We can be sure that the 2016 presidential candidates, whoever they are, will be in favor of promoting opportunity and cutting poverty. The question is: how? In our contribution to a new volume published today, “Campaign 2016: Eight big issues the presidential candidates should address,” we show that people who clear three hurdles—graduating high school, working full-time, and delaying parenthood until they in a stable, two-parent family—are very much more likely to climb to middle class than fall into poverty:

But what specific policies would help people achieve these three benchmarks of success?  Our paper contains a number of ideas that candidates might want to adopt. Here are a few examples: 

1. To improve high school graduation rates, expand “Small Schools of Choice,” a program in New York City, which replaced large, existing schools with more numerous, smaller schools that had a theme or focus (like STEM or the arts). The program increased graduation rates by about 10 percentage points and also led to higher college enrollment with no increase in costs.

2. To support work, make the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) refundable and cap it at $100,000 in household income. Because the credit is currently non-refundable, low-income families receive little or no benefit, while those with incomes above $100,000 receive generous tax deductions. This proposal would make the program more equitable and facilitate low-income parents’ labor force participation, at no additional cost.

3. To strengthen families, make the most effective forms of birth control (IUDs and implants) more widely available at no cost to women, along with good counselling and a choice of all FDA-approved methods. Programs that have done this in selected cities and states have reduced unplanned pregnancies, saved money, and given women better ability to delay parenthood until they and their partners are ready to be parents. Delayed childbearing reduces poverty rates and leads to better prospects for the children in these families.

These are just a few examples of good ideas, based on the evidence, of what a candidate might want to propose and implement if elected. Additional ideas and analysis will be found in our longer paper on this topic.

The U.S. is the only advanced country without a paid leave policy, enabling workers to take time off to care for a new baby or other family member. At least two Presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton and Marco Rubio, have been talking about it, making it likely that it will get attention in 2016.

The idea has broad appeal now that most two-parent families and almost all one-parent families struggle with balancing work and family. Polls show that it is favored by 81 percent of the public—94 percent of Democrats, 80 percent of Independents and 65 percent of Republicans. Three states, California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, have each enacted policies that could become models for other states or for the nation.

Paid leave promotes inclusive growth

Overall, paid leave is good for workers, good for children, and possibly even good for employers because of its role in helping to retain workers. It is also a policy that encourages inclusive growth. Studies of European systems suggest that paid leave increases female labor force participation and that the lack of it in the U.S. may be one reason for the decline in female labor force participation since 2000 and the growing female participation gap between the U.S. and other countries, adversely affecting our absolute and relative growth. The policy would make growth more inclusive because it would disproportionately benefit lower-wage workers.

The devil is in the design

The major issues in designing a paid leave policy are:

1. Eligibility, and especially the extent of work experience required to qualify (often a year);
2. the amount of leave allowed (Clinton suggests three months; Rubio four weeks);
3. the wage replacement rate (often two-thirds of regular wages up to a cap), and
4. financing.

Legislation proposed by Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) and Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) calls for a 0.2 percent payroll tax on employers and employees. Most states have made paid leave a part of their temporary disability systems. Senator Rubio proposes to finance it through a new tax credit for employers. 

Getting it right on eligibility, length of leave, and size of benefit

My own view is that a significant period of work experience should be required for eligibility to encourage stable employment before the birth of a child. This would not only encourage work but also insure that the subsidy was an earned benefit and not welfare by another name (but see below on financing).   

Leave periods need to be long enough to enable parents to bond with a child during the child’s first year of life but not so long that they lead to skill depreciation and to parents dropping out of the labor force. Three months seems like a good first step although it is far less generous than what many European countries provide (an average of 14 months across the OECD). That said, the Europeans may have gone too far. While there is little evidence that a leave as long as 6 months would have adverse effects on employment, when Canada extended their leave from six months to a year, the proportion of women returning to work declined.

A replacement rate of two-thirds up to a cap also seems reasonable although a higher replacement rate is one way to encourage more parents to take the leave. Among other things, more generous policies would have positive effects on the health and well-being of children. They might also encourage more fathers to take leave.  

How to pay for it

On financing, social insurance is the appropriate way to share the putative burden between employers and employees and avoid the stigma and unpopularity of social welfare. It would, in essence, change the default for employees (who are otherwise unlikely to save for purposes of taking leave). Some may worry that imposing any new costs on employers will lead to fewer employment opportunities. However, many economists believe that the employer portion of the tax is largely borne by workers in the form of lower wages. Moreover, in a study of 253 employers in California, over 90 percent reported either positive or no negative effects on profitability, turnover, and employee morale. Reductions in turnover, in particular, are noteworthy since turnover is a major expense for most employers. 

Will paid leave cause discrimination against women?

Another worry is discrimination against women. Here there is some cause for concern unless efforts are made to insure that leave is equally available to, and also used by, both men and women. This concern has led some countries to establish a use-it-or-lose-it set aside for fathers. In the province of Quebec, the proportion of fathers taking leave after implementation of such a policy increased from 21 to 75 percent and even after the leave period was over, men continued to share more equally in the care of their children.

Will Congress enact a national paid leave policy in the next few years? That’s doubtful in our current political environment but states may continue to take the lead. In the meantime, it can’t hurt if the major candidates are talking about the issue on the campaign trail.       

The injustices faced by African Americans are high on the nation’s agenda. “Black Lives Matter” has become a rallying cry that has elicited intense feelings among both supporters and detractors. As William Julius Wilson has pointed out on this blog, the focus on policing and criminal justice is necessary but not sufficient. Concerted action is required to tackle systematic racial gaps in everything from income and wealth to employment rates, poverty rates, and educational achievement.

Ta-Nehisi Coates argues that financial reparations should be paid to all those who have suffered directly or indirectly from slavery and its aftermath, including present day injustices such as the targeting of subprime mortgages to minorities. The moral case is compelling, and Coates notes that there have been other instances in U.S. history when reparations have been paid—such as to some Native American tribes and to the Japanese-Americans thrown into internment camps during World War II.

Even if the moral argument for reparations is won, there are formidable obstacles in terms of policy, politics, and law. How would reparations work in practice? To be fair, Coates does support the bill from Congressman John Conyers establishing a commission to examine precisely these questions. Even if a workable policy can be found, the political opposition would, to put it mildly, be formidable. There are also doubts about constitutional legality. However, these are certainly questions worthy of better answers than the ones currently being made.

Reparations are a stark example of a race-based policy: targeting resources or an intervention at an explicitly-defined racial group. At the other extreme are “race-blind” policies, applied with no regard to race (at least in theory). But there is a middle ground, consisting of what might be labeled ‘race-conscious’ policies. These policies would be designed to close racial gaps without targeting racial groups.

What might race-conscious policies look like? Here are some ideas:

1. Professors William Darity at Duke and Darrick Hamilton of The New School propose to tackle race gaps in wealth by providing “baby bonds” to children born to families with limited wealth. In 2013, median net worth was $11,000 for black households compared to $141,900 for whites. Darity and Hamilton are supporters of reparations in principle, but are alert to policy and political feasibility. Their specific proposal is that every baby born into a family with below-median wealth receives a “baby bond” or trust fund. These would be worth $50,000 to $60,000 on average, but scaled according to the level of the family’s wealth. The money would be available at the age of 18 for certain expenditures such as paying for college or buying a home. This is a good example of a race-conscious policy. It is not explicitly targeted on race but it would have its greatest impact on African American families.
2. While racial wealth gaps are large and troubling, the disappearance of almost half of unskilled, young black men from the labor force may be an even greater problem in the long run. A comprehensive approach on jobs could include raising the minimum wage, expanding the EITC, and providing subsidized jobs in either the public or private sector for those unable to find jobs on their own. The job subsidies might be targeted on young adults from high-poverty neighborhoods where joblessness is endemic. The subsidized jobs would help people of all races, but especially African Americans. A jobs-based program is also likely to find greater political support than straightforward wealth redistribution. Granted, such jobs programs are hard to administer, but we now have a large number of workers whose job prospects are slim to nonexistent in a technologically-oriented and service-based economy.
3. An enhanced EITC could also help to increase wealth (or lower indebtedness). As Kathryn Edin and her colleagues note in It’s Not Like I’m Poor, the EITC is normally received as a lump sum refund at the end of the year. As a form of forced saving, it enables poor families to repay debt and make mobility enhancing investments in themselves or their children. According to Edin, recipients like the fact that, unlike welfare, the tax credit links them socially and psychologically to other Americans who receive tax refunds. A more generous EITC could therefore help on the wealth as well as income side, and narrow racial gaps in both.
4. A final example of a race-conscious policy is the Texas “top 10” law, which guarantees admission to any public university in the state for students in the top 10 percent of their high school class. This plan could be expanded to other states.

The “Black Lives Matter” movement has refocused the nation’s attention on mass incarceration and related injustices in the criminal justice system. But this problem exists side by side with racial inequalities in income, wealth, education, and employment. There are no easy answers to America’s stubborn race gaps. But jobs and wages seem to us to be of paramount importance. Implemented in a race-conscious way (by targeting them to areas suffering from high rates of poverty and joblessness), employment policy might be the most powerful instrument of all for race equality.

Tomorrow, President Obama unveils his last budget, and we’re sure to see plenty of proposals for spending on education and skills. In the past, the Administration has focused on investments in early childhood education, community colleges, and infrastructure and research. From a budgetary standpoint, the problem with these investments is how to capture their benefits as well as their costs.

First step: find out what works. The Obama Administration has been emphatic about the need for solid evidence in deciding what to fund. The good news is that we now have quite a lot of it, showing that investing in human capital from early education through college can make a difference. Not all programs are successful, of course, and we are still learning what works and what doesn’t. But we know enough to conclude that investing in a variety of health, education, and mobility programs can positively affect education, employment, and earnings in adulthood.

For example:

1. Young, low-income children whose families move to better neighborhoods using housing vouchers see a 31 percent increase in earnings;

2. Quality early childhood and school reform programs can raise lifetime income per child by an average of about $200,000, for at an upfront cost of about $20,000;

3. Boosting college completion rates, for instance via the Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (ASAP) in the City University of New York, leads to higher earnings.

If such estimates are correct (and we recognize there are uncertainties), policymakers are probably underinvesting in such programs because they are looking at the short-term costs but not at longer-term benefits and budget savings.

First, the CBO’s standard practice is to use a 10-year budget window, which means long-range effects are often ignored. Second, although the CBO does try to take into account behavioral responses, such as increased take-up rates of a program, or improved productivity and earnings, it often lacks the research needed to make such estimates. Third, the usual assumption is that the rate of return on public investments in human capital is less than that for private investment. This is now questionable, especially given low interest rates.

A hot topic in budget politics right now is so-called “dynamic scoring.” This means incorporating macroeconomic effects, such as an increase in the labor force or productivity gains, into cost estimates. In 2015, the House adopted a rule requiring such scoring, when practicable, for major legislation. But appropriations bills are excluded, and quantitative analyses are restricted to the existing 10-year budget window.

The interest in dynamic scoring is currently strongest among politicians pushing major tax bills, on the grounds that tax cuts could boost growth. But the principles behind dynamic scoring apply equally to improvements in productivity that could result from proposals to subsidize college education, for example—as proposed by both Senator Sanders and Secretary Clinton. Of course, it is tough to estimate the value of these potential benefits. But it is worth asking whether current budget rules lead to myopia in our assessments of what such investments might accomplish, and thus to an over-statement of their “true” cost.

When Franklin Roosevelt delivered his second inaugural address on January 20, 1936 he lamented the “one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.” He challenged Americans to measure their collective progress not by “whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; [but rather] whether we provide enough for those who have too little.” In our new paper, One third of a nation: Strategies for helping working families, we ask a simple question: How are we doing?

In brief, we find that:

• The gulf in labor market income between the haves and have-nots remains wide. The median income of households in the bottom third in 2014 was $24,000, just a little more than a quarter of the median of $90,000 for the top two-thirds.
• The bottom-third households are disproportionately made up of minority adults, adults with limited educational attainment, and single parents.  
• The most important reason for the low incomes of the bottom third is a “work gap”: the fact that many are not employed at all, or work limited hours. 

The work gap

The decline in labor force participation rates has been widely documented, but the growing gulf in the work gap between the bottom third and the rest of the population is truly striking:

While the share of men who are employed in the top two-thirds has been quite stable since 1980, lower-income men’s work rates have declined by 11 percentage points. What about women?

Middle- and upper-income women have increased their work rates by 13 percentage points. This has helped maintain or even increase their family’s income. But employment rates among lower-income women have been flat, despite reforms of the welfare system and safety net designed to encourage work.

Many on the left point to problems like low pay and lack of access to affordable childcare, and so favor a higher minimum wage and more subsidies for daycare. For many conservatives, the problem is rooted in family breakdown and a dependency-inducing safety net. They therefore champion proposals like marriage promotion programs and strict work requirements for public benefits. Most agree about the importance of education.

Time to debate some more radical solutions 

It may be that the standard solutions to the problems of the bottom third, while helpful, are no longer sufficient. A debate about whether to make safety net programs such as Food Stamps and housing assistance conditional on work or training is underway. So are other solutions such as subsidized jobs (created by some states during the Great Recession as a natural complement to a work-conditioned safety net), more work sharing (used in Germany during the recession), or even a universal basic income (being considered by Swiss voters in June).

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Technology unimaginable at the time of the nation’s founding now poses stark challenges to America’s core constitutional principles. Policymakers and legal scholars are closely examining how constitutional law is tested by technological change and how to preserve constitutional principles without hindering progress. In Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change (Brookings Institution Press, 2011), Governance Studies Senior Fellow Benjamin Wittes and Nonresident Senior Fellow Jeffrey Rosen asked a diverse group of leading scholars to imagine how technological developments plausible by the year 2025 could stress current constitutional law. The resulting essays explore scenarios involving information technology, genetic engineering, security, privacy and beyond.

On December 13, the Governance Studies program at Brookings hosted a Judicial Issues Forum examining the scenarios posed in Constitution 3.0 and the challenge of adapting our constitutional values to the technology of the near future. Wittes and Rosen offered key highlights and insights from the book and was joined by two key contributors, O. Carter Snead and Timothy Wu, who discussed their essays.

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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On April 10 and 11, 2015, the Seventh Summit of the Americas will bring together the heads of state and government of every country in the Western Hemisphere for the first time. Recent efforts by the United States to reform immigration policy, re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, and reform our approach to drug policies at home and abroad have generated greater optimism about the future of inter-American relations. This Summit provides an opportunity to spark greater collaboration on development, social inclusion, democracy, education, and energy security.

However, this Summit of the Americas is also convening at a time when the hemisphere is characterized by competing visions for economic development, democracy and human rights, and regional cooperation through various institutions such as the Organization of American States, the Union of South American Nations, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

On Friday, April 3, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings hosted Assistant Secretary of State Roberta S. Jacobson for a discussion on the Seventh Summit of the Americas and what it portends for the future of hemispheric relations.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #VIISummit

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Last week’s Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama will be remembered for the historic handshakes and broad smiles shared by Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro—the first sit-down meeting of leaders from the two nations since Fidel Castro marched triumphantly into Havana in early 1959. But this memorable encounter was merely the most visible piece of a much broader Cuban strategy at the Panama Summit.

The large Cuban delegation took full advantage of the several forums that comprise the complex Summit process. These periodic inter-American conclaves feature meetings among heads of state and foreign ministers, a CEO Summit for corporate executives, and a Civil Society Forum for representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Cubans seized all three opportunities and fielded strong teams to advance their interests: to engage with the multi-level inter-American system, and to send clear signals back home of where government policy is headed.

Face-to-face diplomacy

In addition to the Obama-Castro encounter, foreign ministers John Kerry and Bruno Rodriguez held a lengthy bilateral. Since Obama and Castro publicly announced their intention to renew relations on December 17 of last year, negotiations have dragged on. Cuba is reluctant to grant American diplomats unrestricted travel throughout the island to engage with Cuban citizens, including political dissidents. This is the norm in international diplomacy, the United States argues, whereas the Cubans remain fearful that U.S. diplomats will provide encouragement and assistance to activists advocating for political pluralism. The Cubans want to be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, a designation which automatically invokes economic sanctions. The White House is withholding that relief as a bargaining chip in the negotiations.

In his opening plenary remarks, President Castro spoke passionately and at length, impressing the audience with his heartfelt remarks even as he came across as an elder statesman indulging in the memories and glories of his youth. Yet, Castro was also sending signals to the stalwarts in the Communist Party back home that he had not forgotten their sacrifices and was not abandoning their values. His engagement with the United States would not be allowed to endanger their tight control of Cuban society. Still, most significantly, Castro kept the door open to engagement with the United States by dramatically addressing President Obama, tossing him compliments: “President Obama is an honest man…I have read his two memoirs and I believe he is a man who has remained faithful to his humble origins.”

By lauding Obama, holding a private bilateral, and appearing with a broad smile at a press opportunity, Castro reaffirmed his commitment to improving relations with the United States. He also may have been nudging his negotiators to wrap up the talks to allow the mutual re-opening of embassies. The Cubans are aware that not all of Washington favors improved relations, and that they must consolidate the process of diplomatic normalization while Obama commands the White House.

The CEO and Civil Society Forums

Presumably, the main Cuban motivation for engaging the United States is economic: to attract more tourists, financial remittances, and eventually productive investments from the United States and the rest of the world, and to extract a relaxation of sanctions, particularly those impeding international financial transactions. Cuban Minister of Trade and Investment Rodrigo Malmierca led a commercial delegation that included top executives from state-owned enterprises, as well as leadership from the new Mariel Development Zone. At the CEO Summit, Malmierca was granted one of the few time slots for a keynote address. But rather than take advantage of this unique opportunity, the Cuban minister rushed through an uninspired text, offering nothing that could not be found in previous government press releases and official documents. More than two years after the passage of a much-heralded foreign investment law and over a year after the official opening of the Mariel Development Zone, very few new investments have earned official authorization.  

While potentially interested in Cuban markets, executives I spoke with remain cautious, skeptical that the government has yet created a sufficiently business-friendly environment to warrant the risk. They speculate as to why so few new foreign ventures are underway: is it opposition from well-placed hard-liners, bureaucratic inertia, or lack of financing or other necessary business inputs? In private conversations, Malmierca hinted at a political obstacle: many Cubans identify the revolution with nationalizations of private property, so it will be difficult to explain to them why foreign investment is now so welcome.

The Cubans also fielded a significant presence at the Civil Society Forum. The dominant group represented government-affiliated “non-governmental” organizations (GONGOS) such as the official trade union or Confederation of Cuban Women, while opposition NGOs marshalled about a dozen persons. At a pre-Summit speech in Caracas, Castro had ominously labelled these opposition NGOs “mercenaries” in the pay of foreign intelligence services. Following that lead, the government-affiliated group staged aggressive, noisy demonstrations denouncing the opposition representatives and accusing them of harboring infamous terrorists. The GONGOS threatened to boycott the Forum (although some did eventually participate), and disrupted the Forum’s working group on democratic governance. Here again, the message being telegraphed back home was clear: the Cuban government does not consider these opposition voices to be legitimate actors and loyal Cuban citizens should not associate with them.

Discernable signals

Altogether, at the three forums the Cubans demonstrated their strong interest in participating actively in hemispheric affairs and institutions. The Cubans are capable of fielding smart, disciplined delegations with well-scripted strategies and messages. Once again, the high-quality Cuban diplomacy demonstrated that it has few peers in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The messages transmitted at the Panama Summit were subtle but decodable. In the diplomatic sphere, Castro wants to move forward, to take advantage of Obama’s tenure to relax U.S.-Cuban tensions and gain some economic advantages. In the business sphere, Malmierca reaffirmed Castro’s oft-repeated admonitions that economic change on the island will be very gradual and socialist planning will not be discarded under his watch. In the political sphere, the Cuban Communist Party intends to maintain its absolute hegemony—political pluralism outside the Party is definitely not yet on the policy agenda.

Read more about the Summit with Richard Feinberg's post on how the United States came out of the Panama Summit of the Americas.

At the previous Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012, President Barack Obama was badly roughed up by his Latin American counterparts (and embarrassed by his Secret Service for entertaining sex workers). Happily, the president and his entourage did much better at last week’s Summit in Panama, but the United States still has a way to go before the Summits once again become the productive vehicle for U.S. foreign policy that they once were, at their founding in Miami in 1994.

In Cartagena, leader after leader criticized the United States for allegedly heavy-handed counter-narcotics policies; oppressive treatment of immigrants; a weak response to crime and poverty in Central America; and monetary policies that supposedly harmed their economies. Most pointedly, speakers denounced the decades-old economic sanctions against Cuba. But given the upcoming Congressional elections, Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not want to do anything to endanger their Democratic Party’s chances. Obama was reduced to affirming, uncharacteristically, “I am here to listen, but our policies will not change.”

Once the November 2012 mid-term elections were over, policies did, in fact, change as the United States took a more relaxed approach to counternarcotics; the administration announced immigration policy reforms, including negotiating agreements with Central American nations to reduce the outflow of children and promote economic growth and jobs at home; and Vice President Joseph Biden met repeatedly with Central American leaders, and offered $1 billion in economic and security assistance.

In Cartagena, the Latin Americans threatened to boycott the Panama Summit if Cuba was not invited. But last December 17, President Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro announced their agreement to negotiate the normalization of diplomatic relations, and in one blow, the United States transformed a thorn in relations with Latin America into a triumph of inter-American diplomacy that significantly enhanced U.S. prestige in the region.

So in Panama, most of the Latin American and Caribbean leaders, rather than berate the U.S. president, praised him for his courage and generally treated him with courtesy and respect. The three leaders of Central America’s Northern Tier (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—whose president is a former guerrilla commander) were effusive in their praise. The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, who in Cartagena had sharply criticized U.S. monetary policies and had cancelled a visit to the White House to protest NSA spying, was pleased to announce that her visit had been rescheduled for this June. 

Obama’s own performance was more spirited than it had been in Cartagena. In response to a harsh polemic by Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, Obama shot back: “The U.S. may be a handy excuse for diverting attention from domestic political problems, but it won’t solve those problems.” After listening politely through Raúl Castro’s extended remarks—during which Castro praised him as a man of honesty and authenticity—Obama departed to avoid having to sit through the predictable harangues of Argentine President Cristina Kirchner and Bolivian leader Evo Morales. Few could blame him.

At the parallel CEO Summit of business executives, Obama delivered thoughtful responses to questions posed by several entrepreneurs including Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, distinguishing himself from the facile rhetorical answers of the other presidents on the panel. At a Civil Society Forum where delegates affiliated with Cuban government organizations engaged in disruptive tactics, Obama lectured firmly on the virtues of civility and tolerance. Together with two other presidents (Tabaré Vasquez of Uruguay and Guillermo Solis of Costa Rica), Obama met privately with a dozen leaders of nongovernmental organizations, took notes, and incorporated at least one of their suggestions into his later public remarks.

But Obama’s Panama experience was marred by an inexplicable misstep by his White House aides a month earlier—the very public sanctioning of seven Venezuelan officials for alleged human rights violation and corruption, and the declaration that Venezuela was a “threat to U.S. national security.” To Latin American ears, that language recalled Cold War-era justifications for CIA plots and military coups. The State Department claims it warned the White House against Latin American blowback, but perhaps not forcefully enough. Once Latin American anger become apparent, the White House tried to walk the “national security” language back, saying it was just a formality required by U.S. legislation, but the damage was done. Speaker after speaker condemned the “unilateral sanctions” and called for their repeal.

The ill-timed sanctions announcement provided Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his populist allies with a ready stick to beat the United States. For whileObama’s diplomacy had managed to peel off most of the Central Americans and win over or at least diminish the antagonism of other leaders, it had not found a way to tranquilize the rejectionist states (Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina) tied to Venezuela in an “anti-imperialist” alliance. Although a relatively small minority, these spoilers seriously disrupt plenary meetings with long and vituperative monologues, and small minorities of “veto” players can block the signing of otherwise consensus documents such that in Panama, as in Cartagena, no consensus declaration was issued; rather the host leader signed brief “mandates for action” that lacked full legitimacy.

The problem of the rejectionist minority will be partially alleviated when Kirchner is shortly replaced, likely by a more moderate government in Argentina, and political turnover will eventually come in Venezuela, but the hemisphere needs new rules that protect majority rights to get things done. Some simple procedural innovations, such as a more forceful chair, or even the simple system of red-yellow-green lights that alert speakers to their time limits, would help.

Notwithstanding the misstep on Venezuela sanctions and the disruptive tactics of the rejectionist minority, the overall mood in Panama was upbeat, even celebratory. Leaders made reference to the xenophobic violence and religious intolerance plaguing other continents, and remarked with some pride that, in comparison, Latin America was a zone of peace that was also making progress, however inadequate, on human rights, poverty alleviation, and clean energy. With some procedural fixes, favorable political winds, and continued progress on concrete issues of mutual interest, inter-American relations could well continue their upward trajectory.

Read more about the Summit with Richard Feinberg's post on Cuba's multi-level strategy at the Seventh Summit of the Americas.

Today’s announcement of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana replaces over five decades of mutual hostility and aggressive name-calling with a new atmosphere of diplomatic civility. The re-opening of embassies in both capitals establishes platforms upon which to build more normal working relations. Now, the hard work begins, as the two nations gradually dismantle the comprehensive wall of restrictions separating them for two generations.

Expectations are running high, especially in Cuba, that diplomatic engagement will catalyze economic betterment on the island. To stimulate more travel and trade, the U.S. government needs to clarify rules for engaging with the emerging Cuban private sector, and make it clear to U.S. banks that they are permitted to support the use of credit cards by U.S. visitors in Cuba. The administration should also begin to consider another round of liberalizing initiatives, some under consideration in the U.S. Congress, to further relax travel restrictions, and to enable more U.S. firms—beyond agriculture and medicines—to assist the Cuban people.

For its part, the Cuban government should open efficient channels to facilitate the commercial exchanges now authorized by the Obama administration. Cuban entrepreneurs should be permitted ready access to U.S. firms wishing to sell building equipment for construction cooperatives, restaurant supplies for private-owned restaurants, and automotive spare parts for private taxis. Micro-enterprise lending should be authorized to support these emerging non-state enterprises.

If both nations build upon today’s welcome announcement by further opening these channels to travel and commerce, Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro can help to safeguard their joint legacy. By fortifying and expanding constituencies on both sides of the Florida Straits, immersed in daily exchanges to mutual benefit, the two governments can render their diplomatic accomplishment politically irreversible in both capitals.

The global consumer products company Unilever Plc announced on Monday a $35 million investment in Cuba’s Special Development Zone at Mariel. Late last year, Brascuba, a joint venture with a Brazilian firm, Souza Cruz, owned by the mega-conglomerate British American Tobacco (BAT), confirmed it would built a $120 million facility in the same location.

So far, these are the two biggest investments in the much-trumpeted Cuban effort to attract foreign investment, outside of traditional tourism. Yet, neither investment is really new. Unilever had been operating in Cuba since the mid-1990s, only to exit a few years ago in a contract dispute with the Cuban authorities. Brascuba will be moving its operations from an existing factory to the ZED Mariel site.

What is new is the willingness of Cuban authorities to accede to the corporate requirements of foreign investors. Finally, the Cubans appear to grasp that Cuba is a price-taker, and that it must fit into the global strategies of their international business partners. Certainly, Cuban negotiators can strike smart deals, but they cannot dictate the over-arching rules of the game.

Cuba still has a long way to go before it reaches the officially proclaimed goal of $2.5 billion in foreign investment inflows per year. Total approvals last year for ZED Mariel reached only some $200 million, and this year are officially projected to reach about $400 million. For many potential investors, the business climate remains too uncertain, and the project approval process too opaque and cumbersome. But the Brascuba and Unilever projects are definitely movements in the right direction.

But Unilever feared that granting its Cuban partner 51% would yield too much management control and could jeopardize brand quality. Unilever also balked at exporting products made in Cuba, where product costs were as much as one-third higher than in bigger Unilever plants in other Latin American countries.

The 2012 collapse of the Unilever contract renewal negotiations adversely affected investor perceptions of the business climate. If the Cuban government could not sustain a good working relationship with Unilever—a highly regarded, marquée multinational corporation with a global footprint—what international investor (at least one operating in the domestic consumer goods markets) could be confident of its ability to sustain a profitable long-term operation in Cuba?

In the design of the new joint venture, Cuba has allowed Unilever a majority 60% stake. Furthermore, in the old joint venture, Unilever executives complained that low salaries, as set by the government, contributed to low labor productivity. In ZED Mariel, worker salaries will be significantly higher: firms like Unilever will continue to pay the same wages to the government employment entity, but the entity’s tax will be significantly smaller, leaving a higher take-home pay for the workers. Hiring and firing will remain the domain of the official entity, however, not the joint venture.

Unilever is also looking forward to currency unification, widely anticipated for 2016. Previously, Unilever had enjoyed comfortable market shares in the hard-currency Cuban convertible currency (CUC) market, but had been largely excluded from the national currency markets, which state-owned firms had reserved for themselves. With currency unification, Unilever will be able to compete head-to-head with state-owned enterprises in a single national market.

Similarly, Brascuba will benefit from the new wage regime at Mariel and, as a consumer products firm, from currency unification. At its old location, Brascuba considered motivating and retaining talent to be among the firm’s key challenges; the higher wages in ZED Mariel will help to attract and retain high-quality labor.

Brascuba believes this is a good time for expansion. Better-paid workers at Mariel will be well motivated, and the expansion of the private sector is putting more money into consumer pockets. The joint venture will close its old facility in downtown Havana, in favor of the new facility at Mariel, sharply expanding production for both the domestic and international markets (primarily, Brazil).

A further incentive for investment today is the prospect of the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions, even if the precise timing is impossible to predict. Brascuba estimated that U.S. economic sanctions have raised its costs of doing business by some 20%. Inputs such as cigarette filters, manufacturing equipment and spare parts, and infrastructure such as information technology, must be sourced from more distant and often less cost-efficient sources.

Another sign of enhanced Cuban flexibility: neither investment is in a high technology sector, the loudly touted goal of ZED Mariel. A manufacturer of personal hygiene and home care product lines, Unilever will churn out toothpaste and soap, among other items. Brascuba will produce cigarettes. Cuban authorities now seem to accept that basic consumer products remain the bread-and-butter of any modern economy. An added benefit: international visitors will find a more ready supply of shampoo!

The Unilever and Brascuba renewals suggest a new realism in the Cuban camp. At ZED Mariel, Cuba is allowing their foreign partners to exert management control, to hire a higher-paid, better motivated workforce, and it is anticipated, to compete in a single currency market. And thanks to the forward-looking diplomacy of Raúl Castro and Barack Obama, international investors are also looking forward to the eventual lifting of U.S. economic sanctions.

This piece was originally published in Cuba Standard.

Editors’ Note: The odds of wringing short-term concessions from Cuba's proud and nationalist leaders are stacked against Obama, Richard Feinberg and Ted Piccone believe. They argue the trip should be judged by its ability to expand constituencies in both countries who want a more open and prosperous Cuba. This post originally appeared on Huffington Post.

President Obama's decision to make a historic visit to Cuba later this month is about more than U.S. politics or business opportunities on the island. It's a bold bet that

presidential diplomacy can secure a new normal in U.S.-Cuba relations after over five decades of hostilities, embargoes and gridlock.

Based on our years of analysis and policymaking in and out of government, we believe the odds of wringing short-term concessions from Cuba's proud and nationalist leaders are stacked against Obama. We also believe, however, that that is the wrong metric. Rather, this trip should be judged by its ability to expand constituencies in both countries who want a more open and prosperous Cuba.

To that end, Obama should draw on his extraordinary rhetorical skills to paint a vision for both Cubans and Americans of a future attractive enough to persuade the island's citizens, especially its ambitious and talented millennials to remain on the island and for the resourceful Cuban American diaspora to invest in that vision. This promise of a Cuban renaissance should include one where citizens freely exercise their chosen professions, engage directly with a transparent and accountable government, have access to the global internet, and travel abroad routinely for family and business purposes.

To help shape such a future, the U.S. delegation should engage not only with Cuba's historic revolutionaries but also with its next generations of public and private leaders from across Cuban society. The White House can also use the visit to leverage Obama's immense popularity on the island to speak directly to the Cuban people about their aspirations for a brighter future.

Given the longstanding feuds between our two countries, however, it will take longer than a year or two to unwind the accumulated distrust and build support for this new normalcy. On the U.S. side, major sectors have swung clearly in favor of normalization - business and agricultural interests, human rights and religious groups, and the broad swath of U.S. citizens keen to know Cuba after decades of isolation. Even majorities of Cuban-Americans and Hispanic voters favor engagement over the embargo.

These constituencies, however, are not yet strong enough to persuade Congress to lift the embargo. And Havana has done little so far to address the major sticking points in Washington's list of legitimate grievances, particularly in the key areas of human rights and economic reforms.

On the Cuban side, Raúl Castro recognizes that Cuba's ability to protect the social gains of the revolution depends on normalizing its participation in the global economy. Its economy badly needs the injection of U.S. commerce, professional exchanges and tourism that would flow readily once the embargo is lifted. Family-run businesses, farmers, young people and professionals in sectors like software and biotechnology also stand to gain from these changes.

Notably, many of those fighting for a more pluralistic Cuba applaud Obama's decision to declaw the embargo as a political shield for government hard-liners; it helps their cause for a more honest debate at home about how to reform Cuba's outdated model of state-centric development and to make government more accountable to its citizens.

The visit offers both presidents a rare opportunity to demonstrate to these various stakeholders that change is not one-sided but a mutual accommodation. There is nothing like a presidential visit to move bureaucracies and catalyze action.

For example, the visit could accelerate progress toward easing the embargo. Already, new rules encourage trade with the emerging private sector and with some state-owned enterprises. Cuba should now take steps to facilitate such commerce and stop insisting that all sanctions be lifted first.

As important, the two sides should expedite resolution of outstanding U.S. property claims dating back to the early 1960s, a key congressional condition for lifting sanctions. Prompt resolution of these cases would automatically create powerful constituencies in the United States for repealing the embargo and signal to foreign investors that Cuba is prepared to respect property rights and the rule of law. They could also demonstrate a willingness to resolve longstanding claims for compensation for citizens killed in hostilities during the Cold War.

In anticipation of next month's Cuban Communist Party Congress, President Castro can detail his plans to decentralize power, empower the legislature and reform the electoral system.

The precise timing of Obama's visit - just one month before the Party Congress - may signal that Raúl Castro and his pragmatic followers welcome a friendly nudge to recharge the reform process they launched in 2008. It also underscores how little time remains before Americans elect a new president who could reverse steps taken so far with the stroke of a pen. That is the kind of marriage of short and long-term interests that allow wise presidents to make history, and the ultimate test for assessing whether the Obamas' trip is serious business, or just family fun.

In recent years, relations between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the African Union have been crumbling. Relations between the two were once solid with strong support from AU member countries.  The ICC has had support from African countries because of the court’s ability to prevent Rwandan genocide-type atrocities and ease power differentials between small and large African nations in international trial situations. 

Brookings nonresident scholar, John Mukum Mbaku, discusses the rising tensions between the ICC and African countries in his contribution to Foresight Africa, a collection of short briefs on the top challenges and opportunities for Africa in 2014.

Read the related paper »

According to John Mbaku, some African countries see the ICC as quite problematic because of the perceived bias that the court brings mostly African criminal cases to trial.  Other countries feel their sovereignty is threatened by the court.  The African Union has gone so far as to ask member countries not to comply or cooperate with the ICC and has attempted (unsuccessfully) to withdraw from The Hague.  A major trigger for these the recent issues with the ICC and African countries was the election of Uhuru Kenyatta as president of Kenya. Kenyatta was indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity and for allegedly inciting ethnic violence following the highly disputed 2007 elections in Kenya.  

John argues that repairing the ties between African countries and the ICC will be difficult, but might be possible through reforms to the ICC process and commitment to stronger judicial systems in African nations.

Read Foresight Africa 2014, which details the top priorities for Africa in the coming year, to learn more about the prospects for strengthening  international justice in Africa, and other critical issues for the region.

For many years, Africans have complained that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has concentrated its efforts exclusively in Africa, a process that has made a mockery of the court’s claims to bring about an end to global impunity. Some Africans have even argued that the ICC’s claims that it is helping bring about justice in Africa are not unlike those made by proponents of the colonial order established by the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885.

On Tuesday, March 11, I participated in a panel discussion entitled, “The International Criminal Court in Africa: Bias, Legitimate Objections, or Excuses for Impunity?” co-hosted by New York University’s School of Continuing and Professional Studies (SCPS), Center for Global Affairs and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).  The program brought together experts interested in justice and peaceful coexistence in Africa to examine the role that the International Criminal Court (ICC) can play in minimizing impunity in the continent.

I was joined by Ambassador Tiina Intelmann, president of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court; Richard Dicker, director of the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch; and Jennifer Trahan, clinical associate professor at the New York University’s School of Continuing and Professional Studies (SCPS), Center for Global Affairs.  David Tolbert, president of the International Center for Transitional Justice, moderated the discussion.

The most important conclusions from what was a robust dialogue were that (i) it is very important that African countries develop the legal and institutional capacity to deal effectively and fully with impunity and other extra-legal activities that impede human development and peaceful coexistence; (ii) the international community should help African countries develop that capacity; (iii) the ICC should make a concerted effort to open dialogue with the African Union in particular and Africans generally in order for the court to gain a better insight into African problems, while, at the same time, help Africans understand and appreciate the nature of the ICC’s work, how it functions, and why it is a critical international body in the fight against impunity; and (iv) the ICC needs to improve openness and transparency in its activities. To make the ICC a truly international court, important countries such as the United States, India, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation need to be brought aboard. Obviously, more dialogue is needed and it is my hope that soon, we will be able to undertake a discussion of this type somewhere in Africa.

During my presentation, I argued that an important part of improving relations between Africa and the ICC is that Africans must take ownership of their problems and find ways to resolve them themselves. For one thing, justice is most effectively delivered locally. Hence, the first line of business is for each African country to develop the legal and institutional capacity to deal with impunity and other governance problems. External actors, notably the ICC, should only be considered conflict-resolution instruments of last resort.

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The 26th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Executive Council has just concluded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the theme, “2016: African Year of Human Rights with a particular focus on the Rights of Women.” Addressing the delegates, who included some of the continent’s most important political leaders and a collection of distinguished foreign dignitaries, the chair of the AU Commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, reminded delegates of the organization’s vision as embodied in Agenda 2063. This pledge, a blueprint for the social, political, and economic transformation of the continent, emphasizes a bottom-up, inclusive, participatory, and people-driven approach to development. As envisioned by the agenda’s architects, Africa’s diverse peoples should spearhead the continent’s transformation and direct its development. Dr. Zuma also made note of 2016’s theme, which is the protection of human rights, with particular emphasis on the rights of women.

Since it became operational, the AU has faced many challenges, some of them linked to problems that have plagued the continent for many decades (e.g., chronic poverty; political instability and violent mobilization by various subcultures; corruption and other forms of impunity) and others (e.g., terrorism and violent extremism) that have come to the fore since the turn of the century. At the recent Addis Ababa meeting, the AU leadership spoke specifically of “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want,” which is heralded as a new development strategy that will enhance the ability of Africans to use their resource endowments fully and effectively for their own development. Although this 50-year initiative has many objectives, the overall aim is to encourage Africans to own their problems, take control of their resolution, and build, by themselves, a prosperous continent “based on inclusive growth and sustainable development.” [1] The AU’s 26th Ordinary Session gives us a chance to reflect on the continental organization’s recent performance and examine how much further it needs to go.

The challenges that the AU faces can be classed into two categories—those that require immediate attention and those whose resolutions can be undertaken through a long-term process. Although cooperation of the international community is critical for the effective resolution of many of the problems and challenges that Africa currently faces, it is important to reiterate the fact that full and effective resolution lies with the African countries themselves. The AU must not be timid but rather act boldly and aggressively, especially in situations of gross violations of human rights and where people are being massacred and others pushed into forced exile (e.g., Burundi, Darfur, Somalia) and provide the leadership needed to prevent genocide and minimize further deterioration in political and economic conditions in many communities throughout the continent.

Coordinating the fight against terrorism and violent extremism: Terrorism and rising violent extremism are major obstacles to peace efforts, national integration, nation building, and the effective management of diversity throughout the continent. From the destruction of economic infrastructures and the massacre of university students in Kenya by al-Shabab; the slaughter of villagers and the kidnapping of school girls in northeastern Nigeria by Boko Haram; the indiscriminate killing of people at hotels in Mali and Burkina Faso; and the downing of an airliner in Egypt, terrorism and violent extremism continue to constrain the ability of Africans to live together peacefully and create the wealth that they need to fight poverty and improve their living conditions. These affiliated and unaffiliated extremist groups—which also include the Lord’s Resistance Army, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Islamic State, and others—are just a few of the entities that threaten to derail Africa’s transition to good governance and inclusive development, respect for human rights, and peaceful coexistence.

Fighting terrorism in the continent requires a coordinated effort at both the regional and national levels. The AU, through the Algiers Convention of 1999, has created a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy for the continent. Unfortunately, the atrocities listed above show that the AU’s counterterrorism framework does not seem to be working and is not being implemented timely and effectively at the level of individual countries. In fact, in addition to the years-long delay of the Algiers Protocol coming into force, less than a third of the African countries have ratified the convention. In addition, only a few African countries have enacted national legislation and restructured their legal and judicial systems to deal with terrorism. The AU must take bold steps to make sure that the necessary steps are taken at the national level to implement policies that significantly enhance the fighting of terrorism at the continental level (e.g., processes for information sharing and consultation; harmonization of immigration policies, etc.). Of course, the AU must also make certain that national leaders do not use anti-terrorism laws to oppress and exploit innocent citizens.

It is important to note that only inclusive economic growth and development and the establishment, within each African country, of governance systems that guarantee the rule of law, including respect for human rights, can deal fully with terrorism and other types of violent and destructive mobilization.

Analysts argue, however, that fighting terrorism effectively is a long-term effort. It is important to note that only inclusive economic growth and development and the establishment, within each African country, of governance systems that guarantee the rule of law, including respect for human rights, can deal fully with terrorism and other types of violent and destructive mobilization. African countries must fully address those issues (e.g., extreme poverty; severe inequality in access to opportunities for self-actualization, as well as in the distribution of income and wealth; and religious and ethnic persecution) that enhance radicalization and render joining extremist groups an attractive option for many of the continent’s youth.

Pressing South Sudanese leaders for peace: South Sudan gained independence on July 9, 2011 and was immediately faced with a multiplicity of problems. In addition to the fact that the new government lacked the capacity to deliver necessary public goods and services to all citizens, as well as the fact that the country faced significantly high levels of venality in the public sector, it was not able to manage diversity effectively. By the summer of 2013, the country had plunged into a major political crisis, which eventually deteriorated into civil war as President Salva Kiir fought forces loyal to his former vice president, Riek Machar, to remain the country’s chief executive. The struggle soon took on ethnic dimensions since Kiir gets significant support from the Dinkas, and Machar gets support from ethnic Nuer. Both parties signed a peace agreement in 2015 but have failed to meet a January 22, 2016 to form a Transitional Government of National Unity. It is important that South Sudan’s leaders place the interests and welfare of the people above their own and form an inclusive government, which can create the conditions necessary for effective state reconstruction. The AU should hold the country’s leaders accountable for meeting the commitments that they made in the peace agreement. Significant pressure must be put on these leaders by the international community, including especially the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to act responsibly and form an inclusive government that would move the country forward in a peaceful and productive manner. 

Ending the crisis in Burundi: President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to defy the constitution and seek a third term in office unleashed violent and destructive mobilizations that have killed more than 400 people and created a major humanitarian crisis in the region. The United Nations says that since April 2015, as many as 240,000 people have fled the country into exile. Are we about to see a repeat of the past—that is, the manipulation of ethnicity by political demagogues that eventually produced a brutal civil war that killed as many as 300,000 people? Some analysts believe that without a quick stop to what the locals simply call “La Crise,” the country is on the verge of being visited by the ghosts of its violent past. The AU, which had planned to send 5,000 peacekeepers to secure the peace and help restore stability, has abandoned that initiative in view of fierce opposition from Nkurunziza. Even a visit from the U.N. Security Council was not enough to convince Nkurunziza to either allow the AU force to enter Burundi or for the government to engage in dialogue with opposition parties without preconditions.

After their recent visit to Burundi, members of the U.N. Security Council “stressed the urgency of addressing the situation” in the country “before it deteriorates further and possibly takes on ethnic dimensions, despite the position of the government of Burundi that the situation is not of such concern.” But can the AU deploy peacekeepers without Burundi’s approval? Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union grants the AU the right to intervene in any member country “pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” However, a top diplomat at the AU has been quoted as saying that unilateral deployment would be an “unimaginable” act. In addition, it is ironic that at the same time the AU was opting not to act forcefully to secure the peace in Burundi and avert what could be another genocide, the incoming chairman of the AU (President Deby of Chad) was declaring that “[t]hrough diplomacy or by force...we must put an end to these tragedies of our time. We cannot make progress and talk of development if part of our body is sick. We should be the main actors in the search for solution to Africa’s crises.”

The AU and the Libyan crisis: The events of the Arab Spring represented a new modality of regime change that the AU had never before encountered. When military forces of the National Transitional Council (NTC) captured Tripoli on August 22, 2011 and drove away then Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi’s forces, members of the NATO-led military alliance that had been providing “aerial bombardment support to the NTC” immediately proceeded to pressure the African Union to recognize the NTC as the only legitimate government of Libya. Nevertheless, when the democratic uprising morphed into a de facto civil war, the AU’s response was a roadmap, which was informed by the organization’s long-established approach to dealing with intra-state conflicts, which called for a ceasefire and negotiations for an inclusive interim government.

The NTC, however, rejected the roadmap, arguing that it did not make allowance for Qaddafi’s immediate departure. The position taken by the NTC was significantly enhanced by the support that it was receiving from the NATO countries, the Arab League, the United Nations, and several African countries.

Although it denounced what it believed was an illegal regime change in Libya orchestrated by NATO powers supposedly to protect Libyan civilians, the AU went ahead, although reluctantly, and recognized the NTC as Libya’s legitimate government and granted the NTC the right to represent the country in the AU.

Some analysts have examined the AU’s failed efforts to mediate the peace in Libya’s political crisis and have argued that "the most important reason for this failure was the decision by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to “undermine and sideline the AU.” Other reasons for the failure of the AU’s roadmap are said to include the inability of the AU to garner coherent support among African countries for its position on Libya and the fact that the AU never really gained the confidence of either the Qaddafi regime or the NTC.

Although Qaddafi’s regime was recognized as both oppressive and repressive towards the country’s citizens, the AU did not approve the decision by the NTC to transform a democratic uprising into a civil war. The AU became even more adamant about its non-violent approach to the Libyan crisis after the NATO countries effectively became agents of forceful regime change in Libya. However, some observers have argued that the AU’s emphasis on the fact that the regime change was unconstitutional must be weighed against the fact that the Qaddafi regime was not only unconcerned about democratic governance but promoted basic laws that were designed to perpetuate and entrench Qaddafi’s hold on power.

To retain its relevance, the AU must provide the leadership to fully and timely resolve various continental problems, such as democratic and popular uprisings, terrorism and violent extremism, armed conflicts, and of course, the necessary political and economic transformations to enhance inclusive growth and development and participatory governance.

It has been argued that the recognition of the NTC by the AU was inconsistent with the organization’s legal positions [2] regarding the illegal/unconstitutional changes of regime on the continent. But, what can be learned from the AU’s handling of the Libyan crisis? While the AU is quite clear about its opposition to unconstitutional regime changes on the continent, it is important for the organization to put in place clear and specific mechanisms to deal with popular uprisings such as those that occurred in North Africa, including Libya.

As much as resolving armed conflicts is important, the AU needs to actively engage in other transformative activities on the continent, including especially, those activities that fundamentally transform the critical domains (i.e., the political, administrative, and judicial foundations of the state) and provide institutional arrangements that foster inclusive economic growth, peaceful coexistence of each country’s various subcultures, and enhance participatory and inclusive governance. Perhaps, had the AU developed such a specific mechanism for dealing with popular uprisings, it would have been able to more effectively confront the present uprising in Burundi.

To retain its relevance, the AU must provide the leadership to fully and timely resolve various continental problems, such as democratic and popular uprisings, terrorism and  violent extremism, armed conflicts, and of course, the necessary political and economic transformations to enhance inclusive growth and development and participatory governance. African countries must not and should not continue to rely on intervention by external actors (e.g., the EU, the U.N., the ICC, and the United States) to help them resolve domestic problems.

Support good governance: While it is quite clear that countries such as Somalia, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan are in urgent need of institutional reforms to guarantee the rule of law, enhance the protection of human rights, and advance inclusive economic growth, it is important to note that even countries that appear peaceful are still suffering from governance systems that are pervaded by corruption, rent seeking, the lack of government accountability, and impunity. One long-term goal for the African Union should be to galvanize grassroots support throughout the continent for institutional reforms to produce (1) constitutions that cannot be easily manipulated by political elites (as occurred in Burundi and Burkina Faso) to prolong their stay in power; and (2) governing processes that are undergirded by some form of separation of powers, with checks and balances—at the minimum, judicial independence must be safeguarded and the legislative branch granted enough independence so that it can effectively check on what have been, in many African countries during the last several decades, imperial presidencies with virtually no check on the exercise of government power.

Create institutions for improving the livelihood of the average citizen: Institutional arrangements that provide citizens with the wherewithal to resolve conflicts peacefully, organize their private lives and engage in those activities (e.g., start and operate a business for profit; practice their chosen religion; get married and raise a family—that is, engage freely in self-actualizing activities) that enhance their ability to maximize their values and protect themselves from abuse by state- and non-state actors, as well as participate fully and effectively in governance, including being able to hold their governors accountable for their actions.

Strengthen the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: The court needs the authority to actually serve as an effective legal instrument for the protection of human rights in all countries in the continent, including dealing with crimes that are currently being referred to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Facilitate economic integration: Currently, many African countries have economies that are relatively small and not very viable and hence, are not capable of engaging in production processes that can effectively utilize and benefit from technological economies of scale. Integration can significantly increase the size of these economies and enhance their ability to produce goods that are competitive globally in both price and quality. In fact, integration at the regional level, especially if supported by the AU, for example, can help small countries more effectively construct and maintain infrastructures such as roads and bridges, universities and research centers, and other projects that require large initial investments but are characterized by significant scale economies.

Transform the AU from observer to actor: During the last several years, as the continent has been devastated and ravaged by terrorist attacks, the AU has remained essentially an observer. When it comes to the fight against terrorism, the AU should make the plight of the victims of these insidious crimes—not state claims of sovereignty and independence—the main basis for its decisions. The AU, of course, must work with national governments and regional organizations (e.g., ECOWAS in West Africa) but must not allow these local groups to constrain its ability to intervene when doing so would save lives or prevent situations that could deteriorate into mass pogroms. Thus, the AU should act purposefully and forcefully to develop an effective anti-terrorism framework that can deal effectively with terrorism and help member states target and address those issues that enhance extremism. The current one just doesn’t cut it.

Address poverty and inequality: Extreme poverty and unequal access to opportunities for self-actualization remain serious challenges for virtually all African countries. Already, in its Agenda 2063, the AU has promised to address these issues and enhance what it calls “inclusive economic growth and sustainable development.” [3] These issues, of course, are interrelated and tied to many of the recommendations listed above. For example, without peace, it is not likely that any African country will be able to engage in the types of entrepreneurial activities that enhance inclusive growth and development. Hence, it is important for the AU to promote the rule of law and thus create the enabling environment for the emergence of the entrepreneurial communities that offer all citizens the opportunities for self-actualization.

Respond effectively to pandemics: As evidenced by the response to the Ebola pandemic that devastated Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone beginning in March 2014, few African countries have health care systems that can effectively and fully respond to pandemics. In addition, there is no continent-wide framework that can timely deal with such health threats and effectively prevent them from becoming pandemics. The AU must take the lead in helping develop a continent-wide response framework to future health threats.

Ensure the equitable allocation of and access to water: The continuing struggle between Egypt and Sudan, on the one hand, and Ethiopia and the other upstream riparian states, on the other hand, over access to the waters of the Nile River, has reminded us of the need for African countries to develop effective legal frameworks for the equitable allocation of existing water resources. With increased demand for water for household use and for irrigated farming—due to rapid population increases, urbanization, and the effects of global warming—it has become evident that African countries must develop and adopt effective legal frameworks to govern the allocation of water resources, as well as deal with other water-related issues such as ecosystem degradation, conservation, and water treatment and reclamation. The AU can provide the mechanisms for regional discourses on water management and enhance the ability of member countries to develop and adopt effective systems to manage international watercourses.

The African Union is in a position to provide the leadership for Africa to develop into a much more effective competitor in the global economy and a full participant in global governance. To do so, the AU must move aggressively to deal with some pressing issues in order to secure peace and security in several countries and avert descend into anarchy and genocide. In the long-run, the AU should help its member countries develop and adopt institutional arrangements and governing processes that guarantee the rule of law, enhance the protection of human rights (including especially those of women and other vulnerable groups), and promote inclusive growth and development. The timid and extremely cautious approach that the AU is taking with respect to the crisis in Burundi is almost tantamount to a dereliction of duties. The AU leadership must not allow claims of sovereignty and independence made by the governments of member states to inform, and perhaps, cloud its decisions. Emphasis should be placed on the plight of the people who are being exploited, displaced and forced into homelessness and/or exile, maimed, and killed by the violence in these countries.

[1]Aspiration 1 of the AU’s Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.

[2] The AU’s guiding principles can be found in the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes in Government and the Constitutive Act of African Union, which prohibit unconstitutional changes in government. For example, Art. 30 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union states as follows: “Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union.” Also, Art. 4 states that “[t]he Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: “(p) condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.” See Constitutive Act of the African Union, available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf (last visited on February 6, 2016).

[3] Aspiration 1 of the AU’s Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.

The African Union (AU) will hold its 27th Heads of State Assembly in Kigali from July 17-18, 2016, as part of its ongoing annual meetings, during which time it will elect individuals to lead the AU Commission for the next four years. Given the fierce battle for the chairperson position in 2012; and  as the AU has increasingly been called upon to assume more responsibility for various issues that affect the continent—from the Ebola pandemic that ravaged West Africa in 2013-14 to civil wars in several countries, including Libya, Central African Republic, and South Sudan, both the AU Commission and its leadership have become very important and extremely prestigious actors. The upcoming elections are not symbolic: They are about choosing trusted and competent leaders to guide the continent in good times and bad.

The African Union (AU) [1] came into being on July 9, 2002 and was established to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The AU’s highest decisionmaking body is the Assembly of the African Union, which consists of all the heads of state and government of the member states of the AU. The chairperson of the assembly is the ceremonial head of the AU and is elected by the Assembly of Heads of State to serve a one-year term. This assembly is currently chaired by President Idriss Déby of Chad.

The AU’s secretariat is called the African Union Commission [2] and is based in Addis Ababa. The chairperson of the AU Commission is the chief executive officer, the AU’s legal representative, and the accounting officer of the commission. The chairperson is directly responsible to the AU’s Executive Council. The current chairperson of the AU Commission is Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma of South Africa and is assisted by a deputy chairperson, who currently is Erastus Mwencha of Kenya.

Dr. Zuma has decided not to seek a second term in office and, hence, this position is open for contest. The position of deputy chairperson will also become vacant, since Mwencha is not eligible to serve in the new commission.

Notably, the position of chairperson of the AU Commission does not only bring prestige and continental recognition to the person that is elected to serve but also to the country and region from which that person hails. Already, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Dr. Zuma’s region, is arguing that it is entitled to another term since she has decided not to stand for a second. Other regions, such as eastern and central Africa, have already identified their nominees. It is also rumored that some regions have already initiated diplomatic efforts to gather votes for their preferred candidates.

In April 2016, SADC chose Botswana’s minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi, as its preferred candidate. Nevertheless, experts believe that even if South Africa flexes its muscles to support Venson-Moitoi’s candidacy (which it is most likely to do), it is not likely to succeed this time because Botswana has not always supported the AU on critical issues, such as the International Criminal Court, and hence, does not have the goodwill necessary to garner the support for its candidate among the various heads of state.

Venson-Moitoi is expected to face two other candidates—Dr. Specioza Naigaga Wandira Kazibwe of Uganda (representing east Africa) and Agapito Mba Mokuy of Equatorial Guinea (representing central Africa). Although Mokuy is relatively unknown, his candidacy could be buoyed by the argument that a Spanish-speaking national has never held the chairperson position, as well as the fact that, despite its relatively small size, Equatorial Guinea—and its president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema—has given significant assistance to the AU over the years. Obiang Nguema’s many financial and in-kind contributions to the AU could endear his country and its candidate to the other members of the AU.

In fact, during his long tenure as president of Equatorial Guinea, Obiang Nguema has shown significant interest in the AU, has attended all assemblies, and has made major contributions to the organization. In addition to the fact that Equatorial Guinea hosted AU summits in 2011 and 2014, Obiang Nguema served as AU chairperson in 2011. Thus, a Mokuy candidacy for the chairperson of the AU Commission could find favor among those who believe it would give voice to small and often marginalized countries, as well as members of the continent’s Spanish-speaking community. Finally, the opinion held by South Africa, one of the continent’s most important and influential countries, on several issues (from the political situation in Burundi to the International Criminal Court and its relations with Africa) appears closer to that of Equatorial Guinea’s than Botswana’s.

Of course, both Venson-Moitoi and Kazibwe are seasoned civil servants with international and administrative experience and have the potential to function as an effective chairperson. However, the need to give voice within the AU to the continent’s historically marginalized regions could push Mokuy’s candidacy to the top.

Nevertheless, supporters of a Mokuy candidacy may be worried that accusations of corruption and repression labeled on Equatorial Guinea by the international community could negatively affect how their candidate is perceived by voters.

Also important to voters is their relationship with former colonial powers. In fact, during the last election, one argument that helped defeat then-Chairperson Jean Ping was that both he and his (Gabonese) government were too pro-France. This issue may not be a factor in the 2016 elections, though: Equatorial Guinea, Uganda, and Botswana are not considered to be extremely close to their former colonizers.

Finally, gender and regional representation should be important considerations for the voters who will be called upon to choose a chairperson for the AU Commission. Both Venson-Moitoi and Kazibwe are women, and the election of either of them would continue to support diversity within African leadership. Then again, Mr. Mokuy’s election would enhance regional and small-state representation.

Also open for contest are the portfolios of Peace and Security, Political Affairs, Infrastructure and Energy, Rural Economy and Agriculture, Human Resources, and Science and Technology. Many countries are vying for these positions on the commission in an effort to ensure that their status within the AU is not marginalized. For example, Nigeria and Algeria, both of which are major regional leaders, are competing to capture the position of commissioner of Peace and Security. Algeria is keen to keep this position: It has held this post over the last decade, and, if it loses this position, it would not have any representation on the next commission—significantly diminishing the country’s influence in the AU.

Nigeria’s decision to contest the position of commissioner of Peace and Security is based on the decision by the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari to give up the leadership of Political Affairs. Historically, Nigeria has been unwilling to compete openly against regional powers for leadership positions in the continent’s peace and security area. Buhari’s decision to contest the portfolio of Peace and Security is very risky, since a loss to Algeria and the other contesting countries will leave Nigeria without a position on the commission and would be quite humiliating to the president and his administration.

Since the AU came into being in 2002, there has been an unwritten rule that regional powers (e.g., Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa) should not lead or occupy key positions in the AU’s major institutions. Thus, when Dr. Zuma was elected in 2012, South Africa was severely criticized, especially by some smaller African countries, for breaking that rule. The hope, especially of the non-regional leaders, is that the 2016 election will represent a return to the status quo ante since most of the candidates for the chairperson position hail from small- and medium-sized countries.

While professional skills and international experience are critical for an individual to serve on the commission, the AU is quite concerned about the geographical distribution of leadership positions, as well as the representation of women on the commission, as noted above. In fact, the commission’s statutes mandate that each region present two candidates (one female and the other male) for every portfolio. Article 6(3) of the commission’s statutes states that “[a]t least one Commissioner from each region shall be a woman.” Unfortunately, women currently make up only a very small proportion of those contesting positions in the next commission. Thus, participants must keep in mind the need to create a commission that reflects the continent’s diversity, especially in terms of gender and geography.

Individuals that have served in government and/or worked for an international organization dominate leadership positions in the commission. Unfortunately, individuals representing civil society organizations are poorly represented on the nominee lists; unsurprisingly, given the fact that the selection process is controlled by civil servants from states and regional organizations. Although this approach to the staffing of the commission guarantees the selection of skilled and experienced administrators, it could burden the commission with the types of bureaucratic problems that are common throughout the civil services of the African countries, notably, rigidity, tunnel vision, and the inability, or unwillingness to undertake bold and progressive initiatives.

The AU currently faces many challenges, some of which require urgent and immediate action and others, which can only be resolved through long-term planning. For example, the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, and securing the peace in South Sudan, Burundi, Libya, and other states and regions consumed by violent ethno-cultural conflict require urgent and immediate action from the AU. Issues requiring long-term planning by the AU include helping African countries improve their governance systems, strengthening the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, facilitating economic integration, effectively addressing issues of extreme poverty and inequality in the distribution of income and wealth, responding effectively and fully to pandemics, and working towards the equitable allocation of water, especially in urban areas.

Finally, there is the AU’s dependence on foreign aid for its financing. When Dr. Dlamini Zuma took over as chairperson of the AU Commission in 2012, she was quite surprised by the extent to which the AU depends on budget subventions from international donors and feared that such dependence could interfere with the organization’s operations. The AU budget for 2016 is $416,867,326, of which $169,833,340 (40 percent) is assessed on Member States and $247,033,986 (59 percent) is to be secured from international partners.  The main foreign donors are the United States, Canada, China, and the European Union.

Within Africa, South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, and Algeria are the best paying rich countries. Other relatively rich countries, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Cameroon, are struggling to pay. Libya’s civil war and its inability to form a permanent government is interfering with its ability to meet its financial obligations, even to its citizens. Nevertheless, it is hoped that South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, and Libya, the continent’s richest countries, are expected to eventually meet as much as 60% of the AU’s budget and help reduce the organization’s continued dependence on international donors. While these major continental and international donors are not expected to have significant influence on the elections for leadership positions on the AU Commission, they are likely to remain a determining factor on the types of programs that the AU can undertake.

Dealing fully and effectively with the multifarious issues that plague the continent requires AU Commission leadership that is not only well-educated and skilled, but that has the foresight to help the continent develop into an effective competitor in the global market and a full participant in international affairs. In addition to helping the continent secure the peace and provide the enabling environment for economic growth and the creation of wealth, this crop of leaders should provide the continent with the leadership necessary to help states develop and adopt institutional arrangements and governing systems that guarantee the rule of law, promote the protection of human rights, and advance inclusive economic growth and development.

[1] The AU consists of all the countries on the continent and in the United Nations, except the Kingdom of Morocco, which left the AU after the latter recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara). Morocco claims that the Western Sahara is part of its territory.

[2] The AU Commission is made up of a number of commissioners who deal with various policy areas, including peace and security, political affairs, infrastructure and energy, social affairs, trade and industry, rural economy and agriculture, human resources, science and technology, and economic affairs. According to Article 3 of its Statutes, the Commission is empowered to “represent the Union and defend its interests under the guidance of and as mandated by the Assembly and Executive Council.”

During the 27th Heads of State Assembly of the African Union (AU) meeting in Kigali, Rwanda, from July 17-18, 2016, the heads of state were supposed to elect individuals to lead the AU for the next four years. One of the most important functions that the delegates were expected to perform was to elect the chairperson of the AU Commission to replace the present chairperson, South Africa’s Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who had indicated that she would not seek re-election.

Three candidates were standing for the position of chairperson of the AU Commission. These were Dr. Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi, foreign minister of Botswana, Dr. Specioza Waigaga Wandira Kazibwe, former vice president of Uganda, and Mr. Agapito Mba Mokuy, foreign minister of Equatorial Guinea. There was great expectation that the election of any one of these three candidates would significantly advance gender and regional balance, with respect to key leadership positions in continental institutions. Hence, the election of either one of the two female candidates would have been welcomed by supporters of gender balance. However, if the delegates had opted for Mr. Mokuy, such a choice would have been welcomed by the Spanish-speaking community, as well as the continent’s smaller and historically marginalized states. Given the fact that the outgoing chairperson of the AU Commission, Dr. Zuma, is a woman, the hope within the central African community was that Mr. Mokuy would emerge victorious and represent the region, as well as serve as a sign of hope for the heretofore marginalized regions.

Reports from Kigali are that the election for the chairperson has been postponed until January 2017. It is reported that the AU took that decision based on the fact that none of the three candidates had secured the two-thirds majority of votes needed to win. During the election’s first round, Dr. Venson-Moitoi received 16 votes, Mr. Mokuy received 12 votes, and Dr. Kazibwe received 11 votes. 

Those who abstained from voting claimed that the candidates were not qualified to lead the commission.

After receiving the least votes in the first round, Dr. Kazibwe withdrew from the competition. That left Dr. Venson-Moitoi and Mr. Mokuy to compete for the position. Although Dr. Venson-Moitoi garnered 23 votes in the next round, that number was less than the 36 votes to constitute the two-thirds majority needed to emerge victorious.

Part of the reason for this quagmire, as the news from Kigali is indicating, is that as many as 15 heads of state abstained from voting in the first round of the competition and that in the second round, 20 acted similarly. These many abstentions derailed the process and made certain that none of the remaining candidates would emerge victorious.

While these may be legitimate issues to raise, one wonders why these issues were not raised and fully resolved before the delegates actually assembled in Kigali.

Indeed, the AU assembly chair, President Idriss Déby of Chad, cited the boycott as a deciding factor in the failure of any of the three candidates to secure the necessary votes to win. He then announced that the elections had been postponed until January 2017 and that the heads of state had opened up the contest to more candidates—a decision that appears to be a slap in the face of the current candidates. Notably, this appears to support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) bloc’s pre-election petition that the elections be postponed because, as they argued, none of the candidates was qualified to lead. That petition, however, had been previously denied.

President Déby argued, in his post-election proclamation, that the delay would provide candidates and their respective regions with the time to adequately prepare for the elections in January 2017. What appears to be implied by this declaration is that preparations for the failed July elections were inadequate and that with this extra time, the type of behavior exhibited by some representatives during the recently concluded elections would not occur in January. However, unless the AU puts in place rules to prevent such an eventuality, there is no guarantee that January 2017’s elections would not be marred by such last-minute maneuvering again. What is to prevent other blocs from engaging in similar strategic behavior (i.e., boycotting the election) in order to promote their own candidates for the various leadership positions in the commission?

Nevertheless, the AU is a continental organization, and no country or region should be allowed to dominate and monopolize leadership positions in its institutions.

Those who abstained from voting claimed that the candidates were not qualified to lead the commission. Dr. Kazibwe’s candidacy was questioned on the grounds that she was previously convicted of abusing state funds. Mr. Mokuy was taken to task for his country’s human rights record, while Dr. Venson-Moitoi’s candidacy was questioned because her home country, Botswana, has often taken positions that are contrary to those of many other AU members, notably on the issue of Africa’s relations with the International Criminal Court.

While these may be legitimate issues to raise, one wonders why these issues were not raised and fully resolved before the delegates actually assembled in Kigali. Certainly, the AU must have mechanisms to vet individuals who are nominated for leadership positions in its institutions to determine their fit for office. During such a vetting process, groups and individuals within the AU can make known their objections to candidates that they believe are not qualified to perform the jobs for which they are being nominated. Of course, such a vetting process must be governed by rules chosen in an earlier period such as those presented in The Statutes of the Commission of the African Union, which provide information on the minimum qualifications and experience of the commissioners. Hence, any challenge to the qualifications of an individual running to serve on the commission should begin with and be governed by such rules.

Once candidates have been fully vetted and determined to meet the minimum qualifications to stand for the positions for which they have been nominated, no head of state (i.e., elector) should boycott the voting. Of course, it is not surprising that electors would prefer to vote for candidates from either their own countries or region. Nevertheless, the AU is a continental organization, and no country or region should be allowed to dominate and monopolize leadership positions in its institutions. Hence, the AU Commission’s leadership must reflect the continent’s diversity, with specific emphasis on gender and geographic balance. Efforts by heads of state or blocs (e.g., ECOWAS) to engage in last minute strategic maneuvering (e.g., boycotting of elections) in order to secure certain political advantages should be discouraged. Such opportunistic behavior can seriously undermine the AU’s electoral system and place the organization in a very precarious position. In fact, one could argue that the outcome of the July 2016 commission elections in Kigali betray an organization that appears to be adrift and without proper leadership and one that is not willing to follow its own rules.  

In fact, one could argue that the outcome of the July 2016 commission elections in Kigali betray an organization that appears to be adrift and without proper leadership and one that is not willing to follow its own rules.

As the AU looks forward, it must make certain that no voting bloc within the organization is allowed to grant itself the power to derail the electoral process. Such opportunism and capriciousness on the part of any group within the AU can prevent the deepening and institutionalization of democratic principles within the organization and effectively hold hostage the interests of the continent to those of a smaller group or region.

Thus, the process through which the member states of the African Union choose individuals to serve in and manage their institutions must be competitive and based on democratic principles. The AU should learn a lesson from what happened in Kigali and put legal mechanisms in place to deal fully and effectively with any future efforts by groups, individuals, and factions to engage in any behavior that can frustrate the functioning of the organization and its institutions. Perhaps the failure of the AU to anticipate such behavior is due to its inexperience. Nevertheless, the organization must provide itself with the wherewithal to prevent this type of stalemate. For, come January, another region may, at the last minute, register its dissatisfaction with all candidates and seek to replace them.

If the AU is to teach member states the principles of good governance, it must first put its own house in order and lead by example.

As the AU looks forward to the January 2017 round of elections, Senegalese politician and diplomat, Abdoulaye Bathily, has already indicated his interest in competing for the position of chairperson of the AU Commission. To avoid the problems that were encountered by the electoral process in Kigali, he, his country, and his region should commence the formal nomination process in order to provide all interested parties with the opportunity to properly vet his candidacy and determine his fit for office. In fact, other candidates who are planning to stand for the elections in January 2017 should also have themselves formally nominated as soon as possible so that the vetting process can be completed and a final list of qualified candidates agreed before the delegates meet in January 2017.

If the AU is to teach member states the principles of good governance, it must first put its own house in order and lead by example. It must, for example, make its electoral decisions through a democratic and competitive process. It must be governed by the rule of law in order for it to stand as a beacon of light for the many countries in the continent that are trying to deepen and institutionalize democracy. Unless the AU puts into place mechanisms to deal with the types of behaviors that derailed the commission elections in Kigali in July 2016, it risks descending into a quagmire from which it might not get out uninjured.

A 2010 publication of the U.S. Geological Survey caused major excitement in Cyprus, an island that at the time was suffering from the economic collapse of its neighbor and major trading partner, Greece. According to the publication, the seabed of the Eastern Mediterranean could contain up to 120 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas.3 Three years later, the Cypriot administration has high hopes that natural gas exports may get Cyprus—the third smallest European Union member state—back on its feet, after its own financial collapse in 2012. Unfortunately for the Cypriots, the reality on the ground is sobering, and it is currently unclear whether Cyprus will become a producer, or an exporter, of natural gas. Around Cyprus, other countries hope to benefit from the energy potential as well, including Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. In the Israeli Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in particular, substantial reserves of natural gas have been found, though the verdict is out whether these will in fact all be produced.

Exploration of Cyprus’s offshore concessions is at an early stage. Energy majors such as ENI and Total are among the first to explore possible gas (and oil) reserves and they expect results not before 2015. To date, only two test wells have been drilled by Houston-based Noble Energy. Proven reserves have been downgraded since and are currently estimated to be between 3 and 5 tcf. At this level of reserves, investing in a natural gas liquefaction terminal, which the Cypriot administration has supported, is not economically viable. A better alternative would be to construct a pipeline to Turkey, which has a large and rapidly growing market for natural gas.

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• Politics Trump Economics in the Complex Game of Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusolu’s decision earlier this month to decline to participate in the Munich Security Conference due to Israeli ministerial participation marks a new low in the troubled Turkish-Israeli relationship.

And yet, the latest statistics released this week by the Israeli government document an overall volume of $5.44 billion dollars in Turkish-Israeli trade during 2014. This marks an all-time high point in Turkish-Israeli economic relations, up 11.5 percent from 2013, including $2.75 billion in Israeli exports to Turkey (a 10 percent year-to-year increase) and $2.68 billion in Turkish imports to Israel (13 percent higher than 2013).

This pattern of an almost non-existent political dialogue at the senior levels accompanied by robust bilateral trade has characterized the Turkish-Israeli relationship since 2011. Short of unexpected dramatic changes, the relations between the two former allies will likely continue in this pattern for the foreseeable future. 

Almost two years after Israel’s official apology to Turkey over the Mavi Marmara incident (which I wrote about in depth here), the two countries continue to move in different directions, despite sharing similar strategic concerns on a range of regional issues – the civil war in Syria, instability in Iraq and Iran’s nuclear program.

The main bone of contention between the AKP-led Turkish government and the Likud-led government in Israel remains the Palestinian issue. Turkey continues to speak out against Israeli occupation and settlement activity in the West Bank, as well as on Israeli human rights violations towards the Palestinian population. In addition, Turkey remains one of the main (very few) patrons of Hamas, providing the group with political and economic support and allowing the organization to maintain representation in Istanbul. Israel viewed with disdain Turkish attempts, together with Qatar, to facilitate a ceasefire with Hamas during the summer 2014 war. Anti-Turkish sentiments in Israeli public opinion skyrocketed in response to President Erdogan’s allegations that Israeli policies on Gaza are genocidal. 

Amidst rising tensions in the relationship, President Erdogan publicly vowed after his August 2014 election that as long as he’s in power, Turkey’s approach to Israel will not change. As a result, there are no serious expectations that any senior-level political dialogue will resume, and mutual representation is likely to remain at a junior diplomatic level (after ambassadors were withdrawn from Tel Aviv and Ankara in 2011).

The interesting aspect of the relationship continues to be the booming trade between the two countries, which despite political tensions continues to grow at a rapid pace. Clearly there is an interest on both sides to insulate the economic sphere from the political sphere. Robust trade serves both countries’ economic interests and during a very unstable period keeps the relationship afloat. Nevertheless, an Israeli – Turkish natural gas deal which was considered in the past as a likely scenario and possibly a regional and bilateral “game changer” seems at present to be “off the table.” Potential energy cooperation between Turkey and Israel around the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries may be possible only in the context of political rapprochement.