9

Light-induced radiosynthesis of 89ZrDFO-azepin-onartuzumab for imaging the hepatocyte growth factor receptor

Methods that provide rapid access to radiolabeled antibodies are vital in the development of diagnostic and radiotherapeutic agents for positron emission tomography (PET) or radioimmunotherapy. The human hepatocyte growth factor receptor (c-MET) signaling pathway is dysregulated in a number of malignancies including gastric cancer, and is an important biomarker in drug discovery. Here, we used a photoradiochemical approach to produce 89Zr-radiolabeled onartuzumab (a monovalent, anti-human c-MET antibody), starting directly from the fully formulated drug (MetMAb). Methods: Simultaneous 89Zr-radiolabeling and protein conjugation was performed in one-pot reactions containing 89Zr-oxalate, the photoactive chelate DFO-aryl azide (DFO-ArN3) and MetMAb to give 89ZrDFO-azepin-onartuzumab. As a control, 89ZrDFO-Bn-NCS-onartuzumab was prepared via a conventional two-step process using pre-purified onartuzumab and DFO-Bn-NCS. Radiotracers were purified by using size-exclusion methods and evaluated by radiochromatography. Radiochemical stability was studied in human serum and immunoreactivity was determined by cellular binding assays using MKN-45 gastric carcinoma cells. PET imaging at multiple time points (0–72 h) was performed in female athymic nude mice bearing subcutaneous MKN-45 xenografts. Biodistribution experiments were performed after the final image. Tumor specificity of 89ZrDFO-azepin-onartuzumab was assessed by competitive inhibition (blocking) studies. Results: Initial photoradiosynthesis experiments produced 89ZrDFO-azepin-onartuzumab in <15 min. with an isolated decay-corrected radiochemical yield (RCY) of 24.8%, a radiochemical purity (RCP) ~90% and a molar activity (Am) of ~1.5 MBq nmol-1. Reaction optimization improved the radiochemical conversion (RCC) of 89ZrDFO-azepin-onartuzumab to 56.9±4.1% (n = 3), with isolated RCYs of 41.2±10.6% (n = 3), and RCPs >90%. Conventional methods produced 89ZrDFO-Bn-NCS-onartuzumab with isolated RCY >97%, RCP >97% and Am ~14.0 MBq nmol-1. Both radiotracers were immunoreactive and stable in human serum. PET imaging and biodistribution studies showed high tumor uptake for both radiotracers. By 72 h, tumor and liver uptake reached 15.37±5.21 %ID g-1, 6.56±4.03 %ID g-1, respectively for 89ZrDFO-azepin-onartuzumab (n = 4), and 21.38±11.57 %ID g-1 and 18.84±6.03 %ID g-1 for 89ZrDFO-Bn-NCS-onartuzumab (n = 4). Blocking experiments gave a statistically significant reduction in tumor uptake (6.34±0.47 %ID g-1) of 89ZrDFO-azepin-onartuzumab (n = 4). Conclusion: Experiments demonstrate that photoradiosynthesis is a viable alternative approach for producing 89Zr-radiolabeled antibodies direct in protein formulation buffer which reduces protein aggregation and liver uptake.




9

Quantification of PD-L1 expression with [18F]BMS-986192 PET/CT in patients with advanced stage non-small-cell lung cancer

The aim of this work was to quantify the uptake of [18F]BMS-986192, a PD-L1 adnectin PET tracer, in patients with non-small-cell lung cancer (NSCLC). To this end, plasma input kinetic modeling of dynamic tumor uptake data with online arterial blood sampling was performed. In addition, the accuracy of simplified uptake metrics such as standardized uptake value (SUV) was investigated. Methods: Data from a study with [18F]BMS-986192 in patients with advanced stage NSCLC eligible for nivolumab treatment were used if a dynamic scan was available and lesions were present in the field of view of the dynamic scan. After injection of [18F]BMS-986192, a 60-minutes dynamic PET-CT scan was started, followed by a 30-min whole body PET-CT scan. Continuous arterial and discrete arterial and venous blood sampling were performed to determine a plasma input function. Tumor time activity curves were fitted by several plasma input kinetic models. Simplified uptake parameters included tumor to blood ratio as well as several SUV measures. Results: Twenty two tumors in nine patients were analyzed. The arterial plasma input single-tissue reversible compartment model with fitted blood volume fraction seems to be the most preferred model as it best fitted 11 out of 18 tumor time activity curves. The distribution volume VT ranged from 0.4 to 4.8 mL·cm-3. Similar values were obtained with an image derived input function. From the simplified measures, SUV normalized for body weight (SUVBW) at 50 and 67 minutes post injection correlated best with VT, with an R2 > 0.9. Conclusion: A single tissue reversible model can be used for the quantification of tumor uptake of the PD-L1 PET tracer [18F]BMS-986192. SUVBW at 60 minutes post injection, normalized for body weight, is an accurate simplified parameter for uptake assessment of baseline studies. In order to assess its predictive value for response evaluation during PD-(L)1 immune checkpoint inhibition further validation of SUV against VT based on an image derived input function is recommended.




9

Design and development of 99mTc labeled FAPI-tracers for SPECT-imaging and 188Re therapy.

The majority of epithelial tumors recruits fibroblasts and other non-malignant cells and activates them into cancer-associated fibroblasts. This often leads to overexpression of the membrane serine protease fibroblast-activating protein (FAP). It has already been shown that DOTA-bearing FAP inhibitors (FAPIs) generate high contrast images with PET/CT scans. Since SPECT is a lower cost and more widely available alternative to PET, 99mTc-labeled FAPIs represent attractive tracers for imaging applicable in a larger number of patients. Furthermore, the chemically homologous nuclide 188Re is available from generators, which allows FAP-targeted endoradiotherapy. Methods: For the preparation of 99mTc tricarbonyl complexes, a chelator was selected whose carboxylic acids can easily be converted into various derivatives in the finished product. This enabled a platform strategy based on the original tracer. The obtained 99mTc complexes were investigated in vitro by binding and competition experiments on FAP-transfected HT-1080 (HT-1080-FAP) and/or on mouse FAP expressing (HEK-muFAP) and CD26-expressing (HEKCD26) HEK cells and characterized by planar scintigraphy and organ distribution studies in tumor-bearing mice. Furthermore, a first-in-man application was done in two patients with ovarian and pancreatic cancer, respectively. Results: 99mTc-FAPI-19 showed specific binding to recombinant FAP-expressing cells with high affinity. Unfortunately, liver accumulation, biliary excretion and no tumor uptake were observed in the planar scintigraphy of a HT-1080-FAP xenotranplanted mouse. To improve the pharmacokinetic properties hydrophilic amino acids were attached to the chelator moiety of the compound. The resulting 99mTc-labeled FAPI tracers revealed excellent binding properties (up to 45 % binding; above 95 % internalization), high affinity (IC50 = 6.4 nM to 12.7 nM), and significant tumor uptake (up to 5.4 %ID/g) in biodistribution studies. The lead candidate 99mTc-FAPI-34 was applied for diagnostic scintigraphy and SPECT of patients with metastasized ovarian and pancreatic cancer for follow-up to therapy with 90Y-FAPI-46. 99mTc-FAPI-34 accumulated in the tumor lesions also shown in PET/CT imaging using 68Ga-FAPI-46. Conclusion: 99mTc-FAPI-34 represents a powerful tracer for diagnostic scintigraphy, especially in cases where PET imaging is not available. Additionally, the chelator used in this compound allows labeling with the therapeutic nuclide 188Re which is planned for the near future.




9

Prognostic Value of 18F-FDG PET/CT in a Large Cohort of 495 Patients with Advanced Metastatic Neuroendocrine Neoplasms (NEN) Treated with Peptide Receptor Radionuclide Therapy (PRRT)

The objective of this retrospective study was to determine the role of 18F-FDG PET/CT in a large cohort of 495 patients with metastatic neuroendocrine neoplasms (NENs) who were treated with peptide receptor radionuclide therapy (PRRT) with a long-term follow-up. Methods: The 495 patients were treated with 177Lu- and/or 90Y- DOTATOC/DOTATATE PRRT between 2/2002 and 7/2018. All subjects received both 68Ga-DOTATOC/TATE/NOC and 18F-FDG PET/CT prior to treatment and were followed 3-189 months. Kaplan-Meier analysis, log-rank test (Mantel-Cox), and Cox regression analysis were performed for overall survival (OS) and progression-free survival (PFS). Results: 199 patients (40.2%) presented with pancreatic NEN, 49 with CUP (cancer of unknown primary), 139 with midgut NEN, whereas the primary tumor was present in the rectum in 20, in the lung in 38, in the stomach in 8 and other locations in 42 patients. FDG-PET/CT was positive in 382 (77.2%) patients and 113 (22.8%) were FDG-negative before PRRT, while 100% were 68Ga-DOTATOC/TATE/NOC positive. For all patients, the median PFS and OS, defined from start of PRRT, were 19.6 mo and 58.7 mo, respectively. Positive FDG predicted shorter PFS (18.5 mo vs 24.1 mo; P = 0.0015) and OS (53.2 mo vs 83.1 mo; P < 0.001) than negative FDG. Amongst the pancreatic NEN, the median OS was 52.8 mo in FDG positive and 114.3 mo in FDG negative subjects (P = 0.0006). For all patients with positive 18F-FDG uptake, and a ratio of the highest SUVmax on 68Ga-SSTR PET to the most 18F-FDG-avid tumor lesions >2, the median OS was 53.0 mo, compared to 43.4 mo in those patients with a ratio <2 (P = 0.030). For patients with no 18F-FDG uptake (complete "mismatch" imaging pattern), the median OS was 108.3 mo vs 76.9 mo for SUVmax >15.0 and ≤15.0 on 68Ga-SSTR PET/CT, respectively. Conclusion: The presence of positive lesions on 18F-FDG PET is an independent prognostic factor in patients with NEN treated with PRRT. Metabolic imaging with 18F-FDG PET/CT compliments the molecular imaging aspect of 68Ga-SSTR PET/CT for the prognosis of survival after PRRT. High SSTR expression combined with negative 18F-FDG PET/CT imaging is associated with the most favorable long-term prognosis.




9

The role of Nuclear Medicine for COVID-19 - Time to act now.




9

Letter to the Editor: Who was the first doctor to report the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China?




9

Yttrium-90 Radioembolization: Telemedicine during COVID-19 outbreak, opportunity for prime time.




9

The Impact of Radiobiologically-Informed Dose Prescription on the Clinical Benefit of Yttrium-90 SIRT in Colorectal Cancer Patients

The purpose of this study was to establish the dose-response relationship of selective internal radiation therapy (SIRT) in patients with metastatic colorectal cancer (mCRC), when informed by radiobiological sensitivity parameters derived from mCRC cell lines exposed to yttrium-90 (90Y). Methods: 23 mCRC patients with liver metastases refractory to chemotherapy were included. 90Y bremsstrahlung SPECT images were transformed into dose maps assuming the local dose deposition method. Baseline and follow-up CT scans were segmented to derive liver and tumor volumes. Mean, median, and D70 (minimum dose to 70% of tumor volume) values determined from dose maps were correlated with change in tumor volume and vRECIST response using linear and logistic regression, respectively. Radiosensitivity parameters determined by clonogenic assays of mCRC cell lines HT-29 and DLD-1 after exposure to 90Y or external beam radiotherapy (EBRT; 6MV photons) were used in biological effective dose (BED) calculations. Results: Mean administered radioactivity was 1469±428 MBq (847-2185 MBq), achieving a mean radiation absorbed tumor dose of 35.5±9.4 Gy and mean normal liver dose of 26.4±6.8 Gy. A 1.0 Gy increase in mean, median, and D70 absorbed dose was associated with reduction in tumor volume of 1.8%, 1.8%, and 1.5%, respectively, and increased probability of vRECIST response (odds ratio: 1.09, 1.09, and 1.10 respectively). Threshold mean, median and D70 doses for response were 48.3, 48.8, and 41.8 Gy respectively. EBRT-equivalent BEDs for 90Y are up to 50% smaller than those calculated by applying protraction-corrected radiobiological parameters derived from EBRT alone. Conclusion: Dosimetric studies have assumed equivalence between 90Y SIRT and EBRT, leading to inflation of BED for SIRT and possible under-treatment. Radiobiological parameters for 90Y were applied to a BED model, providing a calculation method that has the potential to improve assessment of tumor control.




9

Reshaping the amyloid buildup curve in Alzheimer's disease? - Partial volume effect correction of longitudinal amyloid PET data

It was hypothesized that the brain β-amyloid buildup curve plateaus at an early symptomatic Alzheimer's disease (AD) stage. Atrophy-related partial volume effects (PVEs) degrade signal in hot-spot imaging techniques, such as amyloid positron emission tomography (PET). This longitudinal analysis of amyloid-sensitive PET data investigated the shape of the β-amyloid curve in AD applying PVE correction (PVEC). We analyzed baseline and 2-year follow-up data of 216 symptomatic individuals on the AD continuum (positive amyloid status) enrolled in Alzheimer's Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (17 AD dementia, 199 mild cognitive impairment), including 18F-florbetapir PET, magnetic resonance imaging and mini mental state examination (MMSE) scores. For PVEC, the modified Müller-Gärtner method was performed. Compared to non-PVE-corrected data, PVE-corrected data yielded significantly higher regional and composite standardized uptake value ratio (SUVR) changes over time (P=0.0002 for composite SUVRs). Longitudinal SUVR changes in relation to MMSE decreases showed a significantly higher slope of the regression line in the PVE-corrected as compared to the non-PVE-corrected PET data (F=7.1, P=0.008). These PVEC results indicate that the β-amyloid buildup curve does not plateau at an early symptomatic disease stage. A further evaluation of the impact of PVEC on the in-vivo characterization of time-dependent AD pathology, including the reliable assessment and comparison of other amyloid tracers, is warranted.




9

Molecular imaging of PD-L1 expression and dynamics with the adnectin-based PET tracer 18F-BMS-986192

18F-BMS-986192, an adnectin-based human programmed cell death ligand 1 (PD-L1) tracer, was developed to non-invasively determine whole-body PD-L1 expression by positron emission tomography (PET). We evaluated usability of 18F-BMS-986192 PET to detect different PD-L1 expression levels and therapy-induced changes of PD-L1 expression in tumors. Methods: In vitro binding assays with 18F-BMS-986192 were performed in human tumor cell lines with different total cellular and membrane PD-L1 protein expression levels. Subsequently, PET imaging was executed in immunodeficient mice xenografted with these cell lines. Mice were treated with interferon gamma (IFN) intraperitoneally for 3 days or with the mitogen-activated protein kinase kinase (MEK1/2) inhibitor selumetinib by oral gavage for 24 hours. Thereafter 18F-BMS-986192 was administered intravenously, followed by a 60-minute dynamic PET scan. Tracer uptake was expressed as percentage injected dose per gram tissue (%ID/g). Tissues were collected to evaluate ex vivo tracer biodistribution and to perform flow cytometric, Western blot, and immunohistochemical tumor analyses. Results: 18F-BMS-986192 uptake reflected PD-L1 membrane levels in tumor cell lines, and tumor tracer uptake in mice was associated with PD-L1 expression measured immunohistochemically. In vitro IFN treatment increased PD-L1 expression in the tumor cell lines and caused up to 12-fold increase in tracer binding. In vivo, IFN did neither affect PD-L1 tumor expression measured immunohistochemically nor 18F-BMS-986192 tumor uptake. In vitro, selumetinib downregulated cellular and membrane levels of PD-L1 of tumor cells by 50% as measured by Western blotting and flow cytometry. In mice, selumetinib lowered cellular, but not membrane PD-L1 levels of tumors and consequently no treatment-induced change in 18F-BMS-986192 tumor uptake was observed. Conclusion: 18F-BMS-986192 PET imaging allows detection of membrane-expressed PD-L1, as soon as 60 minutes after tracer injection. The tracer can discriminate a range of tumor cell PD-L1 membrane expression levels.




9

NEMESIS: Non-inferiority, Individual Patient Meta-analysis of Selective Internal Radiation Therapy with Yttrium-90 Resin Microspheres versus Sorafenib in Advanced Hepatocellular Carcinoma

In randomized clinical trials (RCTs), no survival benefit has been observed for selective internal radiotherapy (SIRT) over sorafenib in patients with advanced hepatocellular carcinoma (aHCC). This study aimed to assess by means of a meta-analysis whether overall survival (OS) with SIRT, as monotherapy or followed by sorafenib, is non-inferior to sorafenib, and compare safety profiles for patients with aHCC. Methods: We searched MEDLINE, EMBASE, and the Cochrane Library up to February 2019 to identify RCTs comparing SIRT as monotherapy, or followed by sorafenib, to sorafenib monotherapy among patients with aHCC. The main outcomes were OS and frequency of treatment-related severe adverse events (AEs grade ≥3). The per-protocol population was the primary analysis population. A non-inferiority margin of 1.08 in terms of hazard ratio (HR) was pre-specified for the upper boundary of 95% confidence interval (CI) for OS. Pre-specified subgroup analyses were performed. Results: Three RCTs, involving 1,243 patients, comparing sorafenib with SIRT (SIRveNIB and SARAH) or SIRT followed by sorafenib (SORAMIC), were included. After randomization, 411/635 (64.7%) patients allocated to SIRT and 522/608 (85.8%) allocated to sorafenib completed the studies without major protocol deviations. Median OS with SIRT, whether or not followed by sorafenib, was non-inferior to sorafenib (10.2 and 9.2 months, [HR 0.91, 95% CI 0.78–1.05]). Treatment-related severe adverse events were reported in 149/515 patients (28.9%) who received SIRT and 249/575 (43.3%) who received sorafenib only (p<0.01). Conclusion: SIRT as initial therapy for aHCC is non-inferior to sorafenib in terms of OS, and offers a better safety profile.




9

Editor's Page: Unacceptable Denials




9

Inclusive Growth and Job Creation in Africa: The Outlook for 2019 and Beyond

Invitation Only Research Event

30 September 2019 - 1:30pm to 2:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director, African Department, International Monetary Fund
Chair: Elizabeth Donnelly, Deputy Head and Research Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

The IMF projects real GDP growth of 3.3 per cent in 2019 for sub-Saharan Africa but there is a mixed picture across the continent with growth in Mauritania, Senegal, Ethiopia and Rwanda outstripping projected growth rates for South Africa and Nigeria, for example, while a handful of economies seek to emerge from crisis. Yet, as is increasingly well documented, even strong growth has not delivered lasting socio-economic transformation in many contexts. And that most pressing of needs – job creation including to accommodate, in the next 15 years, an increase in the working age population greater than that in the rest of the world combined – remains a pressing concern for governments and societies. With populations continuing to grow at faster rates than economic growth, and a significant proportion of jobs outside agriculture being in the informal sector, investment in formal labour markets is crucial to creating inclusive economic growth.
 
At this event, the International Monetary Fund’s Africa Director, Abebe Aemro Selassie will discuss the outlook for sub-Saharan African economies in 2019 and progress towards achieving inclusive economic growth to accommodate future demographic change.
 
Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Yusuf Hassan

Parliamentary and Media Outreach Assistant, Africa Programme
+44 (0) 20 7314 3645




9

Côte d'Ivoire’s 2020 Elections: Contestation and Change

Invitation Only Research Event

8 November 2019 - 12:00pm to 1:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Hon Guillaume Soro, Chairman, Rassemblement Pour la Côte d’Ivoire (RACI)
Chair: Paul Melly, Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

As Côte d'Ivoire enters a critical final 12 months before presidential elections scheduled for October 2020, the political atmosphere remains highly uncertain, stoked by the fracturing of the RDR-PDCI alliance and the potential candidacy of a range of high-profile political names. While President Ouattara’s two terms in office have ushered in an improved business environment, with annual economic growth averaging 8 per cent since 2012, political instability over the next 12 months may pose a threat to recent progress and raises wider security concerns in light of the major post-election violence witnessed a decade previously.

At this event, Ivorian presidential contender, and former prime minister and parliamentary speaker, Guillaume Soro, will assess the prime-election context in Côte d'Ivoire and the policies required to deliver inclusive growth and future stability for its citizens.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Sahar Eljack

Programme Administrator, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3660




9

Understanding South Africa's Political Landscape

Members Event

14 November 2019 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Carien du Plessis, Journalist; Co-Author, Understanding South Africa

James Hamill, Associate Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies; Author, Africa's Lost Leader: South Africa's Continental Role Since Apartheid

Martin Plaut, Senior Researcher, Institute of Commonwealth Studies; Co-Author, Understanding South Africa

Chair: Pumela Salela, UK Country Head, Brand South Africa 

President Cyril Ramaphosa led the African National Congress (ANC) to electoral victory in South Africa in May 2019. His promise of rooting out corruption and generating job-creating growth resonated with an electorate scarred by corruption scandals and structural economic and racial inequality.

However, divisions within the ruling party have meant that the delivery of these promises has been slow. Complex and often divisive racial dynamics continue to dominate political discourse especially around land reform and economic transformation.

The country’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), faces its own political crisis following the resignation of former leader Mmusi Maimane, bringing into question the role of opposition parties in the young democracy. 

At this event, South African journalists, Martin Plaut and Carien du Plessis, discuss their new book, Understanding South Africa, providing insights into the current and historical trends that define the political fault lines of modern South Africa. Is Ramaphosa shying away from the difficult political decisions necessary to encourage meaningful change in South Africa’s political environment? And how should the international community understand the trends and dynamics that dominate South African politics?

Members Events Team




9

Secrecy, spies and the global South: intelligence studies beyond the 'Five Eyes' alliance

6 November 2019 , Volume 95, Number 6

Zakia Shiraz and Richard J. Aldrich

The study of secrecy and spies remain subjects dominated by Anglo-American experiences. In recent years there has been some effort to refocus the lens of research upon ‘intelligence elsewhere’, including the global South. This is partly because of intense interest in the Arab Spring and ‘managed democracy’, placing a wider range of secret services under the spotlight. However, the approach to research is still dominated by concepts and methods derived from studying the English-speaking states of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance and their European outriders. This article calls for a re-examination of research strategies for Intelligence Studies and for those theorizing surveillance, suggesting that both fields have much to learn from area studies and development studies, especially in the realm of research practice and ethics. If the growing number of academics specializing in intelligence genuinely wish to move forward and examine the global South they will need to rethink their tool-kit and learn from other disciplines. We suggest there is a rich tradition to draw upon.




9

China's ivory bans: enhancing soft power through wildlife conservation

6 November 2019 , Volume 95, Number 6

Jonas Gamso

China has been a major market for elephant ivory for centuries. However, the Chinese government recently enacted bans on imports and exports of ivory (2015) and on the domestic ivory trade (2017). These bans appear to have come in response to intensive influence campaigns and public shaming from domestic and foreign activists, who cited declining elephant populations and highlighted China's role. However, this shaming-narrative is at odds with conventional wisdom regarding Chinese policy-making: China typically resists international pressures and its authoritarian government is thought to be largely insulated from domestic efforts by civil society groups. This article reconciles Beijing's ivory policy with these conventional beliefs about policy-making in China. I argue that the Chinese government saw unique benefits to banning the ivory trade, under growing international scrutiny, as doing so enhanced Chinese soft power while having very little impact on its sovereignty or development. Non-government organizations (NGOs) operating both inside and outside of China played a role as well: NGOs in China helped to shift Chinese public opinion towards favouring the bans, while those operating abroad led public relations efforts to publicize Chinese demand for ivory to foreign audiences. Efforts by the latter group of NGOs intensified pressure on the Chinese government to rein in the ivory market, while increasing the soft power benefits that banning ivory would bring to Beijing.




9

Somalia's Electoral Road-Map and Federal Relations

Research Event

15 November 2019 - 10:30am to 11:30am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, Leader, Wadajir Party, Federal Republic of Somalia
Chair: Ahmed Soliman, Research Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

As Somalia heads into an electoral cycle, its political landscape and federal picture appear unstable. The federal government is seeking to implement a feasible electoral model that will further the country’s democratic transition ahead of elections set for late 2020 and early 2021. An expanded and more inclusive process will require an agreement on election modalities and approved electoral law, the completion of the constitutional review and improved security provision.
 
Reconciliation and dialogue between the federal government and federal member states will be critical to making further progress on political, security and economic reforms. Recent contestations in the regions of Jubaland, Galmudug and Puntland do not bode well. Somalia’s political leaders are readying themselves for a tough contest with several opposition parties recently merging to form the Forum for National Parties (FNP), led by former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.
 
At this event, the Abdirahman Warsame, leader of the Wadajir Party, will analyse the political and federal transition in Somalia and give his perspective on how to improve the often-fractious relationship between the centre and the regions.
 
THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Sahar Eljack

Programme Administrator, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3660




9

POSTPONED: Connecting Infrastructure Development and Inclusive Economic Growth in Côte d'Ivoire

Research Event

13 March 2020 - 4:00pm to 5:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Hon Bruno Nabagné Kone, Minister of Construction, Housing and Urban Planning, Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

Strong economic growth in Côte d'Ivoire – with annual GDP growth averaging eight per cent since 2012 – is interlinked with an increase in spending on national infrastructure. In 2018, the government announced a $7 billion injection for the sector over five years, for projects including a new 7.5km bridge spanning two districts of Abidjan and a highway extending to Burkina Faso. A public-private partnership to build a new $1.5 billion metropolitan railway system in the capital received formal approval in October 2019.

But the government of Côte d'Ivoire has struggled to make the country’s impressive growth inclusive: Côte d’Ivoire ranked 165th out of 189 on the 2019 United Nations Human Development Index, and the poverty rate is around 46%. Translating significant infrastructural investment into benefit for ordinary and vulnerable Ivorian citizens, including through how project development is managed with communities, will be a critical issue in the lead up to elections scheduled for October 2020 and beyond.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

 

Sahar Eljack

Programme Administrator, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3660




9

Côte d'Ivoire’s 2020 Elections and Beyond: Ensuring Stability and Inclusion

Research Event

21 January 2020 - 11:30am to 12:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

HE Alassane Ouattara, President, Republic of Côte d'Ivoire
Chair: Bob Dewar CMG, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Please note, the second video on this page is from an interview with the president outside the event.

HE Alassane Ouattara, president of Côte d'Ivoire, discusses governance and domestic priorities ahead of and beyond elections, as well as efforts to sustain stability and support an inclusive electoral process.

Presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire, the world’s top cocoa producer and the largest economy in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), will be held ‪on 31st October 2020 against a backdrop of marked political dynamism in the country and wider region.

Possible constitutional amendments and a newly announced major reform of the currency regime are among significant issues drawing focus.

A credible and inclusive electoral process is critical for the improvement of socio-development outcomes and for the maintenance of a positive investment environment.

But instability remains a serious risk and the stakes are high for Côte d'Ivoire and the wider region.




9

Angola's Business Promise: Evaluating the Progress of Privatization and Other Economic Reforms

Research Event

21 January 2020 - 2:30pm to 3:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Hon. Manuel José Nunes Júnior, Minister of State for Economic Coordination, Republic of Angola
Chair: Dr Alex Vines OBE, Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Minister Nunes Júnior will discuss the progress of the Angolan government’s economic stabilization plans and business reform agenda including the privatization of some state-owned enterprises. These reforms could expand Angola’s exports beyond oil and stimulate new industries and more inclusive economic growth.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Sahar Eljack

Programme Administrator, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3660




9

Realizing South Sudan's Peace Deal

Invitation Only Research Event

24 February 2020 - 5:00pm to 6:15pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Miklos Gosztonyi, Conflict Analyst, South Sudan, Norwegian Refugee Council
Matthew F. Pritchard, Research and Policy Specialist, McGill University
Joshua Craze, Writer and Researcher
Teohna Williams, CEO, Business Plan for Peace

South Sudan’s new power sharing government must be formed by 22 February 2020, as specified in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). There have been two extensions to this process already, reflecting the continued distrust among leaders and the complexity of the conflict.

The lack of progress in several contentious areas has delayed the formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for nine months, but the recent decision taken by President Salva Kiir Mayardit to re-establish 10 states has been welcomed by opposition groups, regional mediators and international partners.

It is seen as the breakthrough needed for an agreement to be reached, despite some outstanding concerns. Further meaningful compromises and difficult decisions will be needed to implement a lasting peace agreement.

At this event, a panel of speakers will examine the status of the peace deal following the February deadline and the steps needed to progress the key issues underlying implementation.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Sahar Eljack

Programme Administrator, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3660




9

Children 'born of war': a role for fathers?

4 March 2020 , Volume 96, Number 2

Camile Oliviera, Erin Baines

In this article, we examine exceptional circumstances in which men who father children born as the result of conflict-related sexual violence assume full or partial responsibility for their child's well-being. Children ‘born of war’ are increasingly recognized as a particular victim group in relevant international policy frameworks. Their social status falls somewhere between the victimization of their mother and perpetration of their father. Given the circumstances of their birth, they often experience social rejection and loss of identity with a long-term impact on their well-being. Previous scholarship has primarily documented the challenges faced by their mothers as caregivers and as victims of wartime sexual violence. A discussion on fathers to children ‘born of war’ is absent, attributable not only to their perpetrator status, but also to the assumption that their identity is unknown or that a relationship between father and child is undesired. The article demonstrates this is not always the case. Based on research in northern Uganda between 2016 and 2019 which included interviews and focus group discussions with former male combatants in the rebel group the Lord's Resistance Army, we explore how some fathers seek to maintain a relationship with children born as the result of ‘forced marriage’ and assume partial or full responsibility for their well-being and care.




9

Webinar: Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for African Economies and Development

Research Event

21 April 2020 - 4:30pm to 5:30pm

Event participants

Dr Hafez Ghanem, Vice President for Africa, World Bank
Chair: Elizabeth Donnelly, Deputy Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Dr Hafez Ghanem discusses the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for African economies and their development and poverty reduction efforts, and assesses the priorities and obstacles for establishing a comprehensive response to the crisis.
 
While the acute strain placed on health systems by the COVID-19 pandemic is already in evidence, the long-term economic fallout from the crisis is yet to fully manifest.
 
For Africa it is the economic impact that may leave the most enduring legacy: from the direct expense of measures to treat, detect and reduce the spread of the virus; to the indirect costs of domestic lockdown measures, global supply chain disruptions and plummeting commodity prices.
 
As decision-makers globally start to plan for the scale of this economic shock, strategizing in and on Africa to meet the challenge will require unprecedented planning and commitment - and will need to be matched by support from international partners to enable long-term recovery.
 

Hanna Desta

Programme Assistant, Africa Programme




9

Webinar: Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for Food Security and Resilience in Africa

Research Event

23 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Dr Arif Husain, Chief Economist and Director of Research, Assessment and Monitoring, United Nations World Food Programme
Respondent: Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House
Chair: Professor Tim Benton, Research Director, Emerging Risks; Director, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme, Chatham House
Dr Arif Husain gives his assessment of the potential impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have on food security in Africa and what can be done to prevent a food security emergency.
 
Linked to the immediate public health consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are those of economic and food security, particularly significant for low- and middle-income countries. Currently more than 821 million people globally go hungry, with 100 million of those suffering acute hunger, and this will worsen if the evolving economic emergency becomes a food security emergency.
 
Sub-Saharan African countries rely on trade for food security and for revenue; they imported more than 40 million tons of cereal from around the world in 2018, according to the World Food Programme (WFP). The region faces stark new challenges due to the pandemic.

This event launches the WFP paper COVID-19: Potential impact on the world’s poorest people.

Department/project

Hanna Desta

Programme Assistant, Africa Programme




9

Beyond Lockdown: Africa’s Options for Responding to COVID-19

21 April 2020

Ben Shepherd

Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme

Nina van der Mark

Research Analyst, Global Health Programme
The continent’s enormous diversity means that there will be no one African experience of COVID-19, nor a uniform governmental response. But there are some common challenges across the continent, and a chance to get the response right.

2020-04-22-Africa-COVID-Dakar

Dakar after the Interior Ministry announced compulsory wearing of masks in public and private services, shops and transport, under penalty of sanctions. Photo by SEYLLOU/AFP via Getty Images.

African policymakers face a dilemma when it comes to COVID-19. The first hope is to prevent the virus from gaining a foothold at all, and many African states have significant experience of managing infectious disease outbreaks. The establishment of the Africa Centre for Disease Control highlights the hugely increased focus on public health in recent years.

But capacities to track, test and isolate vary wildly, notably between neighbours with porous and poorly controlled borders and, in most cases, sustained national-level disease control is difficult. Initial clusters of COVID-19 cases are already established in many places, but a lack of testing capacity makes it hard to know the full extent of transmission.

It is not obvious what African states should do as a response. Lack of information about COVID-19 means the proportion of asymptomatic or mild cases is not known, still less the ways in which this is influenced by human geography and demographics.

Africa is an overwhelmingly young continent with a median age under 20. But it also faces chronic malnutrition, which may weaken immune responses, and infectious diseases such as malaria, TB and HIV are widespread which could worsen the impact of COVID-19, particularly if treatment for these diseases is interrupted.

Complex and unknown

Ultimately, how all these factors interact with COVID-19 is complex and remains largely unknown. Africa may escape with a relatively light toll. Or it could be hit harder than anywhere else.

What is clear, however, is that cost of simply following the rest of the world into lockdown could be high. Africa is relatively rural but has higher populations living in informal settlements than anywhere in the world. Many live in cramped and overcrowded accommodation without clean water or reliable electricity, making handwashing a challenge and working from home impossible.

And the benefits appear limited. The goal of lockdowns in most places is not to eliminate the virus but to accept the economic and social costs as a price worth paying in order to ‘flatten the curve’ of infection and protect healthcare systems from being overwhelmed. But this logic does not hold when many of Africa’s healthcare systems are barely coping with pre-coronavirus levels of disease.

Africa suffers in comparison to much of the rest of the world in terms of access to quality and affordable healthcare, critical care beds and specialist personnel. For example, in 2017, Nigeria had just 120 ICU beds for a country of 200 million, equating to 0.07 per 100,000 inhabitants compared to 12.5 per 100,000 in Italy and 3.6 per 100,000 in China.

The pandemic’s ruinous economic impacts could also be more acute for Africa than anywhere else. The continent is highly vulnerable to potential drops in output and relies heavily on demand from China and Europe. Many states are already facing sharply falling natural resource revenues, and investment, tourism and remittances will suffer - all on top of a high existing debt burden.

Analysis by the World Bank shows that Africa will likely face its first recession in 25 years, with the continental economy contracting by up to 5.1% in 2020. Africa will have scant financial ammunition to use in the fight against COVID-19 with currencies weakening, food prices rising, local agri-food supply chains disrupted and food imports likely to decrease as well. A food security emergency appears a strong possibility.

So, although several states have imposed national lockdowns and others closed major urban centres, lockdowns are difficult to manage and sustain, especially in places where the daily hustle of the informal sector or subsistence agriculture are the only means of survival and where the state has neither the trust of the population nor the capacity to replace lost earnings or meet basic needs.

Of course, this is not simply a binary choice between lockdown or no lockdown - a range of intermediate options exist, such as some restriction on movement, curfews, shutting places of worship, banning only large gatherings, or closing pubs, schools and borders.

A significant number of African states have so far taken this middle path. This will not prevent the virus from spreading nor, in all probability, be enough to ensure adequate healthcare for all Africans infected with COVID-19. But it may help slow the spread and buy invaluable time for African states and partners to prepare.

How this time is used is therefore of paramount importance. Popular trust in the state is low in many African countries so strategies must empower communities, not alienate them. Africa’s experience of previous epidemics and long traditions of collective resilience and community-based crisis response - which persist in many places – are significant strengths.

The right messages must be carried by the right messengers, and policies - including cash transfers and food distribution - implemented sensitively. If not, or if responses become militarized, public consent is unlikely to be sustained for long.




9

Nigeria’s Political Leaders Need to Win Trust to Tackle COVID-19

23 April 2020

Elizabeth Donnelly

Deputy Director, Africa Programme

Idayat Hassan

Director, Centre for Democracy and Development
COVID-19 will require Nigeria's government to rely on already stretched communities and informal institutions. But there is a yawning gap in trust and accountability between citizens and the state in Nigeria – the crisis will force the state to attempt to bridge this divide.

2020-04-23-Nigeria-News-Coronavirus

News stand in Lagos, Nigeria on April 12, 2020. Photo by PIUS UTOMI EKPEI/AFP via Getty Images.

Nigeria is better placed than many to respond to the arrival of the coronavirus disease. In 2014, it successfully contained a deadly Ebola virus outbreak and the country’s current score on the Epidemic Preparedness Index (38.9 per cent) is higher than the African and global averages.

But the outbreak is compounding Nigeria’s numerous pre-existing crises. It was already grappling with a Lassa fever outbreak that has claimed more than one hundred lives in 2020, the aftermath of recession, and conflict and insecurity within its borders.

Effective leadership to build confidence will be vital. However, President Muhammadu Buhari has made few appearances, delivering his first speech on Nigeria’s response more than one month after the country’s first recorded case. And the indefinite suspension of meetings of the Federal Executive Council has raised questions on the efficacy of the response.

Extended lockdown imposed

The recent loss of President Buhari’s steadfast chief of staff Abba Kyari as a result of contracting COVID-19 is a further significant setback for the presidency. But the administration has established a presidential task force to develop a national strategy and an extended lockdown has been imposed on the most affected states  Lagos, Ogun and the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. The country has also closed national borders and is expanding testing capacity to 1,500 per day.

However, when Nigeria’s first case was recorded on February 27 it was state governments that initially took action  shutting schools, closing state borders and imposing lockdowns. Going forwards, the 36 state governments will have a key role to play although their governance capacity and commitment varies widely.

The federal government has released $2.7 million to support the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), and promised an additional $18 million  but this falls well short of the estimated $330 million needed to tackle the coronavirus disease in Nigeria. The government is looking to its private sector to help make up the difference. The country’s finances are under severe pressure with Nigerian crude oil  the main source of government revenue and foreign exchange reserves  selling for as low as $12 or $13 a barrel (with production costs of around $22 per barrel), and a debt servicing to revenue ratio of more than 50 per cent even before the oil price crash.

Facing its second recession in four years, with -3.4 per cent GDP growth forecast by the IMF, the country has little economic resilience. Nigeria will not be able to sustain restrictions on its 81.15 million-strong workforce, 83.2 per cent of which operate in the informal sector. One area at particular risk is food security, as the pandemic is disrupting farming, supply chains and trade. By building on past benefit programmes, the federal government is providing cash and distributing food to vulnerable households, but this important effort is being hampered by poor communication, inefficiencies and a lack of transparency  longstanding challenges in many aspects of public service delivery in Nigeria.

In the absence of a reliable social safety net, Nigerians trust and rely on their families, communities and the informal economy to see them through difficult times. It is these informal mechanisms that lend Nigeria its oft-referenced resilience, which has enabled society to function and continue while a largely disconnected political class has focused on self-enrichment.

It is through these traditional channels that the government will need to deliver information, support, testing and treatment. But without high levels of trust, the administration may find it difficult to do so. Many Nigerians initially considered the pandemic a hoax, some describing it as a ‘rich man’s disease’, while others see it as another conspiracy by politicians to loot the treasury.

Lockdown measures have also heightened tensions across the country. Some citizens are rebelling and in one instance burned down a police station in response to the closure of mosques in Katsina state. Marking a further breakdown in the relationship between the population and its leaders, the Nigerian National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) recently reported security services enforcing the lockdown have extrajudicially killed 18 people, while, so far, COVID-19 has killed 25 people in Nigeria.

Mitigating the spread and worst consequences of the virus will depend on the state rebuilding trust with its citizens through effective communication and action. It is particularly important that the community mechanisms of support are protected as they come under growing pressure as communities become increasingly affected by the virus.

The stark choice facing most Nigerians  between risking starvation and risking contagion  means a sustained lockdown is not a tenable option. People will choose to go to work. This will especially be the case as people grow weary of measures imposed upon them by a state that the vast majority of the population believe does not serve or care for them.

Having largely ignored the needs of Nigeria’s citizens for decades, the political class face an uphill battle in building trust with the population. Earning this trust is not only crucial for the struggle against COVID-19 but also for Nigeria’s longer-term progress and system of political governance.




9

Webinar: Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for African Elections and Democracy

Research Event

6 May 2020 - 2:30pm to 3:30pm

Event participants

Dr Christopher Fomunyoh, Senior Associate and Regional Director for Central and West Africa, National Democratic Institute (NDI)
Chair: Elizabeth Donnelly, Deputy Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House
2020 was anticipated to be a year of landmark elections across Africa, including general elections scheduled in Somalia and Ethiopia – countries at critical junctures in their transitions to electoral democracy – as well as a re-run of annulled presidential elections in Malawi.
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has created new challenges for African countries seeking to hold elections or further democratization – including the practicalities of adapting containment measures to electoral processes in the context of strained financial and logistical resources. It may also be used as a pretext for the pursuit of repressive legislation and constitutional amendments to preclude elections or bolster authoritarianism, compounded by new constraints on accountability mechanisms such as election observation missions.
 
At this event, Dr Christopher Fomunyoh discusses the likely impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on elections and democracy in various African countries, as well as responses and measures to meet the multifaceted challenges posed.

Hanna Desta

Programme Assistant, Africa Programme




9

How images frame China's role in African development

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

George Karavas

Political leaders, policy-makers and academics routinely refer to development as an objective process of social change through the use of technical, value-free terms. Images of poverty and inequality are regularly presented as evidence of a world that exists ‘out there’ where development unfolds. This way of seeing reflects the value of scientific forms of knowledge but also sits in tension with the normative foundations of development that take European modernization and industrialization as the benchmark for comparison. The role images play in this process is often overlooked. This article argues that a dominant mode of visuality based on a Cartesian separation between subject and object, underpinning the ascendance of European hegemony and colonialism, aligns with the core premises of orthodox development discourse. An example of how visual representations of development matter is presented through images of Africa–China relations in western media sources. Using widely circulated images depicting China's impact on African development in western news media sources as an example of why visual politics matters for policy-making, the article examines how images play a role in legitimizing development planning by rendering associated forms of epistemological and structural violence ‘invisible to the viewer’.




9

COVID-19 in South Africa: Leadership, Resilience and Inequality

7 May 2020

Christopher Vandome

Research Fellow, Africa Programme
In a world looking for leadership, South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa has been remarkable. One year after he carried the time-worn ANC through a national election, South Africans are crying out for more.

2020-05-07-Ramaphosa-COVID-South-Africa

Cyril Ramaphosa at NASREC Expo Centre in Johannesburg where facilities are in place to treat coronavirus patients. Photo by JEROME DELAY/POOL/AFP via Getty Images.

In the COVID-19 crisis so far, Cyril Ramaphosa has been widely praised for displaying the decisive leadership so many hoped for when they cast their ballot for him in May 2019. Buttressed by others such as health minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, and on a simple objective to prevent transmission, South Africa has been a lesson to the world. Act fast. Act hard.

Former president Thabo Mbeki’s disastrous response to the HIV crisis cast a long shadow over his legacy, and Ramaphosa has taken note. South Africa has had one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. No exercise. No cigarettes. No alcohol.

The lockdown was imposed when the country had only around 1,000 recorded cases and just two deaths. As a result, transmission from returning travellers has not yet led to an exponential infection rate within the community. The government’s swift reaction has bought much needed time with the peak now seemingly delayed to September or October.

Continental and national leadership

Ramaphosa has also emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses. As current chair of the African Union (AU) he leads the continental engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO), and the various international finance institutions, while South African officials are working with the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on a push for African debt restructuring.

He has also been active in trouble shooting to unlock external assistance to the continent, including from China and Russia. Appointing special envoys is typical of his boardroom-honed leadership style.

International and regional partnerships are vital for resilience and the arrival of 217 Cuban doctors to South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the liberationist solidarity of the Cold War era. And regional economies remain dependent on South Africa to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Following the 2008 financial crisis, it was South Africa’s regional trading relationships that remained robust, while trade with its main global partners in China and the US dropped.

Despite the plaudits, Ramaphosa remains vulnerable to challenge at home, notably around his failure to stimulate South Africa’s moribund economy. On the eve of lockdown, Moody’s joined its peers Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in giving South Africa a below investment grade credit rating. The move was a long time coming. Long mooted economic reforms were slow to materialise, and South Africa had fallen into recession.

Ramaphosa depends on a small core of close advisors and allies, initially united in apparent opposition to the kleptocratic rule of President Jacob Zuma and the deep patronage networks he created within both the party and the state. But this allegiance is being tested by economic reality. Support within the party was already drifting prior to the crisis.

Disagreements are not just technocratic – there are big ideological questions in play around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. Energy minister and former union stalwart Gwede Mantashe is wary of job losses, and minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan protective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before coronavirus hit, Ramaphosa seemed content to allow these policy disputes to play themselves out with little decisive intervention.

Slow progress on reform, against worsening economic performance, left Ramaphosa and his allies exposed. In January the president missed the UK’s African Investment Summit in order to assert control over a party meeting at which it was expected his detractors would seek to remove Gordhan.

COVID-19 has sharpened thinking

As the independently assertive - and eminently quotable - pro-market reformist finance minister Tito Mboweni stated, ‘you can’t eat ideology’. Accelerated reform and restructuring is required if the government turns to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance.

For the first time, Gordhan has been forced to deny a bailout to beleaguered state airline South African Airways (SAA), and the government’s lockdown bailout of R300 billion has been applauded by business. Much like the fiscal stimulus and recovery plan of 2018, it relies on smart spending, targeting sectors with high multiplier effects. It also includes significant reserve bank loans.

But it has been criticised for not doing enough to help the most vulnerable. There is considerable fear of what could happen when the virus takes hold in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements where social distancing is almost impossible, basic toilet facilities are shared, and HIV and TB rates high.

There are mounting concerns of the humanitarian cost of a prolonged lockdown, and the government has been faster than others in implementing a tiered lockdown system, trying to get people back to work and keep the economy afloat.

South Africa has been criticized by the UN for the use of lethal force by security forces in enforcing lockdown and, in a society plagued by corruption, there are fears legislation to stop the spread of false information could be used to restrict legitimate reporting on the virus response or other issues.

COVID-19 shines a spotlight on societies’ fault-lines worldwide. South Africa is often touted as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world but, in a globalized economy, these divisions are international as much as they are local.

Resilience comes from within, but also depends on regional and global trading and financial systems. South Africans and international partners have long recognised Ramaphosa’s leadership qualities as an impressive voice for the global south.

But he must also be an advocate for South Africa’s poor. This crisis could accelerate implementation of his landmark pro-poor National Health Insurance and Universal Health Care programmes. Or the hit of COVID-19 on top of South Africa’s existing economic woes could see them derailed entirely. Ramaphosa must push through economic reforms at the same time as managing COVID-19 and rebuilding trust in his government.




9

Chemical Genetics of AGC-kinases Reveals Shared Targets of Ypk1, Protein Kinase A and Sch9 [Research]

Protein phosphorylation cascades play a central role in the regulation of cell growth and protein kinases PKA, Sch9 and Ypk1 take center stage in regulating this process in S. cerevisiae. To understand how these kinases co-ordinately regulate cellular functions we compared the phospho-proteome of exponentially growing cells without and with acute chemical inhibition of PKA, Sch9 and Ypk1. Sites hypo-phosphorylated upon PKA and Sch9 inhibition were preferentially located in RRxS/T-motifs suggesting that many are directly phosphorylated by these enzymes. Interestingly, when inhibiting Ypk1 we not only detected several hypo-phosphorylated sites in the previously reported RxRxxS/T-, but also in an RRxS/T-motif. Validation experiments revealed that neutral trehalase Nth1, a known PKA target, is additionally phosphorylated and activated downstream of Ypk1. Signaling through Ypk1 is therefore more closely related to PKA- and Sch9-signaling than previously appreciated and may perform functions previously only attributed to the latter kinases.




9

Arginine in C9ORF72 Dipolypeptides Mediates Promiscuous Proteome Binding and Multiple Modes of Toxicity [Research]

C9ORF72-associated Motor Neuron Disease patients feature abnormal expression of 5 dipeptide repeat (DPR) polymers. Here we used quantitative proteomics in a mouse neuronal-like cell line (Neuro2a) to demonstrate that the Arg residues in the most toxic DPRS, PR and GR, leads to a promiscuous binding to the proteome compared with a relative sparse binding of the more inert AP and GA. Notable targets included ribosomal proteins, translation initiation factors and translation elongation factors. PR and GR comprising more than 10 repeats appeared to robustly stall on ribosomes during translation suggesting Arg-rich peptide domains can electrostatically jam the ribosome exit tunnel during synthesis. Poly-GR also recruited arginine methylases, induced hypomethylation of endogenous proteins, and induced a profound destabilization of the actin cytoskeleton. Our findings point to arginine in GR and PR polymers as multivalent toxins to translation as well as arginine methylation that may explain the dysfunction of biological processes including ribosome biogenesis, mRNA splicing and cytoskeleton assembly.




9

Identification of an Unconventional Subpeptidome Bound to the Behcet's Disease-associated HLA-B*51:01 that is Regulated by Endoplasmic Reticulum Aminopeptidase 1 (ERAP1) [Research]

Human leukocyte antigen (HLA) B*51:01 and endoplasmic reticulum aminopeptidase 1 (ERAP1) are strongly genetically associated with Behcet's disease (BD). Previous studies have defined two subgroups of HLA-B*51 peptidome containing proline (Pro) or alanine (Ala) at position 2 (P2). Little is known about the unconventional non-Pro/Ala2 HLA-B*51-bound peptides. We aimed to study the features of this novel subpeptidome, and investigate its regulation by ERAP1. CRISPR-Cas9 was used to generate an HLA-ABC-triple knockout HeLa cell line (HeLa.ABC-KO), which was subsequently transduced to express HLA-B*51:01 (HeLa.ABC-KO.B51). ERAP1 was silenced using lentiviral shRNA. Peptides bound to HLA-B*51:01 were eluted and analyzed by mass spectrometry. The characteristics of non-Pro/Ala2, Pro2, and Ala2 peptides and their alteration by ERAP1 silencing were investigated. Effects of ERAP1 silencing on cell surface expression of HLA-B*51:01 were studied using flow cytometry. More than 20% of peptides eluted from HLA-B*51:01 lacked Pro or Ala at P2. This unconventional group of HLA-B*51:01-bound peptides was relatively enriched for 8-mers (with relatively fewer 9-mers) compared with the Pro2 and Ala2 subpeptidomes and had similar N-terminal and C-terminal residue usages to Ala2 peptides (with the exception of the less abundant leucine at position ). Knockdown of ERAP1 increased the percentage of non-Pro/Ala2 from 20% to ~40%, increased the percentage of longer (10-mer and 11-mer) peptides eluted from HLA-B*51:01 complexes, and abrogated the predominance of leucine at P1. Interestingly knockdown of ERAP1 altered the length and N-terminal residue usage of non-Ala2&Pro2 and Ala2 but not the Pro2 peptides. Finally, ERAP1 silencing regulated the expression levels of cell surface HLA-B*51 in a cell-type-dependent manner. In conclusion, we have used a novel methodology to identify an unconventional but surprisingly abundant non-Pro/Ala2 HLA-B*51:01 subpeptidome. It is increased by knockdown of ERAP1, a gene affecting the risk of developing BD. This has implications for theories of disease pathogenesis.




9

'Public servants should get off social media': warning after Islamic State hack

Terrorists and criminals are looking for people to blackmail or seduce into stealing data.




9

Human Services' computers keep disabled out of work

Disabled workers are caught in bureaucratic limbo by problematic computer systems.




9

Uber and the ATO's $3.8 million taxi fare

Tax Office could turn to rideshare service to curb $3.8 million taxi fare




9

Canberra's north-south divided over internet surfing and the NBN

It's another front in the long-running rivalry beneath north and south in the nation's capital.




9

Why we need to stop car crash 'women in tech' panels and actually break the glass ceiling

Women in tech panels seldom have anything to offer besides fortune-cookie wisdom and repackaged logic.




9

From making scarves to building a $165 million tech start-up: Canva's Melanie Perkins

To say it has been a wild ride for Canva founder and CEO Melanie Perkins would be an understatement.




9

How Australian public service's digital reforms will happen, according to the Digital Transformation Office

The millions of customers, the short deadline: how the public service's digital revolution will start.




9

What it's like to be Australia's top tech talent

They're highly mobile, highly sought after, and tend to "upskill" off their own bat. The ball is most definitely in their court.




9

Australian public service's 'gap in capability' to deal with digital revolution

State of the Service report outlines the major hurdle to digital reform.




9

From AFL star to Big Apple start-up, Swift's Joel MacDonald is kicking goals

Two years ago Joel MacDonald was in Melbourne playing in the AFL; now he's kicking goals in New York.




9

Centrelink's IT meltdown hits the disability pension

Centrelink's tech woes disrupts Disability Pension medical crackdown.




9

Telstra privacy breach leaves customer's voicemail exposed

Richard Thornton did a factory reset on his second-hand iPhone 5, but the buyer kept receiving his voicemail.




9

ACT government defends seeking access to Canberrans' metadata

The ACT government has defended its right to seek access to Canberrans' private phone and internet records without a warrant.




9

Government acknowledges poor internet in Canberra's south but sticks to NBN plan

Minister for Communications acknowledges some areas of Canberra's southern suburbs have poor internet access.




9

Branching out after death: where next for the 'Internet of Things'?

It turns out that even death needs the internet.




9

Slack's secret sauce: how it became the fastest growing business app ever

Slack has launched its Asia-Pacific headquarters in Melbourne. We caught up with Ali Rayl, head of customer experience.




9

Digital public service means ditching control and embracing 'we'

Collaborating with the public is the key for a more engaging government experience.