other advantages of laser-based ionization methods include the generally higher tolerance to sample additives and contamination compared with ESI MS, and the contact-less and pulsed nature of the laser used for desorption, reducing the risk of cross-contamination. Furthermore, new developments in MALDI have expanded its analytical capabilities, now being able to fully exploit high-performing hybrid mass analyzers and their strengths in sensitivity and MS/MS analysis by generating an ESI-like stable yield of multiply charged analyte ions. Thus, these new developments and the intrinsically high speed of laser-based methods now provide a good basis for tackling extreme sample analysis speed in the omics.

Sepsis-induced acute kidney injury (S-AKI) is the most common complication in hospitalized and critically ill patients, highlighted by a rapid decline of kidney function occurring a few hours or days after sepsis onset. Systemic inflammation elicited by microbial infections is believed to lead to kidney damage under immunocompromised conditions. However, although AKI has been recognized as a disease with long-term sequelae, partly because of the associated higher risk of chronic kidney disease (CKD), the understanding of kidney pathophysiology at the molecular level and the global view of dynamic regulations in situ after S-AKI, including the transition to CKD, remains limited. Existing studies of S-AKI mainly focus on deriving sepsis biomarkers from body fluids. In the present study, we constructed a mid-severity septic murine model using cecal ligation and puncture (CLP), and examined the temporal changes to the kidney proteome and phosphoproteome at day 2 and day 7 after CLP surgery, corresponding to S-AKI and the transition to CKD, respectively, by employing an ultrafast and economical filter-based sample processing method combined with the label-free quantitation approach. Collectively, we identified 2,119 proteins and 2950 phosphosites through multi-proteomics analyses. Among them, we identified an array of highly promising candidate marker proteins indicative of disease onset and progression accompanied by immunoblot validations, and further denoted the pathways that are specifically responsive to S-AKI and its transition to CKD, which include regulation of cell metabolism regulation, oxidative stress, and energy consumption in the diseased kidneys. Our data can serve as an enriched resource for the identification of mechanisms and biomarkers for sepsis-induced kidney diseases.

Paramphistomosis, caused by the rumen fluke, Calicophoron daubneyi, is a parasitic infection of ruminant livestock which has seen a rapid rise in prevalence throughout Western Europe in recent years. Following ingestion of metacercariae (parasite cysts) by the mammalian host, newly-excysted juveniles (NEJs) emerge and invade the duodenal submucosa which causes significant pathology in heavy infections. The immature larvae then migrate upwards, along the gastrointestinal tract, and enter the rumen where they mature and begin to produce eggs. Despite their emergence, and sporadic outbreaks of acute disease, we know little about the molecular mechanisms used by C. daubneyi to establish infection, acquire nutrients and to avoid the host immune response. Here, transcriptome analysis of four intra-mammalian life-cycle stages, integrated with secretome analysis of the NEJ and adult parasites (responsible for acute and chronic disease respectively), revealed how the expression and secretion of selected families of virulence factors and immunomodulators are regulated in accordance with fluke development and migration. Our data show that whilst a family of cathepsins B with varying S2 sub-site residues (indicating distinct substrate specificities) are differentially secreted by NEJs and adult flukes, cathepsins L and F are secreted in low abundance by NEJs only. We found that C. daubneyi has an expanded family of aspartic peptidases, which is up-regulated in adult worms, although they are underrepresented in the secretome. The most abundant proteins in adult fluke secretions were helminth defence molecules (HDMs) that likely establish an immune environment permissive to fluke survival and/or neutralise pathogen-associated molecular patterns (PAMPs) such as bacterial lipopolysaccharide in the microbiome-rich rumen. The distinct collection of molecules secreted by C. daubneyi allowed the development of the first coproantigen-based ELISA for paramphistomosis which, importantly, did not recognise antigens from other helminths commonly found as co-infections with rumen fluke.

Urinary proteomics studies have primarily focused on identifying markers of chronic kidney disease (CKD) progression. Here, we aimed to determine urinary markers of CKD renal parenchymal injury through proteomics analysis in animal kidney tissues and cells and in the urine of patients with CKD. Label-free quantitative proteomics analysis based on liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry was performed on urine samples obtained from 6 normal controls and 9, 11, and 10 patients with CKD stages 1, 3, and 5, respectively, and on kidney tissue samples from a rat CKD model by 5/6 nephrectomy. Tandem mass tag-based quantitative proteomics analysis was performed for primary cultured glomerular endothelial cells (GECs) and proximal tubular epithelial cells (PTECs) before and after inducing 24-h hypoxia injury. Upon hierarchical clustering, out of 858 differentially expressed proteins (DEPs) in the urine of CKD patients, the levels of 416 decreased and 403 increased sequentially according to the disease stage, respectively. Among 2965 DEPs across 5/6 nephrectomized and sham-operated rat kidney tissues, 86 DEPs showed same expression patterns in the urine and kidney tissue. After cross-validation with two external animal proteome datasets, 38 DEPs were organized; only 10 DEPs, including serotransferrin, gelsolin, poly ADP-ribose polymerase 1, neuroblast differentiation-associated protein AHNAK, microtubule-associated protein 4, galectin-1, protein S, thymosin beta-4, myristoylated alanine-rich C-kinase substrate, and vimentin were finalized by screening human GECs and PTECs data. Among these ten potential candidates for universal CKD marker, validation analyses for protein S and galectin-1 were conducted. Galectin-1 was observed to have a significant inverse correlation with renal function as well as higher expression in glomerulus with chronic injury than protein S. This constitutes the first multi-sample proteomics study for identifying key renal-expressed proteins associated with CKD progression. The discovered proteins represent potential markers of chronic renal cell and tissue damage and candidate contributors to CKD pathophysiology.

The Phillies acquired All-Star catcher J.T. Realmuto from the Marlins on Thursday for catcher Jorge Alfaro, right-hander Sixto Sanchez, left-hander Will Stewart and $250,000 in international bonus slot money, the latest move in a busy and ambitious offseason for a team eager to return to the postseason.

Fans and analysts spend the entire offseason speculating where the top free agents could go, but sometimes an under-the-radar pickup can end up making a world of difference. As positional competitions begin to heat up at Spring Training camps this month, MLB.com's beat writers were asked to identify one potentially overlooked acquisition for each of the 30 clubs. Here's who they came up with.

Leading up to the start of Spring Training, the Around the Horn series will examine each of the Angels' positional groupings heading into the 2019 season. Here's a look at the bullpen.

Fans and analysts spend the entire offseason speculating where the top free agents could go, but sometimes an under-the-radar pickup can end up making a world of difference. As positional competitions begin to heat up at Spring Training camps this month, MLB.com's beat writers were asked to identify one potentially overlooked acquisition for each of the 30 clubs. Here's who they came up with.

Right-hander Matt Harvey sustained a glute strain while participating in agility drills on Wednesday and will be out for roughly a week and a half, Angels manager Brad Ausmus said Thursday.

After undergoing surgery in late June to repair a torn left labrum in his left shoulder that required nine anchors to be inserted to keep everything in place, Zack Cozart is healthy and looking for a bounce-back season with the Angels.

The Angels will be without left fielder Justin Upton early in Spring Training, as he's dealing with right knee patellar tendinitis but is expected to be ready for Opening Day, manager Brad Ausmus said on Monday.

Webinar: South Africa's Economic Recovery Beyond COVID-19 27 May 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 May 2020

Zimbabwe's Economy During the Coronavirus Pandemic and Beyond 8 September 2020 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020

COVID-19 has had a devastating effect on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy. Important foreign currency earning industries have virtually stopped, and across the country livelihoods are at risk and an increasing number of people are reliant on government grants.

Businesses are having to become more flexible but are constrained by a weak policy environment and lack of confidence in the economy. Since 2017, the government has been pursuing an economic reform agenda and Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP), which was scheduled for completion by the end of 2020. The deepening challenges highlight the need to accelerate economic reform and build confidence in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

At this webinar, speakers discuss the measures that government, businesses, and individuals are adopting in response to the COVID-19 economic challenge, and the policies required for recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

The future of global trade: Beyond ‘peak globalization’? 23 November 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2022 Online

Is globalization in retreat?

The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine have highlighted how vulnerable international trade is. But, even before these recent shocks, rising protectionism in major economies around the world and concerns about the environment have weighed heavily on trade.

According to some key measures, the globalization trend appears to have slowed. But is ‘peak globalization’ a reality or a myth? What are the major phases of globaliszation and what might come next? The answer differs between trade in goods, services, capital, technology, data and people. And whether the future is a more integrated or fragmented world economy also depends on politics and the stability of the international order.

Key questions to be tackled at this event includes:

• How do recent shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine, change globalization? 

• What are the key indicators for the global integration of major economies?

• Will there be a split between a US and China-dominated ’trading sphere of influence’?

• Could trade in services offer ‘globalization’ a new phase of rapid growth?

• What impact will technology continue to have on global trade and the future of globalization?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

The discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. The Global Trade Policy Forum is supported by founding partner AIG, associate partner Boston Consulting Group and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo PLC and UPS.

Read the transcript. 

Turkey at a crossroads 4 May 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

What is at stake in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections?

Turkey is heading towards a fateful presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023. These elections are taking place against the background of a deepening economic downturn and a devastating earthquake. The elections will bear a major impact on the future of Turkish democracy, economy and foreign policy. At stake is the nature of Turkey’s political system, its geopolitical identity and the health of its democracy.

To unpack the significance and implications of this election, this event aims to address the following questions:

• What kind of political visions do the main presidential candidates offer for the country?
• How do they differ on the main domestic and foreign policy issues?
• How do the presidential candidates feature in public surveys?
• What does this election mean for Turkey’s foreign policy?
• What is the likely impact of the election on Turkey’s place in the transatlantic alliance and its relations with Europe?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

How do Eurasian kleptocracies earn and use their money? 9 November 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 October 2021 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the presence of corrupt funds from Eurasia in Western democracies, what they are used for, and how they can be constrained.

The Pandora Papers once again shone the spotlight on the UK being home to corrupt funds from kleptocracies, where the ruling elite abuse their political power for private gain.

In recent years much focus has been placed on this term, and the possible effects such money could have on Western democracies.

• How do such states create this wealth in the first place?
• How do these funds make their way to the UK?
• Is the term kleptocracy appropriate for the majority of countries in Eurasia?
• What evidence is there that such funds are ‘weaponized’ to achieve foreign policy goals?

This event discusses the term, how it can be applied, and the differences between how ’grey’ funds are used by various countries. It also highlights how the UK and the wider international community can counteract these flows, both from a legal point of view, and via other methods.

Gorbachev's complex legacy is beyond the popular belief Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

The last major figure with a decisive Cold War role, Mikhail Gorbachev was not as bad as Putin’s Russia portrays him, but also not as heroic as the West thinks.

Arguably the worst year of the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis was 1983, with three major incidents which escalated East-West tensions – and any one of them could have led to a full-scale war.

The first was the Korean Airline KAL007 being shot down by an SU15 fighter aircraft for straying into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 passengers and crew. Then came the identification of signals from Soviet satellites as being incoming US intercontinental ballistic missiles – Colonel Stanislav Petrov, going against all protocols, thankfully decided to report them as a false alarm before he could be sure.

The third was perhaps the most dangerous, being the misinterpretation of a live-fire NATO exercise which was believed by some in both East Germany and Russia to be a front for an imminent attack.

All three incidents occurred in the few months following the infamous March 1983 ‘Star Wars’ speech by US president Ronald Reagan, in which he talked about nuclear arms control and laid out the US case for a ballistic missile defence programme.

At that time Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was the youngest serving member of the USSR Politburo, known to be a favourite of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and it is highly likely he had been aware of these close calls and was part of discussions within Kremlin decision-making circles.

A changemaker both inside and outside the USSR

Following the deaths of Andropov in 1984 and his replacement Konstantin Chernenko in 1985, Gorbachev’s appointment as general secretary of the Communist Party saw him immediately begin to change the Soviet Union from within – and also change relationships with the major Western powers, especially the US, Germany, and the UK.

His policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were primarily aimed at internal reforms but translated into a major reset of international relations and international security. During his six years as leader, Gorbachev initiated many arms control negotiations which resulted in treaties and increased both the transparency and the confidence between the USSR and the US.

These included the 1986 Stockholm Accord which emanated from the Helsinki Process and allowed for the observation and inspection of large-scale military exercises, the 1985 resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks which lead to START I, and the 1987 INF Treaty in which the USSR ‘out-yessed’ the US – the most open and transparent disarmament treaty in terms of notification and verification measures ever agreed.

There was also a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear weapons tests starting from 1985 – which laid the groundwork for the 1996 CTBT – the 1991 Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

The most dramatic moment of all was when Gorbachev and Reagan met at a summit in Reykjavik and came close to deciding to eliminate nuclear weapons – but the initiative failed to reach agreement, mainly because Reagan could not drop his commitment to ballistic missile defences and Gorbachev could not accept the offer of joint development.

Nonetheless, all these nuclear arms control treaties led the way for their descendants which have kept nuclear weapons in check ever since and are still in place in the form of the New START agreement.

But despite these outstanding achievements, Gorbachev had blind spots – such as enabling rather than destroying the USSR bioweapons programme, unlike the US which had dismantled its own bioweapons offensive capability by 1973.

And it is now known that, despite negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia withheld information on new chemical weapons agents – Novichoks – which have since been used to lethal effect by Russia in Salisbury and against figures opposing the current regime.

His misguided faith in a Soviet future

Gorbachev was markedly different to his predecessors as secretary general. He was neither as decrepit nor as hardline, and he understood from the outset that the Soviet Union was, by the 1980s, finally dying.

Using the intellectual abilities of Aleksandr Yakovlev, he forced through the reforms which simultaneously captured the imagination of the free world and liberated his countrymen and women.

But although he built solid relationships – even friendships – with the world’s major heads of state and improved the USSR’s human rights, releasing dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but many – especially Ukrainian dissidents – continued to languish in camps.

The greatest disappointment in Gorbachev’s legacy was he completely believed the USSR could be reformed and still survive as an entity while others, such as Boris Yeltsin and Ronald Reagan, understood it had to be dismantled.

This shortcoming is especially uncomfortable as today’s Russia continues to insist it has a given right to control other former Soviet states, to the extent it is willing to destroy them if they do not concede.

EU-Turkey Customs Union: Lessons for Brexit 15 March 2018 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 March 2018 Chatham House, London

Turkey and the EU are preparing to open negotiations to modernize their 22 year old customs union and expand its scope beyond goods to include services, public procurement and a more liberal regime for agriculture. At the same time, the UK is debating whether to seek a customs union with the EU to facilitate a frictionless flow of goods and to prevent a hard border with Ireland. The speaker will discuss Turkey’s customs union modernization agenda and share his insights on the lessons for the UK’s future relationship with the EU.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

How to Explain Turkey's Early Elections 14 June 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 May 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

On 24 June 2018 Turkey will go to the polls to vote in early presidential and parliamentary elections. Following a constitutional referendum last spring and against the backdrop of Turkey’s continued intervention in Syria and rising economic problems, President Erdogan has argued that an early election would help reduce uncertainty and set the country on a course to greater prosperity. The elections, likely to be held under the state of emergency in place since the attempted coup in July 2016, will also mark the country’s transformation from a parliamentary democracy to one with a powerful executive presidency.

In this session, the speaker will discuss what other factors led President Erdogan to call for an early election, what the state of the opposition is and what we can expect from Turkey should Erdogan win another term.

Turkey Is on the Road to a Severe Economic Crisis Expert comment sysadmin 12 July 2018

The deteriorating state of the economy is President Erdoğan’s Achilles’ heel and the biggest threat to his currently unrivalled leadership.

Fifteen days after Turkey’s parliamentary and presidential elections, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed a new government under radically enhanced executive powers granted by the constitution. He chose 16 loyalists and partisan figures to ensure that he remains front and centre in decision-making and policy formation.

Most notably, Erdoğan sacrificed the former deputy prime minister and ex-Merrill Lynch chief economist Mehmet Şimşek in favour of his inexperienced son-in-law Berat Albayrak as finance and treasury minister to manage the fragile economy. Whether he has the competence to placate jittery financial markets and foreign investors is debatable.

Erdoğan will prioritize short-term growth at all costs to the detriment of macroeconomic and financial stability. That entails foregoing interest rate hikes needed to contain runaway double-digit inflation and to support a plummeting lira that depreciated nearly 20 per cent this year. It also means loosening the purse strings, flooding the markets with cheap credit and sponsoring rampant construction and mega-infrastructure projects.

True to his promise, he has appropriated to himself, by presidential decree, the right to hire the central bank governor, deputies and monetary policy committee members for a four-year term. This completes the politicization of the once-respected and independent central bank and is in line with his unorthodox monetary views that higher interest rates equates with higher inflation.

Erdoğan associates progress with gleaming high-rise buildings, gargantuan infrastructure show-pieces and elevated growth rates. He is spiking the fuel to boost the speed of the sputtering mid-sized Audi-style Turkish economy to achieve superior Ferrari growth rates. As any mechanic knows, these tactics are unsustainable in the long term. Eventually, the engine will burn out.

He does not seem to appreciate that Turkey’s growth model requires an overhaul to join the league of rich economies. It is too reliant on consumer spending and government-sponsored infrastructure and construction projects funded by speculative financial flows rather than on sustained private investment and exports.

Net result: the corporate sector’s foreign-exchange liabilities have climbed to a record $328 billion as of the end of 2017. When netted against foreign-exchange assets, it is still a worrying $214 billion. Its US dollar and euro debt pile has more than doubled since 2008, 80 per cent of which is held by domestic banks. Given these acute balance-of-payments conditions, it is not farfetched that Turkey may impose capital controls in the short-to-medium term to restrict the outflow of foreign assets. At $50 billion, the current account deficit – defined as the sum of the trade balance and financial flows – is not even covered by the central bank’s net international reserves at nearly $45 billion.

Unsurprisingly, some major Turkish companies are negotiating with their bondholders to restructure their sizeable foreign loan obligations as lira devaluation increases the financial burden. Should a significant number of Turkish corporates default on their foreign obligations, this would reverberate across the Turkish economy, cause mass consumer panic, shake the confidence of international financial markets and potentially lead to a crisis within the Turkish financial system and to a deep and prolonged economic recession.

Revealingly, Erdoğan’s nationalist allies, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), refused to join his government. Perhaps Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP leader, learned the lessons of the 2001 financial crisis as a member of a three-party government. So he is opting to project influence from the outside, rather than risk being tainted with responsibility for an economic downturn.

Turkey’s president is doubling down on his singular approach to governance irrespective of the fallout. Notwithstanding his current political dominance, the deteriorating state of the economy is his Achilles’ heel and the biggest threat to his currently unrivalled leadership.

Taking Stock of Turkey's Trade Policy 11 September 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 August 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

As the only large economy outside of the EU with a customs union agreement, Turkey has a unique trade policy. Amid domestic economic challenges, Turkey’s trade minister, Ruhsar Pekcan, will discuss prospects for upgrading the EU-Turkey customs union. She will also discuss relations between the UK and Turkey and outline strategies for post-Brexit trade.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

EU-Turkey Customs Union: Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit 12 December 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 November 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Turkey and the EU have been in a customs union since 1995. Both sides recognize that the current agreement is in need of modernization and have agreed to open negotiations to expand its scope to include services, public procurement, agriculture and other elements that would help bring it into the 21st century.

At the same time, the UK Parliament is debating whether to approve the agreement on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It includes a backstop which – if triggered – would keep the UK and the EU in a single customs territory which would limit the disruption of withdrawal but hamper Britain’s ability to pursue an independent trade policy. The political declaration proposes building on this customs arrangement as the basis for the future relationship.

In this context, the speaker will discuss the current EU-Turkey customs union arrangement and its shortcomings, examine the prospects for its modernization and share his insights on the lessons for the UK’s future trading relationship with the EU.

The event will launch the briefing paper ‘EU-Turkey Customs Union: Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit’.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Middle East 14 May 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Turkey is cooperating closely with Russia to secure its border with Syria and to encourage a long-term political resolution to the Syrian conflict. Its efforts have staved off a humanitarian catastrophe in the northern Syrian province of Idlib and initiated the trilateral ‘Astana Process’ with Russia and Iran as the primary framework to settle the future of Syria.

By contrast, Turkey and the US disagree on a range of important issues including Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air missile defence systems and American support for the PKK-affiliated Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG) in Syria.

In this session, the speaker will outline Turkey’s foreign policy priorities in the Middle East and share his country’s perspectives on the US and Russian policies in that region.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Turkey in 2020 and Beyond: What Lies Ahead for Turkish Politics? 25 November 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Turkey witnessed some major developments over the last year. In August 2018, the dramatic Lira devaluation caused the Turkish economy to go into recession. In the 2019 local elections, which took place during the economic downturn, the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) mayoral candidates took control of Ankara and Istanbul after 25 years of dominance by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The election results might lead to a rethink of the AKP leadership and consequences on Turkish politics will depend on Erdoğan’s interpretation of this reversal of his political fortune.

Will this affect the long-standing alliance between AKP and MHP that has characterised Turkish foreign policy for the past few years? What impact will this have on both the domestic and international level? Finally, will Turkey’s recent incursion into Syria have lasting effect on the country’s alliances with other powers and its standing?

In this context, the speaker will analyse the significance of these changes and the future trajectory of Turkish politics, economics and foreign policy.

Turkey

Research includes Turkey’s domestic politics, its borders with the Middle East region, especially Syria, the future of the Turkish economy, and its role on the international stage.

Democracy and stability remain major issues following the attempted coup of 2016 and the devastating 2023 earthquake, as is the country’s role in the ongoing Syria crisis which affects its borders.

Turkey is also pushing for a stronger voice in multilateral institutions such as NATO and the European Union (EU). It is pushing to be included in future EU free trade agreements, and to simplify procedures for Turkish goods vehicles at its borders with Bulgaria and Greece, and when transiting between EU states.

The country also needs to restore fiscal and monetary prudence, deal with foreign debt in the private sector and focus on productivity-improving economic and institutional reforms to gain the confidence of global financial markets.

A Credit-fuelled Economic Recovery Stores Up Trouble for Turkey Expert comment sysadmin 17 February 2020

Turkey is repeating the mistakes that led to the 2018 lira crisis and another freefall for the currency may not be far off.

Since the 2018 economic crisis, when the value of the lira plummeted and borrowing costs soared, Turkey’s economy has achieved a miraculous ‘V-shaped’ economic recovery from a recession lasting three quarters to a return back to quarterly growth above 1 per cent in the first three months of 2019.

But this quick turnaround has been built on vast amounts of cheap credit used to re-stimulate a consumption and construction boom. This so-called ‘triple C’ economy generated a rapid growth spurt akin to a modestly able professional sprinter injected with steroids.

This has made the currency vulnerable. The lira has steadily depreciated by 11 per cent against the US dollar since the beginning of 2019 and crossed the rate of 6 lira versus the US dollar on 7 February. And there are further warning signs on the horizon.

Credit bonanza

Statistics reveal that Turkish domestic credit grew by around 13 per cent on average throughout 2019. The credit bonanza is still ongoing. Mortgage-backed home sales jumped by a record high of 600 per cent last December alone and the 2019 budget deficit catapulted by 70 per cent due to higher government spending.

Turkey’s central bank fuelled this credit expansion by cutting interest rates aggressively to below inflation and, since the start of this year, purchasing lira-denominated bonds equivalent to around one-third of total acquisitions last year to push yields lower.

Equally, it has linked bank lending to reserve requirements – the money that banks have to keep at the central bank – to boost borrowings via state and private banks. Banks with a ‘real’ loan growth (including inflation) of between 5 and 15 per cent enjoy a 2 per cent reserve ratio on most lira deposits, which authorities adjusted from an earlier band of 10-20 per cent that did not consider double-digit inflation.

Cumulatively, bond purchases (effectively quantitative easing) and reserve management policies have also contributed to eased credit conditions.

Commercial banks have also reduced deposit rates on lira accounts to less than inflation to encourage consumption over saving. Together with low lending rates, the boost to the economy has flowed via mortgages, credit card loans, vehicle leasing transactions and general business borrowings.

Accordingly, stimulus is at the forefront of the government’s economic approach, as it was in 2017 and 2018. It does not seem to be implementing structural change to re-orient growth away from consumption towards productivity.

In addition, governance is, again, a central issue. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s near total monopolization of policymaking means he guides all domestic and external policies. He forced out the previous central bank governor, Murat Cetinkaya, in July 2019 because he did not share the president’s desire for an accelerated pace of interest rate reductions.

New challenges

Despite the similarities, the expected future financial turbulence will be materially different from its 2018 predecessor in four crucial respects.

Firstly, foreign investors will only be marginally involved. Turkey has shut out foreign investors since 2018 from lira-denominated assets by restricting lira swap arrangements. Unsurprisingly, the non-resident holdings of lira bonds has plummeted from 20 per cent in 2018 to less than 10 per cent today.

Secondly, the Turkish government has recently introduced indirect domestic capital controls by constraining most commercial transactions to the lira rather than to the US dollar or euro to reduce foreign currency demand in light of short-term external debt obligations of $191 billion.

Thirdly, the Turkish state banks are intervening quite regularly to soften Lira volatility, thereby transitioning from a ‘free float’ to a ‘managed float’. So far, they have spent over $37 billion over the last two years in a futile effort to buttress the lira. This level of involvement in currency markets cannot be maintained.

Fourthly, the Turkish state is being far more interventionist in the Turkish stock exchange and bond markets to keep asset prices elevated. Government-controlled local funds have participated in the Borsa Istanbul and state banks in sovereign debt to sustain rallies or reverse a bear market.

All these measures have one running idea: exclude foreign investors and no crisis will recur. Yet, when the credit boom heads to a downturn sooner or later, Turks will probably escalate lira conversions to US dollars; 51 per cent of all Turkish bank deposits are already dollar-denominated and the figure is still rising.

If Turkey’s limited foreign reserves cannot satisfy the domestic dollar demand, the government may have to impose comprehensive capital controls and allow for a double digit depreciation in the value of the lira to from its current level, with significant repercussions on Turkey’s political stability and economic climate.

To avoid this scenario, it needs to restore fiscal and monetary prudence, deal the with the foreign debt overhang in the private sector and focus on productivity-improving economic and institutional reforms to gain the confidence of global financial markets and Turks alike.

Webinar: Turkey’s Challenging Post-COVID 19 Outlook 7 May 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 April 2020