In 2018, Iceland joined the Wellbeing Economy Alliance, a network of countries developing frameworks to measure social, economic and environmental factors in an attempt to move beyond GDP being the sole measurement of economic success. Other governments and organizations supporting this approach include New Zealand, Scotland and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
 
Against this backdrop, the prime minister of Iceland and 2019 Chatham House Prize nominee, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, shares insights into her government’s approach and her personal and political motivations for embarking on the wellbeing economy project.

Helen Thompson reflects on the changing nature of the EU as a federation and will seek to map post-Brexit options for the UK within this history. 

Since its beginning in the 1950s, the evolution of European integration has created a series of predicaments for the UK which has been forced again and again to redefine its relationship with the European entity. As Britain seeks to leaves the European Union, it will again need to find a new relationship with it at a time when the future of the US commitment to Europe is also uncertain.
 
Assuming Brexit takes place, to what extent could the federalization of the EU pose issues for the UK? What does a move towards federalization mean for security globally? And how would Britain and Northern Ireland navigate a relationship with a customs union federation?
 
The Schapiro Lecture is published in Government and Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics.


 

This will be done through examining transatlantic approaches and responses to China through the lens for four key themes (digital technology; trade and investment; governance of global commons; and climate change and the environment) that have been identified as crucial to developing effective policy responses and fostering collaboration.

The project will strengthen national, regional and international responses to the risks and opportunities posed by China’s changing role within the global economy and international rules-based order.

The convincing general election win for the Conservative Party and Boris Johnson opens a new chapter in British history. On 31 January 2020, Britain will withdraw from the EU and return to its historical position as a separate European power.

Recognising the strategic significance of this change, the Queen’s speech opening the new parliament stated that 'the government will undertake the deepest review of Britain's security, defence, and foreign policy since the end of the Cold War'. But in what context?

Prime Minister Boris Johnson and other Brexit supporters have yearned for Britain to return to its exceptional trajectory. In their view, Britain can once again become a trading nation - more global in outlook and ambition than its European neighbours, freed from the shackles of an ageing and fractured European continent and its deadening regulatory hand.

This imagery makes good copy. But the 21st century does not offer Britain the same opportunities as did the 18th, 19th or early 20th centuries. This is a different world, and Britain’s position in it needs to be crafted with a sharp eye to what is possible.

Geopolitics undergoing wrenching change

This is not declinism. The UK remains an economically strong and politically influential country by relative global standards – it is currently the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world, and the second largest donor of official development assistance. It has ubiquitous cultural brands from fashion and music to the royal family, and an eminent diplomatic and security position at the heart of all of the world’s major international institutions and alliances, from NATO and the UN security council to the IMF, G7, G20 and Commonwealth. 

But Britain leaves the EU just as the geopolitical landscape is undergoing wrenching change. The United States has turned inwards, closer to its own historic norm, and is undermining the international institutions which it created alongside Britain in the 1940s. China’s international influence is on the rise alongside its vast and still growing economy, challenging traditional norms of individual freedom and public transparency.

Russia is navigating the cracks and crevices of the fracturing rules-based international order with ruthless efficiency. Sensing the change in the wind, many governments are now back-tracking on their post-Cold War transitions to more open and democratic societies.

The implications of this new context have yet to be fully internalised by those who look forward to Britain’s future outside the EU. Britain will be negotiating new trade deals in an increasingly transactional, fragmented and protectionist international economic environment. It will be trying to sell its world-class services into markets where national control over finance, law, technology and media is increasingly prized.

Making new diplomatic inroads will be no easier. The government will face strong internal and external criticism if it lends security assistance to states that are simultaneously clamping down on their citizens’ rights. With the number of military personnel in decline and investment in new equipment stretched across multiple expensive platforms, the UK could struggle to project meaningful defence cooperation to new security partners in Asia at the same time as upholding its NATO commitments and its deployments in conflict zones around the world.

Britain also opens its new global chapter at a time when it is changing domestically. There is no over-riding reason for a missionary British foreign policy – neither the economic returns or image of national glory that drove Empire, nor the existential defence of its land, interests and freedom that drove it during the Cold War.

Stretching liberal interventionism to Iraq, as Tony Blair did when he was prime minister, and to Libya as David Cameron did in 2011, has injected a deep dose of popular scepticism to the idea that Britain - with or without allies - can or should help make the world in its own image.

This more defensive mindset – epitomised by parliament’s refusal to use military force to punish President Bashar al Assad’s regime for using chemical weapons against its citizens in 2013 – will not abate soon. Especially when the new government’s political bandwidth will be stretched by fiendishly complex trade-offs between its financial promises to support domestic renewal, the imperatives of striking and implementing a new free trade agreement with the EU, and the economic consequences of leaving the single market.

All this points to the fact that the most important step for Britain at the beginning of this new national chapter will be to establish an effective partnership with the EU and its member states. They face the same international risks as Britain and have as much to gain from the preservation of rules-based international behaviour. Recognising the continued interdependence between Britain and the EU will offer both sides greater leverage in a more competitive and hostile world.

A new transatlantic relationship

Once it has agreed its new relationship with the EU, Britain can turn to crafting its new relationship with the mighty United States. US-UK economic interdependence and close security ties should help discipline the bilateral economic relationship. The more difficult challenge will be for the UK to avoid falling into fissures between the US and the EU over how to manage bilateral relations with China and Russia, particularly if President Trump wins a second term.

Britain will have to get used to this difficult balancing act between its transatlantic heart and European head after Brexit. This makes it all the more important for the UK to develop new diplomatic and commercial initiatives with countries that are also struggling to cope with the current uncertain, transactional international environment.

Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand can grow as bilateral economic partners and as allies in international institutions, such as the G7, OECD and WTO. They may even open a door to British engagement in regional trade arrangements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-TPP), which do not require the same political commitments as EU membership.

Turning from an EU-rooted foreign and economic policy to one that is once again more international in outlook will be difficult, take time and be more costly than the government currently envisages. The irony is that for this to be successful requires sustained political investment by the Johnson government to build a strong relationship with the EU that it is focused on leaving.

This closed-door roundtable explores possible strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific between now and 2024.

Focusing on trade security, climate change disruptions and security cooperation, it aims to enhance the understanding of the regional goals of, and strategic relationships between, the key countries active in the region.

The workshop is part of a larger project funded by the Strategic Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defence.

The project includes workshops in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India and the Pacific Islands (Tonga).

The president of Malta discusses the current security challenges in the Mediterranean region, reflecting on the role of international cooperation in addressing climate change, migration and refugee flows.

As the UK leaves the EU and the formal negotiations on the future relationship begins, this workshop will discuss any immediate changes and review the short and medium term impacts of Brexit on the energy sector. 

The workshop will look to cover:

• The implications for UK business and system operations of the UK leaving the Internal Energy Market.
• Current and future investment trends in the UK energy system.
• The trade of electricity and gas over inter-connectors.
• The need for the development of a new EU-UK operational framework mechanism.
• The UK's EU withdrawal agreement and the operation of the Single Electricity Market (SEM) across Ireland. 
• Options for the UK outside of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the impact on carbon prices.

This workshop is part of a programme funded by the UK Energy Research Centre on Brexit and the UK’s Net Zero Energy Policy being run by the University of Warwick and Chatham House.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Drawing on her experience as secretary of state for defence and secretary of state for international development, Penny Mordaunt discusses how soft power can protect, promote and project Britain’s international interests and foreign policy agenda.

Often defined as the capacity to influence others without coercion or force, soft power differs from traditional military capabilities in favour of more subtle forms of influence rooted in values, culture and civic institutions.

Consistently upholding democratic values and human rights can contribute to a nation’s soft power as much as its cultural icons and legacies.  However, utilising soft power – the power of attractiveness – is not straightforward: the government is only part of a broad mix of institutions and actors with a role to play.

Can the UK develop a long term approach that brings together all of the components of its soft power for a common purpose?

What are the key sources of Britain’s soft power? How has Brexit affected perceptions of Britain internationally? And with the UK’s departure from the European Union now confirmed, how should we think about its soft power in the future?

Theresa May’s announcement in 2018 on the UK’s ambition to become the G7’s largest investor in Africa by 2022 has been followed by similar stated ambitions at the recent UK-Africa Investment Summit, which saw the attendance of 16 African heads of states. Such ambitions mirror overtures from various international players including a call for a ‘comprehensive strategy for Africa’ by the EU in 2019. While the UK’s recent expansion of its diplomatic networks in Africa and the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement with the Southern African Customs Union and Mozambique appear promising, there are significant challenges to deepening partnerships including visa restrictions and complex business environments.
 
At this event, the panellists will assess the future of trade and investment relations between the UK and Africa. Amid a proliferation of new trading partners including Asia’s emerging economies, Russia and the Gulf states, what are the points of change and continuity in the long-standing relationship between Africa and the UK? And what are the challenges and opportunities facing governments and businesses in Africa and the UK in efforts to build long-lasting economic ties?
 
This event will be followed by a drinks reception.

This event is open to Chatham House Corporate Members and corporate contacts of Chatham House's Africa Programme only.

Not a member? Find out more. For further information on the different types of Chatham House events, visit Our Events Explained.

As an important global actor, the UK gathers intelligence material that helps inform decisions on issues such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime and breaches of international humanitarian law. On the flip side, the UK was a major contributor to intelligence failures leading up to the Iraq war in 2003.

Using the UK as a case study and drawing on new research and interviews conducted by Dr Jamie Gaskarth, the panel will reflect on UK intelligence accountability in the context of 21st century politics. How can democratic governments hold intelligence and security agencies to account when what they do is largely secret? Should intelligence organizations create ethics committees allowing the public more input into intelligence decisions? And what has been the impact of technological and social changes, including the rise of artificial intelligence and social media, on the UK intelligence machinery?

This event will be followed by a drinks reception.

Secrets and Spies: UK Intelligence Accountability After Iraq and Snowden is part of the Chatham House Insights book series published jointly with the Brookings Institution Press. Secrets and Spies was the result of a project funded by the British Academy (SG151249). 

COVID-19
This event is proceeding as scheduled, as are other Chatham House events, in accordance with the advice from the UK Government, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Public Health England. However, we are closely monitoring the spread of COVID-19 and will send updates to attendees as the situation warrants. 
In the meantime, in line with the official advice for returning travellers or visitors to the UK from specified countries and areas (see guidance here), we ask that:

• If you have travelled from Category 1 countries/areas, you refrain from attending the event even if asymptomatic (i.e. even if you are showing no symptoms);
• If you have travelled from Category 2 countries/areas, you refrain from attending the event should you develop symptoms.

If you fall under one of these affected categories and have any questions, please call +44 (0)207 314 3638 or email lbedford@chathamhouse.org.
 

This event is open to Chatham House Corporate Members only. Not a member? Find out more.

For further information on the different types of Chatham House events, visit Our Events Explained.

The European Union (EU) is increasingly looking to its regulatory capacity as a foreign policy tool. In areas such as data privacy and chemical safety, the EU’s success in setting policy standards that are replicated globally have helped cement its reputation as a norm-setting power.

Despite this success, narratives of decline that focus on the EU’s internal and external challenges – including Brexit, the rise of China and growing Euroscepticism within member states – have dominated popular discussions of the bloc’s viability and authority.

The speakers consider the strengths and shortcomings in the EU’s ability to exert global influence focusing particularly on its norm-setting power. Brussels’ primary motivations for setting internal standards and regulations have traditionally been to preserve and strengthen its single market.

What, then, explains the attractiveness of these regulations in external markets? How will the departure of one of its largest internal economies affect the EU’s capacity to export its internal regulations globally?

And to what extent could the EU benefit from diversifying its avenues of exerting global influence?

This roundtable brings together German experts to discuss the country’s role in Europe and the world. Over the course of two sessions, Germany’s EU and wider foreign policy will be examined, with speakers sharing their views on where the country finds itself at the beginning of 2020 and what drives its current priorities across a number of areas. Participants will also compare perspectives on what a post-Merkel Germany might look like, now that the future leadership of CDU, Germany’s largest political party, is under question.

The event will comprise two separate sessions. Participants are welcome to attend either one or both.

08.30 – 09.30
Germany in the EU and the Eurozone

Speaker: Mark Schieritz, Economics Correspondent, Die Zeit
Chair: Quentin Peel, Associate Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Germany’s voice remains possibly the most important in any debate within the EU, including in those around the future of the Eurozone. The country has long been seen as the stalwart of the European economy and its government has always played a key role in driving Eurozone policy. However, most recent EU-wide attempts at reform have fallen short of what many claim needs to be done to complete the monetary union. The recently announced Eurozone budgetary instrument, for instance, remains very small and only focused on investment instead of stabilisation. The German government has been reluctant to go along with French President Emmanuel Macron and his structural reform proposals, though some other member states remain sceptical of his ideas for further integration too.

How can German attitudes towards the future of the Eurozone be explained? Is the government’s resistance to ambitious EU-wide economic reforms shared across the political spectrum in Germany? What stands in the way of further Eurozone reform when it comes to other EU member states? And will Germany’s reluctance to engage with reforms in this area, make it more difficult for the country to build coalitions when it comes to other EU policy areas?

09.45 – 11.00
German Foreign Policy in Perspective

Speakers: Joshua Webb, Programme Manager, Berlin Foreign Policy Forum and the Berlin Pulse, Koerber Stiftung
Dr Nicolai von Ondarza, Deputy Head, EU/Europe Research Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)
Chair: Dr Uta Staiger, Executive Director, UCL European Institute

Historically, Germany has been reluctant to play too active a role on the global stage, relying on its place at the heart of Europe and the transatlantic alliance. However, the current uncertain global context appears to have led to some rethinking on how the country can ensure its voice is being heard internationally, especially where its values are being challenged and its interests are at stake.

What drives German foreign policy in 2020? What are domestic priorities when it comes to trade, security and Germany’s place in the world? What shifts in public opinion may have been engendered by Brexit and Donald Trump’s presidency? What does the rise of China – and China’s growing interest in Europe – mean for Germany’s wider Asia policy?  Finally, what role will Germany play in a post-Brexit Europe? And what are the country’s priorities in its future relationship with the UK?

The speakers will discuss these and other questions, sharing the findings of a recent German public opinion survey and compare these with international expert perspectives. 

After a summer of regional tensions and continued uncertainty regarding the future of the JCPOA, the Chatham House MENA Programme held a closed workshop to examine the impact of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.

Discussions focused on the domestic developments and challenges inside Iran, prospects for new negotiations with Iran, and the regional issues facing the country. Participants also considered the differences between American and European approaches towards Iran.

Summary

• There is a widespread sense that liberal democracy is in crisis, but little consensus exists on the specific nature and causes of the crisis. In particular, there are three prisms through which the crisis is usually seen: the rise of ‘populism’, ‘democratic deconsolidation’, and a ‘hollowing out’ of democracy. Each reflects normative assumptions about democracy.
• The exact role of digital technology in the crisis is disputed. Despite the widely held perception that social media is undermining democracy, the evidence for this is limited. Over the longer term, the further development of digital technology could undermine the fundamental preconditions for democracy – though the pace and breadth of technological change make predictions about its future impact difficult.
• Democracy functions in different ways in different European countries, with political systems on the continent ranging from ‘majoritarian democracies’ such as the UK to ‘consensual democracies’ such as Belgium and Switzerland. However, no type seems to be immune from the crisis. The political systems of EU member states also interact in diverse ways with the EU’s own structure, which is problematic for representative democracy as conventionally understood, but difficult to reform.
• Political parties, central to the model of representative democracy that emerged in the late 18th century, have long seemed to be in decline. Recently there have been some signs of a reversal of this trend, with the emergence of parties that have used digital technology in innovative ways to reconnect with citizens. Traditional parties can learn from these new ‘digital parties’.
• Recent years have also seen a proliferation of experiments in direct and deliberative democracy. There is a need for more experimentation in these alternative forms of democracy, and for further evaluation of how they can be integrated into the existing institutions and processes of representative democracy at the local, regional, national and EU levels.
• We should not think of democracy in a static way – that is, as a system that can be perfected once and for all and then simply maintained and defended against threats. Democracy has continually evolved and now needs to evolve further. The solution to the crisis will not be to attempt to limit democracy in response to pressure from ‘populism’ but to deepen it further as part of a ‘democratization of democracy’.

Perhaps it will be second time lucky. At the end of April, Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will elect a new party leader to follow in the footsteps of Angela Merkel. An emergency party congress has been summoned to do that after the surprise resignation of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Merkel’s chosen successor.

The plan is to leave the decision on who will be the CDU candidate for chancellor at the next election until after Germany’s EU presidency concludes in December. So Merkel will keep her job until 2021, and the new leader will have to learn to live with her.

The three leading candidates are Armin Laschet, Friedrich Merz and Norbert Röttgen, all from the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. Two of the three – Merz and Röttgen – were sacked by Merkel from their former jobs. They have not forgotten. Only Armin Laschet, currently CDU leader in North Rhine-Westphalia and state premier, can be described as a Merkel loyalist, true to her centrist mantra.

He is the man to beat, having teamed up with Jens Spahn, the 39-year-old health minister, who is popular with party conservatives. Spahn will run as his deputy, so the team straddles the left-right divide in the party. But the contest still seems set to be a bitter battle between pro- and anti-Merkel factions that could leave the party badly split.

After nearly 15 years as chancellor, and 18 years as CDU leader, Merkel remains the most popular politician in Germany. In spite of criticism that she lacks vision, her caution and predictability appear to be just what most German voters like.

But her term in office has also seen the steady shrinking of the centre ground in German politics, with the rise of the environmentalist Green party and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) at the expense of the centre-right CDU and the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD).

The battle for the soul of the CDU is between those who think Merkel has been too left-wing, and want a more conservative leader to win back AfD voters, and those who believe that the CDU must stay in the centre, and prepare for a future coalition with the Greens. Merz is seen as the former, Laschet and Röttgen the latter.

Unless Laschet emerges as the clear winner in April, the leadership contest is likely to leave Germany sorely distracted by domestic politics just as it takes over the EU presidency in the second half of the year. Instead of Merkel having a triumphant international swansong on the EU stage, she could be battling to protect her inheritance at home.

The one area on which all three leadership candidates seem to agree is foreign policy: they all want Germany to take more leadership and responsibility, and for the European Union to play a bigger role in security, defence and international affairs. They are all Atlanticists, but critical of Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ stance. All are on the record criticizing the chancellor – at least tacitly – for not having a more vigorous foreign policy.

There the similarity ends.

On the right, the 64-year-old Merz is both the most conservative and the most popular with the party grassroots. He fell out with the chancellor when she took over his job as CDU leader in parliament in 2002. He quit politics to become a corporate lawyer (and a millionaire), but never lost his political ambition. He is an economic liberal but socially conservative, a strong critic of Merkel’s migration policy and her lack of clear leadership. Critics say he is a man of the past, and not a team player.

On the EU, he believes Germany is ‘leaving too much to the French’. If France and Germany cannot agree on financial matters, he said at the London School of Economics in February, they should instead forge a stronger EU industrial policy focused on creating more ‘European champions’.

Laschet, the Merkel loyalist, is four years younger, and from the left of the party. Like Merz, he is a former member of the European parliament. In 2015, he defended Merkel’s open border policy to accept refugees stranded in the Balkans. On Russia, however, he is more critical, calling for a new effort to re-engage with Vladimir Putin. Most recently, at the Munich Security Conference, he called for stronger Franco-German relations, and more support for the eurozone reforms proposed by Emmanuel Macron.

As CDU leader in North Rhine-Westphalia, Laschet has the strongest power base. He earned his political spurs there by winning the last state election in 2017, in contrast to Röttgen, who lost to the SPD and Greens five years earlier.

Röttgen, chairman of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee, is the surprise candidate. Once a Merkel favourite, they fell out when she sacked him as environment minister after he lost the North Rhine-Westphalia election. By throwing his hat in the ring, he has forced it to become an open contest. He is independent-minded and outspoken, but not as bitterly hostile to the chancellor as Merz, so he could be a compromise candidate.

Laschet is clearly the man Merkel would find it easiest to live with. The decision will be taken by a party congress, not a grassroots ballot, which gives him a better chance. But Merz is the most eloquent orator and seen as the best campaigner. The challenge for party members is whether they believe it is better to swing right and squeeze the AfD, or stick to the centre to hold onto voters tempted by the Greens, who have replaced the SPD as the second-most popular party in Germany.

The race is wide open. So is the future of the CDU. The only prediction one can make with much certainty is that as long as Merkel remains chancellor, any successor will struggle to get out of her shadow.

PLEASE NOTE: THIS EVENT HAS BEEN CANCELLED.

There is a widespread sense that liberal democracy is in crisis but little consensus about how to understand it. While some attribute this crisis to the rise of populist figures, movements and parties, others see populism as a response to a deeper hollowing out of democracy during the last several decades. Some blame the development of digital technology – in particular the emergence of social media – while others argue that the correlation between the development of digital technology and the perceived corrosion of democracy is exaggerated or that it has facilitated greater participation in politics from traditionally under-represented demographics in a way that was not previously possible.

Launching the Chatham House research paper The Future of Democracy in Europe, this panel will discuss how liberal democracy is evolving against the background of social and technological change. What are the challenges to liberal democracy in Europe? How should we understand the impact of technology on how democracy in Europe functions? Given the plurality of democratic structures and institutions across the continent, how can democracy in Europe be reinvigorated? And what role can citizens' assemblies and referendums play in making democracy more responsive to citizens?

This event is open to Chatham House Members only. Not a member? Find out more.

For further information on the different types of Chatham House events, visit Our Events Explained.

COVID-19 is a sharp reminder of why trade and climate policy matters. How can governments maintain access to critical goods and services, and ensure global supply chains function in times of crisis?

The timing of many trade negotiations is now increasingly uncertain, as are the UK’s plans to host COP26 in November. Policy work continues, however, and the EU has released its draft negotiating text for the new UK-EU trade deal, which includes a sub-chapter specifically devoted to climate. 

This is a timely reminder both of the pressing need for the UK to integrate its trade and climate policymaking and to use the current crisis-induced breathing space in international negotiations - however limited - to catch up on both strategy and priorities on this critical policy intersection.

The UK government has moved fast to reset its external trade relations post-Brexit. In the past month it formally launched bilateral negotiations with the EU and took up a seat at the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an independent member. Until the COVID-19 crisis hit, negotiations were also poised to start with the US.

The UK is also in the climate spotlight as host of COP26, the most important international climate negotiation since Paris in 2015, which presents a vital opportunity for the government to show leadership by aligning its trade agenda with its climate and sustainability commitments in bold new ways.

Not just an empty aspiration

This would send a signal that ‘Global Britain’ is not just an empty aspiration, but a concrete commitment to lead.

Not only is concerted action on the climate crisis a central priority for UK citizens, a growing and increasingly vocal group of UK businesses committed to decarbonization are calling on the government to secure a more transparent and predictable international market place that supports climate action by business.

With COP26, the UK has a unique responsibility to push governments to ratchet up ambition in the national contributions to climate action – and to promote coherence between climate ambition and wider economic policymaking, including on trade. If Britain really wants to lead, here are some concrete actions it should take.

At the national level, the UK can pioneer new ways to put environmental sustainability – and climate action in particular - at the heart of its trade agenda. Achieving the government’s ambitious Clean Growth Strategy - which seeks to make the UK the global leader in a range of industries including electric cars and offshore wind – should be a central objective of UK trade policy.

The UK should re-orient trade policy frameworks to incentivize the shift toward a more circular and net zero global economy. And all elements of UK trade policy could be assessed against environmental objectives - for example, their contribution to phasing out fossil fuels, helping to reverse overexploitation of natural resources, and support for sustainable agriculture and biodiversity.

In its bilateral and regional trade negotiations, the UK can and should advance its environment, climate and trade goals in tandem, and implementation of the Paris Agreement must be a core objective of the UK trade strategy.

A core issue for the UK is how to ensure that efforts to decarbonise the economy are not undercut by imports from high-carbon producers. Here, a ‘border carbon adjustment (BCA)’ - effectively a tax on the climate pollution of imports - would support UK climate goals. The EU draft negotiating text released yesterday put the issue of BCAs front and centre, making crystal clear that the intersection of climate, environment and trade policy goals will be a central issue for UK-EU trade negotiations.

Even with the United States, a trade deal can and should still be seized as a way to incentivize the shift toward a net zero and more circular economy. At the multilateral level, as a new independent WTO member, the UK has an opportunity to help build a forward-looking climate and trade agenda.

The UK could help foster dialogue, research and action on a cluster of ‘climate and trade’ issues that warrant more focused attention at the WTO. These include the design of carbon pricing policies at the border that are transparent, fair and support a just transition; proposals for a climate waiver for WTO rules; and identification of ways multilateral trade cooperation could promote a zero carbon and more circular global economy.  

To help nudge multilateral discussion along, the UK could also ask to join a critical ‘path finder’ effort by six governments, led by New Zealand, to pursue an agreement on climate change, trade and sustainability (ACCTS). This group aims to find ways forward on three central trade and climate issues: removing fossil fuel subsidies, climate-related labelling, and promoting trade in climate-friendly goods and services.

At present, the complex challenges at the intersection of climate, trade and development policy are too often used to defer or side-step issues deemed ‘too hard’ or ‘too sensitive’ to tackle. The UK could help here by working to ensure multilateral climate and trade initiatives share adjustment burdens, recognise the historical responsibility of developed countries, and do not unfairly disadvantage developing countries - especially the least developed.

Many developing countries are keen to promote climate-friendly exports as part of wider export diversification strategies  and want to reap greater returns from greener global value chains. Further, small island states and least-developed countries – many of which are Commonwealth members – that are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and natural disasters, need support to adapt in the face of trade shocks and to build climate-resilient, trade-related infrastructure and export sectors.

As an immediate next step, the UK should actively support the growing number of WTO members in favour of a WTO Ministerial Statement on environmental sustainability and trade. It should work with its key trading partners in the Commonwealth and beyond to ensure the agenda is inclusive, supports achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and helps developing countries benefit from a more environmentally sustainable global economy.

As the UK prepares to host COP26, negotiates deals with the EU and US, and prepares for its first WTO Ministerial meeting as an independent member, it must show it can lead the way nationally, bilaterally, and multilaterally. And to ensure the government acts, greater engagement from the UK’s business, civil society and research sectors is critical – we need all hands on deck to forge and promote concrete proposals for aligning UK trade policy with the climate ambition our world needs.

Labour leadership candidate, Lisa Nandy, reflects on the party's foreign policy priorities and makes the case for a foreign policy underpinned by internationalism.

In recent years, the Labour party has struggled to reach cross-party consensus on its foreign policy agenda. While the current leadership election offers the party an opportunity to debate and redefine its position on issues such as immigration, security and Brexit, the extent to which Labour can reconcile its factionalism remains unclear. As Labour undergoes a process of reflection, what kind of foreign policy agenda should the party rally behind that will also appeal to voters outside of its traditional base?

Can the Labour party be unified on its approach to international issues? Is an internationalist foreign policy an attractive choice for voters? And as Brexit tensions persist, what might the party's framework be to ensure new trade deals and partnerships align with fundamental Labour priorities such as workers' rights?

In the past few weeks, European Union member states have implemented measures such as social distancing, school and border closures and the cancellation of major cultural and sporting events in an effort to curb the spread of COVID-19. Such measures are expected to have significant economic and political consequences, threatening near or total collapse of certain sectors. Moreover, the management of the health and economic crises within the EU architecture has exposed tensions and impasses in the extent to which the EU is willing to collaborate to mitigate pressures on fellow member states.

The panellists will examine the European Union's response to a series of cascading crises and the likely impact of the pandemic on individual member states. Can the EU prevent an economic hit from developing into a financial crisis? Are the steps taken by the European Central Bank to protect the euro enough? And are member states expected to manage the crisis as best they can or will there be a united effort to mitigate some of the damage caused?  

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

It is less than a month since we published our research paper on the future of democracy in Europe. But it feels like we now live in a different world. The coronavirus has already killed thousands of people in Europe, led to an unprecedented economic crisis and transformed daily life – and in the process raised difficult new questions about democracy.

The essence of our argument in the paper was that democracy in Europe should be deepened. But now there is a much more basic question about whether democracies can protect their citizens from the pandemic.

There has already been much discussion about whether authoritarian states will emerge stronger from this crisis than democracies. In particular, although the virus originated in China and the government initially seemed to struggle to deal with it, it was able to largely contain the outbreak in Hubei and deploy vast resources from the rest of the country to deal with it.

Come through the worst

China may have come through the worst of the health crisis – though a second wave of infections as restrictions are lifted is possible – and there have already been three times as many deaths in Italy, and twice as many in Spain, as in China (although there is increasing doubt about the accuracy of China’s figures).

However, it is not only authoritarian states that seem so far to have coped relatively well with the virus. In fact, some East Asian democracies appear to have done even better than China. At the time of writing South Korea, with a population of 51.5 million, has had only 144 death rates so far. Taiwan, with a population of nearly 24 million, has had only two deaths.

So rather than thinking in terms of the relative performance of authoritarian states and democracies, perhaps instead we should be asking what we in Europe can learn from East Asian democracies.

It is not yet clear why East Asian democracies were able to respond so effectively, especially as they did not all follow exactly the same approach. Whereas some quickly imposed restrictions on travel (for example, Taiwan suspended flights from China and then prohibited the entry of people from China and other affected countries) and quarantines, others used extensive testing and contact tracing, often making use of personal data collected from citizens.

Whatever the exact strategy they used, though, they did all act quickly and decisively – and the collective memory of the SARS outbreak in 2003 and other recent epidemics seems to have played a role in this. For example, following the SARS outbreak, Taiwan created a central epidemic command center. Europe, meanwhile, was hardly affected by SARS – and we seem to have assumed the coronavirus would be the same (although that does not quite explain why we were still so slow to react in February even after it was clear that the virus had spread to Italy).

However, while the relative success of East Asian democracies may have something to do with this recent experience of epidemics, it may also have something to do with the kind of democracies they are. It may be a simple matter of competence – the bureaucracy in Taiwan and South Korea may function better, and in particular in a more coordinated way, than in many European countries.

But it may also be more than that. In particular, it could be that East Asian democracies have a kind of 'authoritarian residue' that has helped in the initial response to this crisis. South Korea and Taiwan are certainly vibrant democracies – but they are also relatively new democracies compared to many in Europe. As a result, citizens may have a different relationship with the state and be more willing to accept sudden restrictions of freedoms, in particular on movement, and the use of personal data – at least in a crisis.

In that sense, the pandemic may be a challenge not to democracy as such but to liberal democracy in particular – in other words, a system of popular sovereignty together with guaranteed basic rights, such as including freedom of association and expression and checks and balances on executive power. There may now be difficult trade-offs to be made between those basic rights and security – and, after the experience of coronavirus, many citizens may choose security.

This brings us back to the issues we discussed in our research paper. Even before the coronavirus hit, there was already much discussion of a crisis of liberal democracy. In particular, there has been a debate about whether liberalism and democracy, which had long been assumed to go together, were becoming decoupled.

In particular, ‘illiberal democracies’ seemed to be emerging in many places including Europe (although, as we discuss in the paper, some analysts argue that the term is incoherent). This model of ‘illiberal democracy’ – in other words, one in which elections continue to be held but some individual rights are curtailed – may emerge stronger from this new crisis.

It is striking that Singapore – also seen as responding successfully to coronavirus – was seen as a paradigmatic ‘illiberal democracy’ long before Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán embraced the idea. In particular, there is little real opposition to the People’s Action Party, which has been in power since 1959.

Since this new crisis began, Orbán has gone further in suspending rights in Hungary. On March 11, he declared a state of emergency – as many other European countries have also done. But he has now gone further by passing legislation that allows him to govern by decree indefinitely and make it illegal to spread misinformation that undermines the government’s response to the pandemic. Clearly, this is a further decisive step in the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Hungary.

So far, though, much of the discussion, particularly in the foreign policy world, has focused mainly on how to change popular perceptions that liberal democracies are failing in this crisis. For example, High Representative Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign minister, wrote last week of a 'battle of narratives'.

But this misses the point. It is not a matter of spinning the European model, but of taking seriously the substantial questions raised by the coronavirus about the ability of liberal democracies to adequately protect their citizens.

Please note this an online-only event.

Norway is one of the few European countries that remains outside of the European Union. After the country’s population rejected the prospect of joining the EU twice, Norway’s relationship with the Union has been based on its membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), alongside Iceland and Liechtenstein.

The ‘Norway Model’ was often mentioned in the run up to the Brexit vote as a possible basis for Britain’s future relationship with the bloc, not least because it offers the least disruption to the current arrangement. Equally, Norway is not subject to the EU fisheries policy - an anticipated major issue in the next phase of Brexit talks. Nor is it part of the EU Customs Union.

Even though Prime Minister Johnson has now ruled out the type of deep economic and regulatory integration with the EU that Norway enjoys through its EEA membership, the country’s experience can still offer valuable lessons for the UK as it prepares to exit the transition period at the end of 2020.

In this session, the speaker will share Norway’s experience as a long-standing EEA member and discuss the challenges of engaging with the EU from the outside. What lessons can Norway offer the UK ahead of the negotiations on the future of UK-EU relations? What are the limits of its current arrangement with the EU? And is there any appetite among the Norwegian population to revisit it?

Since the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic, few countries have chosen to ignore social distancing recommendations. But, even among those states which have, the Belarusian official response to its epidemic remains unique.

President Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s statements that vodka, sauna and tractors are protecting Belarusians from coronavirus attracted amused attention in international media. Lukashenka also described other societies’ response to COVID-19 as ‘a massive psychosis’.

Although Lukashenka is notorious for his awkward style of public communication, the fact that Belarus is refusing to impose comprehensive confinement measures is of concern. Belarusians continue to work, play football and socialise.

Lukashenka, himself playing ice hockey in front of state cameras, claims it is the best way to stay healthy. Belarusian authorities clearly appear to be in denial – and this could have dire humanitarian consequences.

From denial to half measures

Belarus actually has one of the largest numbers of hospital beds in the world per 1,000 of the population. But in the absence of quarantine measures its health system, already crippled by corruption and embezzlement, is likely to be overwhelmed.

Patients being treated for pneumonia in hospitals have suggested medical staff are uninformed and inadequately equipped. It is claimed doctors are not reporting COVID-19 as the suspected cause of death, either through a lack of testing or for fear of reprisals.

Observers believe the real mortality rate is already well above official figures (40 deaths as of 16 April). Based on an Imperial College London model, between 15,000 and 32,000 people could die under the current mild confinement regime – and such a high death toll would hugely impact the country’s political stability. Citing personal data protection, the Ministry of Health has imposed a total news blackout; the only cluster officially acknowledged so far is the city of Vitsebsk.

Although specific Belarusian cities and some individuals started changing their approach – by extending school vacations or cancelling weddings – such measures remain half-hearted.

Clearly a major reason for such an apparently irresponsible reaction is that Belarus cannot afford a massive lockdown that would freeze its already underdeveloped economy and drive it deeper into recession. Unlike many other nations, Belarus lacks budgetary resources for a sizable stimulus package. But a delayed response might backfire on the economy.

Economic recession has been forecast to amount to at least 10% of GDP. For Lukashenka, who openly challenged conventional wisdom regarding the need for quarantine and isolation, such an economic downturn would harm his confidence rating in the eyes of Belarusian voters, mindful of the state’s mismanagement of the crisis. And it could create doubt within the ruling elite itself, with Lukashenka seeking re-election for a sixth mandate in late August.

Against this backdrop, a radicalization of the opposition-minded part of society is also to be expected, with greater reliance on social networks in the face of official secrecy and disinformation. The expected response of the regime is then likely to be pre-emptive repression. Evidence is emerging that law enforcement agencies have already stepped up judicial and paralegal harassment of dissenters, notably independent journalists and bloggers.

Russia’s initial reluctance to address the coronavirus crisis may also have influenced Belarus. Lukashenka and his administration often react to public health challenges by the Soviet rulebook, reminiscent of the Soviet authorities’ mismanagement of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

Russia has unilaterally closed its borders with Belarus and, as bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, this casts further doubt on the viability of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Pro-Russian media forecast Moscow will be unwilling to alleviate the expected socio-economic crisis, as it continues to reject Minsk’s demands regarding subsidised oil deliveries. Yet the Kremlin might use the crisis as an opportunity to resume its integrationist pressure on Belarus.

China, with which Belarus engaged in a seemingly privileged strategic partnership in the 2010s, was actually the first country to dispatch humanitarian aid to beef up Belarusian capacity to fight the virus.

But Minsk should not expect Beijing to rescue its economy and, unless it commits to more internal reforms, Belarus is not likely to receive much from the EU either. The regime has already applied to the IMF for emergency financial support, but conditions are attached and, even if successful, the funds would amount to no more than $900m.

The government’s decision to take only half measures so far is rooted in the hope COVID-19 is not as bad as foreign experts fear. But, unless the leadership acknowledges the public health crisis and mitigates its economic impact, COVID-19 will accelerate Belarus’s slide back into international self-isolation. If combined with a humanitarian crisis, this will put the Belarusian regime under considerable stress.

This crisis does risk a new ‘Chernobyl moment’ for the authorities, but the population could react more vocally this time. As volunteers self-organise to fight the epidemic, it might become more difficult for the authorities to say that it is efficient in running the country. But the bottom line is Belarus desperately needs money. Whoever steps up to support Belarus financially will also be able to heavily influence its politics.

So far, there has been a noticeable worsening of relations that had already soured in recent years – the latest step being President Donald Trump’s suspension of US funding for the World Health Organization (WHO) in response to accusations of Chinese interference in its operations.

Should the world now simply prepare for a period of intense and extended hostility? As director of a policy institute founded 100 years ago in the shadow of the First World War, I believe we must do all in our power to avoid a return of the global strategic rivalries that blighted the 20th century.

Deepening suspicions

Of course, the outcome does not lie only in the hands of the US and Europe. In the 1930s, as much as they wanted to avoid another great war, British and French leaders were forced to respond to Germany’s aggression in central Europe. In the late 1940s, America’s instinct to disentangle itself from war-ravaged Europe was quickly tempered by the realization that the Soviet Union would impose or infiltrate Communist control as far into Europe as possible.

Today, those who warned that China - a one-party, surveillance state with a power-centralising leader - could never be treated as a global stakeholder feel vindicated. They see in COVID-19 an opportunity to harden policies towards China, starting by blocking all Chinese investment into 5G infrastructure and breaking international dependence on Chinese supply chains.

They can point to the fact that Chinese Communist Party officials in Wuhan initially prioritised sustaining economic growth and supressed reports about COVID-19’s capacity for human-to-human transmission, epitomised by their treatment of Dr Li Wenliang. They can highlight how Beijing’s obsession with denying Taiwan a voice in the WHO prevented Taiwanese input into the early analysis of the crisis. They can highlight the ways in which Beijing has instrumentalised its medical support for coronavirus-afflicted countries for diplomatic gain.

For their part, those in China who believed the US and Europe would never allow China’s return as a regional and world power see this criticism as further evidence. They can point to comments about this being the ‘Chinese virus’, a leaked biological weapon or China’s ‘Chernobyl moment’. ‘Wolf warrior’ Chinese diplomats have sought to outdo each other by challenging narratives about COVID-19, while propagating disinformation about the origins of the virus.

There are major risks if this blame game escalates, as it could in the lead-up to a fraught US presidential election. First, consciously uncoupling the US economically from China will make the post-coronavirus recovery that much harder. China already accounts for nearly 20% of world GDP but, unlike after the global financial crisis in 2008, it is fast becoming the world’s leading consumer market. Its financial stimulus measures need to be closely coordinated with the G7 and through the G20.

Second, Chinese scientists were the first to uncover the genetic code of the virus and shared it with the WHO as early as January 12, enabling the roll-out of effective testing around the world. They are now involved in the global search for a vaccine alongside American and European counterparts. While the Chinese government will remain a legitimate target for criticism, Chinese citizens and companies will contribute to many of the most important technical breakthroughs this century.

Third, if COVID-19 creates a long-term schism between China and the US, with Europeans caught on its edge, this could do deep damage to world order. China may become a less willing partner in lowering global greenhouse gas emissions and sharing renewable energy technologies; in helping African and other developing countries grow sustainably; and in helping to build a more resilient global health infrastructure.

Getting the balance right

But the COVID-19 crisis can also be the hinge point to a more coherent and self-interested transatlantic approach to China, one whose motto should be ‘beware but engage’. There should indeed be limits on state-backed Chinese investment in strategic US and European economic sectors, just as China limits Western access to its market. But the goal should be to lower barriers to trade and investment over time on a mutually beneficial and transparent basis, not to recreate an economic Cold War.

Chinese human rights violations, at home and abroad, should be called out. The dissemination of Chinese systems of citizen surveillance, which will be more popular in a post-coronavirus world, should be monitored and contested with US and European alternatives. And the extent of Chinese exports’ access to international markets should be conditional on China improving its phytosanitary standards - which protect humans, animals, and plants from diseases, pests, or contaminants - and strictly regulating unhygienic wet markets.

But to go further and try to make disengagement the dominant transatlantic policy as COVID-19 subsides will not only divide Europe and America. It will also contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy; in which a resentful China grows apart from the US and Europe during a period where they must work together.

Given that it will likely be the world’s largest economy in 2030, how the US and Europe manage their relations with China after this crisis is a question at least as seminal as the one they faced after 1945 with the Soviet Union. In the ensuing years, the Soviet Union became a military superpower and competitor, but not an economic one. Containment was a viable, correct and, ultimately, successful strategy. The same options are not available this time. There will be no winners from a new Cold War with China.

The new European Commission had a bold new agenda when it began its work in December 2019, with climate change, digital transformation and strengthening European democracy among its priorities. Less than six months later, the European continent is in the midst of the worst crisis since the second World War and business as usual has been taken over by crisis management.

Has COVID-19 monopolized the agenda in Brussels? What priorities are still on the table and what debates have fallen victim to the coronavirus? Is the current crisis reigniting and exacerbating existing faultlines in the EU or creating new ones?

Reflecting on his first four months as the Economist’s Charlemagne columnist, the speaker will share what decision-making in Brussels looks like during a pandemic and what debates are dominating conversations in the EU capital today.

In the last 100 years, global economic crises from the Great Depression of the 1930s to the 2008 financial crash have contributed to significant political changes in Europe, often leading to a rise in popularity for extremist parties and politics. As Europe contends with a perceived crisis of democracy - now compounded by the varied responses to the coronavirus outbreak - how should we understand the relationship between externally-driven economic crises, political upheaval and democracy?

The panellists will consider the parallels between the political responses to some of the greatest economic crises Europe has experienced in the last century. Given that economic crises often transcend borders, why does political disruption vary between democracies? What can history tell us about the potential political impact of the unfolding COVID-19-related economic crisis? And will the unprecedented financial interventions by governments across Europe fundamentally change the expectations citizens have of the role government should play in their lives?

This event is based on a recent article in The World Today by Hans Kundnani and Pepijn Bergsen who are both researchers in Chatham House's Europe Programme. 'Crawling from the Wreckage' is the first in a series of articles that look at key themes in European political discourse from the last century. You can read the article here. 

This event is open to Chatham House Members. Not a member? Find out more.

Focusing on trade security, climate change disruptions and security cooperation, the project will develop scenarios exploring possible shifts in regional economic and security priorities from 2019-2024.

Research staff from Chatham House will, in cooperation with local partners, convene expert roundtables in the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India, the United States and Tonga to enhance the discourse and understanding of the strategic relationships in the region, as well as the shared – or disparate – goals of the various countries.

A podcast will be recorded and released in conjunction with each event. The project will culminate with a research paper, amalgamating the roundtable discussions with analyses and policy recommendations developed by the Chatham House team.

Brexit will significantly change the balance within the EU in relation to nuclear energy. Apart from France and Finland, both of whose nuclear development programmes are behind schedule, the UK is the only member state in northern or western Europe currently investing in new nuclear capacity. Brexit will therefore leave the supporters of nuclear energy within the EU27 and the European Commission in a weaker position.

The speaker will argue that at a time when the energy industry needs to accelerate its shift away from fossil fuels, and when the electricity generation industry must cut its carbon emissions faster than it has ever managed to do in the past, this change is unhelpful.

The workshop will also address the need for additional interconnector capacity and the future of carbon-trading outside the EU emission trading system and how this relates to potential nuclear energy capacity.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

• Meeting future global food security requirements is not just about quantity; it is also about meeting growing needs in a way that safeguards human as well as planetary health. But national priorities and policies often remain out of sync with aspirations for more sustainable and healthy food systems.
• International trade and trade policies play an ambiguous role in the current food system. With 80 per cent of the world’s population depending on imports to meet at least part of their food and nutritional requirements, trade has a unique function in offsetting imbalances between supply and demand. However, in the absence of effective regulatory frameworks or pricing frameworks that internalize environmental, social or health costs, trade can exacerbate and globalize challenges associated with food production and land use trends such as deforestation, land degradation, greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss and the shift to unhealthy diets.
• Over the last two decades, trade in agricultural products (excluding intra-EU flows) has more than tripled in value, to reach $1.33 trillion. The geography of global food trade flows has also shifted, primarily towards South–South trade, which now accounts for roughly a quarter of total agricultural trade flows. The nature of global trade has changed drastically, with traditional exports such as wheat and coffee growing slowly at around 2 per cent per year, while products such as palm oil, fruit juice, soft drinks and other processed products have grown at 8 per cent or more annually.
• This overall increase in trade in agricultural products raises questions about the growing utilization of resources, such as water or soil nutrients, that are embedded in those products through production and processing. Trade itself also causes negative environmental impacts, starting with greenhouse gas emissions associated with transport and storage. If the environmental cost associated with production and trade is not reflected in the final price of goods, trade may accelerate the depletion of resources or their unsustainable use.
• It is critical to ensure that trade policy options pursued by producing and consuming countries alike will support a transition to more sustainable and healthier food and land use systems. The first step in addressing trade-related food systems challenges must involve rebuilding trust among policy actors. There is a need for new spaces for informal dialogue among actors, and ‘soft’ governance mechanisms that can help rebuild consensus on the best ways forward. Meeting these challenges also requires an appreciation of the complex interactions between sectoral policies (e.g. on water, land, food, etc.) and their multiple interfaces with trade policies. 
• Conditioning the use of subsidies on their sustainability and/or health impacts encourages the delivery of essential public goods in ways that are consistent with sustainability and health goals. A first step therefore is the removal of perverse incentives (e.g. subsidies encouraging the overuse of fertilizers or pesticides or the overproduction of certain commodities, as well as certain biofuels subsidies) and replacing them with market-correcting subsidies.
• Trade facilitation measures for fruits and vegetables that are aimed at easing transit at the border, by cutting unnecessary bureaucracy and reducing waiting times, can improve their availability, reduce costs and improve food quality and safety for consumers. Similarly, measures aimed at improving sustainable cold storage and upgrading value chains can support better diets and consumption by increasing the availability of fresh produce on markets, especially in developing countries.
• A global food stamps programme developed through the G20 and facilitated by the UN’s food agencies could address purchasing power imbalances and tackle malnutrition in developing countries. If carefully designed, such ‘safety net’ schemes can not only contribute to improving calorific intakes but also help deliver more balanced and healthier diets. Careful attention must be given to how such a scheme would work in practice, building on experience to date with similar initiatives.
• Integrating the notion of sustainable food and inputs trade in the post-2020 global biodiversity framework can help to deliver more sustainable and healthier food and land use systems. This could be achieved by likeminded countries introducing a set of goals or targets aimed at mitigating the role of trade in placing indirect pressure on biodiversity, and to encourage trade in biodiversity-based products including natural ingredients produced ethically and following sustainability principles and criteria.
• An SDG-oriented agenda for agricultural trade is needed. It could be formed by countries seeking to remove perverse incentives, guaranteeing a safe harbour for market-correcting measures, clarifying existing rules and establishing plurilateral negotiations among subsets of the WTO membership, or sectoral approaches, to address specific challenges.
• Greenhouse gas emissions resulting from trade need to be addressed. Governments could seek to achieve this through ensuring the carbon neutrality of existing and new trade deals, either by connecting carbon markets among contracting parties or by developing joint initiatives to tax international maritime and air transport emissions.

The investment community is increasingly seeking to assess the alignment of their portfolios with the Paris Agreement. In a recent update to their Two Degrees of Separation report, Carbon Tracker assessed the capital expenditure of listed oil and gas producers against ‘well below’ 2C targets, and for the first time, against short-term actions at the project level.

The speaker will present the key findings of the report and will argue that every oil major is betting heavily against a low-carbon world by investing in projects that are contrary to the Paris goals.

This roundtable discussion will further explore the report findings and consider what investors, regulators and oil and gas companies can do to encourage alignment  with the Paris Agreement ahead of 2020.  

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

This closed-door roundtable explores possible strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific between now and 2024. Focusing on trade security, climate change disruptions and security cooperation, it aims to enhance the understanding of the regional goals of, and strategic relationships between, the key countries active in the region.

The workshop is part of a larger project funded by the Strategic Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defence. The project includes workshops in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India and the Pacific Islands (Tonga).

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

This half-day strategic workshop, organized by Chatham House and E3G, brought together key climate experts, policymakers and influential actors, especially in Europe, for a focused and facilitated discussion on the roles, risks and potentials of negative emissions technologies (NETs). 

An interactive scenario exercise will be conducted, drawing on a climate simulation tool developed by Climate Interactive, to consider the potential roles and risks of different NETs deployments to meet the Paris Agreement targets and to consider the international co-operation required to manage the pathway to net-zero emissions. Participants will explore the political opportunities, discuss different scenarios and risks and identify areas of interventions and collective action.

The meeting is part of a series of events being held at Chatham House as part of London Climate Action Week (LCAW).

In recent years, clean energy access for refugees and internally displaced people has emerged as a potential method of improving humanitarian outcomes and enabling self-reliance. While recent research emphasizes the need for more quantitative data to inform energy access interventions, better qualitative understanding would also improve innovation in this area.

This ethnographic study is the first of its kind to analyse energy access and resilience strategies deployed in two refugee camps, Kakuma in Kenya and Goudoubo in Burkina Faso. The stories of residents in these camps demonstrate the importance of considering everyday experiences of displaced people in developing sustainable humanitarian energy interventions.

This paper highlights the need for new methodological approaches to expand the evidence base for humanitarian energy interventions and policies. Future research could usefully inform humanitarian energy projects by examining the technical knowledge and existing practices of refugees in the design of energy technologies, systems and business models. Uptake and sustained use of new systems may be more likely where interventions build on or work in harmony with these factors.

In a new event in the Sustainable Transitions series, the speaker will present an update of Sino-Russian gas cooperation.

To give a comprehensive account of their impact on global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, he will discuss the following points:

• Gas is scheduled to start flowing from the Power of Siberia I (POS) on 2 December 2019. But what is the background of development of POS 1 and what is its current status and prospects? 
• What are the chances of exporting gas through the proposed Altai pipeline? Why is the Mongolia export route so significant? And how will it affect the Central Asian Republics and in particular Turkmenistan’s gas export to China? 
• What are the implications of both POS I and Altai gas via Mongolia route in the context of global LNG supply?
• What are the prospects for multilateral pipeline gas cooperation in northeast Asia?
• What are the implications for other Arctic onshore LNG supply, in particular, for Novatek's Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 1 and 2 to China on top of POS 1 and Altai gas?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

A ground-breaking research project from Chatham House, supported by The Power of Nutrition, is exploring the business case for tackling undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies and overnutrition. Companies across all sectors hold huge, transformative power to save countless lives and transform their own financial prospects. To act, they need more compelling evidence of the potential for targeted investments and strategies to promote better nutrition and create healthier, more productive workforces and consumers.

At this workshop, Chatham House will engage business decision-makers in a scenario exercise that explores different nutrition futures and their commercial prospects in each before examining what different strategies business can pursue to maximize future profitability through investments in nutrition.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Climate change and energy transition are re-shaping the extractive sectors, and the opportunities and risks they present for governments, companies and civil society. As the central governance standard in the extractives sector, the EITI has a critical role in supporting transparency in producer countries.

This workshop will bring together experts from the energy and extractives sectors, governance and transparency, and climate risk and financial disclosure initiatives to discuss the role of governance and transparency through the transition. It will consider the appropriate role for the EITI and potential entry points for policy and practice, and the potential for coordination with related transparency and disclosure initiatives. 

Please note attendance is by invitation only.

The UK will host the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) in November 2020 in Glasgow. In the run up, Chatham House is organizing a monthly briefing series targeted to:

• The diplomatic service based in London, in particular, staff of the London embassies who are reporting on climate change issues.
• Senior UK government civil servants, officials and politicians engaged in climate change.
• Academics, experts, business representatives and NGOs.

The first briefing in the series focuses on the results from COP25 held in Madrid in December 2019 and what this means for 2020.

This briefings series offer an opportunity to discuss, in an informal setting, the most pressing and complex climate issues of the day with UK and international government officials and experts.

To identify and promote collaborative opportunities for an inclusive and sustainable circular economy transition at the international level, a clearer understanding and discussions of the potential winners and losers of such a transition is needed. In short, a ‘win-win-win’ vision for the environment, people and the economy, needs to be built and credible pathways to achieving this vision.

This research workshop, organized by Chatham House and UNIDO, will build on previous and ongoing research by Chatham House, and others, to drive forward an inclusive circular economy agenda and promote a just transition from linear to circular economic models. Chatham House, in collaboration with partners, aims to provide a strong evidence base of the opportunities and trade-offs in this transition from linear to circular models by robustly analysing the political economies in key regions in the developing world and engaging with leading stakeholders from governments, international organizations, civil society and the business community.

Latin America is an important geographical region for the circular economy especially in view of the circular bioeconomy and the agenda around inclusiveness. Several countries are beginning to embrace the circular economy concept and related policies. This workshop will bring together circular economy leaders from policy, business and civil society across Latin American countries to identify and discuss challenges, large-scale positive sum opportunities, investment needs, existing alliances and the potential to scale up circular economy practices. The second day of the workshop includes site visits to various circular economy projects in Uruguay.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Mass human displacement crises like those in Syria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar do not dissipate within a year or two. The average age of a refugee camp globally is 18 and counting.

Meanwhile, the pressures on resources and services in neighbouring countries absorbing an influx of vulnerable people can be harsh. Imagine the overstressed schools and hospitals where intake has doubled in areas of Jordan and Lebanon, and the damage to ecosystems and elephant habitats where camps have sprung up in Bangladesh. 

The fallout from such crises is prompting new ways of working in the international humanitarian system. These recognize that short-term, emergency responses can jeopardize national development goals if maintained indefinitely. In most refugee camps for instance, each family cooks with wood in regions already suffering from deforestation.

Reliance on polluting trucks to bring in fuel and water is high. At the same time, developing countries – which host 80 per cent of the record 70.8 million people currently displaced by conflict – desperately need to address health, water, energy and housing needs for their own populations. Aid and welfare interventions directed only at refugees can provoke frustrations amongst the local community, damaging social cohesion and fostering political instability. 

The Global Compact on Refugees, affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly one year ago, aims at fairer responsibility-sharing amongst countries and equitable resourcing to host communities and refugees. The Global Refugee Forum (GRF) taking place 17–18 December in Geneva is the starting point for donor pledges and commitments. 

An opportunity for refugee-hosting countries

Among the GRF’s 6 focus themes is ‘Energy and Infrastructure’ – a new priority for humanitarian aid and finance. This covers energy, environment, water and sanitation, health, shelter and connectivity – services that are tightly interconnected. In October, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) also launched its first energy strategy, which ‘promotes the transition to clean, renewable energy at refugee camps and hosting sites’.

Given this impetus, alongside a growing international focus on speeding up Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) delivery, stabilizing migration and supporting climate resilience, more aid and soft credit for interlinked objectives will become available. Countries hosting refugees have an opportunity; how they approach it will determine the level of support they attract and how effectively it is deployed. 

Policy conditions are key to success

In a refugee situation, energy access is about much more than keeping warm or cooking food. It is also about connecting with loved ones across borders, safety at night, healthy births and making a living. Due to the lack of long-term funding, maintenance systems or government approvals, failed pilots to introduce for example, solar streetlighting or clean cookstoves, are the norm. 

To increase their durability and reach, projects need to harness local markets and support national development goals, especially those on access to modern energy for all (SDG 7), protecting ecosystems (SDG 15) and resilient human settlements (SDG 11). Several examples of these are emerging, each with valuable lessons to share. 

The policy environment, in particular, coordination between authorities, humanitarian agencies and private sector actors, can make or break a project. Beyond the basic conditions of adequate security and refugee acceptance, our research highlights three enabling factors:

First: government willingness to engage in long-term response and resilience coordination. Jordan is the most advanced in this with its three-year rolling Response Plan for the Syria Crisis whereby the government works with humanitarian agencies to integrate refugee welfare with national development needs.

Here, energy, water and housing needs are specified and have attracted funding. For example, in Irbid, Jordan where over 137,600 Syrian refugees live, the Norwegian Refugee Council, is expanding a programme under the Renewable Energy for Refugees (RE4R) initiative that applies energy efficiency and solar water heating to reduce bills and rents for refugee tenants while adding value for Jordanian homeowners.   

Second: strong, clear, energy and environment plans and legislation. Signals can be mixed. Jordan’s ‘wheeling’ regulation, allowed UNHCR to reduce its electricity bills through specially built solar plants at Azraq and Zaatari, yet the current freeze on renewable connections has stifled further projects.

In Rwanda,  the government banned the supply of woodfuel to refugee camps on the basis of concerns about deforestation. The announcement sharpens focus on cleaner cooking.

Yet with little guidance on enforcement and the timeframe for change, it is difficult for UNHCR and its partners to plan viable schemes. A reversion to stove and fuel handouts is likely, damaging the potential to create markets for alternative cooking practices in the camps. 

Third: local fuel prices. Where polluting fuels are subsidized or untaxed, additional subsidy is needed to make cleaner alternatives competitive. The higher prices of diesel in Uganda for example are an incentive for solar projects at Bidi Bidi, the world’s largest refugee settlement.

The Gaia Association-UNHCR clean energy programme in Ethiopia’s Western refugee camps has avoided burning some 10,000 tonnes of wood since 2006 through ethanol, but if  VAT (which is applied to neither charcoal nor kerosene) were waived, it could scale up commercially. 

Joining up the dots

Many humanitarian and government dots could be joined up in support of the SDGs. In Rwanda for example, clarity on electrification plans – which appear to cover refugee areas – could allow camp mini-grids to be designed for eventual grid integration. In Jordan, lessons learned from the home upgrading programme could be applied to meet city climate resilience ambitions. 

Donors at the GRF should support humanitarian operations that leave a positive legacy, increasing the robustness of country infrastructure and systems. Host-country governments should help define and encourage projects that benefit national and refugee populations. This will be critical to both development outcomes and limiting future human suffering. 

The circular economy minimises waste and keeps materials and products in circulation for as long as possible. It is increasingly regarded as a promising model for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the global climate goals of the Paris Agreement, as well as driving sustainable and resilient economic growth in both developed and emerging economies.

The financial industry has a key role to play in scaling up circular practices and ensure the transition from a linear to a circular model. Interest and action from policymakers, the financial industry, and other stakeholders towards financing the circular economy is already emerging in the form of thematic circular economy funds and innovative financial vehicles, as well as new investment criteria, guidance and standards.

However, as more activities around circular economy financing are emerging, questions that arise concern issues of common definitions and standards, consistency with green climate finance and development finance as well as distributive justice and good governance.

Specific questions to be discussed during this event include:

• What is the current circular economy finance landscape in terms of initiatives, definitions, criteria and guidance?
• What are the roles of public and private funding and blended finance in financing the circular economy?
• What lessons can be learned from green climate finance initiatives and ESG related factors and risks?  What types of financial products for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries are required?
• How can the finance industry support inclusive and just transitions to the circular economy?

This roundtable will bring together experts representing public and private finance and investment to discuss these questions and share best practise to forge pathways for joined up approach on circular economy finance.

The roundtable will build on previous and ongoing research by Chatham House and others, to drive forward a global and inclusive circular economy agenda.  

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The seventh annual meeting of the New Petroleum Producers Discussion Group brings together people from the group's member countries. The meeting includes an international discussion, a national seminar and a range of policy-relevant courses which have been specially tailored to the priorities of the group. This year’s international discussion focused on ‘Building Capacity and Institutions’.

The New Petroleum Producers Discussion Group was first established in 2012 and provides a unique forum which brings together governments from over 30 new and prospective oil and gas producers to share their ideas and experiences. The group is jointly coordinated by Chatham House, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI).

This event was hosted by the Ministry of Energy of Uganda.

This closed-door roundtable explores possible strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific between now and 2024.

Focusing on trade security, climate change disruptions and security cooperation, it aims to enhance the understanding of the regional goals of, and strategic relationships between, the key countries active in the region.

The workshop is part of a larger project funded by the Strategic Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defence.

The project includes workshops in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India and the Pacific Islands (Tonga).

December’s UN climate talks held in Madrid were aptly titled ‘Time for Action’. While little progress was made at the conference in establishing an international framework that would help to instigate this, there is still much scope for action in 2020. The need for this has become all too apparent as the impacts of climate change are increasingly seen around the world.

One of the key areas where progress can be made in 2020 is in increasing the ambition of nationally determined contributions (NDCs), these being governments’ plans to take action in response to climate change. To date, 184 countries have submitted NDCs, yet the commitments that have been made fall far short of what is needed to avert catastrophic climate change.

In 2020, however, many countries will be revising their NDCs, presenting an important opportunity to shift momentum; to date 79 countries have announced that they will be enhancing the ambition of their NDCs.

The forest sector is one area where more ambitious targets are likely to be set, and indeed, at the Climate Action Summit in September 2019, more than 20 countries made new commitments for the conservation, reforestation and restoration of their forests.

This will be essential. As is well documented, reducing deforestation is critical to reducing carbon emissions, while healthy and diverse forests are vital for adapting and increasing resilience to climate change.

However, while it is important that ambitious targets are set, this is relatively easy; the bigger challenge lies in ensuring that these are achievable.

This is all too apparent from experience thus far. In 2014, the New York Declaration on Forests set the goal to halve forest loss by 2020, and to end it by 2030. In addition, it included the goal to restore 150 million hectares of degraded landscapes and forestlands by 2020, and a further 200 million hectares by 2030.

The declaration has been endorsed by over 50 countries, as well as business and civil society organizations, yet the 2020 goals are far from being reached – in the six years since the declaration was launched, it has been found that forest loss increased rather than declined, and only about 27 million hectares of land have been restored.

What then is needed to ensure that the commitments being made by governments in their NDCs will actually be met? Three big changes are required.

Firstly, a shift in perspective is needed in many countries to a more forest-sensitive approach to development, one that gives adequate recognition to the full range of values provided by forests, rather than primarily focusing on their role as a global carbon sink. These include their importance for local and national economies, for livelihoods and the well-being of forest-dependent peoples, and for biodiversity and the regulation of local climate and water systems.

The focus on nature-based solutions at the international level offers potential to support this shift. However, it is critical that these are not seen as ‘niche’ approaches, and that countries identify what nature-based solutions mean for them, and how forests and tree-rich landscapes can best be integrated into their development strategies.

Fundamental to achieving this will be further improvements in governance, and this is the second change that is required. Legal and institutional reforms are needed in many countries as well as significant investments in human and technical resources. This will enable processes to be strengthened, or put in place, so that equitable strategies can be developed and implemented – strategies that reflect a balance of the needs and priorities of the full range of stakeholders, including local and global, rural and urban, women and men, young and old.

Financing will of course be critical for this, and the least developed countries in particular will be hindered in the actions they can take without additional finance. This is the third area of change that is needed, and it is to be hoped that the international community will make better progress on this in 2020. Forest and land-use options are often described as a cost-effective means of tackling climate change, as is noted in the Santiago Call for Action on Forests for example.

This is not to say that these will be easy or cheap – as Chatham House has documented, experience of forest governance reform has shown that it takes significant funding and time to bring about deep-rooted change. However, the huge potential benefits that can result, for the citizens of forest-rich countries as well as for the planet, mean that forests and sustainable land-use are a good investment.

The Forecasting Forum 2020 will present the latest thinking from the Chatham House Energy, Environment and Resources Department's senior research team on the dynamics that will affect fossil fuel and energy investments and markets in the year ahead.

14:00 - 14:30 | Introduction and Climate Risks Outlook 

In the last decade, following the financial crisis, the literature on systemic risks has grown. Systemic risks occur when complex, non-linear, interconnected systems fail, often through relatively small perturbations, as their impacts cascade and amplify across the system. Within this context, climate change is a 'threat multiplier' with the risks increasing in scale, frequency and magnitude. Just as complex systems can pass thresholds and tip from a functional state to a non-functional state, so can societies and people’s attitudes. Together risk cascades or systemic risks and attitudinal tipping points have the potential to rapidly change the way the world works. 

Professor Tim Benton will open the Forecasting Forum 2020 with reflections on what this might mean for the pace and linearity of the fossil fuel transition.

14:30 - 15:30 | Session 1: An Outlook on Oil Prices in 2020

In this session, Professor Paul Stevens will argue that the recent events associated with the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani have exacerbated the sensitivity of oil markets to political events and brought 'geopolitics' back into global oil prices. Up to 2014, geopolitics played a key role in determining oil prices in the paper markets where perceptions and expectations ruled. By 2014, the world was so oversupplied with real oil barrels that the oil price collapsed and little attention was given to geopolitical events as geopolitics became marginalized in the determination of crude oil prices. However, recent events in the Middle East suggest that prices will become increasingly volatile but, at the same time, benefit from a rising geopolitical premium.

15:45 - 16:45 | Session 2: An Outlook for Energy in 2020

Recent years have brought significant disruption to the European power sector. Not only are many of Europe’s major utilities restructuring their businesses in light of decarbonization and technological developments but Brexit has distracted - and detracted from - efforts to create more systemic energy linkages between the UK and the rest of Europe. During his presentation, Antony Froggatt will draw on his ongoing research to outline what he believes are the prevailing challenges and opportunities for the European power sector over the coming year while highlighting some of the most significant global trends.

Please note, attendance at this event is by invitation only.