M el-Saadani
Apr 1, 1989; 30:627-630
Articles

JL Dixon
Feb 1, 1993; 34:167-179
Reviews

Gijs den Besten
Sep 1, 2013; 54:2325-2340
Reviews

John M. Dietschy
Aug 1, 2004; 45:1375-1397
Thematic Reviews

JM Dietschy
Oct 1, 1993; 34:1637-1659
Reviews

JE Hixson
Mar 1, 1990; 31:545-548
Articles

Supporting Next Generation of Leaders in Sustainability News Release NCapeling 28 January 2021

A new programme offering paid internships for young people who are passionate about social, economic, and environmental sustainability has been launched.

Implications of post-COVID-19 Restructuring of Supply Chains for Global Investment Governance 14 July 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

As companies rethink and diversify their supply chains in order to enhance resilience, what will this mean for current and future global investment governance?

What are the risks of negative effects on inclusivity and transparency? Does this shift create an opportunity to advance good governance of cross-border investment practices?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

Persuasion or manipulation? Limiting campaigning online Expert comment NCapeling 15 February 2021

To tackle online disinformation and manipulation effectively, regulators must clarify the dividing line between legitimate and illegitimate campaign practices.

Democracy is at risk, not only from disinformation but from systemic manipulation of public debate online. Evidence shows social media drives control of narratives, polarization, and division on issues of politics and identity. We are now seeing regulators turn their attention to protecting democracy from disinformation and manipulation. But how should they distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate online information practices, between persuasive and manipulative campaigning?

Unregulated, the tactics of disinformation and manipulation have spread far and wide. They are no longer the preserve merely of disaffected individuals, hostile international actors, and authoritarian regimes. Facebook’s periodic reporting on coordinated inauthentic behaviour and Twitter’s on foreign information operations reveal that militaries, governments, and political campaigners in a wide range of countries, including parts of Europe and America, have engaged in manipulative or deceptive information campaigns.

For example, in September 2019, Twitter removed 259 accounts it says were ‘falsely boosting’ public sentiment online that it found to be operated by Spain’s conservative and Christian-democratic political party Partido Popular. In October 2020, Facebook removed accounts with around 400,000 followers linked to Rally Forge, a US marketing firm which Facebook claims was working on behalf of right-wing organisations Turning Point USA and Inclusive Conservation Group. And in December 2020, Facebook took down a network of accounts with more than 6,000 followers, targeting audiences in Francophone Africa and focusing on France’s policies there, finding it linked with individuals associated with the French military.

Public influence on a global scale

Even more revealingly, in its 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation, the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) found that in 81 countries, government agencies and/or political parties are using ‘computational propaganda’ in social media to shape public attitudes.

These 81 countries span the world and include not only authoritarian and less democratic regimes but also developed democracies such as many EU member states. OII found that countries with the largest capacity for computational propaganda – which include the UK, US, and Australia – have permanent teams devoted to shaping the online space overseas and at home.

OII categorizes computational propaganda as four types of communication strategy – the creation of disinformation or manipulated content such as doctored images and videos; the use of personal data to target specific segments of the population with disinformation or other false narratives; trolling, doxing or online harassment of political opponents, activists or journalists; and mass-reporting of content or accounts posted or run by opponents as part of gaming the platforms’ automated flagging, demotion, and take-down systems.

Doubtless some of the governments included within OII’s statistics argue their behaviour is legitimate and appropriate, either to disseminate information important to the public interest or to wrestle control of the narrative away from hostile actors. Similarly, no doubt some political campaigners removed by the platforms for alleged engagement in ‘inauthentic behaviour’ or ‘manipulation’ would defend the legitimacy of their conduct.

The fact is that clear limits of acceptable propaganda and information influence operations online do not exist. Platforms still share little information overall about what information operations they see being conducted online. Applicable legal principles such as international human rights law have not yet crystallised into clear rules. As information operations are rarely exposed to public view – with notable exceptions such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal – there is relatively little constraint in media and public scrutiny or censure.

OII’s annual reports and the platforms’ periodic reports demonstrate a continual expansion of deceptive and manipulative practices since 2016, and increasing involvement of private commercial companies in their deployment. Given the power of political influence as a driver, this absence of clear limits may result in ever more sophisticated techniques being deployed in the search for maximal influence.

Ambiguity over reasonable limits on manipulation plays into the hands of governments which regulate ostensibly in the name of combating disinformation, but actually in the interests of maintaining their own control of the narrative and in disregard of the human right to freedom of expression. Following Singapore’s 2019 prohibition of online untruths, 17 governments ranging from Bolivia to Vietnam to Hungary passed regulations during 2020 criminalising ‘fake news’ on COVID-19 while many other governments are alleged to censor opposition arguments or criticisms of official state narratives.

Clear limits are needed. Facebook itself has been calling for societal discussion about the limits of acceptable online behaviour for some time and has issued recommendations of its own.

The European Democracy Action Plan: Aiming to protect pluralism and vigour in democracy

The European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP), which complements the European Commission’s Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act proposals, is a welcome step. It is ground-breaking in its efforts to protect the pluralism and vigour of European democracies by tackling all forms of online manipulation, while respecting human rights.

While the EDAP tackles disinformation, it also condemns two categories of online manipulation – information influence operations which EDAP describes as ‘coordinated efforts by either domestic or foreign actors to influence a target audience using a range of deceptive means’ and foreign interference, described as ‘coercive and deceptive efforts to disrupt the free formation and expression of individuals’ political will by a foreign state actor or its agents’. These categories include influence operations such as harnessing fake accounts or gaming algorithms, and the suppression of independent information sources through censorship or mass reporting.

But the categories are so broad they risk capturing disinformation practices not only of rogue actors, but also of governments and political campaigners both outside and within the EU. The European Commission plans to work towards refined definitions. Its discussions with member states and other stakeholders should start to determine which practices ought to be tackled as manipulative, and which ought to be tolerated as legitimate campaigning or public information practices.

The extent of the EDAP proposals on disinformation demonstrates the EU’s determination to tackle online manipulation. The EDAP calls for improved practical measures building on the Commission’s 2020 acceleration of effort in the face of COVID-19 disinformation. The Commission is considering how best to impose costs on perpetrators of disinformation, such as by disrupting financial incentives or even imposing sanctions for repeated offences.

Beyond the regulatory and risk management framework proposed by the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Commission says it will issue guidance for platforms and other stakeholders to strengthen their measures against disinformation, building on the existing EU Code of Practice on Disinformation and eventually leading to a strengthened Code with more robust monitoring requirements. These are elements of a broader package of measures in the EDAP to preserve democracy in Europe.

Until there are clear limits, manipulative practices will continue to develop and to spread. More actors will resort to them in order not to be outgunned by opponents. It is hoped forthcoming European discussions – involving EU member state governments, the European Parliament, civil society, academia and the online platforms – will begin to shape at least a European and maybe a global consensus on the limits of information influence, publicly condemning unacceptable practices while safeguarding freedom of expression.

Most importantly, following the example of the EDAP, the preservation of democracy and human rights – rather than the promotion of political or commercial interest – should be the lodestar for those discussions.

Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications Expert comment NCapeling 24 February 2022

Russia is violating international law in Ukraine using baseless allegations, and states’ responses should be guided accordingly.

Russia has begun a large-scale military attack on Ukraine, having first declared it recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as separate states. It scarcely needs saying Russia is violating international law – violating the prohibition in the United Nations (UN) Charter on the use of force, violating the obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, and violating the prohibition on intervention.

But Russia is using the language of the law to defend its actions. In all the recent verbiage of President Vladimir Putin, some attempts at legal arguments can be elicited – but they do not stand up to scrutiny.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force with the only two Charter exceptions to this prohibition being self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council. In his speech on 23 February, Putin points to two grounds on which Russia relies on self-defence – defence in aid of the two breakaway republics and self-defence in the light of threats against Russia itself.

Donetsk, Luhansk, and collective self-defence

Putin said ‘the people’s republics of Donbass turned to Russia with a request for help’ and went on to seek to justify his military action under Article 51 of the Charter. But it is only in respect of states that the right of collective self-defence exists – humanitarian intervention on behalf of individuals in a state has not gained a place in international law. And it is only Russia which has recognized the statehood of the two regions.

Putin repeated on 23 February his earlier allegation that the people of the two breakaway republics are being repressed by the Ukraine government, and even that genocide is being committed against them. This baseless allegation is relevant not only to the claim of self-defence on behalf of these regions but also to Russia’s ‘recognition’ of them as separate states.

International law does not give the inhabitants of a part of a state the right to secede from that state. The aspect of self-determination which allows for independence of a ‘people’ applies to peoples in colonies and other overseas territories under the occupation of another state. The other aspect of self-determination is ‘internal’ and comprises the right to freely choose political status and pursue economic, social, and cultural development within the state – as the Minsk accords sought to provide for Donetsk and Luhansk.

There is a somewhat controversial theory in international law that would give a right of secession from a state if the people in question were subject to extreme abuse of human rights and systematic oppression. This is the theory of remedial secession, which some countries, such as Switzerland, used in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in relation to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia – an independence still not recognized by Russia.

But the theory has no support from the international courts and, even if it did, Russia itself has stated previously that a right of remedial secession is ‘limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question’ (see Russia’s submissions to the ICJ in the Kosovo case, para 88).

The facts do not substantiate Russia’s claims anyway. The law is as stated on behalf of the UN Secretary-General on 21 February – that Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions is a ‘violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ There are no ‘states’ which can request the use of military force.

Is Ukraine a threat against Russia?

Putin refers to the ‘further expansion of the infrastructure of the North Atlantic Alliance, the military development of the territories of Ukraine’ as creating an ‘anti-Russia’ comprising a ‘real threat not just to our interests, but to the very existence of our state, its sovereignty’.

Article 51 allows for self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This has been interpreted by many states to include defence against the threat of an imminent attack – for example, there is no requirement to wait until a nuclear strike has begun. But under no interpretation of ‘imminence’ can the situation in Ukraine constitute a threat to Russia. There have been no threats of force against Russia from Ukraine nor from NATO member states. There is nothing to support a legal justification for Russia’s military attack against Ukraine.

The myth of Ukraine never having had ‘real statehood’ also does not give any legal justification for Russian aggression. The UN is based on the ‘principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter). Ukraine retained its membership in the UN at the dissolution of the USSR, having been one of the founding members of the UN as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

What are the legal consequences of Russia’s actions?

Within the UN, it is the Security Council which has the mandate to uphold international peace and security, and act when there is a threat to the peace. But there will be no help from there with Russia’s status as a permanent member holding a veto.

The UN General Assembly may act instead. Since 2014 it has adopted a series of resolutions (the latest on 9 December 2021) requiring Russia to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Crimea. But the General Assembly does not have the powers of the Security Council, and cannot mandate peacekeepers or the use of force.

In due course there may be the need for a UN Human Rights Commission of Inquiry to be launched if there are breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law, and human rights cases may be brought against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. But international institutions do not have the necessary powers to stop what is going on right now.

International law gives the right to Ukraine, being attacked, to call for support from other states. And as well as imposing sanctions, states may wish to consider cyber countermeasures. Some of the recent cyber activity against Ukraine has been attributed by the US, UK, and Australia to the Russian Main Intelligence Unit (GRU).

Challenges of AI Explainer jon.wallace 22 March 2022

What are the practical, legal and ethical implications of artificial intelligence (AI) and how can regulation help meet these challenges?

This article explains the challenges associated with the funding, development, supply and regulation of artificial intelligence (AI). It deals with narrow AI, that is systems and applications that are task-specific.

The article is not concerned with the concept of artificial general intelligence, or AGI, that is an AI which could meet and exceed the full capabilities of the human mind in the future.

Definition of AI

There is no universally accepted definition of AI, but in the UK’s Industrial Strategy White Paper, AI is defined as ‘technologies with the ability to perform tasks that would otherwise require human intelligence’. 

AI makes decisions using algorithms that either follow rules or, in the case of machine learning, review large quantities of data to identify and follow patterns. Because machine learning consists of multiple layers, and machines develop their own learning and patterns, it is opaque compared to traditional rule-following computing.

Today AI applications are common in many economic activities including online shopping and advertising, web search, digital personal assistants, language translation, smart homes and infrastructure, health, transport and manufacturing. 

Risks and benefits of AI

AI has the potential to bring huge advantages, for example in medical science, education, food and aid distribution, more efficient public transport and in tackling climate change. 

Used well, it could help humanity meet the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and make many processes swifter, fairer and more efficient. It is a technology which is likely to be as transformative to human history as was the Industrial Revolution.

However, there are serious ethical, safety and societal risks associated with the rapid growth of AI technologies. 

Will AI be a tool that makes rich people richer? Will it exaggerate bias and discrimination? Will AI decision-making create a less compassionate society? Should there be limits to what decisions an AI system can take autonomously, from overtaking a car on the motorway to firing a weapon?

And if AI goes wrong – for example if a self-driving car has an accident – who should be liable? 

To ensure AI is used safely and fairly, up-to-date and rigorous regulation is needed. 

Regulation of AI

AI creates serious regulatory challenges due to the way it is funded, researched and developed.  

The private sector drives progress in AI, and governments mostly rely on big tech companies to build their AI software, furnish their AI talent, and achieve AI breakthroughs. In many respects this is a reflection of the world we live in, as big tech firms have the resources and expertise required.

However, without government oversight the future application of AI’s extraordinary potential will be effectively outsourced to commercial interests. That outcome provides little incentive to use AI to address the world’s greatest challenges, from poverty and hunger to climate change.

Government policy on AI

Currently governments are playing catch-up as AI applications are developed and rolled out. Despite the transnational nature of this technology, there is no unified policy approach to AI regulation, or to the use of data. 

It is vital that governments provide ‘guardrails’ for private sector development through effective regulation. But this is not yet in place, either in the US (where the largest amount of development is taking place) or in most other parts of the world. This regulation ‘vacuum’ has significant ethical and safety implications for AI. 

Some governments fear that imposing stringent regulations will discourage investment and innovation in their countries and lose them a competitive advantage. This attitude risks a ‘race to the bottom’, where countries compete to minimize regulation in order to lure big tech investment. 

The EU and UK governments are beginning to discuss regulation but plans are still at an early stage. Probably the most promising approach to government policy on AI is the EU’s proposed risk-based approach. It would ban the most problematic uses of AI, such as AI that distorts human behaviour or manipulates citizens through subliminal techniques. 

And it would require risk management and human oversight of AI that poses high risk to safety or human rights, such as AI used in critical infrastructure, credit checks, recruitment, criminal justice, and asylum applications.

Meanwhile, the UK is keen to see the establishment of an AI assurance industry that would provide kitemarks (or the equivalent) for AI that meets safety and ethical standards.

Despite these policy developments, there remain fundamental questions about how to categorize and apply risk assessments, what an AI rights-based approach could look like, and the lack of inclusivity and diversity in AI.

AI ethical issues

AI has serious ethical implications. Because AI develops its own learning, those implications may not be evident until it is deployed. The story of AI is littered with ethical failings: with privacy breaches, with bias, and with AI decision-making that could not be challenged.

It’s therefore important to identify and mitigate ethical risks while AI is being designed and developed, and on an ongoing basis once it is in use. 

But many AI designers work in a competitive, profit-driven context where speed and efficiency are prized and delay (of the kind implied by regulation and ethical review) is viewed as costly and therefore undesirable. 

Designers may also not have the training, tools or capacity to identify and mitigate ethical issues. The majority are from an engineering or computing background, and do not reflect the diversity in society.

Shareholders and senior management will also naturally be hostile to criticism which could affect profits.

Once an AI application has been designed, it is often sold to companies to fulfil a task (for example, sifting employment applicants) without the buyer being able to understand how it works or what risks may come with it.

Ethical frameworks for AI

Some international bodies have made efforts to create an ethical framework for AI development, including UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, and the IEEE’s Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems. And some companies have developed their own ethical initiatives.

But each of these proposals naturally overlaps, is slightly different and is voluntary. They set out principles for creating ethical AI, but provide no accountability in the event that an AI goes wrong.

Ethical roles in the AI industry are a potentially important new profession, but the field is underfunded and under resourced. There is widespread agreement that ethics is important, but a lack of consensus on how it should be enforced.

Government use of AI

It’s equally important that the way governments use AI is understood, consensual and ethical, complying with human rights obligations. Opaque practices by governments may feed the perception of AI as a tool of oppression. 

China has some of the clearest regulation of AI private industry in the world, but the way the government has deployed AI tools in the surveillance of its citizens has serious civil liberties implications.

China’s exports of AI to other countries are increasing the prevalence of government surveillance internationally.

Privacy and AI

Probably the greatest challenge facing the AI industry is the need to reconcile AI’s need for large amounts of structured or standardized data with the human right to privacy. 

AI’s ‘hunger’ for large data sets is in direct tension with current privacy legislation and culture. Current law, in the UK and Europe limits both the potential for sharing data sets and the scope of automated decision-making. These restrictions are limiting the capacity of AI. 

During the COVID-19 pandemic, there were concerns that it would not be possible to use AI to determine priority allocation of vaccines. (These concerns were allayed on the basis that GPs provided oversight on the decision-making process.)

More broadly, some AI designers said they were unable to contribute to the COVID-19 response due to regulations that barred them from accessing large health data sets. It is at least feasible that such data could have allowed AI to offer more informed decisions about the use of control measures like lockdowns and the most effective global distribution of vaccines.

Better data access and sharing are compatible with privacy, but require changes to our regulation. The EU and UK are considering what adjustments to their data protection laws are needed to facilitate AI while protecting privacy.

Sanctions must not prevent humanitarian work in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 30 May 2022

Restrictions on supply of certain items and financial sanctions can impede vital relief unless adequate safeguards are put in place such as exceptions or general licences.

Sanctions play a major role in the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United Nations (UN) has not imposed sanctions, but an important number of states have done so. They have imposed a wide array of restrictions and the number of targeted – or ‘designated’ – persons is unprecedented.

The public has been captivated by the freezing of oligarchs’ assets. There is ongoing discussion about seizing them to provide compensation for war damage. Debate continues about how far to ban oil and gas imports.

One aspect of the sanctions has received far less attention, even though it can exacerbate the effect of the conflict on civilians. Some of the trade restrictions and financial sanctions pose immediate and concrete challenges to the capacity of humanitarian organizations to work in Ukraine and in neighbouring states.

Trade sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) and UK prohibit the export or supply of certain goods and technology in the transport, telecommunications, energy, and oil or mineral exploration sectors to non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk or Luhansk oblasts, or for use there.

Restricted items include technical equipment which is necessary for humanitarian operations, such as water pumps and refrigerating equipment, but also far more mundane items such as vehicles for transport of persons and goods, and office equipment that are necessary for humanitarian organizations trying to work in the region.

Designations can reduce options for support

Financial sanctions also raise problems. Some are immediately apparent. Significantly for humanitarian operations, the two de facto republics of Donetsk and Luhansk are designated by the EU, the UK, and the US. Consequently, it is prohibited to make funds or assets available to them directly or indirectly.

This prohibition covers the payment of any taxes, licences, and other fees to these authorities, as well as the provision of assets to ministries under their control in the course of humanitarian operations, such as ministries of health and education.

Designations of other entities may also be relevant, such as Russian ‘state enterprises’ which operate in these areas and are the sole providers of commodities necessary for humanitarian response, such as heating fuel.

These are the designations which most obviously impact humanitarian response. However, more than 1,000 persons and entities have been designated and humanitarian organizations must avoid purchasing goods and services from them.

Risk-averse commercial partners

Commercial actors – such as banks, insurers, freight companies and commodity providers – whose services are required by humanitarian organizations must also comply with the sanctions. Experience shows that the due diligence measures adopted by humanitarian organizations do not always allay concerns of risk-averse sectors such as banks.

Fears of violating the sanctions, coupled with the fact humanitarian organizations are rarely profitable clients, have led them to severely restrict the services they provide.

This is not the first occasion the problem has arisen. What is different in relation to Ukraine is the number of designated persons and the ‘sanctions packages’ adopted in quick succession. As compliance officers struggle to keep abreast, their institutions become even more risk-averse.

For UK banks, the situation is exacerbated by the adoption of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. This amends existing rules by removing the requirement for the UK Treasury to prove knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect that a transaction violated sanctions, imposing strict liability for sanctions violations.

Time for the UK to follow others

The EU, the US, Switzerland, and other states which have imposed sanctions have sought to mitigate their adverse effects by including safeguards for humanitarian action. Although the UK has largely replicated the measures adopted by the EU in terms of restrictions and designations, it lags behind in including such safeguards.

The UK trade restrictions and financial sanctions do not include exceptions for humanitarian action. While several general licences have been issued, none relate to humanitarian operations.

Instead, the UK measures foresee only the possibility of applying for specific licences – from the Treasury in the case of financial sanctions and the Department of International Trade for trade restrictions. But obtaining specific licences is a time-consuming process which is simply not appropriate for emergency response.

If the UK is to show it is serious about responding to the immense needs caused by the invasion it must introduce appropriate safeguards in its sanctions – either in the form of exceptions or general licences.

What matters is they cover all key humanitarian organizations responding to the Ukraine crisis that are subject to UK sanctions – either because they are UK persons or because their funding agreements with the UK government require them to comply with UK measures.

These include UN agencies, funds and programmes, components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) responding to the crisis in Ukraine and neighbouring states. The provision must also clearly extend to commercial entities which provide necessary services for humanitarian operations.

Given the UK recently adopted an exception along similar lines in relation to the Afghanistan sanctions, there is a valuable precedent for Ukraine.

Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world Feature jon.wallace 17 February 2023

Chatham House experts examine the shifts in geopolitical alliances, security, energy, and supply chains and whether these changes are likely to be long-lasting.

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale re-invasion of Ukraine one year ago was a global shock which ‘marked an abrupt end to 30 years of globalization and all the international co-operation that made that possible’ with serious implications for countries around the world, outlined Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox in her inaugural lecture.

Not only has the war threatened the stability of Europe but it has also impacted food and energy security globally including in the Middle East and Africa, creating shock waves in a world barely recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Zika virus (ZIKV) is a neurotropic flavivirus that causes several diseases including birth defects such as microcephaly. Intrinsic immunity is known to be a frontline defense against viruses through host anti-viral restriction factors. Limited knowledge is available on intrinsic immunity against ZIKV in brains. Amyloid precursor protein (APP) is predominantly expressed in brains and implicated in the pathogenesis of Alzheimer's diseases. We have found that ZIKV interacts with APP, and viral infection increases APP expression via enhancing protein stability. Moreover, we identified the viral peptide, HGSQHSGMIVNDTGHETDENRAKVEITPNSPRAEATLGGFGSLGL, which is capable of en-hancing APP expression. We observed that aging brain tissues with APP had protective effects on ZIKV infection by reducing the availability of the viruses. Also, knockdown of APP expression or blocking ZIKV-APP interactions enhanced ZIKV replication in human neural progenitor/stem cells. Finally, intracranial infection of ZIKV in APP-null neonatal mice resulted in higher mortality and viral yields. Taken together, these findings suggest that APP is a restriction factor that protects against ZIKV by serving as a decoy receptor, and plays a protective role in ZIKV-mediated brain injuries.

Evolving evidence suggests that nicotine may contribute to impaired asthma control by stimulating expression of nerve growth factor (NGF), a neurotrophin associated with airway remodeling and airway hyperresponsiveness. We explored the hypothesis that nicotine increases NGF by reducing lung fibroblast (LF) microRNA-98 (miR-98) and PPARγ levels, thus promoting airway remodeling. Levels of NGF, miR-98, PPARγ, fibronectin 1 (FN1), endothelin-1 (EDN1, herein referred to as ET-1), and collagen (COL1A1 and COL3A1) were measured in human LFs isolated from smoking donors, in mouse primary LFs exposed to nicotine (50 μg/ml), and in whole lung homogenates from mice chronically exposed to nicotine (100 μg/ml) in the drinking water. In selected studies, these pathways were manipulated in LFs with miR-98 inhibitor (anti-miR-98), miR-98 overexpression (miR-98 mimic), or the PPARγ agonist rosiglitazone. Compared with unexposed controls, nicotine increased NGF, FN1, ET-1, COL1A1, and COL3A1 expression in human and mouse LFs and mouse lung homogenates. In contrast, nicotine reduced miR-98 levels in LFs in vitro and in lung homogenates in vivo. Treatment with anti-miR-98 alone was sufficient to recapitulate increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1, whereas treatment with a miR-98 mimic significantly suppressed luciferase expression in cells transfected with a luciferase reporter linked to the putative seed sequence in the NGF 3'UTR and also abrogated nicotine-induced increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1 in LFs. Similarly, rosiglitazone increased miR-98 and reversed nicotine-induced increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that nicotine-induced increases in NGF and other markers of airway remodeling are negatively regulated by miR-98.

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The functional mechanisms of multidomain proteins often exploit interdomain interactions, or “cross-talk.” An example is human Pin1, an essential mitotic regulator consisting of a Trp–Trp (WW) domain flexibly tethered to a peptidyl-prolyl isomerase (PPIase) domain, resulting in interdomain interactions important for Pin1 function. Substrate binding to the WW domain alters its transient contacts with the PPIase domain via means that are only partially understood. Accordingly, we have investigated Pin1 interdomain interactions using NMR paramagnetic relaxation enhancement (PRE) and molecular dynamics (MD) simulations. The PREs show that apo-Pin1 samples interdomain contacts beyond the range suggested by previous structural studies. They further show that substrate binding to the WW domain simultaneously alters interdomain separation and the internal conformation of the WW domain. A 4.5-μs all-atom MD simulation of apo-Pin1 suggests that the fluctuations of interdomain distances are correlated with fluctuations of WW domain interresidue contacts involved in substrate binding. Thus, the interdomain/WW domain conformations sampled by apo-Pin1 may already include a range of conformations appropriate for binding Pin1's numerous substrates. The proposed coupling between intra-/interdomain conformational fluctuations is a consequence of the dynamic modular architecture of Pin1. Such modular architecture is common among cell-cycle proteins; thus, the WW–PPIase domain cross-talk mechanisms of Pin1 may be relevant for their mechanisms as well.

RecQ family helicases are highly conserved from bacteria to humans and have essential roles in maintaining genome stability. Mutations in three human RecQ helicases cause severe diseases with the main features of premature aging and cancer predisposition. Most RecQ helicases shared a conserved domain arrangement which comprises a helicase core, an RecQ C-terminal domain, and an auxiliary element helicase and RNaseD C-terminal (HRDC) domain, the functions of which are poorly understood. In this study, we systematically characterized the roles of the HRDC domain in E. coli RecQ in various DNA transactions by single-molecule FRET. We found that RecQ repetitively unwinds the 3'-partial duplex and fork DNA with a moderate processivity and periodically patrols on the ssDNA in the 5'-partial duplex by translocation. The HRDC domain significantly suppresses RecQ activities in the above transactions. In sharp contrast, the HRDC domain is essential for the deep and long-time unfolding of the G4 DNA structure by RecQ. Based on the observations that the HRDC domain dynamically switches between RecA core- and ssDNA-binding modes after RecQ association with DNA, we proposed a model to explain the modulation mechanism of the HRDC domain. Our findings not only provide new insights into the activities of RecQ on different substrates but also highlight the novel functions of the HRDC domain in DNA metabolisms.

Driven to Extraction: Can Sand Mining be Sustainable? 5 June 2019 — 1:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Sand: Monitoring and management for a sustainable future 2 March 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 February 2021 Online

In partnership with the Global Sand Observatory Initiative, this event outlines the sand challenge, what actions are currently underway to address it, and what else needs to be done.

Please complete your registration on Zoom:

After water, sand is the raw material that the world consumes in the greatest quantity. It is no exaggeration to say that fine sand and coarser materials – the medium-to-coarse-grained pebbles, gravel and rock fragments used in construction – are the building blocks of the modern world.

When bound with cement, sand becomes concrete; when mixed with bitumen, it becomes asphalt; and when heated, it becomes glass. Without sand, we would have no highways, high-rises or high-speed trains. Yet sand – which is used here as shorthand for sand, gravel and crushed rock together – is a resource that is both abundant and finite.

In global terms, it is abundant, especially when compared with many other raw materials, albeit often not available close to where it is needed. It is finite in that the rate at which we are using it far exceeds the natural rate at which it is being replenished by the weathering of rocks by wind and water.

Industrialization, population growth and urbanization have fuelled explosive growth in the demand for sand. Precise data on sand extraction are hard to come by and the lack of data compounds the challenge of managing the resource sustainably.

However, the UN estimates that overall extraction could be in the region of 40 billion tonnes per year, driven primarily by construction sector demand. That equates to 18 kilograms of sand each day for every person on the planet and signals how strategically important these resources are for future sustainable development. Post-COVID-19 recovery investment in infrastructure, digital technologies, tourism and other economic activities are dependent on sand resources.

Current efforts to improve the management of sand resources at local, national and global levels are uneven. This is partly due to unique geological features and geography, but also differences in local manifestations of the ‘sand challenge’, national and regional demand for sand resources, as well as capacities to enforce or implement best practice assessment procedures, extractive practices, environmental management and restoration requirements.

We must put stronger conditions in place for a rapid, just and scaled transition to sustainable sand management. But where to focus our efforts for the greatest positive impact?

The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security 13 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

What are the potential impacts on food and energy markets emerging from the situation in Ukraine?

Russia and Ukraine are key players in global energy, food, fertilizer and mineral markets. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, both the threat and reality of resource flows being reduced drove up global prices, and has impacted the day-to-day life of people and businesses around the world.

Developing and nutrition-fragile countries across Africa and the Middle East will be hit the hardest – Somalia, for example, is reliant on Russia and Ukraine for 100 per cent of its wheat imports and is currently experiencing its worst drought in years.

The potential scale of disruption to food and energy markets increases with every week the war continues. This event launches the Environment and Society programme’s latest briefing paper The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security: Cascading risks from rising prices and supply disruptions.

The panel discusses:

• The political, socio-economic and resource pressures already faced by the international community prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• Direct and cascading impacts on the complex and interconnected energy, minerals, food and fertilizer markets, and policy or market responses that may exacerbate these impacts.
• Geopolitical ramifications that will affect the evolution of the conflict, as well as longer-term international cooperation and security.
• Measures that governments can take to build resilience, both to the ongoing impacts of the situation in Ukraine and to future risks of market disruption and geopolitical upheaval.

What does sustainable agriculture mean? 24 May 2022 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 May 2022 Chatham House and Online

Experts compare and contrast visions of ‘sustainable’ agriculture.

There is growing and unprecedented recognition of the adverse effects of food systems on global warming, air and water pollution, biodiversity, soil, and managing the emergence and spread of infectious diseases. At the same time, concern is rising over the role of climate change itself in compromising food security, supply-chain resilience and food price spikes.

Against this backdrop, the need for agriculture to become more ‘sustainable’ is clear. However, there is little consensus over what that means in practice. To address this, Chatham House is launching a new research paper comparing and contrasting the two most commonly articulated versions of ‘sustainable agriculture’.

The first focuses on sparing land for nature and increasing the productivity of agricultural land while minimizing environmental impacts. The second involves scaling up nature-friendly farming while emphasizing demand-side changes to reduce the overall pressure on land.

• How can we understand the arguments in support of either version and the assumptions and ideologies which underpin them?

• What are the implications of promoting one version of agriculture over the other

• How can policy transform agriculture and food systems?

• What should civil society support as ‘sustainable’ choices?

Taiwan Charts a New Course After Elections Expert comment sysadmin 19 January 2016

The resounding victory for the opposition marks a decisive break with the past and could make life much more difficult for Beijing.

A victory for Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential election on Saturday had been widely predicted. But the margin of victory, and the crushing defeat suffered by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) in the concurrent legislative elections, could mean a conclusive shift in both the country’s domestic politics and its important relationship with Beijing.

Why the DPP won

President elect Tsai Ing-wen’s victory was no close run thing nor was it a result of a split in the opposition vote as was claimed for her predecessor. The KMT ran a disastrously inept presidential campaign. The farcical way in which they first chose then unseated a totally unsuitable candidate simply underlined their lack of cohesion or purpose. This came on top of an unconvincing record in administration that showed the party to be increasingly tired, self-destructive and out of touch. Eric Chu, the eventual replacement choice, had neither the time nor the charisma to put things right.

Moreover, on the key issue of mainland policy, the KMT had come to be seen as serving more a party interest than a national one. It now appears that a majority in Taiwan believe that the DPP will more effectively champion and promote their interests in relation to China than the KMT. The coup de theatre of the meeting of the presidents of China and Taiwan in November had no discernible electoral impact. More widely, the view of the national identity as a Taiwanese one rather than a Chinese or hybrid Chinese/Taiwanese one has taken firm hold. The DPP responded more effectively to this new political climate.

What it means for relations with Beijing

Relations between Taiwan and the mainland can only become more difficult now, but quite how that works out in practical terms remains to be seen. It seems unlikely that China will choose, initially at least, to row back from the agreements reached with the outgoing administration, but further progress will be problematic. A new basis needs to be worked out for political negotiations, and neither side will wish to compromise its position. It is likely that there will be increasingly hard line and even bellicose rhetoric emanating from some quarters in China, but it will remain more measured on the official side. The reality of China’s military and economic power remains there for all to see.

The last DPP administration saw heightened tensions in US/China/Taiwan relations. The US will no doubt be arguing for calm and caution with both sides. All the official pronouncements so far from the DPP have been moderate. There is no desire for a confrontational policy from Taiwan, but equally Tsai made it clear that she was determined that ‘our democratic system, national identity, and international space must be respected. Any form of suppression will harm the stability of cross strait relations.’

A new era

President elect Tsai will be able to form and run an administration free from the shackles of a hostile legislature that made life so difficult for the first DPP administration under Chen Shui-bian, and her party can now claim a convincing popular mandate. She won by a margin of twelve percentage points over her rivals.

But the new administration faces real challenges, even beyond mainland policy. Taiwan’s economy has been relatively stagnant. There are increasing demands for new style politics. In her victory speech Tsai spoke of her wish to respond to the desire of the people for a government that is more willing to listen and one that is more transparent and accountable. She will want to escape from the shadow of the corruption that blighted the last DPP administration.

The DPP now has full control of Taiwan’s political processes for the first time ever, but equally significantly the pretensions of the KMT to be the natural ruling party in Taiwan have been dealt a devastating blow. Taiwan’s democracy has moved into a new era.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Karen Rios Soto explains how mathematics illuminates the link between air pollution from motor vehicle emissions and asthma. Air pollution causes the premature deaths of an estimated seven million people each year, and it makes life worse for all of us. People with asthma can experience chest tightness, coughing or wheezing, and difficulty breathing when triggered by air pollution. One major source is gas- and diesel-powered cars and trucks, which emit "ultrafine" particles less than 0.1 micrometers across. That's about the width of the virus that causes COVID-19, so tiny that these particles are not currently regulated by the US Environmental Protection Agency. Yet ultrafine particles can easily enter your lungs and be absorbed into your bloodstream, causing health issues such as an asthma attack or even neurodegenerative diseases. Mathematics can help us understand the extent of the problem and how to solve it.

Dr. Valentina Wheeler of University of Wollongong, Australia, shares how her work influences efforts to understand wildfires and red blood cells. In Australia, where bushfires are a concern year-round, researchers have long tried to model these wildfires, hoping to learn information that can help with firefighting policy. Mathematician Valentina Wheeler and colleagues began studying a particularly dangerous phenomenon: When two wildfires meet, they create a new, V-shaped fire whose pointed tip races along to catch up with the two branches of the V, moving faster than either of the fires alone. This is exactly what happens in a mathematical process known as mean curvature flow. Mean curvature flow is a process in which a shape smooths out its boundaries over time. Just as with wildfires, pointed corners and sharp bumps will change the fastest.

Dr. Abiy Tasissa of Tufts University, discusses the mathematics he and colleagues used to study particle collider data, including optimal transport and optimization. Collider physics often result in distributions referred to as jets. Dr. Tasissa and his team used "Earth Mover's Distance" and other mathematical tools to study the shape of jets. "It is interesting for me to see how mathematics can be applied to study these fundamental problems answering fundamental equations in physics, not only at the level of formulating new ideas, which is, in this particular case, a notion of distance, but also how the importance of designing fast optimization algorithms to be able to actually compute these distances," says Dr. Tasissa.

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Friedrich Haslinger
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5219-5227.
Abstract, references and article information

Yu. L. Ershov
St. Petersburg Math. J. 35 (), 461-465.
Abstract, references and article information