In last Thursday’s GOP debate, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, Jeb Bush and Chris Christie managed to avoid mentioning their common proposal to “reform entitlements” by raising the Social Security retirement age from 67 to 70. That was probably a good idea. Their proposal only demonstrates their lack of understanding about the demographics of older Americans, especially the dramatic disparities in their life expectancy associated with education and race. Recent research on life expectancy indicates that their proposed change would effectively nullify Social Security for millions of Americans and sharply limit benefits for many millions more.. While many people in their 30s and 40s today can look forward to living into their 80s, the average life expectancy for the majority of Americans who do not hold a college degree hovers closer to 70, or the average life expectancy for all Americans in 1950.

The Widening Inequalities in the Life Spans of Americans

This research, summarized recently in a study published in Health Affairs, found that life expectancy for various age cohorts of Americans is closely associated with both educational achievement and race. For example, the average life expectancy for college-educated American men who were age 25 in 2008, or age 33 today, is 81.7 years for whites and 78.2 years for blacks. (Table 1, below) By contrast, the projected, average life span of high-school educated males, also age 25 in 2008 or 33 today, is 73.2 years for whites and 69.3 years for blacks. Women on average live longer than men; but similar disparities based on education and race are evident. The average life expectancy of women age 25 in 2008, or 33 years old today, was 79 years for whites and 75.4 years for blacks for those with a high school diploma, and 84.7 years for whites and 81.6 years for blacks with college degrees. Most disturbing, the average life expectancy of Americans age 25 in 2008 without a high school diploma is just 68.6 years for white men, 68.2 years for black men, 74.2 years for white women, and 74.9 years for black women. Surprisingly, the researchers found that Hispanics in this age group have the longest life expectancies, even though they also have the lowest average levels of education. Since these data are anomalous and may reflect sampling problems, we will focus mainly on the life-expectancy gaps between African American and white Americans.

Tallying How Many People Are Adversely Affected

Census data on the distribution by education of people age 25 to 34 in 2010 (ages 30 to 39 in 2015) provide a good estimate of how many Americans are adversely affected by these growing differences. Overall, 56.3 percent of all Americans currently in their 30s fall are high school graduates or left school without a high school diploma, educational groups with much lower average life expectancies. (Table 2, below) More precisely, 10.1 percent or almost 4.8 million Americans in their 30s today lack a high school diploma, and 46.2 percent or 18.9 million thirty-somethings have high school diplomas and no further degrees. All told, they account for 23,702,000 Americans in their 30s; and among older Americans, the numbers and percentages are even higher.

Since race as well as education are major factors associated with differences in life expectancy, we turn next to education by race (Table 3, below). The totals differ modestly from Table 2, because Census data on education by race cover ages 30-39 in 2014, while Table 2 covers age 30-39 in 2015 (ages 25-34 in 2010).

• Among people in their 30s today, 45.4 percent of whites or 10,613,000 Americans have a high school degree or less – and their average life expectancy is 9.4 years less than whites in their 30s with a college or associate degree.
• Among people in their 30s todays, 64.4 percent of blacks or 3,436,000 Americans have a high school degree or less – and their life expectancy is 8.6 years less than blacks in their 30s with an B.A. or associate degree, and 11.6 years less than whites with a college or associate degree..
• Among people in their 30s today, 75.6 percent of Hispanics or 6,243,000 Americans have a high school degree or less – and their life expectancy is 5.0 years less than Hispanics in their 30s with a college or associate degree.

As a policy matter, these data tell us that across all communities—white, black, Hispanic—improvements in secondary education to prepare everyone for higher education, and lower-cost access to higher education, can add years to the lives of millions of Americans.

Preserving Meaningful Access to Social Security Benefits

The widening inequalities in average life expectancy associated with race and education have more direct policy implications for Social Security, because the number of years that people can claim its benefits depends on their life spans. The growing inequalities in life expectancy translate directly into growing disparities in the years people can claim Social Security benefits, based on their education and race. Assuming that Americans in their 30s today retire at age 67 (the age for full benefits for this age group), they can expect to claim retirement benefits, on average, ranging from 1.2 years to 19.3 years, based on their education and race. (Table 4, below)

The most pressing issues of life expectancy and Social Security involve white males, black males, and black females without college degrees: Among Americans age 33 today, white and black men without high school diplomas and black males with high school degrees, on average, can expect to live long enough to collect benefits for less than three years. Similarly, white and black women without high school diplomas and black women with high school degrees, on average, can expect to collect benefits for less than eight years. Together, they account for 25.2 percent of whites and 64.4 percent of blacks in their 30s today. By contrast, male and female white college graduates age 33 today, on average, can expect to collect Social Security for between 14.7 and 17.7 years, respectively; and 33-year old black men and women with college degrees, on average, will claim benefits for 11.2 to 14.6 years, respectively.

These findings dictate that proposals to raise the Social Security retirement age should be rejected as a matter of basic fairness. Among this year’s presidential hopefuls, as noted earlier, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush and Chris Christie all have called for raising the retirement age to 70 years. Under this policy, black men in their 30s today without a college degree and white men now in their 30s without a high school diploma, on average, would not live long enough to collect any Social Security. The change would reduce the average number of years of Social Security for Americans in their 30s today,

• From 1.6 years to -1.4 years for white men with no high school diploma,
• From 1.2 years to -1.8 years for black men with no high school diploma, and
• From 2.3 years to – 0.7 years for black, male high-school graduates.

Furthermore, among Americans in their 30s today, white and black women without a high school diploma, white male high school graduates, and black female high school graduates, would live long enough, on average, to collect Social Security for just 3.2 to 5.4 years. The GOP change reduce the average number of years of Social Security for Americans in their 30s today,

• From 6.2 years to 3.2 years for white, male high school graduates,
• From 7.2 years to 4.2 years for white women with no high school diploma,
• From 7.9 years to 4.9 years for black women with no high school diploma, and
• From 8.4 years to 5.4 years for black, female high-school graduates.

All told, proposals to raise the retirement age to 70 years old would mean, based on the average life expectancy of Americans in their 30s today, that 25.2 percent of whites in their 30s and 64.4 percent of blacks of comparable age, after working for 35 years or more, would receive Social Security benefits for 5.4 years or less.

Gary Burtless, a senior fellow in Economic Studies, explains new research on the growing longevity gap between high-income and low-income Americans, especially among the aged.

“Life expectancy difference of low income workers, middle income workers, and high income workers has been increasing over time,” Burtless says. “For people born in 1920 their life expectancy was not as long typically as the life expectancy of people who were born in 1940. But those gains between those two birth years were very unequally distributed if we compare people with low mid-career earnings and people with high mid-career earnings.” Burtless also discusses retirement trends among the educated and non-educated, income inequality among different age groups, and how these trends affect early or late retirement rates.

Also stay tuned for our regular economic update with David Wessel, who also looks at the new research and offers his thoughts on what it means for Social Security.

Show Notes

Later retirement, inequality and old age, and the growing gap in longevity between rich and poor

Disparity in Life Spans of the Rich and the Poor Is Growing

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Researchers have long known that the rich live longer than the poor. Evidence now suggests that the life expectancy gap is increasing, at least here the United States, which raises troubling questions about the fairness of current efforts to protect Social Security.

There's nothing particularly mysterious about the life expectancy gap. People in ill health, who are at risk of dying relatively young, face limits on the kind and amount of work they can do. By contrast, the rich can afford to live in better and safer neighborhoods, can eat more nutritious diets and can obtain access to first-rate healthcare. People who have higher incomes, moreover, tend to have more schooling, which means they may also have better information about the benefits of exercise and good diet.

Although none of the above should come as a surprise, it's still disturbing that, just as income inequality is growing, so is life-span inequality. Over the last three decades, Americans with a high perch in the income distribution have enjoyed outsized gains.

Using two large-scale surveys, my Brookings colleagues and I calculated the average mid-career earnings of each interviewed family; then we estimated the statistical relationship between respondents' age at death and their incomes when they were in their 40s. We found a startling spreading out of mortality differences between older people at the top and bottom of the income distribution.

For example, we estimated that a woman who turned 50 in 1970 and whose mid-career income placed her in the bottom one-tenth of earners had a life expectancy of about 80.4. A woman born in the same year but with income in the top tenth of earners had a life expectancy of 84.1. The gap in life expectancy was about 3½ years. For women who reached age 50 two decades later, in 1990, we found no improvement at all in the life expectancy of low earners. Among women in the top tenth of earners, however, life expectancy rose 6.4 years, from 84.1 to 90.5. In those two decades, the gap in life expectancy between women in the bottom tenth and the top tenth of earners increased from a little over 3½ years to more than 10 years.

Our findings for men were similar. The gap in life expectancy between men in the bottom tenth and top tenth of the income distribution increased from 5 years to 12 years over the same two decades.

Rising longevity inequality has important implications for reforming Social Security. Currently, the program takes in too little money to pay for all benefits promised after 2030. A common proposal to eliminate the funding shortfall is to increase the full retirement age, currently 66. Increasing the age for full benefits by one year has the effect of lowering workers' monthly checks by 6% to 7.5%, depending on the age when a worker first claims a pension.

For affluent workers, any benefit cut will be partially offset by gains in life expectancy. Additional years of life after age 65 increase the number years these workers collect pensions. Workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, however, are not living much longer, so the percentage cut in their lifetime pensions will be about the same as the percentage reduction in their monthly benefit check.

Our results and other researchers' findings suggest that low-income workers have not shared in the improvements in life expectancy that have contributed to Social Security's funding problem.

It therefore seems unfair to preserve Social Security by cutting future benefits across the board. Any reform in the program to keep it affordable should make special provision to protect the benefits of low-wage workers.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in The Los Angeles Times. 

The American people deserve to have a federal government that is both responsive and effective. That simply isn’t the case for more than 1 million people who are awaiting the adjudication of their applications for disability benefits from the Social Security Administration.

Washington can and must do better. This gridlock harms applicants either by depriving them of much-needed support or effectively barring them from work while their cases are resolved because having any significant earnings would immediately render them ineligible. This is unacceptable.

Within the next month, the Government Accountability Office, the nonpartisan congressional watchdog, will launch a study on the issue. More policymakers should follow GAO’s lead. A solution to this problem is long overdue. Here’s how the government can do it.

Congress does not need to look far for an example of how to reduce the SSA backlog. In 2013, the Veterans Administration cut its 600,000-case backlog by 84 percent and reduced waiting times by nearly two-thirds, all within two years. It’s an impressive result.

Why have federal officials dealt aggressively and effectively with that backlog, but not the one at SSA? One obvious answer is that the American people and their representatives recognize a debt to those who served in the armed forces. Allowing veterans to languish while a sluggish bureaucracy dithers is unconscionable. Public and congressional outrage helped light a fire under the bureaucracy. Administrators improved services the old-fashioned way — more staff time. VA employees had to work at least 20 hours overtime per month.

Things are a bit more complicated at SSA, unfortunately. Roughly three quarters of applicants for disability benefits have their cases decided within about nine months and, if denied, decide not to appeal. But those whose applications are denied are legally entitled to ask for a hearing before an administrative law judge — and that is where the real bottleneck begins.

There are too few ALJs to hear the cases. Even in the best of times, maintaining an adequate cadre of ALJs is difficult because normal attrition means that SSA has to hire at least 100 ALJs a year to stay even. When unemployment increases, however, so does the number of applications for disability benefits. After exhausting unemployment benefits, people who believe they are impaired often turn to the disability programs. So, when the Great Recession hit, SSA knew it had to hire many more ALJs. It tried to do so, but SSA cannot act without the help of the Office of Personnel Management, which must provide lists of qualified candidates before agencies can hire them. SSA employs 85 percent of all ALJs and for several years has paid OPM approximately $2 million annually to administer the requisite tests and interviews to establish a register of qualified candidates. Nonetheless, OPM has persistently refused to employ legally trained people to vet ALJ candidates or to update registers. And when SSA sought to ramp up ALJ hiring to cope with the recession challenge, OPM was slow to respond.

In 2009, for example, OPM promised to supply a new register containing names of ALJ candidates. Five years passed before it actually delivered the new list of names. For a time, the number of ALJs deciding cases actually fell. The situation got so bad that the president’s January 2015 budget created a work group headed by the Office of Management and Budget and the Administrative Conference of the United States to try to break the logjam. OPM promised a list for 2015, but insisted it could not change procedures. Not trusting OPM to mend its ways, Congress in October 2015 enacted legislation that explicitly required OPM to administer a new round of tests within the succeeding six months.

These stopgap measures are inadequate to the challenge. Both applicants and taxpayers deserve prompt adjudication of the merits of claims. The million-person backlog and the two-year average waits are bad enough. Many applicants wait far longer. Meanwhile, they are strongly discouraged from working, as anything more than minimal earnings will cause their applications automatically to be denied. Throughout this waiting period, applicants have no means of self-support. Any skills applicants retain atrophy.

The shortage of ALJs is not the only problem. The quality and consistency of adjudication by some ALJs has been called into question. For example, differences in approval rates are so large that differences among applicants cannot plausibly explain them. Some ALJs have processed so many cases that they could not possibly have applied proper standards. In recognition of both problems, SSA has increased oversight and beefed up training. The numbers have improved. But large and troubling variations in workloads and approval rates persist.

For now, political polarization blocks agreement on whether and how to modify eligibility rules and improve incentives to encourage work by those able to work. But there is bipartisan agreement that dragging out the application process benefits no one. While completely eliminating hearing delays is impossible, adequate administrative funding and more, better trained hearing officers would help reduce them. Even if OPM’s past record were better than it is, OPM is now a beleaguered agency, struggling to cope with the fallout from a security breach that jeopardizes the security of the nation and the privacy of millions of current and past federal employees and federal contractors. Mending this breach and establishing new procedures will — and should — be OPM’s top priority.

That’s why, for the sake of everyone concerned, responsibility for screening candidates for administrative law judge positions should be moved, at least temporarily, to another agency, such as the Administrative Conference of the United States. Shortening the period that applicants for disability benefits now spend waiting for a final answer is an achievable goal that can and should be addressed. Our nation’s disabled and its taxpayers deserve better.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in Politico.

Editor’s note: The remarks below were delivered to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget on release of their report on the SSDI Solutions Initiative. 

I want to thank Marc Goldwein for inviting me to join you for today’s event. We all owe thanks to Jim McCrery and Earl Pomeroy for devoting themselves to the SSDI Solutions Initiative, to the staff of CFRB who backed them up, and most of all to the scholars and practitioners who wrote the many papers that comprise this effort. This is the sort of practical, problem-solving enterprise that this town needs more of. So, to all involved in this effort, ‘hats off’ and ‘please, don’t stop now.’

The challenge of improving how public policy helps people with disabilities seemed urgent last year. Depletion of the Social Security Disability Insurance trust loomed. Fears of exploding DI benefit rolls were widespread and intense.

Congress has now taken steps that delay projected depletion until 2022. Meticulous work by Jeffrey Liebman suggests that Disability Insurance rolls have peaked and will start falling. The Technical Panel appointed by the Social Security Advisory Board, concurred in its 2015 report. With such ‘good’ news, it is all too easy to let attention drift to other seemingly more pressing items.

But trust fund depletion and growing beneficiary rolls are not the most important reasons why policymakers should be focusing on these programs.

The primary reason is that the design and administration of disability programs can be improved with benefit to taxpayers and to people with disabilities alike. And while 2022 seems a long time off, doing the research called for in the SSDI Solutions Initiative will take all of that time and more. So, it is time to get to work, not to relax.

Before going any further, I must make a disclaimer. I was invited to talk here as chair of the Social Security Advisory Board. Everything I am going to say from now on will reflect only my personal views, not those of the other members or staff of the SSAB except where the Board has spoken as a group. The same disclaimer applies to the trustees, officers, and other staff of the Brookings Institution. Blame me, not them.

Let me start with an analogy. We economists like indices. Years ago, the late Arthur Okun came up with an index to measure how much pain the economy was inflicting on people. It was a simple index, just the sum of inflation and the unemployment rate. Okun called it the ‘misery index.’

I suggest a ‘policy misery index’—a measure of the grief that a policy problem causes us. It is the sum of a problem’s importance and difficulty. Never mind that neither ‘importance’ nor ‘difficulty’ is quantifiable. Designing and administering interventions intended to improve the lives of people with disabilities has to be at or near the top of the policy misery index.

Those who have worked on disability know what I mean. Programs for people with disabilities are hugely important and miserably hard to design and administer well. That would be true even if legislators were writing afresh on a blank legislative sheet. That they must cope with a deeply entrenched program about which analysts disagree and on which many people depend makes the problems many times more challenging.

I’m going to run through some of the reasons why designing and administering benefits for people determined to be disabled is so difficult. Some may be obvious, even banal, to the highly informed group here today. And you will doubtless think of reasons I omit.

First, the concept of disability, in the sense of a diminished capacity to work, has no clear meaning, the SSA definition of disability notwithstanding. We can define impairments. Some are so severe that work or, indeed, any other form of self-support seems impossible. But even among those with severe impairments, some people work for pay, and some don’t.

That doesn’t mean that if someone with a given impairment works, everyone with that same impairment could work if they tried hard enough. It means that physical or mental impairments incompletely identify those for whom work is not a reasonable expectation. The possibility of work depends on the availability of jobs, of services to support work effort, and of a host of personal characteristics, including functional capacities, intelligence, and grit.

That is not how the current disability determination process works. It considers the availability of jobs in the national, not the local, economy. It ignores the availability of work supports or accommodations by potential employers.

Whatever eligibility criteria one may establish for benefits, some people who really can’t work, or can’t earn enough to support themselves, will be denied benefits. And some will be awarded benefits who could work.

Good program design helps keep those numbers down. Good administration helps at least as much as, and maybe more than, program design. But there is no way to reduce the number of improper awards and improper denials to zero.

Second, the causes of disability are many and varied. Again, this observation is obvious, almost banal. Genetic inheritance, accidents and injuries, wear and tear from hard physical labor, and normal aging all create different needs for assistance.

These facts mean that people deemed unable to work have different needs. They constitute distinct interest groups, each seeking support, but not necessarily of the same kind. These groups sometimes compete with each other for always-limited resources. And that competition means that the politics of disability benefits are, shall we say, interesting.

Third, the design of programs to help people deemed unable to work is important and difficult. Moral hazard is endemic. Providing needed support and services is an act of compassion and decency. The goal is to provide such support and services while preserving incentives to work and to controlling costs borne by taxpayers.

But preserving work incentives is only part of the challenge. The capacity to work is continuous, not binary. Training and a wide and diverse range of services can help people perform activities of daily living and work.

Because resources are scarce, policy makers and administrators have to sort out who should get those services. Should it be those who are neediest? Those who are most likely to recover full capacities? Triage is inescapable. It is technically difficult. And it is always ethically fraught.

Designing disability benefit programs is hard. But administering them well is just as important and at least as difficult.

These statements may also be obvious to those who here today. But recent legislation and administrative appropriations raise doubts about whether they are obvious to or accepted by some members of Congress.

Let’s start with program design. We can all agree, I think, that incentives matter. If benefits ceased at the first dollar earned, few who come on the rolls would ever try to work.

So, Congress, for many years, has allowed beneficiaries to earn any amount for a brief period and small amounts indefinitely without losing eligibility. Under current law, there is a benefit cliff. If—after a trial work period—beneficiaries earn even $1 more than what is called substantial gainful activity, $1,130 in 2016, their benefit checks stop. They retain eligibility for health coverage for a while even after they leave the rolls. And for an extended period they may regain cash and health benefits without delay if their earnings decline.

Members of Congress have long been interested in whether a more gradual phase-out of benefits as earnings rise might encourage work. Various aspects of the current Disability Insurance program reflect Congress’s desire to encourage work.

The so-called Benefit Offset National Demonstration—or BOND—was designed to test the impact on labor supply by DI beneficiaries of one formula—replacing the “cliff” with a gradual reduction in benefits: $1 of benefit last for each $2 of earnings above the Substantial Gainful Activity level.

Alas, there were problems with that demonstration. It tested only one offset scenario – one starting point and one rate. So, there could be no way of knowing whether a 2-for-1 offset was the best way to encourage work.

And then there was the uncomfortable fact that, at the time of the last evaluation, out of 79,440 study participants only 21 experienced the offset. So there was no way of telling much of anything, other than that few people had worked enough to experience the offset.

Nor was the cause of non-response obvious. It is not clear how many demonstration participants even understood what was on offer.

Unsurprisingly, members of Congress interested in promoting work among DI recipients asked SSA to revisit the issue. The 2015 DI legislation mandates a new demonstration, christened the Promoting Opportunity Demonstration, or POD. POD uses the same 2 for 1 offset rate that BOND did, but the offset starts at an earnings level at or below earnings of $810 a month in 2016—which is well below the earnings at which the BOND phase-out began.

Unfortunately, as Kathleen Romig has pointed out in an excellent paper for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, this demonstration is unlikely to yield useful results. Only a very few atypical DI beneficiaries are likely to find it in their interest to participate in the demonstration, fewer even than in the BOND. That is because the POD offset begins at lower earnings than the BOND offset did. In addition, participants in POD sacrifice the right under current law that permits people receiving disability benefits to earn any amount for 9 months of working without losing any benefits.

Furthermore, the 2015 law stipulated that no Disability Insurance beneficiary could be required to participate in the demonstration or, having agreed to participate, forced to remain in the demonstration. Thus, few people are likely to respond to the POD or to remain in it.

There is a small group to whom POD will be very attractive—those few DI recipients who retain a lot of earning capacity. The POD will allow them to retain DI coverage until their earnings are quite high. For example, a person receiving a $2,000 monthly benefit—well above the average, to be sure, but well below the maximum—would remain eligible for some benefits until his or her annual earnings exceeded $57,700. I don’t know about you, but I doubt that Congress would favorably consider permanent law of this sort.

Not only would those participating be a thin and quite unrepresentative sample of DI beneficiaries in general, or even of those with some earning capacity, but selection bias resulting from the opportunity to opt out at any time would destroy the external validity of any statistical results.

Let me be clear. My comments on POD, the demonstration mandated in the 2015 legislation, are not meant to denigrate the need for, or the importance of, research on how to encourage work by DI recipients, especially those for whom financial independence is plausible. On the contrary, as I said at the outset, research is desperately needed on this issue, as well as many others. It is not yet too late to authorize a research design with a better chance of producing useful results.

But it will be too late soon. Fielding demonstrations takes time:

• to solicit bids from contractors,
• for contractors to formulate bids,
• for government boards to select the best one,
• for contractors to enroll participants,
• for contractors to administer the demonstration,
• and for analysts to process the data generated by the demonstrations.

That process will take all the time available between now and 2021 or 2022 when the DI trust fund will again demand attention. It will take a good deal more time than that to address the formidable and intriguing research agenda of SSDI Solutions Initiative.

I should like to conclude with plugs for two initiatives to which the Social Security Advisory Board has been giving some attention.

It takes too long for disability insurance applicants to have their cases decided. Perhaps the whole determination process should be redesigned. One of the CFRB papers proposes just that. But until that happens, it is vital to shorten the unconscionable delays separating initial denials and reconsideration from hearings before administrative law judges to which applicants are legally entitled. Procedural reforms in the hearing process might help. More ALJs surely will.

The 2015 budget act requires the Office of Personnel Management to take steps that will help increase the number of ALJs hired. I believe that the new director, Beth Colbert, is committed to reforms. But it is very hard to change legal interpretations that have hampered hiring for years and the sluggish bureaucratic culture that fostered them.

So, the jury is out on whether OPM can deliver. In a recent op-ed in Politico, Lanhee Chen, a Republican member of the SSAB, and I jointly endorsed urged Congress to be ready, if OPM fails to deliver on more and better lists of ALJ candidates and streamlined procedures for their appointment, to move the ALJ examination authority to another federal organization, such as the Administrative Conference of the United States.

Lastly, there is a facet of income support policy that we on the SSAB all agree merits much more attention than it has received. Just last month, the SSAB released a paper entitled Representative Payees: A Call to Action. More than eight million beneficiaries have been deemed incapable of managing $77 billion in benefits that the Social Security Administration provided them in 2014.

We believe that serious concern is warranted about all aspects of the representative payee program—how this infringement of personal autonomy is found to be necessary, how payees are selected, and how payee performance is monitored.

Management of representative payees is a particular challenge for the Social Security Administration. Its primary job is to pay cash benefits in the right amount to the right person at the right time. SSA does that job at rock-bottom costs and with remarkable accuracy. It is handing rapidly rising workloads with budgets that have barely risen. SSA is neither designed nor staffed to provide social services. Yet determining the need for, selecting, and monitoring representative payees is a social service function.

As the Baby Boom ages, the number of people needing help in administering cash benefits from the Social Security Administration—and from other agencies such as the Veterans Administration—will grow. So will the number needing help in making informed choices under Medicare and Medicaid.

The SSAB is determined to look into this challenge and to make constructive suggestions. We are just beginning and invite others to join in studying what I have called “the most important problem the public has never heard of.”

Living with disabilities today is markedly different from what it was in 1956 when the Disability Insurance program began. Yet, the DI program has changed little. Beneficiaries and taxpayers are pay heavily the failure of public policy to apply what has been learned over the past six decades about health, disability, function, and work.

I hope that SSA and Congress will use well the time until it next must legislate on Disability Insurance. The DI rolls are stabilizing. The economy has grown steadily since the Great Recession. Congress has reinstated demonstration authority. With adequate funding for research and testing, the SSA can rebuild its research capability. Along with the external research community, it can identify what works and help Congress improve the DI program for beneficiaries and taxpayers alike. The SSDI Solutions Initiative is a fine roadmap.

Editor's note: This piece was written in response to John McDonough's article in the American Journal of Public Health titled "Shorter lives and poorer health on the campaign trail." Read McDonough's article here. 

McDonough is right about two very important things. First, that in America we have quite dismal outcomes for the enormous amount we spend on health care. And second, that there is a real opportunity for a new political dialog between left and right to take root—though perhaps one that is more of a quiet agreement than a high-profile grand bargain. 

McDonough wisely draws attention in Figure 3 of his editorial to the sharp distinction between the United States and other Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries in the relative proportions of gross domestic product spent on health services and social services. The United States is a lonely outlier because we overmedicalize our approach to health conditions and community health. Generally a blend of social, housing, public health, and other preventive strategies would yield better health results than calling an ambulance—and at a fraction of the cost. Even our higher survival rates after age 75 years is a mixed blessing, as Gawande points out, because expensive and frequent medical interventions may extend age but often not the quality of life.¹ 

The good news, both substantively and politically in this election year, is the growing recognition that addressing the social determinants of health is a key—perhaps the key—to improving health outcomes while slowing the growth in health spending as a proportion of gross domestic product and public spending. McDonough and I agree on that, despite his affection for Bernie Sanders’ utopian Medicare-for-all, which likely would do little to address the underlying cost and outcomes problem. 

So how could a new conversation develop, of the kind both we both would like to see? I think on several fronts. 

First, building on existing collaboration, serious analysts and policymakers on both sides of the political spectrum should explain more extensively how resources currently restricted to either health care or social services and housing should and could be more routinely braided together. Despite some interesting experiments and demonstrations that allow certain health and housing money to be mixed and used creatively, budget restrictions and payment systems generally make this dif- ficult. We could seek to agree on a mixture of legislative action on payments and budgets, and using Medicaid (Section 1115) waivers, to permit money currently available only for medical services to be used instead for housing and social services where that could be shown to improve the health of individuals in a community. 

Second, we could agree on bipartisan steps to allow states to experiment with more creative approaches to alter the blend of strategies they have available to achieve improved health outcomes. Section 1332 of the Affordable Care Act (Pub L No. 111–148) is a start, since it will allow states to propose alternatives to some Affordable Care Act provisions to improve coverage and outcomes without increasing federal costs. McDonough and I agree on using 1332 waivers in this way. But a further step would be legislation to allow states to seek even broader waivers to shift money between health and social service programs. For that to happen, conservatives would have to accept increases in total spending on some social service programs. Progressives would have to accept reductions in health programs and reduce their reluctance to granting states more flexibility. Both would have to accept rigorous evaluation to determine what works and what does not. 

And third, there is an opportunity for agreement on empowering intermediary institutions² in neighborhoods, including charter and community schools, as well as health systems,³ to serve as hubs for integrated approaches to achieving health communities. That approach combines the conservative emphasis on the importance of nongovernmental institutions with the progressive emphasis on community action. Again, systematic evaluation is needed. 

Hopefully there can be cross-party congressional support agreement on these themes, as McDonough notes has occurred in alternative sentencing. But it is unlikely in the election season that such themes will be seized upon by presidential candidates. In my view, that is probably good, because presidential elections are about differences, not path-breaking agreements. Better, during this election cycle, to foster positive conversations that cause such themes to be taken out of the election debates, so that they will have broad support for enactment after the Election Day dust has settled. 

1. Gawande A. Being Mortal. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books; 2015. 

2. Singh P, Butler SM. Intermediaries in Integrated Approaches to Health and Economic Mobility. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution; 2015. 

3. Butler SM, Grabinsky J, Masi D. Hospitals as Hubs to Create Healthy Communities: Lessons From Washington Adventist Hospital. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution; 2015.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in the American Journal of Public Health. 

Editor's note: On March 1, Alice Rivlin testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health on the financing and delivery of long-term care in the US. 

Chairman Pitts, Ranking Member Green: I am happy to be back before this Subcommittee, which is never afraid to take on complex issues of great importance to millions of Americans. I have worked on long-term services and supports (LTSS) for a long time and have recently had the privilege of co-chairing the Long-Term Care Initiative at the Bipartisan Policy Center (along with former Senators Bill Frist and Tom Daschle and former Governor and Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson). Our February 2016 report, Initial Recommendations to Improve the Financing of Long-Term Care, appended to my testimony, outlines a set of doable, practical changes in both public and private programs that could improve the availability and affordability of long-term services and supports.

I don’t need to remind this committee that Americans are living longer, and many of us will need help with the ordinary activities of daily living and suffer cognitive impairments that make it dangerous for us to cope alone. The number of people needing LTSS is rising and expected to double in the next 35 years or so.

Responsibility for LTSS is shared among seniors and people with disabilities themselves, family, friends, and volunteer care-givers; communities, state, and federal government. This shared-responsibility system is severely stressed, and will become increasingly unable to cope as the numbers needing care increase. Growing burdens fall on families, often daughters and daughters-in-law, who must manage daily conflicts between earning a living, caring for children, and meeting the needs of elderly or disabled relatives. Growth in Medicaid, the largest payer of long-term services and supports at about $123 billion per year, stresses state and federal budgets as spending for older Americans and individuals with disabilities competes with budgets for education and other investments in young people.

Many efforts to find a comprehensive solution to long-term care financing have failed—evidenced by passage and subsequent repeal of the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act and failure of the federal Long-term Care Commission to reach consensus on financing recommendations. Recently, however, a growing consensus has emerged around a set of incremental steps, which, if taken together could greatly improve the availability and affordability of long-term services and supports to America’s most vulnerable populations and take some of the burden off families and Medicaid in a fiscally responsible way. In recent weeks, The Bipartisan Policy Center and The Long-term Care Collaborative have offered similar sets of recommendations, as has LeadingAge, a key provider association.

While policymakers failed to agree on big legislative solutions, amazing progress has been made at the community level in finding new ways of keeping older Americans and people with disabilities out of institutions and in the community where they are happier and less isolated and can be served more effectively and cheaper. There has been an explosion of assisted living facilities, continuing care communities, senior villages, senior centers, senior daycare, and use of home health aides of various sorts. Growth in home and community-based services (HCBS) has been rapid, while the population served by traditional nursing homes has been virtually flat. Medicaid, with the support of both parties in Congress, has moved to increase the availability of home and community-based services.

The group working on the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Long-Term Care Initiative addressed the question: Is there a set of practical policies that could command bipartisan support that would improve the care of older Americans with disabilities, take significant pressure off families and Medicaid, and not break the bank? We came up with four proposals.

Make private long-term care insurance more affordable and available. Long term care ought to be an insurable risk. If more people bought Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) in their earning years, there would be less pressure on their savings and family resources and Medicaid when they became disabled. But both demand and supply of LTCI are weak and falling. Potential customers are reluctant to buy because it is costly and the need seems remote and hard to think about. Carriers find it difficult to price a product that will be used far in the future and fear losing money if customers live and use services for a long time. Many insurance companies have stopped offering LTCI.

Our report recommends developing a new type of private insurance product: “retirement long-term care insurance,” which would cover long-term care for a limited period (2-4 years) after a substantial deductible or waiting period and would have coinsurance. The insurance would provide inflation protection, which helps to ensure benefits keep pace with the rising costs of care, and a non-forfeiture benefit, which allows lapsed policyholders to access a limited benefit. Employers would be encouraged to offer such policies as a default option as part of a retirement plan. These policies, if offered through employers and public and private insurance exchanges, could cut premiums in half according estimates done by Milliman, LLC, for the Bipartisan Policy Center and other organizations. Penalty-free withdrawals would be allowed from retirement plans, such as 401(k) plans and IRAs, beginning at age 45, exclusively for the purchase of retirement LTCI.

Design a federal long-term care insurance option for those with catastrophic costs. Part of the reluctance of carriers to offer LTCI relates to the difficulty of predicting costs far in the future and the fact that a few policy holders may have extremely high costs for a very long time. A public program, covering truly catastrophic long-term care spending, could overcome this reluctance and reduce the cost of private LTCI. Catastrophic insurance, combined with retirement LTCI from the private market, could substantially relieve families and Medicaid. The cost of this program should be fully offset so as not to add to the deficit.

Streamline Medicaid home and community-based care options to encourage more effective care in lower-cost settings. While Congress has been proactive in encouraging state Medicaid programs to shift care settings from institutions to home and community-based care, states continue to face a daunting federal waiver process and multiple state options. Securing waivers requires complex negotiations between states and the federal government, and each of the existing state options have disincentives. Home and community-based options should be simplified into a single streamlined state plan amendment process.

Ensure that working people with disabilities in need of long-term services and supports do not lose access to their long-term services and supports as earnings increase. Individuals with modest employment incomes risk losing access to services that permit them to remain on the job. Existing Medicaid “buy-in” programs are often costly. Building on the “Achieving a Better Life Experience,” or “ABLE” Act, states could be given the option to offer a lower-cost, Medicaid buy-in for long-term services and supports designed to “wrap around” private health insurance or Medicare. Under this option, working individuals with disabilities would pay an income-related, sliding-scale premium.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to share my thoughts on this issue. It is one of America’s big challenges, but it’s an even bigger opportunity for a constructive bipartisan policy process. I look forward to continued dialogue and will keep you apprised of forthcoming recommendations by BPC’s Long-Term Care Initiative in 2016 and 2017.

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Editor's note: On March 16, Paul B. Ginsburg testified before the California Senate Committee on Health on fostering competition in consolidated markets. Download the full testimony here.

Mr. Chairman, Madame Vice Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am honored to be invited to testify before this committee on this very important topic. I am a professor of health policy at the University of Southern California and director of public policy at the USC Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics. I am also a Senior Fellow and the Leonard D. Schaeffer Chair in Health Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution, where I direct the Center for Health Policy. Much of my time is now devoted to leading the new Schaeffer Initiative for Innovation in Health Policy, which is a partnership between USC and the Brookings Institution. I am best known in California for the numerous community site visits over many years that I led in the state while I was president of the Center for Studying Health System Change; most of those studies were funded by the California HealthCare Foundation.

The key points in my testimony today are:

• Health care markets are becoming more consolidated, causing price increases for purchasers of health services, and this trend will continue for the foreseeable future despite anti-trust enforcement; 
• Government can still play an effective role in addressing higher prices that come from consolidation by pursuing policies that foster increased competition in health care markets. Many of these policies can be effective even in markets with high degrees of concentration, such as in Northern California.

[1] Gaynor, M., and R. Town, The Impact of Hospital Consolidation – Update, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Synthesis Report (June 2012).

[2] Baker, L. C., M.K Bundorf and D.P. Kessler, “Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership Of Physician Practices Is Associated With Higher Prices And Spending,” Health Affairs, Vol. 35, No 5 (May 2014).

[3] Chapin White and Megan Egouchi, Reference Pricing: A Small Piece of the Health Care Pricing and Quality Puzzle. National Institute for Health Care Reform, Research Brief No. 18, October 2014.

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According to an August 2015 survey, 72 percent of Americans find drug costs unreasonable, with 83 percent believing that the federal government should be able to negotiate prices for Medicare. Recently, Acting Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Andy Slavitt commented that spending on medicines increased 13 percent in 2014 while health care spending growth overall was only 5 percent, the highest rate of drug spending growth since 2001.

Some of the most expensive drugs are covered under Medicare’s medical benefit, Part B, because they are administered by a physician. They are often administered in hospital outpatient departments and physician offices, and most commonly used to treat conditions like cancer, rheumatoid arthritis, and macular degeneration. Between 2005 and 2014, spending on Part B drugs has increased annually by 7.7 percent, with the top 20 drugs by total amount of Medicare payments accounting for 57 percent of total Part B drug costs. While overall Part B drug spending is a small portion of Medicare drug spending, the high growth rate is a concern, especially as new expensive breakthrough cancer drugs enter the market and have a negative effect on consumers’ pockets.

Unlike Part D, the prescription drug benefit, there are fewer incentives built in to Part B for providers to consider lower cost treatments for patients even if the lower cost drug may be clinically equivalent to the more expensive drug, because prior to budget sequestration, providers received 6 percent on top of the Average Sales Price (ASP) of the drug. Larger providers and hospitals often receive discounts on these drugs as well, increasing the amount they receive directly on top of the out-of-pocket cost of the drug.

This leads to more out-of-pocket costs for the consumer, as patients usually pay 20 percent of Part B services. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that in 2013, among new drugs covered under Part B, nearly two-thirds had per beneficiary costs of over $9,000 per year, leading to out-of-pocket costs for consumers of amounts between $1,900 and $107,000 over the year. On top of these high costs, this can lead to problems with medication adherence, even for serious conditions such as cancer.

A New Payment Model

To help change these incentives and control costs, CMS has proposed a new demonstration program, which offers a few different reimbursement methods for Part B drugs. The program includes a geographically stratified design methodology to test and evaluate the different methods. One of the methods garnering a lot of attention is a proposal to lower the administration add-on payment to providers, from current 6 percent of ASP, to 2.5 percent plus a flat fee of $16.80 per administration day.

Policymakers, physician organizations, and patient advocacy organizations have voiced major concerns raising the alarm that this initiative will negatively affect patient access to vital drugs and therefore produce poorer patient outcomes. The sequester will also have a significant impact on the percentage add on, reducing it to closer to an estimated .86 percent plus the flat fee. But we believe the goals of the program and its potential to reduce costs represent an important step in the right direction. We hope the details can be further shaped by the important communities of providers and patients who will deliver and receive medical care.

Geographic Variation

Last year, we wrote a Health Affairs Blog that highlighted some of the uses and limitations of publicly available Part B physician payment data. One major use was to show the geographic variation in practice patterns and drug administration, and we particularly looked at the difference across states in Lucentis v. Avastin usage. As seen in Exhibit 1, variation in administration is wide among states, even though both are drugs used to treat the same condition, age-related macular degeneration, and were proven to have clinically similar outcomes, but the cost of Lucentis was $2,000 per dose, while Avastin was only $50 per dose.

Using the same price estimates from our previous research, which are from 2012, we found that physician reimbursement under the proposed demonstration would potentially change from $120 to $66.80 for Lucentis, and increase from $3 to $18.05 for Avastin. Under the first payment model, providers were receiving 40 times as much to administer Lucentis instead of Avastin, while under the new proposed payment model, they would only receive 3.7 times as much.

While still a formidable gap, this new policy would have decreased financial reimbursement for providers to administer Lucentis, a costly, clinically similar drug to the much cheaper Avastin. As seen in Exhibit 1, a majority of physicians prescribe Avastin, thus this policy will allow for increased reimbursement in those cases, but in states where Lucentis is prescribed in higher proportions, prescribing patterns might start to change as a result of the proposed demonstration.

Source: Author’s estimates using 2012 CMS Cost Data and Sequestration Estimates from DrugAbacus.org

The proposed demonstration program includes much more than the ASP modifications in its second phase, including:

• discounting or eliminating beneficiary copays,
• indication-based pricing that would vary payments based on the clinical effectiveness,
• reference pricing for similar drugs,
• risk-sharing agreements with drug manufacturers based on clinical outcomes of the drug, and
• creating clinical decision tools for providers to help develop best practices.

This is all at the same time that a new model in oncology care (OCM) is being launched, which could help to draw attention to total cost of care. It is important that CMS try to address rising drug costs, but also be sure to consider all relevant considerations during the comment period to fine-tune the proposal to avoid negative effects on beneficiaries’ care.

We believe CMS should consider offering a waiver for organizations already participating in Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) models like the OCM, because financial benchmarks are based on past performance and any savings recognized in the future could be artificial, attributable to this demonstration rather than to better care coordination and some of the other practice requirements that are part of the proposed OCM. Furthermore, because this demonstration sets a new research precedent and because it is mandatory in the selected study areas rather than voluntary, CMS must try to anticipate and avoid unintended consequences related to geographic stratification.

For example, it is possible to imagine organizations with multiple locations directing patients to optimal sites for their business. Also, without a control group, some findings may be unreliable. The proposed rule currently lacks much detail, and there does not seem to be enough time for organizations to evaluate the impact of the proposed rule on their operations. Having said that, it will be important for stakeholders of all types to submit comments to the proposed rule in an effort to improve the final rule prior to implementation.

The critical question for the policymakers and stakeholders is whether this model can align with the multitude of other payment model reforms — unintended consequences could mitigate all the positive outcomes that a CMMI model offers to beneficiaries. Helping beneficiaries is and should be CMS’ ultimate obligation.