Last month the European Commission proposed that the EU should mobilize the next tranche of funding for Turkey (€3 billion) under the EU–Turkey deal agreed in 2016. The deal is part of a rapidly developing strategy on the part of the EU to improve cooperation on migration issues with countries of origin as well as those through which migrants and refugees transit en route to Europe. Since 2015, the EU has ramped up negotiations, with the New Partnership Framework underpinning arrangements with countries such as Niger, Mali and Ethiopia, and endorsing a memorandum of understanding between Italy and Libya in February 2017.

A common thread that runs across all of these deals is their focus on containment in exchange for funding, rather than a principled approach to refugee protection. For example, the EU has committed around €6 billion to Turkey as a contribution towards the cost of humanitarian assistance for the over 3 million Syrian refugees residing there. This funding also operates as an incentive for Turkey to take back all refugees and migrants who have irregularly arrived in Greece via Turkey since the deal entered effect.

Similarly, the EU is providing financial support to Libya in exchange for its cooperation in reducing the flow of migrants and refugees towards Europe, while the New Partnership Framework aims to reduce the number of migrants and refugees departing for Europe in exchange for EU aid. While financial incentives geared towards containment do not amount to new policy, with the increasing number of deals being negotiated, the use of such a strategy appears to be both accelerating and becoming more explicit.

An effective investment?

Implementation of these deals has been hindered by obligations under international law, raising questions not only as to their legality but also their value for money.

Under the EU–Turkey deal, refugees arriving in Greece irregularly were to be returned to Turkey, with an equal number of Syrian refugees resettled to Europe in exchange. However, implementation of this aspect of the deal has been limited.

Under EU asylum law, Greece is obliged to provide access to asylum procedures for those arriving on its shores. Given that most arrivals from Turkey came from refugee-producing countries (including Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq), an individualized assessment of ‘safe third country’ is required before any possible return to Turkey can take place. This requires a finding that Turkey can guarantee effective access to protection for the individual in question, including protection against refoulement (i.e. forced return to a country where he or she is at risk of serious harm or persecution). By the end March 2018, only 2,164 people had been returned to Turkey.

As for Italy, with EU support, under the MOU with Libya it has been training as well as providing funding and logistical support to the Libyan coastguard – including an Italian naval presence in Libyan waters – to intercept boats in the Mediterranean. Given the mounting evidence of abuse of migrants and refugees, whether by Libyan coastguards or inside Libyan detention centres, this raises questions as to whether the support being provided by Italy and the EU amounts to a breach of international law.

Despite concerns about the protection risks for refugees, advocates of such deals claim they have the potential to prevent dangerous journeys, saving lives and interrupting the business model of smugglers. Numbers crossing the Mediterranean have indeed dropped since the deals were agreed. However, in Libya it has created an ‘anti-smuggling’ market which, despite leading to a reduction of migration in the short term, may not be sustainable in the long term if it drives conflict between various non-state actors.

In the case of the EU–Turkey deal, while it has led to a fall in arrivals to the Greek islands in the first six months of 2017, there is also evidence that smugglers were already adapting their routes, forcing refugees and migrants to travel on the more dangerous central Mediterranean route.

For now, at least, these deals appear to have gained significant popular support within the EU. Italy’s approaches in Libya, for example, have been broadly backed by the Italian public – unsurprising given that some polls indicate 50 percent of the Italian population believe migrants to be a threat to public security. However, the drivers of public attitudes towards refugees and migration are complex and, as noted in a policy brief published under the Chatham House–ODI Forum on Refugee and Migration Policy, influenced in part by narratives driven by politicians and the media.

What some of these deals have achieved is the significant flow of aid money towards job creation and economic opportunities for refugees, incentivizing policy change in some contexts and producing real benefits for the refugees concerned (while reducing pressures on them to move onwards via dangerous journeys).

A prominent example is the Jordan Compact, a 2016 agreement between Jordan, the EU and international financial institutions including the World Bank to improve the livelihoods and education of Syrian refugees inside Jordan. While challenges in its implementation remain, including concerns about labour rights, the Jordan Compact has resulted in real improvements in education and access to the labour market for Syrian refugees. The Jordanian government has made policy concessions on access to work permits for Syrian refugees, removing some of the barriers that prevented refugees accessing jobs, while the EU has committed to ease trade barriers for goods produced in Jordanian factories on condition they hire a percentage of Syrian refugees.

Likewise, the EU–Turkey deal’s most successful component has been its financial contribution of €3 billion of aid under the EU Facility for Refugees towards support for the 3.7 million Syrian refugees currently being hosted by Turkey. This includes €1 billion allocated to the Emergency Social Safety Net, described by the European Commission as the ‘largest single humanitarian project in the history of the EU’, directly impacting the livelihoods of some 1.1 million vulnerable refugees.

Moving ahead

While some aspects of these deals reflect a genuine effort to cooperate in addressing the needs of refugees, other elements risk undermining the very essence of the global refugee protection regime.

The diplomatic squabble over a proposed refugee ‘swap’ of 1,250 refugees between the US and Australia in February 2017 highlights the danger of refugees becoming bargaining chips. Similarly, the Kenyan government’s announcement that it would close Dadaab refugee camp in late November 2016 cited the EU-Turkey deal as justification. Migration partnerships which emphasise the securing of EU borders against refugee arrivals may diminish the willingness of states in the Global South to continue to host large numbers of refugees.

While the positive aspects of such deals deserve acknowledgement, understanding their impact on refugee protection must be given greater attention. This is vital not only to ensure their workability but also to ensure that those countries who spearheaded the creation of the global refugee protection regime do not end up undermining its existence.

Please note this event was originally scheduled on 13 June 2018 and has been postponed to 2 July 2018.

Technology companies, social media platforms and other internet intermediaries dominate the digital age, and harnessing data in algorithmic and artificial intelligence systems is widespread, from political campaigns to judicial sentencing.

The recent Facebook and Cambridge Analytica revelations provide a sharp illustration of the risks to human rights and democracy posed by data-mining and "platform capital".

These revelations have focused public and policy debate on two key issues. First, they raise questions of how accountability and remedies can be effectively achieved, particularly where companies close in the wake of such revelations. Second, key questions arise on what regulation should look like.

Facebook has pledged to respect privacy of its users better, but how effective is self-regulation? There has been heavy emphasis on the role that the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) can play to improve the protection of privacy and data protection, but will it be enough? What are the implications for international law - how can the established standards in human rights and data protection respond to these challenges?

This event, co-hosted with the ESRC, Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project, will be followed by a drinks reception.

Read the meeting summary on the Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project website. 

On 10 September, US National Security Advisor John Bolton used his first major speech since joining the White House to attack the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) potential investigation of American personnel in Afghanistan. The ‘American patriots’, as Bolton describes them, are being investigated for potential torture and ill-treatment of detainees, mostly in 2003 and 2004, during the United States-led invasion of the country.

Bolton has a long history of opposition to the ICC. Although the US signed the ICC Statute under president Bill Clinton, it was ‘unsigned’ by Bolton, then an under-secretary of state in the George W Bush administration.

And when the court first opened its doors in 2002, Bolton helped secure, in what he described on 10 September as one of his ‘proudest achievements’, around 100 bilateral agreements with other countries to prevent them from delivering US personnel to the ICC. Those agreements were often extracted under pressure, with the US threatening to cut off military and other aid to countries that refused to sign.

In recent years under the Obama administration, relations between the US and the ICC improved, and the US offered help and support to the court. Bolton’s attack is aimed at reversing those gains – with measures aimed directly at the court and its staff.

These include: (i) negotiating ‘even more binding, bilateral agreements to prohibit nations from surrendering US persons to the ICC’; (ii) banning ICC judges and prosecutors from entering the US, sanctioning their funds in the US financial system and prosecuting them in the US criminal courts (and doing the ‘same for any company or state that assists an ICC investigation of Americans’); and (iii) ‘taking note if any countries cooperate with ICC investigations of the United States and its allies, and remember[ing] that cooperation when setting US foreign assistance, military assistance and intelligence sharing levels’.

These are serious threats – they would potentially undermine the work of a court that is designed to prosecute the world’s worst crimes. The ICC prosecutor and its judges would be barred entry from the US to attend to vital work of the court.

Some of that work, ironically, is at the behest of the US. For instance, two of the UN Security Council’s referrals to the ICC, one in relation to atrocities committed in Sudan, the other in respect of the crimes committed by Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, were referred with US support. 

Also, the meetings of the ICC Assembly of States Parties are held each year at UN headquarters in New York. Those meetings may have to be held elsewhere if the ICC judges and staff are under threat of arrest.

In the case of the potential torture linked to operations in Afghanistan, the ICC has not been acting on its own initiative in investigating. For example, the Center for Constitutional Rights submitted ‘victim’s representations’ to the ICC on behalf of two of their clients, Sharqawi Al Hajj and Guled Hassan Duran, emphasizing the importance of an ICC investigation of US officials for serious crimes arising out of post-9/11 detention and interrogations.

According to the center, both Al Hajj and Duran were detained by the CIA in black sites or 'proxy-detention' by other countries, tormented and tortured.

Although the US is not a party to the ICC Statute, Afghanistan is, and therefore the court has jurisdiction over US nationals who allegedly committed atrocities in Afghanistan. And it should be noted that the investigation includes pursuing any atrocities committed by the Taliban and Afghan security forces during the same period.

So the basis for attacking the work of the ICC based on this is shaky, and Bolton’s threats raise a number of important international law questions going forward. 

For one, they may be unlawful retaliatory steps, given that the US has obligations to accord at least some privileges and immunities to judges and other personnel of the ICC under the 1947 UN Headquarters Agreement between the UN and US. Counter-measures might be considered by member states of the ICC, either alone, or collectively. 

In this regard, Bolton’s comments about the EU will not go unnoticed: he suggests Europe is a region where ‘the global governance dogma is strong’. The US may yet come to learn just how strong that ‘dogma’ is.

With US abstention from the ICC, the opening remains for Europe and other regions to position themselves at the heart of the international criminal justice regime, thereby – as in response to the US attitude towards climate change – building a network of partnerships with other like-minded nations to compensate for US disengagement.

Further, while the ICC has many critics, and could be improved as an institution, Bolton’s speech may have the effect of galvanizing support for the world’s first permanent international criminal court. That could be a good thing for the court, which is sorely in need of support for its work.

Whatever concerns states may have about the ICC, they may be outweighed by a mutual desire to stand up to perceived bullying by the Trump administration, in favour of the international rule of law. 

In a decade as UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan championed a vision of global governance anchored in shared responsibility and the rights and dignity of the individual.

Confronted with multiple global crises that raised questions about the UN’s purpose, Annan pressed for human rights and development to be at the centre of international efforts and sought to broaden participation in shaping and delivering solutions to global challenges.

As the UN’s 75th anniversary approaches, this conference will explore Annan’s legacy for the future of global governance.

Questions include the appropriate response to high-profile and ongoing failures to prevent human rights atrocities and protect victims of conflict, the impact of technology on democracy, lessons from the Millennium Development Goals for the Sustainable Development Goals and ways to meaningfully involve civil society, businesses and individuals in addressing global challenges.

The conference will bring together key figures involved in Annan’s initiatives with actors currently engaged in conflict prevention, humanitarian action, human rights and development to identify lessons and generate forward-looking recommendations.

This conference is being held as part of a series, including a public event hosted by UNA-UK at Central Hall in Westminster, exploring Kofi Annan's legacy.

This initiative is generously supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Open Society Foundations and enjoys the cooperation of the Kofi Annan Foundation.

With international trade discourse taking an increasingly transactional and sometimes belligerent tone, it would be easy to overlook the quiet revolution currently under way to bring new voices into trade policy development and monitoring. The traditional division of responsibilities between the executive and legislature – whereby treaties are negotiated and signed by the executive, and the legislature does what is necessary to implement them – may be undergoing some change.

Growing awareness of the implications of trade and investment treaties for many aspects of day-to-day life – food standards, employment opportunities, environmental quality, availability of medicines and data protection, just to name a few – is fuelling demands by people and businesses for more of a say in the way these rules are formulated and developed.

Various options for enhancing public and parliamentary scrutiny of trading proposals have recently been examined by two UK parliamentary select committees.[1] The reason for this interest is obviously Brexit, which has presented UK civil servants and parliamentarians with the unusual (some would say exciting) opportunity to design an approval and scrutiny process for trade agreements from scratch.

Doubtless, EU authorization, liaison and approval procedures (which include a scrutinizing role for the European Parliament) will be influential,[2] as will the European Commission’s experience with stakeholder engagement on trade issues.[3] The recommendations of both UK select committees to include human rights impact assessment processes as part of pre-negotiation preparations[4] echo calls from UN agencies and NGOs for more rigorous and timely analysis of the human rights risks that may be posed by new trading relationships.[5] Again, EU practice with what it terms ‘sustainability impact assessment’ of future trade agreements provides a potential model to draw from.[6] 

However, process is no substitute for action. Human rights impact assessment is never an end in itself; rather, it is a means to a positive end, in this case a trade agreement which is aligned with the trading partners’ respective human rights obligations and aspirations. It bears remembering, though, that the idea of assessing trade proposals for future human rights risks is a relatively recent one. Do we have the tools and resources to make sure that this is a meaningful compliance and risk management exercise?

Thus far there is little evidence that human rights impact assessment and stakeholder engagement exercises are having any real impact on the content of trade agreements.[7] This is the case even in the EU, where practice in these areas is the most advanced and systematic.[8]

There are several possible reasons for this. First, the methodological challenges are enormous. Aside from the crystal-ball gazing needed to forecast the social, economic and environmental effects of a trade intervention well into the future, demonstrating causal links between a trade agreement and a predicted adverse impact is often highly problematic given the number of other economic and political factors that may be in play.[9]

Secondly, there are many challenges around the need to engage with affected people and listen to their views.[10] The sheer number of possible impacts of a trade agreement on different individuals and communities, as well as the range of rights potentially engaged, makes this a difficult (some would say impossible) task. Some prioritization is always necessary.

This makes for difficult decisions about who to engage with and how. Perceived bias or an apparent lack of even-handedness – favouring business compared to civil society, for instance – can sow mistrust about the true aims of such a process, undermining its future effectiveness as participants begin to question whether it is genuine or worthwhile.[11]

The challenges are even more acute where impact assessment practitioners are tasked with investigating potential human rights impacts in other countries. Even if it is possible to get past the inevitable political sensitivities,[12] the sort of in-depth consultations required will be beyond the budget and time constraints of most assignments.[13]

There are good reasons why trade policy should be subject to greater public and parliamentary scrutiny, and why there should be more opportunities for public participation in the formation of new trading regimes. By building more opportunities for stakeholder consultation at these stages, we can acquire perspectives on trade that are not available from other forms of assessment and analysis.

However, policymakers should be wary of overstating the benefits of existing procedural models. Human rights impact assessment processes are still struggling to provide compelling analyses of the relationships between trade agreements and the enjoyment of human rights, let alone a roadmap for policymakers and trade negotiators as to what should be done.[14]

And financial and practical barriers to participation in stakeholder engagement exercises mean that, at best, these will provide only a partial picture of stakeholder impacts and views.

Experiences with human rights impact assessment of trade agreements so far demonstrate the need for realism about two things: first, the extent to which one can sensibly anticipate and analyse human rights-related risks and opportunities in the preparation stages for a new trading agreement; and, second, the extent to which problems identified in this way can be headed off with the right form of words in the treaty itself.

Both recent UK select committee reports place considerable faith in the ability of pre-project transparency and scrutiny processes to flush out potential problems and prescribe solutions. Of course, there may be cases where frontloading the analysis in this way could be useful, for instance where the human rights implications are so clear that they can readily be addressed through upfront commitments by the parties concerned, whether by bespoke or standardized approaches.

More often, though, for a trade agreement running many years into the future, human rights impacts and implications will take time to emerge, suggesting the need for robust monitoring and mitigation frameworks designed with longevity in mind. Ideally, pre-signing approval and assessment processes would lay the groundwork for future action by both trading partners, either jointly or separately (though preferably both).

To this end, as well as developing ideas for more robust substantive provisions on human rights, policymakers should consider the institutional arrangements required – whether pursuant to the trade agreement or by complementary processes – to ensure that human rights-related risks identified during the planning stages are properly and proactively followed up, that emerging risks are tackled in a timely fashion, and that there are opportunities for meaningful stakeholder contributions to these processes.

Notes

[1] UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (2019), ‘Human Rights Protections in International Agreements, Seventeenth Report of Session 2017–19’, HC 1833 HL paper 310, 12 March 2019, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtrights/1833/1833.pdf; and House of Commons International Trade Committee (2018), ‘UK Trade Policy Transparency and Scrutiny, Sixth Report of Session 2017-2019’, HC 1043, 29 December 2018.

[2] European Parliament and Directorate General for External Policies (2019), Parliamentary scrutiny of trade policies across the western world, study paper, March 2019, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/603477/EXPO_STU(2019)603477_EN.pdf.

[3] European Commission (2019), ‘Trade policy and you’, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/index_en.htm.

[4] See UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (2019), ‘Human Rights Protections in International Agreements’, para 12; and House of Commons International Trade Committee (2018), ‘UK Trade Policy Transparency and Scrutiny’, paras 124–34.

[5] OHCHR (2003), Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Human Rights, Trade and Investment, 2 July 2003, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, Annex, at para 63; UN Economic and Social Council (2017), ‘General Comment No 24 (2017) of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities’, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/24, 10 August 2017, para 13; and UN General Assembly (2011), ‘Guiding principles on human rights impact assessment of trade and investment agreements’, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/59/Add.5, 19 December 2011.

[6] European Commission (2016), Handbook for Sustainability Impact Assessment (2nd ed.), Brussels: European Union, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154464.PDF.

[7] Zerk, J. (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, Chatham House Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/human-rights-impact-assessment-trade-agreements.

[8] Ibid., pp. 11–13. For a detailed explanation of the EU’s approach to human rights impact assessment, see European Commission (2016), Handbook for Sustainability Impact Assessment.

[9] Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, pp. 14–21.

[10] Ibid., pp. 21–22.

[11] Ergon Associates (2011), Trade and Labour: Making effective use of trade sustainability impact assessments and monitoring mechanisms, Final Report to DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion European Commission, September 2011; and Gammage, C. (2010), ‘A Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Economic Partnership Agreements: Challenging the Participatory Process’, Law and Development Review, 3(1): pp. 107–34. For a civil society view, see Trade Justice Movement (undated), ‘Trade Justice Movement submission to the International Trade Committee inquiry into UK Trade Policy Transparency and Scrutiny’, https://www.tjm.org.uk/resources/briefings/tjm-submission-to-the-international-trade-committee-inquiry-into-uk-trade-policy-transparency-and-scrutiny, esp. paras 23–32.

[12] Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, pp. 20–21.

[13] Ibid., pp. 21–22.

[14] Ibid.

This essay was produced for the 2019 edition of Chatham House Expert Perspectives – our annual survey of risks and opportunities in global affairs – in which our researchers identify areas where the current sets of rules, institutions and mechanisms for peaceful international cooperation are falling short, and present ideas for reform and modernization.

The UK Supreme Court’s ruling last Wednesday has, at least temporarily, scuppered the prime minister’s plans to limit parliamentary debate before the looming Brexit deadline. Some of the prime minister’s allies have attacked the ruling as a ‘constitutional coup’. But a close reading reveals that the court has stayed within its remit to interpret, rather than make, the law.

In a carefully reasoned judgment, the court emphasized that the case was not about Brexit. But the judges certainly did not shy away from the extraordinary nature of the matters before it, noting that such factual situations have ‘never arisen before and are unlikely ever to arise again… But our law is used to rising to such challenges and supplies us with the legal tools to enable us to reason to a solution.’

The key question before the court was whether the prime minister’s decision to seek prorogation was ‘justiciable’ – i.e. amenable to being reviewed by a court. The English and Scottish courts earlier on in these proceedings had come, dramatically, to opposing views on this.

The Supreme Court was not dissuaded by the inherently political considerations involved in the prime minister’s decision, stating that while ‘courts cannot decide political questions, the fact that a legal dispute concerns the conduct of politicians, or arises from a matter of political controversy, has never been sufficient reason for the courts to refuse to consider it’.

The court went on to emphasize that the Crown’s remaining prerogative powers (exercised on the advice of the government or directly by ministers) have long been subject to judicial scrutiny; such oversight is essential to guarding the separation of powers underpinning the UK’s constitution.

So far, so conventional. The full bench of the Supreme Court was required to grapple, though, with a prerogative power that had never been tested before in the courts. And so they delved back to the 1611 Case of Proclamations: ‘the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allow him’. In the court’s view, the legal issue to be resolved was the scope of the power to prorogue (the existence of this particular prerogative not being in dispute).

With no case law available to provide direct guidance on this question, the court, instead, relied on two fundamental principles of the UK’s constitution – parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. What would be the logical consequence of an unlimited power to prorogue? The ability to shut parliament permanently.

The conclusion: this particular prerogative power had limits. The court held that:

‘A decision to prorogue Parliament (or to advise the monarch to prorogue Parliament) will be unlawful if the prorogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive. In such a situation, the court will intervene if the effect is sufficiently serious to justify such an exceptional course.’

Having come to this conclusion, the court was left to examine what justification had in fact been given, noting that the prime minister’s motives were irrelevant. It noted that no clear reason had been given – the relevant documents were all concerned with preparing for the Queen’s speech.

Noting evidence on normal practice for such preparations, including from a former prime minister, the court found it ‘impossible… to conclude…that there was any reason – let alone a good reason – to advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for five weeks’.

The court’s decision was neither inevitable nor a radical departure from legal tradition. It represents the gradual evolution of the long-established legal principle that the crown’s powers are set by the law and supervised by the courts.

Courts have traditionally been reticent to rule on prerogative powers which are ‘high politics’ by nature – classic examples include declaring war and negotiating treaties. In recent years, though, the judiciary has shown a growing confidence to grapple with the contours of those prerogative powers that remain. Deference is still shown when looking at how those powers have been used as opposed to the limits of the prerogative in question.

The Supreme Court ruling won’t reassure those who worry about the emergence of an activist court willing to wade (improperly) into the political arena. Nor will it necessarily bring comfort to those anxious about an unwritten constitution in an era where political conventions are fast unravelling.

But divisive court rulings are nothing new, nor are ministerial outbursts about inconvenient judgments. In the current environment, politicians should take particular care not to send mixed messages which undermine the independence of the UK’s judiciary. Public trust in British institutions is dangerously low and the UK can ill-afford further damage to its reputation as a country steeped in democracy and the rule of law.

About the Conference

In the run-up to the UN’s 75th anniversary and almost a year after his death, Chatham House and the United Nations Association – UK (UNA-UK) held a two-day conference to explore Kofi Annan’s legacy in the context of the current period of global uncertainty.

The ‘Our Shared Humanity’ conference brought together a global and diverse group of individualsworking on peace and security, human rights and development issues to:

• Reflect critically on Annan’s record, and capture lessons learned from his tenure as UN secretary-general, and his later work as a mediator and elder statesperson; and
• Generate recommendations for current policymakers and influencers.

This paper summarizes key points raised during each session of the conference, and presents the substantive recommendations that emerged from the discussion.

In order to bring the conference themes to a wider audience, UNA-UK held a public event on the eve of the first day of the conference at Central Hall Westminster – where the UN had held its first ever meetings in 1946 – with speakers including Nane Annan, Sherrie Westin (president of global impact and philanthropy, Sesame Workshop), Amina Mohammed (current UN deputy secretary-general) and Mary Robinson (chair of The Elders and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights).
 

International law applies to cyber operations – but views differ on exactly how. Does state-sponsored interference in another state's affairs using cyber means – for example,  disinformation campaigns in elections, disabling government websites, or disrupting transport systems – breach international law? If so, on what basis and how are the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention relevant? States are increasingly attributing cyber operations to other states and engaging in the debate on how international law applies, including circumstances that would justify countermeasures.

As states meet to debate these issues at the UN, the panel will explore how international law regulates cyberoperations by states, consider the prospects of progress at the UN, and assess the value of other initiatives.

This event coincides with the launch of a Chatham House research paper which analyses how the principles of sovereignty and intervention apply in the context of cyberoperations, and considers a way forward for agreeing a common understanding of cyber norms.

This event will bring together a broad group of actors, including policymakers, the private sector, legal experts and civil society, and will be followed by a drinks reception.

Summary

• Online political campaigning techniques are distorting our democratic political processes. These techniques include the creation of disinformation and divisive content; exploiting digital platforms’ algorithms, and using bots, cyborgs and fake accounts to distribute this content; maximizing influence through harnessing emotional responses such as anger and disgust; and micro-targeting on the basis of collated personal data and sophisticated psychological profiling techniques. Some state authorities distort political debate by restricting, filtering, shutting down or censoring online networks.
• Such techniques have outpaced regulatory initiatives and, save in egregious cases such as shutdown of networks, there is no international consensus on how they should be tackled. Digital platforms, driven by their commercial impetus to encourage users to spend as long as possible on them and to attract advertisers, may provide an environment conducive to manipulative techniques.
• International human rights law, with its careful calibrations designed to protect individuals from abuse of power by authority, provides a normative framework that should underpin responses to online disinformation and distortion of political debate. Contrary to popular view, it does not entail that there should be no control of the online environment; rather, controls should balance the interests at stake appropriately.
• The rights to freedom of thought and opinion are critical to delimiting the appropriate boundary between legitimate influence and illegitimate manipulation. When digital platforms exploit decision-making biases in prioritizing bad news and divisive, emotion-arousing information, they may be breaching these rights. States and digital platforms should consider structural changes to digital platforms to ensure that methods of online political discourse respect personal agency and prevent the use of sophisticated manipulative techniques.
• The right to privacy includes a right to choose not to divulge your personal information, and a right to opt out of trading in and profiling on the basis of your personal data. Current practices in collecting, trading and using extensive personal data to ‘micro-target’ voters without their knowledge are not consistent with this right. Significant changes are needed.
• Data protection laws should be implemented robustly, and should not legitimate extensive harvesting of personal data on the basis of either notional ‘consent’ or the data handler’s commercial interests. The right to privacy should be embedded in technological design (such as by allowing the user to access all information held on them at the click of a button); and political parties should be transparent in their collection and use of personal data, and in their targeting of messages. Arguably, the value of personal data should be shared with the individuals from whom it derives.
• The rules on the boundaries of permissible content online should be set by states, and should be consistent with the right to freedom of expression. Digital platforms have had to rapidly develop policies on retention or removal of content, but those policies do not necessarily reflect the right to freedom of expression, and platforms are currently not well placed to take account of the public interest. Platforms should be far more transparent in their content regulation policies and decision-making, and should develop frameworks enabling efficient, fair, consistent internal complaints and content monitoring processes. Expertise on international human rights law should be integral to their systems.
• The right to participate in public affairs and to vote includes the right to engage in public debate. States and digital platforms should ensure an environment in which all can participate in debate online and are not discouraged from standing for election, from participating or from voting by online threats or abuse.

Summary

• The vast majority of state-to-state cyberattacks consist of persistent, low-level intrusions that take place below the threshold of use of force. International law, including the principle of non-intervention in another state’s internal affairs and the principle of sovereignty, applies to these cyber operations.
• It is not clear whether any unauthorized cyber intrusion would violate the target state’s sovereignty, or whether there is a threshold in operation. While some would like to set limits by reference to effects of the cyber activity, at this time such limits are not reflected in customary international law. The assessment of whether sovereignty has been violated therefore has to be made on a case by case basis, if no other more specific rules of international law apply.
• In due course, further state practice and opinio iuris may give rise to an emerging cyber-specific understanding of sovereignty, just as specific rules deriving from the sovereignty principle have crystallized in other areas of international law.
• Before a principle of due diligence can be invoked in the cyber context, further work is needed by states to agree upon rules as to what might be expected of a state in this context.
• The principle of non-intervention applies to a state’s cyber operations as it does to other state activities. It consists of coercive behaviour by one state that deprives the target state of its free will in relation to the exercise of its sovereign functions in order to compel an outcome in, or conduct with respect to, a matter reserved to the target state.
• In practice, activities that contravene the non-intervention principle and activities that violates sovereignty will often overlap.
• In order to reach agreement on how international law applies to states’ cyber operations below the level of use of force, states should put their views on record, where possible giving examples of when they consider that an obligation may be breached, as states such as the UK, Australia, France and the Netherlands have done.
• Further discussion between states should focus on how the rules apply to practical examples of state-sponsored cyber operations. There is likely to be more commonality about specific applications of the law than there is about abstract principles.
• The prospects of a general treaty in this area are still far off. In due course, there may be benefit in considering limited rules, for example on due diligence and a prohibition on attacking critical infrastructure, before tackling broad principles.

Internet regulation is increasing around the world creating positive obligations on internet providers and exerting negative unintended consequences on the internet infrastructure. In some ways, most of this regulatory activity is justifiable. Governments are concerned about the increased risk that the use of the internet brings to societies. As a response, many governments have been enacting regulations as their main approach to dealing with these concerns. The main challenge is that most of the current regulations are either ill-defined or unworkable.  

On the one hand, several governments have established procedures that seek to analyze the impacts of new regulatory proposals before they were adopted. However, there hasn’t been enough attention aimed at analyzing regulations after they have been adopted and only a few have measures in place to evaluate the impacts of the procedures and practices that govern the regulatory process itself.

On the other hand, much of the regulation creates unintended consequences to the internet itself. It undermines many of its fundamental properties and challenges the integrity and resiliency of its infrastructure.  

This event discusses current practices in internet-related regulation and the related challenges. Panellists will discuss how governments can enforce regulations that achieve their intended purpose while at the same time protecting the internet’s core infrastructure and its properties, including its openness, interoperability and global reach.

• Civil nuclear facilities and organizations hold sensitive information on security clearances, national security, health and safety, nuclear regulatory issues and international inspection obligations. The sensitivity and variety of such data mean that products tailored for insuring the civil nuclear industry have evolved independently and are likely to continue to do so.
• ‘Air-gaps’ – measures designed to isolate computer systems from the internet – need to be continually maintained for industrial systems. Yet years of evidence indicate that proper maintenance of such protections is often lacking (mainly because very real economic drivers exist that push users towards keeping infrastructure connected). Indeed, even when air-gaps are maintained, security breaches can still occur.
• Even if a particular organization has staff that are highly trained, ready and capable of handling a technological accident, hacking attack or incidence of insider sabotage, it still has to do business and/or communicate with other organizations that may not have the essentials of cybersecurity in place.
• Regardless of whether the choice is made to buy external insurance or put aside revenues in preparation for costly incidents, the approach to cyber risk calculation should be the same. Prevention is one part of the equation, but an organization will also need to consider the resources and contingency measures available to it should prevention strategies fail. Can it balance the likelihood of a hacker’s success against the maximum cost to the organization, and put aside enough capital and manpower to get it through a crisis?
• All civil nuclear facilities should consider the establishment of computer security incident response (CSIR) teams as a relevant concern, if such arrangements are not already in place. The existence of a CSIR team will be a prerequisite for any facility seeking to obtain civil nuclear cyber insurance.
• Preventing attacks such as those involving phishing and ransomware requires good cyber hygiene practices throughout the workforce. Reducing an organization’s ‘time to recovery’ takes training and dedication. Practising the necessary tasks in crisis simulations greatly reduces the likelihood of friction and the potential for error in a crisis.

The development of governance in a wide range of digital spheres – from cyberspace to internet infrastructure to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) – is failing to match rapid advances in technical capabilities or the rise in security threats. This is leaving serious regulatory gaps, which means that instruments and mechanisms essential for protecting privacy and data, tackling cybercrime or establishing common ethical standards for AI, among many other imperatives, remain largely inadequate.

A starting point for effective policy formation is to recognize the essential complexity of the digital landscape, and the consequent importance of creating a ‘common language’ for multiple stakeholders (including under-represented actors such as smaller and/or developing countries, civil society and non-for-profit organizations).

The world’s evolving technological infrastructure is not a monolithic creation. In practice, it encompasses a highly diverse mix of elements – so-called ‘high-tech domains’,[1] hardware, systems, algorithms, protocols and standards – designed by a plethora of private companies, public bodies and non-profit organizations.[2] Varying cultural, economic and political assumptions have shaped where and which technologies have been deployed so far, and how they have been implemented.

Perhaps the most notable trend is the proliferation of techno-national regimes and private-sector policy initiatives, reflecting often-incompatible doctrines in respect of privacy, openness, inclusion and state control. Beyond governments, the interests and ambitions of prominent multinationals (notably the so-called ‘GAFAM’ tech giants in the West, and their ‘BATX’ counterparts in China)[3] are significant factors feeding into this debate.

Cyberspace and AI – two case studies

Two particular case studies highlight the essential challenges that this evolving – and, in some respects, still largely unformed – policy landscape presents. The first relates to cyberspace. Since 1998, Russia has established itself as a strong voice in the cyberspace governance debate – calling for a better understanding, at the UN level, of ICT developments and their impact on international security.

The country’s efforts were a precursor to the establishment in 2004 of a series of UN Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs), aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems. These groups initially succeeded in developing common rules, norms and principles around some key issues. For example, the 2013 GGE meeting recognized that international law applies to the digital space and that its enforcement is essential for a secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment.

However, the GGE process stalled in 2017, primarily due to fundamental disagreements between countries on the right to self-defence and on the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber conflicts. The breakdown in talks reflected, in particular, the divide between two principal techno-ideological blocs: one, led by the US, the EU and like-minded states, advocating a global and open approach to the digital space; the other, led mainly by Russia and China, emphasizing a sovereignty-and-control model.

The divide was arguably entrenched in December 2018, with the passage of two resolutions at the UN General Assembly. A resolution sponsored by Russia created a working group to identify new norms and look into establishing regular institutional dialogue.

At the same time, a US-sponsored resolution established a GGE tasked, in part, with identifying ways to promote compliance with existing cyber norms. Each resolution was in line with its respective promoter’s stance on cyberspace. While some observers considered these resolutions potentially complementary, others saw in them competing campaigns to cement a preferred model as the global norm. Outside the UN, there have also been dozens of multilateral and bilateral accords with similar objectives, led by diverse stakeholders.[4]

The second case study concerns AI. Emerging policy in this sector suffers from an absence of global standards and a proliferation of proposed regulatory models. The potential ability of AI to deliver unprecedented capabilities in so many areas of human activity – from automation and language applications to warfare – means that it has become an area of intense rivalry between governments seeking technical and ideological leadership of this field.

China has by far the most ambitious programme. In 2017, its government released a three-step strategy for achieving global dominance in AI by 2030. Beijing aims to create an AI industry worth about RMB 1 trillion ($150 billion)[5] and is pushing for greater use of AI in areas ranging from military applications to the development of smart cities. Elsewhere, the US administration has issued an executive order on ‘maintaining American leadership on AI’.

On the other side of the Atlantic, at least 15 European countries (including France, Germany and the UK) have set up national AI plans. Although these strategies are essential for the development of policy infrastructure, they are country-specific and offer little in terms of global coordination. Ominously, greater inclusion and cooperation are scarcely mentioned, and remain the least prioritized policy areas.[6]

Competing multilateral frameworks on AI have also emerged. In April 2019, the European Commission published its ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI. Ministers from Nordic countries[7] recently issued their own declaration on collaboration in ‘AI in the Nordic-Baltic region’. And leaders of the G7 have committed to the ‘Charlevoix Common Vision for the Future of Artificial Intelligence’, which includes 12 guiding principles to ensure ‘human-centric AI’.

More recently, OECD member countries adopted a set of joint recommendations on AI. While nations outside the OECD were welcomed into the coalition – with Argentina, Brazil and Colombia adhering to the OECD’s newly established principles – China, India and Russia have yet to join the discussion. Despite their global aspirations, these emerging groups remain largely G7-led or EU-centric, and again highlight the divide between parallel models. 

The importance of ‘swing states’

No clear winner has emerged from among the competing visions for cyberspace and AI governance, nor indeed from the similar contests for doctrinal control in other digital domains. Concerns are rising that a so-called ‘splinternet’ may be inevitable – in which the internet fragments into separate open and closed spheres and cyber governance is similarly divided.

Each ideological camp is trying to build a critical mass of support by recruiting undecided states to its cause. Often referred to as ‘swing states’, the targets of these overtures are still in the process of developing their digital infrastructure and determining which regulatory and ethical frameworks they will apply. Yet the policy choices made by these countries could have a major influence on the direction of international digital governance in the future.

India offers a case in point. For now, the country seems to have chosen a versatile approach, engaging with actors on various sides of the policy debate, depending on the technology governance domain. On the one hand, its draft Personal Data Protection Bill mirrors principles in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), suggesting a potential preference for the Western approach to data security.

However, in 2018, India was the leading country in terms of internet shutdowns, with over 100 reported incidents.[8] India has also chosen to collaborate outside the principal ideological blocs, as evidenced by an AI partnership it has entered into with the UAE. At the UN level, India has taken positions that support both blocs, although more often favouring the sovereignty-and-control approach.

Principles for rule-making

Sovereign nations have asserted aspirations for technological dominance with little heed to the cross-border implications of their policies. This drift towards a digital infrastructure fragmented by national regulation has potentially far-reaching societal and political consequences – and implies an urgent need for coordinated rule-making at the international level.

The lack of standards and enforcement mechanisms has created instability and increased vulnerabilities in democratic systems. In recent years, liberal democracies have been targeted by malevolent intrusions in their election systems and media sectors, and their critical infrastructure has come under increased threat. If Western nations cannot align around, and enforce, a normative framework that seeks to preserve individual privacy, openness and accountability through regulation, a growing number of governments may be drawn towards repressive forms of governance.

To mitigate those risks, efforts to negotiate a rules-based international order for the digital space should keep several guiding principles in mind. One is the importance of developing joint standards, as well as the need for consistent messaging towards the emerging cohort of engaged ‘swing states’. Another is the need for persistence in ensuring that the political, civic and economic benefits associated with a more open and well-regulated digital sphere are made clear to governments and citizens everywhere.

Countries advocating an open, free and secure model should take the lead in embracing and promoting a common affirmative model – one that draws on human rights principles (such as the rights to freedom of opinion, freedom of expression and privacy) and expands their applications to the digital space.  

Specific rules on cyberspace and technology use need to include pragmatic policy ideas and models of implementation. As this regulatory corpus develops, rules should be adapted to reflect informed consideration of economic and social priorities and attitudes, and to keep pace with what is possible technologically.[9]

Notes

[1] Including but not limited to AI and an associated group of digital technologies, such as the Internet of Things, big data, blockchain, quantum computing, advanced robotics, self-driving cars and other autonomous systems, additive manufacturing (i.e. 3D printing), social networks, the new generation of biotechnology, and genetic engineering.

[2] O’Hara, K. and Hall, W. (2018), Four Internets: The Geopolitics of Digital Governance, Centre for International Governance Innovation, CIGI Paper No. 206, https://www.cigionline.org/publications/four-internets-geopolitics-digital-governance.

[3] GAFAM = Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft; BATX = Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and Xiaomi.

[4] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (undated), ‘Cyber Norms Index’, https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/cybernorms (accessed 30 May 2019).

[5] Future of Life Institute (undated), ‘AI Policy – China’, https://futureoflife.org/ai-policy-china?cn-reloaded=1.

[6] Dutton, T. (2018), ‘Building an AI World: Report on National and Regional AI Strategies’, 6 December 2018, CIFAR, https://www.cifar.ca/cifarnews/2018/12/06/building-an-ai-world-report-on-national-and-regional-ai-strategies.

[7] Including Denmark, Estonia, Finland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden and the Åland Islands.

[8] Shahbaz, A. (2018), Freedom on the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism, Freedom House, October 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism.

[9] Google White Paper (2018), Perspectives on Issues in AI Governance, https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/public-policy/engaging-policy-stakeholders-issues-ai-governance/.

This essay was produced for the 2019 edition of Chatham House Expert Perspectives – our annual survey of risks and opportunities in global affairs – in which our researchers identify areas where the current sets of rules, institutions and mechanisms for peaceful international cooperation are falling short, and present ideas for reform and modernization.