Executive Summary

Government information technology is subject to a variety of rules, regulations, and procurement policies.  Computing is treated differently depending on whether the platform is based on desktops, laptops, mobile devices, or remote file servers known as cloud computing.  There are differences between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, as well as in the level of privacy and security expected for various applications.  

Some people perceive higher security on desktop or laptop computers and lower security with the cloud because the latter’s information is stored remotely through third-party commercial providers.  In reality, though, there are serious security threats to all electronic information regardless of platform, and cloud server providers often take security more seriously than mass consumers or government officials employing weak passwords on their local computers. 

In this paper, I review current federal IT policy and discuss rules, practices, and procedures that limit innovation.  There are a variety of obstacles that make it difficult for policymakers to take full advantage of the technological revolution that has unfolded in recent years.  After outlining these issues, I make recommendations on policy changes required to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal computing. 

My specific recommendations include:

1. Public officials should develop more consistent rules on computing across desktop, laptop, mobile, and cloud platforms.  
2. The use of video, collaboration, and social networking should be authorized for congressional offices.  This would make legislative branch policy consistent with that of the executive branch.
3. Judicial branch computing should be modernized, with greater emphasis on cloud computing. 
4. There should be a more uniform certification process for federal agencies.  Right now, each agency is responsible for certifying its own applications.  It makes sense to have a “joint authorization board” with the power to review management services and certify particular products for use across the government. 
5. Congress should update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to change the process by which law enforcement agents obtain electronic information.  Instead of using a prosecutor’s subpoena, legislation should require a “probable cause” search warrant that is approved by a judge.  This would provide greater safeguards in terms of online content, pictures, geolocation data, and e-mails.
6. Privacy rights should be placed on the same footing regardless of whether a person is using desktop or cloud computing.  It makes little sense to have weaker standards on one platform than another.  Consumers and government decision-makers expect the same level of protection whether they are accessing information on a desktop, laptop, mobile, or cloud storage system. 
7. Congress should amend the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to strengthen penalties for unwanted intrusion into computing systems.  The law has inconsistent penalties and prosecutors have found that it is hard to prosecute cyber-crimes. 
8. Apps.gov represents a big step forward and government use should be expanded because it makes procurement easier and speeds public sector innovation.  It is a model of how the government can reinvent itself through digital technology in ways that improve efficiency and effectiveness.
9. Countries need to harmonize their laws on cloud computing so as to reduce current inconsistencies in regard to privacy, data storage, security processes, and personnel training,  
10. There should be mechanisms for data exchange that encourage portability across platforms.  We should avoid vendor lock-in that precludes data exchange.
11. Data on uptime, downtime, recover time, archiving, and maintenance schedules would help build public trust by providing information on computing performance.

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Event Information

The U.S. government spends billions of dollars each year on computer hardware, software and file servers that may no longer be necessary. Currently, the public sector makes relatively little use of cloud computing, even though studies suggest substantial government savings from a migration to more Internet-based computing with shared resources.

On July 21, the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings hosted a policy forum on steps to enhance public sector adoption of cloud computing innovations. Brookings Vice President Darrell West moderated a panel of experts, including David McClure of the General Services Administration, Dawn Leaf of the National Institute for Standards and Technology, and Katie Ratte of the Federal Trade Commission. West released a paper detailing the policy changes required to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal computing.

Audio

• Moving to the Cloud: How the Public Sector Can Leverage the Power of Cloud Computing

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)
• Download Dawn Leaf's PowerPoint Presentation (.pdf)
• Download David McClure's PowerPoint Presentation (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20100721_cloud_computing
• 0721_cloud_computing_leaf
• 0721_cloud_computing_mcclure

In December 2009, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy conducted a day-long simulation of the diplomatic and military fallout that could result from an Israeli military strike against the Iranian nuclear program. In this Middle East Memo, Kenneth M. Pollack analyzes the critical decisions each side made during the wargame.

The simulation was conducted as a three-move game with three separate country teams. One team represented a hypothetical American National Security Council, a second team represented a hypothetical Israeli cabinet, and a third team represented a hypothetical Iranian Supreme National Security Council. The U.S. team consisted of approximately ten members, all of whom had served in senior positions in the U.S. government and U.S. military. The Israel team consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Israel with close ties to Israeli decision-makers, and who, in some cases, had spent considerable time in Israel. Some members of the Israel team had also served in the U.S. government. The Iran team consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Iran, some of whom had lived and/or traveled extensively in Iran, are of Iranian extraction, and/or had served in the U.S. government with responsibility for Iran.

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Introduction:

In the ebb and flow of Middle East diplomacy, the two interrelated issues of an Israeli-Syrian peace settlement and Washington’s bilateral relationship with Damascus have gone up and down on Washington’s scale of importance. The election of Barack Obama raised expectations that the United States would give the two issues the priority they had not received during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration. Candidate Obama promised to assign a high priority to the resuscitation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and separately to “engage” with Iran and Syria (as recommended by the Iraq Study Group in 2006).

In May 2009, shortly after assuming office, President Obama sent the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, and the senior director for the Middle East in the National Security Council, Daniel Shapiro, to Damascus to open a dialogue with Bashar al-Asad’s regime. Several members of Congress also travelled to Syria early in Obama’s first year, including the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, John Kerry, and the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Howard Berman. In addition, when the president appointed George Mitchell as special envoy to the Middle East, Mitchell named as his deputy Fred Hof, a respected expert on Syria and the Israeli-Syrian dispute. Last summer, both Mitchell and Hof visited Damascus and began their give and take with Syria.

And yet, after this apparent auspicious beginning, neither the bilateral relationship between the United States and Syria, nor the effort to revive the Israeli-Syrian negotiation has gained much traction. Damascus must be chagrined by the fact that when the Arab-Israeli peace process is discussed now, it is practically equated with the Israeli-Palestinian track. This paper analyzes the difficulties confronting Washington’s and Jerusalem’s respective Syria policies and offers an approach for dealing with Syria. Many of the recommendations stem from lessons resulting from the past rounds of negotiations, so it is important to understand what occurred.

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Introduction:

There is an Egyptian proverb that says those who worry about demons will tend to run into them. Like much folk wisdom, it has solid psychological foundations; the likelihood of a problem rearing its head often appears to be exacerbated by constantly fretting about it. Ever since Hosni Mubarak stepped down as president of Egypt on February 11, 2011, the demon named “Now What?” has been keeping the Israeli government up at night. On August 18, it finally leapt up at them.

That day, a group of armed men attacked Israeli buses, as well as civilian and military vehicles north of Eilat, near the Egyptian border. Eight Israelis, both civilians and soldiers, were killed. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) set off in hot pursuit, shooting at the attackers from a helicopter. The helicopter crew either failed to notice, or ignored, that they were shooting over the Egyptian side of the border. In the pursuit, three Egyptians— an officer and two enlisted men—were killed and another three later died of their wounds. Israeli minister of defense Ehud Barak, while blaming Palestinian groups for the assault, made comments to the effect that the attacks were largely Egypt’s fault as there had been a major security collapse in Egypt since the former regime had been ousted six months earlier.

The way matters unfolded over the next few days pointedly illustrated the answer to a question that had been asked repeatedly both by international media and the Israeli government since Hosni Mubarak’s ouster: What did Egypt’s January 25 Revolution mean for Israel? The simplest answer is that it is no longer business as usual. The relationship between Egypt and Israel has changed and both countries will have to navigate new waters carefully and wisely.

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Last winter, Salafi parties in Egypt proved themselves a formidable political force, winning a quarter of the vote in the country’s first elections in the post-Mubarak era. For many in Washington, the unexpected strength of Egypt’s conservative religious groups raised unsettling questions about the future of U.S.-Egyptian relations and America’s security interests in the region.

Will the political success of Salafis turn Egypt into an anti-American power and strengthen jihadist groups like al-Qa’ida that are bent on using violence against the United States and its allies?

In the Saban Center Middle East Memo, William McCants, a Middle East specialist at CNA and adjunct faculty at Johns Hopkins University, examines the implications of the Salafis’ turn to, and success in, electoral politics. McCants argues that while political participation may not moderate Salafis’ positions on social issues, it will likely erode the strength of their most extreme and violent affiliates. For this reason, America’s interests may be best served when Salafis play a role in post-revolution politics.

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• The Lesser of Two Evils: The Salafi Turn to Party Politics in Egypt

The Saban Center for Middle East Policy joined with the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War in June 2012 to host a one-day crisis simulation that explored the implications of spillover from the ongoing violence in Syria. The simulation examined how the United States and its allies might address worsening instability in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and elsewhere in the Middle East as a result of the internecine conflict in Syria.

The Saban Center’s Middle East Memo, “Unraveling the Syria Mess: A Crisis Simulation of Spillover from the Syrian Civil War,” authored by simulation conveners Kenneth M. Pollack, Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, and Marisa C. Sullivan, presents key lessons and observations from the exercise.

Among the key findings:

• A humanitarian crisis alone is unlikely to spur the international community to take action in Syria.
   
• Turkey is a linchpin in any effort to end the fighting in Syria, but Washington and Ankara may not see eye-to-eye on what the end game should be.
   
• U.S. history in Iraq and Lebanon make intervention there unlikely, even if spillover causes a renewal of large-scale violence.

The simulation suggested a tension between U.S. political antipathy toward greater involvement in Syria and the potential strategic desirability of early action.

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• Unraveling the Syria Mess

The crisis in Syria continues with no end in sight, and in the Saban Center's latest Middle East Memo, Breaking the Stalemate: The Military Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War and Options for Limited U.S. Intervention, Saban Center Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack argues that until there is a breakthrough on the battlefield, there will be no breakthroughs at the negotiating table.

In his paper, Pollack lays out the military advantages and disadvantages of both the opposition and the regime's forces, and looks at how different opportunities for U.S. intervention can affect those critical dynamics. This analysis provides a much-needed counterpoint to the debate over the possible cost of U.S. options in Syria with an analysis of their likely impact on the conflict.

Highlights include:

• The strengths and weaknesses of the opposition, including: greater numbers, a history of deprivation of political power, the aid of Islamist militias affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups, and support from Arab and Western countries.
   
• The strengths and weaknesses of the regime, including: motivation to defend against a determined majority, a geographic advantage, the remnants of the Syrian armed forces, help of foreign contingents like Hizballah, and the support of foreign countries like Iran and reportedly Russia and China.
   
• Options for U.S. interventions to break the stalemate, including:

  • Training and equipping the opposition.
  • Stopping the resupply of the regime in order to diminish its ability to generate firepower.
  • Attacking regime infrastructure targets, such as military bases, power-generation plants and transportation choke points like bridges.
  • Establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone.
  • Engaging in a tactical air campaign against regime ground forces.

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This summer, the world has watched as an al Qaeda offshoot, the Islamic State group, launched a militant offensive into Iraq, seizing large swaths of land. This Center for Middle East Policy’s Middle East Memo, Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq, examines how the fall of Iraq’s key city of Mosul has changed matters for Kurds in Iraq, and the necessity for American policymakers to take stock of the reality of the Kurdistan Region in this “post-Mosul” world.

Highlights: 

• A look at the Kurds of Iraq, their history and how the United States has largely spurned a partnership with them. Having been autonomous in Iraq since 1991, the Kurds heeded the aspirations of the United States in 2003 to assist in the removal of the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein, and played by the rules of the game established in the post-2003 period, albeit unwillingly at times. However, they have consistently refused to follow a path that would result in relinquishing the powers they enjoy. They have even taken steps to extend their autonomy to the point of having economic sovereignty within a federal Iraq, thus bringing them into serious dispute with Baghdad and the government of Nouri al-Maliki and earning the rebuke of the United States.

• An examination of how, since 2011, failed U.S. and European policies aimed at healing Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic fissures have contributed to the current situation. By so strongly embracing the concept of Iraq’s integrity as crucial to American interests in the region, key allies and partners have been marginalized along the way.

• Policy recommendations for the United States and its western allies, given that the Kurdistan region now stands on the threshold of restructuring Iraq according to its federal or confederal design, or exercising its full right to self-determination and seceding from Iraq. By ignoring the realities of Kurdish strength in Iraq, U.S. and European powers run the risk of losing influence in the only part of Iraq that can be called a success story, and antagonizing what could be a key ally in an increasingly unpredictable Middle East.

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• Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq