Recent advances in MS-based proteomics have vastly increased the quality and scope of biological information that can be derived from human samples. These advances have rendered current workflows increasingly applicable in biomedical and clinical contexts. As proteomics is poised to take an important role in the clinic, associated ethical responsibilities increase in tandem with the impact on the health, privacy, and well-being of individuals. Here we conducted and report a systematic literature review of ethical issues in clinical proteomics. We add our perspectives from a background of bioethics, the results of our accompanying paper extracting individual-sensitive results from patient samples, and the literature addressing similar issues in genomics. The spectrum of potential issues ranges from patient re-identification to incidental findings of clinical significance. The latter can be divided into actionable and unactionable findings. Some of these have the potential to be employed in discriminatory or privacy-infringing ways. However, incidental findings may also have great positive potential. A plasma proteome profile, for instance, could inform on the general health or disease status of an individual regardless of the narrow diagnostic question that prompted it. We suggest that early discussion of ethical issues in clinical proteomics is important to ensure that eventual regulations reflect the considered judgment of the community as well as to anticipate opportunities and problems that may arise as the technology matures further.

Nuclear Disarmament and the Protection of Cultural Heritage Research paper sysadmin 6 October 2017

States possessing nuclear weapons should be called upon to consider and publish the risks posed to cultural heritage, and their mitigation strategies, in their nuclear-weapons doctrines and policies.

Summary

• Renewed risk assessments for nuclear weapons and policies are taking place around the world in light of nuclear modernization and the changing geostrategic environment that is making the use of nuclear weapons more likely. As such the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and tests have received increased attention. However, the effect on cultural heritage has so far been neglected.
• The potential for armed conflict to destroy cultural heritage has been recognized in international law since 1954. There is significant evidence on the impact of nuclear weapons on cultural heritage including the consequences of their use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the effect of nuclear-testing programmes in places of cultural significance since 1945. States that possess nuclear weapons have increased liabilities and responsibilities to protect cultural heritage and cultural rights. The need to protect cultural heritage should strengthen the case for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons.
• Failure to take into account the protection of heritage in the development of nuclear weapons policies – including disarmament, non-proliferation and arms-control negotiations – significantly undermines states’ existing commitments to protecting heritage threatened by conflict.
• Risk assessments of the impact of nuclear weapons on cultural heritage and important cultural artefacts – and methods of preventing such catastrophic damage – should be part of protecting cultural heritage in every country and the subject of informed public debate. A new body of knowledge on the full range of nuclear weapons impacts would introduce a fresh perspective to inform decision-makers, international organizations and the public in thinking about nuclear weapons policies and practices.
• Risk and resilience frameworks, which provide sets of solutions for risk assessments, would allow assessments of nuclear weapons threats to heritage and highlight vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Such frameworks would provide a basis for policymakers to identify the world’s cultural heritage most at risk and help develop mitigation strategies to ensure that it is protected. In particular, states possessing nuclear weapons should be called upon to consider and publish the risks posed to cultural heritage, and their mitigation strategies, in their nuclear weapons doctrines and policies, as a contribution to transparency and confidence-building, and as a responsibility to the world’s shared heritage. International organizations, such as the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), have a role to play in bridging security perspectives with protecting cultural heritage.

Gender-smart Procurement: Policies for Driving Change Research paper sysadmin 14 December 2017

Governments should use public procurement policy as a strategic lever to accelerate gender-inclusive economic growth through the application of state spending power.

• Governments need to rethink public procurement policy. They need to use it as a strategic lever to accelerate gender-inclusive economic growth through the application of state spending power, while maintaining rigorous governance standards. Reform of public procurement to make it more gender-inclusive could create a ‘diversity dividend’ through increased job creation and economic growth. Gender-smart procurement policies could also mitigate economic and business risk by rendering supply chains more diverse.
• In 2014, G20 members agreed to reduce the gender gap in the labour market by 25 per cent by 2025. Procurement policy is one of the most powerful tools governments have to achieve this goal. All G20 members, regardless of the differences in their legal frameworks, can implement measures that will increase the ability of women to benefit from procurement policy.
• Public procurement accounts for around one-fifth of global gross domestic product (GDP). It is estimated that women entrepreneurs supply only 1 per cent of this market. Women’s businesses face considerable barriers to accessing procurement tenders and winning procurement contracts. The inadequate design of many procurement processes prevents more inclusive gender outcomes for citizens. Governments should redefine procurement policies to make explicit the requirement that increasing women’s workforce participation, through greater use of female suppliers, is a key objective when selecting bids for procurement contracts.
• Through the use of policy and spending levers, governments can play four primary roles in encouraging procurement from enterprises owned by women, or from businesses committed to promoting female labour participation. These roles are:
  - To direct reforms of government procurement – reviewing procurement policies and practices to ensure sustainable and inclusive procurement;
  - To reduce barriers to women’s participation in the economy – creating the support mechanisms to ensure an environment in which businesses owned by women can flourish;
  - To help scale up gender-smart procurement in the private sector – expanding government’s role in encouraging private companies to spend more of their procurement budgets with women’s businesses; and
  - To encourage increased transparency on the issues – creating and sharing procurement databases and lessons learned, especially at the regional level.
• Companies can also benefit from having more diverse supply chains and volunteering for accreditation schemes. They can start conversations with government about national regulation that encourages diversity in procurement, leading by example.
• The G20 should set measurable and time-bound targets in the area of gender-smart procurement, to build on the momentum of UN reforms and incorporate good practice in supply chain management.

Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness Research paper sysadmin 9 April 2018

As Libya’s war economy persists, prospects for the restoration of functioning central governance become more distant.

Summary

• Libya suffers from interlinked political, security and economic crises that are weakening state institutions, damaging its economy and facilitating the continued existence of non-state armed groups. As rival authorities continue to compete for power, the resulting fragmentation and dysfunction have provided a fertile environment for the development of a pervasive war economy dependent on violence.
• This war economy is dynamic and constantly in flux. Relative to earlier problems, there were signs of progress on several fronts in 2017: a reduction in human smuggling, a tripling in oil revenues, and increased local action against fuel smuggling. Yet the dynamics that have supported the war economy’s rise remain.
• Libya’s war economy is highly damaging for the future of the state for three reasons:
  • First, it provides an enabling environment for networks of armed groups, criminal networks, corrupt businessmen and political elites to sustain their activities through illicit sales and predatory practices. Their operations are closely linked to the dispensation of violence, and are thus a spur for further conflict.
  • Second, the war economy perpetuates negative incentives for those who profit from the state’s dysfunction. Only effective governance, supported by a durable political settlement, can tackle the foundations of Libya’s war economy. But neither a return to functioning central governance nor the development of a security sector that is fit for purpose is in the interests of war economy profiteers, who are therefore motivated to act as powerful spoilers of reform.
  • Third, the political contestation and resource predation practised by those engaged in the war economy are having a disastrous impact on Libya’s formal economy, undermining what remains of its institutions. As the war economy persists, therefore, the prospects for the restoration of functioning central governance become more distant. This threatens to create a vicious cycle that accelerates further state collapse.
• Due to the limited capacity for coercion available to any actor or entity connected with the state, a strategy of co-opting networks of war economy profiteers has almost exclusively prevailed. This has failed. Drawing on the lessons from these attempts, a more successful policy must pursue targeted measures to combat the enabling structures of Libya’s war economy where possible, and to co-opt war economy profiteers only where necessary.
• In this, state authorities can do more to utilize what power they have to name and shame war economy profiteers in order to weaken the local legitimacy critical to profiteers’ survival. The state must present credible alternative livelihood opportunities to those engaged in, or benefiting from, the war economy. Progress will depend in part on the creation of positive incentives to abandon such activity. Where profiteers cannot be incentivized to move towards more legitimate economic activities, greater and more effective efforts must be made to reduce the profit margins of illicit schemes.
• The international community can do more to support Libyan efforts in countering the war economy. Cooperation over the targeting of criminal groups’ overseas assets, support for increased transparency over the dispensation of state funds, and measures to reduce the viability of illicit activities can all help to strengthen the position of state authorities.

Further reading

Discover the six things you need to know about Libya’s war economy

Exploring Transatlantic Responses to Far-right Populism in Europe: Simulation Exercise Research paper sysadmin 1 May 2018

A new paper summarizes the findings of a recent simulation exercise exploring how governments on both sides of the Atlantic might respond to a descent towards populist authoritarianism in an EU member state.

Summary

• To better understand how governments on both sides of the Atlantic might respond to a descent towards populist authoritarianism in an EU member state, Chatham House organized a simulation event involving a group of experts drawn from the public sector, academia and NGOs.
• Simulation exercises enable the testing and modelling of the responses of different actors when presented with specific situations; participants’ interactions in a given set of circumstances are explored, and patterns of negotiation are captured and analysed.
• In this simulation, European, US and multilateral representatives were given the task of managing relations with Baltia, a fictional Eastern European state on the verge of electing a far-right nationalist, Eurosceptic government. They were then challenged to manage their relationship with Baltia after it had elected such a government, which was pushing for a ‘leave’ vote in a planned referendum on the country’s continued EU membership.
• The simulation highlighted a number of issues:
  • Limited instruments are available to liberal democratic governments where there is cause for concern regarding the outcome of an election in an allied country. There are relatively few tools at the disposal of governments to support political allies, or to prevent outcomes that are perceived as threatening democratic norms. The simulation reinforced the view that interventionist moves, either from the European Commission or from individual national governments, would be more likely to come in response to an unfavourable development rather than pre-emptively.
  • The EU, and caucuses of European states, are the main international interlocutors in this type of political crisis involving an EU member state. The US opted to play a limited role in the negotiations; the same was largely true for NATO, aside from its action in sharing intelligence about a potential coup in Baltia. France and Germany formed a natural working partnership, taking meetings together and coordinating policies first before discussing them with a wider European circle, although their positions did not always align.
  • The UK’s capacity to shape the outcome of collective EU discussions appeared more restricted, while Brexit also seemed to shape the response of other EU states to the developing situation in Baltia. Although member states were undoubtedly reluctant to see another country go down this route, they were also resolute in demonstrating a unity of approach and limited flexibility in the face of the new populist government’s attempt to divide them.

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part One Other resource sysadmin 29 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) jointly organized this four-day meeting at Chatham House for international lawyers to discuss a wide range of issues related to public international law and the rights of individuals.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For China University of Political Science and Law, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The roundtable had a total of 22 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 12 non-Chinese (from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Two Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable meeting in Beijing on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Beijing was hosted by CUPL and involved 20 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing) and 10 non-Chinese (from Australia, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the experts network being built, the second meeting included a mix of participants from the first meeting and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Three Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) and the Graduate Institute Geneva held a two-day roundtable meeting in Geneva on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Geneva was co-hosted by the Graduate Institute Geneva and involved 19 participants, 9 Chinese (from six research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 11 non-Chinese (from eight research institutions in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the third meeting included a mix of participants from the first two meetings and some new participants

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part Four Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable in Beijing on emerging issues of public international law.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting was co-hosted with CUPL and involved 28 participants, consisting of 19 Chinese participants (from six leading research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and nine nonChinese participants (from eight leading research institutions in Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, Switzerland, Canada and Singapore).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the fifth meeting included a mix of participants from the previous meetings and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

New Frontiers in Gender-responsive Governance: Five Years of the W20 Research paper sysadmin 2 November 2018

After five years of the W20, women and gender equality remain at the margin of the G20. There is a real risk of the W20 representing a one-off territorial gain at a frontier that could easily be pushed back again.

Summary

• 2018 marks the fifth anniversary of the first grouping of the W20, the engagement group of the G20 that focuses on gender-inclusive economic growth and advocates for gender equality across the G20 agenda. Formally launched under the Turkish G20 presidency in 2015, the W20 is made up of women from business, international organizations, civil society, think-tanks and academia across the G20 member states.
• This paper takes stock of the critical steps in the development of the W20 over the last five years, examining its background, rationale and foundations, and identifying the areas of economic governance where it has so far contributed the most – and those where more action is needed. The W20 has filled a gap, it but needs to carefully assess its coherence with the UN agencies, the private sector, the G7 and other G20 engagement groups.
• The establishment of the W20 has contributed to defining new frontiers for economic governance and shifting the traditional approach from gender-neutral to gender-responsive. Whereas in 2013 gender in the G20 was considered a marginal issue better dealt with by ministers for equal opportunities, now gender equality and women’s economic empowerment are part of the mainstream economic dialogue. The next step is to ensure more structural and monitored policy reforms at the G20 level.
• Already, the W20 can count among its achievements the ‘25 by 25’ female labour force participation commitment adopted at the G20’s Brisbane summit in 2014, and the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative (We-Fi) and Business Women Leaders’ Taskforce, both agreed at the Hamburg summit in 2017.
• The W20 is constrained in its policy impact by limited engagement with the finance track and a lack of consistent resourcing levels. Addressing these issues would strengthen its role as a credible player in shifting global economic governance while contributing to good gender-responsive domestic policies.
• Progress on gender equality has been too slow and too peripheral to drive change in the relatively short term – over one generation, for example. G20 governments must therefore embrace active, credible policies to bring more women into the labour market, improve access to education and finance, close the pay gap, invest in social infrastructure – especially childcare and assistance for the elderly – and support female entrepreneurs. These domestic policies need to be internationally coordinated so that action and benefits can be widespread.
• A feminist, inclusive agenda at the G20 level should highlight the current empirical evidence of women’s exclusion from the benefit of their economic activity, both in G20 members and beyond. The W20 should also focus on efforts to remedy the lack of women’s representation in G20 processes and in economic governance as a whole.

Proportionality in the Conduct of Hostilities: The Incidental Harm Side of the Assessment Research paper sysadmin 6 December 2018

Clarification of international humanitarian law is important in ensuring compliance with the rule of proportionality, but a culture of compliance within armed forces and groups is also crucial.

Summary

• Military operations are taking place with increasing frequency in densely populated areas. Such operations result in loss of life and harm to civilians, as well as damage to civilian objects, (including infrastructure providing essential services). In order to protect civilians, it is imperative that armed forces and groups comply with the rules of international humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities, including the rule of proportionality.
• The rule of proportionality prohibits attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This research paper analyses the key steps that belligerents must take to give effect to the rule, with a particular focus on one side of proportionality assessments – the expected incidental harm.
• Those undertaking proportionality assessments before or during an attack must consider whether the expected harm will be caused by the attack, and whether that harm could be expected (that is, was it reasonably foreseeable).
• For the purpose of proportionality assessments, injury to civilians includes disease, and there is no reason in principle to exclude mental harm, even though it is currently challenging to identify and quantify it. Damage to civilian objects includes damage to elements of the natural environment.
• Once the incidental harm to be considered has been identified, a value or weight must be assigned to it. This is then balanced against the value or weight of the military advantage anticipated from the attack to determine whether the harm would be excessive.
• In the determination of whether the expected incidental harm would be excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage, ‘excessive’ is a wide but not indeterminate standard.
• Belligerents should develop methodologies so that those planning and deciding attacks are provided with all necessary information on expected incidental harm, and to assist them in assigning weight to the incidental harm to be considered.
• If it becomes apparent that the rule of proportionality will be contravened, the attack in question must be cancelled or suspended.
• Clarification of the law is important in ensuring compliance with the rule of proportionality, but a culture of compliance within armed forces and groups, inculcated by their leaders, is also crucial.

The Costs of Fuelling Humanitarian Aid Research paper sysadmin 7 December 2018

As humanitarian crises become more protracted and aid budgets face unprecedented scrutiny, agencies could save millions by switching from diesel and oil fuels to cleaner energy sources.

Download the accompanying toolkit

Most refugee and internal displacement camps are in remote locations, so humanitarian agencies consume large amounts of fuel on the transport of staff, equipment, and goods such as food and water.

Operations tend to rely on on-site electricity generation to power reception centres, clinics, schools, food storage, water-pumping and street lighting. Despite the essential role of energy in humanitarian action, and the UN’s stated commitment to carbon neutrality by 2020, there is no concerted effort to move away from fossil fuel to date.

Summary points

• Agencies are paying too much for the energy they consume. They are overwhelmingly dependent on oil fuel for electricity generation, even though renewable energy solutions are reducing costs for those deploying them in similar conditions. Well-below-optimum standards of efficiency in buildings, generator use and fleet management are also the norm.
• Agencies typically have few incentives to do things better. There is rarely motivation to conserve fuel, nor performance indicators for energy or fuel use. In addition, energy spending and use lacks transparency.
• Few agencies collect and report on energy use. Where numbers are available, they are usually partial and unverified. Energy costs are rarely transparent in budgets; and donors do not know how much is being spent.
• We estimate that around 5 per cent of humanitarian agencies’ expenditure goes on diesel, petrol and associated costs such as fixing generators. That would mean that the sector spent some $1.2 billion on polluting fuel in 2017.
• Based on current best-practice, the sector could save at least 10 per cent of fuel costs on ground transport, 37 per cent through behaviour change and more efficient technologies, and 60 per cent on generation – all using currently available, affordable and proven practice and technology changes.
• At current prices, this could mean operational savings of over $517 million a year for the humanitarian sector, roughly equal to 5 per cent of UNHCR’s funding gap for 2017.
• In Kenya, annual spending on diesel and petrol for the seven agencies surveyed was $6.7 million in 2017. Replacing gensets with solar systems could create significant savings due the costs of diesel, the likelihood of protracted camp situations, and the opportunities that off-grid solar would offer for extending electricity access to refugees and local populations in Garissa and Turkana counties.
• In Jordan, solar energy now powers the majority of camp facilities and many households. However, the use of grid electricity by humanitarian agencies’ large head offices in Amman remains high and expensive. Improving the energy efficiency of buildings is a priority for savings.
• In Burkina Faso’s Goudoubo camp, NGO offices are desperately short of power – they have no computers or air-conditioning. Investment in renewable forms of energy for this and other camp services such as street lighting and water pumping would enable better service provision, and could drive increased rural energy access among host populations across this area of the Sahel.

Toolkit

An accompanying toolkit, Powering Ahead: Improving How We Use and Account for Energy in Humanitarian Operations, provides practical guidance for humanitarian agencies that want to make energy cost savings and reduce their carbon and emissions footprint.

Innovative Financing for Humanitarian Energy Interventions Research paper sysadmin 28 February 2019

This paper explores the increase in resources and funding needed to improve the access of displaced people to modern and sustainable energy services.

Summary

• In settings that host displaced and refugee communities, energy can act as an enabler for improved healthcare, education and access to clean water. More efficient sources of energy can also save money that can be reinvested in life-saving interventions. A range of challenges exist that inhibit the uptake and effective management of cleaner energy solutions in displacement settings. These are magnified by a lack of available and appropriate funding.
• The current funding gap is significant. In many cases, involving the private sector (both enterprises and investors) is viewed as a way to accelerate delivery of sustainable energy solutions, leverage additional capital, efficiency and expertise, and adopt more sustainable and market-based approaches.
• Displacement settings are an extreme example of complex and unpredictable operating environments. Traditional approaches to the financing of energy access will not be supported by the risk/return characteristics of this market opportunity, so alternative structures are needed.
• Such structures can include mechanisms such as grants, guarantees, ‘results-based financing’ and ‘impact bonds’. These blended financial instruments should aim to leverage first losses – whereby, in the case of default, the first loss is taken by the ‘impact-first’ investors, or guarantors, thereby fully or partially protecting ‘finance-first’ investors.
• Given the specific constraints of displacement settings, any financing mechanisms at present are likely to fall between the categories of providing ‘more efficient aid’ and ‘more efficient aid through markets’. They are likely to constitute a transitional step from grant-making towards the use of commercial investment vehicles.
• While a number of financial mechanisms could be applied to attract private-sector engagement, most remain theoretical, with few being implemented extensively or at scale. Where such financial mechanisms have already been used, access to relevant data is poor, especially in circumstances where the desired outcomes were not achieved.
• The Moving Energy Initiative (MEI) completed feasibility work into the concept of an energy humanitarian fund and found that, while a need for this type of facility has emerged, it sits in a difficult position between energy access, climate and humanitarian funding sources. Key donors are needed to drive forward innovative financing vehicles and further testing of these mechanisms, in order to generate market data and evidence for further iterations and additional investments.

Adopting a Market-based Approach to Boost Energy Access in Displaced Contexts Research paper sysadmin 25 March 2019

This paper evaluates the market-based approaches adopted in the MEI projects in Kenya and Burkina Faso. It articulates how such commercial strategies can be applied to the delivery of energy in displacement settings and compares this to real world examples.

• Development of long-term energy solutions in displacement settings tends to be perceived as investment that falls outside the remit of emergency responses. In addition, when emergency energy supply measures are implemented they often result in expensive, unreliable and unhealthy energy provision for those in protracted or recurrent crises.
• There is widespread agreement among humanitarian and development experts that an effective refugee response should include long-term development solutions as well as emergency relief.
• The energy access imperative is more pronounced when considering the need for effective energy distribution in practically all camp activities and basic necessities: pumping and treatment of clean water; heating and cooling for food storage and cooking; energy for livelihood activities; and provision of light for schooling, hospitals and the prevention of violence against women and children.
• Minor shifts in household energy use to basic solar lighting options and non-wood fuels would save $303 million annually on refugee fuel costs.
• Within refugee contexts in Kenya and Burkina Faso, the MEI sought to examine opportunities to use market interventions, rather than in-kind distributions, to improve clean energy access over the long-term and test the delivery of market-based approaches.

Moving Energy Initiative Learning Briefs Research paper sysadmin 29 March 2019

Drawing on experiences from Phase II of the MEI in Burkina Faso, Kenya and Jordan, these learning briefs highlight MEI’s approach to innovation, engagement with the private-sector and host communities, and gender-sensitive energy projects. The four learning papers are intended for practitioners and policymakers working in the humanitarian sector and host-country governments.

Findings from Phase I of the Moving Energy Initiative (MEI) in 2015, published in the Chatham House research paper Heat, Light and Power for Refugees: Saving Lives, Reducing Costs, highlight the negative impacts of limited sustainable energy provision on the security of displaced populations. The paper also identified some of the challenges for energy programmes in this sector, such as the lack of robust data on energy access and the priorities of refugee populations.

In Phase II of the MEI, Practical Action led detailed research into the energy needs of refugees in Burkina Faso and Kenya. Chatham House analysed data on global refugee energy use in displacement contexts and produced an interactive map. Energy 4 Impact explored sustainable funding options, private-sector contract models and non-wood cooking concessions. The market development and low-carbon energy initiatives in Burkina Faso, Jordan and Kenya were managed by Practical Action and Energy 4 Impact, with the support of local partners. These partners represented the MEI at multiple conferences and events to share findings and advocate for the inclusion of displaced people in the sustainable energy agenda.

Drawing on experiences from Phase II of the MEI in Burkina Faso, Kenya and Jordan, these learning briefs highlight MEI’s approach to innovation, engagement with the private-sector and host communities, and gender-sensitive energy projects. The four learning papers are intended for practitioners and policymakers working in the humanitarian sector and host-country governments.

Artificial Intelligence Prediction and Counterterrorism Research paper sysadmin 6 August 2019

The use of AI in counterterrorism is not inherently wrong, and this paper suggests some necessary conditions for legitimate use of AI as part of a predictive approach to counterterrorism on the part of liberal democratic states.

Summary

• The use of predictive artificial intelligence (AI) in countering terrorism is often assumed to have a deleterious effect on human rights, generating spectres of ‘pre-crime’ punishment and surveillance states. However, the well-regulated use of new capabilities may enhance states’ abilities to protect citizens’ right to life, while at the same time improving adherence to principles intended to protect other human rights, such as transparency, proportionality and freedom from unfair discrimination. The same regulatory framework could also contribute to safeguarding against broader misuse of related technologies.
• Most states focus on preventing terrorist attacks, rather than reacting to them. As such, prediction is already central to effective counterterrorism. AI allows higher volumes of data to be analysed, and may perceive patterns in those data that would, for reasons of both volume and dimensionality, otherwise be beyond the capacity of human interpretation. The impact of this is that traditional methods of investigation that work outwards from known suspects may be supplemented by methods that analyse the activity of a broad section of an entire population to identify previously unknown threats.
• Developments in AI have amplified the ability to conduct surveillance without being constrained by resources. Facial recognition technology, for instance, may enable the complete automation of surveillance using CCTV in public places in the near future.
• The current way predictive AI capabilities are used presents a number of interrelated problems from both a human rights and a practical perspective. Where limitations and regulations do exist, they may have the effect of curtailing the utility of approaches that apply AI, while not necessarily safeguarding human rights to an adequate extent.
• The infringement of privacy associated with the automated analysis of certain types of public data is not wrong in principle, but the analysis must be conducted within a robust legal and policy framework that places sensible limitations on interventions based on its results.
• In future, broader access to less intrusive aspects of public data, direct regulation of how those data are used – including oversight of activities by private-sector actors – and the imposition of technical as well as regulatory safeguards may improve both operational performance and compliance with human rights legislation. It is important that any such measures proceed in a manner that is sensitive to the impact on other rights such as freedom of expression, and freedom of association and assembly.

Centenary Series: Exploring the International Affairs Archive dora.popova 14 September 2020

International Affairs has been a central part of the institute’s history, both as a record of speeches made by dignitaries such as Mahatma Gandhi and Henry Kissinger, and as a forum for policy-relevant academic research.

Delving into the International Affairs archive brings out stories behind some of the most significant players of the last century.

War Time: Temporality and the Decline of Western Military Power Book dora.popova 22 February 2021

In War Time the Western way of war, its pace and timing, are discussed and analysed by experts who question the West’s ability to maintain its military superiority given the political and strategic failures of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In War Time, war studies experts examine the trajectory of Western military power. They discuss conflicting perceptions of time anchored within Western political and military institutions, and the Western attachment to fast-paced warfare at the expense of longer-term political solutions.

Divided into three sections, the book covers ‘civic militarism’ and the trajectory of Western power, Western perceptions of time and the international normative order, and military operations and temporality. War Time explains why the West has been overwhelmingly powerful on the battlefield and yet strategically and politically weak as exemplified by the return of the Taliban and the hasty evacuation of troops and personnel from Afghanistan.

The book identifies policies that decision-makers must adopt to stave off the decline of Western military dominance.

This book is part of the Insights series.

Watch the event

A special event was held in March 2021 to mark the launch of the book. View the event here.

Praise for War Time

About the editors

Sten Rynning is professor of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.

Olivier Schmitt is professor with special responsibilities at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, and currently director of research and studies at the French Institute for Higher National Defence Studies.

Amelie Theussen is assistant professor at the Center for War Studies, University of 
Southern Denmark.

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Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - April 2021 Other resource NCapeling 11 June 2021

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 20 and 30 April 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 937 respondents between 20 and 30 April 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is corrected and weighted by gender, age, size of respondents’ town of residence and education level.

Summary

• After Lukashenka, the most known political figures in Belarus are pro-protest politicians: Tsikhanouskaya, Babaryka, Tsikhanouski, Kalesnikava, Tsapkala and Latushka. Viktar Babaryka is the most popular presidential candidate among Belarusian urban citizens, and Lukashenka comes second to him.
• State organizations and bodies are still mistrusted by more than half the population, while the army is slightly more popular than other bodies. Independent media, labour unions and human rights organizations are trusted far more than state ones.
• Russia leads when it comes to positive attitudes to foreign states: one in three Belarusians feel very positive about their neighbour and 79 per cent feel positive in general. 71 per cent Belarusians feel positive about China, which is the next highest indicator. Despite propaganda efforts, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland and EU states in general are still perceived positively by more than 60 per cent of Belarusians, with fewer than 20 per cent feeling negative about them.
• The position on Russian interference in the Belarusian political crisis is consolidated enough: 58 per cent think that Russia should remain neutral. The rest are almost equally divided between those who think Russia should support the protest movement (19 per cent) and those who think Russia should support Lukashenka (23 per cent).
• 40 per cent have changed their attitude to the Russian government since it supported Lukashenka in the crisis, and 73 per cent are sure that Russia is his sole support.
• While 32 per cent of Belarusians see union with Russia as the most appropriate foreign policy, 46 per cent would like to be in a union with both Russia and the EU simultaneously.
• Almost half the population thinks that Belarusian foreign policy in the event of a pro-protest government coming to power would be oriented toward friendship and cooperation with both Russia and the West, which correlates with how the majority thinks it should be. Although 42 per cent expect foreign policy would lean toward the EU in that situation, which is less acceptable: only 25 per cent think it ‘should’.
• The proportion of respondents who think Belarus should remain in the Collective Security Treaty Organization is 58 per cent, while 35 per cent would like to see Belarus not belonging to any military bloc and a small share (seven per cent) would prefer Belarus to join NATO.
• Almost half of the population considers Lukashenka to be the major obstacle for political stability and economic development and is sure he does not care about, and in fact is a threat to, independence.
• In general, most Belarusians have a consolidated opinion that the authorities should start negotiating with opponents and free all political prisoners.
• More than half of Belarusians think that Lukashenka must leave immediately or before the end of 2021, while 27 per cent think he should leave when his term ends in 2025. The opinion that Lukashenka should rule for another term beginning in 2025 is marginal – only ten per cent support this.
• Expectations are not so optimistic though: only 26 per cent believe he will leave office this year. One in three thinks he will leave in 2025; a further 19 per cent say that he will stay on for further terms in office.
• If Lukashenka doesn’t leave, people expect an increase in emigration and unemployment, the continuation of repression in all areas of life, falling exchange rates and the tightening of dependency on Russia.
• Opinion on abortions is still consolidated, with only 19 per cent thinking they should be banned in most or all cases. The same applies to Lukashenka’s infamous statement that society in Belarus is not ready to have a female president: only 20 per cent agree with the opinion.
• 52 per cent don’t think there is a problem of wage inequality between men and women in Belarus, while 37 per cent do see an issue.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - Nov 2021 Other resource NCapeling 20 January 2022

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 1 and 10 November 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 767 respondents between 1 and 10 November 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is adjusted by gender, age, education level and the size of respondents’ place of residence.

Summary

• After Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the most well-known political figures in Belarus are the protest leaders: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Viktar Babaryka, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Valery Tsapkala, Marya Kalesnikava and Pavel Latushka.
• Lukashenka and Babaryka have the highest popularity ratings among Belarus’s urban population. At the same time, Lukashenka has a high negative rating: half of the city residents surveyed say that they would never vote for him. Babaryka has one of the lowest negative ratings in the country.
• The popularity ratings of pro-government politicians are low, and their negative ratings remain extremely high, although the latter have decreased slightly in comparison with July 2021. The popularity ratings of protest leaders are significantly higher than those of politicians who support the current government.
• Trust in state and independent organizations is polarized along political lines. Thus, respondents classed as hardcore protesters do not trust state structures and do trust independent ones, while Lukashenka’s supporters hold the opposite positions.
• Belarusians’ geopolitical orientations remain stable. The most widely preferred option for a geopolitical union is simultaneous integration with the EU and Russia.
• Belarusians have become increasingly negative about the possibility that Russian airbases could be established on Belarusian territory (48 per cent in November 2021, compared to 39 per cent in July 2021).
• Belarusians are now feeling more strongly that the situation concerning the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened: in November, more than half were beginning to respond that Belarus is unable to cope with the spread of coronavirus.
• Sanctions against Lukashenka and those around him are supported more widely than sanctions against state enterprises.
• Belarusians feel there is acute social tension in their country: almost everyone surveyed states that social tension exists, while one in every five respondents considers the situation catastrophic. A perception that there is social tension is closely related to many factors, with the strongest of all being a sense of a lack of personal safety.
• Only one-third of Belarusians are prepared to call the state built under Lukashenka their own. Most of the survey respondents do not trust this state to some degree, and do not believe that the state protects the interests of Belarusian citizens.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

• Belarusians’ views on the political crisis (PDF)

• Взгляды белорусов на политический кризис (PDF)

100 years of International Affairs Other resource dora.popova 1 March 2023

Charting a century of key moments in international relations and International Affairs.

International Affairs was created to be a record of speeches given by visiting dignitaries at Chatham House. Over the last 100 years, the journal has evolved into an independent academic journal publishing work of the highest quality.

On the fringes of the Paris peace conference Lionel Curtis called for an organization whose purpose would be to foster mutual understanding of and between nations. Chatham House was established in 1920 and for much of the time since, International Affairs has been a central part of the institute’s publishing output.

As such, for most of its history, contributions to the journal have reflected the prevailing attitudes of the time, both in terms of who was published and the content of their work. Perhaps the most important change over the last century has been the increasing diversity of voices and perspectives published in IA’s pages. Today, as the journal enters its second century, it publishes authors from across the globe. Yet the editorial team is all too aware there is still much to do.

Keep reading to explore the journal’s history and to find out more about our second century.

The drawings in this timeline were commissioned by the International Affairs team from Sequential Potential Comics.

In nucleotide excision repair, bulky DNA lesions such as UV-induced cyclobutane pyrimidine dimers are removed from the genome by concerted dual incisions bracketing the lesion, followed by gap filling and ligation. So far, two dual-incision patterns have been discovered: the prokaryotic type, which removes the damage in 11–13-nucleotide-long oligomers, and the eukaryotic type, which removes the damage in 24–32-nucleotide-long oligomers. However, a recent study reported that the UvrC protein of Mycobacterium tuberculosis removes damage in a manner analogous to yeast and humans in a 25-mer oligonucleotide arising from incisions at 15 nt from the 3´ end and 9 nt from the 5´ end flanking the damage. To test this model, we used the in vivo excision assay and the excision repair sequencing genome-wide repair mapping method developed in our laboratory to determine the repair pattern and genome-wide repair map of Mycobacterium smegmatis. We find that M. smegmatis, which possesses homologs of the Escherichia coli uvrA, uvrB, and uvrC genes, removes cyclobutane pyrimidine dimers from the genome in a manner identical to the prokaryotic pattern by incising 7 nt 5´ and 3 or 4 nt 3´ to the photoproduct, and performs transcription-coupled repair in a manner similar to E. coli.

The faithful segregation, or “partition,” of many low-copy number bacterial plasmids is driven by plasmid-encoded ATPases that are represented by the P1 plasmid ParA protein. ParA binds to the bacterial nucleoid via an ATP-dependent nonspecific DNA (nsDNA)-binding activity, which is essential for partition. ParA also has a site-specific DNA-binding activity to the par operator (parOP), which requires either ATP or ADP, and which is essential for it to act as a transcriptional repressor but is dispensable for partition. Here we examine how DNA binding by ParA contributes to the relative distribution of its plasmid partition and repressor activities, using a ParA with an alanine substitution at Arg351, a residue previously predicted to participate in site-specific DNA binding. In vivo, the parAR351A allele is compromised for partition, but its repressor activity is dramatically improved so that it behaves as a “super-repressor.” In vitro, ParAR351A binds and hydrolyzes ATP, and undergoes a specific conformational change required for nsDNA binding, but its nsDNA-binding activity is significantly damaged. This defect in turn significantly reduces the assembly and stability of partition complexes formed by the interaction of ParA with ParB, the centromere-binding protein, and DNA. In contrast, the R351A change shows only a mild defect in site-specific DNA binding. We conclude that the partition defect is due to altered nsDNA binding kinetics and affinity for the bacterial chromosome. Furthermore, the super-repressor phenotype is explained by an increased pool of non-nucleoid bound ParA that is competent to bind parOP and repress transcription.

Faithful replication of the mitochondrial genome is carried out by a set of key nuclear-encoded proteins. DNA polymerase γ is a core component of the mtDNA replisome and the only replicative DNA polymerase localized to mitochondria. The asynchronous mechanism of mtDNA replication predicts that the replication machinery encounters dsDNA and unique physical barriers such as structured genes, G-quadruplexes, and other obstacles. In vitro experiments here provide evidence that the polymerase γ heterotrimer is well-adapted to efficiently synthesize DNA, despite the presence of many naturally occurring roadblocks. However, we identified a specific G-quadruplex–forming sequence at the heavy-strand promoter (HSP1) that has the potential to cause significant stalling of mtDNA replication. Furthermore, this structured region of DNA corresponds to the break site for a large (3,895 bp) deletion observed in mitochondrial disease patients. The presence of this deletion in humans correlates with UV exposure, and we have found that efficiency of polymerase γ DNA synthesis is reduced after this quadruplex is exposed to UV in vitro.

All 30 Major League teams will wear special "MLB 150" patches on their uniforms for the entire 2019 season in honor of the 150th anniversary of the 1869 Cincinnati Red Stockings, the first openly all-salaried professional baseball team.

A slimmed down Maikel Franco and a bulked up Scott Kingery will compete for playing time at third base this season.

Aaron Nola established himself as one of the best pitchers in baseball in 2018. The Phillies ensured on Wednesday that he will be the ace in their rotation for possibly the next five seasons.

General Manager Matt Klentak discussed the Phillies' offseason in a press conference on Thursday in Clearwater, Fla. The Phillies remain in contact with the agents for Bryce Harper and Manny Machado. The belief is that the front office still prefers Machado over Harper because of Machado's combination of offense and defense.

Jake Arrieta on Thursday offered an unexpected explanation for his second-half struggles in 2018: he pitched much of last season with an injured left knee.

Phillies president Andy MacPhail opened a 28-minute press conference on Friday afternoon at Spectrum Field with facts and figures about investments the organization made the past few seasons as the team wallowed at the bottom of the National League. Then MacPhail talked a lot about Bryce Harper and Manny Machado as well as manager Gabe Kapler.

Jean Segura became one of the Phillies' most notable offseason acquisitions, a two-time All-Star expected to give the organization its best overall production at shortstop since Jimmy Rollins left town, in part because of a little brawl he had late last season with Mariners teammate Dee Gordon.

The Phillies have been the favorites in the Bryce Harper sweepstakes for months, and that speculation heated up over the weekend.

The Phillies list isn't quite as strong as it once was because of the Realmuto deal, but there's still some very good talent at the top and some exciting players on the rise.

Will Rhys Hoskins be bummed if Bryce Harper signs elsewhere?

Bryce Harper is the final superstar standing for the Phillies.

Leading up to the start of Spring Training, the Around the Horn series will examine each of the Angels' positional groupings heading into the 2019 season. Here's a look at the bullpen.

MLB.com looked at each team's two highest-ranked position players in WAR, according to the Steamer projections. Here are the top 10, but keep in mind that things could change once Manny Machado and Bryce Harper find homes.

All 30 Major League teams will wear special "MLB 150" patches on their uniforms for the entire 2019 season in honor of the 150th anniversary of the 1869 Cincinnati Red Stockings, the first openly all-salaried professional baseball team.

The 2019 MLB season feels so close now. Spring Training has begun. Players are taking the field. So it's time to rank the best of the best.

Right-hander Matt Harvey sustained a glute strain while participating in agility drills on Wednesday and will be out for roughly a week and a half, Angels manager Brad Ausmus said Thursday.

After undergoing surgery in late June to repair a torn left labrum in his left shoulder that required nine anchors to be inserted to keep everything in place, Zack Cozart is healthy and looking for a bounce-back season with the Angels.

The Angels will be without left fielder Justin Upton early in Spring Training, as he's dealing with right knee patellar tendinitis but is expected to be ready for Opening Day, manager Brad Ausmus said on Monday.