The United Nations Security Council decided on 10 April to deploy a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) which will take over the mission of the African Union (MISCA), which itself succeeded the mission of the Economic Community of Central African States (MICOPAX).

The crisis that has been occurring in CAR is certainly the most dramatic in its history: more than 600 000 Central Africans are internally displaced or sought refuge in neighbouring countries; according to the United Nations, 1.7 million live in a constant situation of food insecurity and 878 000 need immediate medical assistance; Muslim communities are fleeing Bangui and the western region, subsistence economy no longer exists and the de facto partition of the country, caused by the sectarian violence, is gradually becoming a reality.

To stabilise the Central African Republic (CAR), the transitional government and its international partners need to prioritise, alongside security, action to fight corruption and trafficking of natural resources, as well as revive the economy.

Cameroon’s apparent stability belies the variety of internal and external pressures threatening the country’s future. Without social and political change, a weakened Cameroon could become another flashpoint in the region.

A new consensus and strategy are urgently needed to tackle the numerous, brutal armed groups in eastern Congo and to save the February 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) in the Great Lakes region.

The ever-decreasing likelihood of a free and fair presidential election is in growing conflict with a popular desire for change in Burundi. To safeguard the Arusha principles agreed in 2000 to end Burundi’s civil war, the opposition and President Nkurunziza in particular must return to the path of democracy and dialogue.

With the 2016 presidential elections approaching, tension in the Democratic Republic of Congo is increasing. President Kabila is nearing the end of his second term and political manoeuvring within the government to create conditions for a third term is mobilising popular opposition, testing the country’s fragile democratisation and stability. International pressure is now vital to find a peaceful way forward.

Alors qu’une tentative de coup d’Etat contre Pierre Nkurunziza, émanant de l’ex-chef d’état-major, Godefroid Niyombaré, est en cours au Burundi, Thierry Vircoulon chercheur à l'International Crisis Group, explique qui est le général putschiste et analyse, plus généralement, l'appareil sécuritaire du Burundi.

All is in place for a violent confrontation in Burundi. The failed coup on 13 May has intensified opposition to President Pierre Nkurunziza’s push for a third term in office. After ten years of peace, Burundi is in danger of reopening the fault lines that once led the country into civil war.

Since President Paul Biya came to power in 1982, Cameroon has been a sleepy regime with a soft and aging dictator, a nation all but forgotten in a remote corner of the African continent. This has dramatically changed with the spillover of Boko Haram from Nigeria into Cameroon in 2014 and its transformation into a regional threat. Now there is not a single day without reports of Boko Haram attacks in northern Cameroon. Even before it realized what it meant, the Cameroonian regime had become part of the fight against terrorism. After initially downplaying the problem, Cameroon’s leaders are now discovering the challenges and dangers of this new war. This rising, external threat sheds a new light on a forgotten country with a strategic position in Africa. The geography of Cameroon is both its blessing and its curse—a pivot between West and Central Africa, divided by language, culture, and history, its very existence depending on a regional stability so often beyond its grasp.

Tous les éléments d’une confrontation violente sont en place en Burundi. En observant les derniers développements, il semble que les éléments qui ont conduit par le passé à des massacres et à une longue guerre civile au début des années 1990 se remettent en place.

Le 20 août, Pierre Nkurunziza a été investi pour la troisième fois. Son investiture, annoncée le matin même, a eu lieu presque en catimini et les ambassadeurs européens et américains accrédités à Bujumbura étaient visiblement absents tout comme l’Union africaine. La multiplication des assassinats en août a conduit la présidence à organiser l’investiture à la sauvette.

Am 20. August 2015 legte Burundis Präsident Pierre Nkurunziza schnell und leise zum dritten Mal den Amtseid ab. Die Vereidigung war erst am selben Morgen angekündigt worden, und die in der Hauptstadt akkreditierten Botschafter aus Europa und den USA blieben ebenso demonstrativ fern wie die Vertreter der Afrikanischen Union. Mit Blick auf die Sicherheitslage und die hohe Zahl politischer Morde im August hatte man sich entschlossen, die Vereidigung rasch und ohne großes Aufheben durchzuziehen.

​Religious intolerance is a growing but seriously underestimated risk in Cameroon, both between and inside the major faiths. To halt the spread of violent extremism in the country, Cameroon needs to bring all sects into a new social compact and within the bounds of a charter for religious tolerance.

La imagen de Camerún como una isla de paz en medio de una región tumultuosa terminó en 2013, cuando la violencia de Boko Haram cruzó la frontera nigeriana. Este grupo está afiliado al llamado Estado Islámico o Daesh, e incluso se rebautizó como Estado Islámico de África Occidental a principios de este año. Pero la forma brutal de yihadismo africano que representa difícilmente se explica por el auge del Estado Islámico en Irak y Siria. De hecho, es en parte una consecuencia del cambiante panorama religioso africano, que afecta y no poco a Camerún.

The image of Cameroon as an island of peace amidst regional turmoil ended in 2013, when Boko Haram’s violence first crossed the Nigerian border. The militant group is affiliated with so-called Islamic State or Daesh, and even renamed itself Islamic State in West Africa earlier this year. But the brutal form of African jihadism it represents is hardly a result of the Islamic State’s rise in Iraq and Syria. In fact, it is in part a consequence of Africa’s changing religious landscape – not least in Cameroon.

L’image de havre de paix dans une région en proie aux conflits dont bénéficiait le Cameroun a volé en éclats depuis l’irruption de Boko Haram en 2013 au nord du pays. Ce mouvement, devenu l’Etat islamique en Afrique de l’Ouest en mars 2015, revendique son affiliation à Daech. Néanmoins, l’apparition brutale et sanglante de ce djihadisme africain est moins liée à l’essor de Daech en Irak et en Syrie qu’aux bouleversements du paysage religieux de l’Afrique en général et du Cameroun en particulier.

In Central African Republic, the conflict between armed groups is now compounded by a conflict between armed communities. The roadmap to end the crisis including elections late 2015 presents only a short-term answer and risks exacerbating existing tensions. The transitional authorities and their international partners must address crucial issues by implementing a comprehensive disarmament policy and reaffirming that Muslims belong within the nation.

En Centrafrique, la course aux élections qui prévoit des scrutins présidentiel et législatif avant la fin de l’année est aussi irréaliste que dangereuse. Alors que le plan initial de la transition a complètement déraillé, l’obstination des internationaux, et plus particulièrement de la France, à faire voter les Centrafricains à l’ombre des groupes armés, avec une administration territoriale squelettique et des haines inter-communautaires tenaces ressemble plus à une fuite en avant qu’à un processus de transition accompli.

The United States, France, and the United Nations are falling into an all too familiar trap in the Central African Republic (CAR) of financing transition elections before armed militias have been disarmed and their communal hold broken. Exclusionary and botched elections could trigger another wave of violence and deepen the crisis.

The deteriorating situation in Burundi is a perfect storm of much that undermines stability in Africa today — presidents seeking impunity and power through dubious new terms, authoritarian regimes muzzling opposition and independent media, regional rivalries stalemating efforts to bring peace and outside powers unwilling or unable to act.

Burundi is back in the spotlight of the world’s media and the agenda of the United Nations Security Council. As recently as two years ago, the country was considered a success story in peacebuilding circles, but now the news is firmly of a negative variety. The UN is trying to prevent a new civil war in a region still haunted by the Rwandan genocide. How did success so quickly turn to failure?

Ahead of Chad’s presidential election on 10 April popular discontent is rising amid a major economic crisis, growing intra-religious tensions and deadly Boko Haram attacks. The regime that portrays itself as spearheading the fight against regional jihadism could see all sorts of violent actors gain influence at home if it pursues exclusionary politics and denies its people a viable social contract.

The current political crisis has reopened the wounds of Burundi’s past. Hardliners now dominant in the government brutally stifle dissent, fuel ethnic hatred, and undermine the Arusha accord that framed Burundi’s peace for the past decade. The international community should push toward real dialogue, and prepare to intervene if violence escalates.

Le 1er juin dernier à Mugamba (province de Bururi), Pierre Nkurunziza a lancé un ultimatum. « Du haut d’une camionnette, micro à la main, sous très haute protection de l’armée et de la police », rapporte l’AFP, le président burundais a ordonné aux insurgés de cette commune du Sud du pays de déposer les armes dans les quinze jours : « Téléphonez à vos frères qui ont pris les armes, dites-leur que nous leur donnons quinze jours pour qu’ils y renoncent […] Quinze jours, pas plus. Dites-leur cela ». Hasard ou préméditation, la fin de cet ultimatum devrait coïncider avec la reprise prévue des discussions à Arusha, en Tanzanie, entre le gouvernement et l’opposition.

Burundi’s year-long crisis has not gone away. It started with President Pierre Nkurunziza’s determination to claim a third term, trampling over the constitutional arrangements that ended a decade-long civil war. Press freedom is a major casualty of the new strife; but the turmoil has also transformed the way in which Burundians get information. For better or worse, social media has filled the vacuum left by the shutting down of the most popular radio stations and forcing out of many of the country’s professional journalists.

Texas has become the first state to have its "alternate assessment aligned to modified academic-achievement standards" pass the U.S. Department of Education's peer-review process.

Test-based accountability has not generated the significant gains in student achievement that proponents intended, Helen F. Ladd contends.

States looking to renew NCLB waivers while they transition to new assessments ask to freeze school ratings in place for one year, the Education Department says.

Flawed achievement-gap targets in the state's NCLB flexibility waiver force a do-over and highlight complexities.

David Figlio and Eduwonkette discuss if today's testing and accountability policies accurately depict student performance and the size of the achievement

What should be included in a measure of school quality? If not by standardized test scores, how should we measure student achievement? Julian Vasquez Heilig and I each have some thoughts.

Federal law requires states to report student test scores in achievement levels, but leaders in the Golden State want to take a different approach.

A 10-year study by a blue-ribbon panel of scientists concludes that high-stakes testing and other accountability measures have largely failed to translate to real improvements in student achievement.

A 10-year study by a blue-ribbon panel of scientists concludes that high-stakes testing and other accountability measures have largely failed to translate to real improvements in student achievement.

Mostly, states are holding to a higher bar for student achievement than they did a decade ago. But Iowa, Texas, and Virginia continue to show large gaps between their state proficiency standards and NAEP's.

The Education Week Research Center looks at student scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress from 2003 to 2015, a period overlapping with the No Child Left Behind Act.

The U.S. Education Department says the states need more evidence to use the popular admissions test to measure high school achievement.

More than four years after the passage of ESSA, English-language-learner education policies across the country remain "disjointed and inaccessible," a new report concludes.

The U.S. tests its students more than most nations, but is the deluge of data providing the information schools need?

Helen Janc Malone introduces this week's blog theme, "accountability and assessment systems." She writes that at the heart of the current accountability debate is a fundamental question, What is the purpose of all the collected assessment data? Are they an end game or a starting point to educational

News.

If we continue to focus on student growth and improvement as learners, keep track of that progress, and watch its impact on standard test results, will we be able to know if what we are doing is helping students develop as learners and thinkers.

This article, published ahead of print on 28 July 2008, has been withdrawn by the authors. Although moderate synergy between P2-RANTES and C peptides can be observed with high statistical significance in cell fusion assays, this synergy was not able to be verified in HIV viral assays. The authors regret the overstatement of synergy and will revise the paper for publication at a later date.

Objectives. The aim of this study was to assess the safety of early oral switch (EOS) prior to 14 days for low-risk Staphylococcus aureus bacteremia (LR-SAB), which is the primary treatment strategy employed at our institution. Usually recommended therapy is 14 days of intravenous (IV) antibiotics.

Methods. All patients with SAB at our hospital were identified between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2018. Those meeting low-risk criteria (healthcare-associated, no evidence of deep infection or demonstrated involvement of prosthetic material, and no further positive blood cultures after 72-hours) were included in the study. The primary outcome was occurrence of a SAB-related complication within 90 days.

Results. There were 469 SAB episodes during the study period, 100 (21%) of whom met inclusion criteria. EOS was performed in 84 patients. In this group, line infection was the source in 79%, methicillin-susceptible S. aureus caused 95% of SABs and 74% of patients received IV flucloxacillin. The median duration of IV and oral antibiotics in the EOS group was 5 (IQR 4-6) and 10 days (IQR 9-14), respectively. Seventy-one percent of patients received flucloxacillin as their EOS agent. Overall, 86% of oral step-down therapy was with beta-lactams. One patient (1%) undergoing EOS had SAB relapse within 90 days. No deaths attributable to SAB occurred within 90 days.

Conclusions. In this low MRSA prevalence LR-SAB cohort, EOS was associated with a low incidence of SAB-related complications. This was achieved with oral beta-lactam therapy in most patients. Larger prospective studies are needed to confirm these findings.

Background: This study summarizes drug resistance analyses in 4 recent phase 2b trials of the respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) fusion inhibitor presatovir in naturally infected adults.

Methods: Adult hematopoietic cell transplant (HCT) recipients, lung transplant recipients, or hospitalized patients with naturally acquired, laboratory-confirmed RSV infection were enrolled in 4 randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled studies with study-specific presatovir dosing. Full-length RSV F sequences amplified from nasal swabs obtained at baseline and postbaseline were analyzed by population sequencing. Substitutions at RSV fusion inhibitor resistance-associated positions are reported.

Results: Genotypic analyses were performed on 233 presatovir-treated and 149 placebo-treated subjects. RSV F variant V127A was present in 8 subjects at baseline. Population sequencing detected treatment-emergent substitutions in 10/89 (11.2%) HCT recipients with upper and 6/29 (20.7%) with lower respiratory tract infection, 1/35 (2.9%) lung transplant recipients, and 1/80 (1.3%) hospitalized patients treated with presatovir; placebo-treated subjects had no emergent resistance-associated substitutions. Subjects with substitutions at resistance-associated positions had smaller decreases in viral load during treatment relative to those without, but similar clinical outcomes.

Conclusions: Subject population type and dosing regimen may have influenced RSV resistance development during presatovir treatment. Subjects with vs without genotypic resistance development had decreased virologic responses but comparable clinical outcomes.